

the Presidency in his place. Doubtless, this was the wiser course. The letter addressed to Lord Wellesley's private secretary, fully expressed the gratitude and admiration of the young civilian, who owed so much to the departing Governor-General :

CHARLES METCALFE TO MAJOR MERRICK SHAW.

" Muttra, June 20, 1805.

" DEAR SHAWE,—The intelligence of Lord Wellesley's intention to quit India has caused universal regret, and it would be very surprising if I were not afflicted by it.

" I should be very sorry that his Lordship should quit this country without receiving the humble assurance of my eternal thankfulness and gratitude; but the various acts of his goodness towards me have long filled my heart with sentiments which it would be vain for me to attempt to express.

" In common with every man who loves his country, and particularly with those who have watched the course of affairs, I must lament Lord Wellesley's resignation of the government at this moment, as a most grievous public misfortune, and however improbable it may be that his Lordship would be induced to remain under the confederacy of ignorance, ingratitude, and malice which has been formed against him by the majority of the Court of Directors, yet whilst there is a possibility of such a change in his Lordship's resolution, I cannot, and will not, relinquish the hope of it.

" In speaking of the Directors as I have done, I of course separate my father from those men with whom he happens in station to be associated. His opinions are widely different from theirs, and there is not in the United Kingdom, nor in India, nor in the world, a man who has a greater admiration of Lord Wellesley's talents and virtues, or a higher sense of



the vast advantages which our nation has derived from his administration.

“You well know that I must lament Lord Wellesley’s departure, from private and personal considerations. I have been so long used to look up to his Lordship’s approbation as the highest reward which I could receive, that in his departure I shall lose one great incitement to exertion; I trust that I shall always do my duty to my country, and prefer the public interests to any other. If I do not, I must lose sight of everything that I have learned in the Governor-General’s office. Yet, if ever I perform any services which may deserve to be approved, I shall regret that Lord Wellesley is not here to approve them, for his approbation would be more precious to me than that of any other Governor-General ever can be. His Lordship’s favor first distinguished me, brought me out of the beaten track of the service, and placed me in situations from which prospects of future eminence and success opened upon me. If ever these prospects are realised, I shall owe their fulfilment to Lord Wellesley, and I shall carry with me through life the firm conviction of an endless obligation.

“You may remember when I quitted Calcutta that I particularly requested Lord Wellesley’s permission to return to his family and office at the end of the campaign; the hope of doing so has been ever uppermost in my mind. When I received the melancholy news that his Lordship was preparing to quit India, I was more than ever anxious to proceed to Calcutta, in order that I might have the honor of paying my respects to him before his departure.

“When I was on the point of requesting Lord Lake’s permission to quit head-quarters, my intentions were checked by Colonel Malcolm’s expressing a wish that I should remain here, as he has the goodness to suppose that I might be useful.

“He tells me that I cannot better show my gratitude to Lord Wellesley than by assisting in scenes in which he will



ever feel an interest. If I could, indeed, flatter myself that I could be useful, or that the motives of my stay should meet with his Lordship's approbation, I should less feel the disappointment of not being able to pay my best respects in person. The expression, however, of a wish for me to remain, on the part of an officer in Colonel Malcolm's situation, I consider to be a public call. Under an officer with Colonel Malcolm's great knowledge and abilities, I expect to acquire information and experience which may hereafter enable me to perform useful public services.

"I have no favor to ask from his Lordship; the cup of his kindness has been already filled beyond my deserts.

"My last request is, that his Lordship will believe me to be bound to him by the most sincere gratitude and attachments. It would be presumptuous in me to pretend to offer my humble services to his Lordship, yet I should be favored if he would consider me as his devoted servant, ever anxious to receive, and eager to obey, his commands.

"All India will anxiously watch the future course of his Lordship's public life, and I hope that he will continue to guard the fate of India. I hope that his Lordship will long enjoy every happiness that he can wish, that he will soon overthrow all his enemies, and see the accomplishment of all his designs.

"I trust that I shall be excused if I have taken any improper liberty in writing this letter. I am, and can never cease to be, actuated by the greatest reverence for Lord W.'s character, and the most respectful attachment to his person.

"Wishing you, dear Shawe, a pleasant voyage and a happy life,

"I remain, yours sincerely,

"C. T. METCALFE."

This letter, which was very gratifying to Lord Wellesley, produced the following reply, under the hand of his private secretary :



## DEPARTURE OF LORD WELLESLEY.

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MAJOR MERRICK SHAWE TO CHARLES METCALFE.

"Calcutta, July 10, 1805.

"DEAR METCALFE,—In this season of hurry and packing up you will not expect from me so long a letter in reply to yours of the 20th of June as the subject of your letter merits. It will be sufficient to inform you that Lord Wellesley was extremely gratified by its contents. His Lordship has received it as a warm and unequivocal testimony of your attachment to him. The sentiments which the present state of affairs has excited in your mind do credit to your judgment and to your feelings, and as Lord Wellesley entertains a most favorable opinion of both, your expressions were highly satisfactory to him. Lord Wellesley is disposed to form the most favorable expectations of your future success from his opinion of your public zeal and talents, and I hope he is too good a judge to be disappointed. I beg leave to add my sincere good wishes, and the expression of my hopes that his expectations may be fulfilled.

"Lord Wellesley would have been very glad to see you previous to his departure, but he entirely approves your resolution to remain at your present post at this crisis.

"I trust that the state of affairs in Hindostan is rapidly advancing towards an advantageous and permanent settlement, and if your father could bite his brethren in Leadenhall-street, all would be well with respect to the future safety of this country.

"Believe me to be, ever yours sincerely,

"MERRICK SHAWE.

"Pray remember me to Cole, who will always do credit to Lord Howe's boys."

On the 20th of August, 1805, Lord Wellesley took his final departure from Calcutta, and in the beginning of January, 1806, he set foot again on English soil. Soon after his arrival he expressed a wish to





see Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, who called upon him, and received from the lips of the retired Governor-General an account of the talents and the disposition of his son, which might have gladdened any father's heart. It was the fortune of Lord Wellesley, as it was the fortune of another great Indian statesman, to be assailed and reviled, under the shelter of parliamentary privilege, by men who could not understand his measures or appreciate his character. Among the foremost of his defenders in the House of Commons was Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, who had done battle for him, too, in the Court of Directors, and being in the minority at the India House, had thereby sacrificed his chances of succeeding to the Chair. It was an honest and a manly defence, based upon sincere convictions, the result of much knowledge and experience, and it was not persevered in with less heartiness for the reflection that, whilst defending the character of an able statesman, he was serving the friend of his favorite son.



## CHAPTER VI.

[1805—1806.]

## THE "GREAT GAME" ENDED.

Arrival of Lord Cornwallis—His Policy—Necessities of an Exhausted Treasury—Charles Metcalfe's Views of the New System—Letters to Mr. Sherer—State of our Relations with Scindiah and Holkar—Advance to the Banks of the Hyphasis—Treaty with Holkar—Return of the Army—Metcalfe appointed to the Delhi Residency.

ON the 30th of July, 1805, Lord Cornwallis took upon himself a second time the office of Governor-General of India. He went out to extricate the country from political entanglements and financial embarrassments which had disquieted and alarmed the Home Government, and not without solid reason for their anxiety. The British power in the East had been for some time subjected to all the exhausting influences of a state of chronic warfare. No sooner had one campaign been brought to a close than we were continually finding ourselves at the outset of another. And whilst we were putting down our new enemies, our old ones, in spite of the most solemn engagements, were bracing themselves up to renew the contest. It seemed, indeed, without any hyperbole, to be a great national illustration of the old story of Hercules and the Hydra.



The East India Company were at this time essentially a Merchant-company. They were restrained by act of Parliament from wars and conquests, and from treaties with native princes likely to entangle us in wars and conquests. They desired, both upon principle and upon policy, to abstain from the extension of their empire; for they believed that there was only weakness in such extension, and that by seeking new fields of political enterprise we should neglect the good government of the old, and utterly sacrifice the Trade. It was not strange, therefore, that they should have viewed with the liveliest apprehension the recent great conquests in Central India; the treaties and the acquisitions that had attended them. We were rapidly becoming masters of the whole continent of India, in spite of the principles, and in spite of the policy, of the Company; and the Court of Directors, viewing the progress of these great events from a distance, could only see in this universal dominion the forerunner of universal prostration and decay. The gigantic military enterprises which we had undertaken had not only exhausted the treasury, they were forestalling the revenues of the country. The Government of British India, indeed, was fast approaching a state of bankruptcy; and in the eyes of a commercial company this was the most alarming contingency of all.

It is not to be doubted that our position in India at this time was beset with difficulties and dangers of no ordinary kind. It is not to be doubted that



those difficulties and dangers were only to be removed by the establishment of Peace. But they who attributed to Lord Wellesley a disinclination to Peace, were ignorant and unjust. His steadiest friends and warmest admirers were shaking their heads and saying amongst themselves that the "glorious little man" was losing heart—that he had become far too prone to compromises and concessions—that he was overlooking insults and offences which ought to be resented, and rewarding as friends or welcoming as associates men who deserved only the chastisement due to the most unscrupulous of our enemies. And, doubtless, they rightly estimated the deserts of the Mahratta chieftains. But wisdom wears one garb on the banks of the Jumna; another on the banks of the Hooghly; and another, it may be added, on the banks of the Thames. Neither the players of the "great game" in Lord Lake's camp, nor the merchant-statesmen in Leadenhall-street, whilst they set up theories of their own, both wise after their kind, took account of those practical impediments to War or Peace with which the Governor-General had to contend. They did not reflect that Peace at one time might be as difficult as War at another. They did not reflect—to use an expression the emphasis of which atones for its want of elegance—that it might happen that, in making War or in making Peace, Lord Wellesley "could not help himself." He was forced into War by Circumstances not to be controlled or resisted; and by Circumstances equally uncontrollable and





## THE "GREAT GAME" ENDED.

irresistible, he was compelled to make every effort, compromises and concessions included, to restore the country to peace.

In 1803 the conduct of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar rendered war inevitable; in 1804 the excesses of Holkar again compelled us to take the field; but in 1805, though we had still wrongs to redress, and insults to chastise, the exhausted state of the Company's treasury, and the host of evils which these wars had entailed upon the country, rendered it necessary that, even at some loss of national dignity, peace should be speedily restored. And when Lord Cornwallis arrived in India, the paramount object of Lord Wellesley's desires, the chief subject of his thoughts, and the main occasion of his labors, was the speedy re-establishment of Peace, and the restoration of the financial prosperity of the empire.

That Cornwallis, armed with specific instructions from home, having no parental interest in the condition of affairs that had arisen in Central India, and regarding the men to whom the conduct of our military and political affairs had been entrusted as mere abstractions, may have set about the work before him in a more resolute and uncompromising manner than if he had himself been concerned in the measures, and associated with the personal agency to which this state of things was in no small degree to be attributed, is hardly to be doubted. But the policy which he intended to pursue differed but little in its essential features from that which Wellesley himself would, at this time, have adopted.



The two statesmen were for some days both resident in Calcutta. During that interval, Sir George Barlow, who was the link between them, drew up an elaborate paper on our relations with the States of the North-West, in which past events were recited, and prospective measures were mapped out for the guidance of Lord Cornwallis. It was intended to embody the views of Lord Wellesley, as modified by the circumstances in which Government were then placed, and was submitted to him for approval. A single sentence, not affecting the general tenor of the document, was inserted by the retiring Governor-General, who then declared that it fairly represented his opinions. There was, indeed, but little antagonism between the sentiments of the two statesmen. Both recognised a necessity against which it was impossible to contend; but it fell to Cornwallis to commence the execution of those measures which, under other circumstances, neither might have willingly initiated, but which in the conjuncture that had then arisen, seemed equally inevitable to both.

It need hardly be said, that in Lord Lake's camp these measures were grievously unpopular. Every military and political officer on the banks of the Jumna cried out loudly against them. And Charles Metcalfe, earnest among the earnest in his disapprobation of the new system, or no-system which was now to be enforced, could hardly bring himself to believe that the Governor-General was not somewhat of a bigot, wedded indissolubly to his own theories, and utterly regardless of the opinions of



all the experienced practical men in the country. Before Lord Cornwallis had been more than a month in India, the young diplomatist entered into a critical examination of the venerable nobleman's conduct. The letters which he wrote at this time forcibly express not only his own views of North-Western Politics, but those of the Party to which he belonged :

CHARLES METCALFE TO J. W. SHERER.

"Camp, Muttra, August 31, 1805.

"MY DEAR SHERER,—Your silence has lasted very long. I have been particularly anxious to know your sentiments upon the change which the arrival of Lord Cornwallis has produced. It is very probable that I look upon things in a wrong light, but I confess my opinion is, that as far as I am able to see, all the acts of Lord Cornwallis since his arrival have been deficient in wisdom ; and I believe that it may prove to be a great misfortune that his Majesty's Ministers or the Imperial Directors should have selected for the government of this country a man of experience and knowledge. . . . Had the genius of our country led the choice to a man of judgment, who had not before been in India, he would certainly have applied for information to those persons who might be supposed the most capable of giving it, and, whatever might have been his decision, after he had collected his knowledge, it would, we may suppose, have been the result of unprejudiced deliberation.

"Lord Cornwallis's manner and substance of speech are precisely the same now as they were on the first day of his arrival. There is some immoveable notion in his head. Has Lord Cornwallis sought information from any man who was likely to give it? If he has not you will, I think, agree with me that he has been wanting in his duty, and that such self-sufficient importance may be injurious to the public interests. I should suppose that the persons whose opinions upon the political state



of India would be useful for the consideration of a Governor-General would be Lord Wellesley, Lord Lake, Sir G. Barlow, Lumsden, Edmonstone, Colonel Close, Colonel Malcolm, Mr. Webbe (if he had lived), Colonel Gerard, and Mercer (these two have had opportunities of acquiring great local knowledge, and have in person seen what the nature of our situation in Hindostan is, and what is the extent of difficulty and danger in pursuing one course, and may form a judgment of the probable effects of another). If these are not the persons whose opinions are to be estimated, the political management of India must have been wretchedly conducted for the last seven years. But Lord Cornwallis knows better than all these. Surely Lord C. might suppose that a great change having taken place since he was in the Government before, his knowledge of the present state of affairs might be improved by communications with others. 'No,' he says, 'I know best, and what I say must be right.'

"All our communications are, of course, most confidential, and I will mention one of Lord C.'s remarks, which shows his own character. He says, 'There is a general frenzy for conquest and victory even in those heads which I had believed to be the soundest.' Setting aside that this sweeping observation is false and unfounded, as the records of the Government will prove, let us observe the nature of it. He agrees that the wisdom or necessity of a particular course of policy, which he is pleased deliberately to term a frenzy, is strongly impressed upon those heads which he had believed to be the soundest. Respect for the judgment of those men would have led common characters to examine into the causes of such a prevailing conviction, and would have induced them to suspect that such an universal effect might have some good cause which it would be right to search for. But this man has a head so very sound, that the only thought that arises in his mind is that there is not a sound head in India. He proves either that he is no judge of heads, or that he disagrees with the soundest heads. I believe there is no soul who does not heartily wish for peace, but it





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## THE "GREAT GAME" ENDED.

would surely be unwise to purchase a temporary peace by concessions.

"I believe that affairs would be immediately settled with Scindiah if the armies were advanced; and I believe that Holkar could not survive long. They have had frequent disputes lately. A settlement with Holkar does not appear practicable until he is quite reduced; unless it is intended to grant him such concessions as shall establish him into a mighty power; and if this is done it will not be long before we repent of it. At one period he was very nearly extinguished. His junction with Scindiah has revived his power in a small degree; but he is very much reduced. It will be melancholy to see the work of our brave armies undone, and left to be done over again. I hope for the best from Lord C.'s administration; but I am, I confess, without confidence. It is surely unwise to fetter the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, and to stop all operations until his own arrival. We shall have Holkar near us in a few days. I wish you would send us money.

"Yours affectionately,

"C. T. METCALFE."

In the last words of this letter there was mighty significance—"I wish you would send us money." Unhappily, there was no money to send. This was the only circumstance that weakened the force of Charles Metcalfe's arguments. But it was a practical answer of such cogency and comprehensiveness, that it rendered all else superfluous. Sherer, who was then in the Finance department of the Administration, must have smiled sorrowfully at the utterance of such a wish in such a crisis.

In the abstract, as I have said, the young writer's arguments in favor of the forward movement of the



army are sound ; but there is an unconscious want of justice in some of the reflections on the character and conduct of Lord Cornwallis. During the short time that this venerable nobleman was capable of attending personally to the affairs of the empire, he exhibited a marked respect for the opinions of the eminent men with whom he was immediately associated—Barlow, Lumsden, and Edmonstone. With the first he had been in continual correspondence ever since he had quitted India in 1793 ; and, in the last, who, as Political Secretary, accompanied him on his fatal excursion to the Upper Provinces, he placed confidence without stint. These were his legitimate advisers, and they were his best ; for they were acquainted with the state of all the departments of Government, with all the springs and wires of that great complex machine. The time had not yet come for him to take counsel with Lake and Malcolm ; but he was on his way to the Upper Provinces to meet them. It was not their business to decide whether there should be Peace or War—but Peace or War once decided upon, how it was most expediently to be made. And on these points Lord Cornwallis determined that he could best take counsel with them on the spot.

Three weeks after the despatch of the above letter, the young diplomatist wrote in somewhat better spirits of the prospects before him. "The army," he said, "is ordered to assemble. *We want money only.* Holkar talks of visiting Delhi again. His motions have neither been active nor menacing as





yet. There is, I think, no prospect of Scindiah presuming actually to contend with us, if we are disposed to forgive him all his past sins; but I make no doubt that he will regulate his conduct in the way that will be suited best in his opinion to induce us to purchase his good-will by concessions; and I am sorry to say that the political conduct of our Government for the last year is likely to encourage a hope in him that an appearance of an intention to aid Holkar may succeed." And, doubtless, there was much truth in this. The recent bearing of Lord Wellesley towards Scindiah had been conciliatory in the extreme. Eager to avoid an open rupture, he had overlooked some grievous insults and offences, had accepted unsatisfactory explanations of indefensible acts, and by such concessions had plainly indicated to the restless chief that we were eager, almost at any cost, to restrain him from flinging himself into the arms of Holkar. When Lord Cornwallis arrived in India, he wrote to the Home Government, that he had found the Company at war with Holkar, and scarcely at peace with Scindiah. This, indeed, was the true condition of affairs. The latter chief was oscillating between the state of a treacherous, presumptuous ally, and an open, defiant enemy. I shall speak presently of his conduct more in detail. But first, it is desirable to show what was the position of Holkar at this time, and what the course we were pursuing towards him. Both may be gathered from the following letter, maintaining the arguments of the Lake-and-Malcolm school against his financial opponent:



" September 28, 1805.

" MY DEAR SHERER,— . . . I will go over in order the different parts of your letter, but I do not presume to answer them satisfactorily. In respect to the war with Holkar, a firm conviction of its unavoidable necessity has always superseded in my mind every question regarding its policy. Holkar's conduct and language evinced, I think, a firm determination to attack us or our allies. His restless and ambitious disposition made it certain that he would attack somebody, and that he would not disband his large army, which has been considerably increased by chiefs and troops, who had been compelled at the peace to quit the service of Scindiah and Bhoonsla, and the necessity of maintaining his army demanded that he should lead it to plunder somewhere. The most likely countries for him to attack, were those occupied in Hindostan by the British Government and its allies; for the Deccan was a scene of dreadful famine; Malwa was nearly as bad. He said that he would attack the British Government and its allies, and as many circumstances connected with the state of India rendered it probable, there was, I think, no cause to disbelieve him. The least that can be said is, that you had no security from him that he would not, and he would not even disguise his intentions. Under such circumstances, it appears to me that every preparation for a war with Holkar was absolutely necessary; that a war was to be expected—indeed, not to be avoided; and the only question was whether it was wise to make it offensive or defensive.

" A defensive system necessarily included the defence of our allies. In these were included Scindiah's state and the Jypore, Macherry, and Bhurtpore countries. These smaller alliances are alluded to in another part of your letter, and will be considered in their turn. The defence of these alliances under Holkar's menacing situation, required that another force should be maintained in Malwa for the defence of Scindiah's possessions. Thus far, an offensive and defensive system would



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agree, but it remains to be determined whether it was wiser to halt in that position, or to convert the military force which would be necessarily assembled for defensive purposes against Holkar, into the instruments of reducing his power and resources, dispersing his large army, destroying the impression of fear which was attached to the sound of his name, encouraging our allies, dispiriting our enemies, and compelling Holkar to lower his lofty projects. I prefer the offensive system, and my reasons are these. It afforded a better prospect of rendering the war short; it tended to confirm the impression of our energy and power, and to show that the much-dreaded Holkar was no object of fear to us; it gave a more probable chance of reducing Holkar to moderate views than would have been given to defensive measures; the destruction of Holkar entirely might be expected. A defensive system incurs nearly the same expense, by requiring the same armies to be maintained completely equipped in the field; it would be more difficult to defend countries from the predatory incursions of horse, than it would be to strike an effectual blow at the heart of Holkar's power by an attack upon his artillery and country; a defensive system was not so well suited to the superior character which it was the policy of the British Government to maintain. Measures of defence only might prolong the war to a very distant period, might encourage all adventurers to join Holkar, and thereby increase the difficulties of defence and the number of enemies; and if, as I firmly believe would have been the case, we should have proved inadequate to the complete performance of our promises of protection, our protection would be slighted, our influence and power diminished, our character, upon which we stand as a firm rock, disgraced; and the influence, power, and character of our enemy proportionately increased. We have now come as far as the determination to carry on offensive hostilities, and here I will stop.

"The conduct of war is a separate question from its policy. It does not follow that it was unwise because it was unfortunate in its course. A different conduct would have prevented the



evils which happened. This, too, is a question upon which I shall trouble you with my notions in some future epistle. I must also postpone my intention of going at length into the other observations of your letter. With respect to the alliances with the petty states, I shall observe *en passant* (as old Gil used to say), that in my opinion they might be made highly advantageous. These states in Hindostan, under our protection, would form an excellent frontier to our North-Western possessions, by throwing back the Mahrattas to a great distance from our fertile provinces. The countries of these states are not in themselves so tempting as our territories are, and incursions into them would not be made perhaps without designs upon our country. Such a frontier, extending in most places above 100 miles, would be very great strength to us. I do not see the same inconvenience which you do of interference in their broils; I am more inclined to believe that the effect of our established influence would put an end to all their broils, and diffuse universal tranquillity; and if this system is not destroyed, I look forward in sanguine hope to this blessed end, the inestimable gift of Great Britain to India, and the proudest monument of our glory.

“With respect to the irruptions of the Sikhs and northern hordes, they are not, I think, to be expected except in a case like the present, when we are engaged in a harassing war in India. The North-Western countries are an impassable barrier, a dry, sandy desert; the territory through which the Sikhs advance is a short space easily defended. Unless the Tartars come tumbling from the hills, we may be tranquil on our northern frontier. The inhabitants of these provinces may be governed, I think, without difficulty; they appear to me to lament the existence of war as much as men can do. Even the Rohillas can be tamed, and I trust will be. The expected advantages from the small alliances have never yet been realised; they are still in prospect; perhaps the new Government will abandon them; and there is an end of my vision. I am ashamed to express my opinions, when they are opposite to



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yours, in so useless a way; but I am not able to enter largely on all subjects to-day, for which you cannot, I think, be sorry; if you have not had enough, I will say more at another time.

"Let us now take one look at the present situation of affairs. Holkar and Meer Khan have advanced to our country west of Delhi, *i. e.* the districts of Kamoon, Narnal, Reeraree, &c., where there is at present no force to meet them. That they would do this was not unforeseen, and in the month of July Lord Lake sent a proposal to Government to station a very considerable force in those districts, in order to prevent the approach of the enemy by that route. Lord Cornwallis received this letter, never replied to it, but, when he put himself into his boat, issued orders to Lord Lake to prohibit his advancing any detachments or making any other movements until his arrival on the Jumna. At the same time, and since, repeatedly was stated the want of money; no means were taken to supply the army; it is true that twenty lakhs were sent up from Calcutta, but it was well known that a certain time was required for it to reach Muttra, and some measures of raising money, which would not have been difficult in these provinces, ought surely to have been adopted. None were; and now Lord Lake cannot move, with the enemy in our country. Every exertion is now made to get money, and we shall get enough in a few days to set us off with some force; but in consequence of this misconduct, there will, perhaps, be once more an important risk.

"There is a misery in seeing evils which might easily have been prevented, which sometimes makes me wish myself out of the busy scene.

"My father informs me that he lost the situation of Deputy-Chairman this year because the majority of the Directors did not choose to join the active friend of Lord Wellesley to Mr. Grant (Chairman), his inveterate enemy. My father expresses his happiness at the conduct which he has pursued throughout and everywhere with regard to Lord W. I am very happy at it; and there is so violent a current against his administration,



and such a desertion on the part of those who might have been expected to defend him, that I am disposed to believe that Lord W. will be well pleased with my father's support.

"I have taken up a great deal of your time. Who is to be Accountant-General? God bless you, my dear Sherer; remember me to Bayley, Fagan, and all friends.

"Believe me, ever your affectionate friend,

"C. T. METCALFE."

This letter was written from Muttra. A division of Lord Lake's army had been awaiting there the breaking up of the Monsoon. The commencement of such further operations, as in those days of ministerial change might be sanctioned by the Supreme Government, could not be entered upon until the end of the rainy season, and that looked-for time had now arrived. The difficulties which met us at every turn had not diminished since our armies were last in the field. Neither our arms nor our diplomacy had achieved more than temporary successes. We had entered into treaties of everlasting friendship only to see them violated in a few months, and we had utterly broken and dispersed the armies of our enemies only to see them reunited and reorganised within a still smaller space of time. The treachery of the Mahratta chiefs was as remarkable as their elasticity. We could not bind by the most solemn engagements men who were without faith and without shame; and we could not break down a power that presented to us no fixed and permanent point of attack, that dissolved itself before us when danger threatened, and then by that rapid process of reintegration which is unknown to regular armies, ap-





peared again in another part of the country, little weakened by the reverses it had sustained.

The treaty into which we had entered with Dowlut Rao Scindiah was distinguished by the moderate character of the terms we had imposed upon him, and it was believed that after the proof we had afforded of our military prowess he would recognise the expediency of observing it. But wrought upon, as I have already said, by an infamous minister, he had been guilty of repeated violations of the treaty, and shown a disposition to co-operate with any state but the one he had pledged himself to assist. Instead of aiding us to control the excesses of Holkar, he had exerted himself to encourage them. He received with favor the agent of that chief. He publicly corresponded with Ameer Khan, and even bethought himself of taking into his service the mercenary Rohilla—one of the most implacable of our enemies as he was, and the levies under his command. He impeded our letter-carriers and couriers. He enlisted large bodies of Pindarrees, and plundered the border country of the Peishwah. He kept himself in a warlike attitude in the field—now appearing in one place, now in another, and, in spite of repeated promises to return to his capital, continued by these threatening movements to encourage our enemies and to unbinge the resolution of our friends. And there was very little doubt in the mind of the British Resident that he was prepared to unite himself openly with Holkar, and take the field against us in the event of a protracted contest with that chief.



In vain did Mr. Jenkins,\* then a young man of high promise—one of those early statesmen who, reared in the great political hothouse of Lord Wellesley's office, had anticipated the ripening action of time—protest against these violations of the treaty, these palpable indications of a hostile spirit, at the Court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. In vain did he demand the dismissal of the unprincipled minister who had been the real mover of all these acts of hostility. Feeble and infatuated, the Mahratta chief made promises which he had not the courage to fulfil, whilst his minister, emboldened by impunity, proceeded to new acts of outrage, and at last instigated a body of Pindarrees to attack the camp of the British Resident. Redress was promised, but was not given. The evil influence of Ghautka was paramount at Scindiah's Court. Everything was tending rapidly to a crisis when it was precipitated by the determination of the misguided chief, in spite of the treaty which bound him to abstain from all such measures, to march down upon Saugor, in the Peishwah's dominions, and to recruit his exhausted treasury by levying contributions upon it. This was tantamount to a declaration of hostility, and Mr. Jenkins, therefore, believing that the national honor would be compromised by his longer continuance at Scindiah's Court, announced his intention of withdrawing the Mission. But Scindiah, apprehending that as the departure of Colonel Collins had been attended with such disastrous results,

\* Mr. Jenkins, upon the death of Mr. Webbe, had succeeded that gentleman as Resident at Scindiah's Court.





similar acts of retribution might follow the departure of Mr. Jenkins, forbade the British minister to quit the Mahratta camp.

This was in the spring of 1805. Holkar, it was supposed, was then at his last gasp. This, in some measure, seemed to lessen the difficulties of our position; but it caused a curious state of doubt and incertitude as to the future to arise in the Calcutta Council Chamber. Whether in this conjuncture we should endeavor to propitiate Scindiah or Holkar, sacrificing the other to our just vengeance, was the question that now divided the councils of the Supreme Government. Sir George Barlow proposed that we should enter into a treaty, offensive and defensive, with Holkar; that the two armies, jointly or separately, should attack Scindiah at all vulnerable points; and that, having conquered him, we should hand over to Holkar as much of his territory as might be coveted by that chief. Lord Wellesley, on the other hand, conceived that it would be expedient to reason with Scindiah on the impropriety of his conduct; to send a British minister of high rank to his court; to enter into a new alliance with him; and to deliver over to him part of the territories of Holkar. The conduct of the two chiefs had justified the adoption of either course. It was a mere question of expediency whether Scindiah or Holkar should be the immediate victim of our righteous displeasure.

The opinions of the Governor-General were necessarily those which shaped the subsequent measures of Government. Every possible precaution was taken to avoid an open rupture with Dowlut Rao



Scindiah; every possible effort was made to conciliate the offending chief. He was told that his explanations were accepted; that he would not be called upon to make any restitution for the Residency property that he had plundered; that Colonel Malcolm or Mr. Mercer (or both), the highest political officers in the country, would be sent to his Court to aid him in settling his government, and to deliver over to him portions of Holkar's territory; and that it was not the intention of the British Government to commit any act of hostility whatever against his Highness's troops and possessions.\* But in spite of these pacific demonstrations, and in spite of Scindiah's promises, the spring passed away, and the summer passed away, and still Jenkins was not released.

Lord Wellesley, who, in the month of May, had been made aware of the fact not only that his reign was nearly at an end, but that Lord Cornwallis was to be his successor, would, under any circumstances, have hesitated to commit the new Governor-General to important measures which the latter might be unwilling to carry out to their conclusion. But it was the season when active operations are for the most part suspended—when warlike movements on a large scale are difficult, if not impossible—and, therefore, partly of necessity and partly of design, the settlement of our uncertain relations with Scindiah was postponed; whilst Lord Lake's army was cantoned among the ruined mausolea and de-

\* MS. Memoranda of Lord Wellesley. Letter of Governor-General to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, May 26, 1805.—[MS. Records.]



THE "GREAT GAME" ENDED.

caying palaces of Muttra, Agra, and Secundra. But in the month of July, when the war-season approached, Lord Lake, from the first of these three places, addressed a letter to Scindiah, calling upon him to release the British Resident, and to afford him safe conduct to our camp, or to be prepared on the breaking up of the Monsoon to see the British army advancing against him. This language from one who had shown that words from him were speedily followed by blows, produced the desired effect. Scindiah had begun to discern that more was to be gained from the friendship than from the enmity of the British Government; and so Mr. Jenkins was released, and sent in safety to the British frontier.

In the mean while, Holkar, who had lost none of his old energy or his old elasticity, was recovering from the effects of his late discomfiture. He had, indeed, nothing more to lose. He was reduced to the state of a mere soldier of fortune; and carried, as he said, all his possessions on the saddle of his horse. But that dominion of the saddle was still formidable. It was in the very nature of things that Upper India should be swarming with desperate adventurers—the scattered fragments of all the armies we had beaten in the field—eager to reunite again under some common standard. So it was not long before Holkar, attended by Ameer Khan as his lieutenant, had raised a considerable army, and collected a large number of guns. With these he marched towards the Sutlej. He had opened a correspondence with the Sikh chiefs, and he believed



that they would unite themselves with him. It was a combination which promised great results; and already the turbulent Mahratta saw himself at the head of an immense body of predatory horse, streaming from the country of the five countries, plundering the fairest regions of Northern India, and carrying everything before him in his desolating career.

But these visions were destined soon to yield to the pressure of waking realities of a far more sombre complexion. Holkar had men with arms and horses; and he had an imposing train of artillery,\* but he had no money to subsist them. He was even poorer than we were ourselves; and we were in a melancholy state of pecuniary destitution. Wherever he went, his poverty compelled him to make enemies for himself, by demanding money or plundering the country. In the Cis-Sutlej Sikh States he exerted himself especially to obtain the assistance of the Rajah of Puteeah, from whom he demanded two lakhs of rupees; but by this time, Lake had set his divisions in motion. General Dowdeswell, with a force of all arms, was ordered forward to Saharunpore, from which advanced position he could defend the Doab, and open communications with the Sikh chiefs. With Dowdeswell's division went Charles Metcalfe, as Political Agent. The service was the same as that which he had rendered in the spring of the year with the division of General Smith, that had gone in pursuit of Ameer Khan

\* It was that, indeed, and nothing more. I believe that it was a mere imposition, for most of the guns were unserviceable.



THE "GREAT GAME" ENDED.

into Rohileund; and the position, which was one of independence and responsibility, was peculiarly pleasing to him.\*

There was fine weather, a fine country, an exciting adventure, and plenty of work. Young Metcalfe was in good health and good spirits. It was his business now to conduct, in the General's name, an important correspondence with the Sikh chiefs; to detach them from an alliance with Holkar, if they had formed one; and to deter them if they had not. Of these the Rajah of Puteealah was the most important. The letter which Metcalfe addressed to him, with the Rajah's answer, may be given in translation, as an illustration of the work in which the young diplomatist was engaged, and a not unamusing specimen of the diplomatic correspondence of the East:

TO RAJAH SAHIB SINGH OF PUTEELAH.

"I have heard of your many good qualities, and have become anxious for your acquaintance. The reports of your enemies state that you have joined the cause of Holkar, and have consequently placed yourself in the situation of an enemy to the British Government. I cannot believe that you would act in a manner so adverse to your true interests.

"The power of the British Government is known to the whole world. It is terrible to its enemies and a sure protection

\* Sir Theophilus Metcalfe called this "nursing King's officers;" and in his letters to his son rather made light of the employment. But it was, and has been ever since, the most important duty that can be entrusted to a young man of ability acquainted with the languages, the habits, and the political condition of the people

in whose country our armies are moving. These "nurses" have since come to be called "politicals." Half a century ago, when Charles Metcalfe "nursed" Generals Smith and Dowdeswell, the employment was a new one. He was, indeed, almost the first of the race.



CSL

## LETTER TO SAHIB SINGH.

to its friends. Holkar is a fugitive, and has fled from Hindostan to the country of the Sikhs, from dread of the British troops. Wherever he goes he brings destruction on those who assist him. Whilst he remains in your country, he destroys your crops and plunders the inhabitants. It is not consistent with your famed wisdom to associate yourself with such a man. Convinced that the reports which I have heard are false, I write to you, in a friendly manner, to inform you that I am advancing with a large army of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and that I shall in three or four days arrive at the banks of the Jumna. If you act openly against the enemy, you may depend upon assistance from the British Government. The Government regards the Sikh chiefs as friends, and has no intention of interfering in their concerns. Its sole object is to defeat the hostile designs of Holkar. Whoever joins the desperate fortunes of that freebooter must expect to draw upon himself the vengeance of the British Government; and whoever acts against him will be rewarded with great kindness. Attack the enemy, and your interests will undoubtedly be promoted. If you have any communications to make, I shall be happy to receive a confidential person from you. Make me happy by the transmission of friendly letters, with accounts of your welfare."

FROM RAJAH SAHIB SINGH TO MAJOR-GENERAL  
DOWDESWELL.

[*"Despatched at night immediately on the receipt of your letter."*]

[After compliments]—"I have had the honor of receiving your friendly letter. . . . I have derived great happiness, confidence, and satisfaction from the perusal of it. The case is, that since the bright sun of British rule has enlightened the countries of Hindostan, I have sincerely and faithfully fulfilled the duties of submission and attachment to the Government, and have preserved the relations of friendship and good-will with its officers, with whom I have always held, and now hold, a friendly correspondence.





## THE "GREAT GAME" ENDED.

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"In no instance has our friendship been interrupted. God is my witness! From the time when my heart first received the impression of attachments to the Government, the impression has always increased, and is not to be erased.

"When Holkar, suddenly flying with fear from the victorious armies of the British Government, brought his ill-boding train into the country, and sought my assistance and alliance, preserving in its purity my faith and friendship to the British Government, I paid no attention to him whatever. When the plundering oppressor fixed his camp of wretchedness between Putealah and Syfabad, it was suggested to me that my enemies would perhaps join him and procure success to their designs, and I was persuaded that the necessity of the time made it advisable to keep up an outward intercourse with him. From necessity I submitted to one or two conferences. Still, however, notwithstanding my apparent good-will, the rascal did not refrain from plundering and destroying my country, which he has made a desert. I at one time hoped by his means to punish my enemies; but this, also, was not brought about. The wretch, whose profession and livelihood is plunder, has marched to plunder towards the Sutlej. I have no asylum but in the British Government, to which I shall ever look up. From it I shall always, I know, derive protection and prosperity. I feel great confidence from your near approach. May it be propitious. I have answered your kind letter in haste. I shall immediately despatch a person in my confidence."

The sincerity of all this may be doubted. Had Holkar's prospect of success appeared, in the eyes of the Sikh chiefs, to have sufficient encouragement in it, it is not improbable that they would have united themselves with that desperate freebooter, and taken part in the proposed incursion. But the Mahratta appeared before them as a fugitive and a mendicant. The British troops were pressing for-



ward in pursuit of him. On both banks of the Sutlej the Sikhs regarded our advance with lively apprehensions, and were eager to see the battalions, both of Holkar and the Feringhees, on their way back to Central India. Both armies, before the close of the year, were encamped in the Punjab. On the 9th of December the British army was posted on the banks of the Hyphasis, opposite to Rajpoot Ghaut, and were gladdened by the sight of the noble scenery which opened out bewitchingly before them.\* Holkar had marched to Umritsur, and taken up his position there, in the heart of the Sikh country, relying upon assistance that was never afforded to him. The promptitude of Lake's advance had cut off from the fugitive Mahratta all hopes of such coadjutancy. Thus, feeble and alone, he saw that resistance was useless. There was nothing, indeed, left for him but to obtain the friendly offices of the Sikhs to bring about an amicable arrangement with the dominant state which he had so injured and insulted. It was whilst affairs were in this condition, the army still halting upon the banks of the classic river, that Charles Metcalfe wrote the following letter :

\* See Thorn's History of the Mahratta War. "In the extreme distance from north to east arose the snowy ridge of old Imaus. . . . The fleecy softness of its faint and irregular outline appeared to great advantage, in resting upon immense masses of nearer elevations, whose rocky eminences in chaotic confusion were most beautifully contrasted with pine-clad hills, still closer to the view, and these

again relieved to the eye by the prospect of a fine undulating country of hill and dale, covered with luxurious vegetation, and enlivened by numerous villages, temples, and ruins to the extent of thirty miles, bounded by the noble river which, flowing in majestic grandeur immediately before us, brought to our recollection that we were standing as it were on classic ground."





## THE "GREAT GAME" ENDED.

TO J. W. SHERER.

"Camp, Rajpoot-Ghaut, on the Berah or Hyphasis,  
December 18, 1805.

"MY DEAR SHERER,—I sent off yesterday a letter to our friend Bayley, to which, in order to avoid repetition, I refer you for an account of myself and my movements since I last wrote. From it you will perceive that I am exceedingly happy in my present situation, and wish nothing more than to remain in it. I see much novelty and variety, and my spirits are kept alive by the change. I was with General Dowdeswell's division of the army when I received yours of the 22nd October. I have taken my leave of the subject of Lord Cornwallis. Whatever may be my opinion of his designs, let it rest. I do not wish to assail his respected and respectable memory. His successor appears to have no fixed principles. His professed object is—and it must be granted that it would have been arduous if not impeachable for him to have entertained any other—to follow the plans of Lord Cornwallis; but he commenced his government with a modification of them which appeared to me to be wise, and to constitute an honorable system of administration, adapted to the state of affairs, calculated to promote the interest of our country, agreeable to the supposed policy of our rulers, reconcileable to Sir G. B.'s former conduct, and to the measures which had his full concurrence, and not deficient in spirit. Under this view of his outset, combined with my opinion of his knowledge of all our internal and external affairs, his integrity, and general character, I congratulated myself on the prospect of a just, honorable, prudent, and economical administration.

"Since my return to head-quarters a great change has taken place in my sentiments from the perusal of the Governor-General's despatches and instructions. There is a character pervading them which promises weakness and indecision, disgrace without recompense, treaties without security, the name of peace without tranquillity, and imaginary economy without



saving, the loss of power, influence, and character—in a word, the speedy renewal of universal disturbance and extensive war. This is all idle rant to you, whilst I cannot enter into a minute discussion of these *horrible* designs. One shocking proposition is, that we shall derive security from the dissensions of our neighbours; and a still more shocking system is founded upon it, which is intended, and must tend, to revive in Hindostan, in the Mahratta Empire, and on every quarter of our extensive frontier, all those quarrels, wars, and disturbances and depredations which are now nearly entirely crushed, and which might be for ever, I think, suppressed with much less difficulty than we shall be able to keep out of them when raised, and to preserve ourselves from the bad effects of their influence.

“Two objects I consider to be necessary for the security of tranquillity to us in Hindostan:—The reduction of Holkar to a state of impotence from which he shall not be able to raise himself (his destruction would be most desirable), and the maintenance of our alliances and paramount influence with the petty states of Hindostan. The latter question I have lately looked at more particularly than I before did, and every day increases in my mind the importance of those alliances. I know that you think differently. If you come up to Hindostan I should not despair of an alteration in your sentiments.

“I am much—very much obliged to you for your careful transmission of the pictures. I long to see them. The youngest of the boys has been dead it is now one year and a half.\* He was called and taught to believe himself my favorite. The revival of his cherub features to my sight will be a melancholy pleasure. The enclosed is from Hufeez to his father, and he wishes it to be given without delay, as it contains an order on my agents for cash.

“On looking over my letter, I cannot help laughing at the positive and unsatisfactory manner in which I have given an opinion of the politics of our new Governor. In fact, whilst

\* Henry Metcalfe, his youngest brother, died at school from the effects of an attack of measles.





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## THE "GREAT GAME" ENDED.

the measures which I hate are in agitation, I am anxious and warm; let them be once executed, and I shall resign myself with patience and silence.

"Mention to me any new works of note that have appeared lately. I rejoice at Tucker's appointment on public grounds.\* I hope that it does not interfere with your private prospects.

"I go on here as well as I wish. I have not been much troubled with business lately. What I do is under Malcolm, with whom I have always been on very good terms. I have not, however, any particular intimacy with him; and prefer to consider myself as distinct from his establishment. Cole has been ill, and is not yet strong. Few have withstood the late sickly season; I have, and I thank God for, the enjoyment of uninterrupted health and increasing strength.

"I am, my dear Sherer,

"Yours very affectionately,

"C. T. METCALFE."

On the day after this letter was written, an agent from the Lahore Government appeared in our camp charged with the office of mediator between Holkar and the British Government. On the following day arrived an emissary from Holkar himself to negotiate the terms of a treaty of Peace. There was no difficulty now in arranging a settlement of affairs. The Indian Government, under peremptory instructions from home, and utterly unable in the embarrassed state of their finances to prosecute another great war, were compelled to pacificate upon terms which, under other circumstances, they might have

\* The appointment to the Accountant-Generalship of Henry St. George Tucker, whom, as the ablest financier in India, Sir G. Barlow had induced to leave the house of business with

which he had connected himself, in order that, in the great crisis that had arisen, he might assume the direction of our pecuniary affairs.



regarded as derogatory to the character of a great nation. Concessions were made to Holkar which the Commander-in-Chief, and all his staff on the banks of the Hyphasis, declared to be disgraceful; but which the Governor-General\* at Allahabad and the Accountant-General at Calcutta believed to be necessitated by the pressing exigencies of the times. At the same time, Scindiah, whose agent had been for some while in our camp, reaped his share of the benefits arising from the conciliatory spirit of the British Government. A treaty of peace was concluded with that Prince, by which most of the advantages conceded by the old treaty of Surjee Argenjaum, made by Arthur Wellesley, were secured to him, in addition to a pension of four lakhs of rupees; and he on his part undertook to grant an indemnification for the losses sustained by the British Resident, and engaged to dismiss the unprincipled Minister, Ghautka, who had been the real mover of all the outrages against the British Government, for ever from his councils. This treaty, the terms of which were subsequently rendered still more favorable to Scindiah, was ratified under a royal salute on Christmas-day. What Charles Metcalfe thought upon the subject will presently be seen.

In the mean while, Holkar's agent had returned to his master to take counsel with him relative to the terms offered by the British, and not until the beginning of the new year did he present himself

\* Sir George Barlow, who, on the death of Lord Cornwallis early in October, had succeeded as provisional

Governor-General to the chief seat in the Administration.





again in our camp. Then it appeared that Holkar was inclined to presume upon the pacific spirit of his adversaries, and to obtain better terms, if he could. But Lord Lake was not to be frightened or to be cajoled into further concessions. He declared that if the treaty were not signed within three days, he would at once cross the river, and move upon Holkar's camp. This threat had the desired effect. And on the 7th of January a treaty which restored large possessions to the man who, a little time before, had declared that he could carry his all on his saddle, was ratified with all due ceremony in the presence of several of the Sikh chiefs.

On the following day, attended by an escort of two battalions of sepoy, Charles Metcalfe, under instructions from Lord Lake, set out for the Maharratta camp. The visit of friendship was intended to give assurance to Holkar's people, who, weary of a war from which they derived but little, either in the shape of plunder or the shape of pay, could hardly bring themselves to believe that the peace they desired was at hand. He was received in full Durbar, with every mark of satisfaction and respect. There was but one gloomy face—one moody spirit in the conclave. Ameer Khan had reluctantly attended the meeting, and was now little inclined to do honor to the representative of the British Government. The scene in Holkar's Durbar-tent was an interesting one; but I need not describe it, for on his way back with the army, which broke ground immediately afterwards on its return to the provinces, Charles



Metcalf related the circumstances of the interview in a letter to his friend Sherer :\*

CHARLES METCALFE TO J. W. SHERER.

"Camp, Sirhind, January 26, 1806.

"MY DEAR SHERER,— . . . The peace with Holkar and our march from the Punjab are already known to you. Bayley or Jenkins will have told you that I have been in Holkar's camp. My visit to him was occasioned by his request that some gentleman might be sent to him, as a mark of friendship and confidence from the British Government. It was, indeed, necessary to give satisfaction to his people, who would not give credit to his proclamation of a peace. They considered it as a trick such as he had often before practised to raise their fallen hopes ; and, consequently, the arrival of the mission which confirmed the fact was hailed with every demonstration of unbounded joy and rapture.

"The conduct of Holkar and his chiefs was equally expressive of the highest delight ; and made my mission a very pleasing and happy business. My task was easy, being in its nature only to convey assurances of friendship. One subject only of discussion occurred, and that was attended with no difficulty. It was my duty to urge his immediate departure from the Punjab on his return to Malwa. I got from him a promise to move on the 13th, which he maintained, to my surprise. *Ek-chushm-oo-doula's*† appearance is very grave, his countenance expressive, his manners and conversation easy. He had not at all the appearance of the savage that we knew him to be. The same countenance, however, which was strongly expressive of joy when I saw him, would look very black under the influence of rage, or any dark passions. A little lap-dog was on his musnud—a strange playfellow for Holkar.

\* See also Appendix A, for Metcalfe's official report.

† A nickname for Holkar, signifying One-Eyed.



THE "GREAT GAME" ENDED.

The jewels on his neck were invaluablely rich. With these exceptions, there was nothing extraordinary in his Durbar, which was just as might have been expected under the circumstances of his situation. All his chiefs were present. Ameer Khan is blackguard in his looks, and affected on the occasion of my reception to be particularly fierce, by rubbing his coat over with gunpowder, and assuming in every way the air of a common soldier. But for his proximity to Holkar, he would have passed for one ; indeed, I did not know that he was Ameer Khan. I consider his behaviour to have been affectation. He had the impudence to ask from me my name, which must have been known to him ; and his conduct was so evidently designed to bring himself into notice, that I felt a gratification in disappointing the unknown impudent ; and answering plainly to his question, I turned from him and continued a good-humored conversation with Holkar and Bhao Bhaskur. I was better pleased that I did so when I learned his name, for he had on a late occasion behaved with egregious impertinence.

"I have been very much gratified with this accidental mission, because though of no importance it is a little distinction. Lord Lake has made use of it to say more in my favor than I have ever deserved in a despatch to the Governor-General. I shall have great satisfaction in discussing with you hereafter the conduct of Sir G. Barlow. I am anxious to hear your opinions and to explain to you mine. . . . I think that you will agree with me in blaming the furious zeal for reduction which dismissed all the members of the Governor-General's office from appointments in the service, without any steps to make a recompense. The Governor-General will perhaps have reached Calcutta when this reaches you.

"Make my love to Jenkins and Bayley. I hope that I shall be with you in a very few months. What say you to my proposed trip to England, as mentioned to Butterworth? Let



me have the benefit of your advice on that subject. I shall be better pleased when you write more; but am now, and ever,

“Your very affectionate friend,

“C. T. METCALFE.”

The Army was now on its way back to the British Provinces. It was a season of comparative leisure, which Charles Metcalfe turned to advantage by devoting more time to his private correspondence. The following letters have a double interest; for they treat largely of public affairs, and afford some glimpses of the personal character of the young writer :

FROM CHARLES METCALFE TO J. W. SHERER.

“Panceput, February 12, 1806.

“MY DEAR SHERER,—I had the pleasure, a few days ago, of receiving your kind letter of the 17th ult. I am greatly indebted to you for its contents. It brought the latest intelligence of my brother that I have yet received; my last letters are dated in the early part of November. He continues, I am rejoiced to see, in every way happy and content. . . . I have been a very bad correspondent to my brother, and he complains against me in his last. He knows, however, that my idleness is not caused by want of affection. The passage which you transcribed\* is, as you rightly judged, peculiarly gratifying to me. The difference in our habits which was acquired in our childhood, will probably stick to us, and it is possible that we may have different opinions on controversial points, as you may remember we used to have, but in fraternal affection and friendship Theophilus and I will ever have, I am sure, the same mind and spirit.

“We are moving on to Dihlee. Four battalions, with a body of 1200 horse (Skinners' Corps), will be left here (Pance-

\* See ante, page 114, note.





put) under Colonel Burn. Another battalion is at Kurnal. We shall reach Dihlee in five days. That rascal, *our friend* Holkar, has been playing tricks ; and by way of a specimen of what may be expected, has already violated the treaty in a *few* articles. From our pacific, mild, moderate, amiable character, Holkar may play as many tricks as he pleases, and we shall have the generous magnanimity of overlooking them. I am getting tired of Politics, and am not disposed to trouble you much more with them, or Sir George Barlow. We can discuss subjects fully *tête-à-tête*. You will, I dare say, be able to show me his merits in revenual, judicial, and financial administration since he has ascended the throne. I have been so situated as to see him only in one point of view, and he has not, in the light in which I have seen him, appeared to advantage. It may be the fault of my optics. But I cannot with temper see his incorrigible wantonness in wasting and throwing away our strength and influence. He has not yet actually done the mischief; and I wish that our guardian genius would convert his hard heart.

"Lord Lake has acted in a dignified and noble manner. He declares his sentiments in opposition to those of the Governor-General, and he urges every argument and fact which he hopes will induce him to alter his plans. Having done this, he is determined not to embarrass or counteract the views of the Government ; and feeling that he cannot be a fit instrument for the execution of measures which he entirely disapproves, finding also that Sir G. B. does not know how to exercise his supreme authority without deviating from the respect due to Lord Lake's rank, situation, character, and services, his Lordship is resolved to resign all political powers and to confine his attention to military arrangements. His despatches are marked equally by proper respect and manly firmness. They show that he is attentive to what is due to Sir G. B., and to what is due to himself. Several great questions upon which the Governor-General had issued his instructions are now on



reference to him, and among others the Declaratory Articles done by Sir G. B. at Allahabad, and published (I by this day's post perceive) in the *Gazette*. These have not been forwarded to Scindiah.

"The whole treaty is now open to public discussion. I shall hope to know from you your own sentiments and those of the public on it. I have not time or room at present to say more than that I think the Declaratory Articles destroy the best, most honorable, and most advantageous part of the treaty, and substitute much mischief. Enough of this shocking business. Many thanks for your information concerning my box and its contents. The correspondence on the Mahratta war is the most valuable part of them, as a book of reference, and recollection, and *comparison*. If I should not immediately return to Calcutta I should wish you to send it to me. If my return is, as I expect, immediate, I will thank you to keep it for me.

I think with you, that the principle laid down for the retrenchments is good. As for individual feelings, they must suffer. I think, however, that the parsimony of the Government is too ostentatious in its display. As real, and full as noble, an economy might be practised without such an universal publication of it. It is as much held forth in the Most Secret and Important Instructions as in the public advertisements. In fact, it seems to be the ruling principle system and merit of the Administration. When such is the case (I hope I shall not be suspected of blaming sound economy in the observation), I will venture to observe that the Government will be deficient in greatness of spirit and honor.

"Of myself I know nothing more than that I am well and happy. I hope that you and Bayley, with Fagan, Adam, Grant, &c., are equally so. Make suitable and kind remembrance of me to all those friends, and believe me ever

"Your affectionate friend,

"C. T. METCALFE."





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## THE "GREAT GAME" ENDED.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

"Camp, Dihlee, March 14, 1806.

"MY DEAR SHERER,—I received yours of the 16th ult. a few days ago. I am extremely concerned that any expression in my letter should have conveyed the insinuation which you very justly reprobate. Such never existed in my mind; if it had, it would have caused to me very severe unhappiness. Believe me, Sherer, the confidence that I have in your friendship, and in the firmness and continuance of it, as long as I may be not quite unworthy, is a consoling pleasure to me in our separation. I look forward to finding you at our meeting the same kind, unaltered friend, that you used to be. Without this reliance I should be very wretched, for I consider the regard of respected friends as an inestimable blessing, and any diminution of it would be an insufferable affliction. Do not, therefore, think that I could ever mean to insinuate that distance of time or place could affect your sentiments. We are anxious about what we prize, and my anxiety to hear from you perhaps made me complain more than I had any right to do. Indeed, when I consider the incessant business which you go through, I ought to be grateful for every line that you bestow on me, but have no right to complain. It would be unconscionable, indeed, to expect that you should not in your leisure hours seek refreshment from harassing fatigues in those pursuits to which your mind is bent. Forgive my impatience.

"You speak of the variety and opportunity of improvement which occur in my situation. I feel the value of them, and look back over the whole time that I have spent in this manner with very great satisfaction. I have, however, I am sorry to confess, thrown away my opportunities of improvement. I have acquired habits of idleness and indifference. I am almost afraid I love wandering for its own sake, rather than for the knowledge which it might enable one to acquire. Works and ruins which would have made me mad with solitude formerly, operate with much diminished effect now. I know not whe-



ther it is that the repetition of novelty blunts the edge of curiosity, or that human art cannot produce much variety, but from some cause my curiosity is not so sharp and lively as it was. There is, however, something in this place to which the mind cannot be indifferent. The ruins of grandeur that extend for miles on every side, fill it with serious reflections. The palaces crumbling into dust, every one of which could tell many tales of royal virtue or tyrannical crime, of desperate ambition or depraved indolence, that have caused the accomplishment of the most important events, and yet have never reached the ear of history; the myriads of vast mausoleums, every one of which was intended to convey to futurity the deathless fame of its cold inhabitant, and all of which are passed by unknown and unnoticed, eclipsed by the grandeur of one or two which attract the traveller. These things cannot be looked at with indifference. The view at present before me from my tent contains the history of ages. We are about a mile from what we now call Dihlee. I have before me the magnificent tomb of Humaioun; the ruined fort where Shah Alum was deprived of sight; a ruined palace where another poor king was thrown out of a window (the very window is staring at me), and many other buildings of which my ignorance knows nothing, but which, doubtless, have had their share of blood and murder. I should like much to go over the history of India whilst here, but there is not a book in this army. The Commander-in-Chief does not patronise literature in his troops. 'D—— your writing, mind your fighting,' is his maxim—a maxim, too, the latter part of which he has taught by example as well as precept. If I were a poet . . . I could write something at this place in an elegiac strain about—

'The pomp of heraldry, the pride of power,' &c., &c.

The ground on which we are encamped was occupied by Holkar's army when it besieged Dihlee. The defence was one of the greatest and most important actions that has been performed, but the man whose exertions caused the success of it,





## THE "GREAT GAME" ENDED.

has met his reward from this encouraging Government in an unrecompensed dismissal from his office.\* Speaking of Holkar, he has in true character made a point of breaking all the articles of the treaty that he has not had it in his power to fulfil. He is at present engaged in plundering the Sikhs. Be it said to his credit, that he plunders most those who befriended him. We are detained here until he chooses to march towards his own country. This is a happy state of Peace.

"What think you of the new policy of the Declaratory Articles to both treaties? It is, I suppose, the first time that a Government has found fault with its negotiators for getting too much. Holkar has fired a salute for the unthought-of gratuity of Tank Rampoora, &c., and is, of course, vastly pleased. He says, however, that we are great rascals, and not to be trusted. Nor, after the acts of this Administration, can we be trusted. But why do I constantly harp upon the character of our Government? I believe it is because I am daily compelled to feel that we are disgraced; and that Holkar is the prevailing power in Hindostan. On the conduct of Government with respect to the plunder of Jenkins's camp, I agree with you; and have talked on that subject with Malcolm. He once alleged a strange reason for not resenting it, that it and all other hostility was the act of Scindiah's Minister only, and not of Scindiah himself. Who is Scindiah separate from his Government? A foolish boy. Can we look to anything but the acts of his Government?

"I hope that you and Jenkins will become intimate, and I am sure that the more you know him the more you will esteem him. I wish that Government would provide for him in a handsome way. I wrote to him some days ago. I have been looking in vain for a letter from Bayley for a very long time. Make my salaam to him and Jenkins, Fagan, Adam, Trant, &c.

"Cole and the sporting ones of this quarter are on a hog-hunting party. All the riding that I have had has not given

\* Colonel Ochterlony, who had been removed from the office of Resident at Delhi to make room for Mr. Seton.



me a grain more of enterprise on horseback than I used to have, so I enter no more into those dashing amusements than formerly. What proceeds perhaps from timidity is put down to the score of gravity, and as there is not a soul here whose pursuits are like mine, my want of vivacity is generally pitied.

. . . Believe me, my dear Sherer,

“Your affectionate friend,

“C. T. METCALFE.”

The war was now at an end. The Grand Army was to be broken up. Charles Metcalfe's occupation as the nurse of Queen's officers was gone; and he soon ceased to disquiet himself about the inglorious Peace on which in the foregoing letters he had so earnestly descanted. As I have already said, it is not my province in this work to enter minutely into the circumstances of the Mahratta war, or to investigate the public conduct of one Governor-General or another. In the years 1805-1806, political controversy rose to a higher pitch of excitement than it had ever risen before, or than it has ever risen since in Indian official circles. Men spoke and wrote in those days eagerly and emphatically, according to the light that was in them; and it is not for us, after the lapse of half a century, to condemn them for that one-sidedness which is apparent in all their arguments. The Lake party were right at Muttra and Delhi. The Barlow party were right at Calcutta. The views of both parties were tinged by local and incidental circumstances. If Barlow had commanded the Army, he would, probably, have been as eager for the prosecution of the war as Lake, if he had been at the head of the Administra-





tion, and immediately responsible to the Home Government, would have been for its cessation. And I do not doubt that Charles Metcalfe, if he had been Accountant-General, would have written just such letters as flowed from the pen of Henry St. George Tucker.\*

But, in all such cases as this, where there is a great conflict of opinion regarding the measures of Government or the conduct of men in authority, it is incumbent on the historian primarily to consider with whom the *responsibility* rested. Now, the responsibility of war-making or of peace-making in 1805-6, did not rest with Lord Lake, but with Sir George Barlow. We certainly had not found by experience that it was easy to crush either Scindiah or Holkar; but we had found that our efforts to crush them had thrown the Finances of India into such a state of embarrassment, that it was absolutely impossible to maintain the military expenditure on its existing scale. There was no money in the Treasury; our loans were unproductive; we had already anticipated the powers of investment possessed both by European and native capitalists. The cry from Lord Lake's camp was, "A little more money—and one more blow at the enemy." And all the argu-

\* The correspondence between Mr. Tucker and Sir G. Barlow in the years 1805 and 1806, recently published in the *Memoirs* of the former, very fairly reflects the views of the Peace party. From that correspondence, and from Metcalfe's letters given in this chapter, a just conception may be derived of the antagonistic arguments of the Soldiers and the Financiers. As I am not writing a

History of India, or even of the Marhatta War, I publish these letters as I published Mr. Tucker's correspondence, mainly as illustrations of the personal character and career of the man. The few remarks which I have made upon the subject in the text are of a very general nature. It is probable that on a future occasion I may have to treat of it more in detail.



ments in favor of the continuance of the war were based upon the hypothesis, that a little more money and one more vigorous blow would have brought it to a close. If Sir George Barlow could have indulged such a conviction as this, he might, perhaps, have authorised a last brief and decisive campaign. But there was nothing to give vitality to such a conviction. The success of such a movement was, at least, uncertain. The exhaustion of the Treasury and the orders of the Home Government were *not*. The responsibility of neglecting such a warning as was afforded by the one, or disregarding such a duty as was suggested by the other, was exclusively his—and it was a tremendous responsibility which he did not think it his duty to incur.\* He, therefore, determined to make peace upon such terms as the enemy were not likely to reject. It is right that history should take account of this; but it is not strange that in the excitement of Lord Lake's camp its significance should, for a time, have been overlooked. Many years afterwards, Charles Metcalfe, looking back with other eyes on the events of 1805-6, and seeing much that was then concealed

\* It appears to me that Sir George Barlow states the case very fairly in the following sentences which I find in the rough draft of a letter to Lord Lake:—"I wish his Lordship to understand that I offer these sentiments only as my opinion, and by no means as a decision against the correctness of his Lordship's judgment, which may be right. But as I am personally and exclusively responsible to the East India Company and to my country for the terms of the pacification, I am persuaded that his Lordship's candor

and liberality will satisfy him that I have only discharged my duty to the public and to myself by adhering to my own opinion. If I had adopted his Lordship's sentiments in opposition to my own opinion, and if an early interruption of the peace were to follow, his Lordship will be sensible that my urging that I had conformed to his advice in preference to being guided by my own judgment, would be no justification whatever of my conduct."





from him, admitted that the measures adopted by Sir George Barlow were necessitated by the exigencies of the Financial crisis ; and that however objectionable in themselves, and however mischievous in their results, it was hardly possible, under the circumstances which then existed, to have followed any other course.



## CHAPTER VII.

[1806—1808.]

## THE DELHI ASSISTANTSHIP.

Charles Metcalfe's Prospects—His Visit to Calcutta—Appointed Assistant to the Resident at Delhi—Administration of the Delhi Territory—The People and the Court—Character of Mr. Seton—Charles Metcalfe's Duties—Letters to Mr. Sherer—Pecuniary Circumstances—Better Prospects.

It has been stated that Charles Metcalfe, when he joined the Camp of the Commander-in-Chief, still retained his situation as an Assistant in the Office of the Governor-General. But among other retrenchments which had now been effected by the new Administration was the abolition of the "Office." This, although it entailed upon him a considerable loss of salary, Metcalfe scarcely regretted. Without Lord Wellesley and his old associates, who were now scattered over the country, the "Office" would have been nothing to him. What his prospects were at this time it was hard to say. The orders of Government were, that he should remain with Lord Lake until his services were no longer required, and that then he should "return to the Presidency,



in order that when opportunity should offer he might be employed in some other branch of the public service.”\*

There was nothing very hopeful in this. He had resolutely determined, as long as it was possible, to adhere to the Political line; but in that department of the public service great retrenchments were being made, and Metcalfe believed that Sir George Barlow was not likely to extend towards him any very great amount of favor.† He was in no hurry, therefore, to return to the Presidency to wait for a new appointment. Indeed, he seriously contemplated at this time a visit to England, and wrote both to his friends at Calcutta and his family in England, to consult with them on the expediency of the step. He received, however, little encouragement from either quarter. Before, indeed, the answers from his home-letters had arrived, he had made up his mind to continue at his post.

From the following letter, written from Cawnpore at the end of May, may be gathered more distinctly what were his feelings and intentions at this time:

\* *Mr. Edmonstone to Mr. Metcalfe, May 29, 1806.*

† Barlow, however, it must be said, had recognised the great ability and the fine character of young Metcalfe from the very commencement of his career, and predicted for him a rapid rise in the service. “I have great pleasure in acquainting you,” he wrote to Colonel Collins, “that young Metcalfe possesses very pleasing manners, and that he appears to unite quick parts with a very solid understanding. If I am not mistaken he will eminently

distinguish himself among his contemporaries.” When it was ascertained that the King’s Government had refused to appoint Sir George Barlow permanently to the Governor-Generalship, in spite of the earnest support of the Court of Directors, a report obtained in Calcutta that the whole Court had voted for Sir George, with the exception of three members, and that Sir Theophilus Metcalfe was one of the three. But the statement was entirely erroneous—Sir Theophilus was one of Barlow’s most strenuous supporters.



CHARLES METCALFE TO J. W. SHERER.

"Cawnpore, May 29, 1866.

"MY DEAR SHERER,— . . . I shall quit this place for Calcutta about the middle of June, and suppose that I shall reach it about the first week of August. I have settled to join Malcolm's party on the voyage down. Without waiting for an invitation, I shall inform you that I intend to make your house my home, but I shall hope to hear from you on that point, as it may be possible you are so situated with regard to room or something else, as to make my invasion an inconvenience to you. As I have nothing now to do here, I wish as soon as possible to be at the Presidency, in order that my destination may be decided, and that I may again be employed.

"I am determined, if the Governor-General will allow me, to adhere to the line in which I have made my outset, even if I should be obliged to submit to a temporary loss or degradation, and the scene on which I wish to be employed is that which I have just quitted. I think that it will be the busiest; I therefore give it a preference. On the whole, prospects are not so flattering as they once were to me, but every dog has his day, and *le bon temps viendra*, I trust. I do not mean to make immoderate haste, nor to put myself to any inconvenience in my journey to Calcutta. I shall proceed leisurely. Under more encouraging circumstances, I think that I should have been there before this time, for I feel every wish to be again engaged on public service. By-the-by, I was long ago ordered down, and am perhaps guilty of disobedience by staying so long.

"My letters from England are very pleasing. My father says that he is proud of my conduct. You know, my dear Sherer, what pride a son must feel at such praise from an honored father. One sentence of his approbation is an ample reward for any exertion, and more than consolation under every disappointment. God bless you, dear Sherer.

"Your sincere friend,

"C. T. METCALFE."



THE DELHI ASSISTANTSHIP.

In fulfilment of the intention here expressed, Charles Metcalfe started on his river-voyage to Calcutta in the course of June, and about the third week of the following month he found himself again at the Presidency. He was now only in his twenty-second year; but he had passed nearly six of these in the public service, and was already a ripe diplomatist. By all who knew him—by his private friends and official associates, he was held in such estimation that not one of them hesitated to predict his speedy attainment of the highest honors of his profession. There was much in all this to solace him under what he believed to be a lull in the prosperity of his career; but nothing cheered him so much as his father's letters, which breathed the warmest affection, and expressed the exultant pride with which Sir Theophilus contemplated the honorable progress of his favorite son.

But there was little occasion for despondency of any kind. Charles Metcalfe had not long to sojourn at the Presidency, waiting for the dawn of official re-employment. On the 15th of August, he received a letter from the Secretary of Government, announcing that the Governor-General in Council had been pleased to appoint him "First Assistant to the Resident at Delhi."

This was not a very brilliant appointment. Time was when he would have regarded it with some contempt—but the Political service was not then what it once had been in the palmy days of the "glorious little man" who had set Charles Metcalfe on the high road which leads to fame and for-



tune. He had come now to look more soberly at these things, and so long as he was not removed to the Revenue or Judicial departments, he was content with his situation. Indeed, Delhi was of all others the place in which, under these altered circumstances, he had recently desired to be posted.

Mr. Seton was then Resident at Delhi. A little time before he had been the Governor-General's agent in Rohilkund; but Sir George Barlow entertained so high an opinion of his zeal and ability, that he removed Colonel Ochterlony from the Delhi Residency to place the civilian there in his stead. To Seton, who was a man of peculiar delicacy and generosity of feeling, the circumstances under which he had been ordered to proceed to Delhi would have been extremely painful, if such an explanation of these circumstances had not been offered to Ochterlony as to convince him that he had not forfeited the high opinion of Government.\* But Seton was a man whose whole soul was in the public service, and

\* See letter of Mr. Seton to Colonel Malcolm, Bareilly, March 12, 1806.—“It must give the sincerest gratification to every honest heart to learn that the explanation of the grounds of the present arrangements have been such as to convince Colonel Ochterlony that he stands as high as ever in the estimation of Government. But surely Government will not content itself with merely soothing the wounded feelings of a public officer of his great and acknowledged merits; nor can I bring myself to think that it is not in contemplation to make a handsome provision for him, although it was not, perhaps, announced or recorded at the same time with the arrangements, inasmuch as it was a

public measure.”—[*MS. Correspondence.*] The supercession of Colonel Ochterlony had not been decreed without manifest reluctance. “The ground of hesitation I have with regard to this arrangement,” wrote the Governor-General, “is the service rendered by Colonel Ochterlony in the defence of Delhi. Is this consideration such as should prevent me removing him? and will it justify my making the sacrifice of the public interests, which I know I should make, if I were to relinquish the arrangement? I consider Mr. Seton's appointment to Delhi to be of the most essential importance in a variety of points of view.”—[*MS. Notes of Sir G. Barlow.*]





who, once appointed, was eager to join his appointment, and to devote himself day and night to its duties. Of Metcalfe he knew little, but that little had kindled within him a fervor of admiration for the young *attaché*, and one of his first wishes on being nominated to the Delhi Residency was to associate with himself, in the performance of his new duties, one whom he emphatically described as "a young man of most uncommon abilities and acquirements." "Although my personal knowledge of Mr. Metcalfe," he wrote to Colonel Malcolm, "is but slight, it is sufficient to convince me of the truth of what you say respecting him. We met but *once*. But it was SUCH an 'ONCE'! So interesting a meeting! I already knew a great deal of his character from having seen many of his private letters, and from having been in the habit of familiar intercourse with many of his friends. As a young man of most uncommon abilities and acquirements, not to have known him would have 'argued myself unknown.' When, therefore, we met, I could not meet him as a stranger. Ever since, I have been one of his many enthusiastic admirers. In the arrangements to be formed for conducting the public business at Delhi, the claims of such a candidate cannot be overlooked. I recollect, however, hearing one of his friends and correspondents observe, that he would not like to be stationed at Delhi, and that Calcutta was the station he preferred."\* Such being the opinion of the

\* *MS. Correspondence.*—The observation in the last sentence must be supposed to have reference to the days when Lord Wellesley was Governor-

General. Metcalfe himself subsequently applied for the appointment. Some passages of another letter from Mr. Seton may be introduced here in



young Assistant entertained by his official superior, there was little chance of Metcalfe's connexion with the Court of the Mogul terminating as did his first diplomatic experience at the Court of the Mahratta. Perhaps no two men were ever more unlike each other than Archibald Seton and Jack Collins. Each, as the young Assistant soon discovered, lacked what the other had in excess.

Starting to join his appointment without much loss of time, Metcalfe proceeded by dawk to Delhi, and reached the imperial city on the 23rd of October. The journey was not a pleasant one; but his reception was of the kindest and most flattering description; and he soon began to find, that if in his new official position he had anything to contend against, it was the excessive delicacy and humility of the Resident, who shrunk from employing the services of his Assistant in the manner contemplated by Government in such an appointment. What Charles Metcalfe thought of this, may best be described in his own words:

illustration of this and other points. The communication quoted in the text had been sent to Metcalfe, who wrote to thank Seton for the kindness it expressed. On this the latter wrote: "Think not, my dear sir, that I mean frivolously to compliment or poorly to flatter, when I assure you that our meeting at Kangur made an impression upon my mind—upon my heart, which no time can weaken. The unspeakable interest, which the circumstance of my being then introduced to your personal acquaintance gave to my visit to camp, makes me consider it as one of the leading epochs of my life; and ever since that memorable period, I have longed for the means of being

brought into nearer connexion with you, and of being indulged with an opportunity of cultivating your friendship. In this avowal, which is dictated by the heart, you have, my dear sir, a vertical reply to one part of your letter. I shall only add, that if Government comply with your application, and render you my associate in the political branch of the business attached to the Residency at Delhi, I shall feel as if eased at once of one-half of my care. That it will be complied with I cannot for a moment doubt." The meeting alluded to in these letters was in General Smith's camp, when his force was in pursuit of Ameer Khan, in Rohilkund.





## THE DELHI ASSISTANTSHIP.

CHARLES METCALFE TO J. W. SHERER.

"Dihlee, October 25, 1806.

"MY DEAR SHERER,—I arrived here on the 23rd, after a very troublesome and uncomfortable journey. From Mynpooree to this place I encountered several difficulties. I scarcely anywhere found a sufficient number of bearers, and what there were were old and tottering wretches. I met with a remarkable instance of respect in an officer of the Udalut, a Darogah, or, as the people in this part of the world call him, Udalut-walla. I passed the whole night in the street of the town of Koorja, because this gentleman had chosen to seize the bearers that had been stationed for me, and had carried them on his own pleasure to a village some miles distant. For the last thirty or forty miles, by mistake no bearers had been stationed, because by an erroneous calculation I was not expected so soon. I therefore abandoned my palkee, &c., and after a long walk, and when I could walk no longer, a long ride upon a Sowar's horse, which I had the good luck to obtain, I at last reached the object of my labors.

"All is well that ends well, and now I am as comfortable as I could wish. Seton is most kind. I foresee that I shall have some difficulty in persuading him to break through a bad habit which he has acquired of doing every part of business, even the minutest, with his own hands. I commenced my attack yesterday, and mentioned to him several duties which he daily performs, and which in my conception ought to devolve upon the Assistant. But he says that he is shocked at the idea of degrading my &c., &c., &c., to such mean occupations, and that the assistance which he expects to derive from me is in the aid of my &c., &c., &c., on the great questions of politics. This is very fine and complimentary, and of course not displeasing, but, as I observed to him, how can that be degrading to the Assistant which is daily performed by the Resident? and what is the use of an Assistant, if he does not relieve the superior from some part of the drudgery and detail



of official duties? He was at last brought to say that we would relieve each other. Such is his delicacy, or the inveteracy of his habit, that I foresee some difficulty; but I shall persist, and do not despair of accomplishing the object. And if once he can be brought to throw off the unnecessary trouble that he takes upon himself, he will, I am sure, be much happier, for at present he worries himself with detail, and the clearest head in the world must be confused by the mixed and multifarious nature of the minute duties to which he gives his attention. He seldom comes either to breakfast or dinner. He rises before the day, and labors until the middle of the night. He does not move out; he takes no exercise, and apparently no food. The real duties of his situation do not require such toil, and I must persuade him to relinquish a part to me.

"The collections are ridiculously trifling, and the districts in a sad and irremediable state of confusion. Orders have been issued for a settlement. Spedding has not commenced on it. It is a funny duty for me to perform, who am entirely ignorant of such matters; but I must undertake it, and as I am completely under Seton's orders, I am not so terrified as I should otherwise be. I shall probably, but not positively, go into the Mofussil to make the settlement, and it is possible that I may take the field against my refractory subjects, of which there are more than there are tractable. God forbid that this business should end in leading me into the Revenue line. I must endeavor to prevent that.

"I am, ever yours affectionately,

"C. T. METCALFE."

Charles Metcalfe was now fairly settled at Delhi—the imperial city of the Great Mogul. The Emperor, Shah Allum, old, blind, and infirm, still held there the mockery of a Court. The victories of the British army on the banks of the Jumna had rescued



him from the thralldom of the Mahrattas to impose upon him another yoke. In our hands he was as helpless, but less miserable. He was at the mercy of men who respected his fallen fortunes, and desired that he should enjoy as much of the luxury and the pomp of royalty as could be purchased for a certain sum of money, to be appropriated to him out of the revenues of our new possessions. How this was best to be done was a question which for some time perplexed the Calcutta Council. Upon the first establishment of our supremacy in the Delhi territories, it was determined that a maintenance for the Royal Family should be provided by means of certain assignments of land, and an annual stipend payable to the Shah. These territories were not to be brought under the operation of the rules and regulations of the Company which were to be introduced into other parts of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces; and it was, therefore, arranged that the fiscal administration of the districts which had been set aside for the maintenance of the royal household should be entirely in the hands of officers appointed by the Shah himself, with the sanction of the British Government. The principal officers for the collection of the customs and duties of the city of Delhi and the management of the police were also to be appointed by the Shah, in concurrence with the British Resident. But this functionary was "not to interfere with the executive duties of any of those officers; nor with the municipal or revenue arrangements of the city or territory, except by his advice



and recommendation.”\* There was, indeed, to be a sort of *imperium in imperio*. A remnant of regal power was to be delegated to the Mogul, that his money might pass into his hands rather in the shape of revenue than in the shape of pension, and that he might still flatter himself with the thought of possessing some officers and some subjects of his own.

In sanctioning this arrangement, the British Government thought more of the feelings of the Shah than of the prosperity of the people of Delhi. The evils of the system were apparent; and Ochterlony soon pointed them out. “I lose no time,” he emphatically wrote to Government on the 30th of November, 1804, “in earnestly requesting, from a knowledge of the disposition and temper of his Majesty and his probable successor, that the provision intended for his Majesty should be a fixed stipend payable, in ready money, from his Treasury. Any lands assigned for this purpose would, I am fully persuaded, be unproductive of the real value, nor could the controlling power intended to be vested in the Resident prevent much oppression in the Pergunnahs, and exorbitant taxation in the city.”† This was one side—the people’s side—of the question; but looking only at the King’s side, it appeared that the new arrangement, though it might flatter the vanity of the Shah, was calculated to inflict upon him a solid injury, by placing it in

\* Memorandum by Mr. Edmonstone (April 27, 1805)—“On the Subject of an Arrangement for the Maintenance

of his Majesty Shah Allum and the Royal Household.”—[*MS. Records.*]

† *MS. Records.*



his power to waste his substance upon favorites and parasites. "Any assignment of lands," wrote Ochterlony, in the same letter, "though it might, and, I have no doubt, would flatter his pride, would only open a path to grants which would in a short time deprive him of nearly the whole of his country; nor would any influence of the Resident be able to control his bounty, which has been, during his life, weak, ill-placed, and indiscriminate."\* And in a subsequent letter, pointing out more in detail the evil consequences of placing the collection of the town-customs in his hands, especially in time of scarcity, the Resident wrote "to give the Shah all that is realised, exclusive of the pay of establishments, would be an easy and a sacred duty in the Customs as in the Pergunnahs; but to invest him with a control, is to give him a power to injure himself, to which the avarice and self-interest of numberless dependents would undoubtedly lead."†

Nor were these the only evils inherent in such a system. It was only too probable, as, indeed, experience had already shown, that in the assigned districts the revenue-payers might sometimes contumaciously withhold the sums claimed by the officers of the Shah. In this case, coercion would become necessary. The taxes could only be collected under the constraint of a military force. A choice of difficulties then presented itself. Either this constraint

\* *MS. Records.*—"His (the King's) probable successor," added Ochterlony, "is imbecility personified, and under the guidance of a woman of low extraction, originally a servant of the

household, weak, proud, and in the highest degree avaricious and rapacious."

† *MS. Records.*



must have been exercised by the miserable rabble which the King or his officers would be compelled to retain; or the Company's troops must have been employed for the purpose. In the one case, there was no reliance to be placed on the support of men who might at any time have sided with the recusants or been defeated by them; and in the other, the British Government would have been placed in an anomalous and embarrassing position, for they would have exercised military control where they had no civil power; would have been compelled to enforce measures for which they were not responsible; and to counteract evils which they were not suffered to prevent.

On a review of these important suggestions, the Supreme Government, after much consideration, moved by the recommendations of the Resident, resolved on a notable compromise. They were desirous to spare the feelings of the Shah; but, at the same time, not to invest him with powers which might be exercised to the injury both of the people and of himself. So they gave him a nominal authority over the assigned districts; but arranged that, at the request of his Majesty, the Company's servants should undertake their administration in his name.\* The authority of the Shah was to be a harmless fiction. The actual administration was to be vested in

\* "The lands might be considered as Khalsa lands, placed by his Majesty under the charge of a British authority, and the collections might be made and all other acts done in his Majesty's name; and as the Resident further suggests, inferior officers might be appointed by his Majesty

to attend the Collector's office, for the purpose of satisfying his Majesty's mind that no part of the collections is embezzled by the executive officers of the British Government."—[Mr. Edmonstone's Memorandum. *MS. Records.*]





the Resident; but there was to be a great parade of the name of Shah Allum; and the British officers, whilst dandling the miserable puppet, were to appear to be the humblest of his slaves.

But all this was to be merely an experiment. "All circumstances considered," wrote Sir George Barlow, then senior member of the Supreme Council, "and particularly the attention necessary to be paid to the feelings of his Majesty, would appear to render the system of management here proposed the most advisable, at least for the present. But it might be intimated to his Majesty, that if the system should not prove to be well calculated for the improvement of the country, for the realisation of the Revenue, and the maintenance of tranquillity, such alterations in the system will be hereafter suggested for his Majesty's approbation as shall appear advisable. It will ultimately, I imagine, be found to be necessary for the attainment of the several objects above stated, to extend the British Laws (Regulations) to the assigned territories."\* And, under the orders of Lord Wellesley, instructions were sent to the Resident in conformity with Barlow's suggestions, based as they were on Edmonstone's abstract of Ochterlony's recommendations. And this was the system of management in force when Charles Metcalfe joined his appointment.

But that the system did not work well was soon

\* MS. Notes of Sir George Barlow on the margin of Edmonstone's Memorandum. The paper is endorsed by Lord Wellesley with the words, "Draft of Instructions to the Resi-

dent at Delhi, to be sent in conformity to this Memorandum, including Sir George Barlow's remarks, in which I concur.—W."



apparent. Even upon the vestige of authority that remained to him the Shah was inclined to presume; and the excess of delicacy and generosity with which a man of Mr. Seton's temper was sure to treat the poor puppet, tended to increase this natural presumption. That this, however kindly the intention, was in effect but cruel kindness, Metcalfe believed; but he did not come hastily to the conclusion that his official superior was at fault. He had been nearly a year at Delhi, during which he had seen many proofs of the evil working of the system, when he wrote the following letter to his friend Sherer:

CHARLES METCALFE TO J. W. SHERER.

"June 16, 1807.

"MY DEAR SHERER,—I have had so little of any satisfactory matter to communicate, that it has not been incumbent on me to transmit to you an account of my affairs; nay, more, that I am on the whole doing so badly, that it is almost a duty to be silent. Now, having laid a heavy charge on your back, and prevented, as I conclude, by invincible arguments, any retort on your part, I proceed to tell you that I am, with respect to health, as well as usual, and that, I thank God, is very well; in spirits, too, pretty well; and though the place is very dull, and I myself am no great enlivener of society, never fail to be merry on a favorable opportunity. I am tired of business, and long to have less to do, the nearest to nothing the better; for I see that I could spend my time much more satisfactorily and advantageously to myself in my own way, than by attending to the Politics, Police, Revenue, and Justice of this quarter; and now comes the dreadful tale. My Finances are quite ruined, exhausted beyond hope of any reasonable repair. You know that I am very prudent; prudence is a prominent feature in my character; yet, ever since I came to





this Imperial Station, I have gradually been losing the ground which I had gained in the world, and at length I find myself considerably lower than the neutral situation of having nothing; and without some unlooked-for and surprising declaration of the Fates in my power, I see nothing but debt, debt, debt, debt after debt, before me.

"The last stroke that has involved me in utter despair, has been the necessity of building. I have been up to my neck for some time in bricks and mortar, mud and dirt, and I am threatened, in consequence, with being over head and ears in debt. After all, I am only building a small bungalow fit for a bachelor. Notwithstanding, all things conjoining, the expense is considerable. Seton would have had me, very kindly, to live with him; but I declined it for a thousand reasons. The one that I used to him, which was a principal one, was, that I could never enjoy a moment's privacy at the Residency; which is as true as that you could not enjoy privacy seated in a chair in the middle of the Cossitollah. Every part of one is no less thronged with natives than the other. . . .

"I do not exactly conform to the policy of Seton's mode of managing the Royal Family. It is by a submission of manner and conduct, carried on in my opinion far beyond the respect and attention which can be either prescribed by forms, or dictated by a humane consideration for the fallen fortunes of a once illustrious family. It destroys entirely the dignity which ought to be attached to him who represents the British Government, and who, in reality, is to govern at Dillee; and it raises (I have perceived the effect disclosing itself with gradual rapidity) ideas of imperial power and sway, which ought to be put to sleep for ever. As it is evident that we do not mean to restore imperial power to the King, we ought not to pursue a conduct calculated to make him aspire to it. Let us treat him with the respect due to his rank and situation; let us make him comfortable in respect to circumstances, and give him all the means, as far as possible, of being happy; but unless we mean to establish his power, let us not encourage him to dream of it.



Let us meet his first attempts to display Imperial authority with immediate check; and let him see the mark beyond our respect and obedience to the shadow of a *shot* proceed.

"Seton, however, seems to think (which if it is, as I think, an error, is a kindly one), that we cannot study too much to soothe the feelings of a family so situated; that the most obsequious attentions do not at all hurt the Resident's dignity; and that by yielding to the King the exercise of power in small points, we shall be able to oppose him with a better grace on great and important occasions. To what length the idea of small points may be carried is uncertain. One man will think one thing, and another another. A great deal is left to discretion; and it has often happened, that what Seton has assented to as a mere trifle, has struck me of such importance as to require opposition. Two authorities exist in the town, which circumstance gives rise to much trouble and confusion. A riot lately took place in the town, threatening to be very serious, which arose, I am convinced, entirely from that circumstance, which would never have taken place if the people had not expected that the King would (as he did) protect them; which had, in fact, its origin in the palace, and which, if traced to its primary cause, proceeded, I believe, from the effect of Seton's too delicate and submissive conduct. Ideas of the exercise of sovereignty ought, I think, to be checked in the bud; it may be attended with difficulty to destroy them when they have been suffered to grow for some time; at least, greater difficulty than there is in suppressing them altogether.

"Enough.—This letter begins to smell of the shop. Of mighty importance to be sure are the politics of Delhi! What progress that infernal villain Buonaparte has made; I long to hear more of affairs in Europe. We have had a long interval of darkness since the last accounts. No letters either from home. I have just heard of the sudden death of Colonel Collins. There is always something more shocking in a sudden death than in a forewarned demise. I felt a stronger spirit of





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ment against him than I have ever felt towards any other  
He has reached that goal at which all enmities subside;  
end. I sincerely forgive him for the wrong he  
and I trust that God will forgive me if I ever  
wronged him.

"Remember me to all friends, and believe me,

"Ever your sincerely attached,

"C. T. METCALFE."

The "riot" of which Metcalfe speaks in the above letter was this. The Mussulmans of Delhi had risen up in rebellion because a Hindoo banker of influence had carried an idol through the city, and had been suspected of an intention to impart undue pomp to the proceeding. A cry was raised that the interests of Islam were in danger. The banker's house was attacked. There were tumultuous gatherings in the streets. Seton was absent, in attendance on the princes, who were performing certain ceremonies in honor of the late King's memory;\* so the responsibility of quelling the disturbance devolved upon Metcalfe. He did it promptly and well—with energy and with judgment. He went first to the officer in command of the troops, and desired him to get his men under arms, and prepare to march into the city. Then he went to the palace, and called upon the King to exert his authority to suppress the tumult. The answer of the King was unsatisfactory; so Metcalfe proceeded at once to the lines, called for the immediate aid of the military authority, and returned with the battalion to the scene of disorder. The presence of the troops damped

\* Shah Allum had died in December, 1806.



the energies of the rioters, the crowds dispersed, and there was almost a bloodless victory. Had the King done his duty in the emergency, not a shot need have been fired.\*

Leaving for a while this poor shadow of a "Great Mogul," with his pension of 200,000*l.* a year, let us dwell for a moment on the former part of this letter, and bestow a thought upon the "pecuniary circumstances" of the Assistant to the Resident at Shah Allum's Court. If Biography were to take note of things, and to expatiate upon them in proportion to the amount of thought devoted to them by the subject of the "Life" or "Memoir," a very large space in all these Lives and Memoirs would be devoted to the "pecuniary circumstances" of the man whose character and career are in course of illustration. The greatest among us will think about money and be disquieted by the want of it. To be in debt is with young civilians almost a condition of existence. Some never get out again. Now Charles Metcalfe never had been extravagant; but he had been in debt before this, had extricated himself from it, and now he was "in difficulties" again. The fact is, that, pecuniarily speaking, his fortunes had not lately been on the ascendant. When attached to the Governor-General's Office, in 1804, he had drawn a salary of 800 rupees a month. An addi-

\* Metcalfe's conduct in this matter elicited the praises of the Supreme Government. The Chief Secretary wrote:—"You will be pleased to communicate to your First Assistant, Mr. Metcalfe, the Governor-General in Council's high approbation of the

firmness, judgment, and promptitude of action manifested by Mr. Metcalfe on that critical occasion. To the exertion of those qualities the Governor-General in Council primarily ascribes the speedy suppression of the disturbance."





tional (deputation) allowance of 12 rupees a day had been subsequently granted to him, when he was serving in Lord Lake's camp; and as the order for this grant was not passed till many months after he had joined the Army, and then took retrospective effect, the accumulations enabled Metcalfe to pay off all his old debts. But on the 15th of December, 1805, the Governor-General's Office having been abandoned, the salary which he had drawn as an Assistant in it ceased, and in its place he was allowed a salary of 400 rupees a month, with the same deputation allowance as before. He was now, in 1807, drawing 750 rupees a month as Assistant to the Delhi Resident—being nearly 500*l.* a year less than he had received three years before.\* This might have sufficed him—but the necessity of building a house at Delhi caused an increase of immediate expenditure, which he could not meet; so the curse of Debt sate again upon him. He had a liberal and a wealthy father, who at this time was so proud of his son's success in life, and of the repeated eulogies that were passed upon him, that he would have done anything for him, and often said so; but on this very account Charles Metcalfe was slow to ask—he would rather have suffered all the miseries of Debt for years than have presumed on the kindly emotions which he had raised in his parent's breast. He determined therefore to extricate himself; and before long the means were placed at his disposal. Some new arrangements for the

\* These facts and figures are taken less to make separate references to from the original official letters preserved by Lord Metcalfe. It is need- each.



civil administration of the Delhi territory caused an increase of his official duties, and with it came an increase of his salary, the accumulations of which he left to form themselves into a sinking fund for the reduction of his debts.\* And never after this reduction did he feel the burden again.

But there was much in Metcalfe's estimation to detract from the advantages of this increased salary. The new duties imposed upon him were connected with the fiscal administration of the Delhi territory; and he had a great and increasing dislike of Revenue business. Even when the Commission, appointed in 1807 to report upon the civil administration of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, was in course of construction, and Mr. Tucker, the working member of the itinerant Board, was anxious to see Charles Metcalfe attached to it as Secretary, he was unwilling to accept such a situation lest it should lead him away permanently from the Political line to which he was resolute to adhere. On other accounts, the appointment had many attractions—and when he found that his friends Sherer and Bayley were attached to the Commission—the former as Secretary, the latter as Interpreter, he often longed to be one of the party. In the following letter to the former his opinions and feelings are clearly expressed :

CHARLES METCALFE TO J. W. SHERER.

“ July 10, 1807.

“ MY DEAR SHERER,—I am rejoiced to see your appointment and Butterworth's to the Commission, as I indulge the

\* Letter to Sherer, *post*, page 236.





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hope of seeing you here, though not immediately. It of course has taken place with your entire consent, and both you and Bayley, I imagine, retain your respective situations in Calcutta. It will be a delightful trip for you; you will see a great deal which you must greatly wish to see. You will obtain a most extensive knowledge of a most important branch of our affairs, and your situation being only temporary, it will not interfere with your plan of always keeping your headquarters in Calcutta, nor with your views of promotion in that most successful field of action. Considering these circumstances, I look upon your appointment as a most pleasant and fortunate event, and congratulate you upon it accordingly. The same to Bayley, to whom I shall shortly address my sentiments on his conduct, although he has behaved so shockingly lately as almost to be unworthy of my notice. My love to him notwithstanding. I already anticipate some delightful days with you two in my Bungalow at Delhi. You have a most respectable Deputy and agreeable companion in Fortescue, to whom I beg you to remember me kindly. My remembrance also to the Commissioners in proper terms and degrees. By-the-by, Tucker will, doubtless, have mentioned to you what I read in a letter from him to Richardson, that at first, with the assent of Cox, he had proposed to Sir G. Barlow, through Lumsden, my appointment as Secretary to the Commission. Of course at that time he could not have expected that the Secretary's office would be put on so respectable a footing. He could have had no idea that the Government would spare you Bayley and Fortescue, otherwise he would never, it is clear, have thought of me. I will tell you the effect that this had on my mind when Richardson sent me Tucker's letter. I must observe that Tucker wrote just after Lumsden left him to carry the proposition to the Governor, and therefore could give no hint of the result. I was, of course, flattered by the circumstance, and obliged to Tucker, but I wished that he had not made the proposal, and I did not like the thought of getting so deep into the Revenue line, and so



far from the Political. I did not know what I should do, if any reference were made to me, as on the one hand to give up my post on a favorite line, and on the other to reject so respectable a situation likely to be attended with considerable advantages, would be either way difficult. My hope was that Government, without any reference to me, would make its own arrangement excluding me, and so relieve me from the responsibility of guiding my own destiny. The sight of your appointment was the first and is the only intelligence which I have yet received, and besides the pleasure of seeing your appointment to a post which I thought would be pleasing to you, I felt on my own account great relief. Although I am much obliged to Tucker for thinking of me, I am glad on many accounts that the present capital arrangement has taken place. If I could take the tour which you are about to make in company with you and Bayley, what happiness I should feel! But alas, alas! I must rest contented with the hope of seeing you here. With respect to the object of your Commission, it is my private opinion—but I am not, you know, a mighty wise man in these matters (nor indeed in any other)—that the Ceded and Conquered Provinces are not ready for a Permanent Settlement. But you come, I suppose, with discretionary powers, and I trust with full and efficient control.

“If the Commission wishes to try its hand at unsettled countries, it will have a glorious opportunity in those which have lately been under my management (perhaps it would be more properly called mismanagement). All my efforts to call the attention of Government, or even the proper and active attention of the Resident, to the subject have been vain. I thank God, Spedding will be here in two or three days, and I shall be relieved from the charge. Then there will remain the confounded Udabut, in which, from circumstances peculiar to Delhi, there is work for ten Judges without there being one. If these duties continue, it will be a farce to call myself in the Political line, whilst I am continually lagging from morning to night in the Judicial and Revenue. I shall on Fraser's arrival





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astonish Seton, by requesting permission to confine myself to my own line; and perhaps shock him by this proof of my insensibility to the prayers of a numerous people petitioning for justice; for Seton, in theory, is an enthusiast for the administration of justice. . . . We have been, and are, and I believe ever shall be, on the best of terms. We have had our different opinions on public matters, and argued them, and finally adhered each to his own, without any interruption of harmony or diminution of confidence, and considering our relative situations the merit of this rests entirely with him. More of him another time. For myself, I never, I assure you, can lose sight of the object to which you guide my thoughts; I mean Adam's office. I despair, indeed, of ever gaining it, but I do not the less desire it. It is the only situation in India that I think of. I would make any exertions to obtain it if I expected success. But I fear, I fear, I fear, that I have no chance. I wish that you could make out an *obvious connexion* between it and the trifling affair which lately happened here. I sincerely thank you for your kind expressions relative to the business here. It was a trifle, and you have heard all relating to it that is worth mentioning. I have much left unsaid, but will resume at another time; it is now very late. Believe me ever, my dear Sherer, not forgetting the glorious defeat of the Corsican wretch,

"Yours most affectionately,

"C. T. METCALFE."

In this letter we see with sufficient distinctness that Charles Metcalfe could not easily reconcile himself to the performance of the uncongenial duties of the Revenue and Judicial departments; but in the following, his dislike of these services breaks out with more manifest impatience; for he had been disquieted by an unexpected call to act as Collector



of Saharunpore. There was a scarcity of civilians at that time in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces; and there were geographical reasons, if none other, why Metcalfe should be taken from Delhi to officiate for Mr. Guthrie, during his leave of absence from the station; so he received a missive from one of the Government Secretaries, ordering him to act as Collector of Saharunpore "for one month"—an "insignificant duty," of which he could not refrain from expressing his disgust:

CHARLES METCALFE TO J. W. SHERER.

"Meerut, August 27, 1807.

"MY DEAR SHERER,—I have just now received your letter from the Ganges, between Mirzapore and Allahabad. I rejoice to find that you are so much pleased with your trip. It appears to me to be a great relief to the sameness of your official duties, and altogether an event which must be attended with incalculable advantages. I am not surprised that your mind wanders occasionally from Regulations, Reports, and Plans, to seek refreshment in the Elysium of interesting literature. I should be very much astonished to hear the contrary of *you*, though it might do very well for *M*——. In saying what you did to Tucker concerning my views, you acted like a true friend. If the offer of such an honorable post had ever reached me, I might have hesitated before I declined it. An ambition to be so distinguished would, doubtless, have tingled in my breast; but my reason tells me, that in order to secure any success in the Political line, or any other, the only wise way is to adhere to that line most tenaciously; and as my choice is fixed, I mean to pursue what appears to be the best way to attain my object. With these sentiments, you will be able to conceive that my disgust and annoyance is not small in being



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sent on the insignificant duty of acting as Collector in the absence of Guthrie from his station.\*

"This is a dreadful blow to all my plans, because it may be repeated whenever the convenience of sending me from Delhi to act for any Collector in the vicinity may suggest itself to the wise head of an unaccommodating Secretary. What would I not give, if I must act out of my line, to change my present situation to be made your deputy! I should like very much to know what answer *my friend* Sir George gave, when I was proposed as Secretary. If you should ever hear from Tucker, let me know. I dare say it was, that I was too young and inexperienced.

"I hope that I shall be able to spend some time with you and Bayley, but I shall not be so much my own master as you expect. I shall, most likely, have a troublesome year of it. I expect to be out the greater part of the season with a considerable military force, to *reduce* a barren unproductive country to subordination. It will be a most unpleasant duty; but Seton's heart is set upon it, and I do not know how I can get rid of it. Unfortunately, our districts are not put under your

\* Metcalfe wrote to his friend John Adam, who was then in the Secretariat department, setting forth the inconvenience of detaching him from his regular duties to act temporarily out of the line of his profession; and it may be gathered from the following extract from Adam's reply that he obtained something of an assurance that he would not be sent on deputation again:

"I am sorry," wrote Mr. Adam, on September 17, 1807, "that I am not able to give you a positive promise that you will never at any future time be employed on deputation; but I think it extremely improbable that you will, after what I have said to Edmonstone on the subject, and the manner in which he has spoken to Dowdeswell. D. excused himself on the subject of your being sent to Saharunpore on the ground of there being no other fit person whom they could employ on that duty within a

very great distance, and he assured him that it should not occur again. Edmonstone himself is fully impressed with the impropriety as well as the unfairness of sending you to perform duties so foreign to your own profession and to your inclination. . . . It so happened, too, that one day at Barrackpore Lord Minto was asking me about your situation (which he introduced by saying that Seton had been writing of you in terms of high praise), and I took the opportunity of telling him your objections to the temporary employment you were upon, and your wish to devote yourself altogether to the Political line. He made some observation about the superiority of the Political line, and that your deputation would not last long; but whether the impression will remain, I cannot tell. I should hope, however, there is no danger of your being again made a collector."



Commission—if they were, I should expect some good in them. Our Customs at Delhi particularly require your interference; which, from the absurdity of keeping up all the old Sayers, and refraining from introducing a new system, are in a most abominable state. A representation that I made on the subject, in order to get rid of the worst part of them, went no further than Seton's desk.

“I am much of your way of thinking with regard to his Majesty of Delhi. If I do not go all lengths with you in destroying every part of the shadow of his Royalty, I am, at all events, for letting him see very clearly that he is a mere shadow; and if this could not be done completely without destroying even the empty name which I would wish for the present to leave to him, I would destroy even that. Thinking as you do, you will be vexed, as I am, to find that the tone, language, and behaviour of the *Court*, together with all the outward marks, and in some respects, the real operative influence of Royalty, have become in an increasing ratio much more ridiculous and preposterous since the accession of the illustrious Ukbar than they were before. It has often made me wonder, and at the same time almost made me mad, to see a most worthy excellent man blind to such gross absurdity, and a dupe to wild and romantic feelings.

“As we near, I hope that our correspondence may become more frequent. This hint is not necessary to Bayley; he at all times writes so frequently! My love to him. Remember me to Fortescue.

“Believe me ever, your sincere friend,

“C. T. METCALFE.”

All through the cold weather of 1807-1808, Charles Metcalfe, actively employed in the performance of his official duties, had little time for private correspondence. Nor would there have





been much to gather from it that would advance the progress of the narrative if he had found leisure to keep up a constant interchange of sentiment with his friends. But the summer of the latter year came to him pregnant with great events. His ambition was now about to be signally gratified. Lord Minto was at this time Governor-General of India. From all quarters he had heard the praises of Charles Metcalfe, and though personally unacquainted with him, he had such confidence in his zeal and ability, that he rejoiced when the progress of events enabled him to give the Delhi Assistant an opportunity of distinguishing himself on an independent field of action. He was about to be employed on an important Political Mission, demanding for the due execution of its duties the highest diplomatic powers. In what state the summons found him may be gathered from a letter which he wrote in July to his friend Sherer. He had then either not received the official notification of his appointment, or it was a State secret—but soon afterwards, he was on his way to the Punjab :

CHARLES METCALFE TO J. W. SHERER.

“ Delhi, July 3, 1808.

“ MY DEAR SHERER,—As it is long since I have written to you, I will give you some account of myself. As by the blessing of God I have a good constitution, and have never experienced any of those misfortunes which wound the heart or warrant any tendency to melancholy, I enjoy as usual good health and good spirits. My accounts from my family are in all essential points of a most pleasing nature. My father and mother continue perfectly healthy. My sisters are growing up



all that their parents wish them to be; and Master Tom is said to be a quick, merry boy, with a *slight inclination* to idleness.

“From China I have no late intelligence. The only bad piece of news that I have received from England is, that my father has lost his seat in Parliament. I am sure that he must feel the want of it, and I confess that I felt much annoyed by the intelligence. There is some consolation, however, in thinking that at my father’s time of life rest and retirement, if not required, ought at least to be beneficial.

“You are of course acquainted with the arrangement which has lately taken place here, attaching permanently to the situation of First Assistant the duties of the *ci-devant* office of Superintendent of Revenues. I am far from being pleased either with the arrangement or the mode in which it has been ordered; but there is no use in grumbling about it. To the charge of the business now settled upon me they have affixed the Commission which the Superintendent used to draw, in order, I suppose, to soften the bitterness of the trouble. I mean to make this a sinking fund for the reduction of my debts, which, owing to the expenses of my Bungalow, has risen to a considerable amount. My political character will henceforth be little more than nominal, for I must necessarily give up my time and attention to Revenue matters. In two or three days I shall take the field, and I do not expect to take up my residence again at Delhi before the next hot winds.

“What an unexampled and surprising picture the state of Europe now presents; France, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Germany, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Italy, Turkey, all Europe, save little Sweden, combined against our country. We may truly call ourselves ‘*divisos orbe Britannos.*’ Although this is a state of things which no one could ever have wished to see, I confess that I feel a pride in it. There is something glorious in fighting against the world. I admire the spirited and dignified conduct of our Ministers. I hope that we shall do as well as possible under such strange circumstances. Surely the combination against us cannot hold together long. Is it





not unnatural? Will the Emperor of Russia long consent to be the tool of France? or is he, with all the other Powers of Europe, so completely enslaved as to make his conduct and theirs not a matter of choice? What strange things we have seen. We go to war with Turkey entirely on account of our friendship with Russia—Turkey makes peace with Russia but cannot be induced to make peace with us, and the two Powers unite against us. We broke off a treaty with France on account of some point for which we were struggling in favor of Russia, and now Russia and France are in alliance against us. We sent to Prussia money and arms to assist her against France, and now both money and arms are turned against us on the side of France. We sent a large expedition to the Baltic to aid our allies; when it arrived our allies had become our foes, and it was obliged to take the navy and capital of one of those Powers whom it was sent to protect from French influence.

“We have at different times paid Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Germany; we preserved to Turkey a great portion of its empire, driving out its enemies the French; we have constantly fought the battles of Europe against France; and all Powers are now ranged on the side of France against us. Hurrah for the tight little Island! What will become of General Whitelocke, think you? Perhaps he will be shot, as Voltaire says, speaking of Admiral Byng: ‘*pour encourager les autres.*’ God bless you.

“Your faithful friend,

“C. T. METCALFE.”



## CHAPTER VIII.

[1808—1809.]

## THE MISSION TO LAHORE.

Apprehensions of an Invasion—Measures of Defence—Metcalf appointed Envoy to Lahore—Meeting with Runjeet Singh—Conduct of the Rajah—Delays and Excuses—Metcalf's Diplomatic Address—His Firmness and Decision—Advance of the British Troops—Progress of Negotiation—The Proposed Treaty—Collision with the Akalis—The Treaty concluded.

WHEN, in the spring of 1808, from the Council-chamber of Calcutta, Lord Minto and his colleagues looked out upon those vast tracts of country which lie beyond the Sutlej and the Indus, and saw already the shadow of a gigantic enemy advancing from the West, it was no idle terror that haunted the imaginations of our British statesmen. The pacification of Tilsit had leagued against us the unscrupulous ambition of the great French usurper and the territorial cupidity of the Russian autocrat. That among the mighty schemes which they then discussed for the partition of the world between them, the invasion of India was not one of the least cherished, or the least substantial, now stands recorded as an historical fact. We know now that it was nothing more than a design; but it was not less the duty of





our Indian rulers in 1808, to provide against a contingency which then seemed neither improbable nor remote. The occasion was one which, if it did not warrant a demonstration of military power, at all events invited a display of diplomatic address. It was sound policy, in such a conjuncture, to secure the good offices of the princes and chiefs who were dominant in the countries which were supposed to lie on the great high road of the invader. If the rulers of Afghanistan and the Punjab could be induced to enter into friendly alliances with the British Government for the resistance of invasion from the North, it seemed to Lord Minto and his colleagues that more than half of the danger which threatened our position would be at once removed.

Already was French intrigue making its way at the Persian Court. That was the sure commencement of the great game that was about to be played—the safest and the wisest commencement. It was a great thing, therefore, to re-establish our ascendancy at Teheran—and a great thing to achieve the diplomatic occupation of the countries between Persia and India before our enemies could appear upon the scene. To accomplish the former object John Malcolm was despatched to the Court of the Shah-i-shah; and to secure the latter Mountstuart Elphinstone and Charles Metcalfe were ordered to proceed—the former to Cabul, and the latter to Lahore.\*

\* What the course of aggression to be pursued by the French would be, our Government could of course only conjecture, for it is doubtful whether the former had ever any very clear perception on the subject themselves. The following passages, however, from the letter of instructions sent to Charles



The Prince to whose Court Metcalfe was ordered to proceed was Runjeet Singh. Since, in pursuit of Holkar, Lake's battalions had encamped in the country of the five rivers, the rise of that chieftain had been rapid. He had gone on without halting,

Metcalfe indicate what Lord Minto's conjectures were. After speaking of diplomatic events in Persia, the document thus proceeds:

"The increasing importance of those transactions in Persia, and the activity and advancement of those hostile projects of the French, which suggest the necessity of a close connexion with the states of Lahore and Cabul, having rendered the establishment of a direct intercourse with the Rajah of Lahore and the King of Cabul at an early period of time an object essential to the interests and security of the British Government in India, the Right Hon. the Governor-General in Council has resolved to adopt without further delay the measures necessary for that purpose, by appointing direct Missions to each of those Courts, intending at the same time that the officers employed on this occasion should be vested with authority to open a negotiation with them respectively for the attainments of the ultimate object of the proposed connexion, that of encouraging the states of Cabul and Lahore to resist the progress of a French army, which may endeavor to traverse the territories of those states with a view to the invasion of India; and the Governor-General in Council, reposing full confidence in your zeal, ability, discretion, and local knowledge, has been pleased to vest you with the charge of the proposed Mission to the Rajah of Lahore in the capacity of Envoy on the part of the British Government."—[*Edmonstone to Metcalfe, June 20, 1808.*] And again: "If the French should ultimately fail of securing the co-operation of Persia in the execution of their hostile designs against India, and should be enabled to advance their armies into Persia, they

may be expected to endeavor to establish their power in the latter country by force of arms. It is probable, indeed, that, under circumstances, they will place their dependence on their power to overawe and control the state of Persia rather than on the friendship and co-operation of that state. With regard to the precise nature of the measures and operations by which the French may endeavor to prosecute their hostile designs against India, after having opened a passage for their troops into Persia, established a military ascendancy, Government possesses no authentic information. Some reports state that the French propose to aid the King of Persia in the conquest of the Afghan territories, and to annex them to the King's dominions, and subsequently to invade India by the route of Caubul and the Punjab. Other reports have stated, that it is the intention of the French to prosecute the projected invasion of India by the southern route of Scinde and Guzerat. . . . Although the French may possibly pursue the course above stated with respect to the Afghan territories, it is at least equally probable that they will endeavor, by means of their emissaries, to secure the good-will of the King of Cabul, and to obtain for their troops a free passage through those territories. It is to be expected also that they will despatch emissaries to Lahore with the same view. It is consistent with the activity which distinguishes the character of the French, to suppose that they have already despatched agents to those countries—a supposition which augments the urgency of your Mission, and the proposed Mission to Cabul."—[*Edmonstone to Metcalfe, June 20, 1808.*]



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on his career of conquest. A man of unbounded energy and unfailing courage—with great natural sagacity and no inconvenient amount of conscientiousness either to control his energies or direct his abilities—he had been recently absorbing all the small principalities beyond the Sutlej, and consolidating them into a great empire. Even the petty Sikh states on our side of the Sutlej were not beyond the scope of his ambition. He was eager to bring them also under the common yoke; and as he approached the confines of British dominion, was already beginning to excite the jealousy and mistrust of his Christian neighbours. In 1805 he was known to us merely as one of the chiefs of the Punjab; in 1808 he was the Maha-rajah (or great king) Runjeet Singh.\*

Of the Sikhs we were long content to know little. In the first years of the century our British functionaries spoke of them as “miscreants,” as a law-

\* See Metcalfe's own account of the progress made by Runjeet in this interval:

“It must be remembered that in the time of the Mahrattas his (Runjeet's) power was very petty compared with what it is at present. He had not then subdued many chiefs of the Punjab, and would not presume to extend his views beyond the Sutlej. As late as 1806, when the British army was on the Beah, he was not the sovereign of places in the Punjab within thirty miles of Lahore. Indeed, several of his present obsequious dependents were then quite independent of him, and some were in open war with him. Since the beginning of 1806 his power has increased in an extraordinary manner, and as, throughout his life, it has been progressive, it

may be supposed how inferior it was in 1802 and 1803, when the Mahrattas were masters of Delhi. From 1803 to 1806 he was extending his possessions in the Punjab. In the course of 1806 he nearly completed the subjugation of the country, and in the latter end of the last-mentioned year he commenced his encroachments on the left bank of the Sutlej. Since that time his power has become much more respectable than it was before—since that time he has amassed treasure of which he had none before—since that time he has collected most of his guns and formed his infantry corps. In brief, since that time his power has assumed substantial form and greatness.”—[Metcalfe to Edmonstone. *MS. Records*, June 2, 1802.]



less and degraded people, either indulging their predatory habits abroad, or sunk deep in sensuality at home. Neither their territorial arrangements nor their military resources were matters of vital concern to us at this time; and if we took any account of the national character of the followers of Govind, it was in pursuit rather of ethnographical knowledge than in furtherance of any political ends. But the great war with the Mahrattas, and the conquests which it had forced upon us, brought us into proximity with these strange new people; and it then became apparent to us that we could no longer regard the Sikh States as a group of petty principalities, exercising no influence whether for good or for evil upon the security of our position, or the pacific character of our rule. It seemed, indeed, necessary to do something; but what that something was to be it was difficult to decide. In the disunion of the Sikhs there were elements both of safety and of danger to the British—of safety, because a power so utterly wanting in union and organisation could never be formidable in itself; of danger, because the very causes which prevented the Sikhs from becoming formidable enemies rendered it impossible that they should become serviceable friends. There was, indeed, in these states, on both sides of the Sutlej, nothing of unity or stability out of which a barrier against external invasion could be erected. It was apparent that we could enter with them into no engagements that could bind them to oppose the advance of an European army. To protect themselves against spoliation it was but



too likely that they would league themselves with the invaders, and swell the tide of devastation and destruction. It was difficult to deal with such a combination of circumstances as now presented itself, and yet to adhere strictly to those principles of non-interference which the British Legislature had established, and to which the Indian Government of the day declared its fixed determination to adhere.\*

The advantages of giving something like a tangible form and substance to the scattered elements of the Sikh power on the banks of the Sutlej had been urged upon the Supreme Government by Colonel Ochterlony whilst still Resident at Delhi. It was proposed by him, that the British Government should distribute the country between the Sutlej and the Jumna among four principal Sikh chiefs, the precise limits of the territory of each being assigned by us, and that we should enter into specific engagements with these chiefs. Or, if it were considered that such engagements were not likely to be observed, it was suggested that resort might be had to a more decided exercise of our

\* See, for the views of the Supreme Government in 1805-1806, minute drawn up by Mr. Lumsden for the Governor-General:

"The Sikh chieftains in the actual condition of their respective tenures could not by any arrangement be rendered efficient allies and auxiliaries against an invading enemy. It would be impracticable to unite them in a common interest and a common cause. In the event of invasion they would probably add by their junction to the

number of the invaders, and increase their means of devastation. . . . . We could not safely or prudently depend in any degree upon the sentiments of gratitude or the obligations of public faith and honor to govern the proceedings of such a tribe. The ruling chieftains would probably provide for their security from immediate plunder or destruction by conciliating and assisting, and perhaps by joining, the enemy."—[MS. Records.]



paramount power—that the whole body of Sikh chiefs might be reduced to the condition of tributaries, and compelled to pay for the maintenance of a British force to “watch their conduct,” or, in other words, to hold them in absolute subjection. But this was not a course of policy likely to find favor in the eyes of Lord Cornwallis, Sir George Barlow, or Lord Minto. “The Resident was informed that the arguments which would justify such an exercise of our power would equally justify the annexation of the whole of the Sikh territory to the British dominions, and that the extension of our territorial possessions, or of our political control for purposes of expediency, or even of comparative security, unsupported by motives of indisputable justice and indispensable necessity, had never constituted an object of the policy of this Government.” \* A strictly defensive system was to be maintained—not that defensiveness which is nine parts aggression, but rigid non-interference, which turns its back upon its neighbours until it receives a blow from behind. The Sikh chiefs were to be left to themselves. But they were to be chastised if they offended us. Predatory incursions across our borders were to be visited in the first place by the expulsion of the offenders at the point of the bayonet, and in the second place by the partition of their lands among those chiefs who aided us in the suppression of the lawless excesses of their neighbours. And it was believed that we should best

\* Minute of Mr. Lumsden, *ut supra*.—[*MS. Records.*]





maintain the integrity of our frontier by showing that we were as unwilling to practise as we were able to resist aggression.

In this state, affairs remained until the year 1808, when the two circumstances to which I have referred at the commencement of the chapter induced Lord Minto to depart from the policy to which his predecessors had so religiously adhered—the increased apprehension of European invasion and the progressive consolidation of the empire of Runjeet Singh. A Sikh alliance had now become more expedient and more practicable. We wanted an ally, and we had found one. Left to themselves, the Sikh chiefs on the further side of the Sutlej had, one by one, been compelled to own the supremacy of Runjeet, whilst those on our side of the river, awed by the threats of the Lahore chief, were trembling for the safety of their possessions. Of the influence and the ability of this chieftain the British Government had no doubt. His integrity and good faith they may have questioned, for he was a Sikh. But they believed that they might work upon his hopes and upon his fears, and by demonstrating to him that his own interests would be largely promoted by an alliance with the British, induce him to enter into an engagement for the protection of the frontier of Hindostan.

In the winter season of 1807-8 a favorable opportunity of establishing amicable relations with the Lahore chief seemed to have presented itself. Runjeet Singh, who had written a friendly letter to Lord Minto, contemplated a visit to Hurdwar; and it



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was resolved that a British officer should be despatched to meet him there. The functionary selected for this duty was Charles Metcalfe.\* But the vacillating chief never fulfilled his intention; and when subsequently he declared that he contemplated a visit to Thanetur, it was felt that so little reliance was to be placed on his movements that it would be expedient to shape our own measures without reference to the uncertain procedure of the impulsive Sikh. So it was determined that a Mission should be sent across the Sutlej, under the conduct of Charles Metcalfe; and on the 20th of June, 1808, the Supreme Government, under the hand of Mr. Edmonstone, formally announced his appointment, and the instructions by which the young ambassador was to be guided.

The duties of the Mission were to be entrusted entirely to Metcalfe himself. He was to move without secretaries, assistants, or attachés. A military escort was to be provided; and a proper establishment of moonshees, writers and servants, was to be furnished. But the work of diplomacy was to be left entirely to his unaided counsels. He was to carry with him, however, the Oriental diplomatist's

\* Metcalfe had applied for the Deputy-Secretaryship in the Political department, on the translation of John Adam. Lord Minto had previously made other arrangements with respect to this office, but he directed his Private Secretary, in reply to Metcalfe's application, to express his Lordship's high sense of his character and abilities, and the desired intention of the Governor-General to take an early opportunity of promoting so excellent a public servant.

"The esteem," wrote Mr. Elliot, "which his Lordship has conceived for your character and talents, is founded as well on what has already fallen under his own observation as on the report of those whose judgment has been formed on a longer acquaintance. It will, therefore, give him great satisfaction to evince these sentiments by such marks of confidence and favor as he may find suitable opportunities of showing you."—[*Mr. Elliot to Mr. Metcalfe, October 25, 1807.*]





best auxiliary, a costly supply of presents; and, in order that his communications with the Government might be frequent and uninterrupted, he was instructed to establish a letter-post between Delhi and Umritsur. His personal salary was to be 2000 rupees a month, and all the expenses of the Mission were to be charged to the State.\*

Such were the outer circumstances of the Mission to Lahore. The letter which determined them carried also the instructions of the Supreme Government relative to the course of policy to be pursued by the British representative at the Sikh Court. It was such a letter as Metcalfe had never received before—such a letter as a young man of three-and-twenty has seldom, if ever, received from the Government of a great empire. The object of the Mission was of the most momentous character. It was simply to counteract the towering ambition of the gigantic despots of France and Russia. Of the great scheme of diplomacy by which Persia, Afghanistan, and the Punjab were to be erected into friendly barriers against Russo-Gallic invasion, Metcalfe was to be the pioneer. He was to prepare the way for Elphinstone, and make things ready for the reception of Malcolm. He was to conduct a series of the most delicate operations alone and unaided in a strange country, and to negotiate a treaty of friendship with a Prince of an uncertain and capricious temper, of selfish and unscrupulous ambition, unrestrained by any principles of Chris-

\* *Mr. Edmonstone to Mr. Metcalfe, June 20, 1808.*—[MS. Records.]



tian rectitude, or any courtesies of civilised life. But the very difficulties which beset such a position, and the responsibilities with which it was surrounded, only in the eyes of Charles Metcalfe, enhanced its attractiveness. He had been panting for a great opportunity, and now the great opportunity was come. They who have caught glimpses of the early character of the man in the recorded pages of his Common-place Book, and seen what were his aspirations, will readily conceive what were the pulsings of his warm heart, and the tinglings of his young blood, when he sate down to read the instructions of the Supreme Government, and to draw up for his future guidance the following memoranda, containing an abstract of the Chief Secretary's Letter and his own interpretation of its contents :

#### "MEMORANDA FROM INSTRUCTIONS.

"General and conciliatory answers to be returned to any questions from the Cis-Sutlejean chiefs respecting the object of my mission. Arguments to be used to satisfy them that the improvement of the relations of amity between the British Government and the Rajah of Lahore involves no arrangements prejudicial to other chiefs. Applications for protection against Runjeet Singh to be referred to the President of Dihlee, but endeavors to be made to convince the chiefs that Government takes an interest in their welfare, and that the objects of my mission are entirely consistent with those friendly sentiments.

"Main object of the Mission:—Counteraction of the designs of the French. The time of stating my ultimate purpose to be regulated by circumstances. Expedient first to make myself





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acquainted with the character and disposition of Runjeet Singh and his Ministers, and to endeavor to create an interest with them by conciliating their confidence and good-will. Proper to ascertain the Rajah's disposition respecting my residence at his Court. If he should be desirous of my continuance, to select my own time for opening the negotiation. In the mean time, to represent the object to be the improvement of the amicable relations so long subsisting between the states, and confirmed by the intercourse between Lord Lake and the Rajah, and by the treaty then concluded. Reference to be made to Runjeet Singh's friendly letter to the Governor-General, and the Governor-General's reply. To observe that the demonstration of attachment contained in that letter had augmented the solicitude of Government to cultivate the connexion between the two states, and that I had been sent accordingly for the express purpose of cementing the bonds of friendship. That I had been despatched to Hurdwar with the same view; and that the failure of that opportunity of showing our friendship had suggested the still more distinguished mark of regard by a direct Mission to his Court.

“Cases in which it would be advisable to enter immediately, or the proper object of my mission:—1st. If any French agent should have arrived at, or might be expected in, Lahore, or the adjacent countries. 2nd. If the designs of the French and the state of affairs in Persia should have attracted the Rajah's notice. 3rd. Receipt of authentic intelligence of the actual advance of a French army towards Persia.

“General principle upon which to conduct the negotiation:—Opposition to the French to be urged as the only way of securing the Rajah's territories and independence from the insatiable ambition and unlimited encroachment and violence of the ruler of France. To persuade him that he will not be able to resist the enemy without a British force. To secure the Rajah's consent to the march of a British army through the Punjab, and the exertion of his authority in furnishing supplies, with permission to establish depôts of provisions and