

THE DELHI RESIDENCY.

I think not—decidedly not. At present, notwithstanding my uncommon good fortune, I am not convinced that it is conducive to a man's happiness to send him to seek his fortune in India."—[*Delhi, March 6, 1813.*]

" I cannot describe to you how much I am worked. And if I could, there would be no pleasure either to you or me in the detail. I will, therefore, pass over that for awhile, and endeavor to forget my plagues. Tom arrived here on the 18th. I am very much pleased with him, and think him a superior young man. I will answer for his doing well. He distinguished himself very much in College, and got out by his own exertions in less than four months. Here he and I are together; and here we shall remain for many and many a long year, consoling each other as well as we can for the absence of all other friends.* I shall see you, I hope, in eighteen years!"—[*Delhi, November 2, 1813.*]

" It is very kind in you to wish me home; and I assure you that I wish myself at home most ardently. Nevertheless, as the sacrifices which a man must make who comes to India have been made for the most part already, I do not mean to return to England to struggle with poverty, or to be forced to draw tight my purse-strings. The sacrifice that I have made I consider great. The recompense that I propose to myself is to have a competency, not merely for my own expenses, but to enable me to assist others without reluctance or restraint. My own expenses may, I think, be trifling. I believe that I should have more pleasure in spending only 500*l.* per annum, than I should have in squandering 5000*l.* in the same way. But to put extreme economy out of the question, allow 1500*l.* or 2000*l.* for my own expenses. You know better than I do what a single man ought to live upon creditably, without attempting to vie with people of large fortunes. Tell me what

* The younger Metcalfe, by the spontaneous kindness of Lord Minto, had been appointed an Assistant to the Delhi Resident.



RETURN OF MR. SETON.

you think requisite for the support of a bachelor in a decent, comfortable manner. Add to that what would be requisite to procure a seat in Parliament. Add to that a sum to enable me to make presents freely to my friends, and to assist the distressed, and to contribute to public charities. Let me know the sum total, and I will make my arrangements accordingly. . . . I am become very unsociable and morose, and feel myself getting more so every day. I lead a vexatious and joyless life; and it is only the hope of home at last that keeps me alive and merry. That thought cheers me; though writing to any of you always makes me sad." — [*Shalimar, Delhi, March 20, 1814.*]

From passages such as these, glimpses may be caught of the inner life of the Delhi Resident. Stripped of his externals, the *burra sahib*, or great lord of the imperial city, was but a solitary exile, continually disquieted by thoughts of Home. But he lived with the harness on his back, and incessant occupation preserved him from despondency or depression. He had now become Resident indeed. The anticipations of his return to Scindiah's Court which he had expressed in one of his letters to his Aunt, were not to be realised. At the commencement of September, 1812, Mr. Seton entered the Hooghly river, on his return from Prince of Wales' Island, full of the thought of revisiting Delhi. But a letter from Lord Minto, announcing that he had been appointed provisionally a member of Council, met him at Diamond Harbour. Two vacancies were about to occur at the Council-Board. Mr. Lumsden and Mr. Colebrooke had both nearly served for the appointed five years of office. To the first of these

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vacancies that ripe statesman, Mr. Edmonstone, who had long been little less than the Supreme Government itself, stood nominated by the Court of Directors. For the second, the choice lay between Mr. Tucker and Mr. Seton; but after some discussion at the India House, the latter had been eventually appointed; and the intelligence had arrived just in time to greet him as he entered the river on his return to Bengal.

Scarcely had Seton landed, when he wrote to his old Assistant to apprise him of what was a matter to him of such vital importance. But he had been anticipated by some of the denizens of Government House, who, a week before, had despatched the glad tidings to the Acting-Resident. The intelligence, which was in some measure unexpected, filled both Seton and Metcalfe with joy. To the former, moreover, it was an inexpressible relief. "In addition to considerations of a domestic character," he wrote to his old Assistant, "I trust I have a due sense of others of a less selfish kind, which render the situation gratifying in the extreme; and you, my dear Metcalfe, will, I am persuaded, give me credit for the delight with which I indulge the reflection that the arrangement will necessarily fix you at Delhi. I really cannot express to you how awkward and distressed I felt every time that the idea came across me that I could not return to Delhi without being the means of your quitting that station. In vain did I try to reconcile my mind to it by turning to the 'flattering unction' of its being necessary, in consequence of the state of my domestic concerns.



THE PERMANENT APPOINTMENT.

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All would not do. I still felt the awkwardness arising from the embarrassing reflection that I must either sacrifice the pressing claims of my family, or interfere with the views of my friend—and of such a friend! The present arrangement has, among many other desirable points, the advantage of tranquillising this painful struggle." The May fleet which arrived in October brought out the official announcement of Seton's appointment; so the old Delhi Resident remained in Calcutta; Metcalfe was confirmed in the appointment which he had now held on a precarious tenure for a year and a half; and Richard Strachey succeeded in the same manner to the Residency at Scindiah's Court.

And thus was removed one of the great drawbacks of Charles Metcalfe's position at Delhi during the earlier period of his incumbency; but there were still, as he said in his letters to his Aunt, many vexations and annoyances, the troubles of the Residency, not the least were those which arose out of the folly of the Mogul, and the wickedness of his family and dependants. There were things done in the Palace and duly reported to the Resident, in violation of all laws human and divine. The crimes which were thus committed, sometimes behind the sanctity of the *purdah*, most disquieted Metcalfe, for it was difficult either to prevent their commission, or to deal with them when they were committed. One day it was reported to him by the officer in command of the Palace-guard, whose duty it was to take cognisance of all that passed within the limits of the imperial residence, that two of the



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young princes had been playing the parts of common robbers—oiling their naked persons, then rushing with drawn swords among the startled inmates of the Zenana, and forcibly carrying off their property. Another time it was announced to him that one of these princes had murdered a woman in the Palace, either by beating her to death or compelling her to swallow opium. Again tidings came to him that one of the ladies of the Emperor's establishment had murdered a female infant. Then it was reported to the Resident that the imperial quarters had been rendered a general receptacle for stolen goods and sequestered property. Then a knotty question arose as to whether the slave-trade, having been prohibited in the city of Delhi, should be allowed to survive in the Palace. Then it appeared that the Emperor himself, after sundry intrigues at Calcutta, was intriguing with the Newab Wuzeer of Oude, through the agency of the Prince Jehanguire, who, on the pretext of attending a marriage festival, had gone to Lucknow, from Allahabad, where he was a state-prisoner, to beseech the Newab to intercede with the British Government for the augmentation of his father's stipend.

Since Charles Metcalfe had made his first obeisance at the Court of the Mogul, the old blind Emperor, Shah Allum, had been gathered to his fathers; and now Akbar Shah, his son, reigned in his stead. The infirmities of the unhappy monarch had not been without their uses. His wants had been comparatively few, and he had grown penurious at the close of his career. When he died, it appeared



that he had hoarded up some lakhs of rupees; so his predecessor found himself with a supply of unapportioned cash in his treasury which he might call undividedly his own. But the new King being neither blind nor penurious, complained that the stipend allowed by the British Government was insufficient for the wants of such a family as he was bound to maintain. The inmates of the imperial Palace constituted a considerable population in themselves. There were members of the royal family belonging to several generations, including even the connexions of Shah Allum's predecessor; and liberal as were the allowances granted by the British Government, they barely sufficed to support, in comfort and respectability, a royal family of such inordinate dimensions. The condition, indeed, of these wretched people moved the generous sympathies of Lord Minto. Something of a promise had been made to the Mogul, that when the financial condition of the British Government would admit of greater liberality, an addition would be made to the imperial stipend. So in the summer of 1809 the Governor-General was induced to review the whole question, and in an elaborate minute, partly written by Mr. Edmonstone, partly by himself, declared his intention of augmenting the allowances of the Shah, and indicated the most advantageous method of doing it. The increased amount was still below that which the Mogul had declared to be necessary for the support of his household; but the savings of Shah Allum for some time made good the deficiency, and kept the royal pensioner



quiet. No sooner, however, was this exhausted, than he began to bestir himself ^{reserve-fund} a further augmentation of what he called ^{to} obtain "bute," and to this end instructed his favorite son ^{to} in whose behalf he had long desired to set aside the rights of the heir-apparent, to obtain the ear of the Newab Wuzer of Oude, and to induce him to further his claims. The letter of the Shah* fell into the hands of Colonel Baillie, the Resident at Lucknow, who recommended that thenceforth the Prince should be "subjected to those salutary restraints, under the influence and authority of the Resident, which would seem indispensable to the future guidance of his conduct, and cannot be easily applied under any other authority."†

Indeed, it was necessary to exercise no little salutary restraint over the movements of the Shah and his favorite son. The idea which the former had encouraged of setting aside the rightful succession in favor of the latter had been peremptorily resisted by the British Government; but it was doubtful whether it had been wholly abandoned. A little time before the detection of these Lucknow intrigues—that is, in the spring of 1811, soon after Metcalfe's assumption of office—the Mogul had

* The exordium of the King's letter sets forth the state of the case as given in the text:

"My beloved son, the light of my eyes and delight of my soul, may the Almighty increase your years! After prayers for the prolongation of your life, be it known to you that in consequence of the great increase of necessary expenditure, the money which

was left in the treasury at the demise of his late Majesty has all been removed and expended. The tribute allowed by the English is totally inadequate to defray my expenses, and there seems no prospect of an increase, nor of the satisfactory adjustment of any other matter depending," &c., &c.

† Colonel Baillie to Mr. Edmonstone, March 3, 1813.—[MS. Records.]



been partly the agent, partly the victim, of another intrigue at Calcutta. This business was known in the official language of the times as the Mission of Prawn Kishen. The secret history of this Mission is diverting in the extreme. Two wily natives—the one a Hindoo, the other a Mussulman, aided by a Moulavee, or Mahomedan priest—persuaded the Shah that they could do great things for him at Calcutta, especially in respect of the succession of Prince Jehanguire, through the agency of the Chief-Justice, Sir Henry Russell, from whom a letter, addressed to his Majesty, was produced. The weakness of the King caught in the imposture. The cunning knaves were sent as *wakeels** to Calcutta, whilst the expounder of the Koran remained behind in the imperial city to consummate the fraud. They did their work with considerable address, and for some time, by means of a series of amusing fabrications, contrived to live upon the credulity of their master. There was no falsehood—there was no forgery—which these sharpeners hesitated to utter or to commit. They wrote astonishing accounts of their reception by “Lord Russell,” and despatched letters to the King in the name of that high functionary. They declared that they had waited on him immediately on their arrival at Calcutta, that on receiving an account of his Majesty’s situation he had “rung his hands with grief,” and on reading the King’s letter he had bitten his lips, and assured the Envoy that he had caused the Governor-

* *wakeel* is an agent, or attorney. probably be of frequent occurrence, generally signifies a diplomatic agent.
In his work the word, which will



General to write a letter to the Nizam (Metcalf), saying, "I have sent you that you should honor his Majesty, not that you should distress him. If, another time, I hear of your offending his Majesty, you may expect to be punished. . . . Be tranquil, for the business of the heir-apparentcy, and of the removal of the Nizam, shall soon be effected, and the other matters, also, will be easily accomplished." Having thus assured the King that all his representations had been favorably received, they bid him, in a subsequent letter,* that they were 'off for London' with the Governor-General and the old Delhi Resident and ~~and~~ his Majesty, to pay their wages to a friend, whom they named, in their absence. Lord Minto and Mr. Seton were just at that time embarking for the Eastern Archipelago, and the knaves taking advantage of a circumstance, the outline of which might obtain notoriety even at Delhi, assured the King that they were going to England, and that his humble servants

* The letter in which this is stated is highly amusing. They had told the King before that Mr. Elphinstone had been sent a prisoner to England, and now they related the circumstances of his acquittal:

"His Lordship (Lord Russell) has ordered us both to accompany Mr. Seton and his Excellency the Governor-General to London—so, God willing, off we go to London, by the way of Bombay. We hope in your Majesty's gracious kindness to allow Gora Chund to join us in this quarter, for from the smallness of our wages we can with difficulty make our subsistence if asunder. We trust in your Majesty's bounty for increase of our wages. It has been our bad fortune, and the cause

of disappointment, that such has not taken place as yet to the present day. We leave Kevel Ram with the aforesaid gentleman (Lord Russell); Mr. Elphinstone having been accused of partiality to the Fre to go to London. 'Twas obliged King he said, 'I am before the have been accused thro fault, but cause when in Delhi I spite be- Seton on account of his riled Mr. the royal family. I an respect to He was accordingly acqu a no fault.' off with Seton and thed. We set vernor on the 18th of Mrab Go- beg that our wages be paid. We Moulavee from month to month, the of course will get it conveyed to us. [MS. Records.]



were going with him. And having done this, the lying Moulavee assured the King that the story was correct, that his wakeels had sailed with the Governor-General, and that all his Majesty's wishes would now be speedily fulfilled.

In due course the fraud was discovered. The letters from Calcutta, in which such great things had been promised, were placed in Metcalfe's hands. The Shah expressed unbounded contrition, but it was doubtful whether he did not grieve over the failure of his Mission rather than over his own misconduct in attempting to carry on an under-hand intrigue; and Metcalfe, therefore, took the opportunity of counselling his Majesty to "relinquish that torment of his life, the worrying desire to effect impracticable changes." He was not without a hope at a time that the advice which he offered would have due effect upon the Shah, and dissuade him from launching in any further profitless intrigues. But baffled in the direction of Calcutta, he soon began to consider whether he might not put his diplomacy with better success at Lucknow. There was, indeed, an under-current of intrigue continually flowing out of the Palace; and, although it could hardly at any time become dangerous in its effects, it was likely to become inconvenient, and was, therefore, to be restrained. Precarious visions of a great future revival were induced by these decayed princes. The more the generous sympathy of the British Government sought to cover their actual humiliation with outward marks of courtesy and respect, the more they



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dreamt of recovering the substantialities of their by-gone greatness. "The King," wrote Lord Minto, in the minute to which I have alluded, "went on his attainable purpose, but destitute of power to attempt it openly, and too feeble even to avow it, goes to every little artifice, engages in every petty intrigue, and is drawn into all the oblique and disingenuous courses which the ladies of his Palace, or councillors equally feminine, can suggest and recommend to him. An opening is furnished for such practices by the liberal courtesy with which the exterior observances due to the real sovereignty of his ancestors are, most properly, extended to his nominal title; and under cover of the formal homage, which a tenderness for his personal feelings alone prompts us to render him, he seeks to advance a silent and gradual claim to the substantial attributes of greatness."*

That these wild imaginations would be fostered by the excessive kindness and consideration of Mr. Seton, Metcalfe had always predicted.† And now he found that this noble failing of his friend had greatly increased his own difficulties—that the evils he had foreseen had actually come to pass. It was now his duty, therefore—a duty forced upon him, no less by his own rooted convictions than by the recorded instructions of the Supreme Government—to do all that could be done without any indicate

* Minute of Lord Minto, June 6, 1869.—[MS. Records.]

† See letter to Mr. Sherer in Chapter VI, especially a passage at page 224, which may be compared with the extract given above from

Lord Minto's minute ten two years afterwards. Such, nevertheless, was the unreasonableness of the Shah, that he complained of Mr. Seton's conduct.



and vexatious interference in the domestic affairs of the royal household, to baffle all these petty intrigues, and disperse all these idle aspirations. It was his policy, whilst exercising firm control in all matters of essential importance, to abstain from meddling with petty details connected with the interior arrangements of the Palace. But nothing was more difficult than this. He could not turn a deaf ear to the reports of robbery and murder which came to him from that great sty of pollution; and yet he could not deal with offences so committed as he would with crimes, more immediately under his jurisdiction, committed in the open city. Even the truth struggled out but dimly from the murky recesses of the Palace. Sometimes little things were magnified and mystified into gigantic shadows, which dissolved at the touch of judicial inquiry. At others, it was not to be doubted that terrible realities were altogether obscured and lost among the swarming labyrinths of that great building. All these things greatly disquieted Metcalfe; for the evil was a tremendous one and so difficult to reach.

There were other vexations and annoyances to disquiet him at this time. Among these was one which inconveniently affected the efficiency of his administration. The "Assistants," upon whose coadjutancy Metcalfe chiefly relied at this time for the due administration of the revenue of the Delhi territory, were Mr. William Fraser and Mr. Gardiner. But it happened, as it often happens in such cases, that their efficiency in this particular office became the signal for their removal to another; and Met-



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calfe was suddenly deprived of their aid. This "spoliation of the Delhi Residency," as Mr. Seton subsequently called it, was done with the best intentions by Lord Minto, who, appreciating their services, was anxious to reward them, and so removed them to the Judicial Department.* But the Resident complained, and not without reason, of being thus stripped of his auxiliaries; and Seton, to whom the letter of complaint was addressed, gave it to Lord Minto one evening at the tea-table. "More complaints, my Lord, and legitimate ones, too," he said, "from my excellent friend Metcalfe." "Knowing them to be such," replied Lord Minto, "I am almost afraid to read them, more especially as I have not yet been able to write to him the explanatory letter which I have so long had in contemplation." "He, however," continued Seton, reporting these circumstances to his friend, "did read the letter, and with great interest—I might almost say distress and embarrassment—distress on your account and embarrassment on his own. Yet, though really annoyed at reflecting on the havoc made at the Residency, he could not help laughing aloud at your humorous picture of your distress, concluding with 'kings, vakeels, Sikhs, Patans, and old women.'" And, writing again soon afterwards with reference to the same subject, the member of Council said, "If I did not know you to be greatly

* This, after a lapse of forty years, still remains one of the gravest defects of the Indian Civil-Service system. Men are removed, for the sake of promotion, from one department

to another, just at the very time when the experience gained in the old office is likely to be turned to profitable account.



above all vanity, I might perhaps offer you some consolation on by repeating what Lord Minto said upon the occ^r (his words were *Ipse agmen*), and conse- a hostily ad- quent most men—to enlighten even when ‘shorn of thar’ beams.’”

Of the circumstances under which those changes had been made Mr. Seton entered into an elaborate explanation; but he said rightly that Lord Minto had only been deterred by pressure of business from explaining them under his own hand. The Governor-General had, indeed, long been waiting for an opportunity of making his peace with Metcalfe; but that opportunity did not occur until he was half way home. And then from the Cape of Good Hope he despatched the following pleasant letter, which illustrates at once his kindness of heart, his affection for Metcalfe, and the interest which he took in all the affairs of the Government which he had now quitted:

LORD MINTO TO MR. METCALFE.

“Cape of Good Hope, February 24, 1814.

“MY DEAR SIR,—I offended against every right feeling by coming away from Bengal without a line to acknowledge the many proofs of the kindest, and to me the most flattering and gratifying, partiality, which you afforded me during the period of our acquaintance in India, and I am not disposed to aggravate my fault by carrying my silence round the Cape, and beyond the limits of the Company’s quondam privileges. Accept, therefore, from hence, the tardy, but not less warm and sincere assurances of my cordial and affectionate regard.



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This sentiment having originated in the most perfect esteem and having ever since been improved by a constant observation and experience both of character and talents, made your estimate better credited, and its value perhaps, enhanced in your estimation. This sort of plump declaration is, perhaps, seldom made, except to a different sex, just before the question is proposed. I except stand for once as an introduction, between a pair of the set it gender, to a request which I feel a great inclination to propose same a sincere, constant, and mutual friendship from this time forward. On my part it has begun long ago; and I have, therefore, a stock in hand that may furnish a sort of security for my part of the bargain, and some strong indications of regard already afforded by you leave me no apprehension of a disappointment in your share of the contract.

"Brownrigg has, I think, acted the part of a confidant in this affair very faithfully, and from his go-between-ship I might still contrive to hear pretty regularly anything that interests you much; but I shall be still more gratified, and if you sign the counterpart of this treaty, I shall positively expect you to keep me informed under your own hand, *proprio pugno*, of everything that in any degree concerns your welfare, credit, happiness, or comfort.

"I began, a great while ago, an explanatory letter to you on the affair of Mr. Fraser's and Mr. Gardner's sudden removal from Delhi to Moradabad. As the matter naturally appeared to you, there was a most complicated injury, affecting at once yourself and both those gentlemen; while in reality I was all the while thinking I had done a very clever thing, and that I was a fortunate man in meeting what I understood to be the earnest wishes of your assistants, and what I concluded had received your previous concurrence. I happened, unfortunately, not to finish that letter, and feel less confident now in entering on the subject, as the particulars are less fresh in my memory. I can venture, however, to say all that appears material, as far as my intentions are concerned. The fact is, that Mr. Seton, our common friend, had about that time repre-



LETTER FROM LORD MINTO.

sented to me in glowing terms the merits of Mr. Fraser and Mr. Gardner, and the fair pretensions that both had acquired by distinguished service to advance to some station superior in emolument to those they then held, as well as leading to earlier prospects of higher promotion. From the state of the Diplomatic line, and the claims of assistants senior to themselves, they were discouraged from confining their views to that department, and, in a word, were desirous of being transferred to the Judicial. I was well acquainted with the very extraordinary merits and very eminent services of both, and considering these as constituting powerful claims to the attention and favor of Government, I was sincerely anxious to promote their views; but I told Mr. Seton that I had scruples, and should find considerable difficulty in appointing either of these gentlemen at once to the office of Judge and Magistrate, especially in the Upper Provinces, where that office was placed on a higher scale of emolument than elsewhere. I admitted that the Residency at Delhi united, to some extent, the duties of Revenue, of the Judicial service and of Police, to the diplomatic functions, in a manner which distinguished it from other Residencies, and which had the effect of facilitating the transfer of the officers attached to Delhi to those other departments; but still it was a transfer, and operated in a manner which was calculated to give umbrage and to create dissatisfaction amongst those whose promotion was suspended in a line to which they had devoted themselves, and in which they had qualified themselves by a pretty long course of practice and experience for the situations, in which they were superseded by gentlemen drawn from another branch of service. You will easily imagine that I was more conversant in these discontents than the candidates for office themselves; as discontent, in which ever party it lay, was sure to find its way to me. I had another objection, on a principle of more importance, to bringing these gentlemen, at the first step, to the office of Judge and Magistrate. To be qualified for its duties, requires more than talents, application, activity, and probity, all of which I



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knew Mr. Fraser and Mr. Gardner to possess, and to have proved themselves to possess most eminently. But it has been a principle with me to require Experience also in the particular functions of that line. Under these considerations, I explained to Mr. Seton the difficulties that would stand in the way of an *immediate* appointment to the office of Judge and Magistrate, and advised his friends, through him, to enter the Judicial line as soon as possible in the rank of Assistant Judge, or Magistrate. This ~~over~~ might be, as I do sincerely think it would have been, ~~slow~~ the individual and *personal* pretensions of these distinguished persons; but I viewed it in the light of a temporary accommodation principle, and as leading in the least objectionable manner, and at the same time by a sufficiently early process, to the object of their wishes. Soon after these discussions with Mr. Seton, the resolution was taken to appoint two Assistant Magistrates in the Zillah of Moradabad; and I felt immediately the opportunity which that resolution afforded, of enabling Mr. Fraser and Mr. Gardner to make their *first step* towards Judge and Magistrate. I proposed Mr. Fraser accordingly, and immediately afterwards Mr. Gardner. As this was done with the concurrence of Mr. Seton, I had no doubt of its proving acceptable to the parties concerned; and I never doubted your privity and acquiescence in these views of your assistants. After enjoying very agreeable reflections for some time on the subject of these arrangements, Mr. Fraser's remonstrance and your lamentations (most natural, I allow, since you had not been prepared for such a reduction in your force), took me all aback, or rather all aghast! I felt in a moment, that in this capital measure, which had tickled me so much, I had been little better than a busybody and a marplot. What related to Mr. Fraser was instantly revoked, and Gardner was left in Moradabad only because it was not ascertained that he objected to it. These are the circumstances with regard to the *intention*, I mean mine; you will perceive that I entertained none other than that of promoting the views in the service of two young gentlemen, whom, without knowing either per-



sonally, I esteemed and admired extremely. I certainly mistook my road; or rather, was misled into the false steps I made. I am, therefore, very desirous that Mr. Fraser should understand that nothing was further from my thoughts than degrading, or in any way mortifying a person whom I have long respected, and that I had no hostile design, nor any other than the most friendly towards him in the whole affair. With regard to the *Resident at Delhi*, I may as well confess that, having always had a very mean opinion of his abilities, and thinking him a very unamiable character and dull companion, I did entertain a secret wish to bring him into disrepute, by depriving him of his most able and experienced coadjutors.

"Now for ourselves. We arrived here in good health, the 7th instant, and shall sail for St. Helena the 26th, in company with the *Stirling Castle*. Whether we shall proceed with that ship from St. Helena to England, cannot be determined till we know the state of the convoys at St. Helena.

"As the whole ship's company of the *Hussar* are your slaves, I may venture, without consulting them, to send you everything that is kind from the whole, of all ages, and both genders.

"Believe me ever, my dear Metcalfe,

"(being entitled to this familiarity by the *contract*),

"Faithfully and affectionately yours,

"MINTO."

But that which most disquieted Charles Metcalfe during the earlier years of his Residency at Delhi was a circumstance connected, not with the diplomatic, not with the administrative, but with the social side of his multiform office. It was his duty, as has been already hinted, to keep up a certain state at Delhi, as the representative of the British Government at the Court of the Mogul. To a public functionary in such a situation the entertainment of a certain, or, rather, an uncertain number of



people every week is a business rather than a pleasure. He has to feast scores of people, of whom he knows little, and for whom he cares nothing; and to live in crowds, where he would fain be alone. His house is a sort of huge caravansary, from which no one is turned away, but every one carries off something. For purposes of current hospitality, a liberal monthly allowance is granted by Government,* and Metcalfe was of a character which ensured its expenditure to the last sixpence. But it happened that when he joined the Delhi Residency it was in a poor state of equipment. It was sadly wanting in all the necessary appointments of plate and furniture. Hospitality was impracticable with such means, and the external dignity of the Government could not be becomingly maintained. It was Metcalfe's duty, therefore, as he conceived, to make certain purchases of public property at the public expense. Of these purchases, the Supreme Government tacitly approved, and the disbursements were formally admitted. But when the accounts went home to the Court of Directors, that body disapproved of the expenditure, and severely rebuked Metcalfe. "The conduct of the Delhi Resident," they wrote to the Governor-General in Council, "in incurring charges of so enormous a magnitude as

* The gross allowances attached to the office had been diminished on the departure of Mr. Seton, who had drawn a consolidated allowance of 8000 rupees a month — being 2850 rupees salary, with 5150 rupees Resident's charges. By a resolution of the Governor-General in Council, February 27, 1811, it was declared that this

measure had been adopted on grounds principally of a personal nature with respect to Mr. Seton, and decreed that the allowances of the Delhi Residency should be placed on their former footing. For further information on this subject, see the close of Chapter XII.



those referred to in the papers before us, without having received, or even applied for, the previous sanction of Government, is in every view unjustifiable. The charges are reported by the Civil Auditor to be unprecedented in amount, and we are surprised to find these irregularities in the Resident's proceedings passed over without any mark of displeasure or reprehension." And having commented upon the several items of the charge, they proceeded to say—"We consider the whole disbursement to have been incurred under circumstances so directly in opposition to the regulations of which Mr. Metcalfe could not have been ignorant, and in a spirit of such profuse extravagance, that we cannot possibly sanction any part of them without holding out to our servants in general an example of the most dangerous tendency, as it amounts to no less than an assumed right to disburse the property of the Company at the discretion of the individuals divested of all wholesome control. We shall accordingly consider the whole of this disbursement as having been made unwarrantably, and under the personal responsibility of the Resident, and so accordingly direct that he be peremptorily required to pay into your treasury the whole amount of the said sum of 48,119rs. 6a. 5p., and that the property purchased thus irregularly be considered as belonging to the Resident, and not as constituting any part of the Company's dead-stock."*

This was, doubtless, a severe rebuke. But as in India they throw up before their doors and windows

* General letter to Bengal, September 30, 1814.—[*MS. Records.*]



well-watered screens of fragrant grass, through which the fiery winds of the hot season pass cooled and tempered, so the Governor-General was careful that the scorching blasts of the Court's economical indignation should reach Metcalfe only through one of these *tatties*, softened and moderated, and rendered endurable by cooling qualifications of his own. "Although the Governor-General," wrote the Political Secretary, John Adam, in an official communication to the Delhi Resident, "has deemed it proper, as an act of obedience to the positive instructions of the Court, to communicate their order to you, yet as his Lordship sees grounds for believing that the Honorable Court will take a more favorable view of the question on re-consideration, I am desired to inform you that the orders will not be enforced until the further directions of the Honourable Court may be received in reply to the proposed reference."* And at the same time John Adam wrote privately to Metcalfe, telling him that the Government intended to resist "the encroaching spirit of the Court of Directors," of which he was "destined to be the victim."†

But, in spite of the protection thrown over him by the Supreme Government, the censures of the Court of Directors wounded Metcalfe to the quick. It is the fate of most men, some time or other in the course of their lives, to be suspected and accused of those very offences which they are least capable of

* Secretary to Government to Resident at Delhi, July 15, 1815.—[*M.S. Records.*]

† John Adam to Charles Metcalfe, July 19, 1815.—[*M.S. Correspondence.*]



committing. In spite of the mollifying influences of the Secretary's official letter, the rebuke of the Court was severely felt. "I have the disgrace and mortification," wrote Metcalfe to Mr. Adam, "to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, conveying to me the censure of the Honorable the Court of Directors expressed in the most unqualified terms. It is the severe censure," he added, after thanking the Governor-General for his unsolicited kindness, "contained in the orders of the Court, which I feel most acutely, far more so than the pecuniary injury which it is proposed to inflict. My life and everything that I have are at the disposal of the Honorable Company; but my character I wish to carry unsullied to the grave."* He then entered into an elaborate and triumphant defence of his conduct, and con-

* It is right that I should give the substance of the defence, though the letter is too long for quotation in its integrity.

"When I arrived as Resident at Delhi," he wrote, "there was not a single article of public property at the Residency in the way of furniture for the house or equipment for the table. I could not make up the deficiency by any brought with me, because the equipment of the Residency which I had quitted was public property, and remained for the use of my successor, though much of it had been paid for out of my monthly allowances. That some furniture for the Residency house and some equipment for the Residency table were necessary, will, I hope, be admitted. It is obvious that a house is useless without furniture, and that a table cannot be kept without equipment. I take it for granted, therefore, that some furniture and some equipment were unquestionably indispensable." Assuming this, he said, two questions

arose, one as to the responsibility—the other as to amount. Both had been submitted to the Supreme Government. It was competent for them to pass a decision; and if they had decided in either case against Metcalfe, he would cheerfully have abided by the decision. He argued that as the Residencies at Scindiah's Court, Nagpore, Poonah, Hyderabad, and Mysore possessed property charged to the public account, he was justified in assuming that the Delhi Residency might be brought into the same category, and admitted to the same privileges. But he declared that at the same time he had purchased the property on his own responsibility, and left it to the Government to determine whether it should be a public or a private charge. As Government had decided that it was the former, he reasoned conclusively that the censure, if any, should not be cast upon him, but upon the Government which had admitted the charge.



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cluded by saying: "Knowing that I have always served the Company with devoted zeal and indefatigable labor; knowing that I am ready every day to lay down my life in their service; knowing that in the case which has brought down such heavy disapprobation on me, I was far from deserving censure, it is with a feeling stronger than grief that I find myself selected for public disgrace. In whatever spirit my conduct may be judged—whatever return my services may receive, I shall continue, as long as I serve the Company, to serve with unabated zeal and entire devotion. Unfounded censure cannot depress me, neither shall it diminish my faithful exertions. Highly as I prize the approbation of the Honorable the Court of Directors, if I have the misfortune not to obtain it, the approbation of my own conscience will support me; and I shall not sink under censure, however severe, when I feel that it is not merited, and see that it arises from error." It was, indeed, as he said, the censure that stung him. The intended punishment was nothing. He was willing to abide by any arrangement for the disposal of the Residency property.* It was not in

* In a subsequent letter he submitted to the Government the following three modes of settling the question:

"First—Let the orders of the Honorable Court be literally fulfilled. Let me pay into the treasury all the extra expenses passed by Government during my Residency on account of plate, furniture, and equipment, and let all the property purchased by me of these descriptions belong to me. Secondly—Let my allowances be put on a footing with those of my prede-

cessor retrospectively to the day of my appointment, and let me repay to the Honorable Company all the extra expense incurred by me in the equipment of the Residency. Let the equipment of the Residency be my own property as in the time of my predecessors. Third—Let the expenses of the Residency under my predecessor, extra as well as established, be added together for the whole period of his incumbency. Let the same operation take place with regard to the expenses of the Resi-



the nature of the man to haggle with Government on a question of rupees. His whole life was a denial of the injurious supposition hinted in the Court's letter. In after years, when the increase of his fortune enabled him to manifest an increased liberality in all his dealings, he was continually taking upon himself charges which ought more properly to have been borne by the State—continually expending his private fortune upon public objects. It is not improbable that the circumstance here narrated gave a new and sustained impulse to his natural liberality; that, mindful of past vexations, he may have determined at any sacrifice to avoid the possibility of their recurrence, and so have fallen into an extreme of liberality which, noble as it is in itself, is not altogether, in respect of its operation upon others, free from certain inconveniences and objections.

But annoyances and vexations, such as have been briefly touched upon in this chapter, are inseparable from high station, whether in the East or in the West; and there were, on the other side, great compensations. Of these the chief was the knowledge that, under his administration, the industrial resources of the Delhi territory were being plentifully developed, and the prosperity of the people greatly increased. At the period of which I am now speaking—the years 1814-15—it was less, perhaps,

dency under me for a period of similar extent. Let me pay the difference if it be against me, and let the equipment of the Residency be my property as it was my predecessors'. I am

heartily willing," he added, "to abide by any of these arrangements. If I suffer, I shall suffer by my own proposition."



from the contemplation of what had been done than from the thought of what might be done, under his auspices, on such a field of beneficent action, that he derived solace under the depressing influences of all public and private vexations. He saw, indeed, many great defects in the system under which the affairs of our newly-acquired provinces were administered, and he was eager to introduce reforms which he knew would contribute to the happiness of our subjects. When, therefore, he reported that under the excellent management of Fraser and Gardner—for he was not one who sought to monopolise to himself the credit which rightfully belonged in part to his coadjutors—the revenues of the Delhi territory had greatly increased, and that new breadths of land were being brought under cultivation, he did not disguise from himself, or seek to disguise from Government, the fact that the landed settlement of the Delhi territory was on an unsatisfactory footing, and that justice demanded its entire revision. From a comprehensive report before me, written in 1815, I purpose to make some extracts, illustrative of Charles Metcalfe's views at this time of some important questions of domestic government. We have hitherto seen him principally as a diplomatist. Before passing on to other busy scenes of political strife and military action, let us regard him, for a little while, as an administrator, and see how liberal and large-minded were his views at a time when liberality and large-mindedness, in matters of Indian administration, were rarer qualities than they are in the present more enlightened times.



In this report, after mention has been made of the progressively increasing revenues of the Delhi territory—revenues which had risen between the years 1807-8 and 1813-14 from four lakhs to fifteen lakhs of rupees, and it has been shown that the increase has been mainly an increase in the landed revenue, allusion is made to the *Abkarree*, or spirit tax, and it is shown that the last year of the statement exhibits a considerable decline. This is accounted for by the fact that the men who farmed this part of the revenue had, in the preceding year, bidden too high for the privilege. And if it were not so, humanely argued Metcalfe, there would be nothing to regret :

“A diminution in this branch of revenue is not much to be regretted. There is no danger of a permanent or serious loss as long as people drink spirituous liquors; and any decrease of revenue proceeding from a diminution of consumption would be a cause of joy rather than of regret.”

It is, however, to the larger subject of the landed revenue that this report mainly refers. But before the writer passes on to the consideration of it in all its length and breadth, he pauses to speak of the advantages of Canal irrigation, and to urge the completion of the Delhi Canal :

“I cannot refrain,” he says, “from taking advantage of this opportunity to bring again to the notice of the Governor-General the subject of the Delhi Canal. This subject has engaged the attention of Government for many years; and all the information relating to it that can be furnished from this place has already been submitted. . . . It is supposed that the



produce of the canal would, in a very short time, repay the expense of bringing it into order; and it is certain that the restoration of this beneficial work would be productive of a great increase of revenue to Government, and a great increase of comfort, wealth, and health to the inhabitants of the territory and city of Delhi."

Then he enters on the great domain of Land-Revenue, and after discussing the much-vexed question of right in the soil, he thus proceeds to advocate the claims of the village Zumeendars :

"Admitting that the Government has the property of the soil, the question is, as the Government cannot occupy the land, and as the land requires resident proprietors, who are the people that, next to the Government, may be supposed to have the best right? It is here that the paramount claim of the village Zumeendars may be justly, and it is to be hoped, indisputably contended for. What men can have greater rights than those whose ancestors have occupied the same lands and habitations from time immemorial; who live on the soil entirely, and cultivate at their own expense and by their own labour; who receive it by hereditary succession or by purchase; who leave it to their children or, if reduced by necessity, sell it or mortgage it; or if they choose, transfer it by gift during their lives? These rights are exercised by the Zumeendars, and have been exercised for centuries. If they be not sufficient to constitute undoubted property, they are surely sufficient to confer a paramount claim. . . . Notwithstanding the numerous revolutions which have taken place in this part of India, the rights of the village Zumeendars have generally been held sacred, more sacred, it seems to me, than any other property; and though numerous sorts of oppression have been devised, it does not appear that any oppressor, generally speaking, has presumed to interfere with these rights. It is probable that expediency has operated to secure them, as much, at least,



as justice; but be the cause what it may, it appears to me that the most clear and most distinct rights held in this part of India are those of the village Zumeendars.”*

Having thus contended that our engagements ought to be made with this class of proprietors, he proceeds to explain the nature of the settlement which it would be desirable to make. The evil consequences of short settlements had already manifested themselves, and Metcalfe was eager to persuade the Government to grant long ones in their stead. “Settlements,” he writes, “should be made for periods of ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, or a hundred years—the longer, perhaps, the better. At all events, the periods should be sufficiently long to admit of considerable profit being made by the cultivators from their own labor and enterprise.” “This,” he adds, “is the very essence of the system.” Its advantages lie upon the surface. “In exchange for

* An interesting illustration of the importance attached to these rights, even by the owners of principalities, which is given in this report, may not inexpediently be cited in this place:

“To show the value,” wrote Metcalfe, “set on those rights and the respectable estimation in which they are held, I may mention that Koom Raj Singh, great uncle of the Rajah of Bulumgurb, and sole manager of all the Bulumgurb lands, pointed out to me once, as I was riding with him, a single small village in the territory under his management, of which he boasted, with evident exultation, that he was the Zumeendar, having purchased the zumeendaree from the original Zumeendars. What made it of consequence to him to purchase this petty zumeendaree of a single village? or why did he exult at this acquired right? Why, he knew that the Raj

of Bulumgurb would descend to a distinct branch of the family, his regency would in due time expire, the family might be degraded from its high rank in some future revolution, its territories might be seized, its Raj might be lost; but he flattered himself, confidently, that under any circumstances this zumeendaree, purchased with his own money, would descend as a perpetual right to his family untouched and undisturbed by any future Governor or Government. It must seem strange to the inhabitants of India, who so much respect these zumeendaree rights, that the British Government, which professes to consult justice in all its actions, should apparently undervalue rights which have been respected by the most despotic and the most lawless governments.”



this insecurity, it is in the power of Government to confer security. Instead of wealth lawlessly acquired by opposition to the Government, and hastily spent to avoid plunder, we may confer the power of acquiring solid, legitimate, and lasting wealth, which shall be cherished, applauded, and upheld by the Government; which shall be a source of consequence in the eyes of the people, and of flattering distinction on the part of the rulers. Then, instead of dissatisfied and disaffected landholders truly complaining that we have injured them by diminishing their consequence and their profits, we may expect to have landholders bound to us by the strongest ties of self-interest, and acknowledging, from irresistible conviction, the incomparable benefits of our rule."

He then proceeded to explain in what manner, under these settlements, the revenue was to be collected. "Every village is inhabited, wholly or partially, by Zumeendars, or possessory proprietors of the land. These are the persons with whom the settlement ought to be made; but as the number of them is generally too great for the transaction of business, a certain number of Mokuddums, or head men, being in general the men of the greatest property and influence in the village, act on the part of the village, agree to terms, sign engagements, and transact negotiations. The village is bound by their acts. The Mokuddums having concluded the settlement with the officers of Government, are charged with the duty of collecting the revenue in the village."



On the good effects of such a system as this, Metcalfe descanted with no common earnestness. He wrote as one whose whole soul was in the cause. He showed how wealth would be accumulated—how security would engender providence—how a spirit of independence would be acquired—how commerce and education would be promoted—how the people would be elevated in the social scale, and rise to a height of moral and intellectual grandeur never attained by them before. It was nothing, he argued, that by so raising them, we might teach them in time to emancipate themselves from our yoke. In spite of all such considerations as this, our duty, he said, was clear :

“ There may be those who would argue that it is injudicious to establish a system which, by exciting a free and independent character, may possibly lead, at a future period, to dangerous consequences. . . . But supposing the remote possibility of these evil consequences, that would not be a sufficient reason for withholding any advantage from our subjects. Similar objections have been made against our attempting to promote the education of our native subjects; but how unworthy it would be of a liberal Government to give weight to such objections. The world is governed by an irresistible Power, which giveth and taketh away dominion; and vain would be the impotent prudence of men against the operations of its almighty influence. All that rulers can do is to merit dominion by promoting the happiness of those under them. If we perform our duty in this respect, the gratitude of India and the admiration of the world will accompany our name throughout all ages, whatever may be the revolutions of Futurity; but if we withhold blessings from our subjects from a selfish apprehension of



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possible danger at a remote period, we shall merit that reverse which time has possibly in store for us, and shall fall with the mingled hatred and contempt—the hisses and execrations of mankind.”

If this had been written yesterday, there would have been nothing noticeable in it; but forty years ago such language was not often to be found in the despatches of our Indian functionaries. Charles Metcalfe, indeed, was much in advance of his contemporaries. There were few of his brethren, I fear at this time, in whose breasts such liberal utterances as these would have awakened sympathetic echoes. The system of Land-Revenue which he then desired to introduce into the Delhi territory became substantially, after a lapse of many years, the system which regulated the entire settlement of the North-Western Provinces. The long obscured rights of the village zameendars were acknowledged; and there is every reason to hope that many of the predictions of the young Delhi Resident are now in course of realisation, under the salutary influence of the system which he advocated with so much warmth.

One more illustration of Charles Metcalfe's early liberality may be derived from the same source. At this time there were few evils, real or supposed, which the members of the Indian Civil Service generally regarded with so much dread and abhorrence as the free admission of European settlers into the interior of the country. Their exclusiveness revolted at the thought of such an intrusion; and they



could see nothing but oppression of the people and danger to the state in such an innovation. But Metcalfe, even at this early period, was guilty of the heresy not only of desiring, but officially recommended that independent Europeans should be invited to bring their capital, their enterprise, and skill freely into the British territories.

"I am aware," he wrote, "that nothing that I can say on this subject would have any weight. I am also sensible that in expressing such opinions, I may be deemed guilty of presumption; but on an occasion like the present, I conceive myself bound to recommend whatever promises to be beneficial, with reference to the subject of this Report; and, therefore, I recommend the free admission of British subjects to settle in India under laws and regulations suited to the state of the country, and unlimited liberty to acquire property by lawful means, as the surest mode of adding to the resources and increasing the strength of our Asiatic Empire."

It was no small thing even with the aid of able and indefatigable assistants, to carry on the civil administration of the extensive districts under the superintendence of the Delhi Resident. But Metcalfe was not one to shrink from any amount of labor. To his civil duties he devoted himself with an assiduity which alarmed many of his friends. Among others Ochterlony, who maintained a close and affectionate correspondence with him, wrote to Metcalfe, in the autumn of 1813, saying: "You will not be long Resident of Delhi, if you pursue your



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present course ; and I cannot but think that a fair representation of your multifarious and miscellaneous duties would exempt you from all but the intrigues of the Palace and the general political duties, which I do most sincerely believe to be quite sufficient for any one mind that was ever created."



CHAPTER XI.

[1813—1818.]

THE POLITICS OF UPPER INDIA.

Metcalf's Political Duties—Conduct of the Bhurtpore Rajah—Macherry and Jyepore—Indications of general Inquietude—Lord Moira's Tour in the Upper Provinces—The Nepaul War—Metcalf's Opinions—Meeting with the Governor-General—Offer of a Secretaryship—Letters on the Subject to Mr. Jenkins—The Secretaryship declined—Death of Metcalf's Parents.

To the "general political duties" of which Ochterlony spoke—duties which greatly occupied the thoughts and employed the energies of the Delhi Resident—it is now time to advert. On the frontier of his territory were a number of native principalities, our relations with which were under his superintendence; and, although he interfered with them no more than was essential for our security, it was necessary to keep upon all of them a watchful eye, and upon some a restraining hand. It was not likely that the rulers of these states, who were as regardless of what was due to others as they were ignorant of what was really beneficial to themselves, should have continually possessed themselves in peace, and consistently reciprocated the good faith and the good feeling which

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was shown towards them by the paramount power. Mistrustful of the good intentions of the British Government, and unscrupulous in their dealings with one another, it was frequently Metcalfe's duty at this time to turn his thoughts from the great work of domestic improvement to the less gratifying duty of controlling the erratic propensities of some neighbouring chief.

At the Delhi Residency, as the Head-Quarters of Diplomacy in Upper India, there was always a cluster of "wakeels," or agents representing the interests of various princes and chiefs in the states contiguous to our own. Some of these were the agents of petty sovereigns—others of predatory chiefs—whose empire was yet to be acquired. But all had business to transact with the Resident—all had questions to put and demands to make. And the less recognised the position of the master, the more preposterous, in all probability, were the proposals of his servant. It was no uncommon thing for one of these "wakeels" to ask Metcalfe's permission for his master to attack some neighbouring state on his own account, or to be employed in the same work of aggression on the part of the British Government. And when these overtures were civilly declined, the agent would sometimes naively beseech the Resident to tell him whom he might attack.

But there were more difficult questions than these demanding solution. Among the earliest of our allies, who excited the watchfulness of Metcalfe during his residence at Delhi, was our old enemy of Bhurtpore. After a lapse of eight years, during



which the conduct of the British Government towards him had been uniformly friendly and considerate, he now, in 1813, became suspicious of our designs, and peremptorily signified his intention no longer to suffer a British wakeel to reside at his Court. He had committed many excesses on our frontier; he had destroyed our villages; he had murdered our people; he had carried off our property. But instead of chastising him for these offences, we had sent an accredited agent to his Court, to be the channel of our representations to the Rajah, and thus, it was hoped, to keep him in check. But what was the result? "The petty chief," as Metcalfe wrote, "after using ineffectually his endeavors to prevent the approach of this friendly agent to his capital, tries by ill treatment to compel his employers to recall him; does not permit him to take up his residence at his Court, nor to exercise his functions, nor even to enter the walls of the capital without special permission, and a special guard, but keeps him and his people outside of the town, encamped on the plain, in a state of restraint, and, moreover, persists in this unfriendly course of proceeding, though invited to a more amicable behaviour in the most conciliatory language; and though warned that a continuance of such insulting conduct must inevitably give offence to the British Government."

The minute from which these extracts were taken is a long and elaborate one; full of characteristic energy and determination, clearly and forcibly expressed. It should never be forgotten by the reader,



whose experiences are those only of European life, that the Minutes of the Indian Statesman, in the history of his career, take the place of the orations which, under free governments in the western world, are delivered to senatorial assemblies. The Indian Statesman is not stirred by the excitement of popular applause; his utterances do not reach the ears of hundreds of auditors, and are only in rare instances subsequently reflected by the Press, and dwelt upon by thousands of readers. He writes, in the solitude of his own chamber, under many depressing influences, knowing that what he writes is to count its readers by units; but, writing nevertheless, with his whole heart in his work, earnestly and enthusiastically, and often with a power of expression which in oral discourse would charm a popular assembly. There may be dull writers in India, as there are dull speakers in England; but there are many eloquent exceptions, whom it would be easy to enumerate; and the name of Charles Metcalfe in such an enumeration would be one of the foremost in the list.

In this Minute on Bhurtpore the writer dwelt earnestly on the great forbearance which, throughout many years, had been shown towards the offending state, and he contrasted the course which we had adopted, in this instance, with that which had been followed towards a neighbouring principality—the Rajpoot state of Jyepore. Partly in illustration of Metcalfe's style—partly because I shall come presently to speak of our dealings with Jyepore—the following passage is given. In such brief, pregnant, antithetical sentences Metcalfe always rejoiced :



“It is curious,” he wrote, “in adverting to the events of past days, to observe how our policy has operated in favor of Bhurtpore. We formed alliances about the same period with the states of Bhurtpore and Jyepore. Both states on the same occasion were false to their alliances, but in different degrees. Bhurtpore joined and fought with our enemy Holkar. Jyepore only hesitated to fulfil its engagements with us. The one which committed the most venial fault has suffered; the other, which sinned against us more heinously, has been befriended. With Jyepore we kept on terms during the war with Holkar, and made use of its troops against him; but after the war we abandoned it to its fate, and the country has since been overrun by the armies of Holkar and other freebooters. Bhurtpore we had to fight as the ally of Holkar, and we have ever since protected it against all enemies. Jyepore has been sinking every day since we dissolved the alliance with that state, and is now nearly annihilated. Bhurtpore has been growing in wealth, power, and consequence under our protection. Jyepore is now at our feet begging for protection and alliance. Bhurtpore refuses to admit our agent to reside at his Court.”

That there was a clear *casus belli* was never doubted. Metcalfe recommended that the British Government should dissolve its alliance with the Bhurtpore Rajah, and send an overwhelming force against his stronghold. He did not counsel the slow process of a regular siege. For some time past we had been unfortunate in our regular sieges. The experiences of the Mahratta war indicated that they were not seldom unsuccessful. Instead, therefore, of attempting to breach Bhurtpore, he recommended that we should carry it by *escalade*. Well acquainted as he was with the peculiar construction of the place, and cognisant with the circumstances,

both of attack and defence, which had resulted in our former inglorious failure, he pointed out, with great precision and distinctness, the causes of our past disasters, and indicated the best means of avoiding them. He was convinced that Bhurtpore would fall beneath a *coup de main*. He believed that we wanted nothing more than the stout heart and the cold steel. He lived to see the English ensign waving over Bhurtpore; but the stronghold was carried by another process.

He waited more than ten years to see the realisation of his hopes. The Government of India were not at this time prepared to undertake a war against Bhurtpore. The Java expedition had diminished our available resources in respect both of money and of men. So our resentment was expressed only by the dismissal of the Bhurtpore agent from Delhi, whilst another and a higher representative of the offended Rajah was permitted to remain at the Court of Calcutta. The intention of Government was officially announced to Metcalfe, whilst Mr. Seton, who, it will be remembered, had taken his seat in the Supreme Council, wrote privately to his old assistant to say that they were deterred from making war, under so great provocation, not by any want of will, but by a lamentable want of means.*

* "How sadly you have been annoyed by that weak, ungrateful man, the Rajah of Bhurtpore. We may say with truth, 'If we could, we would!' He has given us repeated cause of offence; and did the state of our army and our finances (now very low) admit of our meeting the probable consequences of an open rupture, we

would of course hold very plain language. But as that is now out of the question, we must avoid showing our teeth—that is, we must, whilst we evince to him that we are dissatisfied with his conduct, take care not to appear too angry—because if we did, we might lead him to suppose that we would fain go to war with him at



In the mean while, the Jyepore state seemed to be at its last gasp. Unprotected by the paramount power, and helpless in itself, it lay at the mercy of all its unscrupulous neighbours, and all the predatory chiefs who were continually looking out for some undefended quarter against which to direct their attacks. That great Rohilla freebooter, Ameer Khan, whose acquaintance Metcalfe had made during the war with Holkar, and whose subsequent career had been one of unbridled excess, was pursuing his course of spoliation wherever the weakness of others tempted him to let loose his banditti; and, another soldier of fortune, Shah Khan, was emulating the Rohilla in deeds of unscrupulous daring. The notorious weakness of Jyepore had long excited the cupidity of the former chief, who in 1811 ravaged the country and reduced the unhappy Prince to a state of feebleness and prostration which bordered closely upon dissolution. But there were other trials still in store for him. Scarcely had Ameer Khan quitted the Jyepore territory, when the Rajah of Macherry,* known as the Rao Rajah, entered it with an invading army, and in the year 1812 took possession of the two forts of Doobbee

once, if we could, and that conclusion would give rise to another, viz., that we are too weak to have recourse to the *ultima ratio regum*. On this ground it is that we must, whilst manifesting our displeasure, preserve our tranquillity; and to borrow an expression from the *Agreeable Surprise*, take care 'not to give him room to suppose his Serene Highness (the Governor-General) is in a passion.' This will explain to you our motive for not doing more than insist upon

the Rajah's withdrawing his wakeel from Delhi. Since he will not agree to receive an accredited agent from you, it is but fair that you should dismiss his agent from yours. There were, however, powerful objections to our going still further by dismissing his wakeel, who has hitherto been stationed at Calcutta—or declaring the alliance dissolved."—[*Seton to Metcalfe, June 21, 1813.*]

* Macherry is a state bordering upon Bhartpore.

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and Sikrawa with the territories adjacent to them. This was an outrage which, although Jyepore was not under the protection of the British, was to be remonstrated against and resisted; and Metcalfe accordingly, through the Rajah's wakeels, called upon him to make restitution. In spite, however, of the Delhi Resident's repeated requests, the usurper remained obdurate. All through the year of his acquisition, and all through the following year, he remained in possession of the tracts of country he had snatched from his neighbour.* It was time, therefore, that decided steps should be taken to obtain restitution, so Metcalfe counselled a display of military force; and in the mean while addressed to the Rajah the following spirited letter of warning and remonstrance:

MR. METCALFE TO THE RAO RAJAH.

"From your want of attention to my repeated requisitions for the restoration of Doobbee and Sikrawa to their lawful owner, the Rajah of Jyepore, I am led to conclude that it is not your intention to restore those places.

"If you have no regard for justice; if you think it right in the sight of God to seize the property of another without cause of offence; if you see no difference between the friendship and enmity of the British Government; if you see no good in its

* "He had," says Colonel Sutherland, "so long remained in security, that he had forgotten the danger of involving himself with his neighbours, and thought the British Government would not arm against him in support of the interests of Jyepore. He was, too, supposed to have collected a treasure of nearly half a million sterling. It became a question whether in this state of affairs we should withdraw

from the terms of our alliance with the Rao Rajah, and allow Jyepore to revenge its own wrongs, bringing on Ulwur (Macherry) all the evils of an invasion from the forces of that state, those of Ameer Khan, Shah Khan, and other leaders of predatory bands, or whether we should ourselves assemble an army to punish the Rao Rajah."



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friendship and no danger in its enmity ; if you prefer the retaining of Doobbee and Sikrawa to the continuance of the friendship of the British Government, and think that you can retain those places in spite of the British Government ; if you prefer war with the British Government to the restoration of those places ; if you feel yourself strong, and fancy the British Government weak ; if you think that success will attend you in war,—then all that I can say will be unavailing. What will be will be.

“ But if you believe that the British Government does possess any power ; if you are aware that its anger is to be feared ; if you know that it adheres to a determination once formed, then I conjure you to pay attention to your true interests. Do not, I implore you, suffer designing men to mislead you. They are plotting your ruin, and will rejoice at your destruction.

“ Do not imagine from the moderation which has been shown that this point can ever be conceded to you. That is impossible. The British Government has a sincere regard for you ; and therefore has not yet proceeded to forcible measures, in the hope that you may be persuaded by advice and remonstrance to do what is necessary in justice to the Rajah of Jyepore. But if you do not restore Doobbee and Sikrawa, sooner or later measures of another nature will be necessary, and then repentance will be vain.

“ Never, never, never will the British Government cease to demand the restoration of Doobbee and Sikrawa to the Rajah of Jyepore ; and if to accomplish that purpose war be unavoidable, however much it will regret the necessity of hostilities, still it will not fail to do its utmost to compel you to perform that indispensable act of justice.

“ Take your choice. Choose between the friendship and the anger of the British Government, and tell me plainly what you are determined to do.

“ I perform the duty of a friend in giving you warning. If you should be ruined by not following my advice, you will not



have to blame me. I have given you notice. Remember what I say."

Such remonstrances, such warnings as these, were thrown away upon the Rajah. Earnestly, therefore, Metcalfe recommended Government to authorise the employment of a military force to compel the reculant chief to make an unconditional surrender of the places he had conquered, and to pay the expenses of assembling our troops. Lord Moira had by this time entered upon the government of India. The tone in which Metcalfe wrote on the subject to his friend John Adam, then Political Secretary, pleased the new Governor-General, to whom the Delhi letters were confidentially submitted, and impressed him with a high opinion of the moral and intellectual qualities of the Resident.* The authority which Metcalfe sought was granted to him. A military force was assembled; a demonstration was made. The British troops advanced within a march of the capital; and then the Rajah yielded to our demands.

* "I could not refuse myself the satisfaction of communicating your letters confidentially to Lord Moira, who entered fully and cordially into the spirit and tendency of your reasoning, and is disposed to go the full length of all your views in the event of the early submission of the Rao Rajah not disarming us. He considers your letter to contain a very able view of the affairs to which it refers, and not less just than able. It is his opinion that the mere submission of a power, which has forced you into an expensive and hazardous appeal to arms, even though accompanied by the cession of the objects in dispute, to be insufficient for the interests of a state (I use his own words)—that

there should be infliction to deter others from imposing upon us a similar embarrassing necessity, and other observations to the same effect. If we actually engage in war, then I have little doubt that he will be disposed to make the Rajah smart for his conduct. The instructions of the 1st authorise you to reduce him to unconditional submission in the case supposed. To-day I shall send you an answer to your last despatch, conveying authority to enforce payment of the expense of assembling the troops, even if he should surrender before the sword is drawn."—[John Adam to Charles Metcalfe, November 15, 1813.]



The places which he had usurped were restored to their legitimate owners; and he was compelled to open his treasury to repay us for the expenses we had incurred in bringing him thus tardily to reason.

Viewed by themselves, these were but small matters, scarcely deserving of the space, which I have bestowed upon them, in such a memoir as this. But they were parts of a great aggregate of evil—examples of the confused and embarrassing state of our relations with the numerous petty states of Central India, resulting from those great peace measures of 1806, which Metcalfe at the time criticised with so much severity and censured with so much warmth. It appeared to him now that we were beginning to reap the difficulties and perplexities we had sown; and that a general adjustment of our relations with these states was imperatively demanded for the security of our position and the establishment of a permanent peace. We were now, indeed, on the threshold of great events. It was plainly foreseen that some vast political changes were at hand; and there was not a statesman of high repute between the banks of the Jumna and the western coast who was not eager for the settlement of which I have spoken, even though it should be preceded by a great and burdensome war. The crisis, indeed, was close upon us. Compromises and concessions could not much longer retard its approach.

The most peaceful rulers who ever governed our Indian Empire have left to their successors a sad heritage of political convulsion, military strife, and financial embarrassment. The greatest wars which

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have taxed the wisdom of our Indian statesmen and the energies of our Indian armies have been undertaken by the successors of Lord Teignmouth, Lord Minto, and Lord William Bentinck. It seems as though in the eastern world the moderation of our rulers could bear only the bitter fruit of war and conquest—that forbearance in one year were but the antecedent of compulsory violence and aggression in another—that the most steadfast resolution to go so far and no farther, formed, in all honesty and all wisdom, by the least ambitious of our statesmen, could only pave the way to new victories and new additions of territory to an empire already “overgrown.”

When in the autumn of 1813 Lord Minto sailed from India, the country, as he believed, was lapped in universal repose. But scarcely had Lord Moira seated himself in the vacant chair, when it seemed to him that war was inevitable. Mutterings of distant hostility reached him from many quarters, and stirred the heart of the old soldier as with the sound of a trumpet. He did not long remain inactive at the Presidency. His associates in the Supreme Government dissented from the views of the Governor-General, and strife between them was speedily engendered. In the autumn of 1814 Lord Moira turned his back upon the Presidency; and then the war became a war of minutes. Into the merits of this controversy I am not called upon to enter. It is sufficient to state the fact, that the greater part of the long administration, on which this narrative has now entered, was disturbed by continual hostilities



with neighbouring states. The first of these was a war with Nepaul. The depredations committed by the Goorkhas on our borders—the continual insecurity of our frontier which the conduct of these hardy mountaineers entailed upon us—called for a display of military force. Preparations were made for the coercion of our offending neighbours ; and the commencement of the ensuing cold season—the cold season of 1814-15—saw our armies again in motion.

The events of the Goorkha war are not connected with the biography of Charles Metcalfe by any other link than that of the correspondence which he carried on with many of the chief actors in it—with Ochterlony, with Jasper Nicolls, with the young Engineer Lawtie, with his old assistant Gardner, now employed in a political capacity on the Nepaul frontier, and with others, who contributed more or less to the ultimate success of our operations. The correspondence was not a cheering one. For some time it treated mainly of misfortune. The war opened with a disastrous failure at Kalunga, where the gallant Gillespie, attempting to carry a strong fortress without breaching, was shot through the heart at the head of his men. Ochterlony, aided, as in his generous candor the veteran ever delighted to acknowledge, by the brave-hearted, quick-witted subaltern Lawtie, achieved some partial success ; but he did not think that he was strong enough to follow them up ; he had never been able to perceive the wisdom of the war, and had little taste for the ser-

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vice on which he was employed.* Marley and Wood failed miserably. Nicolls did better things, and laid the foundation of an honorable fame. But, looking at the whole, the outset of the war was calamitous and discreditable; and Metcalfe, disappointed by repeated tidings of failure and disaster, began to think that the beginning of the end had arrived, and that our Indian Empire would soon be shaken to the base. It was his opinion that a grand cardinal error had been committed in not effecting the settlement of Central India before entering upon this Goorkha campaign. It was his opinion that we were too prone to under-rate the strength and despise the resources of our enemies; that our failures generally resulted from over-confidence; that we were far too prone to fling ourselves, without ordinary caution, upon the strongholds of our enemies; and that inasmuch as that our tenure of India was dependent upon the assertion of our military superiority in the field, and that as on several recent occasions this superiority had been assumed rather than demonstrated, our very position in India was threatened by the recurrence of such failures. There were remedies for this he believed at our command, and it was our duty to resort to them. What they were he was eager to indicate—and, in a paper which he

* On his first appointment to command a division of the army in the field, Ochterlony wrote to Metcalfe: "A new sort of service, my dear friend!! I have not the least objection to a proper vindication of the national honor, and, if necessary, an attack on the heart of their empire, Catmandoo, or some of the members

in this quarter; but to set off with the idea of overthrowing a long-established Government, and for such an unprofitable purpose, appears to me the most Quixotic and the most impolitic measure we have ever attempted—setting aside all physical difficulties."—[August 25, 1814. *MS. Correspondence.*]



forwarded to Lord Moira, in November, 1814, he emphatically set them forth. He was a civilian; but he was no novice in the art of war; he had lived much in the camp; he had seen much of military operations; he had observed our failures, as he had our successes, and traced both to their source. It was no presumption in him, therefore, to write on military questions, as affected by local circumstances in Upper India, even for the guidance of so ripe a soldier as the man then at the head of affairs.

At this time, holding the offices both of Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, Lord Moira, attended by a numerous suite, was progressing through the Upper Provinces of Hindostan. It was subsequently arranged that the Delhi Resident, accompanied by the "wakeels" of the different native Courts within his diplomatic circle, should meet the Vice-regal Camp at Moradabad. But early in November there was a conjuncture of circumstances which rendered Metcalfe's detention at the imperial city a very probable state-necessity, so he despatched to his friend John Adam, Political Secretary, his paper on the conduct of the war, to be submitted to the Governor-General. "I transmit," he wrote, "the accompanying, for submission to Lord Moira, with some trepidation; because I am not sure that his Lordship will approve of my intruding my thoughts on his notice, on a subject not perhaps within the bounds of my official duty; nevertheless, I transmit it under a conviction, probably erroneous, but working powerfully in my mind, that the subject demands early consideration

in the point of view in which I have stated it—in which point of view it may not for some time be seen unless brought to notice. His Lordship may deem my opinions absurd, and my conduct in thrusting those opinions upon him presumptuous, but he will, I trust, bestow an indulgent consideration on the motive by which I am actuated; and pardon a presumption which proceeds solely from anxiety for the public welfare.”

In the paper thus submitted to the Governor-General, Metcalfe, after alluding to the recent disaster at Kalunga, proceeded to declare his opinion that we held India only by the sword, and that the overawing weapon was being blunted in our hands :

“ Every successive failure of this description is more disastrous on account of its influence on the stability of our power than on account either of the lamentable fall of brave men, or the temporary derangement of the plans of Government, much as both of these effects are to be deplored.

“ The present opportunity is taken for attempting to bring this subject to notice, in the hope that the recollection of the circumstances of our recent disaster may procure some attention to opinions, which cannot derive any weight from their owner, which would probably be disregarded in a time of peace, and might appear ridiculous in a career of uninterrupted victory. These opinions were first excited by personal observations in the field, and have been strengthened by attention to subsequent events. . . .

“ Whatever delusions may prevail in England respecting the security to be derived from the affections of our Indian subjects, and a character for moderation and forbearance with foreign native states, it will probably be admitted in India, that our power depends solely on our military superiority. Yet



there is reason to apprehend that our comparative superiority is in some measure diminished in consequence of a general increase of discipline, experience, skill, and confidence, on the part of the military of India."

Having laid down these general propositions, which may, perhaps, be disputed, he proceeds to declare what is indisputable—that there was, as there still is, in our armies a dangerous tendency to under-rate the strength of our enemies. Metcalfe had seen something of this in the Mahratta war. He was familiar with the language of the camp. He knew that it was the fashion to speak slightly of both the courage and the prowess of our enemies. He knew that men, who accepted with caution these disparaging estimates, were called "croakers;" that it was considered, indeed, something almost ignominious to question our ability to crush all opposition at a blow. And, knowing this, he felt that at the outset of what promised to be a long and harassing campaign there was nothing more to be guarded against than this over-weening confidence in our gallantry, our resources, and our fortune:

"It is desirable, in the first instance, that the favorable reports received beforehand relative to the weakness of an enemy's fortresses and the inefficiency of his troops should be listened to with caution. Men of sanguine dispositions give favorable reports, and anticipate unqualified victories, without reflecting on the possibility of difficulties and the chances of failure, because it is in their nature to do so. Other men, not sanguine, are generally very loth to express an unfavorable opinion. There is always the chance of success. Encouraging intelligence is always the more agreeable; and men do not like

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to subject themselves to the reproach of being alarmists. We are apt to despise our opponents, till from defeat we acquire an opposite sensation. Before we come to the contest, their powers of resistance are ridiculed. Their forts are said to be contemptible, and their arms are described to be useless. Yet we find on the trial, that with these useless weapons in their contemptible forts they can deal about death among their assailants, and stand to their defences, notwithstanding the skill and bravery of our army. If we were not misled beforehand by a flattering persuasion of the facility of conquest, we should take greater pains to secure it."

These pregnant truths are truths equally to be regarded now, after the lapse of forty years of conquest, not unchequered by repeated disaster. It were well that a warning voice, again and again proclaiming them, should be lifted up at the outset of every new campaign.

After speaking in detail of past disasters, of some of which, as our great miscarriage at Bhurtpore, he had personal cognisance, he proceeded to express a very strong conviction that we had failed in all our sieges to turn our ordnance to the best account—that if we were to bring into the field powerful mortar-batteries, with good stores of shells, and try the effect of a brisk and long-continued vertical fire upon the besieged places, they would, if not evacuated by the enemy, be easily carried by assault:

"We have on our side," he said, "the science of Europe, and we ought to bring it into play. Economy in this department is ruinous. We ought to be lavish of the contents of our arsenals, and saving of the lives of our men. We ought to make



defence impracticable and hopeless. We ought to overpower resistance by the vastness of our means. There is a branch of equipment in sieges which might be made of more use than it is at present to the great annoyance of the enemy, and frequently to its total expulsion. A great number of mortars and an abundant supply of shells should be attached to every besieging army. There are many situations in which, from the natural difficulties of the position, an assault cannot take place without considerable hazard of failure. In such cases, an incessant shower of shells, day and night, might make the place too warm for the garrison, and obviate the necessity of a storm. There are other occasions in which it may be desirable to avoid the delay of all the operations of a siege. And on such occasions bombarding day and night might accomplish the object in a short time. There are some situations for which the mode of operation is peculiarly suitable—for instance, the small hill forts of the Goorkhas appear to be of this description; and had Kalunga been bombarded day and night for as many days as we were before it prior to our attempt to storm it, it is probable that we should not now have to lament our disastrous failure at that place, and the loss of our gallant general and his brave companions in death."

These practical considerations Metcalfe supported by adducing several instances of the success of shelling derived from the recent annals of Indian warfare. On some occasions he admitted that it might be expedient "for the speedy accomplishment of a great object to risk a hazardous assault." The capture of Alighur by a *coup de main* at the very commencement of the Mahratta war, had tended, in no small measure, to secure the success of all our subsequent operations. Metcalfe had been of opinion only a little while before this paper was written, that if we again undertook to besiege Bhurtpore, it



would be expedient to attempt to carry it by a *coup de main*.* But these were exceptional cases; and the writer continued to dwell upon the expediency of following the more cautious mode of operation. One thing, at all events, was certain. If war were to be made, it was expedient to make it with full consideration, and with sufficient means. We were at this time on the threshold of some momentous enterprises. The Indian army did not seem, as then constituted, to be competent to the successful performance of the great work that lay before it. So Metcalfe did not hesitate to denounce the thrifty policy of the Home Government, and to call for an augmentation of the army :

“The writer of these remarks,” he said, in conclusion, “does not shrink from briefly stating his opinion, that an increase of our army is highly expedient, and, perhaps, absolutely necessary for our existence in India; and that we ought to govern our policy by different considerations from those which regulate the orders of the Government at home. Our power on India rests upon our military superiority. It has no foundation in the affections of our subjects. It cannot derive support from the good will or good faith of our neighbours. It can only be upheld by our military prowess, and that policy is best suited to our situation in India which tends in the greatest degree to increase our military power by all means consistent with justice.”

Looking at our recent disaster at Kalunga with the eye of a true soldier—the eye of one who had once been what old Sir Theophilus used to call the

* See *ante*, pages 377-378.



“Nurse of King’s officers”—Metcalf, in this paper, hit the blot to a nicety, and suggested the true remedy. His recommendations were justified by the result. After another failure, rendered memorable by something even more lamentable than the death of the gallant Gillespie, the effect of a bombardment was tried. Never was anything more completely successful. Our mortars and howitzers did terrible execution among the defiant garrison of Kalunga. In a little while the air was tainted by the decaying bodies of heaps of men destroyed by our murderous shells, and all resistance was at an end. Out of the six hundred defenders of the place only seventy escaped. The fortress was speedily demolished; and soon passing travellers related that not one stone was left upon another.

The general opinions officially expressed in the concluding passages of the memorandum had found utterance a few days before in a private letter to Metcalfe’s old friend Richard Jenkins, then Resident at Nagpore, whom he had not seen for many years, but whom he still affectionately remembered. Jenkins, who now become a mature statesman, shared with Elphinstone and Metcalfe the honors of the highest Diplomatic Triumvirate in the country, had drawn up an elaborate paper on our alliances with the states in the direction of the Berar country and the Nerbudda territories; and a copy of it had been sent to the Delhi Resident, who read it with delight, and returned it with the following letter to the writer—a letter in which Metcalfe expounds his general views of the extent to which it behoved the

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British Government to adhere to, or depart from, their system of non-interference :

CHARLES METCALFE TO RICHARD JENKINS.

“ November 3, 1814.

“ MY DEAR JENKINS,—I lately received the accompanying from Strachey by your desire, and am much obliged to you for the perusal of its interesting contents. I congratulate you on the accomplishment of your views, so far as that, the subsidiary alliance being rejected by the Rajah, a connexion is to be formed with Bhopal and Sagur, &c. How impracticable the non-interference system is found to be; or if practicable, how constantly it is deviated from! Nothing can be more desirable than an advance in your quarter, either by a subsidiary alliance with Nagpore, or by the arrangements now in contemplation. Therefore, I rejoice at this partial abandonment of the non-interference system. But I want to see it openly renounced as absurd and impracticable in our present situation. Let our policy be guided by justice and moderation, but let us take every fair opportunity of securing and aggrandising our power.

“ We require, by-the-by, an increase of revenue to enable us to maintain an increase of the army, rendered necessary to all appearance by the extension of our connexions, as well as the great extent of our frontier. I do not know, however, that an increase of the army is in contemplation, or that the necessity is admitted by those who are to judge; I only speak my own sentiments on this point. It is curious to observe how frequently we are compelled by policy to deviate from our *fixed* principles. I remember the time when the advancement of our influence on the Sutlej was reprobated even by Lord Wellesley as too great an extension of our views. Subsequently proposals to that effect were repeatedly rejected, until my mission to Lahore, which produced at least the benefit of an arrangement that has been attended with the best effects; though when I went on that mission it was not in contemplation to protect the chiefs between the Sutlej and the Jumna,



other plans being in contemplation for the conciliation of Runjeet Singh, whom at that time it was impossible to conciliate. Our subsequent interference in favor of Nagpore against Meer Khan was another deviation from our system, and a very wise one. I only regret that we did not take advantage of the opportunity to make the Rajah purchase our permanent protection on our own terms. Various arrangements since have shown other deviations from our system; and it only remains to renounce a system from which we are always compelled to deviate. Our power in India is so strangely constituted, that unless we take advantage of all fair opportunities to increase our strength, we may meet some day with unexpected reverses, and have our power shaken to its centre, if not overturned. It is doubtful, I think, how long we shall preserve our wonderful empire in India; but the best chance of preserving it must arise from our making ourselves strong by all just means; not from an absurd system which would affect to look on with indifference at the increasing strength of others, and to trust for our existence to the unattainable character of unambitious amiable innocence and forbearance. Are you acquainted with the plans of Government regarding Nepaul? If not, I can send you some information regarding them.

"It is long since I received your affectionate and kind letter written on your return to Nagpore. When are we destined to meet? It is now more than eight years since I last had the happiness of seeing you, and God knows when I shall see you again. But I hope to retain your friendship as long as we live, and to pass many happy days with your hereafter. Believe me, with faithful attachment,

"Your affectionate friend,

"G. T. METCALFE."

Such opinions as are here expressed were not distasteful at head-quarters. The paper which Metcalfe forwarded to Lord Moira was favorably re-

ceived;* and it was soon responded to by an invitation to the writer to visit the Governor-General's camp. "As the immediate urgency," wrote John Adam, on the 21st of November, "for your remaining at Delhi has diminished, Lord Moira has desired me to say that he will be happy if you can meet him at Moradabad, where he expects to arrive in ten days from this date. . . . His Lordship is of opinion that as you are yourself to come to Moradabad, it will be more convenient to bring your host of native visitors to that station, or near it, than to postpone them till his arrival at Kurnaul, as proposed in Swinton's letter to you."† This business of the reception was, indeed, an important one. The near approach of the Vice-regal Camp had thrown not only the royal family of Delhi, but the whole circle of native diplomatists, into a state of excitement; and arrangements were now to be made both for the reception of his Majesty's delegates and the crowd of lesser wakeels, and for a deputation of

* On the first receipt of the paper, John Adam had written to Metcalfe that there was little doubt of his Lordship's approbation. "The indispensable measure," he said, "of augmenting the military force is, I fear, not to be expected. With respect to the mode of conducting operations against fortified places, his Lordship's judgment had long since adopted a conclusion corresponding to yours; and the utmost care has been taken not only to furnish the forces destined to act against the Nepaulese with an ample equipment of mortars, howitzers, and shells, but to enjoin in the most positive manner the use of them to the utmost. The neglect of this order at Kalunga it is too late to dis-

cuss, and must ever be lamented."—*[John Adam to Charles Metcalfe, November 20, 1814. MS. Correspondence.]*

† Metcalfe had proposed Meerut as a fit place for the reception of the native diplomatists, but the course of the Governor-General's progress had been changed; it was suggested that Kurnaul would be a better place "to meet them," wrote Mr. Swinton, who was then Persian Secretary, "as we come down on Delhi." "By this arrangement," he added, "we should not have too much of their company, which, with the large party of ourselves, is certainly not desirable."—*[George Swinton to Charles Metcalfe, November 15, 1814. MS. Correspondence.]*



British functionaries to the Imperial Court. On this subject Mr. Adam wrote, in the letter above quoted, to Metcalfe:

"As Lord Moira will not visit Delhi himself, unless under circumstances which I cannot anticipate, his Lordship has it in contemplation to send to his Majesty a deputation of compliment. It is proposed that this deputation shall consist of Ricketts, Swinton, and myself, and two of his Lordship's immediate personal staff—for example, the Military Secretary and the First Aide-de-camp. I have been desired to mention the subject to you for the purpose of obtaining your sentiments on the propriety and expediency of the thing generally, and in order that the ceremonial of the reception may be previously adjusted."^{*}

"I am going immediately to meet his Lordship at Moradabad," wrote Metcalfe to Jenkins on the 24th of November. By the end of the month he was in the Vice-regal Camp. The ceremonies, of

^{*} Some grave questions of no very easy solution, arising out of the windy dignity of the poor puppet of Delhi, had suggested themselves to the authorities at head-quarters. It was not improbable that the Mogul, considering rather what he, or his ancestors, had been, than what he was, would refuse to pay to the Governor-General such compliments as the Governor-General was willing to pay to him. This especially in the matter of nuzzurs or presents of homage—the interchange of which Lord Hastings considered desirable to avoid even with the King—but he intimated that he would not object to it, if required, "or to any other indispensable forms, under a conviction that they cannot be misconstrued into demonstrations of homage on his own part." "His Lordship," added Mr. Adam,

"will also expect that if his deputation present nuzzurs to the King, his Majesty's deputation will present nuzzurs to the Governor-General, and in all respects perform the same or corresponding ceremonies." The apprehensions here glanced at were justified by the result. Metcalfe could not persuade the unhappy King that, if he were to meet the Governor-General at all, it was incumbent upon him to meet his Lordship as an equal. The Shah still required that some acknowledgment of his superiority should be shown; so the Governor-General declined the interview. "Have the goodness, therefore," wrote the Chief Secretary to Metcalfe, after the former had left the camp of the Governor-General, "with your accustomed diplomatic ability, to reconcile the King to the impracticability of a meeting."

which he was then master, were soon over, and more serious business was in hand.

There were many important questions to be put to the Delhi Resident—much information to be sought which only he could satisfactorily afford :— what effect our recent disasters had upon the people of the Delhi territory and the adjacent country, and on the minds of the dependent chiefs and independent princes of Hindostan—what would be their influence on the mind of Runjeet Singh—what steps should be taken to counteract such influence—what course of conduct ought to be pursued towards Bhurtpore—whether, and under what circumstances, the Governor-General should have a personal interview with the King of Delhi—whether the power of granting native titles should be left in the hands of the imperial puppet, or assumed by the British Government—whether an agent from Shah Soojah, the fugitive King of Cabul, should be received in the Vice-regal Camp—and, lastly, what was the general political and military condition of the Upper Provinces of India, with reference to the defence of our frontier and the expediency of consolidating our power in the interior of India. For the solution of all these questions, the Governor-General and his Ministers looked eagerly to Metcalfe's arrival in camp.*

At Lord Moira's head-quarters were many able men. Civilians of high repute and soldiers of large experience and sound judgment clustered around

* "Memorandum of Points for up by Mr. John Adam.—[MS. Records.]
discussion with Mr. Metcalfe," drawn



him. It happened that the chief of these were Charles Metcalfe's friends—Charles Ricketts, John Adam, and George Swinton, the Chief Ministerial Functionaries; and George Fagan, the Adjutant-General, all knew and esteemed Metcalfe—nay, they loved him; and now they eagerly welcomed among them one whose public character and personal qualities were equally valued by them. They had all spoken of him to Lord Moira in language of becoming admiration. To the Governor-General, indeed, who had often heard, and on perusing the despatches of the Delhi Resident had echoed, his praises, Metcalfe was presented as no stranger. He was received at once into the councils of the Vice-regal Camp. Such an accession of strength in such a juncture was more than welcome.

For the juncture was one which in the eyes of Lord Moira and his staff demanded the exercise of all the talent that could be pressed into their service. The Goorkhas, who were defying us from their hill-forts; the Pindarrees, who were ravaging our frontiers; the Mahratta princes, who, sheltered by the name of ally, were looking eagerly for a favorable opportunity to assail us—were not the only enemies whose skill and courage at this time disquieted the Governor-General. There was a contest raging between the Head-quarters' Camp and the Council-chamber of Calcutta; and the Pindarrees of Leadenhall-street, with their restrictions and retrenchments, were assailing the rear of the Governor-General. Mr. Edmonstone was then Vice-President of the Council. Mr. Seton and Mr. Dowdeswell were his associates in the Government.



The current business of the administration was in the hands of these three gentlemen ; and though the power of war-making and peace-making belonged to the Governor-General, the councillors had still the means of conducting an opposition which, however futile for the time, might, backed by the Court of Directors and the Board of Control, eventually be successful, and was, at all events, embarrassing and annoying.

Edmonstone was a host in himself. He had immense experience ; a sound head ; a ready pen ; and a reputation second to none in India. It was with deep sorrow that he arrayed himself against the Governor-General ; but what he believed to be his duty, he was not one to shrink from doing, and he recorded his opinions with the calm confidence of one never doubting the goodness of his cause, but deploring the necessity of asserting it. Lord Moira respected his opponent ; as did all the ministerial officers in his camp—but he was not on that account less anxious to refute him. He saw the necessity of having able men at his elbow to expound his opinions and to give effect to his projects ; and he soon saw that Metcalfe was one who would enter with his whole soul into the views of the Governor-General, making light of those very difficulties which were being continually paraded before him by his antagonists of the Calcutta Council. The longer Metcalfe remained in the camp of the Governor-General, the more plainly it appeared that his policy was identical with that which Lord Moira was inclined to favor. Indeed, the boldness and decision with which Metcalfe declared his opinions, seemed to



fix and rivet those of the Governor-General and disperse all doubts and misgivings. It was pleasing to the old soldier to be thus supported by one of the ablest of India's younger statesmen; and all the ministerial officers by whom he was surrounded delighted in the thought that they had obtained the assistance of so thorough-going and efficient an ally.

Invited to declare his opinions freely, Metcalfe not only delivered them, without reservation, in oral discourse, but fully expounded them in elaborate minutes. In one written in December, 1814, in the Governor-General's Camp, he laid down a detailed plan for the settlement of Central India, prefaced by a series of general propositions, declaring that everything must give place to the necessity of maintaining an overwhelming military establishment.* But it was apparent to him, that now that we had once embarked in the Nepaul war, nothing else could be done until we extricated ourselves from it with honor. The dangers it had entailed upon us, he said, were great; for England could not fail with impunity, and we were now surrounded with enemies all eager to take advantage of our discomfiture:†

* More detailed mention of this paper will be found in the following chapter.

† That Metcalfe, at this time, was not inclined to under-rate the extent of our failures, or the danger which they brought upon us, may be gathered from some passages in a letter written to Mr. Jenkins about this time (Jan. 15, 1815). In this letter the writer says: "We have met with an enemy who shows decidedly greater bravery and greater steadiness than our troops

possess; and it is impossible to say what may be the end of such a reverse of the order of things. In some instances our troops, European and Native, have been repulsed by inferior numbers with sticks and stones. In others our troops have been charged by the enemy sword in hand, and driven for miles like a flock of sheep. In a late instance of complete rout, we lost more muskets by a great number than there were killed, wounded, and missing. In short, I,



“There is Runjeet Singh,” he wrote in a paper given to Lord Moira, in January, 1815, “looking eagerly on from the north-west. There is Meer Khan within a few marches of the Delhi and Agra frontiers. There are Scindiah and the Rajah of Nagpore settling whether they shall attack us or not; and thus virtually menacing our frontier from Agra down to Kuttack. There are the Pindarrees ready to pour themselves into every defenceless country. Had the operations of our campaign against the Goorkhas been decidedly successful, the war would have increased our reputation and power; and so far from encouraging any hostile designs of other powers, would have deterred all enemies from such designs. But when our numerous enemies see us entangled and embarrassed in an unsuccessful war, it is hardly to be expected that they will refrain from taking advantage of such a favorable opportunity, unless they be overawed by suitable arrangements and proportionate exertions on our part.”

Under such circumstances Metcalfe argued that it was desirable to conclude peace with Nepaul as soon as a blow could be struck at the Goorkha power—such a blow as would relieve us of all apprehensions of their again inviting a contest with the British. This, he said, could only be done by commencing

who have always thought our power in India precarious, cannot help thinking that our downfall has already commenced. Our power rested solely on our military superiority. With respect to one enemy, that is gone. In this war, dreadful to say, we have

had numbers on our side, and skill and bravery on the side of our enemy. We have had the inhabitants of the country disposed to favor us, and yet overawed, notwithstanding our presence and partial success, by the character of our enemy.”



operations upon a much larger scale than had been previously instituted. "Let every effort," he said, "be made to open the next campaign with an overwhelming force. And, finally, let every opportunity be embraced for concluding an honorable peace, since it is only by a ruinous expense and unprecedented exertions that entire success is to be expected in a continuance of the war." No better recommendation than this could have been offered. But how was it to be carried into effect? Metcalfe declared that the crisis was a great one; and that it was incumbent on the Government to make extraordinary exertions to bring an overwhelming force into the field. "Reinforcements of Europeans and natives," he said, "should be brought to as great an amount as can be obtained from the other Presidencies. European regiments should be called from our other colonies, even from England. Every exertion," he continued, "that would be made in times of imminent peril ought to be made now to ward off a peril which appears to be not improbable." "We never had," said Metcalfe, "an enemy to contend with in India so formidable as our present enemy. None other ever displayed so much bravery in action or so much system, skill, and conduct, so much prudent caution, and so much well-timed confidence. None other ever possessed a country so easily defended and so difficult to the invader, and so detrimental to the peculiar advantages which we should otherwise have over our enemy. All these considerations demand serious attention. Let us resolve

to evince to this bold enemy that we have the means of crushing him. If we cannot secure an opportunity of defeating his assembled army in the field, let us show him that we can collect a force against which opposition would be fruitless. Let us show him that our resources are not confined to local means; and that if a small army be not sufficient to revenge our wrongs, the British nation can send us an overpowering one."

It was not, said Metcalfe, his duty to determine the amount of force necessary for the overthrow of the Goorkhas, but he knew that it was the worst folly to attempt it with insufficient means, and he believed that "if the object could not be accomplished by the application of our local means in men and money, we ought without loss of time to require the necessary assistance from England." "To conclude," he said, "the wisest course would seem to be to prosecute the war with such an immense force as shall either enable us to overthrow the enemy, and completely defeat his armies at all points, or shall reduce him to submission to our terms, by convincing him of the inutility of opposition. If anything be left to chance, though we may succeed, we may also fail, and the chances are against us, from the nature of the enemy's country and our inexperience in mountain warfare."

The truth of all these propositions was acknowledged, and the suggestions put forth were "approved" by the Governor-General. Indeed, what in this paper was so emphatically propounded, had already been submitted, in another shape, to Lord



Moirā, and had elicited his approbation.* Many were the papers which, at this and a little later period, he drew up for the guidance of the Governor-General,† and very much that he then wrote was

* I find the following memorandum, in the handwriting of Mr. Ricketts, the Private Secretary, giving an abstract of one set of recommendations which Metcalfe laid before Lord Moirā, with the Governor-General's acceptance of the proposals:

"Metcalfe. — 1st. To endeavor to bring the Goorkha war to a termination, by aiding the operations of the regular detachments, with the services of bodies of irregulars.—[Approved.]

"2nd. Negotiations with Scindiah, Bopal, and Sangor.—[See *Political Correspondence*.]

3rd. To carry the increase of our army, regular and irregular, to the utmost extent practicable, &c.—[Approved.]

"4th. To ascertain the real object of the Rajah of Nagpore, Meer Khan, Mahomed Shah Khan, &c.—[Approved.]

"His Lordship will be happy to receive the further recommendations promised by Mr. Metcalfe."

† A catalogue of these papers is given in the following extract from a letter written to Mr. Jenkins in May, 1816:

"Many thanks," wrote Metcalfe, "for your permission to see your letter on the Political State of India. I shall apply to Clive for it. Elphinstone told me it was admirable. I would with the greatest pleasure send you mine, though I fear the very reverse of admirable; and it requires a little detail to explain why I cannot. I happened to be the first in the field in writing on this subject. After the first failure at Kalunga, I thought the opportunity a good one for procuring attention to opinions strongly impressed on my mind, which I knew would be unpopular, and I volunteered a paper to Lord Moirā on the causes of our numerous failures of late years, be-

ginning with that of Bhurtpore, and on the necessity of adopting measures to ensure success. This was answered by a call to head-quarters. Immediately after my arrival there, I gave in a paper on the measures to be pursued in consequence of the state of affairs at that period. This was soon followed by another, containing a view of the Political State of India, or as Adam called it, *De Rebus Omnibus*, and recommending the settlement of Central India, the suppression of all predatory powers, the protection of all weak powers, the acquisition of as much territory and revenue as the chances of just war might throw into our hands; and in short, the establishment of our supreme influence over the whole country within the Sutlej and Indus. This was followed by another paper on the progress of the Goorkha war, next by one on an alliance with Jyepore—then one on our military policy and establishments—then another on the settlement of Central India—with several intermediate ones which I do not accurately recollect. The whole would form a large volume—but they were all written in such haste, that of the greater part I have no record, the drafts having been sent from my hand to the principal Private Secretary, and never returned, and of the few foul drafts which remain in my possession I have taken no care, not thinking them worth the perusal of any one, except the person for whose information they were written, and on whose want of information I presumed to give value to the matter, notwithstanding the faults of the composition. If, however, I can ever put my hand on any, I will send them with all their faults on their heads. Success to your negotiation. Wish the same to mine, for I am about to commence one with Jyepore. Sooner

embodied, in substance, and sometimes in his very words, in the minutes of the head of the Government. He spent about a month—including the Christmas and New Year of 1814-15—in the camp of the Governor-General, making himself all this time very useful and very agreeable, and leaving a blank behind him when he went. His separation, however, from his friends of the Governor-General's Staff was not of a very long continuance. The pride of the poor Mogul, who insisted upon the acknowledgment of his superiority over the British Viceroy, prevented, as has been seen, Lord Moira's visit to Delhi; but a deputation, consisting of the principal officers of his public and private Staff, was to proceed, soon after Metcalfe's departure, to the Court of the pageant-king; and, at the same time, Lady Loudoun,* with a considerable retinue, was to visit the imperial city. When, therefore, Metcalfe returned to Delhi, it was his pleasing duty to make preparations for the reception of his friends, and to reciprocate the hospitalities he had received.

How, for some little time after this, Metcalfe was compelled to play the part of Master of the Ceremonies—to introduce the British deputation to the Mogul Emperor—to attend Lady Loudoun—to manage the meeting of the Countess with the Begum Sumroo, and to superintend the introduction of her Highness to the Governor-General, need not be told in detail. Before the month of January had worn

or later, if not very soon, we must undertake the subjugation of all India." * The lady of the Governor-General—a countess in her own right.



to a close, Metcalfe was again in the Governor-General's Camp, and again in council with his Ministers. Throughout a considerable part of February he remained at head-quarters, and the longer he remained the more strongly was Lord Moira impressed with the conviction that in the great battle which he was about to fight for the settlement of Central India, both with his colleagues in the local Government and with the Home authorities, it would be expedient to have at his elbow a man who so well understood the whole subject, and who was prepared with such an array of arguments in defence of the policy which was favored at head-quarters.

But how was this to be accomplished, consistently with existing arrangements? How was Metcalfe to be removed from Delhi to a seat worthy of his acceptance in the Secretariat? There were changes in that winter of 1814-15 evolving themselves, which seemed to afford facilities for such an arrangement as might bring the Delhi Resident to the Vice-regal Court. Mr. Tucker, who had filled long and worthily the office of Financial Secretary, had been promoted to the Chief Secretaryship, and soon afterwards announced his intention of proceeding upon leave to sea, and subsequently, as the event proved, to England. This movement caused a vacancy in the Secretariat which it was necessary to fill. Mr. Dowdeswell, who had been Chief Secretary, had succeeded to the Supreme Council. Mr. Charles Ricketts was now Chief and Private Secretary. Mr. Butterworth Bayley was Judicial Secretary; Mr. Adam was Political Secretary; Mr. Swinton

was Persian Secretary. But the Financial Secretaryship, which Mr. Tucker had held before his promotion, was still vacant. It was proposed, therefore, to Metcalfe, that he should, in the first instance, enter upon this office with the reversion of the Private Secretaryship, on the expected retirement of Mr. Ricketts. The proposal was a perplexing one. All through the spring and summer of 1815 this great personal question continued from time to time to distract his mind. He clung with peculiar fondness to the Delhi Residency; he knew that he was useful there; but it was probable that a larger sphere of usefulness might be opened out to him by his transfer to the Secretariat—and the Secretariat was ever regarded as the high road to the Supreme Council. What his doubts and distractions were in this perplexity, may be gathered from the following letters to Mr. Jenkins, on whom the Governor-General intended to bestow the Delhi Residency if Metcalfe should vacate it:

CHARLES METCALFE TO RICHARD JENKINS.

[Without date—received on the 16th of June, 1815.]

“MY DEAR JENKINS,—After a long and inglorious struggle, we have at length, by superiority of numbers, the protection of artillery, and length of purse, gained considerable successes over the Goorkhas. The whole of the mountainous country between the Sutlej and the Gogra, which it took them thirty years to conquer, has been wrested from their hands and placed at our disposal.* So that although we cannot boast of our

* “Sreenugur and other places within the space mentioned are still in the enemy's hands, but it is expected that they will be evacuated.”—C. T. M.



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exploits, the enemy cannot exult at the result. There are some symptoms of a disposition on his part to treat for peace on our terms, and I shall be glad if peace be concluded. If not, I hope that we may fight better next campaign. If the enemy's Government had acted as boldly as their troops have fought bravely, we should not have had any success to console ourselves with. It is better as it is. There have been some instances in which our troops have not disgraced themselves. The operations at Almora have been the most creditable of the campaign, and reflect honor on the commander, Colonel Nicolls, and on the troops. Ochterlony, too, has gained great increase of reputation by his prudent judgment and skill.* Some generals have damned themselves. The gallant Gillespie would, I am sure, have carried everything, had he not been basely deserted by a set of cowardly wretches.

"I reflect on the events of the campaign with great pain. If we are to depend on numbers and money for success over our enemies, the prospect is not very encouraging. Livy's description of the Ligurians, which I met with by chance the other day in reading Eustace's Tour in Italy, is admirably applicable to the Goorkhas.

"I hasten to another subject on which I have longed wished to write to you, but have been deterred by the uncertainty with which it is beset.

"[*Confidential.*].—I was in attendance on Lord Moira during a considerable part of December, January, and February. He expressed a desire to have me at the Presidency. As the only visible mode of effecting this purpose, he offered me the succession to the Financial Secretaryship, about to be vacated, it was supposed, by Tucker's resignation. The flattering manner in which the proposal was made, deprived me of the resolution requisite firmly to reject it, and I almost pledged myself to

* "The European officers were never more conspicuous for excellent conduct than in the present campaign. Individual gallantry and devotion

have been displayed in the highest degree by young officers. But our troops have failed to show their former confidence."—C. T. M.



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accept it. I have, however, many doubts as to the propriety of the change, and am inclined to retract. These doubts I have expressed in the proper quarter, and I think it probable that the arrangement will not take place. I will not detain you with a detail of the *pros* and *cons* which divide my mind on the question, but proceed to inform you that it was in contemplation, when I was at head-quarters, to make you the Resident at Delhi. I do not know how you would like this; and if you would not like it, you must be prepared to object to it in the event of its being proposed to you. If you wish for any information respecting this Residency to determine your choice, send me your questions, and I will give you full and faithful intelligence. My removal, however, is very uncertain, and will probably not take place; for I am more attached to Delhi in consequence of the apprehension of quitting it, than I ever was before. What would you think of my impudence if I were to set up for a Financial Secretary? I should be glad to have your opinion. I do not like to quit the line in which I have served all my life, for one in which I must be incompetent. I am afraid, too, of being detained longer in the country by the proposed change. But I promised not to trouble you with this detail. God bless you.

"Yours affectionately,

"C. T. METCALFE."

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

"August 26, 1816.

"MY DEAR JENKINS,—I have determined to remain at Delhi, and am glad that I have. Lord Moira has on every occasion been most kind to me, and I shall ever be grateful to him. It was proposed to me to take the Financial and Revenue Secretaryship now, with the assurance of the Private Secretaryship in addition on Ricketts's resignation, which the latter pledged himself to give in in December, 1816. Had the latter situation been vacant now, and offered to me together with the other, I could not have refused them. But it is as well as it is.



I have discovered that I am more attached to Delhi and the inhabitants of the territory under me than I formerly supposed myself to be. I found, when my removal was probable, that I should quit with great reluctance scenes to which I had become attached by habit, and a people for whose welfare I had several plans unaccomplished. I am well pleased to find myself secured in my own habits, and at liberty to devote myself to the interest of my subjects. I declined the Financial Secretaryship on the ground that it would retard by return to England; and the promise of the Private Secretaryship, from disinclination to bind down Lord Moira and Ricketts. It is now understood that there is no obligation on Lord Moira's part to renew any similar proposal at a future period, nor on mine to accept it, if renewed. The same reasons which induced me to rejoice now at my staying at Delhi, make me wish that I may not hereafter receive any temptation to quit it. One great advantage which I feel at Delhi is, that I shall always there be independent of a seat in Council; that is, that I shall not care a straw if I do not obtain one. Had I accepted a Secretaryship in Calcutta, I must have turned my views to Council, and should, in all probability, have been disappointed. I took leave of Lord Moira on the 21st at Futtehghur, and am now on my way to Delhi. I have written this short report of my proceedings for your early information. The necessity of any reply to your questions concerning Delhi is obviated by my continuance at that place. I will not, therefore, trouble you with the details which otherwise I should have sent you, unless you require them with a view to any future contingency. Accept my cordial thanks for the friendly and affectionate contents of your last letter. I shall write to you again soon. I have some communications to make respecting the politics of head-quarters. The Goorkha war is still pending; at least, peace is not concluded, nor can we agree on the preliminaries as yet.

"Believe me ever, your most affectionately,

"C. T. METCALFE,"

But the idea of attaching Metcalfe permanently to the Secretariat was not abandoned at headquarters, even after the Governor-General had retired to Calcutta.* As the year wore on to a close, the pressure of public business still suggested the expediency of securing the services of one so well acquainted with all departments, and so peculiarly qualified to assist the councils of Government in those great political affairs connected with the settlement of Central India which were fast beginning to absorb every other consideration. It was difficult to make the necessary arrangement. Mr. Ricketts, on whom it seemed mainly to depend, was well inclined to make considerable sacrifices for its accomplishment, but Lord Moira demurred to the plan which his Private Secretary proposed. What the arrangement was, and the powerful considerations which induced him to make it, may be gathered from the following passage in one of Mr. Ricketts's private letters to Metcalfe:

"At this juncture a second campaign against the Goorkhas was probable—the proposed concession to them was resisted by

* An effort had been made to persuade Metcalfe to return with the Governor-General's Camp to Calcutta. "The 15th of August," wrote the Private Secretary to him, "is still the time fixed for his Lordship's departure, and allowing a day or two for delay, I reckon upon the 20th as the day. This, I trust, will square with your plans, and on many accounts we hope that you will be able to take a run with us to Calcutta. . . . Your presence there would be useful—indeed, the only *ready* means, perhaps, of enabling you finally to determine about accepting a Secre-

taryship or remaining at Delhi." There were other inducements, too, to tempt him to the Presidency, for Theophilus Metcalfe had come round to Calcutta about some important business connected with the Factory and the Tea-trade—but the Delhi Resident resisted them all. He proceeded, soon after the receipt of Ricketts's letter, to the camp of the Governor-General at Futtehghur, and after declining the offer of an appointment in the Secretariat, took leave of Lord Moira (as indicated in the above letter to Mr. Jenkins) and returned to Delhi.



Lord Moira—the affair of Trimbackjee was in a most critical state—the disturbance at Hyderabad was not quelled—the Mahratta confederacy was in agitation—the Pindarrees were in motion—Ameer Khan was overwhelming the Rajpoot states—troops were required to overawe Scindiah—Baillie was tottering at Lucknow—Raffles was to be removed from Java—many financial discussions were on the *tapis* both as relating to the war expenses and to resources for the future, which required a final adjustment between the territorial and commercial accounts, subjects on which all good folks differed—that the orders of the Court of Directors respecting a reduction of the army remained yet to be considered—that the reports of his Lordship, in the Military, Revenue, and Judicial Departments were to be completed, and might excite much discussion—that a necessity was imposed upon his Lordship of entering into a full review of our political situation and relations, in which the attack made by his colleagues was to be rebutted, their mistaken notions were to be exposed, and the measures to be produced for our security were to be explained—that most questions of any importance in each department of the Government had been left open for his Lordship's decision—that feuds between the bishop (who is a high priest) and the Kirk remained to be adjusted, and that, in short, so many difficulties and embarrassments presented themselves on every side, that I despaired of his Lordship getting over the whole with any kind of satisfaction to himself without the aid of you, my friend!—Adam was a host certainly in himself; but he was already overwhelmed with business; Bayley could only attend to pending judicial questions; no aid from Trant in finance was to be expected; and I knew that, however well disposed, my talents were very limited, and wholly unequal to the duties with which I was threatened. My plans, consequently, for inducing you to come to Calcutta were as follows:—Mr. Thomson talked of going home in January, and I proposed, therefore, that you should be appointed Territorial Secretary, and that you should divide with me the allowances of Private Secretary on Mr. T.'s departure. This was approved



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by his Lordship ; but Mr. T. changed his mind. I then requested that I might be allowed to resign my situation of P. P.* Secretary in your favor. To this, however, his Lordship would not assent ; and, lastly, I was induced from various causes to beg his Lordship to accept my resignation of the situation, now that I had accomplished with your assistance all the reports and papers which he was so anxious to have ready for transmission to the Secret Committee by the *William Pitt*. Lord Moira, I conceived, would not refuse compliance with my wishes, and I, moreover, conceived that he would then feel at liberty to place you in a post which you were so eminently well qualified to fill. His Lordship, however, requested me to withdraw my application. This has been done for the present ; you consequently are not coming to Calcutta, nor am I, which at one time was not improbable, going to Java."†

But the failure of Mr. Ricketts's honorable efforts was not much to be deplored. The time, indeed, was fast approaching when it would be in the power of Charles Metcalfe to render more essential services to the State in Upper India than at the Presidency. The settlement of Central India was about to be commenced, and in this great work the Delhi Resident was to take no unimportant part.

The consideration of this great subject, and the narration of the personal incidents connected with it in the career of Charles Metcalfe, must be reserved for another chapter. But before passing on to these grave political affairs, the writer must pause to touch upon some points of less historical, but, perhaps, not less biographical importance. It is curious, in running through the immense wilderness

* Principal Private Secretary.

† Calcutta, December 10, 1815.



of correspondence which Metcalfe carefully preserved, to see how many and great, at this time, in addition to the claims of public duty, were the demands of private friendship upon his time and attention. The commissions which were entrusted to him were numerous and varied; and he found time to execute them all. It was not only that the kindness of his heart, his eagerness to give pleasure might always be relied upon; but that there were requests made to him which only he, perhaps, could satisfactorily fulfil—which only he had a power commensurate with the will to accomplish. Thus Mountstuart Elphinstone wrote to him from Poonah, asking him to exert himself to obtain for his friend Mr. Erskine a complete copy of Baber's autobiography, and an authentic portrait of the Emperor.* Malcolm applied to him to obtain information relative to the career of the great Bengal Banker, Omichund, after the

* "Mr. Erskine, at Bombay," wrote Elphinstone, "is employed in translating the commentaries of the Emperor Baber, from a Persian translation of that work, which is certainly the most curious and interesting I ever met with in an Asiatic language. There are, however, several gaps in the translation he has got, and a complete copy in Turkish, which I brought from Peshawur, was lost in consequence of poor Leyden's death, so that Mr. Erskine's translation must remain incomplete unless you can get us a complete copy of the translation at Delhi. The august representative of the house of Timour must assuredly possess the commentaries of the most illustrious of his ancestors, and the founder of his empire. But if his Majesty should not be able to put his hand on the work, some of the literati at Delhi will probably be able to pro-

duce it." A copy of the work was found; but, unhappily, it had the same deficiencies as that in Mr. Erskine's possession. Elphinstone, therefore, requested Metcalfe to obtain him a Turkish copy from Peshawur. An authentic portrait of Baber was also required, and Metcalfe, his characteristic good-nature stimulated by his literary zeal, immediately instituted the necessary inquiries, and found what was sought. Mr. Erskine's charming translation of Baber's Commentaries is well known to English readers—to some through the book itself; to others through Jeffrey's review of it, published among his collected Essays. A posthumous work embracing an elaborate history of some of the princes of the house of Timour—a work of great ability and research—has appeared whilst this sheet has been passing through the press.

destroying fraud that had been practised upon him by Lord Clive. Ochterlony* wrote to him to prepare a monument, and to write an inscription to the memory of that poor young Lawtie, of the Engineers, killed by his brave exertions in the Nepaul war, to which so much of our first successes were nobly attributed by his chief. Nicolls† commissioned him to procure an ornamental sabre, to be publicly presented to a native officer who had distinguished himself in the same war. Edmonstone, in consequence of a reference from England, besought him to obtain information relative to the matrimonial connexions formed between the Mogul princes and the daughters of the Rajpoot Rajahs.‡ Sir William

* "In every letter," wrote Ochterlony, "written to you, I have intended to make a very particular request, which I have ever neglected or forgotten before the conclusion. It is that you will get a slab of marble, and on it cut an inscription of your own composition for the tomb of our lamented Lawtie, at Ruttunghur. Few will read it; but I do not wish an European visitor to pass without knowing that the spot contains the remains of one so deservedly valued and lamented."

† The late Sir Jasper Nicolls, who wrote: "My object in troubling you now is to beg that you will purchase and transmit to me, *via* Moradabad, a sabre, not exceeding in value 400 rupees, which I have obtained Lord Moira's consent to give to a Jemadar of the 4th N. I., who conducted himself with great intrepidity on the 25th ultimo. The blade, if possible, should be good, but it ought to be ornamental also; it should please the eye long after the *éclat* of the action has worn off. I shall present it on the theatre of his valor, and in public."

‡ Metcalfe's answer to this application is worth more than the space that

it will take: "I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 9th a few minutes before a visit from the Joudpore Wakeel, a most respectable and well-informed old man, and I availed myself of the opportunity to apply to him for a solution of the question referred to you from England. He says that it was first proposed to the Rajpoot Rajahs to form a connexion with the imperial family by taking in marriage imperial princesses; but that this proposal was rejected, as such a communication would have polluted the blood of the Rajahs' families, and would have been utter abomination for ever; that they were glad to effect their escape from so alarming a danger by sacrificing their own daughters, who were considered as dead from the time of their connexion with the emperors; that after the ice had been once broken by the formation of a connexion of this kind, it came to be considered a custom, and ceased to be objectionable. That a connexion with the emperors was thought desirable for political purposes, and that the rivalry of the Rajahs of Jyepore and Joudpore made both occasionally press forward with their daughters,



Rumbold besought him to despatch a wet-nurse to Cawnpore—John Adam commissioned him to buy for Lady Hood some of the finest garnets to be found in Delhi. Mr. Richardson wrote to him “at the girls’ desire” for “three Solimanee necklaces, bracelets, &c., and also three lapis-lazuli necklaces, bracelets, &c., and any other little trinkets, or Hindostanee ornaments, or costume that you think they would like.” Added to applications of this varied and interesting character was a never-failing succession of requests for pecuniary assistance, for the most part from military officers, to whom he made advances, with or without any kind of security, often knowing that the loan would prove, as he intended it to be, a gift to the petitioner.

But there were letters, very different from any of these, received during the years of his residence at Delhi—letters which inflicted upon him an acuteness of pain which may, in some measure perhaps, be duly estimated by those who have dwelt upon the passages relating to his parents in the letters which he addressed to his aunt. In the course of the year 1814 he received intelligence of the death of his father. And two years afterwards the sad tidings of his mother’s death also reached him.* This is

each being jealous when such a connexion was formed by the other. Nevertheless that the daughters were considered as dead and gone, though their posthumous influence was an object of desire to their fathers. This is the mode in which the Jondpore Wakeel attempts to solve the question. I shall make further inquiries, and have the happiness of making you acquainted with the result.”—
[May 25, 1814.]

* Intelligence of Lady Metcalfe’s death was received in India in March, 1816. Both events were unexpected—especially the latter. Lady Metcalfe died on the 9th of September, 1815, at the house of some friends in Dorsetshire to whom she was paying a visit. She had just been talking to her son-in-law, Lord Ashbrook, about returning home, when she suddenly expired, “without uttering a word or a sigh.” Mr. George Saunders com-



almost a condition of Indian exile. It is a grievous trial which few escape—to lay up fame and fortune and to see those, with whom we would share their blessings, pass away from our reach. How deeply Metcalfe felt these heavy blows may be gathered from his letters to his friends. “The loss of my mother,” he wrote to Richard Jenkins, in May, 1816, “has made all my prospects dismal: and I cannot now look even to a return to England with any pleasure. The purest happiness that I have enjoyed in life is buried in the grave with both my parents; and I have really, at present, no object to live for. The thought of returning to my parents was my stimulus in everything. This affliction has also affected my correspondence of all kinds. But enough of this. You will, I am sure, excuse me, and believe that nothing can alter my attachment or the delight and pride I feel in the possession of your friendship.” Indeed, it seemed, as one by one the links which bound him to England were broken, the firmness with which he clung to his Indian attachments increased. From this time he fell back for support upon the associations of exile, and solaced himself with the friendships within his reach.

It was with little regret, therefore, that about this time he received an intimation that the Court of Directors, among other retrenchments, had reduced the expenses of the Delhi Residency,* by curtailing

communicated the melancholy intelligence to Captain Fergusson, at Delhi, whom he requested to prepare Metcalfe for the receipt of the sad tidings.

* The expenses of all the Resi-

dencies had been reduced; but whilst other retrenchments were ordered to take immediate effect, the case of the Delhi Residency had been treated as an exceptional one, and Metcalfe had



the Resident's allowances. "The cuttings here," he wrote to Mr. Jenkins, "are 2000 rupees a month from the public allowance. This I have allowed to take effect, as I considered opposition vain. Reductions were also ordered in the number of assistants and the office establishment. These I have opposed, as they do not affect me personally. The reduction of my allowances will keep me in India all my life, as I do not see how I can reduce my expenses." But, as though he could not altogether abandon the thought of some day returning to his native land, he added, "I shall, therefore, be the more inclined to accept any situation, should any such be offered, which, by enabling me to live like a retired individual on some small means, may present a hope of some day returning to England."

At the close of the year 1815 Charles Metcalfe received another visit from his brother Theophilus, who had come round to Calcutta, upon business connected with the financial affairs of the Canton Factory. The visit was a solace to both brothers. "I look forward," wrote the elder brother from Benares, "to a delightful month with you, such as I have not passed for some time; and alas! have but little prospect of seeing a relative for years to come." They met then at Delhi for the last time. Theophilus Metcalfe did not live to see the completion of those twelve years.

been ordered, as a preliminary mea- his office before any reductions were sure, to report upon the expenses of carried out.

CHAPTER XII.

[1815—1818.]

THE SETTLEMENT OF CENTRAL INDIA.

Peace with the Goorkhas—Relations with the States of Central India—Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar—The Pindarrees—Ameer Khan and the Patans—The Rajpoot States—Metcalf's Plans for the Settlement of Central India—Adopted by Lord Hastings—Opposition of the Home Authorities—Change of Policy—Correspondence of Metcalfe with Lord Moira—The Governor-General takes the Field—Suppression of the Pindarrees—Metcalf's Treaties with the Rajpoot Princes.

"HURRAH! peace with the Goorkhas!" wrote Secretary Ricketts from Calcutta to Metcalfe, at Delhi, on the 9th of December, 1815. "Gujraz returned at the time stipulated to Bradshaw's camp, and with full powers from his Rajah to sign the treaty according to the terms required by Lord Moira, which you may recollect to have seen. . . . This treaty has just been ratified by his Lordship in Council; and a counterpart from the Rajah may be expected in ten days—a copy having been sent to him with the signatures of Bradshaw and Gujraz at the time they forwarded the one for his Lordship's gratification." It was expected; but it never came. The expectations formed in this month of December by the inmates of the Government House of Cal-



cutta, like all other expectations based upon the assumed sincerity of a faithless enemy, resulted only in delusion and disappointment. The treaty of Segowlee was not ratified at Catamandu. So hostilities were renewed by the British. They were renewed, under the conduct of Ochterlony, with consummate vigor and ability; and the Goorkhas were soon again at his feet. Defeated and dispirited, they sued for terms; and the general, not without some misgivings,* consented, early in March, to renew negotiations on the basis of the old treaty. Before the end of the month many letters had been despatched from the enemy's country congratulating Metcalfe on the termination of the war. "I offer you my most sincere congratulations," wrote Colonel Jasper Nicolls, who had well performed all the duties entrusted to him in both campaigns, "on the very rapid and glorious success of our arms. Far more has been done than I expected in so short a time. The affair of the 28th ultimo, the capture of Hurreehurpore, and the energetic arrangements for the reduction of Murkwanpore, have been of a character not to be misunderstood by Umr Singh himself, whom shame and disgrace will, I hope, follow in due time. That the treaty has been drawn from them by their fears must now be evident to India, and have its just effect."† "The Goorkhas," wrote Mr. Gardner,

* "I am in a terrible fright," he wrote to Metcalfe, "lest Lord Moira should be angry; but new negotiations, with the necessary cessation of hostility, were in my mind worse than the acceptance of the old, ready cut

and dry." This letter is dated in the original "Valley of Murkwanpore, February 7, 1816." But this is obviously a slip of the pen for March.

† *Sulapore, March 17, 1816. MS. Correspondence.*

THE SETTLEMENT OF CENTRAL INDIA.

Metcalf's old assistant, who was soon afterwards appointed Resident at the Nepaul Court, "have ratified the old treaty of Segowlee; and as Ochterlony must no doubt have been authorised to accept it, as sufficient to satisfy Government, by his having at the same time agreed to a cessation of hostilities, I conclude the war may be considered as terminated. . . . I think we have been highly fortunate, both in the successes which have attended Ochterlony's exertions and the speedy termination that has been put to the campaign, for had it been continued, considering the time of year, I think that we should have been ruined by the climate."* But satisfactory as were these announcements, far more satisfactory and cheering, on every account, was the letter which Metcalfe received from the brave old general himself. "I was most happily relieved from all anxiety," wrote Ochterlony from Camp Beteeah, on the 20th of March, "by a very kind letter from Lord Moira, who I doubt not will be more pleased when he receives all the particulars detailed in my despatch transmitting the ratified treaty by Cartwright. I granted peace on the most submissive entreaty—on the most abject submission, I may say; and as they had before talked of some hope of changes, I took from the negotiators a document expressly stating that every hope was retracted, and that the most rigid adherence to the very letter of the treaty was the only indulgence they could expect from a Government they had treated so ill." And thus the

* *Rumghur, March 17, 1817. MS. Correspondence.*



war was really at an end; and Nepaul became a friendly power.

To Metcalfe this intelligence was most welcome. A great object had now been accomplished. But there was a greater before us to which the pacification of Nepaul had in some measure cleared the way. One obstacle at least to the settlement of Central India had been removed. It had been always Metcalfe's opinion that our operations against the Goorkhas should have been postponed until arrangements had been effected for the establishment of permanent tranquillity throughout all the Central Indian States; but the war having been commenced, he argued that we should conclude it, by a manifestation of overwhelming strength, with the utmost practicable despatch; and then, having in the mean while increased, by every possible means, our military resources, enter with confidence upon the arrangements which the unsettled condition of Central India so imperatively demanded.

Whatever may have been the policy—or the necessity—in 1806, of the sudden winding-up of our political relations in the interior of Hindostan, it is not to be doubted that the precipitate adjustment of affairs, rendered necessary by the embarrassed state of our finances, caused a vast heritage of stirring work to descend to a future Government. It is very true that no statesman is justified in saddling posterity with political convulsions and pecuniary distresses. But it is equally true that no statesman is justified in inflicting a positive injury upon his own generation, with the hope of averting a conjectural

evil from a future one. But the truest statesmanship is that which seizes upon the exact point at which conjectural evils are about to become positive ones, when they have passed altogether beyond the stage of possible prevention, and to delay their extinction is only to nurture their growth. Now, in 1815-16, we had certainly reached an epoch of our career at which any continued reliance upon the efficacy of those principles of non-interference, which had so long regulated our political conduct in the East, would have been suicidal in the extreme. Disorder and confusion were paramount over the whole length and breadth of Central India. The entire country was rent by internal strife. The strong were preying upon the weak. The supremacy of Might was alone recognised. There was altogether a state of lawlessness and disorganisation such as it is difficult for those, who square their notions by the rule and plummet of European civilisation, adequately to conceive.

To describe, with satisfactory detail, the chaotic state of things that had arisen during the ten years which had elapsed since Charles Metcalfe, on the banks of the Beas, met Holkar and Ameer Khan in the camp of the former,* would demand an amount of space that cannot consistently be afforded to it in such a Memoir as this. But I will endeavor in some sort, whilst illustrating the political opinions of the Delhi Resident, and tracing the incidents of his political career, to render it intelligible to the reader, who has made himself acquainted with the

* See *ante*, pp. 196-7-8.



leading circumstances of the first wars with the Mahrattas.

The names or titles of the principal Mahratta chieftains—of Scindiah, of Holkar, of the Peishwah, and the Rajah of Berar, are, it may be presumed, familiar to the reader. The great political and military transactions in which our relations with these powers involved us during the first years of the century, have been already briefly narrated. The alliances which the British Government had formed with these Princes, had been nominally maintained; but the spirit of them had been frequently violated, and there was good reason to believe that at every one of these Mahratta Durbars there was a smouldering hostility which was only waiting for a breath of opportunity to burst out openly into a blaze.

Since the conclusion of the last treaties with the Mahratta Princes, some great personal changes had been wrought under the unfailing action of Time. Scindiah, who at the period of our early negotiations with him was a mere stripling in the trammels of an unprincipled Minister, had now assumed an attitude of independence. He was master of his own actions and his own possessions. He had been quietly organising his army and consolidating his power;* and although whilst the British Govern-

* " Scindiah, though his former vast power was completely broken by the last war, and though his own camp frequently presents a scene of disorder and a spectacle of weakness in the government, which would be destructive to a more regular state, has nevertheless, since the termination of the war, been gradually increasing his power by the subjugation of petty states, by the constant employment of his infantry in operations tending



ment punctually paid him his stipend, and abstained from molesting or controlling him, his disposition was outwardly friendly, it was felt that any suspicion of our designs might soon induce him to employ his resources against his British allies. At Holkar's Court a change, too, had supervened equally striking, but of an obverse character. Our old enemy Jeswunt Rao, under the depressing influences of adversity and inaction, had drunk himself first into idiocy and then into the grave. His son, a minor, now ruled in his place. But the Holkar family were little more than a pageant.* All the real power of the state had been for some time usurped by their old lieutenant, Ameer Khan, the Rohilla, and by another predatory chief of the same adventurous type,† who lived by spoliation and oppression. Whilst these changes were being developed—whilst Scindiah was rising into a reality and Holkar sinking into a name, the Peishwah, by name Badjee Rao, had been recovering from the effect of the troubles which had beset him during the first years of the century, and acquiring with maturity of years some vigor of understanding.‡ His chief public functionary had

to his aggrandisement, and by the accumulation of treasure, in which he has uniformly persisted, though he has had frequently to defend his person against a clamorous and tumultuous army."—[*Memorandum by C. T. Metcalfe, written for Lord Moira in the winter of 1814-15.*]

* "The state of Holkar is in a very different predicament at present. The Government is reduced to a very low degree of weakness. If we exclude the armies of Meer Khan and Mahomed Shah Khan, which act so inde-

pendently that they can hardly be reckoned as forces of the state, the armies of Holkar are completely insignificant. . . . The present policy of the Holkar Government appears to be, to keep the crumbling state together, if possible, until the young Rajah be able to hold the reins himself, in the hope, perhaps, that he may be able to restore its prosperity."—[*Ibid.*]

† Mahomed Shah Khan.

‡ In 1816 he was about forty years of age.



been a fiddler in the band of a Hindoo temple; but the Peishwah relied little on his Ministers, and was especially intent on keeping in his own hands all state affairs connected with the British alliance. He knew the importance of appearing to be a faithful ally. He kept up a show of friendship towards us. But it was believed that he was only biding his time, and that he was eager to throw off the subsidiary force, which sate like an incubus upon him. With the Rajah of Berar, now greatly shorn of his old prestige and his old power by the events of the war of 1803, we had attempted to establish a similar subsidiary alliance. But our offer had been rejected. Eager as was that Prince for the assistance and protection of the British Government when threatened by the predatory cohorts of Ameer Khan, he dreaded the effects of a closer alliance with us; he was continually suspecting us of a design to strip him of his independence. It was the old story—a weak Prince hurried by his own idle fears into the very dangers which he struggled to escape. When Lord Moira visited the Upper Provinces in 1814, and was collecting an army for the chastisement of the Goorkhas, the Rajah believed that our object was the subjugation of Nagpore; and when he found that our troops were entangled in the difficult defiles of Nepaul, he seriously meditated the expediency of taking the initiative against us. Similar apprehensions, indeed, at this time haunted all the Mahratta durbars. We could hardly move without disquieting them; for in every movement they saw a menace.

With these states, so suspicious and susceptible,



there was little probability of our continuing much longer on terms of satisfactory alliance. But there was another power, less palpable but more formidable, with which it seemed likely at this time that we should be brought into earlier collision—a power which for years had been extending and aggrandising itself—the power of the Pindarrees. These were predatory bands of soldiers or freebooters, forming the military strength of no particular state, but ready to take service under any state, or to carry on war upon their own account, whenever sufficient temptation presented itself in the shape of the weakness or the disorganisation of some petty principality not under the protection of the paramount power. During our early wars with the Mahrattas we had seen something of these mercenaries; but they were then comparatively few in number, and were accounted only as component parts of the military resources of Scindiah or Holkar. They were not regarded by us in the light of an infant power likely to exercise a formidable influence over the destinies of Hindostan. But under the sure operation of time, this noxious growth of lawlessness and violence had quickened into a mighty power overawing states. No enterprise seemed to be too vast for the ambition of men who carried, for the most part, all that they possessed on the bows of their saddle; who had everything to gain by the disorganisation they created; with whom rapine was a trade, and cruelty a pastime. Plunder was the first object of their incursions. They devastated wide tracts of country; committed the most detestable