atrocities on the defenceless inhabitants; carried off all that they could; destroyed what they left behind; and returned to augment their resources by raising new levies with the proceeds of the plunder they had seized on their last expedition.

But although these Pindarrees were to be primarily regarded as great depredational leagues, with migratory camps, and systems of desultory military government, rather than a substantive power with any settled home or fixed administration, they had gradually been acquiring some territorial importance of their own. It was not only that from time to time certain assignments of land had been made to them by the Mahratta Princes in reward for their services in the field, but that they had usurped considerable tracts of country, and they had erected forts, in which their families were located, and their property was secured. It was hard to say what might issue from this beginning. It was hard to say what the Pindarree power, under the influence of time and long-continued success, might not be able to accomplish. But whatever might be the result of their successes—whether or not their military supremacy were likely to have any abiding effect upon the old dynasties of Central India—it was very certain that so long as these hordes of reckless banditti were suffered to overawe all its principalities, and to ravage all its provinces, a state of anarchy and disorganisation fatal to tranquillity and peace, hostile to every interest of humanity, must be the chronic condition of the country.

And there were other predatory bands than these

recognised Pindarrees—others of the same general character, but differing in some important features. The immense bodies of mercenary troops under the command of Ameer Khan and Mahomed Shah Khan were at once the support and the burden of Holkar's Government. Dependent in name, but independent in reality, the former chief had long been aggrandising himself at the expense of his master; and by continual successes in the field and an uninterrupted career of rapine, erecting himself and his Patan levies into a great military power. There was something more substantive in his strength, more systematic in his policy, than was discernible in the attributes of the Pindarree force. Pindarreeism, indeed, in the person of Ameer Khan and his brother chief, put on its most respectable apparel. It aimed at larger objects.* It was more political and less desultory; and it was more tangible. We might treat with Ameer Khan—we could only destroy the Pindarrees.

Ameer Khan was something more than a common robber. His ambition was not bounded by the plunder of a village and the torture of its inhabitants—by the acquisition of so many bags of grain and so many silver ornaments stripped from the

* Mr. Prinsep, in his excellent history of the "Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of Lord Hastings," which no one can write of this period without consulting to advantage, says: "The grand difference between the two classes was, that the Patans were banded together for the purpose of preying on governments and powerful chiefs; to this end their force moved about with the materials of regular battles and sieges, so as to work on the fears of princes and men in power, extorting contributions and other advantages from them by such intimidation as an efficient army only could impress. The object of the Pindarrees, on the contrary, was general rapine; they preyed upon the population at large, without arrogating an ability to cope with the governments; their form and constitution, therefore, were framed with a view to this exclusive purpose."

persons of violated women. He moved out with a well-organised and well-equipped army, and struck boldly at principalities. He was the terror of the Rajpoot states. Weak, helpless, distracted, misgoverned as they were, he found among them constant occupation for his predatory cohorts. All this group of little independent kingdoms was lying prostrate, indeed, at the feet of the great marauding Rohilla. They would not assist each other, and they were not strong enough to resist by themselves. We could not take them under our protection. With many of them, our old treaties with Scindiah and Holkar restrained us from forming connexions. To Jyepore we *were* free to extend our good offices. Harassed and distressed by the predatory incursions of the Patan bands, gasping, indeed, for its very existence, this state had long been eager to place itself under the protection of the British Government. The alliance had often been contemplated, often recommended, by the diplomatists of Central India. But the Home authorities at this time were equally averse to the conclusion of new treaties and the modification of old ones; and so Jyepore and the other Rajpoot states remained weak and defenceless in a season of present convulsion and threatened revolution, whilst Ameer Khan was preying upon the very sources of their existence, and flourishing upon their decay.

Such was the condition of things which Lord Moira, soon after his arrival in India, had been called upon seriously to contemplate—such was the condition of things that, on his first visit to the Upper

Provinces, he had earnestly discussed with Charles Metcalfe in the Vice-regal Camp. It was a condition of things that no wise or benevolent statesman could long suffer to exist. Not only did the security of our Indian Empire, but the larger interests of common humanity, demand that an effort should be made by the paramount power to restore tranquillity to the distracted country. The duty of the British Government in this conjuncture stood out clearly before Metcalfe's eyes. It was with no misgiving—with no hesitation that he fully declared his opinions to the Governor-General; and propounded a scheme for the settlement of Central India, which Lord Moira was not slow to adopt. The length of the document in which his views were submitted forbids its entire insertion; but its importance demands that I should set forth some of its more pregnant passages.

And the better to follow his arguments, it should first be seen in what manner he classified the different states of Central India:

"That part of India which is not occupied by the British Government and its allies, is divided among powers who may be classed under the following different descriptions:

"1. Substantive states, ardently desiring our overthrow, and ambitious to aggrandise themselves; who for the gratification of either propensity, would not scruple to have recourse to any measures, and who have armies in their service capable of being converted at a moment's warning into instruments of destruction to our provinces. Against these powers we must always be on our guard; and the frontiers exposed to them can never be considered to be in safety unless defended by our

armies. We may be assured that these powers only want an encouraging opportunity to strike a blow at our existence.

"2. Military powers not substantive states, but more dangerous, perhaps, than these states; being less tangible and having less to lose, living by plunder and devastation—the enemies of all regular governments, more especially hostile in spirit to us, and capable of overrunning and ruining our provinces if we gave them the opportunity, by neglecting our defence. Against these, therefore, we must be equally guarded as against the states of the first class.

"3. Petty states, who are subject to the continual plunder and oppression of the two former classes, who in consequence look up to us for protection, and are, therefore, well-disposed towards us. From these we have nothing to apprehend. These it is our interest to uphold and protect.

"To the *first* class belong Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Nagpore (Berar).

"Of these three, Scindiah is the most powerful, and the one most employed in aggrandising himself.

"The power of Holkar, if considered as unconnected with that of Meer Khan, is very much reduced. That of Nagpore seems to be, too, on the decline. But all three are hostile towards us, and in heart confederated against us; and never will be otherwise until they be forced by the oppression of each other, or of other powers, to throw themselves into our arms for protection.

"The *second* class of powers consists of the Pindarrees, Meer Khan, Mahomed Shah Khan, and generally all predatory leaders. Of these the Pindarrees are the most mischievous. Meer Khan and Mahomed Shah Khan may be considered in a double character, as servants of Holkar and as independent chieftains. These powers, and all others that exist by upsetting peaceful states and disturbing the general tranquillity, must be considered as enemies, since they either act as such or force us to take the same defensive precautions against them as if they were in declared hostility.

"In the *third* class may be included Jyepore, Joudpore, Oudipore, Bekaneer, Jessulmere, Kotah, Boondee, Kerowlee, and the other petty states on the frontier of Guzerat, and, generally, all states who are subject to the oppression of the military and predatory powers."

Having thus shown with what we had to deal, he proceeded in a few pithy sentences to declare how it was desirable to deal with them:

"With regard to all the great military states and all the predatory powers, it is clearly our interest to annihilate them or to reduce them to a state of weakness, subjection, and dependence. This observation refers to all the powers of the first and second classes above described. And with regard to the weak and harmless and well-disposed petty states, though it is not so indispensably necessary for our vital interests that we should support them, yet it is a just and proper object of wise and liberal policy."

It was Metcalfe's opinion at this time that the annihilation of all the substantive States of Central India would be advantageous to the British Government, and he was not without a belief that circumstances would arise to justify such a measure. But he was not yet prepared to recommend it. They had been guilty of no overt acts of hostility; and we had no pretext for drawing the sword against them. But the forcible suppression of the Pindarrees was, on the other hand, a measure that called for immediate execution. Forbearance and moderation in such a case would only have been sinful and cruel. The reduction of these lawless bands was, indeed,

the first object of our policy. Nothing could be done until it was accomplished:

"The first object," said Metcalfe, "to which our attention ought to be directed, is the reduction of the power of the Pindarrees. Not only does this predatory power at all times menace the tranquillity of our territories, and force us to adopt extensive measures of precautionary defence, but has actually invaded our dominions and ravaged our richest provinces, and perpetually threatens a repetition of this outrage and devastation. It is impossible to distinguish between the different bodies of these freebooters. The whole of them are the enemies of all states, and they have all been engaged in ravaging either our own provinces, or those of our allies. As long as this power exists, we cannot undertake any political or military operations without the apprehension of having our provinces laid waste by bands of plunderers. And from the increase of the power of these freebooters which has actually taken place in the last few years, we may judge to what an incalculable extent the evil may proceed if it be allowed to continue to exist. We ought to recollect that the Pindarree is now what the Mahratta power was in the decline of the Mogul Empire of India. Let us take warning, and save the British Empire from the downfall which its predecessor sustained, chiefly from the hands of the predecessors of the Pindarrees."

Speaking then of the difficulty of striking a vigorous blow at a power so meteoric and untangible, Metcalfe then proceeded to say:

"As the destruction of the power of the Pindarrees is the first object of our policy, so it is also, perhaps, the most difficult to be accomplished. The seat of their power is in their camps. It is less tangible than the power of any established state, which must fall with the loss of its dominions. The

Pindarrees may be dispersed, and they will gather again. They may be defeated over and over again without loss of reputation or power, since neither the one nor the other depends on victory in the field. They must be pursued wherever they take refuge; they must be dispersed wherever they assemble. We must not pause until they be annihilated as a power. Even the Pindarree power is in some degree tangible. The Pindarrees have lands and forts, where they keep their families; and the loss of their possessions and the capture of their families would tend greatly, no doubt, to destroy their power."

After speaking of the offensive and defensive preparations which it would be necessary to make for the suppression of these predatory bands, and dwelling upon the advantages to be derived from the success of our measures, Metcalfe proceeded to speculate on the probability of deriving assistance from other substantive States of Central India:

"Every endeavor," he said, "will be advisable to persuade other powers to take part in the contest. Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar, may be invited at the proper time to join a confederacy for the destruction of the Pindarrees. If they accede, and join with cordiality, the object may be gained with greater facility; and the circumstance of acting in union with the British Government for one common interest might lay the foundation of a general confederacy of the established states of India with the British Government as the acknowledged head. But this is an arrangement, perhaps, more to be desired than expected."

If this confederacy were not arranged, it was argued that the British Government could at least demand the neutrality of the states, with the right

of a free passage through their territories; and if this were refused, they could only be treated as open enemies:

"If Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar," continued Metcalfe, "neither co-operate nor remain neutral—in other words, if all or any of these powers oppose or obstruct our operations against the Pindarrees, we have no choice but to consider all powers so opposing us as our enemies, and to attack them accordingly. The war in this case would require greater exertions, but would also be attended with better prospects of solid advantage. The territories of Scindiah, Holkar, or the Rajah of Berar, would afford a recompense for the expenses of the war, and an increase of resources for the payment of additional force."

Having again repeated that the absolute extermination of the Pindarrees by a series of vigorous offensive measures was the first step towards the settlement of Central India, Metcalfe proceeded to consider what should be our bearing towards the military States, as a question distinct from that of their movements for or against the Pindarrees:

"Let us now examine what should be our policy towards Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar, without any reference to the Pindarrees. As long as these powers adhere to the spirit of the treaties which we have with them respectively, and act towards us in a friendly and inoffensive manner, we have no right, it is needless to mention, to deviate from the spirit of existing engagements, however desirable a deviation may occasionally be. We must act towards them with friendship and a liberal regard for their rights and pretensions. But we ought never to forget, that as long as these, or any of these powers are military, ambitious, and unprincipled, it is our in-

terest to overthrow them, or bring them under our influence; and every opportunity should be taken to pursue a policy tending to one of these results when it can be done consistently with good faith and justice. In the event of a war with all or any of these powers, it is our interest to secure the greatest possible acquisition of territory, in order that we may maintain the greatest possible amount of force."

In these suggestions, Metcalfe contended that there was no spirit of aggrandisement; the only object being to secure the safety of our possessions and the general tranquillity of the country:

"In these proposals there is no ambition or wish for aggrandisement beyond what is necessary or desirable for our safety and strength. If the British Government were secure in their present predicament, it might confine its attention to its own internal prosperity, without involving itself in the dissensions and distractions of other states. But we must tranquillise the centre of India, in order to acquire strength in our external boundaries sufficient for the security of our Indian Empire."

Having considered the course of policy to be pursued towards the substantive States of India and the Pindarree freebooters, Metcalfe adverted to those powers which occupied intermediate ground between them—which partook of some of the substantive attributes of the one, and were distinguished also by the predatory habits of the other:

"The military powers of Ameer Khan and Mahomed Shah Khan remain to be spoken of. The existence of such powers is incompatible with the preservation of the tranquillity of India, and they must be destroyed by dispersion or attack before that great object can be secured. Such armies might be dispersed

by making a provision for the chiefs and afterwards disbanding their troops; but unless measures be taken at the same time to prevent the rise of other powers of the same description, new armies will rise up under new leaders, and we shall have the expense of supporting the old chiefs without doing away the evil. But the destruction of the Pindarrees and the other arrangements proposed, will necessarily effect the reduction of the remaining predatory powers."

Having thus considered the policy to be pursued towards hostile states, he glanced at the condition of those friendly principalities which it was desirable to take under our protection:

"These" he said, "should be systematically taken under protection whenever they seek it, and whenever our engagements with other powers leave us at liberty to grant it, and other considerations of an urgent nature do not interfere to prevent such an arrangement. By taking the petty states under our protection, we prevent the aggrandisement of the great military powers, and the growth of the predatory powers which feed on the weaker states. We at the same time secure the political attachment and dependence of established governments and the extension and confirmation of our own power and supremacy. . . . . These states should be made to purchase our protection, and whenever the circumstances of the party will admit of it, a tribute should be demanded sufficient to pay for some increase of our military establishment, an object which should never be lost sight of in any of our political arrangements in the present state of India."

It was true that our engagements with Scindiah and Holkar prevented us from forming alliances with some of these petty states,* but it was recom-

* Joudpore, Oudipore, Kotah, &c.

mended that we should take advantage of any rupture that might free us from these engagements; and such a contingency seemed not very remote.

Special mention was then made of Jyepore:

"The state of Jyepore has long sought our protection, and we are not restrained by any engagements with other powers from affording it. An alliance, however, with Jyepore would necessarily annoy Scindiah and Holkar, and would deprive Meer Khan, Mahomed Shah Khan, and other freebooters of their chief resource. The state of Jyepore could afford to pay a considerable tribute, especially when tranquillity and protection shall have restored the prosperity of the country. An alliance with Jyepore has been objected to as an insulated measure, under the belief of its inefficiency. Although an alliance with Jyepore be effected singly—and a general alliance with the Rajpoot states is impracticable consistently with good faith—nevertheless the alliance should not be considered an insulated measure, but one of a system which can only be accomplished by degrees. We must not expect that a number of states will come forward to seek our alliance exactly at the moment most convenient to our views. If we do not afford our protection when it is solicited, we must expect that it may be rejected when we proffer it. If we refuse now to conclude an alliance with Jyepore, it may happen that Jyepore will be reluctant to conclude one at the precise period when we deem it advantageous for ourselves.* If we adopt the system of protecting the weak states, we must put it in practice gradually, by taking under our protection such of them as are aware of the benefit of it, and we must make some temporary sacrifice for the sake of the advancement of the system."

The result of these alliances, Metcalfe argued, would

* In how remarkable a manner these anticipations were verified by the result will presently appear.

be great, for they would place us, either by the generation of an immediate crisis, or by sowing the seeds of slow decay among the Mahratta states, in possession of the whole expanse of Central India:

"The formation, as suggested, of these alliances would confine the military and predatory powers of India within narrow limits. They must then either devour each other or waste away, or attack us. In the latter event we ought to have made ourselves strong enough to conquer them all and annex the whole of these territories to the British dominions. In that case, by one great exertion, the tranquillity of India might be established on a permanent footing, and our supremacy would be complete. In either of the other cases the same end will eventually be gained in a more progressive manner."

Such was the plan for the settlement of Central India which Metcalfe presented to the Governor-General. But how was so comprehensive a scheme of policy to be carried out? It was anticipated that our measures for the suppression of the Pindarrees would very probably embroil us with all the Mahratta states; but, so far from shrinking back alarmed at the contemplation of such a contingency, Metcalfe regarded it as an element of extreme hopefulness in the great scheme which opened out before him. He felt, indeed, that it was absolutely necessary for the permanent tranquillisation of Central India, not only that the Pindarrees should be rooted out, but that the substantive States should be curtailed of their power, and reduced to a condition of subjection that would prevent them from ever again exciting our fears. The war with the Pindarrees might be fol-

lowed by a war with the Mahrattas. It was incumbent upon us, said Metcalfe, to be provided for this. But how were we to undertake the prosecution of a scheme of policy demanding a display of such immense resources? To this it was replied, that everything must give way to one paramount consideration —that the maintenance of an efficient military establishment must be the first care of the Government, and that to accomplish this we must increase our revenue by every possible means:

"The following," said Metcalfe, "would appear to be the system which we ought to adopt for the security and confirmation of our dominion in India:

"1st. To make it the main object of all the acts of our Government to have the most efficient army that we can possibly maintain, not merely for internal control or the defence of our frontier, but also for those services in the field which our army is perpetually called on to perform on emergencies when we have not time to increase it to sufficient strength.

"2nd. If our resources should, at any time, be unequal to the maintenance of an ample force, not to cripple our strength by attempts to reduce our force within the limits of fixed resources at the imminent peril of our dominion; but to endeavor to raise our resources to meet the demands on us for force.*

"3rd. To enlarge our territories in the interior of India on every occasion of war as much as possible consistently with

* Elsewhere the writer says: "If an increase in the existing branches of revenue in our own dominions prove sufficient for the maintenance of such armies as we require, so much the better. If not, we ought to draw forth new resources; and if these be impracticable within our own dominions, we must look to increase of territory by conquest over our enemies in the interior of India. There is no doubt that opportunities will arise for effecting such conquests, for with the utmost moderation and justice upon our part, misunderstandings and wars in the course of time will be occasionally unavoidable."

justice and policy, moderation to our enemies, and due attention to our allies.

"4th. To apply the net revenues of conquered countries to the maintenance of additional force, and the acquisition of additional force to the achievement of new conquests, on just occasions—thus growing in size and increasing in strength as we proceed, until we can with safety determine to confine ourselves within fixed limits, and abjure all further conquests.

"5th. To enter on no wars from views of aggrandisement without just cause. To respect with the most liberal attention the rights, interests, feelings, and prejudices of all powers; and to cultivate with those who are willing the most sincere and cordial friendship."

These propositions Charles Metcalfe supported in a manner which, doubtless, would have thrown his old friend and correspondent, Sherer the Financier, into a state of considerable alarm—especially if it had been imparted to him with what favor the Delhi Resident's arguments were received in the tent of the Governor-General. But it must ever be considered that we were on the eve of a great crisis, which, in the estimation of some of the ablest statesmen in India, demanded a departure from ordinary rules of procedure. Let us settle the country first, cried Metcalfe; and then practice economy:

"The error," he said, "seems to belong to the Government at home, which has been resolved to make everything bend to a desire to keep down the expenses—as if our expenses could be regulated at our pleasure; as if we could control events so as to render them subservient exclusively to economical and commercial views! The most effectual remedy would be—and a most necessary one it is—to reverse the system of Government, and to make views of economy and retrenchment

secondary to those of safety and power. Let us first adopt measures for the security and strength of our dominion, and afterwards look to a surplus of revenue. If retrenchments be necessary, let them be made anywhere rather than in that branch of our expenditure which is necessary for our existence. Let us cherish our military establishments above all others, for on them our power entirely depends."

To this, of course, the Financier would reply, that it is impossible to cherish our military establishments without money—that money has been emphatically called the sinews of war—and that without money, though we may talk of war, we cannot make it. To this, however, Metcalfe replied:

"It is in vain to say that our commercial and financial arrangements do not admit of an increase of force—Commerce and Finance will soon be destroyed if we have not at all times an army sufficient for the exigencies of our situation. If it were a question whether our military establishments, or any other, should be sacrificed, there could be no doubt that any other establishment must be sacrificed, because our military establishment is the most necessary for our existence. But it is to be hoped that this will never be a question. Let us preserve all our establishments, and make them contribute to the support of each other; but it is necessary to guard with peculiar care the efficiency of our armies. Let us not adopt the absurd notion that Commerce and Finance can thrive by the neglect and reduction of the vital sources of our strength and existence. As well might we expect to give vigor to the limbs by chopping at the heart."

To this the Financier would reply, that if military establishments be necessary for the protection of Revenue, it is equally true that Revenue is necessary

to the support of military establishments, or in a word, that armies are of no use if we cannot pay them—nay, that unpaid armies are worse than useless, for they may become dangerous enemies. Our own guns have been shotted ere now in anticipation of the rising of our unpaid Sepoys. Metcalfe, however, anticipates the objection:

"It may be said, that we must, of necessity, confine our expenses within our resources. Nothing can be more true than this—that our power cannot last long if our expenses exceed our resources. So far all are doubtless agreed. The difference between the system prescribed by the Government at home and that which it is here proposed to recommend, is this:—the former—not avowedly or wilfully it is hoped, but, nevertheless, actually in its operations, attempts to restrain our military expenses within fixed limits, without regard to our safety. The latter would attend to our safety as the first consideration, and endeavor to make our resources meet our necessary expenditure. The inevitable consequence of the former, if persevered in, must be ruin; we may form better hopes of the latter."

Having said this, the writer proceeds to state his opinion that if our Revenue be not sufficient for the payment of our troops, we must augment it:

"If," he says, "the present state of our resources be inadequate to the provision of force sufficient for our safety, we must seek to raise them by extraordinary means. It is true that resources are not always procurable at will, but we must not acknowledge that we cannot raise sufficient resources from our immense empire, unless we be prepared also to admit that we cannot keep the country. When additional resources become necessary, they must be raised, and means must be had recourse to which in ordinary times might be deemed objectionable.

There ought to be, and surely must be, ways and means of raising additional revenue from the vast territories under our dominion. A native Government, equally strong in other respects, would extract much more from the extensive empire which we possess without injuring the prosperity of the country. For instance, a duty on the transport of grain would be levied by a native Government, and would probably be exceedingly productive. The proposal will no doubt be objected to. It is not agreeable to European prejudices; but a duty on traffic in grain—the principal trade of most parts of the country—is a source of revenue under every native Government, and, whether a good or bad source of revenue, it is the only one which promises to be abundantly productive. It is not intended here to enter into any discussion on the expediency or otherwise of such a duty. All that is meant to contend for is, that instead of indulging in the vain hope of promoting our prosperity by the reduction of our establishments, we ought to search for additional sources of revenue."

He then proceeded to argue, that in proportion as it was difficult to derive increased revenues from our existing territories, "the necessity of an increase of territory becomes more apparent:"

"Any acquisition of territory in the centre of India would contract the extent of frontier to be defended, or approximate the connexions between the forces of Bengal and those of the other Presidencies, or give a surplus of revenue available for the payment of a military force, without the chance of involving us in any embarrassments beyond those to which we are already exposed. So far, therefore, from contemplating an increase of territory as an evil to be avoided, we ought to desire it, wherever it can be justly obtained, as the source of safety and power."

But on whatsoever side of the controversy between

the Soldiers and the Financiers Reason and Justice might array themselves, it is certain that for some time the home authorities, as represented no less by the King's Ministers than by the Court of Directors, took the financial view of the great question, and determined that War and Diplomacy should remain in abeyance. The Secret Committee sent out positive instructions against interference with existing arrangements, and directed that "the system which was consolidated at the close of the last Mahratta war should be maintained with as little change as could be avoided." And soon afterwards, a great man having succeeded to the India Board,* the same mysterious authority wrote again, in 1816, "We are unwilling to incur the risk of a general war for the uncertain purpose of exterminating the Pindarrees. Extended political and military combinations we cannot at the present time sanction or approve. Any attempt," it was added, "at this moment to establish a new system of policy, tending to a wider diffusion of our power, must necessarily interfere with those economical relations which it is more than ever incumbent on us to recommend as indispensable to the maintenance of our present ascendency." It would be impossible to conceive anything more at variance with the political system which Metcalfe had propounded than were the instructions from England which reached Lord Moira in 1816, and frustrated all his plans for the settlement of Central India. Metcalfe, as we

* George Canning. See documents quoted in Professor Wilson's continuation of Mill's "History of India."

have seen, had confidently declared that a large military establishment was the first object that the Government should hold in view, and that everything else must give place to it. Finance and Commerce were, he said, but secondary considerations. Everything else must yield to the necessity of maintaining an irresistible military force. But the Directors of the East India Company looked at the question from a different point of view. They argued, that if we did not attend to our commerce and economise our revenue, we could neither maintain a large force nor carry out great political measures. "We find with extreme concern," they wrote in October, 1815, "that the effects of the Nepaulese war are so strongly felt in your financial department as to induce the apprehension that the advances to be issued to our European investment will be reduced to a very small sum indeed. . . . . If the advances for the investment are to be withheld, the sales at this House for India goods will soon be brought to a stand; in which case not only will the operations of our home finances be impeded, but it will also involve the impossibility of our being able to afford to India the assistance, in the event of the continuance of warfare, which would be so necessary, and which we should be so desirous to furnish." They entirely reversed the line of argument which Metcalfe had followed, starting from a different point, turning his effects into causes, his causes into effects, and standing up resolutely as Merchants and Financiers.

The Governor-General was ripe for action; but the decided tone of the home authorities necessarily

compelled him to pause before he put it into execution—the great measures on which he had determined when Metcalfe was in his camp. The opposition which he had encountered from the members of Council had in some measure given way under a pressure of circumstances, if not under a pressure of arguments. He had returned to Calcutta in the autumn of 1815, carrying with him in his portfolio an elaborate minute on the settlement of Central India, to be laid before the Council immediately on his arrival. This minute was drawn up by Mr. Ricketts, principally from memoranda furnished him by Metcalfe. Some parts of it, indeed, were written in Metcalfe's own words; all parts contained his arguments. The policy which it inculcated was, indeed, emphatically Metcalfe's policy. It was ordained by Lord Moira's Ministers that the Delhi Resident should take "the laboring oar."* It was not likely that the bold schemes of the Up-country Council would find ready acceptance at Calcutta. But in the "Chapter of Accidents" there was much written down in their favor. The audacity of the

* See letters of Mr. Ricketts to Mr. Metcalfe, *passim*. "By this dawk I have forwarded to you the outline of a proposed minute to be laid before the Council by his Lordship on his arrival in Calcutta. It has been seen by Lord Moira, by Adam, and by Fagan; and will meet your approbation generally, as the sentiments and plan are your own—nay, the wording yours in many parts, as taken from the admirable notes with which you furnished his Lordship. Still, the whole will require correction, and which I beg of you to undertake without any scruples." And again, in another letter, "You know the value which Lord Moira attaches to your suggestions—you know also the importance to Lord Moira of defending with sound arguments a point of this nature, which, though of vital consequence to the interests of the Indian Government, will be opposed, I fear, by the Council and by the Court of Directors. As a friend of his Lordship, you will feel every anxiety to aid in so good a cause, and I cannot prove my friendship better than by entrusting the laboring oar in the struggle to your able management."—[*Camp, Futtehghur, July and August*, 1815.—*MS. Correspondence.*]

Pindarrees was increasing under the fostering influence of continued impunity, and it was clear that we could not much longer abstain from taking decided measures for the suppression of these reckless marauders, without danger to ourselves, and cruelty to our subjects. Ameer Khan and his Patan levies were making further encroachments on the weak Rajpoot States, and there were indications of a spirit of increased hostility discernible at Scindiah's Court. In this conjuncture, Lord Moira's associates at the Council Board began somewhat to relax in that rigid maintenance of the principles of non-interference which had distinguished their recent proceedings. In spite of the decrees of the home authorities, the spring of 1816 witnessed what may be called the beginning of the end. Gradually the policy which Metcalfe had so emphatically expounded was now beginning to unfold itself; and with equal interest and equal vigilance the Governor-General at Calcutta and the Resident at Delhi now watched the progress of events.

It was part of the great scheme of policy to bring the Rajpoot States under British protection. But from this, in many instances, we were debarred by existing treaties with Scindiah and Holkar. It was one of our objects, therefore, at this time, to find just and reasonable grounds for the setting aside of those articles which held us in this inconvenient restraint. That such occasions would arise Metcalfe had never doubted. But he was not one to suffer the eagerness of his wishes to blunt the keenness of his perceptions, and to see opportunities and occa-

sions when none actually existed. He saw, for example, that the weakness of Holkar was becoming more and more conspicuous, and his affairs more and more confused, but he could not bring himself to believe, as Lord Moira suggested in the following letter, that Holkar in his helplessness would be eager to throw himself into our arms:

LORD MOIRA TO MR. METCALFE.

"Calcutta, January 6, 1816.

"MY DEAR SIR,—The report which you have transmitted respecting the state of Holkar's affairs induces me to bring to your recollection a conversation which passed between us relative to his Government. The little chance which appears for the Regent's extricating herself and him from distress by any other means, renders it probable that she might lend a willing ear to a suggestion for putting that state under the protection of the British Government. I should not require any subsidy, because I must know that it could not be paid. But I should stipulate to have the existing treaty abrogated, and a new one framed which should leave us at liberty to treat with all the Western States. Of course I should bind Holkar's troops (who must, perhaps, be brought into order by some pecuniary advances from us) to be at our disposal. All subordinate points would be easily settled. No proposition must appear to come from us. The suggestion must be made through some trustworthy individual, as if from his own view of matters. If encouraged, he should be authorised to speak to you on the subject.

"I have the honor, my dear Sir, to remain with great regard, your faithful and obedient servant,

"MOIRA."

To this letter Metcalfe immediately returned the following reply, setting forth that the unwillingness

of Holkar's Durbar to form any closer connexion with the British Government was still painfully apparent, but that he would do all that could be done to dissipate this mistrust:

MR. METCALFE TO LORD MOIRA.

"My Lord,—I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's gracious favor of the 6th inst., and shall, in consequence, consider myself authorised to give every encouragement to the Court of Holkar to make proposals for our protection, as far as I can do so consistently with your Lordship's desire that no proposition may appear to come from us.

"The difficulty will be in procuring a trusty person to make the suggestion without its being known to come from us. All our political agencies in this country are so beset by authorised spies, and every native employed by us has so many inducements to make a parade of the importance of his employment, that it is almost impossible to manage such a communication with the requisite secresy.

"The conduct of the Court of Holkar in submitting to the extreme distress which it suffers, without applying to us for protection, seems to be one of the strongest proofs that could be conceived of their reluctance to be connected with us. The only idea that I can suppose to govern their councils is, that of struggling, if possible, with their distresses, and retaining their independence until the arrival of the young Maharajah at manhood, in the hope that he may be able to restore the honor of the fallen state. They know that their independence must cease as soon as they come under our protection; they therefore try every expedient rather than apply to us, and even have recourse to Scindiah, their old enemy, for pecuniary assistance—he who would long ago have pounced upon Holkar's possessions, had not his fear of forcing that power into our arms deterred him, would perhaps be induced to exert himself

to relieve their distresses rather than witness an event so undesirable for him.

"As long as Holkar's Court see any hope of relief from any other quarter they will not probably apply to us, and any appearance of anxiety on our part to procure a connexion would serve to increase their reluctance. There is reason to hope that the time must come when they will solicit our protection as their only refuge, and it is probable that they will feel this disposition more strongly if we preserve the appearance of indifference.

"These considerations would have induced me to recommend the utmost caution in inviting any overtures; and I am happy to find these sentiments sanctioned by your Lordship's previous determination.

"I hope that I shall meet your Lordship's wishes by acting in the spirit of the preceding observations; that is, by giving every possible encouragement consistent with the preservation of a dignified indifference, and a determination to have that solicited and sought for which would not be prized if we tendered it gratuitously.

"An instance of the little degree in which the views of the Court of Holkar have of late been directed towards us, is exhibited in the circumstance that they have now no proper representative with us. Their resident wakeel at Delhi died about a year ago; he was nearly related to the Minister Balaram, and the latter, in consequence, conferred the vacant office on the son of the former wakeel, though an infant. This infant is attended by a very inefficient assistant. I pointed out the absurdity of this arrangement when it took place, but the views of the Minister were best answered by its preservation, and when an attempt was made by another party at the Court to effect the appointment of a more capable envoy, the existing arrangement was defended on the ground that there was no negotiation likely to occur with the British Government which could need the presence of a real man of business.

"The inefficient state of the representative at Delhi renders it difficult to sound the present disposition of the Court through its agent, or to make those friendly communications in continued intercourse, which might encourage overtures without betraying anxiety.

"I shall, however, avail myself of any opportunity for carrying into effect your Lordship's instructions; trusting that if I have in any way misunderstood them, I may be honored with further commands.

"I hope that Lady Loudoun and your Lordship's charming family will meet with a pleasant passage, and that your Lordship may have the satisfaction as soon as possible of hearing of their safe arrival.

"I have the honor to be,

"Your Lordship's obedient servant,

"C. T. METCALFE."

That sooner or later the prostrate condition of Holkar's family must work to our advantage, was not to be doubted. In the mean while, we were greatly exerting ourselves to extend our protection over two other states. It was with no common satisfaction that Metcalfe, in the spring and summer of 1816, received the following letters:

MR. ADAM TO MR. METCALFE.

"Calcutta, April 28, 1816.

"MY DEAR METCALFE,—The Jyepore question was discussed in Council to-day, and it has been determined to renew the alliance—a resolution in which I most heartily rejoice. It was opposed by Edmonstone and Dowdeswell, and supported by Seton very decidedly and handsomely. I shall commence on the instructions without delay, but I lose no time in apprising you of the result of the discussion, as you will be able, with your knowledge of Lord Moira's sentiments and views, to proceed

without awaiting the official intimation. The greatest attention will be paid to the suggestions contained in your letter to me of the 29th March. Nothing will be precipitated; in a word, you will manage the negotiation in your own way. Ochterlony will command the force to advance into Jyepore when the treaty is settled. He will pay us a visit here first, to discuss with Lord Moira the military part of the plan. I do hope we shall yet save that devoted state, and combine the cause of justice and humanity with the promotion of our own interests; but I have been trembling for the issue of the discussion, and feared at one time that all was lost.

"Believe me very truly yours,

"J. ADAM."

LORD MOIRA TO MR. METCALFE.

"Barrackpore, June 9, 1816.

"MY DEAR SIR,—I write a hasty line to apprise you that I have this day received the subsidiary treaty signed by the Rajah of Nagpore. The importance of having secured this point will be readily appreciated by you. Give us credit for not sleeping over our work. Colonel Doveton is to occupy Nagpore for the moment, as it was essential that no time should be lost in the introduction of our troops. But I mean that it should be hereafter a command from the Bengal army, to which I think I shall ultimately render some service.

"Believe me, my dear Sir,

"Faithfully yours,

"MOIRA."

When, a year and a half before, Metcalfe had said, "If we do not afford our protection when it is solicited, we must expect that it may be rejected when we proffer it. If we refuse now to conclude an alliance with Jyepore, it may happen that Jyepore will be reluctant to conclude one at the precise period when we deem it advantageous to ourselves,"

there was a sagacity almost prophetic in the misgivings he expressed. No sooner were all impediments to the proposed treaty removed upon the one side, than forthwith they started up on the other. Now that the measure had passed Council, it seemed that there was nothing to do but to conclude the treaty. The coyness of Jyepore, however, now began to manifest itself and to vex Metcalfe; and it was not until two years had passed away since John Adam's letter was written, that we were permitted to "combine justice and humanity with the promotion of our own interests," and to "save the devoted state."

In the mean while, great events were developing themselves. The settlement of Central India, as recommended by Metcalfe, was about to be undertaken in earnest. A reluctant assent to the proposed movement for the suppression of the Pindarrees had been wrung from the Home Government; and Lord Moira, somewhat enlarging the scheme sanctioned in Leadenhall-street, now determined to take the field with an overwhelming army for the extirpation of these destructive marauders. It was determined that at the commencement of the cold season of 1817 war to the knife should be declared against these people, as common enemies of mankind. No neutrality on the part of the Mahratta States was to be permitted. They were to be called upon to co-operate with us against the Pindarrees; and perhaps the expectation entertained that some previous reluctance, or some subsequent infidelity, would embroil us with the sub-

stantive states in such a manner as to enable us to make certain new distributions of their territory, was not, in some quarters, much unlike a hope.

It was hard to say, when we should once have taken the field and commenced operations, who would not come within the scope of the chastisement we were preparing for the Pindarrees. There were symptoms in many quarters of that restlessness, born of suspicion, which is soon developed into open hostility at a Native Court. In the mean while, preparations on a large scale were being made for the coming campaign; and our statesmen were busying themselves with the tangled skein of politics which the aspect of affairs in Central India presented to them. First to clear away one difficulty, then another; to simplify their diplomacy as much as they could, was the great primal object of their endeavors. One great point was to detach Ameer Khan from the confederacy of predatory chiefs. On this subject Lord Moira wrote to the Delhi Resident early in May:

LORD MOIRA TO MR. METCALFE.

"Barrackpore, May 5, 1817.

"My dear Sir,—Bustle in any one quarter of this country is so likely to excite the speculations and spur the activity of individuals in other parts, that the state of things at Poonah may influence districts nearer to you. Hence it may be wise, if it can be done without affectation, to waken a little the hopes of Ameer Khan. An appearance of wishing to know precisely the territory to which he looks, with obscure hints that there may be soon a course of measures favorable to his views, might be likely to keep him right. Endeavors, I am persuaded, are

earnestly exerted to secure his aid in a grand co-operation of predatory powers; and his declining to enrol himself in such a combination would operate much to keep the others quiet. The coming to a point would be easily evaded by you on the plea that I was shortly expected in the Upper Country. That visit I shall undoubtedly make, though I shall not think it necessary to be at Cawnpore till near the opening of the cool season. . . . .

"Adieu, my dear Sir.

"I have the honor to be, sincerely,

"Your faithful, humble servant,

"MOIRA."

To this question of the detachment of Ameer Khan from the great predatory confederacy, Metcalfe directed his thoughts. In a review of the state of affairs, forwarded, soon after the receipt of this letter, to the Governor-General, he thus expressed his opinion of the course to be pursued towards Ameer Khan:

"To Meer Khan we might offer a guarantee in perpetuity, for himself and his heirs, of the territories which he at present holds from Holkar, yielding from nine to twelve lakhs per annum.

"Some provision is necessary to induce and enable him to quit his present course of life, and it is proper that it should consist of the same territories which have hitherto supported him as a pest to the peaceable part of India.

"We might require of him to disband his predatory army, to dispose of his artillery to us at a fair valuation, and to reside quietly and inoffensively on the territories assigned to him under the protection of the British Government, with only such a force as might be necessary for the collection of his revenues.

"Meer Khan would, perhaps, require from us a large sum of money, under the pretence of having to pay up his troops

before discharging them; but we shall require all our money for other purposes.

"He would also, probably, ask for a grant of territory in our dominions; but it is to be hoped that we need not make such a sacrifice in his favor.

"Should he not accept the terms we offer him, he must abide by the consequences of our determination to put down all predatory powers, without having any provision secured to him."

On the great chart of diplomacy now to be unfolded, the conduct of negotiations with Holkar, with Ameer Khan, and with the Rajpoot States, was assigned to Metcalfe. It has been said that our proceedings towards these principalities had been much encumbered by our treaty with Scindiah. But in the autumn of 1817, as the Governor-General was proceeding towards the scene of his intended operations, he came to the resolution, which had for some time been taking root in his mind, to ignore these embarrassing obligations, and to enter into treaties for the protection of Oudipore and the other forbidden states. On this subject the Governor-General —Lord Moira no longer, for he had been created, for his services, Marquis of Hastings—wrote from Cawnpore, at the beginning of October:

LORD HASTINGS TO MR. METCALFE.

"Cawnpore, October 5, 1817.

"MY DEAR SIR,—You will have formal instructions sent to you on the point; but you cannot too soon learn my sentiments respecting Oudipore. It has been notified to Scindiah that from late occurrences I consider the treaties existing between us as virtually dissolved—that I am ready to renew our rela-

tions, with the confirmation of all his former advantages; but that I must claim and exercise the right of entering into engagements with any states whose position may afford me a security against the re-establishment of the power of the Pindarrees, when they shall be once dispersed. That there might be no ambiguity, I have specified the Rajpoot States. Now the desirable effect would be to have Jyepore, Oudipore, and Joudpore concur in one general arrangement to be taken under British protection. The same subsidiary fine would then do for all three, and the full expenses of it would be easily met by these states. The attempt to bring them into this agreement should be made before such a shock is given to the predatory associations, as may make the Rajpoots feel tolerably secure against future molestation.

"Scindiah has assented to the progress of the British troops from Boorhaupore to the Nerbudda, and is full of professions of his good disposition; but we do not trust him too far. The troops here, both European and native, are in high health, though there is dreadful sickness down the river. At Chaprah, the burials have been from threescore to fourscore in a day. The Bhurtpore Rajah has spontaneously sent 400 horse. I have the honor, my dear Sir, to remain, with great regard,

"Your faithful and obedient servant,

"HASTINGS."

Metcalfe now saw clearly his work before him; and in a little while he was in the very midst of its performance.

On the morning of the 16th of October, 1817, the Governor-General took the field. Of the events which then ensued, great events following each other in rapid succession, until the war with the Pindarrees had grown into a new war with the Mahrattas, it is not the province of Charles Metcalfe's biographer to write in detail. A few sentences must describe

the follies and the forfeitures of the Mahratta chiefs. All through the month of October the Peishwah had been collecting troops with the avowed object of co-operating with the British force. Of his sincerity great doubts were entertained. It was known that the treaty of Poonah was distasteful to him, and it had for some time been rumored at the other Mahratta Courts that he was seeking an opportunity to throw off an alliance that so much oppressed him. That some such design was floating in his mind soon became apparent. Towards the end of the month there was an immense concourse of troops in the neighbourhood of Poonah, swaggering and blustering, and pressing on the British post. On the last day of the month the aspect of affairs was so menacing, that the Resident, Mountstuart Elphinstone, moved the British brigade to Kirkee. Every day produced more decisive symptoms of approaching hostility, until, on the 6th of November, the madness of the Mahratta was at its height. The British Residency was attacked and plundered. The savage excitement of the enemy was extreme; their threats were tremendous. But the high courage of the Resident and his military supporters turned their boasting into disgrace. There was a gallant action, in which large bodies of Mahrattas were ignominiously beaten by a handful of British troops. And before the enemy could bring against the victors the re-assembled army, with which they threatened to overwhelm them, reinforcements were sent to aid the little party of devoted men. Badjee Rao, the Peishwah, fled, but was afterwards captured; and it

was said in Lord Hastings' camp that Elphinstone had become Peishwah in his stead.

Whilst these events were passing at Poonah, there was a somewhat similar development at Nagpore. The Rajah, during our discussions in October with Badjee Rao, had eagerly watched the progress of affairs at the Peishwah's Court. Although there were some suspicious appearances which rendered it necessary that Mr. Jenkins should observe diligently all that was passing before him, and should be prepared for the possibility of a rupture, there were no symptoms of overt hostility. It soon became apparent that the Rajah was intriguing with Badjee Rao; but even when the latter threw off the mask, and rushed desperately into hostilities, a wavering policy was pursued at Nagpore. Towards the end of November, however, there were increased symptoms of hostility; and on the 26th our troops were attacked. Then was fought that gallant action at Seetabuldee, the memory of which is dear to the Indian soldier, and which History will never let die. The Berar Rajah, penitent and desponding, was soon at the mercy of the British. He had forfeited his dominions by this act of treachery against the paramount State, and all that he now had to lean upon was the clemency of the Government he had outraged.

In Scindiah's camp the month of October had been also one of restlessness and tumult. Reports of Badjee Rao's intention to break with the British had kept Scindiah's tumultuous soldiery in a state

of feverish excitement. Resorting to all sorts of shifts and expedients for delay, the Durbar hesitated to conclude the new treaty presented to them, whilst they were secretly intriguing with Badjee Rao, the Pindarrees, and Nepaul. This was not to be suffered. Our diplomatists became peremptory in their demands; our troops were in full march on the Gwalior frontier; so on the day on which Badjee Rao attacked the Poonah Residency, the treaty with Scindiah was signed. But there was little likelihood of a cordial alliance. It was obviously Scindiah's desire to obstruct, rather than to facilitate, our operations. The auxiliary horse with which he had pledged himself to furnish us, was delayed; and it was scarcely doubted that if any disasters should overtake us, he would follow the example of his brethren of Poonah and Nagpore.

Such were the difficulties which beset the negotiations of Elphinstone, Jenkins, and Close at their several Mahratta Courts. The diplomatic business which had been entrusted to Metcalfe was attended with no such stormy proceedings. His negotiations with Ameer Khan were brought to a favorable issue. On the 9th of November, the agent of the Rohilla chief signed at Delhi, on behalf of his master, a treaty by which he stipulated to disband his Patan levies, and to restore all the territories which he had wrested from the Rajpoots. On the part of the British Government, it was stipulated that a sum of money should be paid to him, to enable him to disburse the arrears of pay due to his followers, and

that the lands which he had held under Holkar, as the price of his military support, should thenceforth be secured to him under British guarantee.*

But to conclude a treaty with a native chief is one thing; to render it binding upon him is another. Great doubts were entertained whether Ameer Khan would be true to his engagements. And a question of very difficult solution arose after the signing of the treaty—a question whether it were more expedient to disband Ameer Khan's levies, or to keep them together under his command until the end of the war. On Ochterlony, who commanded a division of the grand army, posted in the Delhi territory, and who had diplomatic powers in the Rajpootana country, devolved the duty of giving effect to the arrangements involved in the treaty with Ameer Khan. Conceiving a higher opinion of the sincerity of that chief than Metcalfe had ever entertained, he was anxious to keep the Patan levies together, and was not without a hope that they might be advantageously employed against our enemies.† Metcalfe believed him to be the dupe of the Rohilla; but Lord Hastings trusted in the sincerity of

* Colonel Sutherland, one of Metcalfe's warmest admirers, in his "Sketch of the Native States of India," calls this treaty one of "rather doubtful character;" but does not enter upon any more minute criticism. Sir David Ochterlony, writing to Metcalfe, put the transaction in its true light, when he said, "Excepting the convenience of the measure, I am not convinced of the propriety of detaching this chief from his nominal master and giving him a large portion of country not our own, before we have had the least communication with his principal on his past conduct, the grounds of our displeasure, or our wishes or determinations respecting his future conduct." That future conduct, however, soon quieted our scruples, and imparted to the treaty with Ameer Khan a sort of *ex post facto* justice.

† "If I had two lakhs of rupees," wrote the General, "of my own, I should not hesitate to give it to Meer Khan, so completely has he assured me of his sincerity."

Ameer Khan,* and was anxious to encourage it by hopes of future rewards. What he might have done, had the war progressed differently, it is hard to say; but he soon saw that it was his true policy to assume friendship, if he did not feel it, and at least to comport himself as a faithful ally.

Whilst thus detaching Ameer Khan from the great confederacy, it was Metcalfe's business, at the same time, to spread over the different Rajpoot principalities the network of diplomacy which had long been designed for them. As soon as it had been finally determined to take the field for the suppression of the Pindarrees, Metcalfe had addressed a circular letter to all the chiefs of Rajpootana, inviting them to send agents to Delhi for the purpose of concluding such engagements with the British Government as would ensure for them, throughout the coming struggle, the protection of the paramount Power.† The requisition was promptly obeyed. The first who sent his representative to Metcalfe's Durbar was Zalim Singh, of Kotah. Zalim Singh had been the first chief with whom, when a boy on his way to Scindiah's Camp, he had interchanged diplomatic amenities;‡ and Kotah had been the subject of the first State-paper which he had drawn up for the use

* "If he will depend on me," wrote Lord Hastings to Ochterlony, "the narrow condition of the treaty shall not be the measure of his reward."

† "The conditions were, simply, that any tribute demandable under a fixed agreement with a Mahratta or Patan chief, should be paid directly to the British Treasury, leaving us to account for it to the party to whom it might be due; and that our protection should be afforded on the usual condition of abstaining from the contraction of any new relations with other powers, and submitting to our arbitration of external disputes."—[*Prinsep's History*, vol. ii.]

‡ See *ante*, pages 70-71.

of Government.* Then the Princes of Joudpore and Oudipore, long-suffering victims of Mahratta and Patan oppression, sent in their adhesion to the great scheme of alliance. Next, Boondee, Bekaneer, Jessulmere, and other lesser states, sent their agents to the British Durbar, to conclude engagements with the paramount Power. And, lastly, came Jyepore, which ought to have been first to allow itself to be saved by our intervention. It happened that, when the time came, this state did not wish to be saved, and talked largely about saving itself. Our negotiations with Ameer Khan had somewhat embarrassed our proceedings towards the Rajpoot States; and now Jyepore was obviously endeavoring to take advantage of our complicated relations, and, as Ochterlony said, to play us off against Ameer Khan. There were curious alternations of presumption and alarm discernible in the conduct of the Jyporeans; and it was hard to say whether the wavering policy they pursued was dictated by apprehensions of our designs or a studied effort to overreach us. The example of the other states was, however, followed at last, and on the 2nd of April the long-talked-of treaty with Jyepore was formally signed.

Two great objects had thus been gained by our diplomacy. We had rendered Ameer Khan harmless, and we had brought the Rajpoot States under our protection. In the mean while, equal success was waiting on our arms. The Pindarrees were scattered and destroyed. Holkar, who had joined

* *Ante*, pages 103-108. Zalim Singh was not the nominal, but the virtual ruler of Kotah.

the enemy,* was disastrously beaten in a pitched battle. The Peishwah was a prisoner in our camp. The Rajah of Berar was prostrate at our feet. Scindiah was hanging upon our skirts, a reluctant ally; feeble as a friend, but, at least, harmless as an enemy. The condition of things which Metcalfe had so long desired had now arrived. We had suppressed the Pindarree power; we had obtained the right to make new treaties with the substantive States—to enforce a new distribution of territory; to consolidate our own empire, and to secure the permanent tranquillity of Central India. The death-blow, indeed, was now given to the Mahrattas. The Poonah territories were bodily absorbed into our own dominions. The Rajah of Berar was deposed, and his country, after the amputation of a considerable limb, placed, during the minority of the new ruler, under the administration of the British Resident. Holkar, convinced of his true interests, alike by our power and our moderation, was brought, after certain cessions of territory and tribute, including the Jagheers we had transferred to Ameer Khan, under British protection; whilst the latter chief became a peaceful administrator and a firm ally to the end of his life. Central India was really settled by these great military and diplomatic operations, and peace and security established where before had been incessant strife and continual alarm.

* Metcalfe, it has been shown, had always been of opinion that Holkar's strong disinclination to place himself under the protection of the British, was not to be overcome so long as there was a hope of his obtaining, by other means, a more independent position. The confederacy now established against us seemed to encourage these hopes; so he threw himself into the arms of the enemy.

But the period of Metcalfe's residence in Central India was now drawing to a close. The question of the Secretaryship, which had agitated him a few years before, was now to be revived. On the 9th of October, 1818, John Adam wrote, at the request of Lord Hastings, saying, that as Mr. Ricketts had determined to proceed to England in the following January, the Private Secretaryship would then be vacant; and that, as the Political Secretaryship would then also be vacant, the Governor-General hoped that Metcalfe would be induced to accept the conjoint offices.* The flattering offer was not refused. Not, however, without some misgivings, did Metcalfe, on the 23rd of October, reply that he was at the service of the Governor-General, and that he would at once make his arrangements to deliver over the charge of the Delhi Residency to his successor.

But who was to be his successor? The solution of the question greatly perplexed the Calcutta Council. After much consideration, it was determined to entrust the military and political duties to Sir David Ochterlony, and to place the civil administration of the district in the hands of a Commissioner or a Board.† "It is not to be expected," wrote

* By the elevation of Mr. Adam to a seat in Council. In another letter that gentleman wrote: "I am working hard to impose upon you nothing that I can do myself. I sincerely hope that you will like your new employment. I do, from long habit, in spite of the toil and occasional vexation that belong to all employments. I am sure you will find yourself happy in Calcutta, where so many will rejoice to see you established. I cannot tell you the comfort I feel at the department passing into such hands."

† The details of the arrangement consequent on Metcalfe's transfer to Calcutta, are sketched out in the following passage of a letter from John Adam, dated November 16, 1818:—"You will receive by this post authority to make over charge of the Residency to Ochterlony, whom Lord

John Adam, "of Ochterlony, or of any other man, that he should go through the Herculean labors that you have sustained." "The political and military duties," he added in another letter, "will be abundant occupation for any one man; and the internal administration has now become so large a concern, as to make it very expedient to place it on the proposed footing on your being withdrawn."

It is hard to say whether the arrangement for the succession were more pleasing to Ochterlony or to Metcalfe. Throughout long years—years which had brought fame and honor to the old soldier—he had smarted under a sense of the injury that had been inflicted upon him in 1805, by his removal from the Delhi Residency. And when the rumors first reached him, that he was to succeed Metcalfe, he could not bring himself to believe in their truth. "I cannot help thinking," he wrote, "that Sir George Barlow's infliction is to pursue me through life." He had long been eager to recover his lost position. He cared not where the situation might be—what the emoluments of office, as long as he were styled "Resident" again.* When, therefore, Metcalfe,

Hastings has resolved to appoint to succeed you. He is to command the third division, and to manage the affairs of Jyepore and Ameer Khan, Keerouly, Kishenagur, and generally of the Eastern Rajpoot States; and to take charge of Joudpore, Oudipore, Kotah, and Boondee. The extension of political and military duty thus to be assigned to Ochterlony, will make it necessary to relieve him entirely, or nearly so, from the administration of the territory of Delhi. The outline of the plan proposed is to appoint a Civil officer, with high powers, judicial and revenue, distinct from the political authority."

* How strong this feeling was, may be gathered from the following touching passage, in a letter written to Metcalfe, in January, 1818:—"In twelve days," wrote Ochterlony, "I shall complete my sixtieth year; and in that long period have never but once had just ground to complain of ill-fortune or ill-usage; but that once, though it has led me to unexpected fame and honor, has, for nearly twelve years, preyed upon my spirits; and all I have since gained appears no recom-

eager to convey the glad tidings to his friend, was the first to communicate to him that his appointment to the Delhi Residency had really been determined by the Governor-General, the delighted veteran, who at threescore was as eager and enthusiastic as a boy, wrote back that his correspondent was not to "expect much sense or connexion in a letter written in a tumult of joy and exultation." He was eager, in carrying out all the subordinate arrangements attendant on the change, to be guided by the wishes and suggestions of his friend. "To whose recommendations," he asked, "can I more earnestly wish to attend than to those of the child of my affection? If I do not speak of other motives, it is not because I am insensible that others exist; but because I flatter myself that none can be more acceptable to you than the forcible one implied in a parental love."*

The time for Metcalfe's departure had now come. He was deeply attached to Delhi, and could not quit the place or its society without many a throb of regret. He was much beloved by the people of all races. His benevolence, his hospitality, his pure unselfishness, his strict integrity, had endeared him

pense for a removal which stamped me with those who knew me best, and loved me most, as ignorant and incompetent, and with the world in general, venal and culpable. A feeling which I cannot describe, but which is quite distinct from the love of ease and the advantages of a Residency, makes me wish for that situation. I would not care where; the name alone seems as if it would wash out a stain—but if that is denied, I shall be happier at Kurnal than anywhere—for there, or near it, are, or will be at no distant date, I trust, assembled all those whom I love with paternal affection; and there, like a Patriarch, I wish to live in the greatest enjoyment this life can bestow—the society of those I love, and who, I believe, return it with sincere and fond affection."

* *Sir D. Ochterlony to Mr. Metcalfe, November 24, 1818.—MS.*

alike to Natives and Europeans. As the day of his departure approached, the latter held a public meeting, and voted him a farewell address.* It was the first of a long line of similar testimonials of public admiration, which were now to pursue him, from different parts of the world, almost to the very day of his death.

He went, regretting and regretted—but he knew that as Resident at Delhi he had not been an unprofitable servant. Twelve years afterwards, referring to this period of his career, he thus summed up the benefits which, under his administration of the Delhi territory, had been conferred upon the people:†

"It may be as well to mention a few facts, as characteristic of the spirit in which the former administration at Delhi was conducted, and the discretionary power of the superior authority exercised. Capital punishment was generally and almost wholly abstained from, and I believe without any bad effect. Corporal punishment was discouraged, and finally abolished. Swords and other implements of intestine warfare, to which the people were prone, were turned into plough-shares, not figuratively alone, but literally also; villages being made to give up their arms, which were returned to them in the shape of implements of agriculture. Suttees were prohibited. The rights of Government were better maintained than in other provinces, by not being subjected to the irreversible decisions of its

* The address, and Metcalfe's reply to it, will be found in the Appendix.

† Although in Chapter X. I have treated at some length of Metcalfe's Civil Administration, I had intended to say more in this place about what some years afterwards was described as the "Delhi System," and which was severely criticised by a very able member of the Bengal Civil Service. But the length to which this chapter has already extended, and some doubt as to whether the discussion would be interesting to the general reader, have warned me to desist. Some passages, however, from Metcalfe's defence of the system, are given in the Appendix.

judicial servants, when there were no certain laws for their guidance and control.

"The rights of the people were better preserved, by the maintenance of the village constitutions, and by avoiding those pernicious sales of lands for arrears of revenue, which in other provinces have tended so much to destroy the hereditary rights of the mass of the agricultural community. In consequence, there has been no necessity in the Delhi territory for those extraordinary remedies which have been deemed expedient elsewhere, both to recover the rights of Government, and to restore those of the people.

"When it comes to be decided whether the Delhi territory has on the whole been better or worse governed than the provinces under the Regulations, the question, it is to be hoped, will be determined by impartial judges, free from prejudice and passion."

Note.—I have given in the Appendix some passages from a Minute touching upon the subject of the allowances of the Delhi Residency. I have also quoted, at some length, in the same place, Metcalfe's account of certain transactions connected with the alleged corruption of some of his subordinates at Delhi — especially of his Moonshee Hufoozoodeen, of whom mention is made in the earlier part of this volume.—*Author.*

CHAPTER XIII.

[1819—1820.]

THE SECRETARYSHIP.

Constitution of the Supreme Government—The Secretariat—Duties of the Political Secretary—The Private Secretary—Metcalfe and Lord Hastings—Irksomeness of the Situation—Correspondence with Sir John Malcolm—Contemplated Removal to Central India—Correspondence with Mr. Henry Russell—The Hyderabad Residency.

So Charles Metcalfe again revisited Calcutta, and entered upon the duties of the Private Secretaryship. After an interval of a few days, the higher office of Political Secretary was vacated by the elevation of the old incumbent to a seat in Council, and the some-time Resident at Delhi launched manfully into the ministerial duties of Government—a worthy successor of Edmonstone and Adam.*

The colleagues of Lord Hastings in the administration were at this time Mr. James Stuart and Mr. John Adam. Metcalfe's old friend and comrade,

* Sir John Malcolm, who had the highest possible opinion of Adam, wrote to Metcalfe, December 30, 1818:—"I am glad, both on your own account and that of the public, that you are gone to Calcutta. I think you in every way an adequate successor to John Adam. I could say more to no man." And not long afterwards Mr. Edmonstone wrote to him:—"Highly as your abilities and services at Delhi were to be appreciated, still I confess that I am happy to learn that my department—the department in which I labored for so many years, and to which I must chiefly attribute my success in India—had devolved upon one so peculiarly capable of fulfilling the duties as yourself."

Butterworth Bayley, was Chief-Secretary; Mr. Holt Mackenzie had charge of the Revenue and Judicial business; and Mr. Swinton was Persian Secretary. So far, therefore, as personal associations could render his position at this time a pleasant one, he had everything to make it so in the characters of the men with whom he was brought into official intercourse.

No one who has observed the frequency with which the names of Edmonstone and Adam have occurred in the preceding chapters of this Memoir, can be altogether ignorant of the duties of a Political Secretary. With the extension of our Indian Empire these duties had necessarily increased. The office is one which has been held in succession by the most eminent men who have adorned the service of the Company. It demands the possession of extensive local knowledge and experience, and profound political sagacity. Although ostensibly only an executive officer, the Secretary is the adviser of the Governor-General, and, in most instances, the rough-hewer of his measures. The amount of his actual power is necessarily determined by the personal character and qualifications of the Governor-General. But the immense extent and diversity of the business to be discharged by the Government being well considered, it is obvious that no statesman at the head of it, whatever may be his genius, his knowledge, and his activity, can shape or even originate all the measures for which he is responsible. A weak man will become, perhaps, the tool of his Secretaries, and leave the Go-

vernment of the country entirely in their hands; but such weakness is strength in comparison with that of the Governor-General who thinks that he can govern India *without* the aid of his Secretaries. Great men, like Cornwallis and Wellesley, steer a middle course. They govern India for themselves, but not by themselves. They use their Secretaries; they are not used by them. They know the full value of their Barlows and Edmonstones; but they do not surrender themselves to be tools in their hands. Lord Wellesley was a man of consummate ability, of brave resolution, and of infinite self-reliance; but it is not too much to say, that he would have been shorn of half his strength if Mr. Edmonstone had not been continually at his elbow.

Of the influence of the Political Secretary in the councils of the State, Metcalfe had seen enough of the ministerial arrangements of three successive Governments to acquire a very clear perception. But he was not one to usurp power not legitimately his own, or to dogmatise where it was his duty to suggest. He had the highest possible respect for constituted authority; and he did his duty without exceeding it.* Moreover, the circumstances of the Indian Government of 1819-20 were not of a nature to place any large amount of power in the hands of a Political Secretary, even if he had been inclined

* Some years afterwards, when he had himself become a member of the Supreme Council, Metcalfe complained of this usurpation of the Secretaries, said that they often gave their opinions very arrogantly and dogmatically in Council, and that they not seldom caballed with the Governor-General against the members of Council, and contrived to get all the patronage into their own hands.—See some further remarks on Metcalfe's respect for constituted authority in Chapter II. Vol. II.

to exercise it. Metcalfe had, in fact, been more powerful when only a volunteer in the camp of the Governor-General. He then really shaped the great measures which were now completed, or which only required a few final strokes from the artificer's hand to render them complete.

That with regard to these final measures for the settlement of Central India he sometimes differed from the highest authorities, and had opinions of his own apart from those which he was called upon to enunciate as the organ of Government, may be gathered from the following letter to Mr. Jenkins. It is an important commentary on the events described in the last chapter, and illustrates the general views of the writer on the great question of interference with the Native States :

CHARLES METCALFE TO RICHARD JENKINS.

"Calcutta, July 5, 1820.

"My dear Jenkins,—Both at Delhi and here I have for many years been complaining that public business does not leave me any time for private correspondence; and from giving way to this feeling, I have lost the interchange of ideas with several valuable friends; I may say with yourself, for our communications have been rare; and certainly with Elphinstone, a most delightful correspondent, with whom I have now little or no intercourse of that kind. I often think that the fault is more my own than that of my business, though at Delhi the work in my time was certainly overwhelming; and here I cannot say that I find leisure for what I wish. Be the cause real or fancied, I have for a long time been anxious in vain to give you my own sentiments distinct from those of Government, given through the channel of their Secretary on part of your late letters, in which I think my own sentiments came nearer

than those of Government to yours. I must, however, go some way back. I have always regretted that after the conquest of the Nagpore country, we elevated any new Rajah to the Musnud. As soon as I heard of the breaking out of the Peishwah and Appa Sahib, I wrote to Adam, urging him with my feeble voice that we should take the territories of both, and unite them to the British dominions. Malcolm and others seemed to take up and advocate a scheme of setting up a Mahomedan interest in opposition to the Hindoos, or more especially the Mahrattas. It appeared to me that the time was past for our trusting to any balance of power for our support; that the setting up of Mahomedan powers was in itself objectionable, and that our true policy was to secure as much country as possible for ourselves; and to announce ourselves avowedly as the master of all the powers of India. I abhor making wars, and meddling with other states for the sake of our aggrandisement—but war thrust upon us, or unavoidably entered into, should, if practicable, be turned to profit by the acquisition of new resources, to pay additional forces to defend what we have, and extend our possessions in future unavoidable wars. With these sentiments, I rejoiced at Lord Hastings' decision regarding the Peishwah's territories, and regretting that which he came to respecting the Nagpore country. I cannot concur in Malcolm's apprehensions of extending our direct rule too rapidly. The sooner the better if done justly. Next to making the Nagpore country our own, the system at present in force there seems to me to be best; and I wish that it were permanently established. Next to permanence, if that cannot be, I would have the longest possible period; and its continuance even for three years, as proposed by you, is better than its immediate transfer. When I say, 'proposed by you,' I mean, proposed in despair of obtaining more. I most entirely agree with you in the sentiment, that we should not set bounds to our interference if we interfere at all; and that if we do interfere, it ought to be with good effect. If possible, I would leave all Native States to their own govern-

ment, without interference. But we are always dragged in somehow, and then it is difficult to say what should be done. The worst plan of all, I think, is to keep in a Minister against the will of the Prince, and to support the man without regard to his measures. Yet this is the mode we have generally slidden into; and as it has been adopted by wiser heads than mine, it is probably right, or unavoidable. I would prefer leaving the Minister to the choice of the Prince, and interfering only as to measures; insisting on the exclusion of the man if his measures were incorrigibly bad, but still leaving the choice of a successor to the Prince. I am not sure how this scheme would answer. I do not think that it has ever been attempted. But I would certainly give it a trial if I were at a Court where interference were necessary, and I were not fettered by previous engagements to a particular Minister.

"I think you will say, '*Ohe! jam satis est*'—so I will conclude with a line or two respecting my own present plans. . .*

"Yours most sincerely and affectionately,

"C. T. METCALFE."

There was little at this time in Metcalfe's situation to evoke his intellectual energies—little that demanded an application of the skill of the master-workman. But there was much to be done. For the most part it was detail work of no great importance—the routine business of the Political Secretary's office—with nothing bracing or inspiriting in it.† His days were given up to official drudgery,

* This conclusion is given at p. 491.

† Doubtless, however, there were some compensations in the midst of all this thankless routine work. It must have been, for example, with no common satisfaction that, as the organ of the Supreme Government, he wrote a public letter to his friend Mountstuart Elphinstone, congratulating him on his elevation to the Government of Bombay. The autograph draft of this letter is almost the only document drawn up by Metcalfe during his tenure of office as Political Secretary, which he preserved among his private papers.

and his evenings to society. "Mornings and days," he wrote to a friend at this time, "I have been at work, and as hard as possible; and every night and all night, at least to a late hour, I have been at all sorts of gay parties. I have been raking terribly, and know not when it will stop; for to confess the truth, I find I rather like it. But I hope the hot weather will check it, for though I do not dislike it, I cannot approve what is so contrary to all my notions of what is wholesome for body and mind."

There were, however, occasional diversities of social enjoyment, rising above the ordinary level of Calcutta gaiety, which Charles Metcalfe regarded with more genuine appreciation. There were now and then banquets given by himself or his friends, redolent of pleasant reminiscences of ancient days, when he built up airy castles in the playing-fields of Eton, or laid the foundations of more substantial ones in Lord Wellesley's office. Charles Lushington brought together at his table a goodly assemblage of the old "Howe boys," when the sayings and doings of their old lord and master were pleasantly discussed; and Metcalfe himself gave an Eton dinner whereto all the Etonians at the Presidency were bidden. And well remembered in after days was the joyous festival at which *Floreat Etona* was drunk with all the honors; and Metcalfe's honored friend and correspondent, Dr. Goodall, was toasted in a manner which showed how the good old man was still respected and beloved. Into such festivities as these, Metcalfe entered with becoming geniality, and was sure to be the life of the party.

I have spoken of the airy castles of Metcalfe's early days. He was always a castle-builder. And now the Political Secretary differed not at all from the eager schoolboy in the Eton cloisters, or the "little stormer" in Lord Lake's camp. His position at the Presidency had brought him again into familiar correspondence with his old friend and teacher, John Malcolm, who now wrote to him from Mhow: "I recognise in all your letters the unaltered Charles Metcalfe with whom I used to pace the tent at Muttra and build castles; our expenditure on which was neither subject to the laws of estimate nor the rules of audit." Miles, counted by the hundreds, now lay between them; but they could still build castles together. There was one magnificent edifice which at this time they were intent upon constructing—but it took fifteen years to convert the airy fiction into a substantial fact.

With such dreams of a brilliant future Metcalfe was wont to solace himself amidst the discontents of a dreary present. Before he had been a year in Calcutta, he had grown weary of the place and of the office. There were many reasons for this; but none which it is very easy to explain. His services were greatly appreciated by Lord Hastings. There were seldom any differences between them on points of vital importance. Both in principle and in practice they seemed to agree. The Governor-General was continually commending the executive aptitude of his Secretary; and when he had altered any of Metcalfe's drafts, always apologised or explained in such a manner as to give a complimentary turn to

such assertions of superiority. His undeviating kindness was, indeed, thankfully acknowledged. Metcalfe was not only Political Secretary, he was Private Secretary at the same time; and therefore, though he did not reside in Government House, he was one of the "family." It does not appear that in this capacity any derogatory duties were entailed upon him—that in any sense he was converted into a lacquey. Six years before, Lord Moira had arrived in India with very magnificent ideas of Vice-regal state, and had drawn up a schedule of the various duties of the household, by which the Private Secretary was degraded into a sort of chamberlain, or *maître d'hôtel*. But he had arrived with a "Private Secretary" in his train, appointed under rather peculiar circumstances, who was, perhaps, not ill-suited to the kind of work that had been assigned to him; and a "Principal Private Secretary" was appointed as the Governor-General's confidential assistant in matters of a more public nature. But before Metcalfe's assumption of office, the Governor-General's ideas of Vice-regal proprieties had toned down, and the Household Secretary had returned to England. There was now but one Private Secretary, and his functions were mainly of a public character. The duties as a member of the family were few; and if he were occasionally requested to invite some distinguished stranger to take up his quarters in Government House, or if he were instructed to issue orders about Court Mourning; or if some delegated members of society solicited him to request the honor of the Governor-General's and

Lady Hastings' attendance at a bachelors' ball, or other public entertainment, these were small matters of business which no man of sense would conceive himself to be humiliated by executing. Lord Hastings was an old courtier; and Metcalfe had every reason to be satisfied with the personal courtesy and urbanity of his Lordship. But for all this, he was not contented with his position. The husk may have been pleasant to look upon; but there was something rotten in the kernel.

What it was does not very plainly appear. Perhaps the causes of Metcalfe's discontent may be found partly in the environments of his position, and partly in his own personal character. As a ministerial officer, he may have been sometimes compelled outwardly to participate in arrangements of which he could not inwardly approve. A high-minded, conscientious man may see too much for his peace of mind of the occult machinery of Government—of the working of all its secret springs and hidden wheels and mysterious contrivances. Metcalfe was too near to Government House; or, perhaps, he was not near enough. He had a natural taste for kingship. It pleased him best to be his own master. He had, for many years, been habituated to independent command. At Delhi he had been lord-paramount—without a rival. At Calcutta he was one of many—a minister among ministers. It is not strange, therefore, that he should have found his new situation irksome to him. None of his friends, when they heard of his disap-

pointment, expressed any surprise. Three of the ablest and most distinguished men in India—Malcolm, Elphinstone, and Jenkins—wrote to him that it was just what they expected.

It was whilst in this frame of mind—eager to escape from what seemed to him both the grave of his independence and the grave of his fame—unwilling to drowse, by imperceptible degrees, into a member of Council, and to close his career whilst yet in the heyday of his intellectual vigor, that the letters of John Malcolm came opportunely to give a new direction to his ambition, and to stimulate his energies by again exciting his hopes. The almost superhuman activity of that great soldier-statesman had found in Central India free scope for exercise; but on this great field of labor he seems to have expended himself in unrequited service. Believing that he was neglected by his employers, he had determined to return to England, either to regain the position which he was said to have lost, or to lay down the wand of office for ever. He desired to see a worthy successor enthroned in his place; and he felt in his inmost heart that there was none so worthy as Metcalfe. His old pupil had written to him that the Secretaryship had become distasteful to him; and now Malcolm wrote with all that genuine earnestness which was so refreshing an ingredient in his character, urging the dissatisfied minister to come to Central India, and not to quit it until the territories committed to his charge had grown into an independent Government:

"I have this moment," he wrote on the 19th of February, 1820, "received your letter of the 30th ultimo. I can enter fully into your feelings, and can only wish, if it is determined to place this situation upon a proper scale (which I deem quite indispensable for the general peace of the country), that you should be my successor. It is a station worthy of your talents and ambition. Talk over the work that has been done and is to be done with Caulfield, who understands the whole scheme; and you will be convinced that there would be more than embarrassment—that there would be danger, in depriving this province of one head to whom all looked, and who was competent to act for Government in cases of emergency. I can have no idea that the nature and extent of my political duties are fully understood. They comprise not merely general control, but in many cases minute interference with every large state and petty chief from Serorissi east to Dungerpore west—from the Satporah Hills to the Mahindra Pass north and south. They include the keeping of the peace, by orders, requests, arbitrations and decisions among the numerous Nabobs, Rajahs, Rogues, and Ryots of this extensive space, who are united in no sentiment but one—a common respect and deference for the representative of the British Government. On him their continuance at peace with each other depends. When I reflect on the elements of which this mass is composed, I can hardly trust the charm by which they are kept in concord; but weaken that, and you have years of confusion. . . . . Had I been near you, the King of Delhi should have been dissuaded from becoming an executive officer and resigning power to jostle for influence. But you acted from high motives, and should not be dissatisfied with yourself. Delhi has had you long enough. It is bad that men of your stamp should in any way stagnate or become too local. . . . . If they offer it (the Central-Indian appointment) on proper terms, accept it; come up in November, and let us be one month together. I may leave you a Governor General's Agent or Commissioner; but depend upon it that ere long you would be a Lieutenant-Governor. These are changes

which will force themselves; and I shall give Adam my sentiments confidentially on this point."

To a man of Charles Metcalfe's temperament there was something very spirit-stirring in such an appeal as this. And it did not come singly to stimulate his ambition. A few days after the receipt of this letter from Malcolm, another came from Mr. Marjoribanks, who had political charge of the districts bordering on the Nerbudda river, urging him to obtain permission of the Government for the immediate resignation of his charge. It was Malcolm's theory that more good was likely to result from the combination than from the division of offices of political control; inasmuch as that the latter necessarily induced the enforcement of different systems of policy, and the prosecution of different modes of procedure. He argued, and with much show of reason on his side, that this seeming want of unity in our councils did much to weaken our influence with the chiefs and people of India; and declared that on that account one man might often do what many would fail to accomplish. Taking this view of the case, he contended that it would be advantageous in the extreme to consolidate all the different Residencies and Agencies in Central and Upper India into one great political charge, eventually to be placed under an officer with the title of Lieutenant-Governor. And he saw in Metcalfe a man well qualified to assume charge of such an office.

This great idea fired Metcalfe's ambition. In the junction of the two extensive tracts of territory over

which Malcolm and Marjoribanks had held political control, he saw the commencement of this consolidation, which was to lead to such great results. So he determined at once to take counsel with John Adam on this momentous subject. Adam entered at once into the idea; admitted the advantages of the plan; and on the following day, having in the mean while received from Malcolm himself a sketch of his great project, he wrote to Metcalfe, saying:

"A part of the enclosed is so much to the purpose of our conversation yesterday, that I must ask you to read it. Further reflection confirms my conviction of the advantage of the plan we talked of yesterday, and this letter of Malcolm's would serve as a ground for making the proposition to Lord Hastings at the proper time. I am satisfied that it ought to be done, independently of Marjoribanks' final decision, though if his charge could be combined with the other, it would be more worthy of your powers, and more advantageous to the public interests. I cannot wonder at your preferring such a situation to your present one, even if the latter had better answered your expectations."

To have found in John Adam a cordial auxiliary was a great point gained. The opinion of such a man fortified Metcalfe in his resolution to address Lord Hastings on the subject. But when he sat down to write a letter to the Governor-General—a letter which was, in effect, a solicitation to be relieved from the privileged situation of his Lordship's confidential adviser—he felt the difficulty and delicacy of the task. The object, however, was a great one; and the thought of it sustained him to the end. At the foot of John Adam's letter he had written

roughly in pencil—"*The union of Malcolm's charge and Marjoribanks' would be grand indeed; and make me King of the East and the West!*" And now this kingship in prospect carried him through all the delicate distresses of the following letter:*

MR. METCALFE TO LORD HASTINGS.

"My Lord,—I am not sure that your Lordship will think me in my right senses in what I am about to submit; but I am, nevertheless, tempted to proceed, by a well-founded assurance that it will meet with indulgent consideration.

"The apparent determination of Mr. Marjoribanks not to be induced by any consideration to retain his situation, and the intention of Sir John Malcolm to return to England at the end of the year, seem to leave unoccupied an important field of public service.

"The union of the duties of these situations would obviate in a great degree the objection, on the score of expense, that might otherwise exist against the permanent continuance of Sir John Malcolm's political office, which is stated by him to be desirable.

"That union would, at the same time, hold forth the prospect of a noble station, combining high political and administrative functions.

"And the view which I take of the importance of such an office, if it were instituted, makes me ambitious to fill it, if such an arrangement should meet with your Lordship's approbation.

"Your Lordship will at one glance determine whether or not this general notion is likely to have your sanction. If it be, I can hereafter trouble your Lordship with details, which it would be a waste of time to intrude upon you at present.

"Your Lordship will, perhaps, be surprised that, after re-

* I have transcribed the letter from a rough pencil draft in Metcalfe's handwriting, a little confused as respects the collocation of the paragraphs. It is without date in the original, but it was written at the beginning of April, 1820.

linquishing such a situation as the Residency of Delhi for the office which I have now the honor to hold, I should think of quitting the latter for any other situation whatever.

"When I reflect on the respectability, emoluments, luxury, comforts, and presumed prospects of my present situation—on the honor of holding a place so near your Lordship's person, combined with the enjoyment of continual intercourse with your Lordship, and on the happiness conferred by your invariable kindness, I cannot satisfy myself that I act wisely in seeking to be deprived of so many advantages in order to undertake arduous duties of fearful responsibility.

"It is very possible, I think, that if your Lordship should indulge my wishes, I may hereafter repent of them; but at present I am under the influence of the following considerations:

"After a sufficient experience, I feel that the duties of the Secretary's office are not so congenial to me as those which I have heretofore performed. I see reasons to doubt my qualifications for this line of service. I think that many persons might be found who would fill the office more efficiently; and I fancy that I could serve your Lordship better in a situation such as I have described, nearly resembling that which I formerly held.

"If the Residency at Delhi on its former footing were vacant, the strong local attachments which I have at that place would induce me to entreat your Lordship to restore me to my former office. But that ground is occupied; and neither would your Lordship agree to my return were I to make the proposition; nor would I wish it, or willingly consent to it, at the expense of my friend Sir David Ochterlony.

"The situation which I have suggested would have duties similar in nature to those of the Residency of Delhi—nearly as extensive, if not more so; and, perhaps from the circumstances of the present moment, more important.

"It may appear that the duties at which I aim are too extensive, and that those of Sir John Malcolm's office alone

would be ample for any one man to undertake. In anticipation of this possible objection, I beg leave to remark, that if Sir John Malcolm's situation alone were to be provided for, perhaps a more economical arrangement than that herein proposed might be devised by transferring his duties to the Resident at Indore, and fixing a subordinate agent at Holkar's Court; that the discharge of the territorial duties of Mr. Marjoribanks' office is to me a fascinating part of the plan which I have suggested; and that, admitting the principle that my duties should be those of general control and management, and that I should not be loaded with detail, I should not think the united charge of the two offices beyond the power of an ordinary man, with the able aid which already exists in all parts of that field.

"If your Lordship should doubt the expediency of retaining Sir John Malcolm's political office, or should wish to confer it on any other person, or should desire still to persuade Mr. Marjoribanks to resume his station on the Nerbudda, or should have any other arrangement in contemplation for that territory, I hope that your Lordship will not allow my wishes to interfere with your intentions. As above observed, I am too proud of my present situation to seek any arrangement accompanied by the uncomfortable consciousness of having intruded myself on your Lordship's indulgence.

"I beg your Lordship not to consider what I have submitted as a formal application, but rather as a representation of what is floating in my mind, communicated with unreserved confidence, inspired by your Lordship's kindness. Distrusting my own judgment, I have communicated on the subject with Mr. Adam, who seems to think the scheme very feasible and recommendable.

"If my notion should meet generally with your Lordship's approbation, it would not necessarily press for immediate decision. As far as my own wishes and convenience would be concerned, I should prefer the postponement of the arrangement to the proper time for relieving Sir John Malcolm—I presume about November, when I could proceed by dawk to the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, and onward to Mhow.

The duties of the Saugor and Nerbudda territories might intermediately be carried on by Mr. Molony and Mr. Maddock, in correspondence with Government; and, in this interval, all the arrangements for the future management of those districts respectively under my general control might be matured and established. But with regard to the time of my departure, as well as upon every other point, I should, of course, be ready to obey with alacrity your Lordship's commands.

"Your Lordship will perceive that I have considered only myself in this proposition; but I trust that you will not misapprehend my motives for doing so. Had I the vanity to suppose that your Lordship would have any preference either for retaining me here, or employing me elsewhere, I should consider myself bound by every duty to suppress my own inclinations and think only of your Lordship's pleasure; but believing that your Lordship will not have any bias on the subject, except what may arise on the one hand from your disposition to do an act of kindness, or on the other from doubts of the public utility of forming such a situation, and of my competency to fill it, I have thought myself at liberty to submit my ideas with reference to myself alone.

"My simple proposition has led me to trouble your Lordship with a tedious explanation; and yet I must conclude, still under the fear that I have not adequately explained my feelings —especially those of respectful attachment and gratitude which your Lordship's undeviating kindness has inspired, and which must ever bind me to your Lordship—lest I should encroach too much on your Lordship's time.

"I have the honor to be,

"Your Lordship's obedient servant,

"C. T. METCALFE."

On the 5th of April, Lord Hastings, writing to Metcalfe, primarily on another topic, said: "We will discuss the subject of your private letter when we meet. But I would not delay saying, that I did

not startle at it." The project, indeed, was favorably received by the Governor-General, and before the end of the month Metcalfe wrote to his friend Richard Jenkins, saying it was designed that the scheme should take effect; and asking what was the best way of getting to Mhow in November or December?* But, little more than two months afterwards, he wrote again to the same correspondent, saying: "I have given up the idea of succeeding Malcolm and erecting my standard on the Nerbudda, in order to go to another field, not so extensive, but more compact and more comfortable, and offering a prospect of greater leisure. It is a bad sign, I fear, that for these reasons I think it preferable. I look upon it as a sort of retirement for the rest of my service in India. I have seen enough of the Secretaryship to know that the respectability and satisfaction of those stations depend upon circumstances beyond one's own control; and though, under some circumstances, I should prefer my present situation to any other, I shall quit it without any desire of ever returning to it, and without much wish of ever having a seat in Council,—were it not for the name of the thing, I might say without *any* wish. This state of feeling I have gained by coming to Calcutta; and it

* "I have disclosed," wrote Metcalfe, "the scheme I communicated to you to Lord Hastings, and it is at present designed that it shall take effect. If so, the Nerbudda territories will come under me—a bad substitute, I fear, for you; but we shall act, I trust, on the same principles. What will be the best way of getting speedily to Mhow in November or December? Though I am not to see you so soon as I hoped, we shall meet, I trust, at Nagpore before the end of the year. At least, I shall embrace the first opportunity of renewing old days with you. What time would it take to get to Nagpore, and thence to Mhow?"—[*Charles Metcalfe to Richard Jenkins, April 28th*, 1820.]

is fortunate that it is so, for I have no chance whatever of a seat in Council at any time."*

The other field—more compact—more comfortable—offering prospect of greater leisure—was the field of Hyderabad in the Deccan. The Residency was then occupied by Mr. Henry Russell. In the month of April that gentleman had written to Metcalfe that he purposed to remain at Hyderabad until the commencement of the following year, and that he earnestly hoped his correspondent would be his successor. The two gentlemen were on terms of intimate friendship and familiarity. They were connected, indeed, by marriage. Mr. Russell was a first cousin of Theophilus Metcalfe's wife. The thought of handing over his office to such a man as Charles Metcalfe afforded him, both upon public and on private grounds, the liveliest satisfaction; and even when such a transfer seemed to be remote, he spoke in glowing terms of the situation. "I always thought," he said, "that you would regret the change from Delhi to Calcutta. It can hardly be long before you are placed in Council; but if this should not be the case, and you should continue desirous of returning to your own line, I should be delighted to deliver

* *MS. Correspondence, July* 5, 1820.—He had written, a few days before, to the same effect to Malcolm, who wrote in reply: "The only part of your letter of the 29th ultimo that I did not like, was that the plan of your succeeding me was given up. If it has been abandoned in consequence of an arrangement that is better for you, I shall rejoice on your account, but not for Malwa, because for all that good work of which I think I have laid the foundation you were precisely the successor I wished, and the man under whom my Tucavees, Potails, Zemindars, Thakoors, Newabs, Rajahs, and Maharajahs would have flourished; but I shall hope the station will yet tempt you, and depend upon my word it will become great in your hands, and work its way, in spite of all routine-mongers, to that consequence it must have before its duties can be efficiently and satisfactorily performed."—[*John Malcolm to Charles Metcalfe, July* 22, 1822.]

this Residency into your hands. You will find an excellent house completely furnished; a beautiful country; one of the finest climates in India, and, when the business which now presses has been disposed of, abundance of leisure to follow your personal pursuits. My original intention was to go home at the end of this year, having made a sort of promise to my father to be with him by the time he is seventy, which he will be in August twelvemonth. These measures of reform will detain me; but by the end of next year matters will be so completely set agoing in their new train, that I shall certainly go then."

But at this time the Great Central-Indian project held possession of Metcalfe's mind. In reply to Henry Russell's letter, he communicated an outline of the plan. Still the Hyderabad Resident did not despair of inducing Metcalfe to become his successor. He had an insuperable array of arguments to adduce in favor of the appointment in the Deccan. He was able, too, to announce that his reformatory measures had been so far initiated, that he might with confidence quit his office at the end of the current year. But there was one condition necessary to this. It was essential that he should be able to rely on the succession of one sure to enter into his views and advance his plans of reform. The letter was an enticing and a convincing one. On more accounts than one, it calls for insertion:

"Hyderabad, May 26, 1820.

"MY DEAR METCALFE,—The project mentioned in your letter of the 10th inst. has made an alteration in my views; or

rather it has done away the alteration I had before made in them, and restored them to what they originally were. Until lately, my plan always was to go home at the end of this year; and nothing could have induced me to think of staying longer but the wish of not only carrying the reform of the Nizam's affairs into complete effect, but also of placing it on so firm a footing as to prevent a clumsy successor from injuring the work, or a hostile or illiberal one from depriving me, after I am gone, of that share of credit to which I may be justly entitled. Now everything that experience and local knowledge enable me to do better than another person will have been done by the end of this year. The foundation has already been substantially laid. The Minister knows as distinctly as I do what is to be done, and by what means it must be accomplished. The reduction of establishments has been arranged, and is in progress; our interference and the objects and effects of it are known and felt throughout the country; and by the end of the revenue year, in September, all the Talookdars will have been chosen and appointed, and the necessary new engagements framed and executed between them and the Government. In short, the whole of the new system has been discussed and matured, and put in action. In the course of the year, therefore, my first wish will have been accomplished; and the second will be effectually secured, if, at the end of it, I can deliver the Residency into such hands as yours. In point of magnitude, your situation in Malwa will certainly be superior to this Residency; but you may do as much real good, and acquire as much real importance, here as you could do there. The office now proposed for you will be made great by adding many things together; at Hyderabad it will be compact and considerable in itself, and will afford, for several years to come, an ample field for the exertions of a man of talents and benevolence. As to personal convenience, there can be no comparison. In Malwa you will have no time to yourself, and you will either be wandering about the country, which is always irksome when it is perpetual, or you will have

to build and furnish a house, at the expense of certainly not less than a lakh of rupees, out of your private fortune. At Hyderabad, after the first six months, when you have looked thoroughly into everything, you will find, compared with what you have been accustomed to, little to give you trouble: at least half your time will be at your own disposal; and you will step at once, without care or expense, into a house completely furnished, and provided with every accommodation. Upon the point of honor, surely you need give yourself no concern. Colonel Wm. Kirkpatrick was appointed from your present office to the Residency at Poona; and even if there were no precedent of that kind, you might be content to measure with Sancho's rule—wherever you sit will be the head of the table. You say yourself that you think you should prefer Hyderabad to Malwa, if you had your choice of the two at the same time. My principal fear, therefore, is lest you should suppose that, by coming into this arrangement now, you would be consulting your own inclinations in the smallest degree at my expense. But a man may be trusted to judge for his own happiness. Be assured that there is quite as much of selfishness in my proposal as you could possibly desire. No galley-slave ever laid down his oar with greater joy than I shall feel at laying down this Residency, whenever I can do so with justice to myself, and with a conviction that I leave the public interests in the hands of an able and upright successor. As it was, it was a sacrifice, and a great one too, for me to resolve on staying so long; and I know that if you succeed Malcolm this year, you will be engaging in plans and measures which will effectually prevent your coming to Hyderabad hereafter. If, therefore, you can be prevailed upon to think the arrangement agreeable to yourself, and do not foresee any serious obstacle in the way of its accomplishment, you can at once intimate to Lord Hastings my wish to retire, and propose to him to nominate you my successor. As I should like to leave Hyderabad in November, so as to be ready to embark at Madras, or Bombay, by the first ships that sail after Christmas,

it is desirable that no time should be lost in doing whatever you may be resolved upon. My end would of course be defeated unless you were to secure the appointment for yourself at the same time that you announce my intention of vacating it. Indeed, I would not resign after all, if I found that any other person was intended for my place.

"Believe me ever, my dear Metcalfe,

"Most sincerely yours,

"H. RUSSELL."

This letter had the desired effect. The Great Central-Indian kingship had begun by this time to appear before Metcalfe as something vague and illusory. The charmings of John Malcolm were already losing their power over his mind. Perhaps Lord Hastings had begun to relax in the adhesion which he had given in to the scheme of consolidating the Malwa and Nerbudda agencies. There may have been other circumstances tending to shake his faith in the advantages or the practicability of the plan which had once laid so strongly hold of his mind. Or Henry Russell's letter may have done the work, without aid from any other quarter. Metcalfe, it has been seen, declared that the promise of greater leisure was irresistibly attractive. He said it was "a bad sign" that such considerations should have had so much weight with him. But in this he was mistaken.* Good or bad, he accepted Russell's offer;

* The great want of our European functionaries in India is want of leisure. The great impediment to their efficiency is, that they have too much to do. Many first-rate men, with the power and with the inclination to initiate and to carry out great schemes of amelioration, which would confer incalculable benefit on the people, are necessitated to expend themselves in the detail-work of mere routine. Metcalfe was often painfully conscious of this. What an Indian functionary calls leisure is exemption from a stringent necessity to perform a certain amount of work within a

and the Hyderabad Resident wrote eagerly to him, on the 4th of July: "I am delighted to find by your letter that my arguments have prevailed with you. You will have made me the happiest man out of India; and I shall be disappointed if, at Hyderabad, you are not one of the happiest men in it. I shall now quit my station without a wish ungratified. It is very desirable that I should deliver the Residency immediately into your hands. . . . . If anything should unfortunately occur to prevent your coming here, the very object of my retiring would be defeated; and much as I should lament the necessity, I should nevertheless feel myself compelled to remain until I had consolidated the reform, even at the sacrifice of all the projects of happiness which your concurrence in my proposal has enabled me to entertain."

The Hyderabad Resident, however, was not to be disappointed. Metcalfe had made up his mind to proceed to the Court of the Nizam; and the proposed arrangement was at once sanctioned by Government. As the cold season approached, the Political Secretary began to make his arrangements for the transfer of his office to Mr. Swinton, who was to succeed him; and by the beginning of November everything was in readiness for Metcalfe's departure. He had many friends in Calcutta, who deeply lamented his going; and now that he was about to leave them, they desired to evince their sense of his

certain space of time, and to expend all the available hours of the day in the current duties of his office. Metcalfe's desired leisure was leisure to do good—not leisure to play at billiards, or to hunt hogs.

worth, both as an officer of the Government and a member of society, by giving him a public entertainment; but the notoriety of such a proceeding had no attraction for him, and he desired that the manifestation of the kind feelings of his friends should assume a more private character. A dinner, however, was given to him by a large party of his friends, and it was at least sufficiently public to form a topic of commendatory discourse in the public journals of the day.

He parted from Lord Hastings with expressions of earnest good-will on either side. "And now, my dear Sir, for yourself," wrote the Governor-General to him, after touching on matters of public concern, "let me assure you that I have been duly sensible of your kind and cordial attachment; and that it is with earnest prayers for your welfare that I wish you all possible prosperity and comfort. We shall not meet again in India, and the chances for it in Europe must, considering my age, be small; but I shall rejoice in hearing from you, and you will believe that I remain yours faithfully, HASTINGS."

APPENDIX TO VOL. I.

[THE following lines were written in 1833 by Sir Charles Metcalfe, then a member of Council, to a very dear friend, whom he had long endeavored, in plain prose, to wean from an unhappy attachment. Though they belong in order of date to the second volume, I insert them here with reference to a passage in the first chapter of the work, the only chapter as it is in which there is any reference to Charles Metcalfe as a poet. It is principally, however, as an illustration of the earnestness of his friendship, the deep interest which he took in the moral well-being of all to whom he was attached, that I have inserted the poem.]

FROM AN ATTACHED FRIEND.

If anxious friendship's counsel could avail
To save thee from the snares of guilty love,
How fondly would I labor to prevail,
How earnest pray for aid from Him above,

Who in a voice of thunder has ordain'd
"Man, thou shalt not commit adultery;
Thy neighbour's wife by thee shall be unstain'd;
From thy foul covetousness shall be free."

Surely, dear friend, thou wouldst not deem it light
To trample God's Commandment in the dust?
To sell thy soul to vicious appetite,
And forfeit Heaven by unbridled lust?

And though God's mercy may all sins forgive,
When deep remorse has purified the heart,
Still in forbidden sinfulness to live,
And tempt God's wrath, is not the wise man's part.

Think even of the earthly ills which wait
On the dark paths of the adult'rous way:
Think of a bloody and untimely fate,
Thyself a lifeless corpse in shameful fray;

Or else a murderer, reeking from the death
Of him whose marriage-couch thou hast defil'd;
Gasping in hangman's noose thy latest breath,
A dangling carcase, hiss'd at and revil'd;

Or if such thoughts have not the pow'r to move,
Because such horrors may uncommon be,
Think of the surer pains of lawless love,
Disgrace and self-reproach and misery.

Think of the wretched woman's blasted name,
Her irretrievable and headlong fall;
Think of her children's everlasting shame,
Whose curses on thee will thy heart appal.

Wilt thou towards the outcast wanton yearn,
And cherish her and share her sorry lot?
Or wilt thou, satiate with possession, spurn,
And loathing leave her desolate to rot?

Thinkst thou the husband and the world to cheat,
Detection baffled, and the crime conceal'd
By artifices, treach'ry, and deceit,
If to such practices thy soul can yield?

Oh, trust not to a Hope so mean and vain;
As sure as fate detection guilt will find;
Nor e'en concealment can remorse restrain,
Nor God's all-seeing eye of lightning blind.

Think that a mother's spirit hovers near,
Charg'd to attend thy steps in woe or joy,
And shield thy progress in this world's career,
The guardian angel of her darling boy.

Do not the deed that her pure soul must scare,
And drive her sainted spirit far away,
Leaving thee destitute of Heaven's care,
Thenceforth to Satan's wiles a helpless prey.

But if it be, as fain I would it were,
That crime is not the object of thy game,
Surely 'tis madness punishment to bear,
If in thy conscience thou art free from blame.

If thou hast not adult'ry's guilty joys,
Why court the adult'rer's blazing infamy?
Why seek a name that fair repute destroys?
Why seem the man of sin thou wouldst not be?

Why run a course that must the good offend,
And make them shun thee as a pois'nous bane—
A course thy warmest friends cannot defend,
Such as for life thy character will stain?

I ask thee not to give up woman's smiles,
Enjoy'd in innocence and open day;
They cheer man's heart, and, free from wanton wiles,
Improve his nature, and his cares allay.

But by-way meetings, roamings in the dark,
Clandestine intercourse that shuns the light,
These are the things that evil purpose mark,
And man's and woman's reputation blight.

Throw not thyself into temptation's net,
For man is weak, the tempter's power strong;
And woman is the surest bait that yet
Satan has used to lure mankind to wrong.

Is life insipid without woman's love?
Then make some free and honest heart thine own:
The truest joys of woman's love to prove
Let Hymen's wreath a pure affection crown.

Then give thyself to love without restraint,
But seek not love where, if it should be won,
It must with sinfulness the woman taint,
And make thee author of the mischief done.

'Tis not alone in foul and filthy act
That there is sinfulness; too oft we find
A body unpolluted and intact
Bearing a guilty and polluted mind.

The feelings, warp'd from their own proper course
Of duteous love, and sent abroad to roam,
Must fill the heart with sin, and prove the source
Of endless mis'ry in a hapless home.

Lend not thyself to perpetrate such ill,
And trust not to the vain, delusive thought,
That if thou dost not do it, others will,
And therefore that the ill is small, or nought.

Whatever others do, do thou the right,
Steadfast in virtue's straight and open way:
Though others do the deeds that need the night,
Do thou the deeds that shine in brightest day.

Nature has given thee her choicest grace,
The power to gain good-will, and captivate
The hearts of fellow runners in life's race:
The rest must on thy own behaviour wait.

To fasten prepossession by the tie
Of strong esteem and confident respect,
Must be the fruit of virtuous energy
And a firm mind with probity erect.

Gen'rous and brave thou art, and kind and good:
Then let not levity deform the work
Which Nature framed in her most lib'ral mood:
Let not the serpent in the roses lurk.

Pardon the boldness with which counsel flows
From one who loves thee with a parent's zeal,
Whose heart with fondness clings to thee, and glows
With warm and anxious interest for thy weal.

Who would that thou shouldst ever honor'd be;
From every spot, from every blemish clear'd;
The pride and boast of all attach'd to thee;
In youth applauded, and in age rever'd.

Lo! age is coming, youth will quickly flee,
With all its pleasant gracefulness and joy:
May'st thou look back on it with conscience free
From the debasement of guilt's foul alloy.

Man's joys, love, learning, genius, glory, power,
Are trifles all compared with rectitude,
Which cheers the soul in life's departing hour,
And wafts it to Divine beatitude.

If, by the aid of unpretending rhyme,
I lead thee to reflect that woe and shame
Will follow pleasure that allures to crime
Or to discredit, I shall gain my aim.

If I have wearied by my prosing strain—
In word or thought if my poor lines offend,
Thy kind heart tells me thou wilt not complain
Of fullest freedom from a faithful friend.

C. T. M.

Allipore, March 25, 1833.

II.—(Page 139.)

LORD HOWE'S BOYS.

[I have promised at page 139 some further information relative to the origin and institution of the society of "Howe Boys" in Calcutta; but, from the few surviving members of it, I have been able to gain little more than the bare assurance of the fact of its existence. Such suggestions as I have elicited are too vague and uncertain and irreconcileable, not only with each other but with ascertained fact, to encourage me to put the stamp of history upon them. After the lapse of half a century, this, in the absence of written memorials, was too likely to be the case. I believe that the term "Lord Howe's Boys" is well understood in the navy, and that it indicates the possession of manly attributes of all kinds.]

A.—(Page 197.)

MISSION TO HOLKAR'S CAMP.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON. LORD LAKE, &c. &c. &c.

Camp, three miles N.W. from Umritsur, January 10, 1806.

My Lord,—I have the honor to report the proceedings of the Mission to the camp of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which your Lordship was pleased to commit to my charge.

Having encamped on the night of the 8th instant at Loodhiana, we yesterday morning marched, accompanied by the Wakeel Balaram Seth, to the vicinity of Holkar's camp. Deewan Gunput Rao, Bukhya Hooshaba, and Gholam Khan, with a large retinue, were sent to meet the Mission, and conducted us to the place appointed for our encampment. A salute of fifty guns and repeated discharges of small arms announced our arrival, and a general rejoicing took place throughout the Mahratta army. I am informed that although Holkar had circulated the intelligence of the establishment of amity with the British Government, his followers had not given credit to it, and considered the report to be an expedient adopted with the intention of easing their minds from the state of depression and despair into which they had been

cast by repeated defeat, distress, and disaster. The arrival of a friendly mission from your Lordship confirmed the rumor of peace, and caused most manifest and universal joy.

It was my wish, in conformity to your Lordship's commands, to visit the chief yesterday, but the importance which was attached by the Durbar to the occasion, and the arrangements for the ceremony, produced a delay. The Brahmins having consulted, declared this day to be propitious.

Gunput Rao and Chimna Bhao having been sent this morning to conduct us, I proceeded, accompanied by Mr. Macaulay and the officers of the escort, to make the visit.

The procession moved slowly on in order to give time for the arrival of the moment which had been decided to be the most auspicious for the interview. Holkar was attended by all the chiefs and officers of his army, and nothing was omitted which could tend to make the reception of the Mission most formal and honorable.

After the usual salutations, I delivered your Lordship's letter and compliments on the establishment of peace. Both were received by Holkar with particular respect. When I expressed, on the part of your Lordship, a hope that the friendship which was happily founded would be strengthened and improved, the chief and his principal officers exclaimed with one accord, and with evident pleasure, that by the blessing of God it would increase daily. A conversation ensued, which lasted for some time, on the present happy state of affairs, in the course of which Holkar and his Ministers made many professions of sincerity, and expressed the highest satisfaction. On my part, I met their professions with the declaration of perfect belief, and was reciprocal in expressions of happiness. I was highly gratified to observe the extraordinary joy which was visible in the countenance and conduct of the chiefs and the whole Durbar.

I afterwards proceeded to observe, that your Lordship marched yesterday from the banks of the Beeah towards the Honorable Company's territories, and inquired when it was the intention of Holkar to march; and on the appearance of some hesitation, I added, that your Lordship had been led by the declaration of the wakeels to expect that he would march immediately, and quit the country of the Sikhs; and remarked, that his performance of the promises of his agents would lead to the establishment of perfect confidence in your Lordship's mind, and would afford the most satisfactory proof to your

Lordship, to the Honorable the Governor-General, and to all Hindostan, of his sincerity in the conclusion of amicable engagements with the British Government. Some conversation followed between Jeswunt Rao Holkar, Bhao Bhasker, and me on this subject, in the course of which Holkar and his Minister assured me they had no desire whatever to remain in the country of the Sikhs; that there should be no occasion to doubt their sincerity, and that the march was only delayed for one or two days, in order that it might be made at a propitious time, and that some necessary arrangements might be completed. I continued to urge the necessity of an immediate return to Hindostan, and Holkar finally promised to move on the 13th.

He then made several requests in behalf of persons who, being in the power of the British Government, have aided Holkar against it, which he desired me to communicate to your Lordship. The details of these I shall hereafter have the honor of representing. I replied, that I would communicate his requests to your Lordship. I added, that your Lordship was anxious to improve the good understanding which now exists, and that doubtless, when time had given strength and security to the friendship—of which the foundations were established—the British Government would be forward to meet all his wishes. I did not consider myself authorised to give any positive encouragements from which Holkar might expect the accomplishment of the particular requests which he mentioned. A subsequent conversation with the Wakeel Balaram has convinced me that the chief introduced the subject at the Durbar for the gratification of the persons interested, but that he is not anxious regarding it; and among others, he states that Meer Khan is not yet satisfied with the portion of country which Holkar has assigned to him.

After some general conversation, and the delivery of presents to me and the other gentlemen of the Mission, we rose to depart. On taking leave, Holkar addressed himself to me, and in a manner marked by an appearance of uncommon earnestness, assured me that he would adhere to the word which he had given, and would render such services to the Honorable Company as should entitle him to its regard and approbation.

Since my return to our camp, Balaram has been sent to me. He has alleged several causes for the delay which has happened

in the march of the Mahratta army. He, however, assures me that the army will march ten kas on the 13th, and that it will make no halt before it reaches the Sutlej. Its route does not seem to be settled.

On a review of the whole behaviour of Jeswunt Rao Holkar towards us, it appears to me to mark strongly his high respect for your Lordship, his just sense of the act of confidence and friendship conferred in a mission of English gentlemen to his camp, and his most sincere happiness at the establishment of amicable relations with the British Government. The gladness which was visible in him and his chiefs was not confined to the Durbar; it was manifest in every part of his camp; and the crowds of his followers which thronged the way on our procession to the visit, and our return, testified, in the most lively manner, unbounded joy.

We shall march to-morrow towards your Lordship's army.

I hope that I may be allowed to express the thankfulness which I feel towards Mr. Macaulay and Lieutenants Short and Laud for their obliging and cordial assistance in the progress of this Mission.

I have the honor to be, with profound respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,
C. T. METCALFE.

III.—(Page 472.)

RESIDENCY ALLOWANCES.

[*From a Minute by Sir Charles Metcalfe, written in* 1830.]

"The allowance to Residents, in common parlance misnamed 'table allowance,' was an allowance, not for table alone, but nominally for 'table, attendants, camp equipage, &c.,' and in reality for every expense of a domestic nature that was proper for the support of the Resident's station. The expenditure of this allowance was left entirely to the Resident's discretion; but every honorable man knew that if he did not expend it for the purposes for which it was granted—that is, if he made any savings from it for his own gain—he would be guilty of a shameful fraud. When, therefore, I am asked whether I invariably and sacredly expended that allowance every month, I should be greatly ashamed of myself if I could not answer

the question in the affirmative. I expended the whole of the public allowance for the purposes for which it was granted. I might say more, but the sole object of these remarks being to give an unqualified contradiction to an insinuation against me, it is not necessary to pursue the subject."

IV.—(Page 472.)

THE DELHI SYSTEM.

[*From a Minute written by Sir Charles Metcalfe in* 1830.]

"Completeness of control and unity of authority were remarkable parts of the Delhi system of administration, as distinguished from that which prevailed in other provinces. One European officer in each district, at the time in question, had entire control over the subordinate native officers in every branch of administration. One superior European officer had entire control over all the superintendents of districts; his control extended to every part of their duties. When the authority of a Board was introduced, the only change that took place in the system of local management was the transfer of control from one to several; the district authorities remained as before. . . .

"It is far from accurate to assert that the Delhi territory is governed without laws. It might more correctly be said to be governed by the same laws which prevail in the provinces subject to the Bengal regulations; for, although these have not been bodily introduced, their spirit has guided the administration, generally, of the Delhi territory; there are local rules besides. The existing institutions were first established by Mr. Seton, a disciple of the regulations. There are generally the same laws in civil and criminal judicature as in the other provinces. The practice of the courts is assimilated. Whatever improvements take place in the other provinces, are naturally adopted in the Delhi territory. It has the benefit of every good regulation, with the advantage of not being subject to those which have been found injurious elsewhere, or which might not be locally suitable. The presence of the King and royal family, and of chiefs possessing sovereign power in their separate territories, but residing much at Delhi, as the headquarters of political supremacy in that quarter, as well as of many other chiefs, formerly Surdars of the Mahratta armies,

settled in Jageers, in the Delhi territory, and of numerous diplomatic agents from native states, seems originally to have pointed out the inexpediency of a literal and inconsiderate enforcement of the Bengal regulations; but so much of the spirit and practice of these laws has from the beginning, and from time to time been introduced into the Delhi administration, that probably the addition of what remains would only produce deterioration. Were it not for this apprehension, there would be no great change if the regulations were formally established in the Delhi territory, so modified as not to affect those who ought not to be subjected to their direct operation. . . . .

" With respect to the control exercised by Government, as well as with respect to the introduction of laws, the condition of the Delhi territory has been progressive and not stationary. At first, as in other newly acquired countries having peculiarities to deal with and difficulties to overcome, much was entrusted to the local authority. By degrees, the control of Government has become more minute, and the details of management have been more and more approximated to those which prevail elsewhere; whether, in the latter case, with real advantage or disadvantage, it would unnecessarily open a wide field of discussion were I now to inquire. . . . .

" At first, when the revenues were small, not much more than a tenth of what they are now, and when the territory was occupied chiefly by dependent Jageerdars, the administration was exclusively in the hands of the Resident, and the assistants under him had only such power as he chose to entrust to them, subject to such control as he thought it expedient to exercise. The system gave him absolute control, and he was exclusively responsible to Government for the proper management of the territory. The assistants were then necessarily young men, because being only assistants to the Resident, their salaries were too small to tempt older servants to seek the same employment. This may be said to have been the case until 1819, with this difference, that some of the assistants remained long enough to cease to be young; and the allowances of the first, augmented by a commission on Customs, had become considerable, owing to increase in that branch of revenue. In 1819, a new arrangement took place. The territory was divided into districts, a principal assistant was put in charge of each district, and a civil commissioner appointed to superintend them. From this time the situation of the assistants in respect to salary has improved, and it is no longer necessary

to appoint young men. It is now on that footing that officers of the same standing, with those who are usually judges or collectors, would naturally be selected. Their powers are, nevertheless, entirely under the control of the commissioner over them; and if they have any power in any degree independent of such control, it has been produced by the progress made in approximating the Delhi system of management to that which prevails in the provinces subject to the Bengal regulations.

"In contending that the employment of young men is no necessary part of the Delhi system, I wish to guard against the impression that I am opposed to the employment of young men. Under control, they may be employed with advantage in any situation. There is a zeal, an energy, an activity of virtue in young men which often more than compensates for mere age, and even experience, too often accompanied by apathy, lethargy, and inertness, the consequences of disease, caused by a climate, the fiery ordeal of which few constitutions can stand unimpaired for a number of years. In rejecting the services of men when young, in situations in which they can be efficiently controlled, we may lose the best aid that they can ever bring to the public interests. I take it to be an error in the regulation-system of administration, that young men obtain prescribed powers in which they are not sufficiently controlled, and an advantage of what once was the Delhi system that the control is thoroughly absolute and unquestionable."

V.—(Page 472.)

ALLEGED CORRUPTION OF METCALFE'S SERVANTS.

[The following extracts from a minute written by Sir Charles Metcalfe, in November, 1829, contain a narrative of all the circumstances connected with the alleged corruption of his "Coachman," Khoda Buksh, and his "Moonshee," Hufoozoodeen, at Delhi. It was alleged that the former, who was *not* Metcalfe's coachman, had made a lakh of rupees by selling the cast horses and old carriages of his master, on the occasion of Metcalfe's departure from Delhi; and that the latter had for many years been enriching himself by taking bribes from the natives —in both cases, under the pretext that some advantage was to be derived by the Resident, and reciprocated in favor of the donor.

To these statements I have appended, taken from the same minute, the case of Peer Alee, the "Khitmudgar," who accompanied him to Hyderabad, and was also said to have made a large fortune by corrupt practices. These histories are on many accounts interesting and suggestive; but I give them here, principally because the circumstances were somewhat notorious at the time, and I should not like it to appear that I considered them subjects to be avoided. In all the three cases Metcalfe's conduct was irreproachable. But he truly said, that he would be a bold man who, after so long a connexion with Native Courts, would venture to say that none of his servants had ever taken bribes. The Moonshee, Hufoozoodeen, is the man of whom mention is made in the earlier chapters of this Memoir.]

THE CASE OF KHODA BUKSH.

"Khoda Buksh Beg was the son of a respectable old soldier, who commanded a body of 100 horse attached to the Residency, and used partly in the police of the country, and partly as the Resident's body-guard. The father being worn out by age, the son, as his lieutenant, was the efficient commandant, and as such was in constant attendance on the Resident. I had known him in that capacity for twelve years, during the last seven of which he was in almost daily attendance on me, and accompanied me in my morning and evening exercise, as well as on all occasions of out-of-door state and ceremony. During the whole of my acquaintance with him I had no reason to think otherwise than well of him, until the circumstances about to be related.

"When I was quitting Delhi in the end of 1818, I found myself encumbered with a large stud, consisting in great part of a breeding stud, with which I had amused myself for several years without disposing of the produce. Having accounts to settle, I was desirous of selling this stud to the best advantage. I consulted Khoda Buksh Beg on the subject, who was accustomed to traffic in horses, and he persuaded me that my stud would sell well. Having no practice in such dealings, and no wish to enter into them, I entrusted the sale entirely to him. It went on, to appearance, prosperously, and most of my horses, but not all, were, as I supposed, sold, when one of my servants informed me that there was no fair sale, but that Khoda Buksh Beg had imposed my horses on several persons, and levied con-

siderable sums of money in my name, without any reference to the price of the horses.

"As soon as I received this intelligence, which I ascertained to be true, I recovered all the horses supposed to have been sold, and repaid the several parties the sums received by me as the purchase-money. I ordered the restoration, by Khoda Buksh Beg, of the sums which he had fraudulently obtained and appropriated. He was brought to trial for defrauding those who had been the sufferers by his imposture, and sentenced to imprisonment, with an order that he should not be released until he had disgorged all that he had levied. The discovery of this villany was so close upon the period fixed for my departure from Delhi, that I had scarcely time to take the requisite measures to repair the mischief perpetrated as far as it was in my power to do so."

CASE OF MOONSHEE HUFOOZOODEEN.

"The next assertion connected with my name is that my Moonshee, Hufoozoodeen, having accompanied me to and from Hyderabad, has retired with a fortune of about four lakhs of rupees. Moonshee Hufoozoodeen neither accompanied me to nor from Hyderabad, nor was he with me there at any time, and if he possesses anything that can be termed a fortune, it is unknown to me, and I am a great dupe, for he is at this moment in my service on an allowance which I give him solely because I believe that he needs it. . . . . I shall enter more fully into the history of Hufoozoodeen. His father was the Moonshee with whom I studied in College, and is still living. I read a little with the son (author, also, of a work used in the College for instruction), who was also a College Moonshee after I quitted College. When I was in Lord Lake's army in 1805, I sent for Hufoozoodeen, and entertained him in my service, in which he continued until I was sent on a mission to Lahore in 1808, when he became Moonshee of the Mission, having previously accompanied me, in 1806, on a mission to Holkar's camp, with which I was charged by Lord Lake, and having also performed public duties under me when I was attached, in 1805, in a political capacity, to a separate division of the army commanded by Major-General Dowdeswell. After the termination of the Lahore Mission, Hufoozoodeen was again my private servant until I became Resident at Delhi, in

1811. He was then appointed Head Moonshee at the Residency, and remained in that office until I quitted the Residency in 1818, when he also resigned his situation.

"Up to this period I had never received any complaint against him, and had no reason to suppose him guilty of any improper act whatever. I had never, however, doubted that a man in his situation was liable to strong temptation, and likely to yield to it. My conduct, therefore, towards him had always been regulated by caution, founded on that general distrust; and when I heard, after quitting Delhi, rumors of his having made money there, I was more sorry than surprised.

"The information was vague, and contained nothing positive or tangible. It, however, induced me to discontinue my connexion with him, until the suspicions which it created could be completely removed. I wrote to Mr. Fortescue, who was my successor in the civil administration of the Delhi territory, to request that he would inquire and ascertain what was alleged against the Moonshee; he replied that he could discover nothing specific against him; that he bore a good character; and was entirely acquitted of doing anything that the natives considered improper; but that he was supposed to have made money, some said by trade, others by the receipt of presents. This account did not satisfy me, because, if he had received presents unknown to me, he had acted faithlessly; and I continued to withhold my support, and had no intercourse with him.

"About two years afterwards I again wrote to Mr. Fortescue, who was still at Delhi, with a view to ascertain from him whether a longer residence had furnished him with more distinct information respecting the Moonshee's conduct, and I asked specifically whether, making the case his own, he would discharge a Moonshee of whom he had the same opinions which the result of his inquiries might have led him to entertain of Hufoozoodeen? His answer on that point was, that he should not discharge him. In other respects, it was much the same as before. I had still doubts as to the propriety of employing Hufoozoodeen, and, in fact, never did employ him either at Hyderabad, or during my last Residency at Delhi: but I was not, I confess, without suspicions that I had done him injustice, nor without consequent self-reproach.

"On my last return from Delhi to Calcutta he made his appearance, and seemed to be in reduced and impoverished circumstances. As I had ceased to hold that kind of public

employment in which a native Moonshee would have temptations to take presents; and as my information respecting Hufoozoodeen was, on the whole, creditable to him, I restored him to my private service, after a separation of nine years.

"This is the history of Hufoozoodeen, into which I have been led by a desire to leave nothing untold respecting a man who is said to have made a fortune of four lakhs at a place where the man never was."

CASE OF PEER ALEE, KHITMUDGAR.

"The Khitmudgar, Peer Alee, alluded to in the marginal extract, accompanied me to Hyderabad. He went with me in the pilot schooner which conveyed me to Masulipatam, and arrived, therefore, long before any of my other servants, who followed by land. I had avoided taking a Moonshee, as before mentioned, in order that there might be no corruption; but the Ministers and others at Hyderabad could not refrain from tampering with a single servant that accompanied the new Resident. In a few months after my arrival, I was informed by one of my assistants that this servant was receiving presents extensively. I requested the same gentleman, the late Mr. R. Wells, to investigate the matter. He did so; and although no specific instance could be established, he satisfied his own mind of the general truth of the imputation. I was sure that his decision was just. I could not make the man disgorge, because nothing was proved, and everything was denied. I discharged him from my service, and sent him out of the Nizam's dominions. Whatever he may have acquired in that way, he has since, I believe, in a great measure, squandered; and he is now living at his home on an allowance from me, which he receives because he was the person who discovered to me the iniquitous proceedings of Khoda Buksh Beg, before noticed."

VI.—(Page 471.)

[The following is the Address voted by the British Residents of Delhi, to which allusion is made at page 471.]

THE DELHI ADDRESS.

DEAR SIR,—Were we to permit your departure, contemplated by us with deep regret, without expressing the vene-

ration and respect we entertain for your many personal excellences, we should do violence to our own feelings.

On this occasion, well aware as we are of your solicitude to shun the most just and measured commendation, we must entreat your permission to declare our sense of that exalted worth, that candor, and openness of heart which shine in all your words and actions, and which exact the highest esteem of all who have enjoyed the happiness of your society. Closely connected with these traits of character are, that condescension to all subordinate to your authority, which rendered business a pleasure to those who transacted it under your guidance, and that judgment, firmness, and rectitude, which gave satisfaction to all whose affairs were confided to your decision.

Whilst, however, we contemplate with unfeigned regret your approaching departure, we should deem ourselves deficient in sentiments of public spirit did the loss we are about to sustain so entirely engross our thoughts that we should neglect the opportunity, which your removal from this Residency to fill an honorable and important office near the person of the Governor-General of India affords us, of soliciting your favorable acceptance of our sincere congratulation on the distinguished choice of his Excellency. This selection, by so able a judge of character and merit as the Marquis of Hastings, is to us a sure indication of the extent and importance of the services which have been rendered to Government by the exertion of your talents and virtues; and we cannot, we think, utter a wish which evinces in us a stronger desire for the prosperity of our Eastern possessions, than that you may long continue to aid the councils of British India.

To give this address, however, a more private and particular application, and to do which we are forcibly called by a recurrence to the regretted occasion of our meeting, we beg to assure you that no period of time can efface the sentiments of friendship and affectionate attachment imprinted on our minds by the urbanity, kindness, and marked attention to private rights and feelings, which we have invariably experienced at your hands; and that we shall feel, to the latest moments of our existence, the deepest interest in every event which may be connected with your welfare, happiness, and fa[illegible].

METCALFE'S REPLY.

MY DEAR FRIENDS,—I am at a loss for language to express in adequate terms my sense of the kindness which has

led you to give expression to the sentiments conveyed in the communication this day received from you. I shall ever remember with lively gratitude the honor which you have thus conferred upon me, nor is the value of this delightful testimony of your regard lessened in my estimation by the consciousness which I feel that I am indebted to it entirely to your indulgent partiality, which has thrown my faults into oblivion, and exalted the little merit to which I may have any pretensions.

The record of your approbation will ever be a source of pride and exultation to me, and furnish during my future life a strong excitement to laudable exertion, from the anxious desire which it must produce that I may not at any time do discredit to the opinion which you have had the goodness to express.

The thanks I owe you are not confined to the present occasion. The obliging attention, cordiality, and friendship, which I have always experienced from you in official as well as social intercourse, have made an indelible impression on me; and though highly sensible of the gracious and condescending favor of the Governor-General in calling me to a situation near his own person, I cannot part without deep regret from a society to which I have so much reason to be warmly attached. I trust, however, that our intercourse is only suspended, and that I may have the pleasure of renewing it with most, if not all of you, in some of the various scenes of life in which we may be respectively summoned to take a part. With most hearty wishes for your prosperity and happiness, and a grateful recollection of all your kindness, I shall ever remain,

My dear Sirs,
Your sincere and affectionate friend,
C. T. METCALFE.

[I cannot do better than append to the above manifestation of the affection with which Metcalfe was regarded by the European inhabitants of Delhi, the following passages from letters which indicate the feelings of the native community.]

Extract from a Private Letter from Major-General Sir David Ochterlony to Mr. Metcalfe, dated the 22nd December, 1818.

"If you had known how much and how generally your departure would have been mourned, you never could have left Delhi; but your humility never gave you a just idea of your value, and I shall have much to do, much to change in my

habits and temper, and much to perform, before I shall be able to reconcile the palace, the city, or the European society, to the great loss they have sustained. I appreciate their feelings justly, and, if there is in it a spark of envy or jealousy, I hope it will only produce a flame of emulation to imitate your virtues."

From the Same.

"I enclose a Razee Nameh. Were you to receive one from all whose inclination would prompt it, I should have transmissions from the whole city. You have no idea of the attachment they felt for you. It cannot be doubted when expressed to me, for they do not usually deal in those articles to a present incumbent when speaking of a predecessor."

Extract from a Letter from Mr. Wilder, Ajmere, 5th April, 1819.

"Several people from Delhi have come here since you went away; and it would really do your heart good to hear them speak of the impression of love and respect you have left behind. I never thought before that the natives possessed such feelings; but I do believe that the sorrow they express for your departure is sincere, and that it will never be effaced."

END OF VOL. I.

C. WHITING, BEAUFORT HOUSE, STRAND.