From what has been said above I would infer that the village of Saṇkisā marks the site of the old Sāṇkāśya the fortified town of Kuśadhvaja and the sacred place where the Buddha is said to have alighted from the *Trayastriṃśa* heaven after imparting the Law to his mother Māyādevī. I would further infer that the elephant-capital resting on the Aśoka column originally stood not far off from the spot where Cunningham first noticed it or where it now rests either near the ruins now surmounted by the temple of Bisāri Devī or the mound now occupied by the village of Saṇkisā.

GREAT MEN AS FACTORS IN CULTURAL EVOLUTION

(Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Roy, M.A., B.L., M.L.C.)

The origin and process of the development of human culture is a moot question in Cultural Anthropology. About half a dozen leading theories are on the field, and each of them claims eminent advocates and adherents. One defect in almost all these theories appears to me to be this ; they, more or less, ignore 'great men'—or, what great men stand for,—viz. great ideas and ideals as factors in the development of culture.

The current leading theories of cultural evolution (or, to use a less debatable expression, the cultural process) may be very briefly indicated as follows :—

There is, first, the orthodox evolutionary or psychological theory associated with the names of the distinguished pioneers of anthropological science, which seeks to reconstruct primitive social institutions through a study of the psychological factors which are discoverable in the individual human mind.

There is next the sociological theory of the French School which seeks to reach the same end through an investigation of those psychological factors which are common to every primitive group.

Then we have the geographic or environmental interpretation of human culture associated with the great name of Ratzel who would make physical environment the chief determinant of culture.

The analogous theory known as the 'Economic environment' theory represents culture as developing by a series of adaptations to an increasingly complex economic or technological environment. Each new invention, however made, creates, according to this theory, a new environment to which the 'social organism' must adapt itself by habit.

We have, next, the American school which, once adhering more or less to the psychological interpretation of cultural origins, in time came to doubt its validity, and to favour the idea of what has been

called, convergent evolution.' The leading American anthropologist Franz Boas and his school of Historical Ethnology, however, now emphasize the necessity for investigating native cultures "in their restricted historico-geographical homes and in the perspective of their relations to physical environment, the surrounding cultures and to the many and often intricate psychological associations formed between the different aspects of culture."

Finally, we have the historical or ethnological school developed out of Ratzel's Geographical school and associated with the distinguished name of Graebner. According to this diffusionist theory of culture, the different cultures of the world have evolved not by a process of independent or parallel evolution due to the homogeneity of the human mind but through chance contact and borrowings of cultural features or through historical blendings of cultures and races. This theory has been carried further towards its extreme logical limits by Prof. Elliot Smith in his theory of 'Culture Compounds'.

Without entering into an elaborate discussion of these theories, I may briefly point out in what respects most of them may appear to be defective.

As regards the evolutionary or psychological theory of culture, it may be said that the uniform reaction of the human mind everywhere to similar conditions cannot be an absolute truth. The reactions of different human groups to the same objects and situations are found to vary according to the different cultural ideals, traditions and social institutions they have respectively developed as the result of their past contacts with their varying surroundings, and the characteristic meanings that surrounding objects come to acquire for each different group. The rigid determinism and a too absolute classification of the earlier evolutionist school which takes little account of tribal migrations and the transmission of cultural elements from one people or area to another and the intermixture of races and cultures, is unfortunately not compatible with ascertained sociological facts. Similar cultural features do not everywhere spring from the same causes, nor have different social groups always advanced in culture in the same uniform order from one dominant cultural type to another.

The geographic or 'physical environment' theory of culture which arose on the European continent as a revolt against the orthodox evolutionary school of England would make geographic environment the creative factor in cultural evolution. Changes in the physical environment leading to man's successive adaptations to such changes by which culture develops are represented by this school as the determining factors and not merely the external stimulii of such development. Although indeed the influence of the physical environment was much more dominant in the early period of human history than now, and although even in more civilized epochs the subtle effects of those immediate circumstances may to some extent continue to work, such environmental influences, however, extend chiefly to that lower range of activities which man shares in common with the lower animal. The more a community advances in culture the less is its dependence on its physical environment. In few cases it can be said that any cultural fact must of necessity follow from any particular environmental condition. Environment far from always exerting a modifying influence on culture is indeed more often modified by it. Thus although physical environment has its share of influence—and that not a negligible one—on culture, it cannot be said to be the determining factor of culture.

The same argument applies with equal force to the 'Economic environment' theory, for man adapts himself to environment, whether geographic or economic, not by unreasoning instinct and habit like the lower animal but by virtue of a consciously reasoning mind, and neither the physical environment nor the economic environment can be said to be a dynamic factor in the development of culture.

As regards the 'convergent evolution' or 'Convergence' theory not long ago emphasised by some American anthropologists who recognised a peculiar tendency of diverse customs and beliefs to converge towards similar forms, it is now recognised that 'convergence' can by no means be a principle in itself and cannot in any sense be called a determinant of culture or even a process by which culture develops. Recent tendencies in American ethnology are towards liberation from its old 'methodological bondage.' In 1917, in his essay on 'The Super-organic', Kroeber inaugurated a

trend towards cultural objectivism and stressed the determinism of historic events and almost negated the role of the individual in history. But Sapir, Haeberlin and Goldenweiser while agreeing with Kroeber in his main contention regarding cultural autonomy have taken exception to his inadequate appreciation of the cultural significance of the individual—a significance which is the main theme of the present paper.

Coming to the Historical or Ethnological theory of culture we find that, if pushed to its ultimate logical conclusion, it would lead to the search for a single centre of origin for each cultural phenomenon. The evidence of the ethnography of different countries does not however appear to lend support to such a view. Again, ethnographic observation shows that cultural contact does not affect all communities in the same or similar manner. New cultural features brought by an immigrant group to a certain area are not equally received by different communities living in that area. One community perhaps rejects the entire set of such new cultural ideas or inventions, another selects only a few of them and rejects the rest and a third perhaps makes a more liberal selection. In fact, this cultural selection and assimilation is determined, more or less, by the particular type of culture of the recepient community—its social traditions and ideals. And in the process of acculturation, the borrowed element is not unoften variously altered or modified and in some cases transformed beyond recognition so as to suit the ideal of the recepient culture. The mechanism of selection, of reception or rejection, of assimilation or transformation is the human mind, or as the sociological school would say, the social mind. Thus it is human psychology and not the history of human migrations nor the borrowing or initiative habit of man, nor his geographic or economic environment that can supply the ultimate explanation of the origin and development of culture.

Finally we come to the sociological explanation of culture. Whereas the orthodox evolutionary or psychological school tries to explain the origin and development of culture by a reference to individual psychology, the sociological school of which Emile Durkheim and Levy Bruhl are the leading exponents hold that as culture or human custom and human institutions are all social

phenomena, the development of culture has to be explained by a reference to what is called the 'social mind.' The social mind, we are told, is the key to the adaptive processes of the social life. Among the exponents of this theory of the social mind there are certain differences of opinion as to the fundamental cultural phenomenon. According to Prof. Durkheim, it is the 'social constraint' exerted upon the individual mind by the 'social mind'; according to the American Sociologist Prof. Franklin Henry Giddings, the elementary social fact on which human society, and therefore human culture, rests is the 'consciousness of kind.' The social mind is described by Giddings as 'the phenomenon of many individual minds in interaction, so playing upon one another that they simultaneously feel the same sensation or emotion, arrive at one judgment, and perhaps act in concert.' According to the French sociologist M. Gabriel Tarde, the elementary factor is imitation, and develops by imitation or the transmission of feeling and idea from one individual to another, from one group to another, and from one generation to another. According to the great psycho-analyst, Dr. Sigmund Freud, it is 'libido' or love that holds together human society, and love-relationships constitute the essence of the group mind.

One defect in all these single-key theories would appear to be that they all regard cultural facts as the result of a particular activity of the mind, 'social constraint,' 'consciousness of kind.' 'imitation,' 'libido,' or 'love' and so forth, and not, as I venture to think, what it should be, namely the conjoint activities of the mind as a whole. 'Social constraint,' or 'consciousness of kind,' or 'imitation' or 'libido' would appear to be but one out of many elements in the process of cultural development.

The cultural process itself would appear to be a complex—the result of a multiplicity of mental activities and not capable of interpretation by any one of them as the fundamental and causative element. Perhaps a more comprehensive and at the same time modified form of theory in terms of the human mind including what has been called the 'group mind' may come nearer the mark, but that does not concern us in the present paper.

As regards the question whether it is the social mind or the individual mind which is the creative agent in cultural evolution, it

seems to me that the distinction is more verbal than real. No ethnologist will deny that cultural evolution is a product of the mind of man living in more or less organised groups or societies and develops by the play of mind upon mind—the inter-communication and inter-stimulation of ideas and the inter-action of different minds held together by the bond of common interests and aims.

But what I here desire to lay special emphasis upon is that the influence of individual minds on the general mind and thus on the culture of the group counts for a good deal in the history and development of culture,—that the creativeness of the individual is as much a formative factor in culture as racial and cultural contact and racial miscegenation. Dr. Sigmund Freud in his account of the erotic origin of social groups would appear to hit the mark more closely when he says that human social groups are dominated by two libidinal or emotional ties,—on the one hand to the leader as their ideal and, on the other, to the other members of the group through the leader or ideal. In fact, what is called the "social mind" or "group mind" is ordinarily not active but reactive. New steps in cultural advance—epoch-making ideas or new inventions —first originate in some gifted individual mind within the group. True, the individual mind is more or less conditioned by the social mind or cultural setting. But although the germ of the new idea may have been already seething in the general mind of the community, it remains infructuous until a great man arises to seize the idea hitherto floating nebulously in the social atmosphere, so to say, breathes life into it and brings it to the light of day ; and the idea begins to mould the age; and around it in time, 'new systems grow.' A great man feels with great intensity, grasps in its entirety and expresses with remarkable clearness some idea that may have been long vaguely struggling to take shape in the group-mind. His intense feeling clear vision, kindling thought and thrilling expression of the thought. his enthusiasm for the idea and his throbbing words electrify his group-fellows. And the idea, broad-based on common feeling—on the common mind of the group—serves to 'put lever to the heavy world,'—to push the community, country or nation up one or more steps higher in the cultural ladder.

Even primitive societies have had their Dr. Tagores and Sir Jagadishes, Sir Prafullas and Sir Asutoshes, their Tilaks and

Gandhis, leaders of thought and leaders of action,—on a much humbler scale. Every close observer of primitive societies knows that it is their ' great men '—men gifted with higher intelligence and superior individuality and broader and keener vision than their tribe-fellows,—who even in such societies rise from time to time and succeed in introducing some new idea or new social or religious idea and usages to modify, supplement or supplant older ideas or usages, and thereby help the community a little forward in the onward path of progress. Less frequently a greater man may arise perhaps to introduce a new system of ideas, belief and conduct which may help the community to take an unusually long stride in its onward march.

Thus, in primitive societies, as in civilised communities, it is their great men—or the ideas and ideals they stand for,—that are the dynamic factors in the cultural progress of a people. It is they who introduce their communities or countries to fresh lines of thought, feeling and activity, and lead them on to higher aims, ideals and powers, and thus serve as dynamic forces of culture. If we compare culture to leverage, a great man or rather some great ideal or invention of a great mind may be compared to the moving power, and the community or group-mind to the weight to be moved by the lever. The individual great man dies, but the power that he has communicated to the community or the country—the ideal and the enthusiasm for the ideal with which he has inspired them—continues to carry them forward along the way he has marshalled them, until years or decades or perhaps centuries later (when in the meanwhile the group-mind has perchance been stimulated and widened by cultural contact or racial fusion, and has otherwise gathered 'germs of a higher birth'), another great man emerges, enters upon the labours of his predecessors, makes stepping-stones of them to attain to some brighter ideal, and, with this ideal as a power ' puts fresh lever ' to the culture of his people and helps to raise it to a further higher level.

INDIAN POLITICAL EVOLUTION COMPARED WITH THAT OF THE WEST

(PROFESSOR NARAYAN CHANDRA BANERJEE M.A.)

The history of India, like that of many countries of the West, affords us ample material for a comparative study of the political development of communities. Various causes and circumstances, however, prevent our realising it. The lack of a recorded history, the utter absence of a chronology, the quaint commixture of history with fable and myth—all stand in the way of our properly studying the evidences, however scanty, which are furnished by our early religious and political literature. We lose sight of real historical facts which in our eyes seem to merge in myths and these myths again pass into the domain of fable. Accustomed as we are to hear of the absence of free institutions in the East, we reconcile ourselves to our supposed inferiority in this respect and regard these as the exclusive patent of the West. We turn to Greece, to Rome, or to the countries of Northern and Western Europe for a study of free political institutions and regard our own countries as the birth-place and the peculiar habitation of despotic power.

All this, again, seems to receive ready confirmation from the evidences furnished by our later legal and religious literature. The later tendency to deify monarchy as a divine institution, the belief in kings being the mundane counterparts of the great gods, the stories of irresponsible exercise of authority by some despotic Hindu kings, described in later chronicles like that of Kashmere, the spirit of submission to authority, all go to prove the utter absence of free institutions as far as India was concerned. To all superficial observers the force of this evidence appears to be more than conclusive, and the average Indian accepts it without attempting to proceed further.

This, however, is hardly true and a careful study of the ancient Indian records places before us facts which not only prove the contrary but explain the causes of Indian political degeneration. India has passed through all trying vicissitudes of fortune. Beginning with that remote antiquity when the Indian Aryans were settled on the banks of the Indus and the Jumna, till the days when the triumphant might of conquering foreigners enslaved her people, she

underwent successive commotions and turmoils, hardly known to other lands. The free communities of the earliest period were exposed to the hostile enemy or were assailed by the ambition of powerful chiefs. Racial differences or those of classes, also had their full play, and all these brought in successive modifications and changes. In the midst of these turmoils, in the midst of the conflict of parties or principles, in the midst of commotions succeeding one after the other, her social and political institutions were shaken to their very foundations. The earlier organisations of her people were modified. Society was repeatedly remodelled, governments were repeatedly reconstructed, and the older and simpler existence passed away.

Repeated foreign incursions led to anarchy, and anarchy paved the way for new social and political reconstruction. Every time, as the Indian tried to resuscitate the social order, he took more care to strengthen the executive power, as a bulwark against anarchy and foreign domination. The desire for protection of life and property, and an eagerness to ensure the continuance of the social order made the people part with their liberty or the ancient right of self-government. Monarchy strengthened its hands. Repeated trumoils helped the princes to consolidate personal sovereignty and to subvert the ancient democracies. With the working of the process of consolidation the clans disappeared. The small states were all merged into considerable monarchies, which, on account of their size and internal diversity, became unwieldy for control by democratic popular assemblies. Social complexities and religious upheavals destroyed the homogeneity of the people, lossened the bonds of the tribe, and made the task easy for the growth of pure monarchies. Sacerdotalism, also, viewed the problem of political discipline from the standpoint of cosmic order, and extolled the rising monarchical authority.

A critical observer cannot fail to observe the working of these forces in the Madhyadeśa, even during the later Brāhmāṇa age. There, Royalty was extolled every day and in course of time came to be regarded as the true governmental system. Complexities in social and religious matters favoured its further development. Then came other changes. With the sixth century B.C., which saw the foundation of powerful empires elsewhere and which also saw social

and intellectual commotions culminating in the rise of Buddhism, Jainism and other systems, powerful forces operated in favour of centralisation and absolutism. The tide of Imperialism grew higher and higher. The working of the forces tending towards absolutism was associated with the movement for the unification of the country, and this culminated in the Great Empire of the Mauryas, which arose immediately with the Greek invasion of the Punjab. That vast edifice, which for a time stood as a bulwark against foreign aggression, was, however, short-lived and crumbled to dust with the inauguration of the theocratic propaganda of Aśoka.

India again fell a prey to foreign domination. Her fairest fields became the hunting ground of the savage races of Central Asia. The Bactrian, the Greek, the Scythian, the Parthian and the Kuṣāna, successively poured into her plains, and dominated on her people till another upheaval contributed to the rise of the Empire of the Guptas. This, after a period of three centuries, was again assailed by foreign hordes and crumbled to dust. After the defeat of the Hunnish barbarians, rival powers struggled for supremacy The country was more or less divided into a large number of principalities, some of which remained for ever local powers, while others struggled for Imperial hegemony. The differences of localities became prominent. Dynastic wars and conquests became the order of the day. As for the people, local autonomy and communal self-government more or less ensured the continuance of their life and prosperity. The rulers everywhere became free from popular control. The only checks that operated on them, were the limited character of their authority, the privileges of the sacerdotal or the military orders, or the chances and fears of successful popular risings. Politically, the people ceased to exist, their destinies were left to be moulded by their rulers. This became the general rule. In some of the principalities, the arrogance of princes waxed higher and higher. The absence of constitutional checks to their authority enabled them to assume the role of irresponsible despots, and they often perpetrated tyrannies which disgrace the annals of any country.

From the above it would appear that India was not always the home of despotic authority. As we shall see very soon, the early Indian communities were as free and democratic as their brethren elsewhere. Then, gradually, their condition was changed. The

same forces which operated in Greece and Rome or which subverted the free Teutonic institutions and helped the rise of the divine monarchies of the Middle Age, acted in India also. As a result of these, similar changes were brought in. Democracies gradually faded into insignificance. Limited royal authority made place for irresponsibility. The people ceased to be masters of their own destinies and became slaves of their rulers. Yet the history of Indian political institutions has something to speak on behalf of the genius and temperament of her people. For though there was a change, yet, Monarchy never became so irresponsible as in Europe after the Reformation. The king was venerated—his office was highly extolled—his functions were compared to those of the rulers of the universal forces—the Devas, yet the Indian people never accepted king as the counterpart or the vicegerent of the omnipotent Deity. Nor did India ever see any Cæsar cult as we find in the history of decayed Rome after the world conquest, and no prince dared to pretend to be invested with "the right divine of princes to govern wrong."

Monarchy was not the only form of government. Republics, too, existed—perhaps as numerous and as potent as in the Western world. Their history is lost to us. We have neither detailed records of the vicissitudes of party fortune—or the services of eminent popular lead rs. Yet, no one can deny their continued existence for ages or the true character of their pluralistic political discipline. When their history is properly studied, it will be found that they were not a whit inferior to those of the Western world. Indeed, some of them existed for as long a period as Athens at least. In some other cases, in spite of a lack of historical details, there is evidence enough to prove their continued existence for longer periods. We need not dilate any further upon the republics. They are numerous, but we simply refer to some of these. Prominent among these were :—

(a) The Yādava confederacy.

(b) The confederation of the Licchavis who were kinsmen to the Sākyas and thus closely connected with the founder of Buddhism.

(c) The confederacy of the Brahmin oligarchs of Kerala.

Of the democratic gaṇas, we may mention the following—

1. The Yaudheyas—who retained their existence for nearly 1400 years e.g. from the days of Pāṇini to the sixth or seventh century A. D.

2. The Mālavas—who retained their republican life from before the time of Alexander to the VIth cen. B. C.

3. The Audumbaras—who are mentioned by Pāṇini and Megasthenes.

4. The Kunindas.

5. The Vṛṣṇis.

6. The Sibis.

7. The Arjunāyanas.

The existence of these is borne out not only by literary evidence, but by the surer testimony of coins and inscriptions or that of foreign visitors. The Greeks of Alexander, have left us accounts of Indian border states whose republican spirit simply recalled to the minds of the dacayed Hellenes, the by gone spirit of Sparta or Athens. We need not go into details about their history, for, the Greek testimony speaks but too highly of the free peoples whom they met after crossing the greater part of Western Asia.

Republics thus existed in India, and republicanism was once a potent force in the country. Mere subservience to the will of the irresponsible monarch was not the normal condition of affairs. Her people had no exclusive patent for adoration, veneration or obedience. They, too, knew how to deliberate in the assembly hall, to discuss public affairs, and to determine their own political destinies. Nor were they insignificant to be laughed at, and if we have the testimony of Phyrrus as to the "gods" of the Roman Senate, we have a similar eulogy uttered by the Buddha on his kinsmen the Licchavis who appeared to him as the "gods in the Traya-triṃsa Heaven." In a later age, the statecraft of Kauṭilya, actuated by a desire for the unification of the country, did its best to undermine their supremacy, yet Kauṭilya, the master of statecraft, could not but look upon them with admiration and dread.

As time went on, the cause of monarchy was furthered by social complexities. In an age of universalism and of social federation,

the democratic city or the oligarchic confederation became an anachronism, and they passed away—some succumbed to the Imperialistic movement, while in others the ideals of their enemies acted and reacted and turned the republicans into local dynasts.

Yet the spirit and the tradition survived. The spirit of local or tribal independence had often clashed with the centralising tendencies of monarchy. The lattter principle survived, but in that struggle it was modified and it changed its character. Local autonomy and respect for local laws and customs came to have recognition even with the most despotic Kings.

Nor did the republican genius die out. It manifested itself in other spheres. If there was sacerdotalism in politics, the spirit of assertion and reason asserted itself in the domain of intellect. It would be idle to dilate on this, but only this much may be pointed out, that each of the three regions remains memorable, as having produced, some of India's foremost teachers. The region of the Kosala-Videha (Magadha) Confederacy produced Mahāvīra and Buddha, the Yādavas produced Śrīkṛṣṇa, while in the family of the Brahmin ex-oligarchs of Kerala, arose the last great teacher of India, Sri Śankarācārya.

European scholars have often harped upon the deficiency of the Indian intellect in political speculation. Many have lamented it while admitting the excellence of Hindu philosophy. Some have gone so far as to say that India had no politics and the India genius was deficient inasmuch as the Indians cared little for material advancement. Here an attempt will be made to show that they were not lacking in interest in matters relating to the affairs of the world, and devoted as much attention to the consideration of social and political matters as the Western thinkers of the Middle ages or those succeeding them. They often attempted to solve supremely important social questions or topics of politics, and speculated on the origin of sovereignty, the relation between the state and the individual, the functions of Royalty or the social aspect of political life, as intelligently as the Western thinkers. In some cases it would appear that they prove their originality or even superiority over their western brethren.

The want of a systematic history makes it difficult for us to record the activities of the earliest speculators, but when we come

to the Great Epic, the Mahābhārata, we find the names of a large number of Indian political thinkers whose opinions are cited, only through the mouth of Bhīṣma " the last of the departing race of wise ancients."

Some of these thinkers go to the very root of the question. They try to picture to themselves the state of affairs which existed prior to the evolution of social order, or the origin of sovereign authority. They discuss the " state of nature " in the same way as Hobbs, Locke and Rousseau. Some of them attempt to attribute the origin of government to contract between the ruler and the ruled, and in one case at least we find a better handling of the problem than that of the renowned Hobbs.

In the Rājadharma chapters we find also, conflicts between separate schools of thought. Some regard monarchy as a human institution, others venerate it as something divine. The extremist champions of popular rights denounce an unrighteous king and go so far as to pronounce, their dethronement or death—some even go so far as to regard it as the duty of subjects to punish unrighteous kings.

Next to these, we have the innumerable Arthaśāstra-writers, whose names only—to our misfortune, have come down to us—only in ridiculous epithets or in nick names. They were the founders of schools of socio-ethical discipline and wrote mainly from the point of view of the rulers.

The last of these Arthaśāstra writers was Kautilya, whom Indian tradition regards as the master diplomat who single-handed overthrew the Nandas. His *Arthaśāstra* remains to this day a monument of Indian political genius. His keen insight into the minds of men, his handling of political problems, his theories about a paternal king, his advocacy of the active duties of the king, will ever remain something worthy of the consideration of posterity, inspite of the lapse of a score of centuries. Further more, his ideas about the requisites of an ideal state, show how clearly he anticipated the problems, which only recently, have drawn the attention of the modern thinkers of our day.

Throughout his book, he harps on the unity of interest subsisting between the ruler and the ruled, and identifies the interest of the ruler with that of his subjects. It was he, who first propounded

those ideas, which in the days of Aśoka, laid the foundations of his memorable enunciation of the fatherly duties of a prince to his subjects, as well as the moral obligation on the part of rulers to do their subjects all possible good.

To the glory of that great man, it must further be said, that he stood out as the champion of the moral and intellectual superiority of the Indians, by his strenuous attempts to put down, that revolting practice of men holding property in men—a custom which was in "vogue among the mlecchas." About the same time as he wrote, the great Greek thinker Aristotle, was trying to find an excuse and explanation for that custom and had gone so far as to justify its existence.

With Kauṭilya, ended that remarkable period of Hindu political speculation. In the hands of Asoka, the grandson of his disciple, the state changed its character and ideals. No longer circumscribed to the duties of maintaining the protection and prosperity of the subjects, the state came to be identified, with an organisation for the universal moral propaganda—an agency not only for the preaching of universal brotherhood, but also for the mental and moral welfare of mankind—a celestial dream in which the state lost itself.

With Kauṭilya, the formative period of Hindu political genius ended. He proved to be the last of a great race of men followed only by pigmies, who could claim no originality—but submitted without reasoning or accepted without questioning. In the eyes of all subsequent thinkers—with the exception of Śukranītisāra-writer, the State came to be associated more with a coercive authority which maintained the social order and ensured peace, rather than an organisation which tackled the problems of the man of 'wants and desires' and devoted its energies to the material welfare of human-kind.

Analysis of the State Concept

Let us now proceed with the analysis of the State Concept and sum up the chief characteristics of the State as it was conceived in ancient India.

The Hindu political speculation with regard to the State was objective and a practical one. The trend of thought never

carried it to that fine idealism as we find with the Great European thinkers. The primary idea in conceiving a state was the desire to ensure the happiness of the individual and of society in general. In origin it was conceived as a voluntary association of individuals —with the express object of eliminating *violence or injustice*— those elements detrimental to man's safety and progress. Almost all Indian accounts agree in attributing the origin of sovereignty or government to contract. Man dictated by instinct or natural law, in order to ensure his personal safety, must live in society ; once society is established conventions are laid down guiding the conduct of men. For the observance of these, the necessity of a coercive power is felt as being due to aberrations in human conduct, which owing to external influences of greed or error deviates from the inner reason, *e.g.*, the dictates of Dharma which is nothing but an objective reflection emanating from the Rita the primordial concept of moral order, and evolves the right line of conduct in the individual man. At one time, this Dharma guided the actions of men, but as man became influenced by greed and vice, society was on the decay. To continue the normal working of the right principle was evolved the Daṇḍanīti, the sum-total of rules which emanated from man's inner sense of right and wrong or good and evil. Later on came the machinery for enforcing its rules and thereby to regulate the conduct of all men. Daṇḍanīti or the law of punishments came to regulate human conduct by awarding punishment for violation of justice and by rewarding the virtuous. It thus became the external bond, which went to ensure the existence and progress of men in civil society. The right to award punishments was vested in the State which guided all the external relations of men.

The basic idea in the concept of Daṇḍanīti (or regulated violence) was one of order and not of freedom as with the modern Western thinkers. The working of the law meant an opportunity to each member of the State by defining and safeguarding his relation to the whole. This concept of order, moreover, had an intimate relation with man's inner ideas, and had a fine psychological basis. Man's primary ideas have always been—those relating to his life and security and perfection—his ideas of justice, of charity—ideas common to men of all grades and ages.

The realisation of the order meant that the individual must have a free scope for the fruition of his ideas. This meant that his life must be guaranteed and at the same time opportunities must be furnished, so that he can bring his life to perfection.

In the words of Fichte "*to live and let live*" became the motto of the State. Hence the scope of state-action became fully comprehensive, and it included all sorts of active help and encouragement to the industries and efforts of the individual by which he could maintain himself and could help himself. The regulation of the arts of life, agriculture, trade and commerce, all came within the sphere of State actions and this from a very early period. Such ideas are present even in the inaugural hymns of the Yajur-Veda and we have practical illustrations of this in the Jātakas.

The State thus became something more than mere police. Its chief aim was the realisation on the part of its members—all possible benefit as far as the material aspect of life was concerned. The normal working of the social organism came under its superintendence. Consequently, it was not confined to the bestowal of benefits on a particular class or a particular section. It came to embrace all sections of the community.

The Indian State was thus a material or economic state. It was freed from theocratic ideals, and was a means to a greater end—e.g. man's self-realisation and his attainment of salvation.

It had a wide scope of action and was far from being narrow. It could admit within its folds men of all castes. and creeds irrespective of their origin, custom or religion. Foreign elements with diverse religious and social ideals came and settled in India and thus added to its strength. In the days of India's political greatness the state presented to the world this high and noble ideal.

Herein it bears a great contrast with the Greek ideal of state. The fine idealism of Greek culture confined the state within the limits of the city—nay—to the governing element of that small community. The ideal was rigid—it could not expand. Greece for ever remained divided into the narrow and isolated communities: the ideals of humanity were to her confined to the city and hardly had any room for expansion. Such an ideal continued to exist till the last days of her existence and when the genius of the semi-

barbarian Macedonian attempted the expansion of the Hellenes, the Hellenic ideal lost itself in the midst of the barbarian whom it had vanquished and felled to the ground.

The only redeeming feature of this narrow ideal was its tendency towards the strengthening of the bonds of solidarity among the members of this small community. In India, such a solidarity was indeed lacking. The widest possible divergences were allowed to exist amongst the communities ; mutual hatreds, too, existed and there was hardly any attempt to bring all sections to a common standard. Rather than have unity the Indian delighted in diversity. Yet her ideals were nobler and higher. There was no lack indeed of that narrow patriotism, nor were there any germs of a narrow nationalistic ideal, which made her people often look upon outsiders with contempt and suspicion, but there ever was the presence of the human and cosmopolitan ideal, which we cannot find elsewhere—not even in civilized Europe—until we come to the middle of the last century or the dawn of the present one.

These two characteristics are worthy of note. They give us not only an insight into the Indian ideas of state, but throw some light on the chief ideals which influenced politics.

India in decay has forgotten her past. She is now the butt of ridicule with the Westerner, who denies her a place in the history of political development, mocks her pacifism and scoffs at her tenacity to the past.

Yet history will prove that in her arose those political ideals—which looked more to humanity than to the solidarity of the narrow social group. Here it was that conscience was freed from dogma. Here it was that oppressed nationalities found refuge from time immemorial. Here it was, that men could live side by side inspite of differences ; here it was again, that the germs of cosmopolitan ideals first manifested themselves—ideals for which the thinkers of our own civilized modern age are sighing in vain.

SIDE-LIGHT ON SOME ASOKAN EDICTS

(PROF. SUKUMAR DUTT, M.A., B.L.)

Historical mistakes have a trick of repeating themselves, specially in ancient Indian history where the brick-making of theory goes on merrily without the necessary straw of facts. A most remarkable mistake of this kind is the popular idea regarding Asoka's relation to the Buddhist Saṃgha.

In his well-known monograph on *Asoka*, Vincent Smith says, "The imperial government (of Asoka) was an absolute autocracy in which the king's will was supreme. From about B.C. 259 Asoka applied his autocratic power to the Buddhist Church, which he ruled as its Head"* Subsequent writers on Asoka seem to have taken their cue from Vincent Smith and have described him as an ecclesiastical as well as civil ruler (*Vide* Radha Kumud Mookerjee's *Men and Thought in Ancient India* and Bhandarkar's *Asoka*). This view of Asoka has been hastily gathered from three Pillar Edicts, viz., Sārnath, Sāñchi and Kausambi (Allahabad). But these significant edicts require a deeper study and call for a closer interpretation than have been given to them hitherto.

For one thing, the fact has been hardly realised sufficiently that by the time of Asoka the Buddhist Saṃgha had developed into a highly organised corporation. It possessed a code of monastic laws in the *Vinayapiṭaka*, the existence of which as a complete code about the middle of the 4th. century, B. C. does not admit of any serious doubt. Bhandarkar however says that "the Buddhist Church probably never had the system of administration enjoyed by the Christian Church in Europe."† If the idea is that the Buddhist Saṃgha never possessed a sufficient body of laws and regulations for the government of its internal affairs, I might refer the reader, if permitted, to Ch. 6 (on The Internal Polity of a Buddhist Saṃgha) of my book on *Early*

* Vincent Smith's *Asoka* (2nd Ed.), p. 92.

† Bhandarkar's *Asoka* (Calcutta University 1925), p. 98.

Buddhist Monachism (Trübner's Oriental Series) for a complete refutation of it. To be the " Head " or the " Ruler " of the Buddhist Saṃgha would imply a certain status, and it is necessary to enquire whether such a status was open to Asoka at all.

Let us at the outset recapitulate the data from which Asoka's ecclesiastical rulership has been sought to be inferred. These are represented, as we have already said, by three Pillar Edicts. Of these, the Sārnath edict is in the best state of preservation. It consists of two parts—the first dealing with schisms in the Saṃgha and the second with the manner in which the edict is to be published and circulated by the Dharma-Mahāmātras to whom it appears to be addressed. The edict is styled a Śāsana.* The operative part of the Śāsana appears also in the Sānchi edict, coupled with an expression of desire that the Saṃgha may remain united for ever. It recurs in the pillar edict, addressed to the Mahāmātras at Kausambi, now preserved at Allahabad. The Śāsana is to the effect that the Bhikṣu or Bhikṣuni who brings about schism(*bheda*) in the Saṃgha should be made to put on white robes (*odatāni dusāni*) and to live at a place outside the Āvāsa or monastic colony (anāvāsasi).† To superficial readers of these edicts, two alternatives will readily suggest themselves—that a law was promulgated by the Emperor relating to the government of the Buddhist Saṃgha, either in his capacity as the sovereign or as the Head of the Church. None of these alternatives, however, goes to the root of the real question at issue.

In the first place, considering the constitution of the Buddhist Saṃgha, as reflected in the *Vinayapiṭaka*, which must be taken to be pre-Asokan, if there is any force at all in the arguments advanced on the point by Max Müller and Rhys Davids,‡ it is impossible to posit that the Buddhist Saṃgha in Asoka's time could have a recognised Head competent to lay down the law for it. While Buddha was alive, he was the Satthā or Law-giver of the Saṃgha But after his demise, there was no successor in this capacity to him. The Saṃgha, as Oldenberg happily puts it, passed from a " mon-

* See Hultzsch's *Inscriptions of Asoka* (Cor. Ins. Ind.—New Ed., 1925), p. 162—"hevaṁ iyaṁ sāsane," etc.

† See *Ibid*, pp. 150 (Kausambi), 161 (Sānchi), 162 (Sārnath).

‡ See Oldenberg's *Vinayapitakam*, Intro., pp. xxxviii—xxxix, and also *Vinaya Texts*, S. B. E., pt. i, Intro., p. xxiii.

archical to a republican type."* A most significant passage in point will be found in the *Gopaka-Moggallāna Suttanta* in the *Majjhima-Nikāya,* where Vassakara asks Ānanda whether Gotama has marked out any particular Bhikṣu who should be the refuge of the Saṃgha after his death. Ānanda answers in the negative. Vassakara then asks if anyone has been subsequently nominated in that behalf. Being answered in the negative, he enquires wonderingly how unity exists among the followers of Gotama. Ānanda answers. "There is no want to us of a refuge ; O Brāhmaṇa, we have a refuge, the Dhamma"†. Nothing stands out more clearly in the *Vinayapiṭaka* than this republican self-government of the Buddhist Saṃgha. The transactions of a monastic community are called Saṃgha-kammas which are classified into numerous forms, described in the minutest detail. These Saṃgha-kammas are based on universal suffrage, every duly qualified member of the monastic community having an equal right of voting and participating in them. Not only is the idea of the paramount authority of a person—a recognised head, a spiritual dictator, or an abbot—foreign to the constitution of a Buddhist Saṃgha, but it is definitely excluded in a number of passages.‡ No person, however highly placed, could pretend to legislate for the Buddhist Saṃgha and set up as its ecclesiastical ruler.

The special matter of the Asokan edicts we have been considering is distinctly included in the monastic code. Schisms are dealt with in *Cullavagga,* iv, 14 and vii, 5. A distinction seems to be drawn there between an honest difference of opinion, not intended to bring about a permanent division, and a difference intended to cause a schism. In the first case, the ground of difference is duly placed before the entire Saṃgha and decided on by voting and after the decision, it cannot be re-opened on pain of a *Pācittiya* offence. But what about a difference intended to bring about a schism?

The attitude towards such a difference shows a clear development. At first such a difference seems to have entailed expulsion from the Saṃgha. In *Mahāvagga,* i, 67, we find the injunction : " Saṃgha-

* See Oldenberg's *Buddha* (trans. by Hoey, 1882).
† Cited by Oldenberg.—See *Ibid,* p. 341, Footnote.
‡ See Dutt's *Early Buddhist Monachism,* pp. 143—145.

bhedako bhikkhave anupsampanno na upasampadetabbo upasampanno nāsetabbo." (A schismatic, O Bhikṣus, should not be given Upasampadā or initiation; if already initiated, should be expelled.) This appears to have been the original attitude towards schismatics. But it is modified in the *Pātimokṣa*, in which the attempt to bring about a schism is classed among the Saṃghādidesa offences (Saṃghā, 10), entailing the penalties of Parivāsa and Mānatta, which consist in the imposition of certain disabilities only. In *Cullavagga*, vii, 5, 5, curses are invoked on the intending schismatic. But in vii, 5, 6, a distinction is implied between an honest intention to bring about a schism and a dishonest one. It is useless here to form conjectures as to the historical circumstances which might have brought about this modification of attitude towards schisms and schismatics, but there can be no manner of doubt that the Buddhist monastic code contained not only the law but the procedure also of dealing with them.

It will thus appear that Asoka's Śāsana in the Sārnath and the other edicts is not a new law imposed by a superior authority on the Buddhist Saṃgha. It is clearly based on the original rule contained in *Mahāvagga*, i. 67;* it is in fact nothing more than a declaration of a law of Buddhist Vinaya which contained the original rule of dealing with schismatics. No headship of the Saṃgha is implied in such a declaration.

But the significance of this declaration must be carefully studied. Few will contend at this hour of the day that the kings and emperors of ancient India were despots of the mid-Asian type whose personal rule was unhampered by constitutional restraints. In fact the idea of the king being the law-maker is not countenanced in Indian jurisprudence at all. The function of the king is limited to upholding the law and to punishing infringements thereof, and is not the making of the law which exists by immemorial custom, independently of him. Society was made up of autonomous units

* The rule enjoins (i) not giving Upasampadā to an intending schismatic and (ii) expulsion of an actual schismatic. The edicts clearly set forth the second part of the injunction. But it seems to me that the first part also is declared in the Kausambi edict in the words—"Saṃghasi no lahige" (see *Inscriptions of Asoka*, Cor. Ins. Ind., 1925, p. 159). The words mean—"Receive not into the Saṃgha." The edict being mutilated at this place, the object of the verb is missing.

and kingship embodied only the principle of co-ordination and protection. The edicts of Asoka have not unfortunately been studied from this point of view of Indian jurisprudence, which would probably reveal the fact that even in those edicts in which he appears to be legislating, as for example in the pillar edicts where he prohibits the slaughter of certain specified animals, Asoka was simply reviving and declaring old laws which had fallen into dissuetude for curiously enough the prohibition of slaughter of specified animals is found in the Hindu Smṛtis as well as in Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*. As a constitutional sovereign, Asoka could not make a law,—neither for the Buddhist Saṃgha nor for any other community, secular or religious. All that it was within his competence to do was to administer the old laws.

The Sārnath edict of Asoka must be read and interpreted in the light of the juridical idea of Samaya. The word, *Samaya*, signifies in the *Arthaśāstra* and the Smṛtis conventional or customary law,—the laws of Desa, Jāti, Kula and Saṃgha. It is laid down by Yājñavalkya that the king must save from violation the customary laws of Srenis, Naigamas, Pākhandis, and Ganas and uphold their authority.* In the *Mitākṣarā*, Pākhandi is explained as those who do not subscribe to the authority of the Vedas, such as Nagnas, Saugatas, etc.† Nārada mentions Pākhandi, Naigama, Sreni, Pūga, Vrāta and Gana.‡ Manu mentions Grāma, Desa and Saṃgha, § and his commentator, Medhātithi, defines Saṃgha as a group of persons of the same persuasion, belonging to different localities or different classes ; as for instances, the Saṃgha of Bhikṣus, the Saṃgha of merchants, the Saṃgha of men learned in the Four Vedas.

That the pious Buddhist Emperor was keenly alive to his constitutional duty of upholding Samaya, specially that of the

* श्रेणीनैगमपाखण्डिगणानामप्ययं विधिः ।
भेदं तेषां नृपो रक्षेत् पूर्व्ववृत्तिं च पालयेत् ॥
—Yājñavalkya, ii, 192.

† पाखण्डिनो ये वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमेव नेच्छन्ति नग्नाः सौगतादयः ।

‡ See Nārada, *Tit.*, x, 1—3.

§ See Manu, viii, 219.

Pākhandis, who are expressly mentioned by Yājñavalkya, appears from his institution of a new class of officials for the purpose called Dharma-Mahāmātras. The Delhi-Topra Edict speaks of the institution of these officials of whom there is no mention either in the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭily or in the Greek accounts of Sandracottas. The Emperor specifies the different classes of Pākhandis (nānā-pāsaṁdesu), e.g., the Saṃgha, the Brāhmanas, the Ājivakas and the Nirgranthas, and is careful to add that the Dharma-Mahāmātras are to busy themselves not with these classes only, but with all other Pākhandis too.* The function of these officials with reference to the Buddhist Saṃgha would obviously be to see that the laws of Buddhist Vinaya, embodied in the *Vinayapiṭaka*, were duly observed and administered by such agencies as the laws themselves provided. Hence the pillar edicts of Sārnath, Kausambi and probably Sānchi are addressed to the Dharma-Mahāmātras. It is quite likely that the danger of schisms had become very considerable in Asoka's time and a broadcasting of the Vinaya law of schism therefore become imperatively necessary. The Vinaya rules, as we have already seen, contained provisions for dealing with schisms, but there were at the same time certain inconsistencies. The Śāsana in the Sārnath edict set all these inconsistencies at rest by declaring the old stringent law as laid down in the *Mahāvagga*. At any rate, a declaration like this was within the undoubted competence of a constitutional king of ancient India.

* See *Inscriptions of Asoka* (Cor. Ins. Ind., 1925), p. 132—"dhamma-mahāmātā chu me etesu cheva viyāpatā savesu cha aṁnesu pāsaṁdesu."

SOME ASPECTS OF THE SĀṂKHYA SYSTEM AS VIEWED BY THE VEDANTIST

(DR. D. K. LADDU, M.A., Ph.D., etc,)

The Sāṃkhya system has been attributed to Kapila. The only works from which we gather our knowledge of the Sāṃkhya system are the Sūtras which are entitled the Sāṃkhya Pravachana, and the Sāṃkhya Kārikā of Isvad Kṛṣna. Indian commentaries have distinguished the pure Sāṃkhya as Nirīsvara and the theistic Sāṃkhya as Śesvara. By Nirīvara is meant that which does not acknowledge the existence of a being superior to both matter and spirit. But Kapila has not done this. He simply leaves it doubtful whether he exists or not. He treats of philosophy rather in relation to matter and man than to Spirit, granting volition to nature and defying it ; but when we find him asserting the superiority of spirit even to this defied nature, we cannot accuse him of complete materialism. Lastly, he admits the existence of a Spiritual Essence or Spiritual Being from which individual souls have emanated and into which they are eventually to be re-absorbed.

The pure Sāṃkhya may be said to be Nirīśvara or Atheistic, so far as it refers the creation of matter to a system of emanation, obedient to the will, not of the Puruṣa but of Prakṛti. It, however, hints at the existence of a supreme Being in ferring the emanation of individual souls to Spiritual Essence.

Kapila's idea of philosophy was that " since heavens and deities to which we are supposed to go, are material and we are subject to the necessity of transmigration, it is a cure for the evils not only of this life but of any material existence through which we may pass. That these evils exist no man can deny. The remedies applied by men to these evils are faulty, for evils return again and again and the necessary means of cure cannot always be obtained. The reward offered is only material heaven in which even the gods themselves are liable to evils and are not immortal, and cannot, therefore, serve as an effective remedy

against the evils. The only means, according to Kapila, of overcoming evils internal, external and forms of it beyond our power to oppose or check, the superhuman, is by liberating the soul from the shackles of matter, and this is attained by perfection of knowledge. Knowledge is certainly power. Knowledge is the highest perfection of man. The superiority of one man over another, of gods over man and of the Supreme Being over Gods is according to the superiority of the kowledge which they possess. While giving superiority to knowledge, he has omitted virtue. The omission of virtue gave birth to a new system known as Theistic Sāṃkhya and necessitated the adoption of the devotional system contained in the Yoga of Patañjali. The object of this philosophy is final emancipation and consolation for the evils of this world, which it affords. The means proposed is knowledge.

It is this knowledge which explains the reasons of our existence on earth by drawing a line between matter and soul, nature and spirit and showing connection of these four with one another, the reason of their connection and their final disconnection. This knowledge, according to Kapila, is acquired by (1) Perception, (2) Inference, and (3) Testimony. Perception is the use of our senses in grasping those objects which are within their reach, such as: developed matter. Inference is the use of our senses in making deduction from that which is within our reach and it is of three kinds, *viz.*, that of effect from cause, that of cause from effect, and comparison. Testimony is of two kinds, actual revelation and tradition. Inference, the great doctrine of causality, is established, and the existence of the imperceptible is proved, as that of nature, or the material essence, from that of developed matter. When perception and inference fail, revelation and tradition are accepted, from which are received the doctrines of transmigration, and the existence of gods. Kapila has often been accused of scepticism, which is largely due to the misunderstanding of Sl. 64 of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. We might at best say that he has accepted without murmur two important dogmas, transmigration and the existence of the Gods. The excuse for the first is that transmigration was a theory which chimed in with his own ideas, and that for the second is his distance from scepticism. The questions proposed by him to answer were not " Do I exist or does matter exist " but

what am I and what is matter?" which generally shows the trend his mind.

After having followed the order of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā and the Kapila Sūtras, we shall try to find what the general view of the system was. The pure Sāṃkhya and all the schools which follow it distinguish everything that exists into the following twety-five categories, for a full exposition of which the reader is requested to read the Sāṃkhya Kārikā and the Kapila Sūtras:—

(1). Nature.
(2). Matter.
(3). Consciousness.
(4)—(8). The five subtle elements (Tanmātras) *viz.*, Sound, Tangibleness, Odour, Visibleness and Taste.
(9)-(13) The five grosser elements (Mahābhūtas), *viz.*, Ether, (Ākāsa), Air (Vāyu), Earth, Light and Water.
(14)-(18). The five senses (Indriyas) *viz.*, Hearing, Touching, Smelling, Seeing and Tasting.
(19)-(23). The five organs of action (Karmendrīyas) *viz.*, the Voice, the Hands, the Feet, the Anus and the Penis.
(24). The Heart (Manas).
(25). Spirit (Ātman).

Such in short is the outline of system to which the Sāṃkhya reduces all that exists. We must see what proofs are adduced to support their existence. As scepticism has no place in the philosophy of Kapila he does not apply his method rigidly to developed matter. Perception through the medium of the senses and judicious employment of our mental faculties are the proofs adduced for its existence. The existence of nature and spirit are, therefore, to be demonstrated and the means employed is inference. The existence of nature as the cause of matter is proved in five ways and the great doctrine of causality is thus established.

(1). The finite individuality of different existing things proves that they must have an external cause. If they were themselves their own cause, they could have no limits, no beginning.
(2). The likeness existing between several individual objects forming them into a class, proves a common origin.

(3). The actual activity in everything formed for action proves the existence of an enlivening principle.

(4). The complete difference between cause and effect which is perceived in every common matter, proves that matter cannot be its own cause and requires something different from matter as its cause, which is nature.

(5). The inseparable unity of the whole Universe, no part of which can exist without and independent of the rest, shows the indivisible source from which all spring.

In these arguments we find that the Sāṃkhya has granted volition to nature and has made it the material and the efficient cause of creation, which makes his arguments fallacious. He denies intelligence to nature, though he asserts the destination of each material object. The great doctrine of causality on which these arguments depend is put forward as : that which does not exist cannot be the cause of any thing. Everything must be done by that which is fitted to do anything and not that which is capable of doing it.

The existence of spirit of rational being which can comprehend matter and nature, is demonstrated in five ways :—

(1). The existence of matter, of the world must have some object. It cannot be useless or accidental. That object cannot be other than the soul.

(2). Everything which exists has a direct positive opposition. Nature and matter are both under the influence of the three qualities and may be considered as one. Something must, therefore, exist as their opposite which is spirit.

(3). The body moves and fulfils its functions according to the laws of nature but the variety of its actions in its relation to matter requires that there should exist that which can direct and prompt them.

(4). Matter has qualities and attributes which fit it for enjoyment. But since it is not the mere body which enjoys them, there must exist something which does so.

(5). The existence of conviction in every being of his own existence is evinced in the desire he feels to be free

from material existence and mundane regeneration and transmigration.

While proceeding to deal with spirit, we find that he has attempted to prove the plurality, individuality and personality of souls in three ways :—

(1). The birth and death of each individual taking place at different times—seems to preclude the possibility of all souls being one ;

(2). The difference in the actions of the individuals proves a different impulse in each suggesting a distinct existence ; for if all souls were the same, they would be prompted to the same action at the same moment.

(3). The three qualities influence individuals in different degrees.

The doctrine of the individuality of the soul deserves particular notice as it is a special feature of this school, since in the Vedas, one Universal soul is supposed to pervade all material bodies, while in other schools and even in the Bhagvad-Gitā, this doctrine is not clearly marked, though often admitted.

The soul which is shown to be individual, is distinct from the body, but it, and not the body, is sensitive, and the body, and not the soul, is active. From the union of the body with the soul, the former appears to be sensitive, while the latter is active. Action in the Sāṃkhya is not mere volition or impulse but must be achieved either by the organs of action, the senses or the heart, regarded as an internal sense. To make the soul inactive is quite in keeping with his theories and in doing so, he does not deny activity to spirit.

Although the pure Sāṃkhya does not make mention of a spiritual essence or Being from which the soul emanates and into which it returns, he must have known that such existed when he speaks of final emancipation as being the loss of the soul's identity. He has shown this by making the consciousness of that individuality an attribute of matter. According to Kapila, since the soul, when once liberated from matter, loses its personality and identity, consciousness can only exist while united to matter.

We shall try to show how the Vedanta is the logical outcome

of the Sāṃkhya and how it pushes its conclusions, still further. Like Sāṃkhya Cosmology the Vedānta is not satisfied with the dualism in which the former ends but it continues its search for the final unity. Here two words occur, macrocosm, external and microcosm, internal. By means of our experience, both external and internal, we arrive at truths. The truths we get from the external are physical science and those from the internal are psychology, metaphysics and religion. A real and perfect truth must be in harmony with the experience in both ; that is to say, the experience gained from macrocosm must be in harmony with that gained from microcosm and vice versa. At one time, however, the internals dominated the externals, just as at present, the externals dominate the internals and have been busy putting down the claims of psychologists and metaphysicians. But a little observation will show that the claims of psychology and metaphysics are in perfect accord with those of modern physics. The word " Nature ", as used by the modern scientists, is exactly what old Hindu Philosophers called by the name " Prakṛti ". The more scientific name for nature as found in modern physical science is " undifferentiated " from which, they believe everything proceeds, out of which come what are called atoms and molecules, matter and force, and mind and intellect. But old Hindu Philosophers stated ages ago that mind is but matter in a finer form. We also find that the intellect comes from the same nature which is called *Avyaktam* " the undifferentiated."

The ancient philosophers define *Avyaktam* as the equilibrium of three forces, Satva, Rajas and Tamas. Tamas means a force of attraction, Rajas that of repulsion and Satva, control of these two forces. When the two forces, attraction and repulsion are controlled by Satva there is no creation, much less modification. But the moment this equilibrium is lost or disturbed, one of the two forces becomes stronger than the other. Then motion begins and evolution goes on. This state of things goes on periodically so that when these forces combine and re-combine, the Universe is projected. There is also a period when everything reverts to equilibrium and a total absence of all manifestation is reached.

Some of the old philosophers said that the Universe quiets down for a period, while others maintained that the process of quieting down applies only to systems, which means that this system, when

it quiets down, goes back to the undifferentiated state. Whichever may be the view taken by them, the principle remains the same, since we see that Prakṛti itself is progressing in successive rises and falls. Evolution and involution have been compared by theistic writers in India to the out-breathing and in-breathing of God. When the universe quiets down, it is not extinct but it exists in a finer form which is called Kāraṇa in Sanskrit. Causation, time and space are still there. This return to the undifferentiated state is what constitutes involution. The manifest part of the universe is what is called gross matter in modern language. The ancient writers called the Bhūtas, external elements. One of these elements is the cause of the rest. It is called Ākāsa which means ether in modern language. Ākāsa is the principal matter out of which proceeds every gross thing. Along with it there is something which is called Prāṇa. This Prāṇa and Ākāsa exist as long as creation lasts. They combine and recombine into gross manifestations and at last they subside and revert to the unmanifested form of Ākāsa and Prāṇa. Ṛgveda, Maṇḍala 10th Sūkta 129, contains a beautiful passage which describes creation, as " when there was neither aught nor naught, when darkness was rolling over darkness, what existed? " The answer there given is, " the eternal one then existed without motion." It is, therefore, clear that Prāṇa and Ākāsa were hidden in that eternal one—though there was no phenomenal manifestation. This is what we call *Avyaktam*. People who are ignorant of Sanskrit translate the elements as air, fire and so on, which old commentators did not mean. The Ākāsa by repeated blows of Prāṇa produces Vāyu which is simply a vibratory state of the Ākāsa, which in turn produces gaseous matter called Tejas. When it cools, the gaseous substance becomes Āpa and when solid, it becomes Prithvī. Then by the reverse process it goes back to the unmanifested condition. We know the same thing from modern Astronomy.

As we have seen, Prāṇa cannot work without the help of Ākāsa. Whatever movement is seen, is simply a modification of this Prāṇa and what is seen in the form of matter is no other than a modification of this Ākāsa. Force without matter and matter without force cannot exist. They are interdependent. They are what we call gross manifestations of the two. Prāṇa may be translated

as vital energy. Thus, it will be found that creation is the product of Prāṇa and Ākāsa, which has neither beginning nor end.

We shall now take the grosser elements, the Bhūtas. Old psychologists say that they are the results of five elements. Whatever is seen is a combination of five things. They are called in Sanskrit the tanmātras. For instance, the eternal wave which touches the eyes, though invisible, does exist, since it comes in contact with the optic nerves. The same is the case with smelling, hearing, etc. Old psychologists say that the cause of the Tanmātras is self-consciousness which again is the cause of these five materials and of the organs. These organs or Indrias are, therefore, the real seats of perception. They, combined with Antahkaraṇa, are called the finer body of man or Sūkṣma śarīra. This has a form because everything material has a form. Behind the Indrias is the Manas, the Chitta, which is the unsettled state of the mind. So when some impression comes on the Chitta, it vibrates a little. Then comes the re-action or the will, behind which there is something called Ahaṅkāra, the self-consciousness or egoism. It is this egoism which says, "I am." Behind it is Mahat, sometimes called Buddhi, intelligence, the highest form of the existence of Nature. Behind it is the true self of man, Puruṣa, the pure, the perfect, who alone is the seer and for whom exists all this change. He is never impure but by implication, adhyāsam, he appears to be so. There are many Puruṣas or selves, each of whom is pure and perfect. It is the various divisions of gross and fine matter that give them various forms or colours. These forms are given by the Prakṛti for the enjoyment and benefit of the self, so that it will realise its free nature. Kapila denies the existence of god and says that a personal god is unnecessary and that Prakṛti alone works out what is good. He repudiates the "design" theory of the Universe, but admits a peculiar kind of God. He says that man struggles to get free and when he gets freedom, he melts into Prakṛti for the time being to come out as an omniscient and omnipotent being and be the ruler of the next cycle when it begins. In this sense he can be called a temporal god but can never be an eternal god, eternally omnipotent. If there were such a God, he must be either bound or free. A God who is free would never create, for there would be no necessity for him to do so. If bound, he could

not create because of weakness. In either case, there would be no eternal ruler. So Kapila understands by gods perfected souls who have become free. The Sāṃkhya does not believe that all individuals are united in one Cosmic Being called Brahman. According to Kapila, all souls will regain their freedom and their natural rights which are omnipotence and omniscience. Then the question arises, " what is the bondage of the souls?" The Sāṃkhya says it has no beginning. If it has no beginning, it must also have no end and we shall never be free. Kapila explains this " without beginning " as meaning " not in a constant line." Prakṛti is without beginning and without end but not in the sense in which the soul or the Puruṣa is understood to be because it has no individuality. Similarly everything in the Prakṛti is constantly changing, but the soul never changes. As the Prakṛti changes, it is possible for the soul to come out of its bondage. When the microcosm evolves there must be first intelligence, then egoism, then Tanmātras, then Organs and then gross elements. The whole universe, according to him, is one body. All that we see are grosser bodies: behind them are finer bodies, behind them again a universal egoism and lastly behind it a universal intelligence. But all these are the manifestations of Prakṛti, not outside of it.

We now find that there is involution and evolution in this process. All is evolved out of that Prakṛti and again involved and finally becomes *Avyaktam*. It is impossible according to the Sāṃkhya for any material thing to exist, which has not consciousness as its material. Consciousness is the material out of which all manifestation is made.

Prakṛti and Puruṣa

Since we have started with Prakṛti which has been called by the Sāṃkhya indiscrete or inseparate and defined as perfect balance of the material in it, it naturally follows that what is in perfect balance can have no motion. What is seen, heard and felt is simply a compound of motion and matter. In the primal state where there was no motion, this Prakṛti was indestructible, because decomposition comes only with the limitation. Again according to the Sāṃkhya atoms are not the primal state. This universe does not come out of atoms. The original matter may compound into atoms which in turn compound into greater and greater things. In the

modern theory of ether, if we say that ether is atomic, that will not bring us to the proper solution. To make it clearer, if we suppose that air is composed of atoms, there will be still some space between two atoms. How is the space to be accounted for? If there is another ether still finer, there must also be something to fill up the space left by the atoms. That would be regressus in infinitism which will never reach a final solution. According to the Sāṃkhya, this Prakṛti as we have seen, is omnipresent and the omnipresent mass of matter in it is the cause of everything that exists. This cause is the more subtle state of the manifested state, the unmanifested one of that which becomes manifested. This means that the materials out of which a body is composed go back into their original state. Beyond this idea of dissolution, any idea such as annihilation is absurd. What was called reversion to the causal state by Kapila ages ago, can be demonstrated as dissolution according to modern physical sciences. The ancients took mind as their basis and analysed the mental part of this Universe and arrived at the same conclusions as those at which modern science has arrived after an analysis of the physical part. Both these analyses lead to the same truth.

The first manifestation of this Prakṛti in the cosmos is Mahat or intelligence according to the Sāṃkhya. Out of this Mahat comes the universal egoism and both these are material. There is no difference between matter and mind except in degree. It is the same substance in finer or grosser form, only that one changes into the other. This egoism changes into two varieties, namely organs of sensation and organs of re-action. By the former, we see, hear, smell, taste, and touch, and by the latter, our hands, feet, voice, excretion and procreation are regulated. Out of egoism comes out another finer from, called Tanmātras, five particles of matter, out of which again is manufactured the gross matter, such as air, water, earth and all the things seen and felt by us.

These are cosmic things which again change into Mahat which is intelligence in one state and egoism in another. This is the cosmic place according to the Sāṃkhyas. What is in the cosmos or microcosm must be in the individual or microcosm. Let us revert to the microcosm, man. He is built on the same plan. First, the nature is perfectly balanced, then it becomes disturbed and action

begins. The first change produced by that action is what is called Mahat or intelligence. Out of it comes self-consciousness, out of self-consciousness, sense nerves and lastly out of sense-nerves is manufactured the gross body. It must be understood that this Mahat is modified into egoism and that this Mahat or intelligence is the cause of all these changes resulting in the production of a body. This covers three states, namely sub-consciousness, consciousness and super-consciousness. The first is found in animals and is called instinct. This is almost infallible, the second is the higher state of knowledge which, though fallible and slow, still has a larger scope and is called reason, and the third is a still higher state which belongs to the Yogi. This is as infallible, as instinct in the first case and more unlimited than reason in the second case. From this it is clear that Mahat is the real cause of all the manifestations, covering the whole ground of the three states in which knowledge exists. This knowledge is finding associations or to put it in the words of an Indian philosopher, is pigeon-holing one's experience with the fund of experience already existing. It is recognizing a new impression. Suppose we want to know what universe is. Since knowledge is, as said above, finding or recognizing new associations with old ones the universe appears to us to be unintelligible until we find its associations. We shall recognize them when we go beyond the universe and our self-consciousness. If we fail to do that, our fruitless labour will lead us to no perceptible result. This conscious plane simply gives us a partial view of the universe. All we know of God is only a partial view of Him and all the rest is cut off and covered by our human limitation. " I am the Universal, so great am I that even this Universe is a part of Me, *Bhagvad-Gitā,* x. 42. This is why we see God as imperfect. To understand Him is impossible unless we resort to a state which is beyond reason or self-consciousness. " When thou goest beyond the heard and hearing, the thought and thinking, then alone wilt thou come to truth." *Bhagvad-Gitā,* II 52. "Go thou beyond the scriptures, because they teach only upto Prakṛti, unto the three qualities of which it is composed and out of which evolves the Universe." *Bhagvad-Gitā,* II. 45.

We now understand that macrocosm and microcosm are built upon the same plan and of the latter, we know only a very small

part, because of the intermediate stage of consciousness of which we know. If a man says that he is a sinner, he is foolish, because he does not know himself. He simply knows one part of himself which may be said to be the "mind ground." The same is the case with the universe. By means of reasoning we can at best know only one part of it. It is the Prakṛti which comprises the sub-conscious, the conscious and the super-conscious, individual Mahat and the universal Mahat with their relative modifications which lie beyond the pale of reason.

We have seen up to this that everything is Prakṛti. Prakṛti itself, is Jada (insentient). Like Prakṛti, mind, intelligence and will, all are insentient. But they all reflect sentiency, the Chitta (intelligence) of some Being who is beyond all this and whom the Sāṃkhya Philosophy calls Puruṣa. This Puruṣa is the cause of all these changes in Prakṛti in the Universe, which means in other words that this Puruṣa is the God of the Universe. It is claimed that the will of this Puruṣa or God created the Universe. This Will is the third or fourth manifestation of Prakṛti. It is said that Will is a compound and that everything that is a compound is a production of Prakṛti. It covers a small portion of subconsciousness. So it is clear that it did not create the Universe. Just as Will which is part of sub-consciousness, cannot move our brain and our heart, because the action of our brain and heart cannot be stopped by us at will, so in the universe, it forms only a part and therefore cannot guide it. This Puruṣa is neither will nor intelligence, because intelligence is a compound. As it is a compound, it cannot exist without matter. This matter takes the form called brain in man. If, then, intelligence is a compound, there must be matter. If that is so, who is this Puruṣa ? This Puruṣa is neither intelligence nor Buddhi (will) but it is a cause of both. It is his presence that sets them vibrating and combining. It does not mix with Prakṛti ; it is not intelligence or Mahat or any one of its modifications, but the Self, the Pure, the Perfect. "I am the witness and through my witnessing, Prakṛti is producing all that is sentient and insentient." *Bhagvad-Gitā*, IX. 10.

This basis of this sentiency is in the Puruṣa and is the very nature of the *Puruṣa*. It cannot be expressed nor understood but it is the material of what we call knowledge. This Puruṣa is not

consciousness, because consciousness is a compound. Sentiency is in the Puruṣa but the Puruṣa is not intelligent, not knowing. It is the very condition in which knowledge is possible. The *Chitta* in the Puruṣa plus Prakṛti is what we call intelligence and consciousness. All joy, happiness, and light belong to the Puruṣa, but it is a compound, because it is that Puruṣa plus Prakṛti. "Wherever there is any happiness, wherever there is any bliss, there is one spark of that immortality, which is called Puruṣa." *Bra: Up.* IV. iii-32. This Puruṣa is the great attraction of the Universe, untouched by, and unconnected with the Universe. "In this world of insentiency, that Puruṣa alone is sentient." *Kaṭha Up.* V. 13. This is what the Sāṃkhyas believe to be Puruṣa. It then follows that this Puruṣa must be omnipresent, because what is not omnipresent, must be limited. If the Puruṣa were limited, it would die, would not be final and would not be free. According to Kapila, there are many Puruṣas and each one is infinite running through the Universe. But we know that it is omnipresent, and that it has neither birth nor death. We also know that it is Prakṛti that casts her mantle of shadow of birth and death upon it and that it is eternal by its own nature.

We have seen that the principal idea on which Kapila works is evolution. He makes one thing evolve out of another, because his very definition of causation is: "the effect is the cause reproduced in another form," Sāṃkhya Phi. 1-118, because the whole universe, so far as we see it, is progressive and evolving. The whole universe must have evolved out of Prakṛti. Therefore, Prakṛti cannot be different from its cause. It becomes limited only when it takes a form. But according to Kapila, from the undifferentiated nature, that is, Prakṛti down to the last stage of differentiation, none of these is the same as Puruṣa. The whole universe is like a lump of clay. By itself it has no light, but we find reason and intelligence in it. Therefore, there must be existence behind it and Prakṛti. This existence is what Kapila calls Puruṣa or Ātman and the Vedānta, Self. According to Kapila, the Puruṣa is a simple factor and not a compound. The Puruṣa is immaterial, while all the various manifestations are material. Because if the Puruṣa is immaterial, it follows that it must be infinite and can have no limitation. So each of such Puruṣas is omnipresent but can act only through fine and gross manifestations of matter. The mind, the self-

consciousness, the organs and the vital forces compose what is called fine body. It is this body that comes to reward or punishment, that goes to different heavens, that incarnates and reincarnates, because we see from the very beginning that the going and coming of the soul (Puruṣa) is impossible. Motion means going and coming of the soul, and that which goes from one place to another cannot be omnipresent. It is the *Sthūla Śarīra* that comes and goes. Thus far we see from Kapila's psychology that the soul is infinite and that it is the only principle that is not an evolution of Prakṛti. It is the only one outside Prakṛti though it has apparently been found by Prakṛti. Prakṛti surrounds the Puruṣa and so it has identified itself with Prakṛti. It thinks, "I am the *Liṅga Śarīra*, I am the gross matter, the gross body" and, as such, am enjoying pleasure and pain. but these do not attach to the soul. They belong to the *Liṅga Śarīra* and to the gross body. The soul is the eternal witness of things going on. "As the sun is the cause of sight in every eye, yet is not itself affected by the defects in the eye, such is the Puruṣa." *Kaṭha Up.* II, ii. 11. "As a piece of crystal appears red when red flowers are placed before it, so this Puruṣa appears to be affected by pleasure or pain from the reflection cast upon it by nature, but it remains ever unchanged." *Sāṃkhya Sūra,* II. 35. The nearest way to describe its state is what we feel during meditation. This meditation is one in which we approach nearest to the Puruṣa. It is called the highest state by the Yogi.

Next the Sāṃkhyas say that this manifestation of Prakṛti is for the soul and that all the combinations of the materials of it are for something outside it. These combinations or constant changes are for the soul and for its liberation that it may gain all this experience from the lowest to the highest. When the soul gains this experience, it finds that it never was in Prakṛti and that it neither comes nor goes. These souls, according to Kapila, are many. All this resolves itself into three propositions: (1) Intelligence does not belong to the soul, it belongs to Prakṛti, (2) there is no god, no creator of the Universe and (3) souls are many, i.e., are infinite in number.

We shall take the first proposition that intelligence entirely belongs to Prakṛti. The Vedānta says that the soul is unlimited

or Absolute: Existence—Knowledge—Bliss. We agree with the Sāṃkhyas when they say that intelligence is a Compound. We know that Chitta or mind-stuff is what combines all things, and upon which all these impressions are made and from which re-action comes. Let us suppose that a gentleman, quite unknown to us, is standing before us. He acts on our mind and the mind throws a wave towards the point from which the action came. It is this wave which we call a gentleman. It is clear from this that there are two elements in this, one from inside and the other from outside. The combination of these is the object before us plus mind. This is what is our external universe. All knowledge is, therefore, by re-action.

The second proposition adduced by Kapila is that there is no God. As this series of limited manifestations of Prakṛti beginning with the individual intellect and ending with the individual body, requires the Self behind as the ruler on the throne, so in the Cosmos, we must enquire what the universal intelligence, the Universal mind, the Universal fine and gross materials have as their ruler. If we deny that there is a universal ruler or governor, we must deny that there is a soul behind the lesser series, because the whole universe is a repetition of the same plan.

The third and the last proposition as laid down by Kapila is that there is a plurality of Gods. We will now show how each soul is and must be omnipresent. Everything that is limited must be limited by something else. Suppose there is a black board here. The existence of a black board is circumscribed by many things and we find that every limitation presupposes some limiting thing. If we think of space, we have to think of it as a little circle, but beyond that is more space. We cannot imagine a limited space in any other way than through the infinite. To perceive the Infinite, we must, therefore, apprehend the Infinite.

When we think of time we have to think of time beyond any particular period of time. The latter is limited and the former is unlimited. Whenever we try to perceive the finite, we find it impossible to separate it from the infinite. This, therefore, proves that this Self must be infinite, omnipresent. Then the question is whether the omnipresent, the infinite can be two. We shall suppose for argument's sake that there are two infinites A and B. The infinite A limits the infinite B. If the infinite B is not the infinite A,

then the infinite A is not and cannot be infinite B. Therefore, there can be but one infinite. Secondly, the infinite cannot be divided. Infinity divided into any number of parts must still be infinity, for it cannot be separated from itself.

The whole universe is one and there is one Self in the Universe, only one Existence and that one existence when it passes through the forms of time, space and causation, is called intelligence, self-consciousness, fine matter, gross matter, etc. All physical and mental forms in the Universe are that One, appearing in various ways. When a little bit gets into this net work of time, space and causation, it apparently takes forms. If the net work is removed, only that one will remain. The whole universe is, therefore, all one and is called in the Vedānta philosophy Brahman. Brahman appearing behind the Universe is all God. This Brahman appearing behind the little Universe, the Microcosm, is the Soul. This very soul, self or Ātman, therefore, is God in man. There is only one Puruṣa and He is called God. When God and man are analysed, they are one. " In all hands you work, through all mouths you eat, through all nostrils you breathe, through all minds you think." *Bhagvad-Gitā*, XIII. 13.

The question now arises how has one individual, one human being, the infinite Being, become broken into parts? The answer is that all this Division is only apparent, because the infinite cannot be divided. This is the conclusion of the Advaita Philosophy or the Philosophy of the *Bhagvad-Gitā*.

INTEREST AND USURY

(PRINCIPAL BALKRISHNA, M.A. PH.D., F.R.E.S.)

The Hindu society had no prejudice against interest either for consumptive or productive purposes. We nowhere read of any prohibitions of loans at interest which were so general in Medieval Europe and the Mohammedan world. In ancient Greece Aristotle was the greatest exponent of the idea that money does not breed money and hence the barrenness of money could not give birth to interest. Moses, Christ, Mohammad, the medieval church-fathers and many others condemned money-lending. No anathemas have, however, been pronounced against the taking of interest on loans in India. The Hindu law-books expound the relations of lenders and borrowers on the basis of contract and hence rigorous laws have been made for the fulfilment of the contractual bargains. The legal, moral and economic justifications of interest have been prominently brought out in the various law-books. The state has been asked to allow a very great latitude to the parties concerned in the taking and realizing of loans. State interference comes in only in extreme cases. It can be realized that the doctrine of *lassez faire* in cases like these must have caused untold misery to the weaker classes, but the respect for free contracts might probably have kept back the state from interfering too often and too much in loan transactions. The free spirit of loan negotiations is summed up in these lines :

" Members of all castes are at liberty to negotiate loans on terms and at rates of interest which seem most convenient to them." (Agni Purāna, Chap. 253, p. 910—Eng. Trans.)

Then Manu (X. 115-118) and Gautama (X. 39-49) include the income accruing from lending money as among the seven lawful modes of acquiring property. Even usury has been permitted to all men in times of distress, though under ordinary circumstances neither a Brāhmaṇa nor a Kṣatriya has been allowed to have recourse to money-lending. Men of these clases must charge only nominal interest even in times of distress. Consequently, the profession of money-lending is really restricted to the Vaiśyas and Śūdras alone. (Manu. I. 90 ; VIII. 410.)

Manu is very emphatic on the point: "Neither a priest nor a military man though distressed, must receive interest on loans; but each of them, if he pleases, may pay the small interest permitted by law, on borrowing for some pious act to the sinful man who demands it."

The freedom of contract in money transactions and the liberty granted to bankers for making their own rules and regulations independently of the state were the chief features of the ancient Indian society. The rules in vogue in the banking circles were respected and decisions in courts were based on the authoritative declarations of the bankers.

Local customs, too, were given due weight in fixing rates of interest, in making loan-contracts and in the recovery of debts.

Bṛhaspati has well said:

"It is by local custom that both the loan and its recovery should be regulated." (XIV. 18).

Gautama and other jurists are also most positive in giving full authority to the bankers to frame their own rules. Cultivators, traders, herdsmen, money-lenders and artisans, have authority to lay down rules for their respective classes. Having learned the state of affairs from those who in each class have authority to speak, the king shall give the legal decision. (Gautama, XI. 21-22.)

The cultivators-artisans artists, money-lenders, trade-corporations, dancers, religious orders and thieves are allowed to decide their own disputes, according to the rules of their own profession, because it is impossible to detect them through the help of others. (Sukra, IV. V. 18-19.)

The futility of making rigorous usury-laws has been fully recognised here. No God-given or priest-promulgated laws were forcibly imposed upon the Hindu society. Each section, group, profession, was absolutely free in regulating its internal affairs, and even in external affairs the state reduced its interference to the minimum.

Usury vs. *Interest*

The wealth employed for increase or growth is known as *Kusīda-loan* or a thing lent to be repaid with interest. Its increase is called Interest on loans.

The word *Kusīda* really means that which adheres closely and cannot easily be got rid of. Bṛhaspati has given a very fanciful etymology of the word, but it brings out the distressed condition of the debtor, the strength of the creditor and the reprehensible nature of loan-bargains.

"That loan is termed *Kusīda* which is exacted by persons without any fear of law or morality, *from a distressed or wretched man*, after having been increased to four or eight times the original amount (through the interest accruing on it)." (Bṛ. XI. 2).

Bṛhaspati makes *Kusīda* synonymous with usury and discloses the various reprehensible features of that institution.

The borrowers have been described as "wretched and distressed," being in the clutches of poverty and extreme necessity. They were weak, defenceless, impecunious and had to bargain with shrewd money-lenders.

(2) At the time of the compilation of the sūtras of Bṛhaspati, every advantage was being taken by some merciless money-lending jews of the weak position of the needy borrowers to exploit them. In doing so they had no compunction, no fear of law and morality. They were neither violating the dictates of morality and precepts of religion, nor the laws of their land. In other words, law, morality and religion all sanctioned the exploitation of the poor peasants and plebians for the sake of the ideal respect for the liberty of contract.

(3) In cases when the borrowers could not pay exorbitant interest and return the principal, compulsion and force were resorted to in extorting from them.

(4) Lastly, it has been said that the original sum lent could grow to three, four or even eight times according to the usage of different countries. After that maximum only, the law intervened to protect the borrower from the extortions of money-lenders, and prohibited the exaction of any higher amount of interest. Bṛhaspati has thus vividly shown that usury was a great instrument of extortion, exploitation, misery, suffering, and ruin of the debtor class. It is too true that money-lenders "traffic in other people's misfortunes, seeking gain through their adversity: under the pretence of compassion they dig a pit for the oppressed."

On account of its reprehensible character, *Kusīda-usury has* been clearly distinguished from *Vṛddhi* or interest. The legal and equitable rates charged on loaned sums are known as *vṛddhi*, but excesses in that profession, though legalized in several codes on account of their prevalence in the commercial circles, are against morality. These were severely condemned on ethical grounds in law-books.

Kinds of Interest

Four special kinds of interest beside simple interest have been declared by Manu and Nārada as follows* :—

(1) *Periodical* (*Kālika*) *Interest* is that which is charged by periods of one month at rates varying according to the profession of the debtor or according to the necessities of each.

(2) *Stipulated* (*Kārita*) *Interest* is the one promised by the borrower himself in times of great distress and not the one thrust forcibly or artfully by a creditor upon the man in distress. (Vyav, 295 p.)

(3) *Corporal* (*Káyika*) *Interest* is taken by Nārada to mean one in which one Paṇa or quarter of a Paṇa is paid regularly *every day* without diminishing the principal, i.e., even though an exorbitant interest may have to be paid, the original capital suffers no reduction.

Bṛhaspati† and Vyāsa, however, derive the term *Káyika* from *Káyā*, a body, and explain that it denotes bodily labour, or the use of a pledged slave or animal. The commentators of Manu have explained the word in the sense of manual labour performed for the creditor with no idea of slavery implied in it. But the authors of the *Viarmitrodaya* and *Madanratna* take it to mean the work done by mortgaged cows, bulls, horses, etc., and the bodily labour in serving the creditor with these means. (p. 298).

(4) *Compound* (*Chakravṛddhi*) *Interest* has been defined as interest upon interest.

We are informed by Bṛhaspati‡ that some writers added one more kind, while others recognised two more sorts of interest. These extra forms are *Sikhā vṛddhi* (Hair-like growing interest) and

* Manu VIII. 153; Gautama XII. 34-35; Nārada I. 102-104; Yāj. in Colebrooke's Dig. I, p. 51.

† Bṛh. XI. 6; Agni P., ch. 253, Eng. Trans., p. 910.

‡ XI. ii, 4-9.

Bhogalābha or interest by enjoyment. Gautama has described and approved these six forms of interest. (XII, 34-35).

(5) The *hair-interest* of Bṛhaspati is the *Káyika* interest of Nārada. It is so called because it grows every day like hair and does not cease growing except on the loss of the head, that is to say, on payment of the principal. Thus the daily interest can only cease by payment of the principal sum.

(6) The *Mortgage* (*Bhogalábha*) *interest* is the return or profit accuring from the use of a mortgaged house, land, property or other forms of wealth.* No money-interest is paid in this case, but the use of the pawned or pledged article or the rent accuring from the pledged field or house is given to the creditor.

The corporal-interest, daily-interest, and pledge-interest or interest by enjoyment are allowed by Bṛhaspati to be continuously taken by the creditor as long as the prinicipal remains unpaid. (Bṛh. XI. 11.)

There are, however, some palliatives. For instance, it is considered usury to use a pledge after twice the principal has been realized from the usufruct, to exact compound interest and the principal, or to charge full interest after a part of it has been liquidated. All these are reprehensible practices. These methods of exacting interest have been declared to be illegal and unjust by Bṛhaspati.

Manu's text as interpreted by Nandana and Rāmchandra, declares: "None should charge interest beyond a year, neither such as is not allowed in the law-books or by the people nor compound, periodical, corporal and stipulated interests."

All the commentators are agreed that there is a positive interdiction in the code of Manu on ethical principles to charge interest in any form other than simple.

Yet scholiasts like Medhátithi and Sarvagña Nārāyaṇa declare that according to some law-givers the last four kinds of interest are not forbidden, while Govinda thinks that all or some of them are permissible for merchants, that is, when loans are used for productive purposes.

* Viram. takes the word in the sense of immovable property. P. 295.

† Medh and Sarv. explain the word "Adṛsta," unseen, as invisible interest which, by being taken day by day or month by month is not allowed to accumulate and thus take a tangible form. It means that Manu is prohibiting the so-called Hair-Interest.

The interpretation of Váchaspati Misra is the most logical. It runs :—

" Let no lender for a month, or for two or three months, at a certain interest, receive such interest beyond the year ; nor any interest which is unapproved ; nor interest upon interest *by previous agreement ;* nor periodical interest *exceeding* in time the amount of the principal ; nor interest exacted from a debtor as the price of the risk, when there is no public danger or distress ; nor immoderate profits from a pledge to be used by way of interest."

The first part of the law is confirmed by Gautama who quotes the opinion of some law-givers to the effect that no lender should receive interest beyond a year.

If the man who has agreed to receive compound interest at a particular time and place, refuses the time, place and conditions of the agreement, he cannot claim compound interest. (Medha., Rāma., Nand., Sarv.)

The question consequently arises how much interest should be paid to the creditor in this case. The amount of interest chargeable to the debtor is then to be settled by those who are experts in maritime and internal trades and able to calculate the profits in a particular trade. According to Sarvagña Nārāyana the interest depends upon the probable profits accruing from a particular enterprise or voyage. If on account of some accident on the sea or on the land, the borrower is not able to make any profits, he is not to pay interest, because insurance had already been considered by the lender for the risk involved in the undertaking.

Rates of Interest

The maximum rate of interest on secured loans authorized by almost all law-givers like Manu,* Vasiṣtha,† Nārada,‡ Bṛhaspati,§ Kautīlya,¶ Yājñyavalkya,** Gautama,†† is 1¼ per cent. per month, or 15 per cent. per annum. This was the highest rate of interest recog-

* VIII. 140.
† II. 51.
‡ I. 99.
§ XI. 3.
¶ *Arthaśāstra*, p. 221.
** II. 37.
†† XII. 29.

nized by the law of the land. In almost all countries governments used to fix rates of interest.

Even the English Parliaments in the past have tried to fix a legal and fair rate of interest. The steps in the process were these :—

1197. All taking of interest forbidden.

1436. A similar Act implying that the forbidden thing was not extinct.

1545. Interest up to 10 per cent made legal.

1552. Interest forbidden (result of the Catholic revival during Mary I.)

1570. Legal interest reduced to 3 per cent.

1884. All restrictions removed.*

On the other hand, when we find that law-givers and scholiasts separated from each other by several millenniums, continue to lay down the same rule, the unprogressive, static, stationary or conservative condition of the Aryan society is vividly impressed upon one's mind. That the laws regarding rates of interests everywhere vary with the changing conditions of trade and industry in a progressive society is the explict verdict of history.

In India no change is visible in the legal rate of interest, hence society must have remained stationary or at least custom-ridden for ages together.

This maximum rate of interest does not seem to be exorbitant and extortionate when even to-day in many parts of the country, agriculturists and villagers in general are paying interest at the rate of one anna per rupee per month or 75 per cent. per annum on the security of their belongings. The maximum rate was 15 per cent. per annum on the basis of security, but when no guarantee of any sort could be given, the rate varied with different castes.

Two per cent. per mensem from men of the priestly class or Brāhmaṇas, 3 per cent. from men of the military class, 4 *per cent. from persons of the trading and industrial classes, and* 5 *per cent. from men of agricultural and labouring classes have been declared to be legitimate rates of interest.*†

Following these law-givers or the prevailing practice of his time

* *Taxation : Yesterday and To-morrow*, by R. Jones, 1921, p. 107.

† Manu VIII. 142; Nārada I. 100; Viṣṇu VI, 2; Yāj. II. 37; *Arthaśastra*, p. 221; Harita in Colebrooke's Dig. I, p. 45.

Kauṭilya has declared the *commercial interest* to be five per cent. per month.

When all those who were actually engaged in the production of wealth, were saddled with such excessive rates ranging between 48 and 60 per cent, trade, industry and agriculture could not be undertaken on any extensive scale. Then, the laws of the land offered little protection or relief to the necessitous, distressed, poor or needy people, and seldom came to the assitance of the agricultural and industrial classes to any appreciable degree. The above-mentioned legal rates, according to Viṣnu (VI. 3-4), were to be enforced by law courts for the time that had elapsed after one year of the contraction of a loan. It has been expressly laid down that debtors of the various castes may pay as much interest as has been stipulated by themselves. This proviso shows that the rates could exceed even the maxima fixed above, but these higher or lower rates promised by the debtors were to be enforced for the first year only.

Nārada exhorted creditors to be generous and virtuous and hence not to be greedy. Following the practice of the virtuous, creditors should take at the most 24 per cent. per annum. By doing so, they do not commit the crime of covetousness. We know how ethics, high moral ideals, principles and precepts are thrown to the winds in actual practice. Actuated and blinded by self-interest men pay scant regard to mere preaching and evade the laws against usury in a thousand artful ways.

Before we proceed further, we must know what kinds of securities have been recognized by Hindu law as valid in the contraction of loans. These were five of varying order of reliability :—

(1) A pledge (Ādhi) of *adequate value*—property, land, ornaments, etc., mortgaged and pawned for the money borrowed. The use of the words " of adequate value " is obvious. The pledge should be of such a price that the debt may be discharged with interest in the event of non-payment.

According to Bṛhaspati a pledge is of four kinds—moveable, immoveable, for custody and for use. These may be explained as under :—

(*a*) A pledge known as Moveable or Personal, consists of horses, slaves, ornaments, chattels, etc.

(*b*) An Immoveable or Real Pledge is made up of real estates, lands, houses, etc.

(*c*) A pledge for custody only is to be merely kept, because it may be injured by use, or because it can not be used. A pledge for use or employment is a thing which is not probably injured by use.

(*d*) (i) An Unlimited Pledge is one which is subject to redemption at pleasure, or which is not to be released before the fixed time. The payment of the debt and surrender of the pledge depend on the will of the party.

(ii) A Limited Pledge is that which can be released at a specific time only. "On payment of the principal at such a time, this pledge shall be released," in this and similar forms, a period is fixed. Loans can be secured by a written contract or with a verbal but attested agreement. If it be questioned whether this thing has been pledged to that man or not, the evidence may be a writing or a witness.

By their subdivisions and mutual differences, there are in all eight distinctions of a pledge approved by Hindu Law. These forms are, in fact, the properties of a pledge. They deal with the nature of the thing pledged, the form of hypothecation, the period of the mortgage, and the evidence of the transaction.* Nārada too is in agreement with Bṛhaspati on the distinctions of a pledge.

(2) Now the second kind of loan-security is called *a binding agreement* (*Lagna*). It means a promise by the debtor to the effect that "as long as the debt is not discharged, so long will he not alienate, either by gift, sale or mortgage or in any other like manner the house, land or other property."

Several scholiasts take *Bandhan* to be a pledge which can not be used, but must be merely kept by the creditor, just as gold and silver ornaments, utensils or various metals, clothes etc. Such a pledge is distinguished by the condition that the pawned article is impaired by use. It is also hypotheticated that the pawn-broker can not use the article as security for a debt contracted by himself in turn.

* Colebrooke's *Digest*, I, pp. 140-144.

The pledge that can be used like lands, houses, cows, buffaloes, trees, elephants, horses, asses, oxen, etc. is known as *Ādhī*. It is hereby implied that the pledged and transferred articles should be restored in an unimpaired condition.

(3) The third kind of loan-security consists of personal guarantee. This *surety* (*Pratibhū*) is said to be of three kinds :—

(*a*) for appearance the surety taking the responsibility to produce the borrower and bring him to the creditor or the court ;

(*b*) for trust-that the borrower is trustworthy and if he proves untrustworthy, the surety shall pay the sum lent ;

(*c*) of payment-that the surety shall pay the money in the default of the debtor. (Nārada, I. 117-121.)

(4) The fourth type of loan-security takes the form of Documents which are of two kinds—the one in the hand-writing of the party himself, the other in that of another person. The former is valid even without subscribing witnesses, the latter is required to be attested. We are not concerned with the specific rules on the validity and value of bonds which have been laid down in the law books. Suffice it to say that a document, if not obtained by force or fraud, was thought superior to witnesses and not *vice versa*.*

(5) The fifth and last kind of loan-security is of *Witnesses* who have been recognised to be of eleven descriptions. They were to be such who had heard or witnessed a deed with their own ears or own eyes.

Bṛhaspati's general rule for the guidance of the people runs thus :—" To a kinsman, relative, or friend one may lend money with pledge only ; a loan to others must be guaranteed by a surety, or there must be a written contract or witnesses." (XIV. 17.)

Loans contracted on the basis of the above five kinds of security, could not bear more than 15 per cent. interest in any case. These securities have been described in the descending order of their reliability and on grounds of legal safety. Therefore, the rates of interest must have varied up to the maximum limit, *cateris paribus*, in these five cases, being lowest in case of mortgage loans and highest when nothing was pawned or mortgaged, but only witnesses were accepted by the lender for the act of loaning money.

* Cf. Colebrooke's *Digest*, I, pp. 21-28.

The maxium rate of 15 per cent. does not seem to be excessive when in our own days loans are generally made by pawn-brokers at the rate of 25 per cent. per annum or more in England even. Loans unsecured by any one of these five kinds of security had to pay from 24 to 60 per cent. per annum. These loans were only for those people who were the poorest of the poor, who had nothing to pawn, who had no friend to stand surety for them, who could not call even witnesses to see the transaction, and who were not willing to give any agreement or document. In such cases risks of loss cannot be adequately estimated and interest ought to have been high to cover losses. Professor Marshall* gives the instance of coster-mongers and cattle-dealers who have to pay 10 per cent. *per day*. Rightly has he told us that a *farthing invested at ten per cent a day would amount to a billion pounds at the end of a year.*

The Hindu laws of interest in cases of unsecured loans seem to be very mild even when judged by our present standards and the rates do not seem excessive. It will have been seen that the daily interest paid in certain transactions is one paṇa or a quarter of a paṇa per cent. The rate of interest on small and unsecured loans prevailing two thousand years back in India was about one-fortieth and at the highest one-tenth of what the coster-mongers have been said to pay in these days in England.

Factors of Interest

It is but proper that the rate of interest should vary with the varying degree of the security offered for the loan. Vyāsa laid down that 15 per cent. per annum may be the rate in case of debts secured by pledges, 20 per cent. p. a. if the security is offered by the surety, while if there is no security of any kind, 24 per cent. may be charged.

The second factor of interest recognised in these books is the reliability of the debtor due to his social position, profession, character, religious merit, etc. The personal security of the borrower must vary in the direct ratio of the descending scale of social and professional positions ; interest must rise in the ascending order as the status of the debtor grows lower and lower. Hence the highest rate of interest allowable from men of priestly class was 2 per cent , from

* Marshall's *Economics*, p. 589.

the military class 3 per cent., from the Vaiśyas 4 per cent., from the Śūdras 5 per cent. per month.*

The third factor was the premium for insurance against trade-risks. Traders who could not offer security of any description and had to go to distant countries through unfrequented forests to sell cloth, etc., could be charged up to 10 per cent per month, while those who had to traverse the ocean, had to pay as much as 20 per cent *per month*.†

The difference in the rates of interest in various countries and in the different localities of the same country, has been recognized by all writers. Even when the customary rates are contrary to the legal rates prescribed in the law books, the former prevail and not the latter.

Lastly, the differences in the rates of interest due to busy and dull seasons have not been ignored. One scholiast adds :—" country is there a mere instance, suggesting usage founded on seasons, on difference of class, and so forth."‡

There is a far greater risk in the maritime trade than in the inland trade, hence the price of the hire of money-capital must be higher. The French law fixes a maximum rate of 5 per cent. for all mortgage or consumption loans, but admits unlimited interest on loans of commercial character. The Hindu law fixed the maximum in productive and risky loans. The act of lending money above those rates constituted the offence of usury and was punishable with a fine of 12 to 96 paṇas. The abetters were to be fined half of the above sum.§

The profits of trade and the prices of foreign articles must have been very high, when merchants and traders had sometimes to pay 120 per cent. interest per annum, though of course, on unsecured loans only, in inland trade and twice as much for maritime commerce. No information on the profits of trade and industry earned in ancient India is available, but an idea of their magnitude can be offered by those which obtained in the first half of 17th century.¶

* Viram, p. 296.

† Yāj. II. 38; *Artha*, p. 221; *Aparāraka*, p. 643.

‡ P. 123 of Colebrooke's *Digest*, I.

§ *Artha.*, p. 221.

¶ Author's *Commercial Relations between India and England*, pp. 170-1, 292-3.

In the Jāvā Records, Vol. IV,, pp. 6-11, the profits of the Manilla and Japan trades on Indian goods are shown. In the latter case they varied from 420 to 700 per cent. in 1667!

Sieur Luillier has given us an idea of the profits of various trades at the end of the seventeenth century. They can be summarised as under:—

1200 per cent. profits on Japan articles.

1000 per cent. profits on China ware.

500 per cent. profits on Chinese silks.

30—40 per cent. profit on Bengal silks and rice brought to Coromandel.

These rates, however, did not hold good in case of free contracts. Any rates of interest, lower or higher, could be agreed to by lenders and borrowers without regard to their own castes according to the conditions of the market and circumstances of the case. Stipulated interests had to be paid in such cases.

Theory of Interest

No rational theory of interest has been propounded in the Hindu books, although the principal items which make up *the market rates* of interest have been admirably brought out. The fundamental cause of the genesis of interest is also not ignored. That interest is the reward of saving, of undergoing a great trouble in earning and a far greater hardship in *maintaining* the money-capital intact, and of *abstaining* from the use of it like a miser, has been implicitly propounded by Śukra* and others.

Thus the legitimacy of private wealth and therefore of interest on capital is proved, because it is the result of labour and of abstinence, or of postponing the present needs for the sake of future needs. Śukra holds the view that it is four times as difficult to save, preserve and maintain wealth as to earn it, because that which is disregarded even for a moment is soon destroyed. There is no greater fool than the man who knows how to earn but not to maintain what has been earned.

Maximum amount to be claimed as interest

Whatever may be the rates of interest—15, 20, 24, 36, 48, 60 per cent or even more, the total interest for any one period during

* Śukra, IV. II. 33—36.

which a particular loan remained unpaid could not exceed the principal borrowed. This rule was observed only in the Āryavarta, while in other countries interest was allowed to be accumulated till it was trebled, quadrupled or even octupled.* This rule of Nārada is confirmed by Manu, Viṣṇu and others. The interpretation, however, put upon it by scholiasts, nullifies the spirit and utility of the law. If interest is paid month by month, or day by day, the amount of interest paid by the borrower may, in their opinion, soar to any amount ; but if it is paid in an accumulated form in one single payment, then alone it shall not be more than the amount of the principal.† In such a case, the law does not offer relief to debtors, because if the principal remains outstanding and the interest be paid in smaller sums than the amount of the principal there is no limit to the sum which may be received as interest. On the other hand, much latitude has been given to creditors to exploit their distressed victims and extort from them exorbitant interest. The courts could not interfere in many cases. The following laws will speak for themselves :

A creditor recovering an acknowledged debt will not be liable to the blame of the king; and if the debtor should complain to the king, he should be fined and made to pay the debt.§

A creditor recovering the sum lent by any (lawful) means shall not be reproved by the king. If the debtor, so forced to discharge the debt, complains to the king, he shall be fined in an equal sum.‡

Moreover the rule is applicable equally to cases whether the interest was paid in money or grain, or whether the debt was or was not secured by a mortgage. The interest-law does not preclude recovery of interest, even when the principal sum lent has been paid off.

* Nārada, I. 106; Viṣnu, VI. 11—17; Manu, VIII. 151; Gautama, XII. 36; Yāj., II. 39; Bṛhaspati, XI. 12.

†See text of Manu :—Interest on money received at once, not year by year, month by month, or day by day, as it ought, must never be more than enough to double the debt; that is, more the amount of the principal paid at the same time.

§ Yāj., II. 40.

‡ Viṣnu, VI. 18-19.

Commodity-Loans

In olden days as at present various kinds of loans were practised all over the country. Money loans constitute only one form, though a most important one. The details of commodity-loan—transactions and the rates of interest paid in the same kind of equal value to lenders are not separately mentioned in Manu. The commentators have especially stated that the very silence on the rates of interest on commodity-loans implies the same rates as on money loans, *i.e.*, 15 per cent. on pledged loans and 24 per cent. etc. on borrowings when there is neither pledge nor surety to secure the loans. The maximum amounts of commodity interest which could be legally charged when it was allowed to accumulate differed in each case. Law-givers are not unanimous on the compound interest allowed by law to be accumulated upon the loaned articles.

The following are the typical examples of commodity-loans* :—

(1) *Gold loans* signified the borrowing of gold, silver, gems, pearls, coral, shells, conches and the like, clothes made of wool and silk. Capital could be doubled in all these cases, creditors could not claim more than 100 per cent. as interest for the exceptionally long period during which the loan was not returned by the borrower. All the great jurists are unanimous on this law.

(2) *Metal loans.*—On all kinds of base metals like copper, iron iron-filings, bronze, tin, lead, etc. when borrowed, one had to pay on re-payment 200 per cent. at the utmost.

(3) *Cloth-loans* have been allowed to be trebled by Bṛhaspati and Viṣṇu, but quadrupled by Yājñyavalka. On the other hand, loans of wool and hair, or of cloths made of these could be quintupled on the authority of Manu and Gautama.

(4) *Grain-loans* taken for the purpose of food could grow to three times the original amount according to Viṣṇu, Yājñyavalkya, Vasiṣṭha and Harita, but even to four times on the authority of Bṛhaspati and to five times on that of Manu and Gautama. In our own days cultivators borrow wheat, paddy, etc., on the condition of paying twice the amount within six months.

* Bṛh. XI 13—16; Yāj. II. 57 ; Manu VIII. 151; Viṣnu VI, 11—17; Nārada I. 107; Vīra. Vyāv., p. 297; Vyāv. M., p. 104 (Mandlika); Kātyāyana in Colebrooke's *Dig.* I, p. 109.

(5) *Vegetable-loans*—Interest on all kinds of edible plants, fruits, roots etc., borrowed by a man could accumulate to 300—400 per cent. Manu and Gautama allow the interest to be accumulated to four times the principal lent.

(6) *Cattle-loans*—In village such loans are frequent even now. If a bull is given on a loan to be used by another person, the owner of the bull whatever interest he might have extorted to be paid him by the borrower, could not claim more than 300 per cent. on the authority of Bṛhaspati.

If a cow has been given by one person to another person, Viṣṇu allows the lender to take the offspring of the cow as interest for her use, while to-day the calf and milk of cow belong to the rearer. The same rule applies to all animals employed for transport. According to Manu, the interest with the principal can be quintupled. However long the period of debt may be, the debtor can only be liable to pay back an amount equal in value to five hundred pieces of money and no more.

(7) *Slave-loans*.—Howsoever strange it may appear to us to-day the custom was prevalent in ancient India to lend *Dāsis*—female slaves for the conjugal use of men other than the owners. In such cases the offspring was the interest accruing to the owner for the loan of the sentient property in the form of a slave.

It has now been seen that interest on commodities varies from 100 to 700 per cent, but Manu does not allow accumulation to exceed more than five times in any case. His laws on money and commodities are given in his own words:—

In *money* transactions interest paid at one time (not by instalments) shall never exceed the principal; on grain, fruit, or hair and beasts of burden, the interest together with the principal *must not be more* than five times the original amount.

Stipulated interest beyond the legal rate, being against the law can not be recovered; they call that a usurious way of lending; the lender is in no case entitled to more than five in the hundred. (VIII. 150-151.)

Time Limit to Accumulation of Interest

The period of time after which interest ceases on various sorts of loans is shown in the following table. Manu does not allow

compound interest, so simple interest is increasing from year to year, till it equals the principal lent. Thus a loan of Rs. 100 will be doubled in six years and eight months. Similarly, as 2 per cent. per month can at the highest be charged from a Brāhmaṇa, it means that if the principal remains with the debtor for a long time, he will pay Rs. 100 per cent. after 50 or more months. A similar calculation is to be made in other cases.

Kind of Loan	*Time*
Pledged money loans ...	... 80 months.
Unsecured money loans ...	... as under 80 months.
For Brāhmaṇas ...	... 50 months.
,, Kṣatriyas ...	... 33 1/3 ,,
,, Vaiśyas	... 25 ,,
,, Śūdras	... 20 ,,
Gold loans	... Same as above.
Metal ,, ...	... Double the above periods.
Cloth ,, ...	... ,, ,, ,,
Grains	...
Vegetables	... ,, ,, ,,
Cattle loans	... Treble the above periods
Seed ,, ...	... Quintuple ,, ,,
Miscellaneous loans	Septuple ,, ,,

Loans without Interest

Interest is forbidden in some cases, unless there has been a special agreement between the parties to the contrary. Nārada has named the following cases when no interest can be charged :—

(1) Price of a commodity purchased but not received.
(2) Price of a commodity sold but not delivered.
(3) Wages.
(4) Deposit.
(5) A fine imposed by the Crown.
(6) Money taken by fraud or the like and restored.
(7) A thing idly promised to dancers and the like.
(8) Wager-money—money won in gambling.

Samvarta has counted a few more items like these :—

(9) Property of women lent to kinsmen or kept with husbands, sons or other protectors bears no interest.

(10) None on interest itself.

(11) Deposit remaining with a depository.

(12) A thing committed in trust or placed with an intermediate person.

(13) A sum which is dubious or unliquidated. It has been explained by Ratnākara to be a sum due by a surety.

Kátyáyana too has some more items on which no interest can be charged :—

(14) On leather
(15) Straw
(16) Āsava
} See Bṛhaspati and Viṣṇu.

Wager-money.

Price of commodities.

Woman's fee—money payable to a courtesan.

Money due from a surety on account of his suretiship.

Nuptial gift.

Vyása has enumerated the following cases :—

(17) A pledge, meant to be kept only, but used without the owner's consent.

(18) A debt not accepted from a debtor tendering it and deposited with a third person.

(19) Part of a loan remaining in the hands of the creditor. (Cf. Gautama, XII. 32-33.)

(20) A fine imposed by government, although paid after a long delay, carried no interest.

A nuptial gift which is promised to be paid.

(21) A sum only promised on a false or immoral consideration, since the donee, it is argued, has no property in a thing promised, there can be no interest.

(*a*) Nārada, Viṣṇu, Yājñyavalkya, Vyāsa, Kātyāyana, Manu are agreed that if a pledge for custody is used by the creditor, interest on loan is forfeited.

(*b*) If a beneficial pledge be damaged, no interest accrued.

(*c*) If a pledge is lost, spoiled, altered or destroyed, it is to be made good by the creditor unless the loss is caused without his fault by the act of God or king. If he can not restore the pledge or its

price, there follows the forfeiture of the principal as well as of interest.*

In the case of a beneficial pledge when its usufruct alone has been accepted as its interest, no other interest is to be taken or given. (Manu, VIII. 143.)

Kulluka has rightly said: "If land, a cow, a slave, or the like, be delivered as a pledge to be used, the creditor shall not receive the interest already ordained on loans of money."

The debt of a surety was payable by his son without interest, but the grandson in default of the debtor, was not morally bound to pay the debt at all. (Pp. 254-5.) The son was to pay the borrowed principal for which his father stood surety, but no interest could be claimed on it. If a grandson had to pay debts contracted by his grandfather, he too had to pay the sum borrowed but not the interest on it. The money due by a surety was on no account to be paid by his grandson; it was lost to the creditor, if the debtor by that time had absconded or otherwise was unable to pay.

Restraint of Debtors

The treatment of the debtors in India was indeed very harsh when judged from modern standards of justice and morality. But it was certainly as, if not more, human than that meted out to debtors in ancient Rome or even in England in the beginning of the 19th century.

Bṛhaspati† has detailed five expedients to recover debt from a debtor. These have been explained by the same law-giver.

When a debtor is made to pay by the advise of friends or kinsmen, by mild remonstrance, by constant following or by the creditor starving himself to death, that mode of recovery is said to be constant to *equity*. When a creditor with an artful design borrows any thing from the debtor, or withholds a thing deposited by him, and thus compels payment of debt, this is called circumvention or legal deceipt.

When a debtor is fettered and conducted into the creditor's house, where he is compelled to pay the debt by beating or other forcible means, it is called *violent compulsion*.

* Colebrooke's *Dig.* pp. 143—158.

† XI. 54—59.

When a debtor is forced to pay by confining his wife, son or cattle, and by having his door obstructed, it is termed the *customary mode* or *the lawful confinement.*

An indigent debtor may be taken to his own house by the creditor and compelled to do work there, such as distilling spirits and the like ; however, a Brāhmaṇa must not be so confined but be made to pay gradually. Bhṛgu ordains that a debtor may be dragged before an assemblage of people, and there restrained until he pays the debt, according to the custom of the country.

Debtors were treated with such harshness and cruelty that provisions as the following had to be made in their favour :

If one confined should need the voiding of urine or fæces, he should either be followed at a distance, or dismissed in fetters, or should be asked to furnish his son or other relatives as a hostage in lieu of himself. If he has furnished security, he should be released every day at the hour of meals and at night, and also *while the hostage remains in custody.* He who can not or will not tender a security for appearance, should be confined in jail or in the custody of guards.

It is evident that the restraint of the person of the debtor and even of the persons of his wife, sons and cattle is permissible.

Even blows are authorized. Threat of blows, catching the debtor by the hair, dragging him to the creditor's house, harsh reproof, and violent confinement are legal on the authority of Bṛhaspati.

Kātyāyana supports the preceptor of the gods in these word* :—" A debtor, being arrested, and freely acknoledging the debt, may be openly dragged before the public assembly, and confined until he pays what is due, according to the immemorial usage of the country." Elsewhere the same author lays down that a creditor may enforce payment from his debtor by beating or by coercion. Manu too has authorized the use of violent measures for enforcing payment.

The general rule is that the harsh methods employed for recovering the debt ought to conform to the usage prevalent in a country. Much light is thrown in the commentary on this text. It is said that in some countries creditors cause their debtors to be

arrested and confined by the king's officers ; in others, they themselves or their servants restrain the debtors ; in others again, they confine them in fetters.

The condition of bringing before the public assembly is worth consideration. Maltreatment of the debtor could be prevented. The persons assembled served as witnesses of the acknowledged debt. It was intended to get the approbation of impartial persons for the work to be done by the debtor in conformity with the local custom.

This treatment was to vary with the nature and amount of the debt as well as with the character of the debtors and creditors. Debtors must have been harshly treated in the houses of their creditors. They could stir out in chains only for bath, meals and for calls of nature. They were kept within closed gates and given meals in their prisons.

Moral sanction of Interest

The moral justification of interest is shown by the severe punishments that have been threatened to fall upon the defaulter of a debt.

Kātyāyana and Bṛhaspati threaten a defaulter to be born again as a slave, servant, wife, or a beast of burden in the house of his creditor, while Nārada pronounces a still greater punishment on the head of a defaulter :—" The debt or loan which a debtor does not repay even on demand shall multiply till it reaches a thousand milions. On that amount having been reached the debtor suffering the consequences of that act *shall in each successive birth be a horse, an ass, a bullock, or a slave.*"

Vyāsa too has something to say on the point :—

" If an ascetic or an agnihotri should die in debt, the merit of those authorities or that worship of fire will belong to the creditor."*

Nārada has beautifully summoned up the case thus :—

" If a creditor of the priestly class die, leaving issues, the king shall cause the debt to be paid to them; if he leaves no issue, to his near kinsman; if he leaves none who are near, to those who are distant, paternal or maternal. If he leaves no heirs near or distant, nor persons connected by sacred studies, the king shall bestow it on

* Vyav. M. pp. 111—112.

worthy priests ; but if none of these are present, let him cast it into the waters. The debts of other classes in similar circumstances, he may seize for himself.†"

This injunction is based on the well-known Hindu law that the wealth of all but priests who die without heirs, goes to the king.*

State Loans

Before we leave this topic of interest, we may refer to two institutions mentioned in Hindu books on politics. State loans were raised or forcibly requisitioned from rich men in times of crises, though interest was paid on them. Śukra says.—" The king, after giving a promise of paying a certain fixed interest, should take the wealth of the rich men in times of dangers as a loan. On the passing off of the danger, he should return the amount to them with interest."‡

Thus the floating or mobile wealth of the community could be requisitioned in times of national crises ; but the borrowed money was not to be appropriated or confiscated by the state, it was to be duly returned to the Government bond-holders along with interest.

On the other hand, there was the practice of depositing state-money with rich bankers that it may serve as a national reserve for critical times.

(1) " The king should deposit his reserves with rich bankers, in order that they may be of use in times of danger." (Śukra, IV. II, 42-45.)

(2) Kautilya too says that " lending the money of the treasury on periodical interest is a *loan.*"

(3) A king by investing his money in loans on occasions sanctioned in the scriptures or by lending money to persons who seek it, does not become amenable to censure.¶

† Colebrooke's *Digest*, I., p. 335.

* Viṣṇu, XVIII. 13—16.

‡ Śukra, IV. II. 21—22.

¶ Agni Purāṇa, Eng. Trans. p. 910.

(4) Loans to agriculturists have been highly praised in various works. In the Sabhā Parva, it has been pointed out that when agriculturists are in want of seed, food, etc., they should be generously given loans on 25 per cent. interest.§

Laws in favour of Debtors

There are many laws to protect borrowers. Those naturally differ in different law-books. On some points there is unanimity or general concensus of opinion amongst Hindu jurists.

A synopsis of these rules will furnish at a glance their comprehensive nature :—

(1) Debtors were not to pay more than the maximum interest on money loans.

(2) Commodity loans were legal for a specified period only.

(3) Certain classes of borrowers were protected from being exploited.

(4) All kinds of interest other than the simple were looked upon as reprehensible.

(5) Accumulation of interest on money and commodities was limited both with regard to time and amount.

(6) There were several persons from whom no interest could be charged for, and in many transactions done under vanity, passion, ignorance, etc., etc., no interest was allowed at all.

(7) The loans of several commodities of a perishable nature were exempted from interest.

Synopsis of Interest Laws

Thus the usury laws of Hindu India can now be summed up thus :—

(1) (i) 15 per cent. per year was the maximum interest allowed on secured money loans.

(ii) Even this rate was not to be charged for more than a year.

(2) *Unsecured* loans were to pay 24 to 60 per cent. varying with the position of a borrower in the scale of castes.

(3) A certain maximum was fixed beyond which accumulated interest could not be claimed. If money loans remained outstanding

§ Mr. Roy's rendering is extremely faulty : "Grantest thou with kindness loans the hundred?" p. 17.

for more than a year, the principal could be doubled, after which interest ceased. Thus no debtor was liable to pay at one time interest which exceeded the principal.

(4) Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas were prohibited to practise usury even in times of extreme distress, but Vaiśyas were allowed to resort to it only to get over a period of distress, so that the practice of money-lending and usury was confined to Sudras, but these on account of their poverty could not probably control much capital.

(5) On loans of commodities, interest could go up to five times, the original value lent to a borrower. So far there is perfect agreement among Manu, Gautama and many other law-givers. In other items, the disagreement between Manu and other jurists becomes sharp.

(6) Interest not approved by law-books and the people was illegal.

(7) Compound, periodical, corporal and stipulated interests *beyond just limits* could not be charged.

(8) A loan secured by a pledge like land, cattle, slaves, etc. that were used by the creditor, bore no interest. (Manu, VII. 143; Gautama, XII. 32 ; Bisnu, VI. 5.)

Such pledged property, howsoever long it may be in the possession of a creditor, can never be lost by being sold or alienated by creditors. Pledges other than the beneficial, i.e., those from which no income accrues, become the property of lenders when the original debt is doubled by unpaid interest. (Manu, VIII. 143-149).

(9) Various penalties are prescribed for the secret use of pledges without the permission of the owner. Similarly, forcible use of a pledge in contravention of a special prohibition was also punishable. (Manu, VIII., 150.)

(10) The state like private individuals was allowed to lend and borrow money and even requisition loans in times of national crises.

(11) Lastly, borrowers and their inheritors were looked upon as morally bound to pay up the principal and interest according to the contract which had been freely entered into by the two contracting parties. The theory of *laisez faire* was prevalent to an extreme in this case, so that many a time borrowers were left to the tender mercies of the merciless money-lenders. Usury laws were promulgated to save the poor and miserable, still the arm of the state was

not long enough to offer protection to the needy. Creditors had much license in extracting and exacting their money from the debtors.

A scene from the *Mṛchchkatika* throws much light on the point. A man has lost ten *Suvarnas* in gambling and has nothing to pay off the debt. He manages to abscond. The master of the gambling house finds him out and drags him hither and thither. He is asked to sell his father, mother, or himself for the payment of the debt. He finally agrees to sell himself. Therefore he walks along the road and cries, "Gentlemen, buy me of this gambling master for ten *Suvarnas*." But no one buys him. A quarrel ensues in which he receives such a blow that he bleeds, faint and falls to the ground. Ultimately the debt is paid by Vasantasenā, the heroine of the play and the gambler is released from the clutches of his creditor.

Enslavement for debts was a very common feature of the Indian society, ancient as well mediaeval, though the treatment was not so cruel as was in ancient Greece and Rome.

THE HORSE IN INDO-EUROPEAN LANGUAGES

(PROF. I. J. S. TARAPOREWALA, B.A., Ph.D.,)

Perhaps the most fascinating branch of the science of Comparative Philology is that commonly known by the German name of *Urgeschichte* or by the equally foreign sounding name *Linguistic Palæontology*. In this an attempt is made to reconstruct the prehistoric culture and civilisation of the speakers of a certain family of languages, as far as this can be traced through means of the languages themselves. As is well known, there are a large number of words which can be traced in several of the important branches of a family of languages; and if it can be proved that these various branches have been separated from each other during a considerable period, then it may reasonably be presumed that these words form, as it were, the common inheritance of all these branches from their common ancestor. A great deal of information regarding the material culture of the peoples speaking these language may be gathered from these words. A fair proportion of the words of this class are names of animals and plants, and these incidentally also supply us with important clues as to the original home of that particular family of languages.

As far as the languages of the Indo-European family are concerned the names of the various animals and plants which are common to the different branches form a fairly long list, and these include both the domesticated as well as the wild animals and plants. Some of these names, such as "elephant" and "camel," though found in all the branches of the I.-E., are not truly original I.-E words, but are borrowed from other non-I.-E. languages and have then became universally accepted in this family. In other cases. one original name, though traceable in many branches, bears a different meaning in each; this is especially the case with the names of plants. Some animals, again, are indicated by several names in the various branches, each name being common to two or more among the branches. It then becomes an extremely fascinating task to trace out why these different branches have adopted these different

names. Some of these points may be illustrated by the names of the horse in the various language of our family.

The connection of the horse with humanity begins definitely (as far as our knowledge goes today) from the palaeolithic times. "The true men of the Palaeolithic Age, who replaced the Neanderthalers, were.....hunting peoples, and some or all of them appear to have hunted the mammoth and the wild horse as well as the reindeer, the bison and the aurochs. They ate much horse. At a great open-air camp at Solutré, where they seem to have had annual gatherings for many centuries, it is estimated that there are the bones of 100,000 horses, besides reindeer, mammoth and bison bones. They probably followed herds of horses, the little bearded ponies of that age, as these moved after pasture. They hung about on the flanks of the herd, and become very wise about its habits and disposition. A large part of these men's lives must have been spent in watching animals. Whether they tamed and domesticated the horse is still an open question. Perhaps they learnt to do so by degrees as the centuries passed. At any rate we find late palaeolithic drawings of horses with marks about their heads which are strongly suggestive of bridles, and there exists a carving of a horse's head showing what is perhaps a rope of twisted skin tendon".*

It is however doubtful that the horse, even if tamed by palaeolithic man, was ever used for riding at all. The animal at that period seems to have been a small bearded pony, and so it was not capable of bearing the weight of a man and therefore was useless for riding.† Later on we find the horse completely domesticated. One of the earliest uses of the domesticated, or rather the semi-domesticated, horse was for sacrifice. A horse's skull discovered by J. A. Sjögren at Ingelstad in Schonen showing a flint knife driven right through it exactly in the centre amply corroborates this view.‡ The first use of the domestic horse was this sacrificial

* Wells, *The Outline of History*, pp. 46-47.

† Herodotus (v. 9), speaking of the Sigynnae, says that they possessed a breed of small shaggy horses, "not strong enough to bear men on their backs, but when yoked to chariots.....among the swiftest known".

‡ Schrader, *Reallexikon*, II. pp. 172 ff. A good picture of this object is given there.

use and as a natural consequence it was also used as human food. Its milk may have also been used later. *

The chief char cteristic of the horse which struck the human being most was its lightning speed. And for this reason the horse in mythology represented darting light, and hence some of the lights of heaven, notably the Sun and the Morning Star. The Asvinas are twin gods of light and correspond to the two Dioscuri of Greek mythology or to the Lettic god's two sons, gods of light in both lands. Dadhikrā also represents the Sun in the form of a steed and is another of these horse-shaped gods of light.†

Two principal species of the domesticated horse are distinguishable at a later age. One of them, the Western, is a heavier and a larger animal and is distinguished by the development of a longer muzzle and a receding brain-cavity. The other, the Eastern, is of a lighter, more delicate type, and possesses a larger brain-cavity, while its muzzle is shorter. This early distinction between the Eastern and the Western types is on the whole well marked in the various word groups of the I.-E. languages that denote this animal.

The word which is found in all the branches of the Indo-Europe family (except the Slavic) is the word *ḱéḱṷo*. This gives :—

Sanskrit *áśva*, Avesta *aspa*, Persian *asp*, Ossetic *yāfs*, Afghan *ās* (*âspa, mare*), Balochi *aps*, *Lithuanian aszwà ;* Greek *híppos*, Latin *equus*, Irish *ech*, Gaulish *epo*, Old Saxon *ëhu*, Old English *eoh*, Gothic *aíhwa* (in *aíhwa-tundi*, briers), Tokharian *yuk* (*yákwe*).

Besides these there is the Skt. *háya* which is cognate to the Armenian *ji*, and, among the *European branches* of the I.-E. we also find two sets of words connected with the horse, which have a fairly wide extension : (1) Greek *pôles*, Gothic *fula*, *Albanian peĺs* Irish *láir* (mare), English *foal;* and (2) Old High German *stuota*, Old Norse *stod*, Old Saxon *stado*, Old English *stod*, English *stud*, Lithuanian *stodés*, which all *denote* "a herd of horses."

* To-day also in the Khirgiz Steppes, the original homeland of the horse, the main uses of the animal are for its flesh and its milk.

† This deity is celebrated in four hymns of the *Rigveda*—iv. 38. 40 and vii. 44. See Grassmann, *Wörterbuch zum Rigveda*, 574; also Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, pp 148-49.

The only important branch of the I.-E. which has been left out of this list is the Slavic.* The word in Russian for the better class of horse (a steed) is *koně*,† in Czech it is *komon*, in Lithuanian *kúme* (mare). These forms are connected with the Old Russian *kómoně*, and, according to J. Schmidt, this last word and the word used in Old Slavic, *koblya* (mare), are connected with the Gallo-Latin word *caballus* and the Greek *kabállēs* (a work-horse or a dray-horse). Schmidt further thinks that all these words may be traced back to a hypothetical form *kob-moně*, a pre-Indo-European (and also perhaps a non-Indo-European) designation for the animal. He also thinks that the first part of this hypothetical word, *kob*, may be compared with the Finnish *hevo*, *hepo*‡ (horse), and that the second part, *moni*, is to be seen in the Latin word *mannus*§ pony or gallic horse). This latter Latin word *mannus*, however, may very well have been derived by assimilation through *mandus* and the same word may be seen in the Albanian *mës* (foal of horse or ass), and in the name of the Messapian god *Jupiter Menzana* (to whom horses were sacrificed); and further this word may be connected with the Basque word *mando*¶ (horse or mule).

In this connection we may mention ancient Gallic place names like *Epo-manduo-durum*.** In any caste from all this we may draw one conclusion certainly, viz., that the words *caballus* and *mannus* point to some non-Indo-European connections.

The existence of the words belonging to the series of the Skt. *ásva* makes it amply clear that the I.-E. peoples†† were acquainted

* In the Hittite, which I regard as an I.-E. language, the word for horse is written in the cuneiform and has been consequently read like the corresponding Assyrian word; so we do not quite know how it was pronounced. Very likely it was much like the Latin *equus*.

† The ordinary Russian word is *loshadi* which has been taken from the Turkish-Tartar *alasha*; see Schrader, *Reallexikon*, II, p. 177.

‡ Is the Eng. *cob* (a small stout pony) at all connected? The derivation given in Skeat's *Etymological Dictionary*, from O.E., *copp* (top or summit) is not very convincing. Can this not have been loan word?

§ It must be added that all scholars do not accept this theory of Schmidt.

¶ Walde, *Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, p. 462. The connection with the Basque here is extremely interesting and significant, but I need not digress on this point.

** The element *epo* here is "horse" and *manduo* is "foal."

†† I use this convenient phrase merely to mean "people speaking the I.-E. languages" there is no ethnological implication whatsoever.

with this animal *before their separation*; while the existence of cognate words corresponding to Skt. *ratha* and *cakra* in very widely separated branches of the I.-E. *may* lead to the conclusion that the horse was also domesticated before the separation. The development of the I.-E. word *ékṷo* in the various branches shows the first and most fundamental sound change, the change which separates the *śatam* from the *centum* languages.* This makes it pretty certain that the I.-E. people in their original home were acquainted with the horse; while the other set of names found in the European branches seemes to indicate that in the course of their migrations through Europe the I.-E. peoples came across the Western variety of the animal and got its name from some of the non-Indo-European people.

From the European remains we find that by the end of the stone age the bones of the wild horse (used as food) become considerably less in quantity, and so we may conclude that by that time the animal had become a valued and permanent member of the human household. This domesticated wild horse of the stone age in Europe was the ancestor of the modern European horse.†

The Vedic Indians regarded the horse as a specially valuable and sacred animal. India is not the land of the horse and consequently the animal was specially well cared for and was stall-fed and not turned out to graze in the meadows with the other cattle. The possession of horses was regarded as a sign of rank and wealth. Warriors were often distinguished by names containing the element *aśva*. The gods were described as possessing glorious divine steed.‡

Indra and Soma have been termed *áśvajit*.§ The gift of horses being the supreme gift we find in some places the word *dāna* (gift) itself being used in the sense of horse.¶ The horse was also valued

* In other words the I.E. palatalised velar sound ḱ changes to a pure velar (*k*) in Greek, Latin, Keltic, Germanic, Hittite and Tokharian; while it changes to a sibilant (*s* or *ś*) in Aryan (Indo-Iranian), Letto-Slavic, Armenian and Albanian. The former group is called the *centum*-group and the latter is called the *śatam*-group from the type-word, the word for the numeral 100.

† Schrader, op. citt., *p.* 171.

‡ *RV*., i. 115 3, and numerous other places.

§ Ibid, ii, 21, 1 and ix 59.

¶ Ibid, v. 27. 5, vii. 18. 22-25 and viii. 46, 24. Cf., similarly Old High German *meidum* (horse) and Goth. *maithms* (gift).

for the beauty of its colour and in the Veda are mentioned steeds of various colours: *hari* (fawn), *rohita* (bay), *śyāma* (dark) and others. The most valued was the white or the cream-coloured horse, like the one the *Aśvinas* gave to Pedu.* The horse was also used in the most important of all royal ceremonies—the *aśvamedha* without which no ruler could call himself *chakravartin*.†

Schrader seems to think that on the whole the I.-E. people were not a race of riders although they had tamed the horse pretty early and had been using it for war.‡ Not being nomads, the horse was not an animal of universal use to the I.-E. people, as to the Tartars, and hence in the earlier literatures of the I.-E. peoples the animal is mentioned much less often than the cow or the ox. They certainly did not "grow up together with their horses and conquer or perish together with them' like the nomadic Tartars.§ But the Aryans (Indo-Iranians) in the course of their migrations from their original home lived for a good length of time in the neighbourhood of Bactria, where they came to know the animal much more intimately than their brethern could in Europe.

So we find that the use of the horse both for riding and for chariots was quite well known to the Vedic Indians. Riding is very categorically referred to in the Veda.¶ Again there are adjectives like *ásvaprṣṭha*** (riding on horseback) and *ásva-budhna* (carried by horses)†† also which show that horses in Ancient India had other uses than merely that of adding pomp and state to the rich or of being sacrificed by kings. Chariots, too, are mentioned in *RV.*, vii. 34. 1 and elsewhere very often, Chariots

* Ibid, i. 116. 6 etc. The word *śveta* is cognate with the word *wheat*, hence the suggested translation, "cream-coloured". Cream-coloured horses are very highly prized; the famous set owned by King-Emperor Edward VII were highly prized and were used by him on all state occasions. Very often a light coloured horse gets pure white out of sheer old age.

† In *RV.*, i. 162 and 163 this ceremony is described.

‡ *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte* (3rd ed.), II, pp. 158-9.

§ Geiger, *Civilisation of the Eastern Iranians in Ancient Times*, I. p. 178. The whole section in this book relating to the horse is well worth reading.

¶ Nothing can be clearer evidence of this than *RV.*, v. 61. 2-3.

** *RV.*, viii. 26. 24.

†† Namely, in chariots? Ibid., ix 8. 3.

are mentioned with horses in *RV.*, ix. 10.1, 22.1 and elsewhere ; and the use of horse chariots in war is clearly mentioned in *RV.*, vi. 75.7. The making of chariots has also been described and "the skill shown in the composition of hymns is.....compared to the art of the carriage-builder". *

Herodotus comparing India and Persia says that the former had "all the four-footed beasts and birds.....very much bigger than elsewhere, except only the horses," and of the latter he says that the Median horse (famed as the Nisean horse) was superior to the Indian animal.†

Horse racing is a very ancient sport. Indeed some scholars seem to think that there was a race-course at the Stonehenge.‡ At any rate it was a sport well recognised by the I.-E. peoples and the Aryans were extremely fond of it. This sport is referred to frequently, and racers have been often mentioned in the Veda. The hymn *RV.*, vii. 69 is a prayer for victory in a chariot race. The two rushing rivers Vipās and Śutudrī are compared to two racing mares.§ There is a special name, *avart*, applied to the race-horse on account of his speed¶

The plateau of Iran is much better suited to be the home of the horse, and the north-eastern parts of Iran border upon the homeland of the Asiatic horse referred to above.** And consequently the Iranians were better horsemen and had better horses than their brother Aryans of India. Herodotus has in a famous passage told us that the ancient Persian were "carefully instructed, from the fifth to the twentieth

* V.S. Ghate, *Lectures on Rigveda*, 191; the passages referred to are i. 61. 4, 94. 1. and iv. 16. 20.

† Herodotus, iii. 106.

‡ Schrader, *Reallexikon*, II. p. 172.

§ *RV.*, iii. 33. 1.

¶ Grassmann, *Wörterbuch zum Rigveda*, 116. Cf. also the Avestan word *aurvat* which means "swift" and is applied to the horse; and the epithet *aurvat-aspa* applied in the Avesta to the Sun.

** In the basin of the Tarim river is still found the *Equus Przewalskii*, who is the nearest representative of the ancient Asiatic type. This land is also the homeland of the wild ass, and hence it was known in ancient India as the *kharostra land*. In this connection, about the ancient homeland of the horse and its diffusion throughout the world, see Wissler, *Man and Culture*, pp. 111-121, especially the map given on p. 120.

year in three things alone : to ride, to draw the bow, and to speak the truth."* Horsemanship has been all through their history a strong point with the Persian people. In later ages, in the wars between Iran and Rome, it was the Iranian cavalry that proved stronger than the Roman legions, and Rome was never able to cross the Euphrates.

Horse and chariot races were the most beloved sports of the ancient Iranians, and the royal game of polo was first played among these people. The Persians loved the animal with a love that bordered upon veneration. The white horse was specially venerated, but horses of other colours were also prized. Among the colours noted in the Avesta are, besides *spaēta* (Skt. *śveta*), *zairi* (Skt. *hari*), *aurusha* (Skt. *aruṣa*), *sāma* (Skt. *śyāma*) and several others, The steeds of the various deities are mentioned as being swifter than anything upon earth, as having the most gorgeous trappings and having their hoofs shod with gold.† The deites themselves sometimes take the shape of horses ; thus Verethraghna (*Vṛtrahan*) appears as a white horse and Tishtrya (the star Sirius) also assumes the form of a white horse, whilst his opponant Apaosha, the demon of draught, takes the shape of "a black horse, hairless on his tail, back and ears", ‡

The pious worshipper in ancient Iran also asked for the gift of good and swift steeds. The possession of horses was with the Iranians also the sign of rank and wealth; and proper names with the element *aspa* indicated the warrior class. Among the most famous bearers of such names were Keresāspa, the great hero of Avestan legends, the hero-minded conqueror of the horned dragon.§ Pouru-shaspa, the father of Zoroaster,¶ and Vīshtāspa, King of Bactria, and his great minister Jamāspa the Wise, two of the earliest and among the most devoted of the disciples of the Prophet.

Warriors prayed to the deities to give strength to their horses.** In later ages ill-treating the horse, by not giving him sufficient food or by

* i. 136; Rawlinson's translation.

† Cf. the description of the steeds of Sraosha, *Yasna* lvii. 27-8.

‡ *Yasht* xiv. 9 and viii. 18. For information about the horses in Iran see Geiger, op. cit., I, pp. 174-80 and also Dhalla, *Zoroastrian Civilisation*.

§ *Yasna* ix. 11.

¶ Many of the ancestors of Zoroaster have names ending in *aspa*.

** Cf. among other passages *Yas.* ix. 22 and lvii. 26,

keeping him in filthy surroundings was a punishable crime. Not only that, but men are warned against catching even wild horses in such a manner as to injure them.*

The veneration felt by the ancient Iranians for the horse is shown in a well-known Avesta text where the ill-used horse says to his rider, "Mayest thou never be a harnesser of horses, nor a bestrider of horses, nor a driver of horses; thou, who dost not pray for strength for me, when in the full assembly when in the course thronged with horses".† The horse was also used as an oracle in Persia. There is the well known story of how Darius got his throne because his horse was the first to neigh at dawn.‡ And in Iran the royal stable was always an inviolable sanctuary. §

It seems almost certain that the horse was the cultural gift of the Aryans to the Semitic races. The word for horse in the Ancient Egyptian is *sûs*, in Assyrian *sîsû*, in Hebrew sûs in Aramaean *sûsjâ*. Attempts have been made to trace all these words to the I.-E. *ḱso ćḱuos* (Skt. *so'śvah*)! But this doubtful philology need not affect the historical fact that the animal was introduced to the Semites by the Aryan people. The horse in Babylon is certainly later than Hammurabi. The royal beast in ancient Babylon was the ass.¶ The Arabs knew the horse much later, but they are now among the best horsemen in the world** and are most intensely devoted to this animal, and they also breed the finest horses in the world.

* These things are mentioned at several places in the *Dinkart*.

† *Yansa* xi. 2.

‡ Herodotus, iii. 85, 88. A similar practice of letting an animal choose the ruler was also followed in India. But here according to folk-tales, it was the elephant who chose the new king.

§ Modi, *Education among Ancient Iranians*, pp. 8-9.

¶ The Aryans "descended from the Oxus-land into Media and made their presence felt on the eastern mountain-border of the Semitic kingdom of Babylon the realm of the great law-giver Hammurabi and his successors. They brought with them from central Asia the horse, hitherto unknown to the Babylonians, who had previously gone to war in chariots drawn by asses" (*Cambridge Ancient History*, I, p. 311). The Sumerians however, knew the horse, and called it "the ass from the east". But the earliest mention of the horse among the Babylonians is in a tablet of the date of Hammurabi (Ibid, p. 501).

** Similarly, though the horse was first introduced into America by the Spaniards, the North-American Indian is a most accomplished horseman.

The two great branches of the I.-E. peoples, the Indians and the Iranians, though they had very intimate dealings with the horse, never degraded him to the level of a beast of burden. In India, as in Iran, the carrying of burdens, as well as the work of ploughing, was done by the ox, the ass or the mule. The horse has always remained "an aristocratic animal", and its possession has always been the sign of high lineage and honorable status. This is reflected in the fact that the ancient I.-E. name—the name by which they had called him from the remotest antiquity—is still used by them to denote the animal. The horse brings even to the meanest rider the ancient and honoured namt of *aswār*. *

In contrast with the condition of the horse in India and in Persia we find that in Europe the animal has been used also as a beast of burden and for agriculture as well. It has not remained "an aristocratic animal in Europe. This change has taken place during the historical period, and the varied designations of the animal among the I.-E. languages in Europe seem to have arisen on this account. The earliest set of names in Europe, however, go back to the *áśva*-series. And these names evidently are applied to the better class animal.

In Greece the country is very unsuited to horses. But in the northern parts of the Grecian world, in Thrace, there are broad grassy plains just suited to the horse. We find that the horse was a very valued animal in ancient Greece, in the Homeric age, of special use for riding and for chariots in times of war.† As with the Aryans so with the Greeks also the possession of horses was a sign of wealth and rank ; and to have a name connected with *híppos* was sign

* The Indian vernacular word *ghōḍā* can be traced back to the Pali-Prakrit (i.e. Middle-Indian) from *ghōṭka* or *ghoḍaka*. Sanskrit dictionaries also give the word *ghoṭaka* as a name of the horse. The *Amarakośa* also gives this word, ii. 8. 43, and the commentary of Bhānuji Dīkṣita explains the word as from the root *ghuṭ*, "to turn," (belonging to the *bhū-class*). But the word appears to be a "prakritism" and I have not been able to find the word in any work of classical Sanskrit. In the *Asvadhāṭi*, published in the *Subhāṣitaratnākara* (evidently a recent composition) the word is found; the passage is quoted in Apte's *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*.

† *Iliad*, x. 513 and 679; *Odyssey*, v. 371.

of aristocracy. In Homer there are several such names found, but only one warrior bearing such a name is eminent. He is the famous Hippothoüs, the Pelasgian.

The steeds of the Greek divinities are described in much the same terms as are those of the Aryan deities, still the steeds of Greek gods are much less important than with the Aryans. In Homer's poems the horse is necessarily mentioned many times, but we are not to judge of the position of the horse in Greek life merely from this fact. We find that in the later days of Athenian superiority only a few rich families could afford the luxury of keeping horses. And till the date of Marathon they kept them more for their Olympic sports than for war. Horses could not be used at all in Greece for any heavy work, for the country is too rocky. It was only after Alexander's time that cavalry took its place as an important unit of the Greek army. Horse sacrifice was also not known except to a few Greek tribes. But their near neighbours, the Illyrians, another I.-E. people, had a temple dedicated to Jupiter Menzana, where horses were offered as sacrifice.

The Romans were no great horsemen, and hence when they were brought face to face with the Iranian cavalry they were always unsuccessful. Italy, however, is a much better country for horse riding and for chariots than is Greece. Hence we find more among the Roman nobility using horses for riding and for driving than in Greece. In Rome also the horse was a sign of nobility. The comparative rarity of horse in Greece as compared with Rome may be judged by the number of ancient equestrian statues found in each.* There is only one Roman name which may be connected with the name of the horse and that is *Marcus*.† Horse sacrifice was practised by the Romans, though in a limited degree; the only god to whom the animal was offered was, quite appropriately, Mars, the god of War.

We have already considered the word *caballus*. It is first used in literature by Lucilius (B. C. 180-102) and originally seems to have

* Always excepting the frieze of the Parthenon. What I mean is statues of *individual* gods or men.

† The word is probably connected with the Keltic word *mare* (horse), but Walde (op. cit.) does not agree with this view.

been applied to a cart-horse. It was distinctly confined to the inferior variety of the horse, whereas the original I.-E. word *equus* was used for the superior animal, the horse of the aristocracy, the *equus bellator*. Side by side with *caballus* there was also another word used, *paraverēdus*. This word was introduced during the Augustan period for indicating a "post-horse". This word is a hybrid from the Greek *pará* and the Gallic *veredus*, "a (post) chaise". This word was introduced during the Augustan period for indicating a "post-horse". It was borrowed by the Germans in the 6th or 7th century A.D., and we thus get the Old High German form *pfer-frit*, whence the Modern German *Pferd* (horse), which has almost completely replaced the native German word.

The word *caballus* replaced *equus in* Vulgar Latin, and thence it spread through all the Italic languages of modern times ; thus. French *cheval*, Italian *cavallo*, Spanish *caballo*, Portuguese *cavallo*, Roumanian *cal*. The word has gone still further afield into Albanian *kal*, and into the Keltic branch as well: Irish *capall*, Breton *caval*, Welsh *cefyll*. The Spaniards have another word to indicate the superior type of horse ; it is the Arabic *alfaraz*.*

Among the Kelts and the Germans the horse was an important animal both from the economic as well as from the religious point of view. Both races regarded the white horse with veneration and the Germans also performed the horse-sacrifice. Racing and stallion-fighting were favourite pastimes with both. Among the Kelts there are several names, both of persons and of places, containing the element *epo*, e. g. *Epona*, *Eporedorix*.† The names like *Marcodurum*, *Marcomagus*, etc., show the element which also means "horse". This word *marc* is also found in Germanic: Old High German *marah*, Old Norse *marr*, English *mare*. The Keltic word was probably also the basis of the Latin name *Marcus*. And this same word travelled eastwards into Slavic lands and has changed its signification to mean "cattle" generally. The Kelts were great at chariot-

* Similarly a good horse was called in Middle High German *môr* from *Maurus*, a Moor, i.e., an Arab.

† This name in Skt. would be *aśva-ratha-rāja*.

building and chariot-fighting* and they were also fine horsemen and horse-breeders. The Germans, on the other hand, possessed fewer horses in the earlier days. Both Cæsar and Tacitus mention that with the exception of a few tribes the Germans preferred to fight on foot rather than on horseback.†

The native German word for horse is Old High German *hros*, Modern German *Ross*, Old Norse *hross*, Old Low German *hërs*, English *horse*. The word originally was used in the sense of "a war-horse". The word is connected either with the Latin verb *currere* (*xcurs-ere*) "to run" or with Skt. *kūrd* to leap, and the Old Norse word *hress* (swift) is doubtless cognate.‡ This word signifying the superior animal, has also been borrowed by other nations. French *rosse* and Italian *rozza*. In both these the animal is understood to be of a huge size,§ and of superior breed. There is another Germanic word also for horse, it is Old High German *hengist*, Old Norse *hestr*, Dano-Norwegian *hest*. The names of the two leaders of the Anglo-Saxons who first came to Britain were Hengist and Horsa, which probably is reminiscent of the good horsemanship of these tribes. The word *hengist* originally meant "a castrated horse". The oldest use of the word is found in the *Lex Salica*, in the form *chanzisto*, where it means *equus castratus*. In English the word is found in the Old English period, but dies out in Middle English. In Modern German the word becomes *Hengst* and has acquired an extended signification of a male horse or stallion, sometimes even that of a male animal generally, whether horse or camel or ass.

Among the Slavic people (excepting the Lithuanians) we find two names generally used for the animal. Both these words are non-Indo-European. The Russian *konĭ* has already been considered,

* Cf. Cæsar, *De Bello Gallico*, iv. 33.

† Cæsar, op. cit., iv. 2; Tacitus, *Germania*, vi. Cæsar's comparison of Gallic and German horses is interesting.

‡ Kluge, *Deutsches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, p. 377.

§ Roman writers also have spoken of the huge size of the German horse

and is generally used for the better kind of horse. The more common word is *loshadĭ* and is a borrowing from the Turkish-Tartar.¶ Evidently the animal was introduced to the Slavs by the nomadic Tartars of the Central Asian steppes. Among the older tribes of the Slavs, we find horse-sacrifice among the Old Prussians and some other tribes. The use of the horse in war among the Slavs came much later with the Slavs. Tacitus mentions** that the Slavs preferred to fight on foot and usually faught thus.

¶ Old Russian *losha*, Turkish *alasha*.

** *Germania*, xlvi.

ŚAIVISM

(PROFESSOR MAHENDRA NATH SIRCAR, M.A., PH.D.)

A complete presentation of Śaivism as a system of thought requires the treatment of Śreekānta's system and the consideration of the Kaśmere Śaivism. These two forms may be conveniently distinguished as the Southern and the Northern forms of Śaivism.

Śaivism is a system of philosophy that falls in with Vedāntism in being essentially idealistic. Śreekānta's system has been developed as an interpretation of the Brahma Sūtras. Though the Northern form has an independent history of its own, still we cannot help thinking that Kaśmere Śaivism is another form of Vedāntic Idealism, not quite identical with it, yet not completely different from it. Difference there must be to lend unto it an individuality as a system, but the fundamental structure of thought does not much differ. Philosophically considered they belong to the same genus.

EPISTEMOLOGY

The epistemology of Southern Śaivism is more akin to Rāmānuja than to Śaṃkara. Knowledge is determinate consciousness implying a relation of subject and object. It is a dynamic dialectic stress, which, to be determinate and concrete, transcends the indeterminate being and passes on to a dialectic synthesis through thesis and antithesis. The antithesis breaks the even continuity of the indeterminate cognition, and the synthesis establishes a concrete unitive consciousness. Intuition by this effort acquires the determinate notion of self-cogniser and self-knower. Psychologically this process involves recognition. Knowledge is a cognition-recognition continuum. This recognition helps knowledge to grow out of its abstraction and indefiniteness to concreteness and definiteness.

Intuition has a projective force, and this projection creates the duality of subject and object. The self-alienation is an eccentric projection, which is soon followed by self-assimilation, the contrary

process of coming within the centre with the full consciousness of a self-cogniser. The duality of subject and object in the unity of self-consciousness is the fundamental epistemological conception of Southern Śaivism

Though the dialectic antithesis brings out the distinction of the subject and the object to the fore, still the subsequent assimilation makes the subject the centre of synthesis, and the object is apprehended as the effect of a move in self-conscious unity and being.

This dialectic character of knowledge is true of finite and infinite consciousness. In finite consciousness knowledge has a definite character through assimilation and recognition. It has an outward reference to concrete things, which, it cannot create, but can express. Expression and creativeness are different in this case. The projective force is expressive and by its reference outward it acquires a concreteness which is not otherwise possible.

In Infinite consciousness the dialectic is at once expressive and creative. The expressive projection and its consequent centric assimilation give the dialectic process an epistemological unity. But the creative antithesis, the reference of the creative force to the centre, and the consequent subordination of the creative projection bring out the dialectic unity in being.

In this sense the cosmic revelation and creation are self-expression of the Infinite to self, for in this process the Infinite has a clear cognition of its concrete unity through a dialectic diversity. And the inward vision is no longer confined to abstract being, but is spread over the whole process of becoming and the inward reference of this becoming to the centre of life and delight. In this way the Infinite comes to recognise itself as *Visva-jñātā* and *kartā*, i.e., the cosmic knower and the cosmic builder.

Śaivism is objective idealism in as much as it recognises the reality of the Infinite, the finite being and Nature and assimilates the finite selves and Nature or Prakṛti in the Unity of Infinite Being. Finite selves and Nature are integrated in the Infinite as its predicates. Herein Śaivism accepts the adjectival theory of predication.

The epistemology of Kaśmere Śaivism recognises an indeterminate intuition which has no character, no distinction and no specialisation. It is *Chit* pure and simple without any vibrative expression. It is the calmness of static consciousness beyond conceptual distinction the nameless, formless and actionless Śiva. Northern Śaivism differs from Śreekānta's in actually accepting an indeterminate consciousness which forms the basis of subsequent development and expression in knowledge. This homogeneity of indeterminate consciousness transcends the mutuality of subject and object of determinate consciousness though it may not actually deny it. It is intuition which does not intuite, it is knowledge which does not know itself. It is transcendent intuition. The author of the *Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya* expresses its essence of *Sūnya*, the indefiniteness by characterising as the indeterminate.* It is not denied a being, it is being itself. It is denied a definite and determinate being and as such appears to be thought as non-being, for thought cannot conceive indeterminate being, accustomed as it is to think in terms of relation. The transcendent Intuition in being the highest position appears to thought as the negation in quintessence.

This intuition, though transcendent, actually does not deny expression and in this it does not change a bit from its indeterminateness. But the initiation of expression presupposes the existence in suspension of the expressiveness in the indeterminate intuition. Expression becomes expressive. This determinateness presupposes then a necessity of expressiveness in the indeterminate expression. The apparent absence of this expressiveness is what characterises *Śiva* (Being) in its complete transcedence. It is *Chaitanya*, the Parama-Śiva.

With the move of expressiveness in expression, intuition begins to intuite, though in the initial expressiveness there is nothing to express. This move of expression is initiated in the indeterminate consciousness without affecting its indeterminateness. Now this expressiveness is inherent in the expression, though there is an

* Vide—*Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya*, Aphorism 4.

Śri parama siva Svtātmaikyena sthitam viśvam Sadasivādyucitena rūpena avabibhāsayiṣuḥ pū vam cidaikyākhyātimāyānaśritā siva parjayāśūnyātīsunyātmatyā prakāśābhedena prakāśamānatayā sphurāti.

occasional suspension and an occasional expression in the indeterminate *Chit*. When it closes itself, intuition alone exists in its evenness and indefiniteness. A dialectic move and development in knowledge and being is conceived in Śaivism, but it has been not allowed to disturb the indeterminate intuition.*

Though the intuition in its indeterminateness has in it the denial of the expressiveness and its dialectic development, still this denial does not suppose complete negation of expression and its development. This expressiveness is the beginning of experience. We use the term experience, in the sense of consciousness coming to a concreteness in cognition, though the terms of the relation may be developed from within, without supposing an external factor,—not necessarily denying mediateness.

Experience supposes expressiveness, and in the expressiveness, expression assumes a concreteness and a determinateness which were not originally in its being, or at least was not manifest in itself. This expressiveness is then an element, not different from the expression, but still not quite one with it. Experience is in expression, but is not expression. As such we can distinguish it as a distinctive element, though not different.

Up till now experience appears still to be abstract, for, though, in the being of indeterminate intuition we have a dynamic expressiveness, there is nothing concrete to express. We have the stage of indeterminate expressiveness. Knowledge still moves in the transcendent abstraction and has not taken any concrete shape.† But though experience has not the concreteness still it must be conceded that with expressiveness intuition cannot remain an abstraction. Expressiveness has a meaning in the concrete sense. for it has a reference to a locus which it informs.

Expressiveness then has a reference to the subject and the object. But this reference to both the sides is not simultaneously manifested. Śaivism refers to two stages in the process.

* Vide—Iśvarapatāyabhijñā, page 191.

Antaraviparivartamānam jñānamātram kriyāvyāpadesāśunyām yāt pratipaditam Sa Sri Sadasivabātārakah kryāśaktimayasya udrekavabhase sati paramesvaram.

† Vide—*Pratyabhijñā Hrdaya*.

Prakasabedena prakāsamānatayā sphurati.

Expressiveness is first related to the expressed. Here expression takes on it the concrete form of self-expression though the other side of the reference is not so clearly presented. The I-consciousness is shaped in the expression, though the not I-consciousness is still nebulous in its formation. Consciousness is here still egocentric‡ and the formation of I is not still understood as a factor in a concrete synthesis.

This I-consciousness is called in Śaivism Sada Śiva Tattva.

A concrete vision of this I requires a clear cognition of the I-ness of consciousness as the centre of expression which expresses a definite thing or an object. The object and its expression are the clear necessaries of this stage of experience. We may go so far as to say that the reference to a definite form is so imperative that in this stage the consciousness of *Idam* or not-I cannot but be prominent. An eccentric projection makes the object more prominent in consciousness which begins to feel its identity as not-I.

This manifest objectification of consciousness is a stage that intervenes between the I-consciousness of the previous stage and the synthetic consciousness of the next. The expressiveness is here concrete, for it has a definiteness in reference to the object. This clear reference brings to view consciousness in its concreteness, a concreteness which was implicit in the previous stage. This explicit concreteness by reference to the subject and object consciousness makes out the third stage in the dialectic expression of being and consciousness. This stage has the technique, *Īsvara tattva*.

But the dialectic expression cannot be long centred in this seemingly outward reference, it comes back upon itself and soon discovers its nature as a unitive consciousness which finds its expression as 'I am this,' followed by a consciousness, 'This am I'. This stage of dialectic unity is called Sadvidyā in the *Iśvara Pratyabhijñā*. The author of the Īsvara Pratyabhijñā says that in the Īsvara tattva the two sides of reference, the subject and the object, are equally manifest and equally appear as belonging to the same locus or the same parts of a complete self. Here experience becomes fully concrete and completely developed, with an

‡ Ego in the sense of initial concentration in expression.

equalisation and the consequent assimilation in unitive consciousness of the experience and the experienced.*

In the Sada Śiva Tattva represented by the predominance of the I-consciousness, the equalisation and the relation of subject and object are not fully developed. Potentially they may have been there, but the relational synthesis and the relational experience emerge only when both the sides of the dialectic come into full view. Actual relation is possible between subject and object, equally prominent in being. But this prominence in the truth of subject and object does not lead to duality, either metaphysical or epistemilogical, for these angles of knowledge are not two ultimate realities, nor two irreconcileable aspects of the same reality. The dialectic presents to us the same reality as subject, the experiencer, and as object, the experienced. The undeniable and invariable reference to and the demand for each other are sufficient to indicate the co-reality of them in the same synthetic unity. This gives us the relation of distinction in unity.

The dialectic march, therefore, holds up before the vision a stage wherein the I-consciousness of a previous stage attains a complete synthetic unity. Epistemological dialectic proceeds from the abstract Intuition to a definite self-cogniser as a unitive consciousness through the equalisation of the experiencer and the experienced. In the unity of the all-expressive and all-integrative self-consciousness the knowledge becomes clear that I am all this, all this is in me as a part of my being.

A point to notice here is that the dialectic move and the synthesis meet at the same centre, the I-consciousness in the Absolute. The development through the reference makes out the concrete character of I-consciousness. When consciousness has passed through all these phases it becomes conscious of itself as I, as containing in it the whole of experience.

In Śaiva epistemology then, knowledge has three successive stages assimilated in the being of Identity.

These stages we may characterise as Intuition, self-intuition and self-experience. In the first the dynamic character and expressive

* Vide—*Īśvara Pratyabhijñā*, 3, 1, 3.
Samānadhikaraṇyaṃ ca Sadvidyāhamidamdhiyoḥ.

being of knowledge are not apparent, in the second Intuition becomes self-intuitive, and in the third Intuition is self-recognitive. In recognition the idea of alienation and consequent assimilation is fully expressed.

The dialectic unity and equalisation of subject and object of the fourth stage in the evolution of determinateness in knowledge in Kaśmere Śaivism corresponds to the initial stage of the dialectic in Śreekanta and Rāmānuja. To these philosophers knowledge is always concrete involving a relation between the subject and the object and knowledge never transcends, nor denies, this relation. Its life is there, and it cannot deny it in any stage. Knowledge is a source of unceasing expression. This expression is determinate as systematically demanding this relation between the self as subject and the self as object. And this mutual demand establishes their unity in the fuller life of a concrete synthesis, which does not ignore any side of the relation, nor make the one more important than the other, but embraces the subject and the object in its self. Such a position surmounts the extremes of subjective Idealism and Realism, ignoring the reality of either object or subject, and recognises their distinction and unity in the complete self of knowledge.

So far the two forms agree. But a stage higher, the difference begins. Śreekānta does not perceive any stage in knowledge and consciousness beyond this unity ; Kaśmere Śaivism does. In other words in Śreekanta as well as in Rāmānuja knowledge is always an explicit notion and the immediacy of the unity of notion involves a mediate relation of subject and object. Kaśmere Śaivism recognises the immediacy of notion to be indeterminate in its initiation where the mediacy is not apparent to be assimilated in the immediacy of Unity. This immediacy of indeterminateness is the exact point whence difference between the two forms begin. And exactly at this point in Kaśmere Śaivism epistemology has an approach towards the epistemology of Śaṃkara and the Śaṃkarites.

Though the mutual reference of subject and object has been accepted in Advaitism, still this distinction is transcended in the identity of indeterminate consciousness, and this indeterminateness presents the true being of consciousness. The reciprocity of subject-object relation, though a fact in empiric intuition and a truism

so long as intuition dwells on empiric basis, is not inherent in intuition itself, but is a creation of *Avidyā* which presents a distinction and a division where there are none. So long as consciousness moves in the limitation put on by *Avidyā*, the logical ego subsists in the relation between a subject and an object. But this relation and its terms of reference have an ideality and no transcendent reality. Empiric intuition and thought-determination together make ideal constructions which have no metaphysical import or significance. The ideal construction may imply the centralisation, as it were, of the ether of consciousness into innumerable points, and the consequent differentiation, still this centralisation and the differentiation are not native to the homogeneity of the transcendent Intuition, which still remains the same and does not lose its identity in the ideal construction. No doubt, it is customary to hold that Advaitism has satisfied the demand of realistic and idealistic attitudes of Intuition and Life, in accepting the truth of the subject and the object and their relation in the formation of concrete knowledge. But closely considered, it will appear to have emphasised the ideality of the relational and determinate consciousness to be denied and not to be assimilated nor even absorbed in the Identity of Transcendent Intuition.

Though northern Śaivism in a certain stage of conciousness accepts the reality of the ideal construction of a relational consciousness, still it seeks to absorb such relational consciousness in the transcendent intuition without denying it, inasmuch as Intuition has a transcendent and absorbing phase where in the I-consciousness buds not, and the 'am-this' consciousness figures not. The dynamism of expression and the effort of ideal construction are suspended in the quietness of the Indeterminate-I and still more in the silence of the transcendent Absolute. In the nascent I-consciousness the concrete experience has not begun to form though it furnishes the basis of the determinate consciousness to come. Transcendence here is clear, for the relational consciousness is still not in sight. But this transcendence gives us the immediacy of an implicit notion and not the immediacy of Vedāntic Sākṣī.

The witness-consciousness is transcendent intuition circumscribed by the limitation of *antaḥkaraṇa* or *Avidyā*, but the *upādhi* is not

operative and the transcendence is apparently clear. In fact Sākṣī, is a state in normal consciousness where the transcendence can be directly felt and immediately apprehended. The immediacy of *Jīva-Chaitanya* is the immediacy of consciousness in its dynamic aspect, for here the distinction of Intuition (static) and the dynamic *Avidyā* is not in view, and as such Intuition in this stage appears as manifestly self-expressive. But the immediacy of Sāksī is the immediacy of expression, the idea of a self as a centre of cognition is lost and is replaced by the consciousness of self as transcendent intuition Though Sākṣī is in touch with the creative *Avidyā*, still it is transcendent in the sense that *Avidyā* has no longer any hold upon it and can no more focus an apparent centre in the expanse of Intuition. Sākṣī is, therefore, the indeterminate Intuition, which appears as determinate in touch with *Avidyā*. *Avidyā* is revealed by it and as such cannot possibly exert an influence upon it. The immediacy of Sākṣī is then the immediacy of static transcendence.

Different is the vision of immediacy of Śadā Siva-consciousness in Śaivism. Expressiveness is here manifest, and this expressiveness is centred in I-consciousness. As such the immediacy of Sāda-siva-consciousness presents itself as a dynamic effort of expression. The dynamic expression is a limitation or *upādhi* of Intuition or Sākṣī of Advaitism. Śaivism accepts this expression to be inherent in *Chīt* and expressive of its nature. In other words, the immediacy is the immediacy of a notion which soon manifests its expressiveness in a dialectic effort.

The dialectic effort in Intuition in Advaitism is psychological, in Śaivism, metaphysical. Śaṃkara cannot accept any effort in Intuition in the metaphysical sense, for, truly it has none, though as a psychological consideration the consciousness is supposed to be active in three normal states. The unity of self-consciousness is a psychological unity and not a metaphysical principle. The dynamic aspect of consciousness which constitutes a continuity and a history, however significant it may appear to be, is metaphysically non-significant, for the drama of the conscious activity becomes a meaningless exhibition when the illusion is over. Indeed Śaṃkara's philosophy gives us a meaning of the psychological unity, which it denies in transcendent Intuition. The import

of empiric intuition and being becomes meaningless in the real sense, for, rightly considered, the implications of the empiric intuitions and pragmatic values are creations of a distorted consciousness, and, however, potential and significant they may appear to distorted vision, their values disappear with right apperception and clear discrimination. They are constructions of sense, aesthetic or moral, and move in false being and divided consciousness. And the whole life which is so seriously conceived and which freely creates and expresses itself comes to nothing in Intuitive consciousness. The entire structure of the formation of understanding and reason, the whole creation of will and its value-conception, have no place in the apex of our consciousness. Śaṃkara's system is based upon psychological revelations and in accepting them it has not metaphysically attempted a synthesis between the two aspects of consciousness immanent and transcendent; on the other hand it has boldly denied the immanent in the transcendent. Though he sometimes appears to accept the claims of both, yet this acceptance is psychological necessity, so long as the *Avidyā* is operative.

Though Śaṃkara himself in the refutation of Vijñānavāda has accepted the reality of the objective reference in knowledge and in this respect differs from his extreme follower Prakāśānanda who denies this reference and reduces the system to subjective Idealism in accepting the creativeness of individual or subjective Śaṃskāras, still this objective reference, a fact and a datum of humanistic cognition, is transcendent and becomes ideal in *Jīvan Mukta*. The realistic touch of the exoteric consciousness loses its significance in the emancipated being and consciousness, wherein the outward reference loses its objective meaning, and the naive realism of popular consciousness is displaced by the epistemological or empiricistic Idealism.

Freedom is initiated with the removal of realistic reference, for this reference binds our thought to an element independent of itself, whereas the understanding of the ideality of this reference makes the thought and consciousness self-centred and self-directed. Between the bondage and limited vision of common-sense consciousness and the freedom and expanse of liberated consciousness a stage intervenes, the stage of the idealistic and illusory conception

of the reference in knowledge. And since the experience of realistic consciousness is denied and sublated in transcendent Intuition of *Jīvan Mukta,* the former is called illusory, the latter, real. Advaitism is open to psychological conviction, and in denying the truth of realistic attitude it simply accepts a fact which unprejudiced consciousness cannot but accept. Philosophy must not dogmatise, but only rationalise human experience, and from human experience we cannot exclude the attitudes of consciousness which may not be frequent, but is none the less significant.

Kaśmere Śaivism does not deny objective reference in immanent consciousness. And in transcendence this reference is completely withdrawn, but not denied. It is there, but not expressed. The *Jīvan Mukta* rises from the limitation of ordinary consciousness and sees the periodical expression and absorption of the universe in the basic being as a move out and a move in of the same life and consciousness. Śaivism presents the whole conscious life as a spiral enfoldment which has various linings, all beginning and ending at the same point. In the beginning the life is not rich in variety, though it is rich in fullness and integrity inasmuch as it is what it is in its wholeness. In transcendent intuition, the whole move is not denied, but momentarily held in quiet and quiescence. Conscious life is a life of stirring and expression and a life of inversion and quiet. The whole goes out, exhausts itself and recoils upon itself in the quiet of transcendence.

Śaivism draws a distinction between the common sense consciousness and the *jīvan-mukta* consciousness. The prejudiced and realistic consciousness has not the transcendence and has limited vision and attraction. The knower transcends the limitation and has the vision of the play of consciousness in all the stages of experience. The stages of ordinary consciousness are not denied, nor are their truth falsified. They are apprehended in the being of Śiva, the transcendent. And the *Jīvan-Mukta* through recognition has the complete vision of his own Sivahood: the whole universe is a rise and a fall in his being. The objective reference is not denied in the *Jīvan Mukta,* though it is occasionally absorbed in him. The *Jīvan Mukta* has in him a transcendence and indeterminateness in which the determinate immanence has occasional lapses. He is indeterminate-determinate consciousness. Determinateness is seen

not itself, as in Realism, but in its constant reference to the Indeterminate locus. The *Jīvan Mukta* has transcended the limitation of the senses and the understanding and has penetrated into the depth of being which appears to be an indeterminate consciousness with occasional expression in determinateness.

The cognition, or more accurately the recognition, is a recognition of self of the *Jīvan Mukta's* own being, and not a cognition of the self as centred in the Infinite. Śreekānta's thesis requires always an objective reference in knowledge, and even in the state of liberation the emacipated consciousness has this reference to Infinite consciousness, though this reference is established not through the sense data, but directly through the consciousness itself. Though this is a move in consciousness, still the sense of distinction is always alive and keeps the necessity of objective reference intact.

Such is not the thesis of Kaśmere Śaivism. Here the emancipated consciousness has no reference to anything else than self—Knowledge, freed from the limitation of the senses and the understanding, recognises itself as both the subject and the object of the reference which in its way to indeterminateness partially, though not completely, vanishes.

In other words the subject-object reference in knowledge which is never denied in Śreekānta, is partially denied in Kaśmere Śaivism. In the former the objective is always present, be it in normal or emancipated consciousness, in the latter the objective reference of the lower stages of expression is not always present in the higher stages. In the former the assimilation is within the Infinite, in the latter the limited consciousness, which characterises the finite, loses its limitation and recognises its limitless being. The former has an expansiveness of consciousness in the Infinite, the latter has an expansiveness of consciousness in itself.

Though Śreekānta has recognised the Brahman-likeness of being and knowledge (Brahma-Sāmyāpatti) of the liberated soul and in this substantially agrees with Kaśmere Śaivism, yet he has this limitation that Brahman remains a separate being for the liberated souls. Āppyaya Dikṣit in his *Śivārkarraṇidīpikā* says, "the liberated souls have their *Chit-Śakti* (consciousness) enlarged and extended on the disappearance of the Āvaraṇa, the cover consequent on the know-

ledge of Śiva or Parameśvara." Their knowledge and experience may be identical, still these experiences have different centres, and as such an individuality attached to each. However identical the experiences may be of liberated souls, still their individualities will speak for a distinction, if not a fundamental difference, in their experiences according to the presentation of the varied aspects of infinite consciousness and the concentration of the different aspect in different centres.

Kaśmere Śaivism differs from the above. In liberated consciousness there is, in fact, no presentation which is not its own and the liberated consciousness has not the least limitation, either actual or possible. Liberation is the removal of the limitation of consciousness, a limitation which is its own and which is self-imposed in the process of self-expression. When this limitation is removed, the emancipated consciousness feels the expansiveness of being and consciousness; it recognises, as it were, its own former self and finds no distinction between itself and the Absolute. In other words, it is more correct to say that the Absolute which in the course of self-expression acquires a limited vision, transcends it in liberation. As such no distinction remains, nor can remain between the absolute and the limited consciousness. Finiteness is limitation in expression. Liberation is the transcendence over this limitation. A liberated soul is Śiva in the true sense of the word, though practically the limitation may linger on up to a certain stage of development in being and consciousness in *Vijñāna kalā*.

STAGES OF EXPERIENCE

Śaivism recognises seven stages of experience. Those stages correspond to the different centres of consciousness formed in the course of expression. Proceeding from Sakala, the atomic consciousness, these centres have definite experience and knowledge. Sakala is the lowest centre where knowledge is limited, in vision and indistinct. Sakalas are subject to the limitation of Māyā and its influence.

Next comes Pralayakalā. Pralayakalās have no definite object, immersed as they are in Prakṛti. They have attained a stage of development known as Prakṛtalaya, i. e. absorption in the Prakṛti

and as such they are no active centres of being and consciousness. Hence they are entitled Śūnya Pramātā.

Then come Vijñānakalās. These have crossed the limitation of finite consciousness and have transcendence over Māyā, but have not the consciousness of the still higher stages. They are freed from the sense of agency. They are consciousness in quintessence, having no touch with anything else.*

Next proceed the Pramātās, Mantra, Mantreśvara, Mantra-Maheśvara, and Śiva stages in the subject-consciousness in transcendence corresponding to Vidyā, Isvara, Saḍa-Śiva and Śiva in transcendent being.

These stages only indicate the different stages of limitation and expansion of being and consciousness. What we cannot help noticing is that though these stages indicate a difference, still, beyond this difference, the identity is always present. And liberation is the consciousness of this identity and the passing off of the limitation and the convergence in a particular centre. The being and consciousness in each centre, be it transcendent or immanent, is the same being throughout, and when an individual has this consciousness or recognition, he is non-different from or is Śiva.

In Śreekānta liberation always presupposes the consciousness of a relation between *Paśu*, the finite consciousness and the infinite Śiva. In normal consciousness this relation, though a necessary postulate of knowledge, is overshadowed by ignorance. But the cognition of this relation brings in other forms of consciousness which are not pure relational. It excites love and service consciousness, and as such with the attainment of an equality with Brahman, the inherent consciousness of its being dependent upon and embracing the infinite life in the delight and joy of fellowship is always present.

Kaśmere Śaivism has not this relational consciousness in Liberation, for the liberated soul perceives nothing besides itself in liberation. It is a quietus in its indeterminate being. The joy here is the joy of this quietism of integral existence without an

* Vide—*Pratyabhijña Hṛdaya*, pages 70—72 (Kaśmere Edition)

effort of expansion and divisoin. Liberation is the attainment of the completeness of Being transcending all relation, fellowship or reference.

Curiously enough, though the systems differ in epistemological setting, they agree in conceiving Liberation as an expansive being with unceasing delight, though such an existence may or may not transcend the relativistic consciousness. Advaitism and Kaśmere Śaivism agree in the transcendence of this consciousness, Śreekānta and Rāmānuja accept a relativistic consciousness assimilated in a unitive consciousness in transcendent being. These nice distinctions apart, every one accepts an infinite dimension of knowledge and being in liberation. None deny this. Rāmānuja and Śreekānta, though they begin with atomic magnitude of finite selves accept an extensive dimension for these selves, otherwise they cannot support their thesis of Brahma-Sāmyāpatti. We should not forget here that both teachers attribute an expansiveness to the dynamic expression of consciousness. And this expansiveness has its full exercise and expression when the limiting view of *Avidyā* is destroyed. Śreekānta's and Rāmānuja's acceptance of this possibility has secured for them the expansive life and being of a liberated soul.

Śaivism frankly admits this expansive being, for the limitation is temporary in the process of expression due to *Māyā*. When the philosophy of Recognition teaches the Śivahood of Paśus, it retains no distinction between *Paśu* and *Poti*.

Śaṃkara's Vedāntism recognises also such a beautitude in the course of an evolution of *Jīva*—consciousness and the attainment of Īśvara's being and knowledge, for, rightly understood, the distinction between *Jīva* and Īśvara is no permanent and real distinction. *Jīva*—consciousness is dominated by *Māyā*, Īśvara—consciousness dominates *Māyā*. When consciousness in *Jīva* through discrimination and dissociation comes to feel its being an object as well as locus of *Avidyā*, it has its *jīvahood* displaced by Īśvarahood. And the limitation of being and consciousness of the previous existence is replaced by an expansion of being and knowledge. So long as the transcendence of intuition is not in sight and is not realised by the adept, the course of evolution will give him an extensive being of

Īsvara. In fact the *Jīva* dies, and Īsvara is what remains. This possibility for *Jīva* in the course of evolution, is still a possibility in *Avidyā*, and as such the expanse is felt and enjoyed in actual realisation but when this touch is forever removed, the being is what remains. So up to a certain point the three forms of thought agree in the delight of expansive being, in the clarity of unobscured and unobstructed consciousness in emancipation. Some call it *mukhyā*, some *gauna*, indirect *mukti*. This is the only difference. Śaivism accepts a non-qualified intuition in liberation, where the determinate being and consciousness lapse into the Indeterminate. But this is a lapse, in Saṃkara it is a dental. But in no case the further possibility of a rise exists, in as much as liberation is conceived as fullness of being and bliss. Once the limitation, the creation of *Avidyā* is off, no cause exists for a further travailing in the limited life and consciousness. But we must admit that in Śaivism the possibility remains for free self expression in as much as the power of expression is inherent in a liberated self.

But this is a rare possibility in as much as being, when it has its full repose in the quietness of indeterminateness, is not disturbed by the rippling of expression, though the current if expression be not forever stopped in as much as it is a rhythm in the life of the Absolute. But though the possibility of an expression remains, still it is no expression in limited being and consciousness, it is a free move in the unlimited expanse, and with the sense of freedom the limitlessness of being is not inconsistent. Emancipation then connotes the transcendence over limitation in indeterminate being with the possibility of free expression and move. Even in the *Jīvan Mukti* this transcendence and free move are possible, though they are subject to the limitation of an association with a physical body. But such limitation does not work when the soul becomes disembodied. Advaita does not accept this free move in liberation. Liberation is complete transcendence in static being which is devoid of any necessity, even the necessity of expression. In other words Śaivism recognises constantly a dynamic element in being. *Māyā* creates a limitation in expression, but cannot deny the original move in expression. The I-ness created by *Māyā* is different from the consciousness of I in the stages of transcendent expression. In Advaita Vedānta, rightly understood, Intuition is an

expression without being ever expressive and as such expression froms no expressive centre, except in touch with *Māyā or Avidyā.*

Expressiveness is a limitation created by *Avidyā,* a limitation in as much it introduces a reference to a centre and an object, and as such it must be conceived as forming, but as not eternally obtaining in Indeterminateness. Both Vedānta and Advaita Śaivism perceive this, but where Advaitism conceives this formation of expressiveness to be a necessity not involved in the Intuition, Śaivism accepts it to be an inherent necessity of the indeterminate intuition, and as such the intuition has a history of self-expression in itself, a history which the Absolute of the Śaṃkarites cannot claim. Śaivism though it is anxious to retain the transcendent indeterminateness of Intuition, is no less anxious not to lose the history.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS

All these forms of thought draw their inspiration directly from self-consciousness. But in saying this we must not limit the term to the content of normal experience. Self-consciousness has varied meanings in different systems of thought, and in oriental philosophy it means the range of experience, not only of normal, but also of super-normal consciousness. The three normal states of consciousness, besides presenting three forms of experience, point to a fourth one where consciousness is supposed to be revealing its own self, in dissociation from the necessary limitation of operative factors of the other stages. This evidence of consciousness in transcendence has been the main stay of the systems. Advaitism accepts complete transcendence in static consciousness, Southern Śaivism in dynamic and expressive consciousness, Northern, in a dynamic equilibrium, of consciousness. This equilibrium gives it the appearance of static being, but in fact, it is a state of a dynamic being in equilibrium, for the moment appearing as a waveless calm. In such a state the expressiveness is not apparent and the experience of such an existence differs from the experience when consciousness is actively expressive unto itself dissociated from the contracting influence of *Māyā* or *Avidyā*. But as such revelation is rare and far removed from common experience, the psychological foundation is sought to be laid upon the rise and the fall in self-consciousness, especially upon its fall in *suṣupti*. *Suṣupti* is a

phenomenon within the bounds of normal experience, and an analysis of *suṣupti* has been in fact the foundation of the philosophic structure of almost all forms of Vedāntism. In *suṣupti* the conscius activity has a fall, and in waking, a rise. This rise and fall are periodical.

Advaita Vedāntism maintains that in *suṣupti* there is an eclipse of the conscious striving of the waking and dream-consciousness, and this eclipse does not mean the holding in abeyance of the striving of conscious life, but practically a disappearance of it in its root cause, *Avidyā*. Such a state is not a denial, but, an absorption of the concrete unitive* experience, and even of its back ground, the formative self. Self-consciousness has then a periodical lapse. *Avidyā* with its vibrative activity is revealed by transcendent intuition. Nothing is there to form a psychological unity.

Northern Śaivism recognises a fall in consciousness in *suṣupti* and a rise in waking. And this it accepts to be a fact of self-experience. The fall is really a fall in consciousness, and no activity of *Avidyā*, inasmuch as conscousness functions here without the senses and the manas. The absence of these functions implies the peaceful repose of the functioning-self in self. If it does not indicate the full indeterminateness of consciousness, at least it has not the definiteness of waking and dream consciousness. It indicates a state of a close or withdrawal of active consciousness. This close is the evidence of the indeterminate consciousness behind all experience.

Śreekanta accepts the indeterminateness of *suṣupti* in the sense that there is no concrete functioning of consciousness. The functioning closes. In these respects the Schools do not differ.

That *suṣupti* is the negation of positive experience admits of no doubt. But when Advaitism denies all functioning of *chit* (e.g. Sureśvara) in *suṣpti*, Śaivism accepts the expressiveness ales in *suṣupti*, though this expressiveness has nothing definite to express.

* Asyaṃ hi prasarantyāṃ jagat unmiṣati vyavatiṣthate ca, nirvirtaprasarāyāṃ ca nimiṣati iti Svānubhava eva atra sākṣī.

In other words, the dynamic character of consciousness is still there manifest.

Vedāntism in all its forms may be characterised as the philosophy of self-consciousness. While Śreekānta with Rāmānuja holds the mutuality of subject and object in knowledge in every stage of its growth and existence, Śaṃkarites deny this reference in all stages of knowledge, and they affirm that logically we cannot determine the reference. Śaivism accepts this reference, but transcends it in certain stage of knowledge. Śreekanta in denying a reference to anything but self in knowledge both as subject and object holds the position of ideal realism, for though the object has no independent existence of its own, yet it is not necessarily on that account reduced to a phantom. The object exists, the self in positing itself posits the object. Though it cannot create it, still it cannot understand the object as completely an independent existence. The object requires the subject to be known ; the subject, the object, to know itself as the knower, and as such the mutuality is a constant factor in knowledge, be it finite or infinite.

Northern Śaivism in creating this reference out of consciousness has in theoretical reason the appearance of Transcendentalism and objective Idealism. The reference of the self to object in determinate consciousness and the projection of the self to re-appear as an object will lend the system the appearance of subjective Idealism. In fact by laying stress on the identity of the absolute and finite consciousness in liberation, and in allowing not the least difference between them, the system approaches subjective Idealism in as much as it recognises the only one subject, Śiva Bhattāraka, and the whole cosmos as a mere expression of this subject, though this subject is not necessarily the finite consciousness. Truly speaking, the question of finite and infinite consciousness cannot arise here at all. There is only one being and consciousness, the supposed distinction of finite and infinite is a false distinction created by the limiting agent, *Māyā*. As soon as this limitation is off, the distinction vanishes leaving behind the one subject, and the one consciousness, its expression and its object. The object is a self-projection. Yogarāja in his commentary on Abhinava Gupta's *Paramārthasāra* says, " the same principle of consciousness (ātman)

which appears as many in the form of subject and object, realises the identity as the all-cognising consciousness in itself." Viewed this wise the system approaches Fichtean Idealism, though it has the touch of Schelling in the Transcendence of Indeterminate intuition. But in the limited conscious centres, the reality of object and its reference in knowledge are not denied. A finite consciousness in *Avidyā* has realistic knowledge and consciousness, a liberated soul idealistic, and liberation connotes the assimilation of the idealistic character of knowledge, so much so that the object-element, before it disappears, must be thought of as the self-projected. Liberation is, therefore, a growth in dealistic understanding and the gradual disappearance of the realism of pragmatic and empiric consciousness. Śreekanta cannot deny the objective reference in knowledge even in emancipation, for the finite consciousness still retains its finitude, though the reference is no longer to an alien Prakṛti, but an expansive move in the Infinite. Knowledge is here expansive, being delightful, dissociated as it is from the limitation of *Avidyā* but still knowledge has a reference to something, besides itself, having its delight in a being besides self.

The epistemological dialectic throws a flood of light on the nature of Being. Being is consciousness. The dialectic of self-expression is also the move in self-revelation in Being.

Being has a transcendent and an immanent aspect. In its transcendence Being is indeterminate, in its immanence Being is determinate. The universe has its existence in the immanent aspect of Being, and is, in fact, a manifestation of it.

In other words Being is both absolute and infinite. As an absolute existence it is beyond the manifold in which it expresses itself. It is beyond form, beyond name, beyond the concrete becoming. It is then the expanse of consciousness, and not a conscious process. This absolute is Parama Śiva, the Transcendent Śiva.

Being becomes infinite when it is an inexhaustible source of expression. The dynamic aspect of the being is now in sight and the inherent Śakti or the power of self-expression and self-becoming becomes active and presents being in its concreteness.

Śakti is the expression of Śiva. With this expression the Absolute acquires a personality and to this personality is attribut-

ed consciousness, bliss, will. His knowledge covers all, His will controls all, His being fills all, He has no limitation, as nothing exists beyond Him.

Bliss is indicative of his complete and independent self. When He enjoys Himself without the intervention of any other means, Infinite is the Bliss. This joy of Bliss is a joy of Being-in-self.

The self now reveals itself as both the enjoyer and the enjoyed. It enjoys itself. The Bliss consciousness is also a determinate consciousness, though in this determinateness the self rests upon self. It does not move out of itself. Or, in other words Śiva enjoys Himself as Śakti. The Śakti enjoys Herself as Śiva. This constant reference of self to self and unwillingness as it were to go out of self brings out the nature of self as Bliss.

Will and its expression in activity are the *Icchā* and *Kriyā Śakti* of Śiva. *Icchā* is the state of poise before creative activity. *Kriyā* is the creative potency on the point of assuming forms. *Icchā* combines in it knowledge and creative activity held in suspense. The creative will is no blind will, it is knowledge and at the same time activity. The universe is the creative expression of Parama Śiva, an expression which is free and independent of the instrumentality of anything else. Śiva is the material cause and the efficient cause of the universe.

Śreekānta also maintains the identity of the material and the efficient causes, but he introduces the additional hypothesis of *Māyā*, the creative principle is not inherent in Śiva of transcendent glory, but in *Māyā* related to Śiva as his predicate, and, therefore, represented as the creative power. And since this creative potency is blind and as such quite helpless in itself to successfully evolve out of itself the definite order and purpose as revealed in the world without the conscious guidance and intervention of Śiva, Śiva is supposed to be the Lord of creation. Though *Māyā* has a nature quite different from Śiva, still *Māyā* is dependent upon Śiva. It is subordinate to Śiva. Śreekānta attributes to Śiva majesty, power, knowledge and intelligence. Śiva has eight designations: Bhava, Sarba, Isān, Pasupati, Rūdra, Ugra, Bheema, Mahādeva.

Bhava indicates Śiva's everpresence and immanence.

Isān is Śiva, the majesty and power.

Paśupati is Śiva, the controller of finite beings.

Ugra is Śiva, the indomitable.

Bheema is Śiva, the awe-inspirer.

Mahādeva is Śiva the all-knower and the super-mystic. The other form of Śaivism (Kaśmere) also attributes to Śiva the five-fold functions, generally called *Kṛtya-pañchakas*. Śiva creates, preserves, destroys and withdraws in himself the world of becoming and bestows grace upon finite beings. In such conception of Śiva we have the theistic attitude. Southern Śaivism is completely theistic, northern Śaivism shares in some degree the implications of theism in a certain stage of knowledge.

The point that comes next for our consideration is the theory of expression. No Philosophy can be without a theory of creative evolution , for if Philosophy is the intelligent interpretation of experience, it can not neglect so momentous a question as the origin of the world and its relation to the infinte. Remarkably enough, no form of Vedāntism is without a theory of *Māyā*, the dynamic principle underlying creative evolution. Śaivism, northern and southern accepts the theory of expression in knowledge. As soon as they come to creative evolution the two systems differ in their explanation. Śreekānta accepts the theory of transformation, Kaśmere Śaivism, of expression. And naturally they should do this, for *Māyā* has been accepted in the one as the material cause of the cosmic evolution and in the other as the limiting principle. *Māyā* in Śreekanta constitutes a category of existence by itself, different from Śiva and *Paśu* or *Jīva*. Prakṛti unfolds herself not independently of but in complete subordination to Śiva. And this evolution is an unfolding and a transformation in Prakṛti, and cannot be regarded as an expression, for expressiveness can be attributed to a conscious being, and not to an inert Prakṛti.

Transformation and Expression connote a disturbed equilibrium, but transformation connotes more, a comlpete change in being, which expression denies. Expression reveals but reveals without a change in being and with a change in form, transformation also reveals but reveals with a change in being and form. The former is known as Ābhāsavāda, the latter Pariṇāmavāda.

Pariṇāmavāda can be rightly attributed to an inert existence. It is the causation applied to dynamism in nature. Ābhāsavāda

can be attributed to consciousness, for it can express. Expression is not possible in inert existence. In other words, Pariṇāmavāda is assimilated to causation in nature, Ābhāsavāda to self-expression and self-causation.

This doctrine of expression has enabled the Kaśmere school to trace the cosmic evolution direct to Parama Śiva in his aspect of Śakti and without the hypothesis of *Māyā*. This conception has made the immanence of Śiva, more prominent, the cosmic evolution is an expression of his own being, nothing different from him.

An interesting question suggests itself ; are there no changes in expression? This question can be answered in two ways. To divided consciousness there are changes and they are real.

To integral consciousness of Śiva, there is no complete change, in expression and it is real. The appearances are real as these are things to divided consciousness, the appearances are real to Śiva as experience. Empirically they appear real, objective to us. Metaphysically they, as the experience of Śiva, have ideality, but no reality and therefore no objectivity. To the *Jīvan-Mukta*, appearances have ideality, but not reality.

ŚAIVISM AND SAṂKARISM

At this point a difference arises between Śaivism and Saṃkara. Śaivism is forced to accept in the clarity of philosophic insight the ideality of the expression and this ideality serves to deny the necessity and usefulness of any other factor in creative evolution, and as shown above, rightly regarded, the whole thing is not an evolution but an expression, and for an expression, nothing besides a dynamic consciousness is our requirement. This position makes the world an ideal construction in idea-forces and puts aside the realistic construction of experience and life. In not admitting any second cause of the world, Kaśmere Śaivism is more idealistic than Śreekānta's. But in accepting an ideal construction which is truly real in the Ābhāsavāda, it differs from the Saṃkarism which, while accepting such a construction, calls it illusory because it is denied in transcendent Intuition. Both Ābhāsavāda the doctrine of expression, and Vivarttavāda, the doctrine of false expression (atattvah anyathākhyāti) lend their support to construc

tion which is ideal ; but the former calls it not false, though sometimes the expression may have a fall-off in the basic support, the latter calls it false because the ideal construction, though it appears on the locus, yet it does not appear in it, nor function in it.

Ābhāsavāda is an approach to the *Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda* of the later Śaṃkarites, for it accepts reality to be a projection and a creation of self. But the difference between them lies in the point that *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda* attributes a falsity to the projection, Abhāsavāda does not attribute such a falsity.. So long as the self functions in this stage, it does not understand the falsity of its creation or projection for the moment and has an ideality of the projection. In this sense no distinction remains between the ideal constructions of these stages.

Difference becomes prominent when the ideal construction is sought to be denied in the next stage. Śaivism does not accept this denial. Śaṃkarism does. As such the ideal construction in Śaivism may appear as non-existent, but really it is not so. It has a potential existence. Śaivism retains a continuity of the locus and the ideal construction, Advaitism does not. This sudden break in continuity is what constitutes the most striking feature in Śaṃkara Vedāntism, and for this Śaṃkara's Philosophy has a double aspect and strikes self-contradictory. And for this Śaṃkara has to deny the whole of experience and institute the doctrine of *Avidya*. Śaṃkara's epistemology has been conceived to fit in with the experiences of different psychological stages and he has the boldness to deny the relativity of empiric consciousness when it can no longer hold on. Śaṃkara is not anxious to have a logical continuity, when the psychological revelation demands the denial of the intuitions of sense and the constructions of understanding. His philosophy rotates on the centre of self-consciousness, which denies in transcendent consciousness the relativity of empiric intuition. Śaṃkara does not deny the duality of empiric intuition and he seems to think that philosophy should not be dogmatic with this naive affirmation of sense-consciousness and be frankly ready to accept a denial of this attitude if and when it comes. Śaṃkara sees the truth of existence in clear transcendence of the sense and thought construction. To him, philosophy is right intuition and not apperception, and so long as the reality is not face to face perceived thought can have no rest in the process of apprehending reality

which it can never apprehend. The finality of thought-activity is reached in a negative conclusion. As such the activity of thought is confined to the sense data, and the reality it apprehends is phenomenal, though objective. This phenomenal objective continues to exist and has a meaning to empiric consciousness, be it limited in *Jiva* (finite), consciousness or unlimited in Iśvara-consciousness. But it is still phenomenal, not real. Śaṃkara may not go so far as to reduce all reality to subjective ideas, all knowledge to Solipsism, but certainly all experiences are denied in the Absolute. But this denial is no denial of self, but denial in the self. After all, Śaṃkara impresses and wants to forcibly impress the transcendence of self, which empirically is supposed to be caught in the snares of its own false creation and false valuation.

Because of the demand of a continuity, Kaśmere Śaivism does not go far as to call the empiric consciousness and pragmatic realisation as completely false. It is anxious to avoid the falsity of division by pointing to the truth of transcendence of self and its expression in immanence. It has recognised the truths of the sense-experience, the construction of will and feeling but has considered them as divided aspects of reality, which, to be appreciated truly and fully must be seen in its integrity and unity. It is remarkable that Śaivism has attributed this divided consciousness to *Avidyā* or *Māyā*, but has not denied it completely. Philosophy has a demand for unity and transcendence and not transcendence apart from unity. This is the significance of Ābhāsavāda, as distinguished from Māyāvāda. Śaivism accepts two constructions—the construction of the finite self and the construction of the Infinite. The former is empiric in as much as it is a construction of the senses and the will and is a reconstruction of the construction of the Infinite.

This reconstruction sets up separate and limited experience and false valuations. Philosophy is an attempt to get over these and to deny the limitation of reference in knowledge. No attempt has been made to synthesise the finite and the original construction, on the other hand there is an apparent tendency to deny the finite creation and to get to the move of life in the Infinite. To attain to it the finite creation is not completely sublated in its material basis, but sublated in the construction and formal grouping, for this

grouping is a finite subjective construction and has a subjective value.

Śaivism recognises two stages of consciousness and self-consciousness in transcendent Intuition. But since self-consciousness has an occasional lapse in consciousness, consciousness is to be accepted as philosophically more fundamental than self-expression and self-consciousness. Though such a distinction of greater and lesser reality may be considered as out of place in the two aspects of the same reality yet we cannot help noticing that Parama Śiva is real and self-consciousness is real in a certain stage but not in the ultimate reality, otherwise indeterminate consciousness as the primal existence can have no significance.

At this point Śaivism is open to criticism. Systems of philosophy which deny in transcedent Intuition self-consciousness, have to explain their origin out if a indeterminate consciousness. Śaṃkara could not explain this. Self-consciousness is a limitation of consciousness created by *Avidyā*. To explain it he has to appeal to an agency which is external. Śaivism seems to synthesise the indeterminate and the determinate consciousness, but the logic is not clear. To say that indeterminateness passes into determinatesness is an affirmation, but no explanation. How is the personality formed in an impersonal background is not clearly evident. It is easy to comprehend that there is a rise and a fall in the waveless indeterminate being—a dynamic equilibrium and a disturbance, but it is not so easy to explain the formation of self-conscious centres. States may come in and pass off on an impersonal back ground, but how the all-comprehensive I comes out, is not clearly explained. At least an indeterminate existence can be said to have no necessity within its own nature to form a concrete and at the same time all comprehensive self-consciousness.

And, again, what does determine the disturbance and striving of the dynamic equilibrium? How can the eternal quietness become vibrative? What is the necessity?

If the Being is indeterminate, it can have no will, far less purpose. Will and purpose are possessions of a personal being, and not of an indeterminate self. To say that will and purpose are sub-

sequently formed is to say that an indeterminate being can be made determinate, a will-less calm can assume will any moment. The necessity of ideal construction is hardly consistent with an indeterminate and impersonal existence. An impersonal being, like a mathematical point, can be conceived to have an existence and nothing more. The dynamic element in the being can be conceived to be constructing an ideal universe, but since in the beginning the dynamic aspect has a poise and an equilibrium and since in it no personal will is active, the dynamic aspect cannot be conceived logically to have sufficient basis for an ideal construction. To say that I-consciousness is potential in the poise is to deny the complete indeterminateness of Śiva. An ideal construction is consistent with a self-conscious self which is dynamic and expressive, but not with a motionless, purposeless, Śiva, the indeterminate. Śaṃkara, with his clear vision, sees the difficulty of assimilating the demands of a determinate self-consciousness and an indeterminate consciousness and while accepting the aesthetic construction of a determinate conscious activity really denies it a metaphysical being. To Śaṃkara the conflict is between a metaphysical and a psychological attitude and while he acknowledges the construction of aesthetic and moral sense, he can not reconcile it with the motionless transcendent being. The creative element in thought works under limitation and this limitation is not consistent with the Absolute.

Philosophy must either deny indeterminate motionless existence and embrace a dynamic concrete being revealing itself out in the rhythmic expression or must deny a rhythmic being and expressive consciousness and embrace an indeterminate *chit*. To accept both seems to be a hopeless and an impossible task. We are inclined to think that we cannot explain the ideal construction on the ground and with the affirmations with which it has been sought to be explained.

Even granting an ideal construction on such a ground as adduced by Kaśmere Śaivism, we notice in the system a contrary tendency to this ideal creation in finite selves to attain to the consciousness of an Identity in recognition. An ideal construction requires a self-projection and self-limitation, but emancipation implies a contrary tendency to self-assimilation and self-recognition. These two processes are contrary, so that the tendency of a construction

is opposed by the tendency of liberation, and as such the original tendency of construction cannot be fulfilled or can only be partially realised.

Kaśmere Śaivism makes every soul the fighting ground of two tendencies, of limitation and construction, and of dissolution and expansion. If these tendencies are native to it, and equally intensive the one cannot ride over the other, and we have a balance and an inactivity. Happily the tendency to construction is a tendency to limitation and is transcended by a tendency to expansion by knowledge and recognition and in this way emancipation has been made possible. In other words the tendency to liberation has been given a greater value and intensity than the tendency to limitation.

What should be impressed is that the tendency to liberation is a force against construction and destroys what is brought out in the process. If such is the case the ideal construction can have no real meaning and plausible value, for had it been ideal, it can vanish, and it cannot be something undesirable to be passed over. The ideal construction necessarily involves a limitation in being and consciousness.

Śreekānta is more consistent in his own way for he has no conflict between the Ideal construction and Emancipation, for emancipation, rightly understood, is emancipation from the realistic sense of difference and division and the emergence of the idealistic sense and aesthetic intuition of the purpose, beauty and joy of the ideal construction. That this meaning is not always evident is due to the completely positivistic and realistic consciousness due to *Māyā*, but philosophic comprehension removes the limitation of realistic consciousness and finds out the expanse, joy, rhythm and harmony of ideal construction. The unitive consciousness in liberation does not give the indeterminate equilibrium of Kaśmere Śaivism and here the liberated soul has movement and enjoyment in the Infinite with all the privileges of an expansive being, a clarified consciousness and an unalloyed delight. The aesthetic and moral senses have their highest gratification.

A word about *Māyā*. Śaivism (Southern) recognises finite selves and Prakṛti as two other realities besides Śiva. These have been conceived as eternally existing in subordination to Śiva. Their

subordination does not reduce them to non-existences or illusions. They are real.

Northern Śaivism accepts finite selves and Prakṛti in the list of categories of existence, but offers a theory of their origin. To realistic consciousness they are positive existences seemingly eternal. Realistic consciousness cannot transcend the positivistic out-look and get over the divided consciousness to apprehend reality as it is. The thirty six catagories of existence are strictly presentations from a realistic attitude of consciousness, but do not set forth reality in its essence, otherwise how can we reconcile the evolution of these elements with the original primal substance of an indeterminate *chit*. Northern Śaivism claims to be an unqualified monism in as much as it does not recognise any other element besides Śiva, the Absolute. It traces the whole evolution from this original substance. In this sense the other categories are to be considered real in an idealistic back ground.

FINITE SOULS

Kaśmere Śaivism views the finite souls from three different standpoints :—

(1) as individual entities,
(2) as parts in the whole,
and (3) as Identity-consciousness.

In the process of concentration, the egoes acquire an individualistic sense, endowed as they are with Buddhi-manas limitation. The individual is the finite experiencer. Such individualism narrows the vision and limits the being and the finite souls have their history of energising on nature's plane as creative agencies. *Ahaṃkāra* functions and the individuals are stirred by the spirit of division. A pluralistic universe presents itself in consciousness. The individual egoes are like Leibnitz's monads, concrete centres. These concrete centres embrace all forms of existence from centres of pure cosciousness (e.g. *Vijñāna kalā*) to centres of appetition.

While the Śaṃkhya in accepting the transcendence of souls from the Prakṛti retains the conception of a spiritual Pluralism, Śaivism recognises no such pluralism in transcendence. In Śaivism Puruṣa, the experiencer, so long as it is under limitation cannot have transcendence, but in tarnscendence, the multiplicity of souls cannot obtain, in as much as multiplicity is a creation or an expression, and is a reality only in immanent sense.

Śaivism has another phase even in immanence in as much as it recognises the necessity and actuality of grace for emancipaton. This at once introduces a relation between the finite souls and Śiva, the Infinite, and brings out the sense of dependence of the former upon the latter. Apart from the theistic importance and significance of these in our spiritual life, they point to a philosophic conclusion of no mean importance. Śaivism recognises the individual as a part in the whole, individual as the whole concentrated in a centre. As such the individual selves live in the whole. In a stage of spiritual experience we begin to look upon our being as a being in the Infinite, the Infinite as the concrete universal focussed in so many centres.

Such a consciousness wipes away the sense of individualism of the former stage and establishes the life of an expanse, of the life of love in the place of the limitation of an active agency of the former. From this view-point, Śaivism recognises the whole expressing itself in individuals and embracing them in love and mercy to redeem them from the sense of limitation and the pride of agency. The acceptance of grace has this meaning only in a philosophic sense. An upward urge reveals the truth of a wider being in the Infinite and the philosophic vision of the purpose and the meaning of the expressive life manifests itself. Such a construction is not out of place in Śaivism. This makes clear the assimilation of the *Paśus* in the unity of Śiva. Then comes the stages of identity with clear philosophic sense and recognition.

Śreekānta's system fully recognises the truth and being of finite selves and though an evolution is traced in Prakṛti under the influence of Śiva, still the history of this evolution cannot be regarded as the history of self-expression of the Absolute. On the other hand the finite souls in working their destiny through Prakṛti have been considered to be erring in their pursuit, for such an attempt serves to darken their vision and make them satisfied with the limited possibilities on nature's plane. The true life and evolution is the dawning on the finite selves of the beauty and grandeur of the Infinite life and its expression. Finite selves are as if put between two alternative possibilities a being in and a move in the Infinite and a move and an energising in nature. The former is a denial of the

empirical, positive and instinctive selves, inasmuch as in such a denial coupled with a complete resignation, the inward consciousness of a life in beatific vision, unceasing delight and deeper truths is revealed. The energising nature, however glorious it may be, is still a life wherein life's attraction is directed to selfish enjoyment and base-satisfactions and life lacks the expansive move in being and consciousness. With the dawning of unitive consciousness the finite selves have a new meaning and a true vision of the possibilities and opportunities offered in nature and these possibilities are now looked upon as privileges and opportunities of serving cosmic ends of humanity, of establishing God's order on earth, as it is in Heaven.

An opposition between finite selves and nature and the ultimate triumph of the finite selves over nature by cultivating the inward sense of the Infinite and by moving faith and will in the light of this vision are recognised in southern Saivism. This opposition is created by an element over which, we, as finite being, have no control, as the agency is surely external, and we, finite and atomic in being and power. Such a conflict is to be transcended by a fellowship with the Infinite which gives us a secure being in the expanse of the Infinite.

Śreekānta then accepts a self-expression in the Absolute, and an evolution in nature. The former is enjoyed by those who are in tune with the infinite, the latter is a truth to those who are out of this tune. And the two cannot combine, for they are mutually exclusive. Emancipation in Śreekānta, then, is no denial of the finite self, not quite an absorption of the finite in the infinite. It is, no doubt, a denial of a life in Prakṛti, but is a life of and with the infinite.

Kaśmere Śaivism does not recognise any existence outside and independent of Śiva, the Absolute. When in the process of self-expression Śiva attains the Suddha Vidyā or stages of concreteness, it has suddenly a self-forgetfulness. This self-forgetfulness is a creation of its own *Māyā*, the principle of obscuration. It limits the limitless Experience, and the limitless Experiencer. *Māyā* is then a principle of obscuration and limitation.

Since this obscuration is caused by a power inherent in the Divine Śakti, this limitation should be regarded as self-imposed. In the process of self-expression, called Ābhasa, *Māyā* causes limitation

and the expression becomes also limited. *Māyā* is the principle of limitation in self-expression.

The conception of *Māyā* as the obscuring power or more properly the self-obscuring power of the primal Śakti has enabled the Kaśmere School to characterise the finite experience as expression, but expression in limitation.

Since this limitation is self-imposed limitation, *Māyā* cannot create a division in the integrity, though *Māyā* can create infinite limited centres within the expanse of the All-Experience of Sadvidyā. The expansive I of the Sadvidyā stage soon becomes so many centers of limited experience, as it were.

By calling *Māyā* the principle of self-limitation in self-expression Kaśmere Śaivism gets over the distinction between the infinite and the finite consciousness. The infinite appears as finite, the unlimited as limited. With the necessity of an ideal construction and self-expression, the absolute makes itself gradually concentrated and without losing its absoluteness and in the process of concentration the centres are formed which are *anu*, atomic, but non-spatial, for the concentration can cause limitation but not spatiality. This non-spatiality retains the spirituality of the being of the finite selves. The concentration, again, cannot change its being from an eternal and durable substance to a transient existence. It has the limitation of being, but not transcience, the finite consciousness is neither spatial, nor transitory.

Māyā in Kaśmere Śaivism is the principle of self-limitation. It is no independent principle like Prakṛti in Śreekānta. It is in Being, a principle by which the expression is concentrated and limited in definite centres. Be it noted here that this principle of individuation is related, to Śuddhavidyā, the fourth hypostasis of Being, the Parama Śiva. This limitation, consistently presupposes an obscuration, for without an obscuration and a falling off in consciousness we cannot conceive its limitation, and individuation. An individuation in the absence of any other principle working necessarily supposes in the initiation a forgetfulness and then a differentiation. Since *Māyā* is a principle working in the infinite, this forgetfulness and individuation must be a move in the infinite. The infinite gets finitised, though this finitude it may at any moment overcome by recognition.

Kaśmere Śaivism has thus a theory of the formation of souls and an evolution of them through Prakṛti, which comes into existence as soon as the Puruṣa or the limited egoes are formed. The falling off in consciousness on the one side circumscribing it to definite centres is immediately followed by the limitation of the experienced of Sadvidyā stage into the formation of the Indefinite this, called Prakṛti. The emergence of Prakṛti into existence at the time when the All-experience has been under the sway of *Māyā* necessarily appears to be a spontaneous and blind activity and Prakṛti in its stage of formation and immediately after it is not clearly cognised and appears vague, indefinite and indistinct. It is not nothing, but a homogeneity which acquires a definiteness as soon as it begins to manifest the difference and the heterogeneity of the guṇas. Prakṛti emerges into existence simultaneously with Puruṣa by the same principle of limitation and attached to each Puruṣa (the finite egoes) is there a Prakṛti, which it affects and which is simultaneously affected by Puruṣa.

The correlativity of the higher stages of *Aham* and *Idam* is not denied here, but only put to a limited application. Śaivism thus works out a conception of the formation of Puruṣa and Prakṛti by the principle of *Māyā*, the principle of limitation. In the state of homogeneity Prakṛti offers a general indefinite experience (bhoga-sāmānya) but not any definite and concrete experience. The details of specific experience come out in the process of heterisation.

Such a conception *Māyā* differs from the Advaitists' conception. The logic of exoteric consciousness through the casual demand attributes the world process to *Māyā*, the creative and the individuating capacity of Iśvara. But with the growth of philosophic vision the demand for a causal connexion of the realistic consciousness vanishes in the idealistic construction of the world illusion. And the effects of *Māyā* are no longer realistic but become illusory constructions. The world is a picture drawn upon the back ground of the Absolute by the prejudiced consciousness, which is really not prejudiced..

Saṃkara's philosophy necessarily accepts a beginningless *Māyā* eternally co-existing with and in the locus of Brahman, but *Māyā* has no relation with it, for Brahman is non-relational. *Māyā* has a reality in relativistic consciousness, the two are inter-

dependent. The cosmic illusion may require the position of a cosmic knower and a consciousness, but it does not essentially differ from the illusions of an individual, produced as they are with the same causes. As illusions these cannot differ, be they limited or unlimited in extent.

The moment we call the world an illusion, the creative activity of *Māyā* becomes idealistic which appears to us as realistic because of the limitation of our mind working through the senses. The inevitable demand of the senses upon our minds and the natural restriction to which mind becomes subjected by the operation of the senses give a sense of reality to the objects of perception. But when the mind learns to work freed from the limitation of the senses, e.g. the dream-construction, the imaginative-creation, the creativeness of the self becomes evident. And this creativeness is spontaneous.

This spontaneity of creativeness of dream and imagination has been the main support of the Vedāntists' claim of a free self-expression, which is ideal but not real. Similarly the focussing of consciousness in finite centres is an ideal construction, but a construction, because it is ideal, can be and is actually denied in the locus. Ideality takes away from it reality and since this ideality is a creation of a principle which dose not obtain in the Absolute, it is denied in a certain stage when it is called illusory and not before. Logically speaking, an ideal world moves in the Absolute, but it is only ideal and not real. An ideal construction, our experience tells us, requires a basis and a formative principle, and these are supplied by the Absolute and the *Māyā*. The formative principle forms and is ever forming: but the locus or the basis is not affected, nor is it conscious of this formation. Vedāntism thus accepts the phenomenal reality of the cosmic experience, but not its absolute reality. Śaivism differs at this point. The creative principle is not illusory, nor the world, a dream illusion. The world then has a place in the absolute, it is conceived as a wave in the eternal calm. Śaivism in a certain stage of human knowledge insists upon the transcendence of the limitation of *Māyā* and the recognition of the identity of the individual with the Absolute self and in this sees the promise of liberation. Still the potentiality of ideal construction

exists there, for the Absolute is in no stage free from the necessity and the requisite factor of self-expression. Such a necessity is not recognised in Śaṃkara Vedāntism and as such the principle of creativeness is denied in the Absolute. In Śaiva Vedānta it is assimilated in the Absolute. Śaivism by the emphasis laid upon the identity of Śiva, and Puruṣa, the cosmic and the individual self recognises no difference between the two, and therefore, has to accept *Māyā*, the principle of self-imposed limitation. Liberation signifies getting over the fascination of this self-imposed forgetfulness and the realisation of the identity of being behind the cosmic expression..

This limitation of being (Puruṣa) has made the conception of liberation possible and actual for the individual souls, for limitation actually operates. But in Advaita Vedānta liberation, rightly viewed, is also a working of *Māyā* and an illusion, just like bondage. The soul is ever free. Create it does surely and in this creation, it undergoes no limitation, though it appears to do so. There is no action in the self, there can be none. The self is neither active nor inactive. It is static quiet.

The liberated soul in Kaśmere Śaivism is just like the Iśvara of the Advaitin, for liberation is the putting off of the limitation and the attainment of expansiveness of being, though in this expansiveness the ideal construction is present as its own being. This is exactly the conception of Iśvara, or more properly the *mukhya Jīva*, when it is no longer under the spell of *Māyā*, but controls it. The only point of distinction is this that a state of apparent static calm is conceived when the effort of ideal construction is suspended, but such a state in Śaṃkara Vedāntism corresponds to the conception of cosmic absorption in Mahāpralaya in Iśvara, or the *mukhya-Jīva*. We come to the conclusion then that liberation in Kaśmere Śaivism corresponds to the Iśvarahood of Saṃkara Advaitism, but not to the Brahman of Vedānta.

Kaśmere Śaivism has given promience to knowledge as the cause and the immediate cause of Liberation, like the Advaitism, for knowledge can burn out ignorance, and its limitation. The Philosophy is, therefore, entitled the philosophy of recognition, which accepts two stages of falling off from and regaining of, the Identity-

consciousness. This recognition actually re-establishes the forgotten identity. Recognition admits a forgetfulness and a re-awakening.

Śaṃkara Vedāntism in the axiom of Identity recognises the value of recognition for *Jīva*-consciousness, so long as it is *Jīva*, but recognition establishes nothing, for there was no forgetfulness, no necessity of recognition. These can refer to a personal consciousness but not to the Absolute. The personal consciousness has an ideality in Śaṃkara, the personality is an external state and does not belong to the consciousness and as such when the false barrier of personality falls off, the consciousness shines in its splendour and brightness, just as it always shines.

More properly, Kaśmere Śaivism in accepting recognition as the immediate cause of ultimate fulfilment lays emphasis upon the removal of limitation and the re-assertion of an expansive self. The functioning still exists, but is spread out in the infinite expanse and only occasionally is hushed into the calm.

Advaitism appeals to *Jīva*-consciousness, to set up a functioning of mental consciousness in the form of ātman, but this abstract functioning after denying the concrete functioning of the mind is in itself denied. Śaivism denies the concrete functioning in a concrete centre. It accepts expansive functioning in an expansive being and even when the functioning ceases, it is not lost but is potential in being. Advaitism denies all functioning and its potentiality in Brahman. Such is the difference between Śaivism and Advaitism in the conception of the monistic Absolute.

ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA

Page 11 line 16. Bṛhatsaṃhitā and Bṛhajjātaka should be in italics.
,, 12 ,, 6. *Arthācastra* read *Arthacāstra.*
,, 15 ,, 31. Omit the bracket and add *in.*
,, 16 ,, 6. Add , after Candragupta's.
,, 16 ,, 23. Add , after horses.
,, 16 ,, 28. Culbadhātucāstra read çulbadhātucāstra.
,, 16 F. note Instead of . after 118, have a ,
,, 17 ,, 3. For *Greeco* read *Graeco.*
,, 17 ,, 7. For *Anviksaki* read *Anvisiki.*
,, 17 ,, 28. For *Dhṛtarāstra* read *Dhṛtarāṣtra.*
,, 18 ,, 17. For *Vātasāyana* read *Vātsyāyana.*
,, 19 ,, 18 For *Medhātithi* read Medhātithi.
,, F. note 2. *Paçcābna* read paccāhna.
,, 25 ,, 7. Add *the* before Kauṭiliya.
,, 25 ,, 14. For Inidan read *Indian.*
,, 25 ,, 29. For *in* read *on.*
,, 27 last line for प्रत्य read प्रत्यु ।
,, 28 ,, 6. for इ read ई ।
,, 28 ,, 6. for व्यदसाति read व्युदसाति ।
,, ,, ,, 18. ,, बृड्ड ,, व्रड्ड ।
,, 28 ,, 30. For *Adhyātmavidyā* read *Adhyātmavidya.*
,, 29 ,, 24. For समातिष्ट read समातिष्टं ।
,, 31 ,, 31. For लान्वलवत्तरा: read लान्वलवत्तरा ।
,, 32 ,, 8. For *order* read *orders.*
,, 32 ,, 20. For भुतरक्षणं read भूतरक्षणं ।
,, 33 ,, 11. For *hereticts* read *heretics.*
,, 34 ,, 6. For दञ्जनीत्यां read दण्डनीत्यां ।
,, 34 ,, 12. For विद्याभिजनवापवय: read विद्याभिजनवापग्र्यवय
" " F. note last line read *amātya* for *āmātya.*
,, 36 ,, 27. Read सर्वतस्त्वत्मानं for सर्वतस्वात्मानं ।
,, 37 ,, 27. For *āryaprayām* read *āryaprāyam.*
,, 37 ,, 23. Add *the* before mountain-fort.
,, 38 last line for गुरुतरं read गुरूतरं
,, 41 For *Warefare* read *Warfare.*
,, 42 ,, 6. For व्युहित read व्यूहित ।
,, 42 ,, 19. For इ read इ

Page 47 last line add so after *is*.
,, 49 ,, 16. Add e after *corr*.
,, 49 ,, 20. For *Kiṭṭa* read *Kiṭṭa*.
,, ,, 8. Omit . after Kramrisch.
,, 50 ,, 37. Add *used both* after *are*.
,, 51 In the table (after line 3) the bracket is to be opposite 'Printing' and 4 is to come under 3.
,, 52 ,, 11. read *gateways* for *gateway*.
,, 53. Foot note read *J. G.* instead of *J. C.* and *gréco* for *greco*.
,, 54. Footnote read *Dheri* for *Dehri*.
,, 55. Footnote , after *Painting*.
,, 56 ,, 19 , after *separate*.
,, 56 ,, 24 read *Smṛtam* for *Smṛiam*.
,, 56 Last but one line read *brushes* for *burshes*.
,, 56 First Footnote put a : after *this*.
,, 58 line 33. Add . after *nim*.
,, 58 ,, 33. Add . after *lepa*.
,, 59 ,, 18. Add . after *vidhi*.
,, 59 ,, 23. Read *adamantine* for *admantmed*.
,, 66 ,, 5. Read *magnum opus* for *Magnum Opus*.
,, 66 ,, 4. from bottom read *umbi* for *jumbi*.
,, 66 ,, 4. Read *nitamba* for *nitamva*.
,, 68 ,, 7. Read *mani for mani*.
,, 70 ,, 4. from the bottom read *godhūma* for *godduma*.
,, 116 ,, 11 from the bottom read *Sacred* for *Scared*.

SIR ASUTOSH MEMORIAL VOLUME

PART II

CONTENTS OF PART II

THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE IN ANCIENT INDIAN ARTS AND INDUSTRIES

(Professor S. V. Viswanatha M.A.)

There has been considerable difference of opinion among sociologists in regard to the extent of interference that may be exercised by the modern state in the affairs of its citizens, ranging from the theory of *Laissez faire* or 'let alone' to that of the more humane socialism and anarchist bolshevism. It may interest us somewhat to note the principles of political and moral obligation which guided the relations of the state and its citizens in ancient India. I propose in this paper to present in general outline the main ideas that prevailed among the ancient Indians regarding the limits of state-interference in the social and industrial activities of the subject people.

The Sphere of State Control

The principle of *Laissez faire* which for a long time swayed the western nations in the attitude of the state to its citizens is not at all found applicable to any period of the history of Indian society. It was perhaps recognized that the application of this doctrine 'would soon fling civilization back into the brute struggle for food'[1]. It was held that social and moral order of the state would best be secured not by a policy of individuals being let alone but by their adhering to the *Dharma* or duties of community or caste to which they belonged. The individual was bound by the rules of his class and in no case does individual freedom as it is comprehended in the principle of individualistic interference, appear to have been allowed in our country. Individualism which implied that every sane adult was the best judge of his or her own interest and that the common welfare was best attained by the intelligent pursuit by each thereof[2] was certainly discredited in the evolution of Indian social morals. In fact, the individual was nothing; the order to which he belonged determined his position and functions, his rights and respon-

1 H. Sidg wick, *Elements of Politics*, 'Individualism and Individualistic Minimum'.

2 C. D. Burns, *Political Ideals*, p. 234.

sibilities. The greatest happiness of the greatest number which is, according to our law-givers, the end of the state[3] was achieved by the subjects not swerving from the rules of their order and whoever uphold his duty, ever adhering to the customs of the *Āryas*, and following the rules of castes and divisions of religious life will surely be happy both here and hereafter.'[4] The way to happiness lies in the discharge of the duties pertaining to one's own class, even though it might entail ruin. Danger is ahead for those that trespass on others' functions, says the Lord in the *Gītā*.[5] That person who practises his own duty can become powerful and influential in this world, for it is the highest act of penance.[6] When these rules are violated, the world would come to an end owing to the confusion of castes and creeds.[7]

General Principles of Interference

As Herbert Spencer puts it,[8] within its proper limits governmental action is not simply legitimate but all-important. But the interference by a state in the affairs of its citizens may be actuated by various motives. It may only use its coercive and supervising power to remove social, political and economic evils, or it may do more constructive work by promoting or fostering what many may regard as leading to the general good and happiness of the Commonwealth.[9] For example, state interference in order to put an end to the evils of excessive drinking may be

3 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 39 (Mysore Ed. and Trans.) "In the happiness of subjects lies a king's happiness ; in their welfare his ; whatever pleases himself he shall not consider as good, but whatever pleases his subjects he shall". (Trans., p. 44.)

4 *Ibid.* p. 8.

5 *Bhagavat Gītā*, III. 35

6 *Sukranīti*, (Madras Ed. and Sarkar's Trans.) I. 23 f. has been interpreted by Mr. Sarkar to mean personal religion and individual morality as against universal religion and absolute morality. This interpretation is not warranted by our scriptures. It clearly means 'the duties of one's order' in *Bhagavat Gītā*, II. 31. It is limited and defined by IV. 15. In ancient India there was neither the idea of personal religion in the individualistic sense nor was the morality placed on the individualistic basis. Morality was held to be absolute. *Dharma* may be rendered as the ethical ideal to which individuals as well as nations were to conform in their private, public and corporate life.' (See my *International Law in Ancient India*, *p* 10). Personal religion was not also comprehended in the Hindu social system as the religion for every man and woman was fixed by that of the community to which he or she belonged.

7 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 8.

8 Herbert Spencer, *Essays*, III. 401. Cf. also 'A king shall lawfully protect the members of the four social orders in due discharge of their duties. Those who are false to their respective duties in life get destroyed.' Gautama, XI.

9 Cunningham : *Cormmonweal.*

said to belong to the first category, while interference in the departments of industries, education aud poor-relief will have to be included in the second class. In ancient India, it was recognized as the duty of the state not only to prevent harm or injury among the individuals that composed the community but to enforce discipline and punish breaches thereof, which may lead to the disturbance of the social and moral order of the society.[10]

Supervision of Industries

Generally speaking, the state in ancient India is seen to interfere in the social and industrial pursuits of the people in order to regulate and protect them. The initiative in all activities leading to the material prosperity of the community was taken by the subject-citizens and the duty of the state was to protect them, for 'that was the very cream of kingly duties.'[11] As we read in the *Arthaśāstra*, the king should safeguard the interests of agriculture, free labour and revenue, for the wealth of the state is for the protection of the subjects.[12] 'He shall always succour the afflicted among his people as a father his children,'[13] for the two primary functions of a king are the protection of his subjects which implied also the constant punishment of offenders.[14] This ideal is evident even in the *Rig Veda* where the king is styled *gopatirjanasya*.[15] Industrial undertakings were mostly due to private enterprise under the supervision of the state. The government played the part of the good parent and saw that its activities were regulated in such a way that posterity throve better in body and in mind. In this capacity it interfered in order to secure uniformity of regulations in the fields of industry and commerce. As a result a large number of State-superintendents are seen appointed in charge of the various departments.[16] These were for gold, coinage, prices, wages, weights and measures, forests, agriculture, artisans, commerce, merchants, store-houses, slaughter-houses, liquor, prostitutes, poor relief and famine relief, forts, routes of traffic, ships etc.

It may be noted that these departments fell broadly into two classes :—

(*a*) Industrial pursuits that were the monopoly of the state, interference in which was bound to bring good to all and

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10 This fact is clear from the long list of fines prescribed in the *Arthaśāstra* for the various offences. Protection implies also punishment. In fact government is *Dandanīti*.

11 *Mahābhārata*, Sānti, 58. 1. 12 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 48.

13 *Ibid.* p. 210.

14 *Sukranīti*, I. 14. *Rāmāyaṇa*, Bāla Kāṇḍa, 17. 6.

15 *Rig. Veda*, III. 43. 5.

16 *Arthaśāstra*, II. *Sukranīti*, II.

(*b*) those that were the results of popular enterprise but were encouraged, regulated and protected by the state. There were only a few industries coming under the first head. These were mining and coinage, manufacture of salt, forestry, arboriculture and the brewing of liquor. *i.e.*, those industries that in modern language yield imperial revenues. The objects of interference in industries coming under the second head were prevention of fraud, illicit dealing and other economic abuses,[17] securing uniformity in standards of weights and measures of objects,[18] protection of artisans and wage-earners, orphans and invalids and, of course, the revenue that they yielded to the state-treasury.

Protection of Agriculture

The protective principle in interference is in evidence in the great care which was bestowed on agriculture by sovereigns in ancient India. It was looked upon as the duty of the government to provide facilities for irrigation of lands as will be clear from the questions that Narada put Yudhiṣthira in the *Mahābhārata* :[19] Are large tanks and lakes constructed in the country in suitable places and filled with water so that the thirsty fields may not be entirely dependent on the water rained by the heavens' ? Though, in ordinary times, the tiller of the soil made his own provision for watering the fields, it is clear that in emergencies the state stepped in to protect the agriculturists. When the harvest failed, for various causes such as pestilence, famine, fire or floods and the lot of the agricultural labourer became miserable it was recognized as a state obligation to afford him reliefs. Larger schemes of irrigation and public works were apparently undertaken by the state because they were too ambitious for individual enterprise, entailing enormous expenditure and risks, while the cultivators constructed the minor ones which they could easily manage to institute themselves.

One illustration will suffice to show that for various reasons, agriculture received the first consideration of the government in ancient India. The provincial governor of west India in the reign of Chandragupta Maurya constructed a dam at Girnar and thus produced the lake Sudarśana from which water was conducted for irrigation of the fields in the province. We are told in the famous Girnār inscription of Rudradāman that the dam

17 *Arthaśāstra*, IV. The sale of bad goods was punished. cf. *Sukranīti*, IV. 5 318.

18 *Arthaśāstra*, II. 19. See also Vasiṣtha, XVII ; Viṣṇu, V. 121-123. Imitations were punished. *Sukranīti* I. 295.

19 Sabhā Parva, V. 81.

had been broken and the lake left unused for over a century after Nandarāja and that the prince constructed the dam, repaired the lake and made it fit for use by the agriculturists. Later, in the fifth century A. D. it is stated that the lake was again repaired by a minister of Skanda Gupta.

REGULATION OF LIQUOR-TRAFFIC

State-interference for the regulation of liquor-traffic was also actuated by the same principle of paternalistic care. It is held generally that over-indulgence in intoxicants is the cause of much suffering and crime. As Kauṭilya observes,[20] the effects of drunkenness are loss of wealth, insanity, absence of consciousness, loss of knowledge, life, wealth and friends, desertion by the virtuous, suffering from pain etc. But there is apparently no general agreement that alcohol was in itself an evil. Hence legislation on the subject has been more or less experimental. The ancient Indian law-givers, both religious and secular, like the modern statesmen and legislators apparently discerned the danger that regulations to the effect of absolute and total prohibition might become futile through the impossibility of being enforced. Hence it is that we meet with statements like the following[21] :—'The man that drinks wine excessively becomes devoid of wisdom ; but wine taken in moderate quantity may even increase his talent, clear up the intelligence, augment his patience and keep that mind steady, but indulgence in it is certainly pernicious'. We know that dangers of drunkenness will not leave a society unless there is a concensus of opinion that drinking is in itself (moderate or excessive) an evil. But the initiative in the direction will have to be taken by the people at large, and especially by those that visit the liquor-shops.[22]

Traffic in liquor was, no doubt, prevalent in ancient India, but the state had the responsibility to determine the time, place, quantity and quality of the trade. Besides the larger fines that were imposed on the unlicensed vendors that carried on the business, the following rules are noteworthy in the *Arthaśāstra*[23] :—Liquor shall be sold only to people of known

20 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 330.
As Hastings Rashdall observes, "What would be the meaning of asking whether drunkenness would be wrong if it did not make a man incoherent in his talk, irrational in his judgments, unsteady in his gait and irresponsible in his behaviour ?. Drunkenness taken apart from all its consequences would not be drunkenness." *The Theory of Good and Evil*, I. 88.

21 *Sukranīti*, I. 116.

22 'There is', in modern times, 'a disposition to narrow temperance to the duty of moderation in drinking.' Similar idea is witnessed in the passage cited above.

23 *Arthaśāstra*, II. 25.

character, lest labourers should spoil the work taken on hand, violate ideas of decency and lose their virtue, and lest vagabonds should commit indiscrete acts. That drunkards were a great scourge to the community is recognized here. Besides the safeguards mentioned above, those that indulged in liquor were compelled to drink within the shops. Drunkards that were extravagent in their expenditure were arrested and kept in custody. Spies, were sent out by the government to ascertain whether the expenditure of liquor-customers was normal or beyond their means. Dealers in liquor were prevented from selling indiscreetly, and when customers under intoxication lost any of their things, the shopkeeper had to make geod the loss and also pay an equivalent fine. It is clear from the above that the evil effects on the community of the drinking habit were well known and measures taken to prevent them. The author of the *Arthaśāstra* would have done better if he had promulgated the principle that prohibition is better than cure of the evils of the habit. But being too keen a politician, he knew that it would be impracticable, and the remedies suggested by him may have proved effective enough to prevent abuses.

POPULATION : CENSUS

A healthy and happy population is a necessary adjunct of a good state. A *janapada* should have among other features primarily a strong and healthy population of good character. That this was the ideal of ancient India is clear from the great concern which the Indian states seem to have felt for their population. It is in evidence in an institution corresponding to the 'census' of modern times in the reign of one of the most remarkable of Indian kings. The third Board of Chandragupta's administrative departments was responsible, according to Megasthenes, [24] for the systemetic registration of births and deaths. 'Nothing in the legislation of Chandragupta is more astonishing to the observer familiar with the lack of methods of ordinary oriental governments than this registration of births and deaths'[25] The ordinance of Chandragupta ran to the effect that births and deaths and among both high and low should never be concealed. 'Even the Anglo-Indian administration, with its complex organization and European notions of the value of statistical information did not attempt the collection of vital statistics until very recent times', says the author of *Indian Constitutional Reform*, viewed in the light of history.

24 Mc. Crindle, *Megasthenes and Arrian*.
25 Smith, *Early History of India*, p. 128.

We are able to get a few details about the census operations of the time from the *Arthaśāstra*.[26] The village accountant had to register the total number of inhabitants belonging to the various castes in the village, to keep an account of the number of cultivators, cowherds, merchants, artisans, labourers, and animals and to take note of the amount of money, free labour, tolls and fines that could be collected from each house in the village. It was his duty to keep a detailed and accurate account of the members of every one of the families in the village, their antecedents (*charitra*), their occupation *(ājūva)*, income and expenditure *(āya* and *vyaya.)* Besides the *Nāgarika* or Town Prefect was ordered to register all cases of emigration and immigration in the city. Of the various departments of Chandragupta's administration one was alloted to the treatment of foreigners.[27] 'To these they assign lodgings, and keep watch over their modes of life by means of those persons whom they give to them for assistants. They escort them on the way when they leave the country, or in the event of their dying, forward their property to their relatives. They take care of them when they are sick, and if they die bury them'. Breaches of these regulations were severely dealt with and officers were taken to task for the return of false statements.

POOR RELIEF : A STATE-DUTY

Gṛhasthas (Men in family-life) that would merely shake off the shackles of family and belongings and would assume the role of ascetics, being incapable of braving the battle of life were discredited by the state and considered to be fit subjects for severe penalties. We meet with the following wholesome rules[28] :—When, without making provision for the maintenance of his wife and children, any person embraced asceticism, he was punished for the offence. When a capable man or woman neglected to maintain his or her child, mother, father, minor brothers, sisters and widowed girls, a fine of twelve *paṇas* was levied. Forced asceticism of women, because they were unable to bear the burden of their family, though they may be strong and capable of earning an honest livelihood, was condemned and not only were such women fined but those that may have been responsible for their conversion to become ascetics.[29] Rules similar in nature are found in many works of Indian literature.

26 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 142.
27 Megasthenes, fragment 34.
28 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 47.
29 *Ibid.* 47 & 48 ; *Śukranīti*, IV. 1. 105.

But it was recognized as a governmental obligation to provide for orphans, aged, infirm and poor, helpless, women and men.[30] The state also found employment for the unemployed poor who would work but could not find any situation. We read that even prisoners were set to work on crown lands or in the repair of roads.[31] Orphans and helpless men were utilized as spies and were given maintenance in return for the service they rendered to the state.[32] Large industrial enterprises corresponding to modern workhouses seem also to have been started by the sovereigns, which would give work and afford relief to the able-bodied poor.[33] Poor-relief was thus a responsibility of the state[34], but those that would prefer to live on alms, though able-bodied, were certainly wicked and deserved to be expelled from the state. On this ground valiant and sturdy beggars were punished[35], if they would not earn their living by honest occupation.

REGULATION OF WAGES

The relation of the capitalist and the labourer was ordinarily allowed to be fixed by contracts and the wages were to be paid according to the agreement.[36] But it was accepted as a wholesome principle that the wages of the labourer should be such as would at least meet 'the compulsory charges' and enable him to lead the life of a respectable citizen. The amount of wages in any industry was low, moderate or high.[37] Wages were considered high, if they adequately supplied the food and clothing and, besides, allowed the labourer some comfort. They were mo erate if he got only the indispensable minimum of food, clothing and shelter *i.e.*, the necessaries for the labourer and his dependents. Low wages were deemed a curse by the state 'for people that are paid low wages are enemies by nature of the society ; they live a miserable life, play into the hands of others, set to plunder others' riches and become a great plague to the community'.38 The idea conveyed in the above was

30 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 47
31 *Sukranīti*, I. 268 ; *Arthaśāstra*, p. 115.
32 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 20.
33 *Ibid.* pp 113, 114.
34 *Hitopodeśa*, I. 14
35 *Sukranīti*, IV. 1. 105 and 107.
36 For the relation of labour and capital in ancient India I would refer the reader to my *Aspects of Ancient Indian Industrial Life* published in the Volume of the Second Oriental Conference, Caicutta. Cf. also, *Sukranīti*, II. 392.
37 *Ibid.* II. 396 ff.
38 *Ibid.*, II. 400. As Pepe LeoXIII observes in his *Rerum Novarum*, 'it is a natural law of justice that the wage should not be insufficient to keep the worker sober and honest'. The regulations regarding wages remind us of

that the labourer, not being able to meet the imperative demands of his family, had to neglect them, and in this manner stood against the realization of the happiness of his community and of the commonwealth.

Promotion of Education and Fine Arts

Let us now pass to show the protective nature of the interference by the state in the educational activities of its citizens. As regards elementary education the initiative lay almost with private enterprise. Education was for the edification of the citizens and it was first the duty of the latter to undertake the responsibility of elementary and primary education. According to the educational ideas of the Vedic and post-vedic periods it was incumbent on the parents to send their children to a teacher variously styled as *Āchāryya*, *Guru*, *Upādhyāya*, under whom they sought instruction,[39] and had the initiation into the arts and sciences. In later times, every Indian village had its own *pāthśāla* maintained by the villagers for giving the instruction in the three R's. But the state always intervened to give encouragement to scholars, to foster fine arts, and help higher educational enterprise in a variety of ways, besides keeping a censorial supervision to promote, in general, the literacy among the people that it governed. The academic centres, of ancient India, Takṣaśila, Nālandā, Kāśi, Ujjain, Vikramaśīla, Madura and Kāñchipura appear to have been concerns, the result of private enterprise. The state acted in all cases as the protector and stretched out the helping hand. The sovereigns patronised learning and culture with their presents to *Paṇḍits* and learned men and with royal endowments for the fostering of fine arts and of cultural studies. Teachers who gave instruction in the arts such as singing, playing on musical instruments like the *Vīnā*, pipe and drum, acting, dancing, painting, reading and writing, divining others' thoughts, shampooing, making of scents and garlands etc., were endowed

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the purport of the humane statutes that were passed in the sixteenth century in England, known as the Statute of labourers, artificiers & apprentices.

39 The Upaniṣads are in essence the great lessons taught by the teachers under whom students sought initiation into the mysteries of life here and hereafter. *Enpassant*, it may be noted that in the Brāhmaṇical scheme of Education, freedom was allowed for the parents to choose the teachers for their children and sometimes, the latter were allowed to do so themselves. One outstanding feature of the educational system was that it was individual, involving individual attention paid to the *Śiṣyā* by the *Guru* and *vice versa*, and the close and intimate union of the hearts, resulting in right understanding and leading to supreme enlightenment. It was not congregational like modern university education. In the history of Indian educational institutions the Buddhists appear to have been instrumental in introducing the congregational element in education and giving instruction to students in mass.

with maintenance by the government.[40] Higher education was encouraged by grants of land to scholars and awards of titles and scholarships. The state honoured every year those that were proficient in the arts and sciences and took such steps as would advance them among its subjects.[41] In fact, these formed one of the most important items of public expenditure.

Voluntary services of the citizens

The life of the state and the life of the persons that make it influence each other, and the sovereign state will be strong and effective only when the citizens are also ready to subordinate their private interests and to fall in with the general will for the common good. The citizens that participate in the life of the state have interest of two kinds—their personal interest and those of the state of which they are members. Though sometimes the two may not agree in the political organization, it is the highest duty of the citizen to do such honorary work or render such voluntary aid as should lead to the smooth and vigorous working of the body-politic.[42]

(*a*) In Normal Times

In normal times the head of the state in ancient India had the right of taking certain revenues from his subjects for the expenditure of the realm in return for the protection he gave them. It was generally understood that the relation of the state and the citizens was of a contractual nature. We read[43], 'A king should replenish his treasury with a sixth part of the yield of land, with fines and forfeitures from criminals and with fair taxes levied from merchants in accordance with the injunction of the *Śāstras* in return for the protection that is granted to them. Let the king protect his subjects, receiving as his return a sixth part of their income'.[44] Even in the collection of his dues the king is advised to act in such a way that the peasant may not be destroyed. Taxes are to be levied in the manner of the weaver of garlands and

40 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 125. These are some of the more important of the sixty four *Kalās* or arts mentioned, in *e. g.*, *Śukranīti*, IV. 3.

41 *Śukranīti*, I. 367, 368.

42 As Hegel puts it, 'it is their highest duty to participate in the life of the state'.

43 *Mahābhārata* : Śānti, 71, 10. Similar rules are found in all the *Śāstras*, conveying the idea of a sixth going to the income in return for protection granted to the subjects.

44 Baudhāyana, 1.10.1.

not of the coal miner. 'Just as fruits are gathered from the gardens only when they become ripe, so revenue shall be collected only when they fall due'.[45] Collection of revenue like that of fruits when unripe should never be carried on lest their source should be injured. Private property owned by individuals was certainly recognized and the latter were allowed to enjoy the fruits of their toil. Though the state was permitted to take the property that was heirless and therefore unclaimed, it was enjoined as its duty to manage and protect the property of minor heirs and make it over as soon as the minor came of age.[47]

On the other hand, it was the duty of the citizens to help to keep the public peace and aid the state police in clearing the roads and highways free from thieves and robbers, to pay the taxes to the state for the political and economic security that was assured them and to observe inviolate the laws and customs laid down in the holy S*āstras* or proclaimed by the sovereign from time to time. The citizens were taught to keep to the primary rules of sanitation and hygiene. 'Whoever throws dirt in the street shall be fined one eighth of a *paṇa* and whoever causes water or mire to collect in it, one fourth of a *paṇa* . The same offence committed on the royal road entailed double the amount of fine' in the *Arthaśāstra*.[48] In judicial proceedings, it was incumbent on the subjects to give voluntary aid to help the Judiciary. 'That wretch of a person who knowing all did not give evidence was visited by the sin and the punishment of a false witness.'[46] Though persons not formally summoned to give evidence were not bound to appear at the law court, any person who came to the court by accident and who knew about the case, if questioned by the judge was bound to give out the truth.[50] Parties to a suit had themselves to produce witnesses to prove the validity of their cause, but witnesses who may be very far or who would not stir out shall be forced to present themselves by the order of the judges.[51] Similarly, the penalty was very heavy for conscious derelection of one's honorary duties. 'When a person caused a criminal to be let off or supplied him with food, dress, information or plans of escape the penalty

45 *Sukranīti*, IV. 2. 113.
46 *Arthaśāstra* p. 246.
47 Āpastamba, II. 14. 5 ; Vaśiṣtha, XVI. 7-9.
48 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 145.
49 Yajñavalkya, II. 79.
50 Gautama, XIII. 3 ff.
51 *Arthaśāastra*, p. 177.

was mutilation or a fine of 900 *paṇas*.'[52] Travellers on the state roads shall catch hold of any person whom they find is suffering from a wound, is possessed of destructive weapons or is a stranger to the place or is skulkingly passing along, etc.'[53] Voluntary efforts of private citizens to keep the roads and streets clear of nuisances and make them more convenient for the travellers were encouraged by the state. 'Those who with their united effort constructed on the roads inns and caravenserais of any kind were shown special favour by the government.[54]

(*b*) In Grave Emergencies

Now we shall deal with the duties of the state and the citizens in times of distress. Normally, the king should never seek to increase his treasure by excessive punishments, land revenues and duties.[55] But on occasions of great financial difficulty the king could have recourse to extra revenues from cultivators, herdsmen and merchants.[56] He may request wealthy men of the kingdom to part with as much as they can, but should be punctual in returning the amount taken on loan with interest as soon as the danger was past.[57] He may purchase, if necessary, any land, offering favourable price to the owners thereof.[58] But if a miser who had much hoarded wealth would not give any aid to his suffering-fellows the government may have resort to the processes of *Karśanam* (extortion) and *vamanam* (forcing one to vomit).[59] It is, however, laid down that the king should be very careful and guarded in the application of these extreme measures. Only in times of crisis and great emergencies could these methods be employed, and 'such expedients,' says Kauṭilya,[60] 'could be resorted to only once' and should never be applied in the case of subjects that cultivate only inferior soils, those that may have been great help to the state in the construction of forts, irrigation works, routes of traffic etc., and of people that may lack the means of subsistence.[61]

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52 *Ibid*, p. 226-227.

53 *Ibid*, p. 144.

54 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 173.

55 *Śukranīti*, IV. 2.9.

56 *Arthaśāstra*, pp 242-246. Similarly in times of war the king may levy extra dues from his subjects. *Śukranīti*, IV. 210.

57 *Śukranītī*, IV. 2. 11.

58 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 242.

59 *Ibid*, p. 208.

60 *Ibid*, p. 243.

61 *Ibid*, p. 242.

If, in grave emergencies such as famine, it was the duty of the king to provide his subjects with grains and provisions and with other assistance by a variety of measures,[62] external and internal, it was the duty of the citizen to volunteer help to elevate the position of his distressed fellows and to promote the commonweal. People who did public and philanthropic work were appreciated and awarded due honours. Those who being moved by motives of public welfare offer their wealth to the government shall be honoured with a special rank at court, a royal umbrella, a precious turban or ornaments in return for their voluntary aid.[63] In some cases the fascination for a title may have induced the people to render such timely assistance to the state. But if the wealthy, who are not moved by such humane considerations or the prospect of reward, are so avaricious as to amass riches like the 'Economic Man', by selling stores of corn at high prices, then as Kalhana says,[64] there was good justification for the use of force. Similarly, in a village where a house was on fire, any house-owner who did not run to give help to entinguish the fire was fined twelve *paṇas* and one who had taken a house only for rent *(avakrayī)* not proving to be of use in such a calamity, was to suffer the penalty.[65] In times of danger, people who neglected opportunities for rescuing themselves being indolent and idle, were fined by the state,[66] and thus made to realise the truth of the good and wholesome maxim 'Self help is the best help.'

62 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 208f.

63 *Ibid*, p. 244.

64 *Rājatarangini*, V. 272f.

65 *Arthaśāstra*, p. 145.

66 In floods, 'Persons neglecting rescue with the exception of those who for want of boats have no means of escape shall be fined twelve *paṇas*' (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 207.)

SOME VAISNAVA SAINTS OF SOUTH INDIA

(By K. G. Sesha Ayyar Esq., b.l.)

INTRODUCTION

From the very earliest times of which Tamil literature treats, the worship of Viṣṇu has been largely prevalent in South India. *Tol-Kāppiyam* is regarded as the earliest Tamil work now extant ; and its authorship is traditionally attributed to a direct disciple of Agastya-muni, a Ṛṣi called Tol-Kāppiyar, or, as the term means, the Ṛṣi of the ancient Kapi-Gōtra. He is said to be no other than the Purāṇic Ṛṣi, Tṛṇadhūmāgni, the son of the well-known Jamadagni. That work is the earliest of the Tamil works that we now have ; and it supplies the basic grammar for all the works of the Sangam period in Tamil literature. In the section relating to *Agattiṇai* or the grammar of subjective life with special reference to Love and Happiness, *Tol-Kāppiyam* classifies inhabited land into four varieties, viz., *mullai* or pastoral land, *kurinci* or hilly tracts, *marutam* or agricultural land, and *neytal* or sea-board land ; and it gives the valuable and interesting information that *Māyōn* or Viṣṇu is the guardian deity of *mulla-makkal* or the inhabitants of pastoral lands. *Paripāḍal* is one of the earliest Sangam works, which Mahāmahopādhyāya V. Swāminātha Aiyar, the greatest Tamil scholar now living, has saved from the ravages of white ants, as he has done several others of the Sangam Classics. It is a collection of lyrics mainly in praise of Viṣṇu, Subrahmaṇya and the Vaigai river. In its complete form, the work, according to an old verse, consists of eight poems in praise of Viṣṇu, thirty-one poems in praise of Subrahmaṇya, twenty-six in praise of the river Vaigai, four in praise of Madura and one in praise of the Sea, thus making up a total of seventy lyrics. Only 22 lyrics in full and a few fragments are published ; and of these, six are devoted to the praise of Tiru-māl or Viṣṇu. One of them extols the worship of Viṣṇu in the forms of Kṛṣṇa and Bala-Dēva in the temple of Tiru-māl-irun-cōali, near Madura ; while another besides describing the bāla-līlas or the juvenile doings of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, mentions definitely by their Tamil names the four *Vyūhas* of the Bhāgavatas, viz., Vāsudēva, Sankarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. In *Cilappatikāram*, a well known epic poem of the Sangam period, the poet tells us that when certain strange and disturbing phenomena occured in Madura, the women of the shepherd class conducted, as a mode of propitiating Viṣṇu, dances to the accompaniment

of songs describing the juvenile feats of Śrī Kṛṣṇa. It is clear from these references that the worship of Viṣṇu was very common in the Tamil country in ancient days ; and judged by the evidence of Tamil literature, there was only one other form of religion that was equally prevalent in South India in early times ; and that was the worship of Subrahmaṇya. *Tol-Kāppiyam* tells us that Subrahmaṇya is the presiding deity of Kurinci or hilly country ; and eight long lyrics, in the published portion of *Paripāḍal*, and *Tiṛu-Murug-āṛṛu-paḍai* are found in Sangam literature, entirely devoted to his praise and worship. I have attempted to show elsewhere that these Sangam works cannot be posterior to the second century A. C ; and if so, we may safely accept the late Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's statement in his *Vaiṣṇavism, Saivism and Minor Religions* that "there is nothing to show that Vaiṣṇavism had not penetrated to the Tamil country about the first century after Christ," as not an exaggerated estimate of the antiquity of Vaiṣṇavism in South India.

Use of Tradition

It is not the object of this paper, to trace the early history of Vaiṣṇavism and its development in south India ; indeed, for such work there is little or no material available and, besides, even if there were material, the attempt would be beyond my competency. The purpose is only to give a short account of some great men among the early Vaiṣṇavas, to whom an abiding influence has attached and from whose works a permanent beneficial result has followed. Among the civilizing agencies to the influence of which the development of the world is indebted, not the least important is the agency of great men. 'Great men have been among us' from the earliest time, whose influence, direct and indirect, on social life and humanity has been powerful and permanent ; and among such great men are the vaiṣṇava saints or Ālvārs who occupy a prominent place in the temple of fame as religious teachers. The Ālvārs come from different castes, ranging from the Brāhmaṇa to the Panama ; and they were born at different places and in different times. In the words of Guizot, the historian of *Civilization in Europe*, 'no-one can say why a great man appears at a certain epoch ; that is a secret of providence, but the fact is not therefore, less certain'. Besides their imperishable writings and the traditions that have come down to us and which have been cherished as a holy heritage by long generations of Vaiṣṇavas, there exists no other

source from which the story and the lesson of their lives can be learnt. *Divya-Sūri-Charita of Garuḍavāhana*, which is said to be the oldest work extant on the Śrī Vaiṣṇava hierarchy, *Guru-parampara-prabhāva* of Pinbalakiya Perumāl-Jīyar and similar works from which the popular accounts of the lives of the Ālvārs have been prepared, only concretized the floating traditions of their day, and the writers of those works do not profess to give under personal responsibility the facts and incidents which they narrate in regard to the Ālvārs. Should the traditions then be rejected altogether in our attempt to know the story of the lives of these great personages? The conception of biography as a faithful portrait of a man's life is entirely modern; and it will be conceded that in ancient and mediaeval times, the lives of great men were utilized by their biographers as fit themes to illustrate in a magnified form a tendency of conduct that was worthy of being followed. The object of biography was conceived to be the production of a great and striking moral effect, and consistently with that initial object, personal lives were narrated so as to serve as a solemn warning or a high example. Recognizing this defect in the accounts of personal life preserved in traditions, he will, nevertheless, not be justified in totally discrediting the biographers. Tradition, after all, is really human testimony regarding the long past, and like all human testimony it is liable to error; but on that account it should not be discarded as wholly unworthy of attention, unless indeed we believe that in ancient times people were incapable of discriminating between truth and falsehood. In the absence of trustworthy first-hand evidence, tradition which in effect is reputation arising from the concurrence of many parties who are unconnected with each other but are all interested in investigating the subject, may be accepted as the ground-work for history, especially in matters in which the probability for personal bias is little. It is in this light that the traditional accounts of the lives of the Vaiṣṇava Ālvārs are utilized in this paper. For English readers interested in the traditions that have gathered round the Ālvārs, there is no better or more interesting and informing book than Śrīmad Govindāchāryya Svāmin's *Holy Lives of the Ālvārs*'.

The Ālvārs

According to the Bhāgavata, Viṣṇu, the Supreme Lord, caused, for the benefit of the Kali Yuga, the incarnation of Vaiṣṇava saints in the Dravida country, and that the world may become better they taught the

message of Bhakti or salvation by faith. The consecrated country lying on the banks of the Tamraparṇī, the Kṛtamatā or Vaigni, the Payasvini Pālār, and the westword-flowing Mahānadi or Periyār, was to be blest with the nativity of the saints. These saints who are known as the Ālvārs, a term which literally means those drowned (in devotion to the love of God), are usually reckoned to be twelve in number, and they come from both sexes and from different castes, the lowest not excluded. Just now, when there is in our country, a powerful ferment due to the existence of social gradations culminating at one end in unapproachability and untouchability, it is pre-eminently important to remember that the Hindus of South India, whether of the Śaiva or of the Vaiṣṇava persuasion, freely recognized that access to saint-hood or spiritual union with God by way of faith and discipline could not be foreclosed by reason of hereditary caste disabilities. They recognized that the chosen instrument of God for carrying out God's purposes for the elevation of the human soul, might appear in any grade of society, that all saints were equally incarnations for the betterment of the world, and there were no gradations of high and low, of first or last among them. Tradition says that the Ālvārs are the incarnations in human form of the emblems and insignia of Nārāyaṇa, who in his infinite love and grace sent them to be born on earth for the salvation of humanity through the consolations of the Vaiṣṇava faith. According to the *Guru-Paramparās*, the following is the list of the Ālvārs in their chronological order :—

Tamil name	Sanskrit name
Poygai Ālvār	Sārō-yōgin
Bhūtatt Ālvār	Bhūta Yōgin
Pēy Ālvār	Bhrānta Yōgin
Tiru Maliśai Ālvār	Bhaktisāra
Nam Ālvār	Śaṭha Kōpa
Madhura Kavi Ālvār	Madhura Kavi
Kulaśēkhara Ālvār	Kulaśēkhara
Periya Ālvār	Viṣṇu Citta
Āṇḍāl	Gōdā
Toṇḍarḍippoḍi Ālvār	Bhaktāṅghrirēṇu
Tiruphāṇ Ālvār	Yōgivāha
Tiru Mangai Ālvār	Parakāla

The traditional and orthodox belief is that the first five are respectively the incarnations of *Śaṃkha*, *Gadā*, *Nandaka*, *Chakra* and

Viṣvaksēna and those that are mentioned as seventh to twelfth in the list are the embodiments respectively of *Kaustubha*, *Garuḍa*, *S'rī* or *Lakṣmī*, *Vanamālā*, *S'rīvatsa* and *Sā-aṇga*. According to sex, all except Āṇḍāl are males, and according to caste, Tiru-pāṇ-Ālvār was a Pañchama Nam-Ālvār and Tiru Mangai Ālvār were S'ūdras, Kulaśēkhara Ālvār was a Kṣatriya, and the rest Brāhmaṇas. They came from different parts of the Drāviḍa country. Poygai Ālvār was born at Kāñchīpuram, Bhūtatt Ālvār in Mahābalipuram, and Pēyālvār at Mylapore in Madras, and these three are said to have been contemporaries, and are regarded as the earliest *Ālvārs*. Tirumaliśai Ālvār was born at a place called Maliśai, near Punamalai in Madras and is said to have been a younger contemporary of the first three Ālvārs. He is said to have been born of Brāhmaṇa parents, but was brought up by a S'ūdra as his son. Nam Ālvār was born at Ālvār-tirn-Kagari in the Tinnevelli district; and though in point of date, he came long after the saints above-mentioned, he is, as his name itself indicates, the first in importance among the Ālvārs, These five are said to have been born *Yōgis*. Madhura Kavi was born at Tiru-Kōlūr, and he is, according to orthodox belief, an incarnation of Kumuda-Gaṇēśa, a subordinate functionary under Sēnēśa—a tradition invented to explain the fact that he sought and accepted Nam Ālvār as his *Guru* or preceptor. Kulaśēkhara Ālvār was born in Tiru-Ancai-Kalam, near Cranganore on the west coast, and was a prince of Kērala. Periya Ālvār and his daughter Āṇḍāḷ were born in S'rīvilliputtūr, in the Tinnevelli District, Toṇḍaraḍi-poḍi Ālvār at Mandamguḍi in the Chōla country, Tiru-pāṇ-Ālvār in Uraiyūr (a suburb of Trichinopoli) once the capital of the Chōla Kingdom and Tiru Mangai Ālvār at Tiru-Kurai-yallūr, near Shiyāli, also in the Chōḷa Kingdom. All of them belonged to the Tamil country, and they lived and worked among the Tamil people. The *Nālāyira Prabandham*, which is a collection of their devotional lyrics in Tamil, is ranked by south Indian vaiṣṇavas with the Vedas and Vedāṇgas in importance. Indeed, *Tiru-Vāy-Moli*, the name by which Nam-Ālvār's one thousand lyrics contained in the Nālāyira Prabandham are known, is the oldest Tamil expression to denote the Veda. Nam Ālvār's *Tiru-Vāy moli* is said to embody the essence of the Sāma Vēda. All the lyrics contained in it are set to music, while the same saint's *Tiru-Viruttam*, *Tiru-Āśiriyam* and *Periya-tiru-Antādi*, all of which form part of the *Nālāyira-Prabandham*, are held to represent the Ṛg. the Yajus and the Atharva Veda respectively. If in popular conception, Nam-Ālvār's poems represent the Vedas, Tiru Mangai Ālvār's

Periya-Tiru-Moli and other works are held to represent the six Vedāṇgas *par excellence*. It is patent, therefore, what great influence the sayings and writings of the Ālvārs had in spreading and establishing Vaiṣṇavism among the Tamil people. The message they spread among the people was that of God's grace which was to be attained by unswerving faith in Nārāyaṇa. That basic idea repeats itself in various forms in the writings of the Ālvārs, and as illustration, the following verses may be cited. Says Nam Ālvār :

I saw the lotus Feet ; and straightway disappeared
The bondage of past deeds. To love the Lord Supreme
And serve Him ceaselessly, that is the way revealed
Of yore for us to follow.

Tiru vāy moli. X. 4. 9.

Again, Tiru Maḷiśai Ālvār writes :

Vouchsafe to me your grace today, and for tomorrow too !
Longer may it remain for me ! Behold ! I'm one with you !
Nārāyaṇa ! from you apart, I'm naught ! In you I live !
And of your saving grace to me, O Lord, in plenty give !

Nān-Mukan Tiru-Antādi.

The measure of their succes in carrying out their high mission will be patent from a song of exultation where Nam Ālvār exclaims :

Glory ! All hail ! The ills of life have fled !
Naraka itself, for punishment ordained,
Has disappeared ! Henceforth the Lord of Death
His function loses here ! The Kali age,
Behold ! doth vanish ! For the devotees
Of Him, the sea-complexioned Lord Supreme
In multitudes have on the earth appeared,
Singing and dancing in ecstatic joy !

Tiru-Vāy-Moli, V. 2. 1.

The First Ālvārs

Based on the chronological order accepted by Vēdānta Dēśikar and others, the Ālvārs will easily fall into three groups. Poygai Ālvār, Bhūtatt-Ālvār, Pēy Ālvār, and Tiru Maliśai Ālvār will form the early Ālvārs, Kulaśēkhara Ālvār, Periya Ālvār and Āṇḍāl will form one group ; and Toṇḍer-aḍi-poḍi-Ālvār, Tiru-pān Ālvār, and Tiru Mangai Ālvār will form the last group. There can be no room for doubt that the first three Ālvārs were really contemporaries, but the traditional account of Tiru-Maliśa

Ālvār gives large scope for doubt whether he was a contemporary of the other three in the first group who are usually referred to as *Mudal Ālvārs* or the first Ālvārs. The *Mudal Ālvārs* are said to have been born in the same month of the same year, the first being just a day older than the second, and the second a day older than the third. Tradition assigns to them an impossible date—4202 B. C., and though that date can be summarily dismissed, it is not easy, from the materials now available, to say when exactly they lived. From the fact that Bhūtattālvār is said to have been born in Mahābalipuram, it has been attempted to assign these saints to the 7th century A. D., because, we are told on the authority of Prof. Jouveau Dubreuil that, this town did not probably exist before the time of Narasiṃha Varman I. The reasoning is extremely inconclusive. Dr. S. Krishnaswāmi Aiyangar in his *Early History of Vaiṣṇavism in South India* concludes that *Mudal Ālvārs* should be placed in the second century A. D. From Tamil literature we see that a poet of the name of Poygaiyār composed a poem called *Kaḷa-Vaḻi-Nāṟpatu* in honour of Kō-Cenkaṇṇan, the well known Chōla king of the Saṇgam period, and he has also contributed two poems to the *Puṟanānūṟu* collection, an acknowledged Saṇgam work. Poygaiyār belonged to the Saṇgam period, and if Poygai Ālvār and Poygaiyār be the same, it follows that the *Mudal Ālvārs* should be placed in or about the period of the Tamiḻ Saṇgam. If that view of Dr. S. Krishṇaswāmi Aiyangār's statement may be accepted as more or less correct, as of all the dates attempted to be assigned to the Saṇgam period in Tamil literary history, the 2nd century A. D. has always appeared to me the most probable. Tradition says that one night, the three Ālvārs happened to meet each other at Tiru-Kōvilūr. It was a night of pelting rain. Poygai Ālvār who came to the place first found shelter in a small hut where there was just enough accommodation for one to lie down. Bhūtattālvār also sought shelter from the rain in the same hut, and when he was told that there was space for only one to sleep, he replied that if one could sleep there, two could sit, and entered the hut. Shortly after Pey Ālvār came and sought admission, and on hearing there was sitting space for only two persons, he said that if so, three could stand, and entered the room. The three came to know each other. This chance meeting proved to be a turning point in their lives. The close contact of kindred souls suddenly brought them a new flood of spiritual light and they burst into praise of Viṣṇu, whose beatific vision was then vouchsafed to them. The songs that flowed from their inspired lips are said to be embodied in the section of the *Nālāyira Prabandham*

known as *Iyaṛpā*. Poygai Ālvār's centum begins by defining God as represented in His manifested universe, Bhūtattālvār begins his centum by regarding the Supreme as Nārāyaṇa, and Pey Ālvār by conceiving Him as associated with Śrī or Śakti. The opening verses of three *Tiru-antādis* tell us in what form each of the three saints obtained his vision of the Lord.

Says Poygai Ālvār :—

With the earth as the receptacle to hold the oil,
The girdling ocean as the *ghī* for the lamp,
And the resplendent sun as the kindled light,
I lit my lamp to see the beauteous Feet
Of Him that on the shining sea recumbent lies ;
And there I placed the garland of song I wove
In glorification of the Lord,
That I from the sea of bondage might be saved.

1st Tiru Antādi.

Bhūtattālvār writes :—

With love as the receptacle, with yearning as the *Ghī*,
And a melting heart as the wick, in estacy
Of soul I lit the lamp of wisdom and glorified
Nārāyaṇa in Tamil verses meetly tried.

2nd Tiru Antādi—I.

Here is Pey Ālvār's account :—

Lakṣmī I saw ! I saw the golden form,
The glorious hues of the effulgent sun !
I saw the mighty golden discus and the friendly conch
All this I saw in Him that bears the ocean's hue !

3rd Tiru Antādi—I.

The measure of their intense faith and illumination, as also their distinctive conception of the Deity, may be judged to some extent from the following verses taken at random from their songs.

O cease from doubt, for thou hast seen the Lord !
Know thou the solid earth, th' expansive sky,
The air, the sounding sea, the glowing fire
Are all the Lotus-eyed Lord Viṣṇu, who
Of yore the small-eyed elephant did save
When in distress it cried to Him for help.

1st Tiru Antādi—29.

The mind, from obscuration purified which knows the truth,
Yearns for and joins with glee the saving Feet
Of Him who wears the Tulsi garland cool,
E'en as the calf seeks naturally its dam.

1st Tiru Antādi—30.

Awake I saw Nārāyaṇa by day !
In sooth I saw Him in my dream again !
At all times oft I saw the glorious form
Of Him who in His hand the gleaming discus holds,
Whose beauteous Feet with heavenly splendour shines.

2nd Tiru Antādi—31.

I care not for kingship of the earth !
Nor would I be the king of Devas in Heaven itself !
For now I have as humble devotee
Sought out the supreme Lord with Lotus-eyes,
Lord Viṣṇu, our Lord of Lords, and worshipped Him.

2nd Tiru Antādi—90.

In body and in mind I did a slave become
To Him who in the dark-blue ocean doth reside,
E'en Him who on his breast as lustrous jewels wears
Lakṣmī, the flower-born Goddess with the coral lips,
And gleaming garlands richly light with precious stones !

3rd Tiru Antādi—37.

The Way to Live I'have learnt ! For I have gained
The Feet of Him, our Lord, the Lotus-eyed,
Viṣṇu of dazzling splendour, on whose breast
Where Śrī resides the garland sweet descends,
Like a long-lying water-fall that runs
Adown a cleft o'er a dark mountain side.

3rd Tiru Antādi—59.

The accounts of the saints to whom has been vouchsafed the beatific experience of the vision of God are always uplifting and full of spititual power, and the writings of the first three Ālvārs have, therefore, been justly included in the sacred literature of South Indian Vaiṣṇavas.

Tirumaliśai Ālvār.

Tirumaliśai Ālvār is said to have been born in the family of Bhārgava Ṛṣi, but brought up by a Śudra, as his parents abandoned him. He is represented by tradition as having studied critically all systems of religion

and philosophy, and as the result of his study to have become convinced of the supreme efficacy of the Vaiṣṇava religion. He is alleged to have spent many hundreds of years in Yōgic trance, and orthodoxy believes that in the interval between two long periods of such trance, the Ālvār received a visit from the Mudal Ālvārs ! The extravagant antiquity assigned by orthodox uncritical opinion to the Mudal Ālvārs necessitated the employment of this obviously unacceptable device to explain, perhaps, an ascertained fact of the proximity in date between the latter Ālvār and the earlier Ālvārs. To emphasize the intensity of his faith in Viṣṇu, a story is told. It is said that on one occasion the Ālvār was visited by Rudra with a view to test his faith. According to Vaiṣṇava belief, Rudra is the grandson of Nārāyaṇa. In his *Nān-Mukhan-Tiru-Antādi*, Tiru Maliśai Ālvār writes in the opening verse : "Nārāyaṇa created Brahma of the four faces, and Brahma Śankara". When Rudra appeared, the Ālvār sat indifferent, stitching a torn cloth. Rudra began the conversation, but observing the Ālvār inattentive, asked him why he was so. "What have I to gain from you ?" Asked the Ālvār. "I desire to confer a boon on you", replied Rudra. "Then can you grant me Mokṣha", asked the Ālvār. "That is exclusively the gift of Nārāyaṇa. Ask something else" said the God. "Can you even by one day postpone the date of a man's death ?" Asked the saint. "That is regulated by his Karma" said Rudra. "Then there is nothing you could give me". Rudra admired the constancy of the Saint's faith in Nārāyaṇa and bestowed on him the title of *Bhaktisāra*. Various other supernatural agencies are said to have attempted to tempt him out of his faith in Viṣṇu, but without any success. It is said that he visited Kāñchīpuram for worship. The Pallava king, who had heard of the saint's supernatural power, importuned him with the request for the grant of the boon of undying youth. Much annoyed, the saint left the place, but lo ! the image of Viṣṇu in the temple also vanished, to be with the Lord's devotee. The Pallava king duly apologized to the saint, who thereupon returned to Kāñchīpuram, and the sanctity of the temple of the Pallava was restored. Unfortunately, we are not told the name of this Pallava king. The late Mr. Gopīnātha Rao thinks that the first quarter of the 8th Century A. D. appears to have been a period of great Vaiṣṇava activity, and that Tirumaliśai Ālvār may be assigned to that period. Dr. Krishṇaswāmi Aiyangār, however, thinks that the king of Kāñchī with whom the Ālvār was brought in contact is Toṇḍaimān Ilan-tiraiyan, a ruler of Kāñchi in the Saṅgam period. There is no reason why the tradition

that Tiru Maliśai Ālvār was a younger contemporary of the Mudal Ālvārs should be summarily rejected ; and if the latter are capable of being placed in the 2nd century A. C., the suggestion of the learned Professor of Indian History in the Madras University that Tiru Maliśai Ālvār was a contemporary of Toṇḍaimān Ilam Tiraiyan may be accepted. There is internal evidence supplied by *Nān-mukhan-Tiru-Antādi*, that its author was posterior in date to Tiru Valluvar, the author of the *Kural* ; for we find in stanza 23 of the former work a very close adaptation, with much verbal similarity of verse 5 of Chapter IX of the latter work. However, there seems to be some reason for doubting if the Ālvār could be placed in the 2nd century, and this doubt I base on literary grounds. His *Nan-mukhan-tiru-antādi*, from which a verse emphasizing the need for Divine Grace has already been quoted, may be a poem of the 2nd Century ; but besides that poem, he has also written *Tiru-Canda-Viruttam* in metrical form from which, if not also the poetical conceits and philosophical ideas in which that beautiful work abounds, would suggest a later period for the Ālvār. Let me give an illustration or two. Addressing God, the saint exclaims :—

Thou art that the word seeks to discover !
Thou art the substance which the word denotes !
The self-existent Light ineffable !
At Thy mere bidding all creation sprang !
Can any creature then in words describe
E'en slightly Thy essential qualities !

Tiru-Canda-viruttam—11.

As the vast ocean holds within itself the swelling waves
Which born in it are in it also ultimately lost,
So Thou dost from the source and art Th' abode of life !
For life from Thee is born ! Likewise both in its active state
And in its passive life in Thee is lived ; and in the end
To Thee doth life return, becoming one with Thee !

Tiru-Canda-Viruttam 10.

Nam Alvār

Nam Ālvār is by common consent the greatest of the Ālvārs. As already observed his writings are regarded by the Vaiṣṇavas of the Tamil country as embodying the four Vedas, and one of his writings bears the hallowed name of Tiru-Vāy-Moli, meaning the holy Veda. He is

the saint among saints, the others standing in relation to him only as individual limbs or organs of the body. Nam Ālvār means 'Our Saint', and it is the belief of orthodoxy that the appellation was bestowed on him by lord Śrī Raṇganātha himself. To Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, he is *Kulapati* and *Kūṭastha* the holy head. Reference is made to his birth in *Śrī Bhāgavata*, *Bhaviṣyat Purāṇa* and *Brahmāṇḍa-purāṇa*. His father Kāriyār belonged to Tiru-Nagari in the Tāmraparṇi basin, and his mother came from Tiru-vaṇ-pariṣāram, a village in South Travancore, a few miles from Cape Comorin. Nam Āḻvār was a born Yōgi, and it is said that even as a child he abandoned home, parents and all other earthly and domestic bondage, and went into a Yogic trance under the shade of an adjacent tamarind tree, which is even now reverentially pointed out by the villagers as Tiru-Puḷi-Āḻvār. When he had been in a state of *Samādhi* for 16 years, there came to him, beseeching initiation, Madhura Kavi Āḻvār. He was the God-ordained instrument to wake the youthful Yogi from his long trance. Madhura Kavi Āḻvār propounded a philo sophical question, which in its wording was almost of the nature of a conundrum. It was : If in the womb of what is dead a subtle thing is born, what will it feed on and where abide ? Forth came the Yogi's answer : It will feed on *that* and abide *there*. '*What is dead*' in the query refers to the body which is '*achit*', and the '*subtle thing*' is the soul. The sage's answer means that the food of the soul is God, and in Him it abides. The Muni had in his silent communion with God learnt the great truth that the Heart of God is the source of all life, and all finite things have their being there and to that they must flow back. By the faculty of transcendental feeling and ecstatic vision, the sage had attained spiritual knowledge and communion with the Highest. That serene and blessed mood and experience are not easily gained, but Nam Āḻvār had gained them by discipline and by Divine Grace ; and he was now ready to serve as God's chosen instrument to guide the human soul in its progress towards God. He revealed to Madhura Kavi Āḻvār that the soul that is to all appearance born in matter has its food and life in God, and Madhura Kavi at once accepted him as his *Guru* or teacher. There are eleven stanzas by Madhura Kavi Āḻvār that are included in the *Prabandham* and in expressing the great joy of the author in having discovered his spiritual master, they emphasize that a preceptor is essential for the attainment of salvation. So complete was his realization of this central fact that Madhura Kavi Āḻvār exclaims that when with gracious eyes Nam Āḻvār regarded him, he was at once freed from the accumulated

sins of his previous lives. Nam Āḻvār realized the unitive life, in which the individual and the Supreme Soul are no longer two but one. He lived in God, and he would not exchange his bliss as a Bhagavata even for the whole of Heaven itself. He exclaims :

Who can compare in all the universe so vast
With me, to whom is given with garlands of sweet songs
To adorn the Lord Who on us as on Śrī bestows
Rich happiness, the Lord Supreme, who is adored
By mortal men and by immortal Gods alike,
The Lord whose Lotus Feet in mercy cool abounds.

Tiru Vāy Moḻi IV. 5.8

The devotee of the Lord who by a species of ecstatic transfusion has known and experienced the Reality, easily appreciates the unity under the bewildering diversity around him. To him, as Nam Āḻvār says, the Highest exists, and the entire visible and invisible world is His form. (*Tiru Vāy Moḻi* I. 1.9.) All manifestations in the universe,—water, earth, fire, air, the sky, the sun and the moon and even Śiva and Brahma—represent Nārāyaṇa, (*Tiru Vāy Moḻi* VI. 9.1,) devotion to whom brings boundless bliss for endless time to the Bhakta who, with melting heart and tears of joy and with body quivering with emotion, dances and sings in praise of the Lord and languishes yearning for union with Him (*Tiru Vāy Moḻi* II. 4 1). Those who have had the beatific vision find the law of their life in love and service (*Tiru Vāy Moḻi* X. 4.9). Surely one living in such an atmosphere of blessedness can echo the words of Nam Āḻvār.

The earth, the sky so vast are all in Thee
But Thou hast through my ears got into me
And now in me residest ! Lord ! Who may
Declare if Thou or I be greater, say !

Periya Tiru Antādi, 75.

As to the date of the great Āḻvār there are, as in almost all matters of ancient south Indian choronology, keen differences of opinion. In the Anaimalai Inscription of 770 A. C., the name of the minister of the Pāṇḍyan King is mentioned as Māran Kāri who is described as a Madhura Kavi or sweet singer or poet. Epigraphists manufactured from this fact the information that the person there mentioned must be held to be the same as Madhura Kavi Āḻvār, the disciple of Nam Āḻvār who had also

the name of Māran ! According to tradition preserved by the hagiologists, to disbelieve or reject which in this particular case no reason has been given, Tirumangai Āḻvār made arrangements for the annual rectital of Nam Āḻvār's *Tiru vāy Moḷi* in Śrīrangam ; and from historical references found in Tirumangai Āḻvār's writings, Āḻvār has been assigned to the 8th century. Obviously then Nam Āḻvār must have lived some centuries before the 8th century. Among those who have written commendatory verses in honour of Nam Āḻvār and Madhura Kavi Āḻvār is Nāthamuni, the grandfather of Āḻvandār, whose younger contemporary was Rāmānuja. He would not be far from Nāthamuni's birth if we take it to be C. 900. In order to connect him with Nam Āḻvār, so that an unbroken succession of spiritual preceptors might be constructed, Vaiṣṇava tradition stated that Nāthamuni was, antecedent to his natural birth, in a state of yogic trance before the holy tamarind tree, that he might bring back the lost *Tiru Vāy Moḷi* of the great Āḻvār, and this *samādhic* period extended over 350 years. If we try to interpret the tradition rationally, we may take this to mean that Nāthamuni came about 350 years after Nam Āḻvār—that is we should look for Nam Āḻvār in the 6th century. With the materials available, one cannot possibly afford to be more definite, but whatever might be his date, his position among the Āḻvārs as *primus inter pares* is undisputed, and is amply justified by the character of his writings in which he has given expression to his 'inmost in the sweetest way', to use one of Meredith's phrases. The sweetness and value of his inmost spiritual song cannot be exaggerated. It is a song of triumph and already a verse has been cited to show his exaltation. Here is another:—

The Kali age is gone ! The Gods themselves have entered
And as appropriate to the great Krita age.
May the floodgates of celestial joy be opened wide
The devotees of our Lord Whose hue is like
Unto the rain cloud and the dark blue sea,
Have in large numbers, singing paeans, appeared
On earth, and over all the land have spread.

Tiru Vāy Moḷi V. 2. 3.

Kulasekhara Āḻvār.

Kulaśekhara Āḻvār was a reigning king of Kerala or the Chera kingdom ; and in time, as his lyrics show, he came to hold sway over the Pāṇḍya and Chola kingdoms also. It is not, however, as a warrior of

renown that he is remembered,—it is as a royal saint that his memory is honoured and cherished. He renounced all wordly pomp and splendour, which even in the plenitude of his regal power he realized the vanity of vanities and vexation of spirit, and he chose to walk humbly with God. Like all truly devotional and religious people, Kulaśekhara Ālvār was a mystic. It has been well said that mysticism is a temper rather than a doctrine. It is a state of feeling which shows itself in connection with human endeavour to grasp and enjoy the divine essence and actual communion with the Supreme Being. To the mystic, God is an experience, and his aim is to become like God and to attain to union with Him. Life, consequently, is to him a constant endeavour and aspiration to live in God ; and such was it to Kulaśekhara Āḻvār. There is a very beautiful story told about him : The Rāmāyaṇa was his favourite study and Śrī Rāma as God incarnate was the deity he adored. One day, when the court poet was reciting the portion where Rāma fights single-handed Khara and his Rākṣaṣa hordes, the king cried in frenzy : "My Rāma is fighting alone. Rise, my valiant soldiers and march with me, His Bhakta, to render Him assistance on the field of battle". So again, when the portion relating to the carrying away of Sītā by Rāvana was read, the king was so much beyond himself with righteous wrath that he exclaimed : "How can I rest here idle ? I shall forthwith cross the ocean, slay the wicked Rāvana, and restore my mother Sītā to Śrī Rāma". Our coldly critical spirit will rail at such incidents as acts of insanity, and that is because we fail to appreciate the mystic's intensity of feeling. He has felt and he has seen and he is convinced ; and to those who have not seen and felt the light as he has done, his acts and utterances may be incomprehensible and, perhaps, appear even foolish. The man of the world is a stranger to transcendental feeling ; he can chop logic ; but what Schelling terms intellectual intuition is unknown to him. But even to him come periods of life when in spite of his preconceived derision for spiritual experiences, the ' mystic germ ' in him, as Williams James would say, asserts itself. Says that well-known philosopher : " Especially in times of moral crisis, it comes to me, as the sense of an unknown something backing me up. It is most indefinite, to be sure, and rather faint. And yet I know that if it should cease, there would be a great hush, a great void in my life." Even as material objects are apprehended by intellectual perception, spiritual things must be apprehended by the spirit. The condition of all knowledge, says Porphyry, is that the subject should become like to the object. We can, thus, know a thing spiritually only

by becoming it. Kulaśekhara Āḻvār was drowned in God-love, which alone was real to him. He sings :—

What makes me King ?
The gaudy thing,
The diadem I wear ?
Not that, indeed the Regal crown
For me whom He has made His own ;
The King of Kings, whose lotus Feet
Upon my head I bear !
They form my crown, those lotus Feet !—
They make me King !

In the *Perumāl Tiru Moḻi*, as his contribution to the *Nālāyira Prabandham* is called, he writes with inimitable pathos that he would value being born as a tree or a stream or a bird on Tiru-vēnkaṭam, modern Tiru-pati, (one of the holiest of the shrines in South India dedicated to Viṣṇu,) very much higher than being the world's absolute monarch, or the possessor of the untold riches of the celestial regions.

Kulaśekhara Āḻvār was born in Tiru-ancai-kalam or Tiru-Vanci-Kulam, the ancient capital of the Cheras, and passed away at Mannārkōil, near Ambāsamudram in the Tinnevelli District. The Āḻvār was also known as Kulaśekhara Perumāḷ, a name which is even now retained by the Kings of Travancore, who are staunch devotees of Śrī Padmanābha. A temple known as Kulaśekhara Āḻvār Kōil, built in honour of the Āḻvār's memory, is even now in existence at Mannār-Kōil and the inscriptions found in the temple show that it has been in existence from before the early years of the 11th Century. When did the Āḻvār live ? The earliest inscription found in the temple is of 1020 A. C. and in order to have gained the honour of having a temple dedicated to him, the fame of the saint must have, some centuries before the 11th, been established in the land. Again, an inscription of 1088 makes provision for the recital of one of the Ālvār's poem at Śrīrangam. The commendatory verse relating to *Perumāḷ-Tiru-Moḻi* is by Maṇakkāl Nambi, the preceptor of Āḷevandār, and the disciple of Nāthamuni's disciple, and this fact would suggest that the Āḻvār was considerably prior to the 10th century. The Āḻvār describes himself as *Kolli-Kāvalan*, *Kūḍal-nāyakan* and *Kōḻik-Kōn*, that is the king of the Chera, Pāṇḍya and Chola kingdoms. It cannot be an idle boast, for the Āḻvār is incapacle of it. When was it possible in South Indian political history for the Chera to have gained ascendency over practically the whole of South India.' He might have

done so before the Pallavas rose to power, that is before the beginning of the 7th Century ; after the Pallava ascendency was over, the Choḷas come to power, and their capital is transferred from Kōḷi (Uṟaiyūr) to Tanjore. It has, however, been suggested, especially with the help of a proposed emended reading of a *śloka* in the Āḻvār's *Mukundamālā* and of some Samskrit poem said to have been composed by a Kerala poet, Vāsudeva, that Kulaśekhara Āḻvār belonged to the beginning of the 9th century. Others again have assigned him to the middle of the 8th century on astronomical grounds, and Dr. Krishṇaswāmi Aiyangār would place him in the 9th century. Tradition makes Kulaśēkhara Āḻvār younger than Nam Āḻvār by 23 years. There is also a statement found in the records of the Kānchī Kāma-Koṭi-Pīṭha that the Āḻvār was a younger contemporary of Ujvala S'ankara, the 14th in succession from S'rī S'ankara in the Kānchīpura Mutt, and the date of Ujvala S'ankara is there mentioned as the latter half of the 4th century.

Whatever his position chronologically may be, there is no doubt that as a devotee he stands very high among the Vaiṣṇava saints, as is shown by the fact that alone among the Āḻvārs, he bears the consecrated name of Perumal. His poems are entremely sweet and are full of the fervour and humility of true devotion. In thought, word and deed, his entire life was a dedication to Nārāyaṇa. He was drowned in God-love. The following lines, which are from his earliest poem, depict his great yearning for the Divine vision, and the company of the Lord's devotees.

When will the day arrive, when I may see
With melting heart the shining moon-like face
And lotus eyes of Him, the ocean-hued,
Who on the serpent couch in Rangam lies,
Where blossoms rich in honey shine in groves ;
The shrine where Brahma, Hara, Indra, all
The other gods and heavenly maidens throng,
And sages wise, from all illusion free,
From all directions come with flowers sweet
To offer adoration to the Lord !

Perumal Tiru-Moḷi I. 6.

When shall I see the day, when I in joy
May join the rapturous crowd of devotees
Who throng the holy court-yard of the shrine
Where Ranga facing south in grace reclines,

So heaven and earth and gods and men alike
May prosper, pain and misery may cease,
True happiness may grow, and devotees,
Aglow with joy of love of God may thrive !

Perumal-Tiru-Moḷi I. 10.

Here is a typical picture which the Āḻvār has given of himself :—

What matters if the world to me seems mad,
And me the thoughtless world e'en so regards !
With frenzied ecstacy of love have I
My soul surrendered into Thee, O Lord,
Sri Ranga, Shepherd of the universe !

Perumal-Tiru-Moḷi III. 8.

Periya Āḻvār and Āṇḍāḷ

Periya Āḻvār was a devout worshipper of Śrī Kṛṣṇa. By birth a Brāhmaṇa, he was the temple priest at Śrīvilliputtur. He was sent for by Vallabha Deva, the King of Madura, and to the Pāṇḍyan King the saint taught the spiritual significance of the worship of Viṣṇu. In grateful recognition of the service, the King rewarded him and bestowed on him the title of *Bhaṭṭar-pirān* which means the chief among Brāhmaṇas. He then sang the *Tirup-pallāṇḍu*, the song of benediction, which is the opening poem of the *Nālāyira-Prabandha* collection. No where else in Tamiḷ literature have we such loving accounts, so full of the symphony of paternal feelings, of the Lord, of Śrī Kṛṣṇa's juvenile *lilas*. The depth of his love for God was immeasureable, but it was the love of the parent, of the mother, for the child. His is the love of benevolence, and it is in view of his unapproachable position in that respect that he is called *Periya* Āḻvār, that is the *great* Āḻvār. To those whose love of God is less fervent than that of the saint, this form of love may appear as mere exaggerated poetry,—they misunderstand its psychology. In practising that form of love, the saint places himself in the impossible position of making himself, as it were, God's benefactor, wishing God greater perfection and greater glory, congratulating Him and bidding Him rejoice. In reality, this form is the result of a holy humility too deep for words. It is the result of the true appreciation of His perfection and His glory, of His grace and His benevolence ; it makes the cause of God prosper in the world by the very simplicity of its fervid exaggerations. The following verses are addressed to the moon

and are in praise of the baby Kṛṣṇa, whom the saint, placing himself in the position of a parent, designates by the pet name Kuṭṭan.

My darling Kuṭṭan, my sweet ambrosia, my Lord
With his tender hands beckons to you and calls you !
O moon ! hide not yourself behind the cloud, but rejoice and come
If you are fit to sport and gambol with my dark-hued child !
Despite yourr lustrous form, your radiance rare,
With my Son's face you never can compare !
The wise One, Lord of Venkaṭa, to you makes sign !
O moon ! Come swift to Him, lest His small hand may ache !
He who the *chakra* in His hand doth hold,
Whose wondering eyes are like the petals of a flower ;
Sits on my waist, and, oh ! points out to you !
If you know what is proper, do not hesitate ;
Unless you barren be, O moon ! come instantly !

Periya Ālvār Tiru Moḷi 1. 5-Sl. 2, 3 & 4.

Āṇḍāḷ, the only lady-Āḻvār, was the daughter of Periya Āḻvār. It is said that when her father was away at the shrine of Śrī Vaṭa-Śāyin, adoring the Deity, she in a mood of frolic used to wear the garlands her father had intended for the image in the temple, and satisfy herself that they would truly beautify the Lord. Hence she gained the name of *Sūḍi-Koḍūtta-Nācciyār*, which means the holy lady who wore first (the garlands) and then gave (them to the Lord). When the time for her marriage approached, she told her anxious father that she had resigned herself entirely to Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa, and would be the bride of no other than Śrī Ranganātha himself. Here are her own words :—

Like sacrificial offerings which Vedic Brāhmaṇas for the Gods intend
Being abused as food for jackals that in deserts roam,
So, if my blooming form and swelling breast intended for the Lord,
For even him who wears the *Śaṃkha* and the *Chakra* in his hands,
Be barely mentioned as in marriage to a mortal man
That very instant, Manmatha ! my life departs !

Nāchiyār Tiru Moli 1. 5.

To her the very idea of earthly man desiring to wed her was a horror and an abomination. She belonged to the Lord of the Universe, Śrī Ranganātha. She exclaims :

O beauteous dames ! My Ranganātha is as nectar sweet !
His locks, His lips, His eyes, O ! how bewitching in their beauty rare !

Lo ! From His glowing navel blooms the lotus fair !
He is my Lord ! For Him I languish ! He has caused
My bracelets to slip off my wrists !

Nācciyār Tiru Moli XI. 2.

The story says that in accordance with her earnest entreaty, Periya Āḻvār took her to Śrī Rangam that she might commune with the Lord in that shrine, and behold, when she appeared before the image of the Lord, there arose a glorious light, and she became one with the Divine bride-groom whom she had so ardently sought. Her songs of love are pre-eminently mystical, and their sweetness and feeling cannot be excelled. They afford one of the best examples in Tamiḻ literature of erotic mysticism. They are spirit-songs in which the love and attraction of the human soul for the Divine Bride-groom, the Supreme Lord of the Universe, are expressed in the language of love between man and woman. One poem of hers, in which she tells us of her dream where she was united in wed-lock to the Lord, is even now sung by Śrī Vaiṣṇavas at their marriages, and on every morning in the month of " Mārgaḻi "(December—January), Śrī Vaiṣṇavas recite, as part of their daily adoration of the Deity, a verse from her *Tiru-pāvai*, a poem consisting of 30 verses or stanzas, which sings the praises of Śrī Kṛṣṇa. It is a lovely poem where a maiden asks her companions to waken so that they may have the ' Mārgaḻi ' bath before dawn, in accordance with approved usage.

Awake, my friends ! The cock has crowed. Did you not hear
The blowing of the shining conch-shell in the fane of Garuḍ's Lord ?

Do you not hear the peal reverberant of Hari's praise ?
The saints and seers who keep Him in their hearts Him glorify,
The Lord who on the surface of the waters rests in *Yogic* slumber !
He sucked of yore the demoness' poisoned breast !
In sport He raised His foot, kicked the false cart, and shattered it to pieces !
Have not the resounding praises of the Lord entered and rejoiced your hearts ?

Awake ! *Tiru-Pāvai*—6.

According to tradition, Periya Āḻvār is 19 years younger than Kulaśekhara Āḻvār. Periya Āḻvār refers to one Neḍu Māṛan, King of Madura, who is described as devoted to Viṣṇu. It is hardly possible that this Neḍu Māṛan can be the Pāṇḍyan King, Ninṛa Śrī Neḍu Māṛan, the Jaina King

of Madura whom Tiru Jñāna Sambandha, the well-known Śaiva Saint converted to Śaivism. This King became such a bigoted Śaiva that he impaled for their heresy the Jains in his kingdom, and is reckoned among the 63 canonized Śaiva saints. The consolations of Vaiṣṇavism could not have been acceptable to such a king. Dr. S. Krishṇaswāmi Aiyangār would identify the Neḍu Māṟan mentioned in *Periya-Āḻvār-Tiru-Moḻi* with Māṟa Varman Avani Śūḷāmaṇi, the grandfather of the Śaiva Niṉṟa-Śīr-Neḍu Māṟan. Others, however, have suggested that the Āḻvār's Neḍu Māran should be Śrī Māṟan who died in 862 A. C., the son of Varaguṇa I and father of Varaguṇa II, and the suggestion is based on the fact that according to the Cinnamannūr plates this Māṟan had an alias *Śrī Vallabha*, and the Guruparamparā tradition says that Periya Aḻvār gained a Vallabha Pāṇḍya as his disciple. In the first place, this would make Periya Āḻvār very much posterior to Tiru Mangai Āḻvār, in utter disregard of the chronological order for which tradition vouches. Secondly, it is highly doubtful if Vallabha, son of Varaguṇa I was a Vaiṣṇava. The Pāṇḍyas generally were Śaivas and supporters of Śaivism, and Varaguṇa I, the father of Vallabha was a very staunch and devout Śaiva, and it is not likely that his son was brought up a Vaiṣṇava. The grandson of Niṉṟa Śrī-Neḍu-Māṟan was Māṟan *alias* Rājasiṃha I who had died before 769 A. C. Nothing is known of his religion, but it is well known from the Madras Museum plates that his son Jaṭila was a very devout Vaiṣṇava and perhaps, the father too was a Vaiṣṇava. Can he have been the Aḻvār's Neḍu Māṟan? He was Pallava Malla's contemporary, and if Periya Āḻvār lived in his time, he would still have flourished before Tiru Mangai Āḻvār. But, perhaps, Prof. Krishṇaswāmi Aiyangār's identification fits in with tradition best.

Toṇḍar-aḍi-p-poḍi Āḻvār

Toṇḍar-aḍi-p-poḍi Āḻvār was born of a Brāhmaṇa family. His real name was Vipra Nārāyaṇa, but he assumed in self-abasement the name of Toṇḍar-aḍi-poḍi, which term means *the dust of the feet of devotees*. He was a bachelor, and he devoted his life to the service of Śrī Ranganātha for whose adornment he used to supply flower garlands which he had himself woven. He led a retired life, away from the distractions and temptations of the world. However temptation did come to him in the form of a courtesan whom he casually met in his flower garden near his lonely residence, and as he had not sufficiently conquered the flesh in him, he fell a victim to her blandishments. By Divine Grace, however, he freed

himself from the defilement, and he purified himself against contamination by the virtue of the water with which he washed the feet of holy men in humility of spirit, and which he imbibed in penitence and in faith. He assumed the name of Toṇḍar-aḍi-poḍi, and thereafter he belonged entirely to S'rī Ranganātha. His contribution to the *Nālāyira Prabandham* consists of *Tiru Mālai* (the holy garland), a poem of 45 stanzas, and *Tiru-palḷi-eḻicci* (the Lord's awakening) which has ten stanzas. In his conception, the greatest treasure and the richest possession is devotion to Viṣṇu, which alone sets the mark of respectability and high status on man. He writes :

> The devotees of Viṣṇu, though of lowly birth
> Doing the most degrading work, are worthy yet
> Of reverent obeisance. Alliances
> With them to form would on us honour great bestow.
> The man who with disrespect treats the devotees
> Of Viṣṇu should be deemed as of the lowest caste,
> E'en though he be a Brāhmaṇ born and fully versed
> In all the Vedas four, and S'āstras six besides !
>
> *Tiru Mālai* 42 AND 43.

Tradition places Toṇḍar-aḍi-poḍi Ālvār 100 years before Tiru Mangai Āḻvār. There is reason to hold, as will be shown presently, that Tiru Mangai Āḻvār was not posterior to the first quarter of the 9th century at the latest, and Toṇḍar-aḍi-poḍi Āḻvār may therefore be provisionally assigned to the 8th century.

TIRU-PĀN ĀLVĀR

Tiru-Pāṇ-Āḻvār is said to have preceeded Tiru Mangai Āḻvār by 55 years. Though born of the lowest caste, he is assigned one of the highest places among the saints. Spiritual work has never been gauged in India by the accident of birth. Every saint is conceived by us to be an incarnation of the Deity. It is God-love that leads to sainthood, and God-love does not rest on the cold reason of the philosopher or on the hard, demonstrated facts of the man of science, but upon feeling, upon intuitive and experienced conviction. Often the illumination comes suddenly, with excess of light, and the recipient is literally in ravishment when it comes. And so was it with Tiru Pāṇ-Āḻvār. So great was the merit of his devotion to S'rī Ranganatha, and so complete his self-surrender to the service and glorification of the Lord, that the wondering Brāhmaṇas carried him to the Holy Presence, where it is said, he became miraculously

united with Śrī Ranganātha Himself. There is a short poem of 10 stanzas which forms his contribution to the *Nālāyira Prabandham*, and the following lines are from it.

The heavy Karmic load of my past lives that bound
Me to the earth removed He and made me His slave !
Not that alone ! He entered me and did in me reside !
I know not what great *tapas* I performed to deserve this boon !
It is the gracious Heart alone of Ranganātha
Where mercy's self eternally resides
That made my humble soul His serf.

Amalanādipirān. 5

Tiru Mangai Alvār

Tiru Mangai Āḻvār is the last of the Vaiṣṇava saints. He was a petty chief and latterly became a highway-man, who was dreaded by all the country round. He fell in love with a lovely maiden named Kumudavalli, but she refused to marry him as he was not a Vaiṣṇava. He got himself duly initiated, and with all the external indications of a Vaiṣṇava complete, he presented himself before her, and renewed his request. She replied that if he would have her, he should, as a condition precedent, feed, with all the due observances of humility, a certain number of Śri Vaiṣṇavas every day for the period of a year, and receive their blessing. Faint heart never won a fair lady, and Tiru Mangai Mannan was not faint-hearted. He agreed to the test. This was the turning point of his life. From a life of sexuality and lawlessness, his pure love for a woman of his choice reclaimed him, and started him on the path of service and devotion to Nārāyaṇa and his devotees. The development of his soul grew apace. He had visions—he witnessed miracles. The Lord Himself appeared, and taught him the great, mystic *mantra* of the Vaiṣṇavas, *Oṃ namo Nārāyāṇāya*—the holy *mantra* of redemption. He became transformed,—the highway robber had evolved into a saint. The change was miraculous ; but such changes have occured. Mary Magdalen was originally a courtesan, and St. Paul was at first a persecutor. The verses of the first section of the Āḻvār's *Periya-Tiru-Moḻi* contain his pathetic confession.

No sciences have I learnt ! My mind I set
On pleasures low and gratified my senses five !
Alas poor me ! No good thereby did I obtain !
To human life around I was a danger.

Now all is changed ! Salvation's path is found !
I learnt and hold fast to the holy name Nārāyaṇa !
Periya Tiru Moli. 1. 1. 8

How withered was my soul ! My mind was filled with agony !
I flung me headlong into misery, not knowing how to escape !
How I with zest sought sexual pleasure, running after women fair !
Then saving grace was shown to me ! I knew my high estate !
My search is o'er ; for I have learnt the holy name Nārāyaṇa !
Periya Tiru Moli 1. 1. 1

High birth it grants and riches ! Every pain
God's servants feel it utterly removes !
The boon of heaven and earth it gracious gives !
It gives us strength and everything besides !
It helps us more than e'en a mother can !
Bliss it bestows ! Such power the Name I have
Discovered hath, the Name Nārāyaṇa !
Periya Tiru Moli 1. 1. 9

Tiru Mangai Āḻvār has been given the consecrated name of *Aruḷ Māri*—the shower of grace—to denote the shower of Divine Grace that descended on him, changing his entire being. He is said to have done a great deal for the cause of Vaiṣṇavism. The temple at Śrī Raṇgam owes much to his munificence. He arranged for the recitation of *Tiru-Vāy Moḷi* at Śrī Raṇgam. He visited many holy places and repaired many shrines. His contribution to the *Nālāyira Prabandham* consists of (1) *Periya-Tiru-Moḷi*, (2) *Tiru-Kurumtāṇḍagam*, (3) *Tiru-Neḍum-tāṇḍagam* (4) *Tiru Eḷu-Kūṟṟirukkai*, (5) *Śiriya-Tiru-Maḍāl* and (6) *Periya-Tiru-Maḍal*, which are said to represent the six *Aṇgas* supplementing the four Vedas that Nam Āḻvār's four works are held to represent. The poems are extremely musical and are of the highest value as spiritual songs.

The date of Tiru-Mangai Ālvār is capable of being determined with more or less defintieness. Lyrics 8 and 9 of the second section of his *Periya Tiru Moḷi* make certain unmistakeable references to known events in Pallava history. In the former there is the mention of Vairameghan and in the latter certain battles, such as Maṇṇai, Nenmeli and Karuvūr, fought and won by the Pallavas of Kāñchī are mentioned. Prof. Krishṇaswāmi Aiyangār holds that Vairameghan mentioned by the Āḻvār is Danti Durga, the Rāṣṭrakūṭa King, who bore the name

Vairamegha ; and he has assigned to the Āḻvār the first half of the 8th century, holding him to be a contemporary of Nandi Varman Pallava Malla. Others, however, hold that Vairameghan of the Āḻvār is a Pallava king of Kāñchī bearing that name, and they attempt to identify him with Danti Varman who, they surmise, had the surname Vairamegha. Danti Varman was the grandson of Nandi Varman Pallava Malla, and he has been referred to the close of the 8th and the beginning of the 9th centuries. My own view, is that *Vaira Megha* like several other names ending in *Megha*, was a Pallava name, and it is not improbable that Nandi Varman Pallava Malla himself had that surname or title. The Āḻvār mentions the *tiger-faced* drum of the Pallava Malla, and the battles he mentions have been attempted to be identified with the battles fought by that great Pallava. Provisionally, therefore, Tiru Mangai Āḻvār may be regarded as having flourished in the latter part of the 8th century A. C.

Conclusion

I must now conclude this paper. I have said enough to show the supreme value the works of the Āḻvārs possess in South India. Whether regarded as pure literature or as spirit songs of mystics, making touching and fervent appeals for Divine Grace, the *Nālāyira Prabandha* and the songs of the Saiva saints contained in the *Devāram* and the *Tiru Vācakam* are among the richest heritage of South India. Millions of people find in them satisfaction for the craving of their souls, and such works are of permanent value to humanity.

THE PROBLEM OF BHĀSA

(K. G. S'ANKAR, B.A., B.L.)

The Problem

Since the discovery and publication in 1912 of the *Svapna-Vāsavadatta* by the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gaṇapati S'āstri, Sanskrit scholars have been discussing the authorship of the 13 plays, including the *Svapna*, which Dr. Gaṇapati S'āstri has published in the *Trivandrum Sanskrit Series* (Nos. 15 to 17, 20 to 22, 26, 39 & 42) and ascribed to the famous dramatist Bhāsa, and there seems no near prospect of their coming to an agreement. The problem involves the following issues :—

(1) Whether all the plays were composed by the same author ;

(2) Whether Bhāsa is their author, and, if so, whether the plays have come down to us intact ;

(3) The identity and date of Bhāsa.

The problem has been greatly complicated by not keeping these issues distinct. I shall, therefore, attempt to focus all the evidence available on each issue, and thereby enable my readers to judge for themselves, if my conclusions seem to be unsupported, wholly or in part, by the evidence adduced.

Common authorship

Common authorship of (1) *Svapna*, (2) *Pratijnā*, (3) *Abhiṣeka*, (4) *Pancharātra*, (5) *Dūta-vākya*, (6) *Bāla-charita*, and (7) *Avimāraka* may be inferred from their identical, or almost identical *Bharata-vākyas*, referring to a Rājasiṃha, who was the sole ruler of the country bounded by the Himālaya, the Vindhya, and the two seas. The *Svapna* (vi. 4) and the *Abhiṣeka* (iv. 7) moreover have in common the line किं वक्ष्यतीति हृदयं परिशङ्कितं मे । The *Pratijnā* (ii. 7) and the *Abhiṣeka* (vi. 23) have likewise the words धर्मस्य हान्तरे न्यस्ता in common. But for the other plays (1) *Chārudatta*, (2) *Pratimā*, (3) *Madhyama*, (4) *Karṇabhāra*, (5) *Dūta-Ghaṭotkacha* ; and (6) *Ūru-bhanga*, the only ground for inferring their common authorship with the *Svapna* is that they have certain structural features in common. They all, except the *Chārudatta*, open with the words नान्द्यन्ते

प्रविशति सूत्रधारः, followed by the *mangala-śloka*, and use the word *sthāpanā* in place of *prastāvanā*. None of them name the author or praise his work, as is usual with Sanskrit plays. They indicate the chief *dramatis personæ* in the *mangala-śloka*, and they have in common the same opening speech of the *Sūtra-dhāra* (stage-manager), i.e., अये किं नु खलु मयि विज्ञापनव्यग्रे शब्द इव श्रूयते। अङ्ग पश्यामि। But all or some of these features are found in other dramas known to be of different authorship, e. g., the *Matta vilāsa* (Mahendra-Vikrama Varman), the *Āścharya-Chūḍāmaṇi* (S'aktibhadra), the *Tapatī-Samvaraṇa* and *Subhadrā-Dhananjaya* (Kulaśēkhara), the *Ubhayābhisārikā* (Vararuchi), *Dhūrta-viṭa-samvāda* (Īśvaradatta), *Padma-Prābhritaka*, (S'ūdraka), and *Pada-tāḍitaka* (S'yāmilaka), and in the South Indian manuscripts of even the *S'akuntalā* and *Vikramōrvaśīya* (Kālidāsa), the *Mudrā-Rākṣasa* (Viśākhadatta) and the *Nāgānanda* (S'rī Harṣa). The common authorship, therefore, of the *Chārudatta* and other plays with the *Svapna* is by no means certain ; and, except the *Chārudatta*, neither are they anywhere referred to in *alankāra* works. On the other hand, Malabār stage tradition perhaps ascribes the *Vichchhinnābhiṣeka* (the first Act of the *Pratimā*) to the Kērala king Bhāskara Ravivarman (1073-1131 A. C.). Scholars who attempt to determine the date of the *Pratimā* from its reference to मानवं धर्मशास्त्रं, बार्हस्पत्यम् अर्थशास्त्रं, माहेश्वरं योगशास्त्रं, मेधातिथेः न्यायशास्त्रं and प्राचेतसं आद्धकल्पं have mistaken its drift altogether. The reference is not to specific treatises, but to the sciences and their mythical founders Manu (*Dharma*), Mahēśvara (*Yōga*), Brihaspati (*Artha*), Mēdhātithi Gautama (*Nyāya*), and Prachētas (*S'rāddha Kalpa*).

Authenticity

Accepting the common authorship of the *Svapna* group, the question remains as to whether they can be ascribed to Bhāsa. Rājaśēkhara in Jalhaṇa's *Sūkti-muktāvali* (*c.* 1250 A. C.), refers to Bhāsa's *Svapna* as follows :—

भासनाटकचक्रेऽपि च्छेकैः क्षिप्ते परीक्षितुम्।
स्वप्नवासवदत्तस्य दाहकोऽभून्न पावकः॥

This verse refers to the tradition as to a contest between Vyāsa and Bhāsa, in which the critics chose the fire-test, and threw their works into the fire. The fire left unburnt the

Bhārata, and, among Bhāsa's dramas, the *Svapna* alone. The tradition has evidently no chronological significance, but only embodies the popular opinion that the *Svapna* at least, among Bhāsa's works, was equal in merit to the *Bhārata*. The same tradition is recorded in a verse of Jayanātha also of the 12th century A. C. (*Prithivīrāja-charita*—I. *3*), which has greatly exercised the minds of the commentator Jōnarāja (15th cent. A. C.) and Dr. Gaṇapati Śāstri as to its correct interpretation. But the difficulty is due only to the faulty reading and may easily be removed by emending विष्णुधर्मान् to विष्णुधर्मन् and पारतवत् to भारतवत्। The verse would then read भासस्य काव्यं खलु विष्णुधर्मन् सोष्याननात् भारतवन्मुमोच and may be translated as follows :—

> Even He, the spreading Fire, has from His mouth,
> Like Bhārat, Bhāsa'a work, indeed, released.

Rāmachandra and Guṇachandra also of the 12th cent. A. C., in their *Nāṭya darpaṇa*, refer to the *Svapna* as Bhāsa's work (यथा भासकृते स्वप्नवासवदत्ते). The existence of several plays of the same name, even in early times, is no doubt possible, as in the case of the *Kunda-mālā* (which, as Mr. A. R. Sarasvati points out, was the name of two different plays), and the *Bāla charita* (the common name, as Dr. Gaṇapati Śāstri himself points out, of two different plays, one dealing with Rāma's and the other with Kṛṣṇa's early life). But none of the many authors, who refer to the *Svapna*, seem to be aware of a second play of the same name. Dr. Sylvain Levi, no doubt, argues from the mention of the author's name by Rāmachandra and Guṇachandra, that their intention must have been to distinguish Bhāsa's play from another of the same name. But, as the same authors refer to other works also, including the *Mṛchchhakaṭika*,, by their author's names, the inference is not a necessary one. We must, therefore, conclude, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that there was only one *Svapna*, and unless there is something repugnant in the references mentioned, we must identify the extant *Svapna* with Bhāsa's famous work, as all scholars eastern and western, the Pishārōṭis alone excepted, agree that its literary merits are fully worthy of even Bhāsa's authorship.

Anthologies

The *prima facie* objection to the authenticity of these plays would be that none of the ten stanzas found quoted from Bhāsa in the Sanskrit anthologies, *Subhāshitāvali* (Nos. 1286, 1353, 1619, 1628, 1821, 1994), *Śārngadhara-paddhati* (Nos. 3292, 3330), and the *Harihārāvali* (Peterson's *Second Report*—p. 58 ; *J. R. A. S.* 1891 pp. 331, 332), is found in these plays. But these might have been taken from other undiscovered works of Bhāsa, or, what is more probable, the anthologists might have been mistaken in ascribing them to Bhāsa. They are, indeed, by no means renowned for their accuracy. For instance, the 7th *śloka* of the *Matta-vilāsa* is mistakenly ascribed to Bhāsa by Somadēva in his *Yaśastilaka*. One of the verses ascribed to Bhāsa is said to be Lakshmīdhara's in *Kavīndra-vachana-samuchchaya* (Thomas. Ed. p. 163). None of the verses ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa in the *Subhāshitāvali* (Peterson. Ed. 8, 528, 529, 3100, 3142) is found in the *Buddha-charita*. The famous verse लिंपतीव is ascribed variously to Daṇḍin (by Pratīhāra Induṛāja), Vikramāditya (by Vallabhadēva), jointly to Vikramāditya and Mēṇṭha (by Śārngadhara), and to Śūdraka (by the *Kāvya-prakāśa* commentators). The force of this objection is not, therefore, sufficient to discredit Bhāsa's authorship of these plays, all the more so because one verse from the *Avimāraka* (i. 12) is actually found quoted from memory in the *Śārngadhara-Paddhati* (st. 1805).

Literary References

The references in Sanskrit literature to Bhāsa and his works may now be examined to see if they are consistent with the ascription of these plays to Bhāsa.

i-Kālidāsa

(1) The earliest is found in the *Mālavikāgnimitra*, where, in the prologue, Kālidāsa refers to Bhāsa as an already famous dramatist. But the reference has no bearing on the authenticity of these plays.

ii-Bāṇa

(2) Bāṇa (*c.* 620 A. C.) refers to the famous plays of Bhāsa, (i) begun by the *Sūtra dhāra*, (ii) with many roles, and (iii) including episodes (*Harṣa-charita*—introd. st. 15). These characteristics are, in common with several other Sanskrit plays, found in these plays also. For the last, the episode of Padmāvatī's hand being solicited for Pradyota's son (*Svapna.* ii) may be cited as an example. The humour for

which, according to Jayadēva of *c.* 1200 A. C. (*Prasanna-Rāghava*), Bhāsa is famed is also abundant in the *Pratijnā*, the *Bāla-charita*, and the *Avimāraka*.

iii-Bhāmaha

(3) Bhāmaha, who quotes Dharmakīrti's *Nyāya-bindu* (iii. 138, 140) in connection with his definition of *dūshaṇa* and *jātis* (v. 28, 29), and is himself dissented from by Bhaṭṭi (xxii. 34) in regard to kāvyas which can be understood only with the aid of commentaries (ii. 20), and therefore must have lived in *c.* 650 A. C., illustrates *nyāya vīrōdha* by referring in detail to the defects in the plot of the *Pratijnā*, though not by name (iv. 40-47), and quotes the passage अनेन मम भ्राताहतो अनेन मम पिता अनेन मम सुतो (*Pratijnā* with comm.-1919-p. 25), slightly adapting it however to suit the metre (iv. 44). Here, as elsewhere, I quote the Prākrit passages, for convenience, only by their Sanskrit versions.

iv-Vāmana

(4) Vāmana, the *mantri* of Jayāpīḍa (*Rāja-taraṅgiṇi* iv. 497), King of Kāśmīr (779—813 A. C.) quotes a verse (iv. 3. 25), found in the extant *Svapna* (iv. 7), with only such slight variations as quoting from memory may involve, e.g, चंद्रांशु for शशाङ्क and कृतं for मम.

v-Abhinavagupta

(5) Abhinavagupta (*c.* 1000 A. C.), in his commentary on the *Bharata-nāṭya-śāstra* (i), cites *Svapna* for an example of play (*krīḍā*), evidently referring to the ball-play in act ii, and in ch ix, he mentions Bhīma's *Pratijnā-Chāṇakya* and *Svapna-Daśānana*, also referred to by Rājaśēkhara (*c.* 900 A.C.) and named evidently in imitation of Bhāsa's *Pratijnā* and *Svapna*. In the *Dhvanyālōka-lōchana* (p. 102), the same Abhinavagupta quotes from "the drama named *Svapna-Vāsavadatta*" a verse, which is not found in the extant *Svapna*. Dr. Gaṇapati Śāstri contends that it *can* have no place either in the extant *Svapna*, as it refers to love at first sight, for which there is no scope in the extant *Svapna*, Vāsavadattā having been already married and Padmāvatī being married only for political reasons. If his view is correct, we would have to discredit Bhāsa's authorship of the extant *Svapna*, as it is not at all likely that such an authority on poetry and the drama as Abhinavagupta was mistaken in ascribing the verse to the *Svapna*. But it may well refer to the dream and its reviving Udayana's love for Vāsavadattā, and a suitable

context is not difficult to find. In the prelude to the 6th Act, we are informed that the *vīṇā* Ghoshavatī, with which Udayana had taught Vāsavadattā is accidentally recovered and that seeing it, he laments, "Thee have I seen, but where is she to whom thou wert dear?" Then enters the king addressing the *vīṇā*. Here I propose to insert the lost verse, as indicated by the rectangular brackets.

(ततः प्रविशति राजा विदूषकश्च)

राजा—[स्खचितपक्ष्मकपाटं नयनद्वारं स्वरूपतडनेन।
उद्घाट्य सा प्रविष्टा हृदयगृहं मे नृपतनूजा॥
(निश्वस्य, घोषवतीं विलोक्य च)]

श्रुतिसुखनिनदे! कथं नु देव्याः स्तनयुगले जघनस्थले च सुप्ता।
विहगगणरजोविकीर्णदग्धा प्रतिभयमध्युषितास्वरण्यवासम्॥

TRANSLATION

(Then enters the king, also the Vidūṣaka)

The king—[Bursting the door of eyelids sealed by force of her resistless form,
She has my heart's home rushed into through portals of my eyes, my queen.
(Sighs, and gazes at Ghoshavatī)]

How didst thou, sweet-toned, who had slept on my fair lady's lap and breasts,

Now live in wood-lands dire, thy frame fouled by the swarm of birds on wing?

It will thus be seen that the verse quoted by Abhinavagupta (and Hemachandra-1088 to 1172. A. C.—also in *Kāvyānuśāsana* p. 21) might have dropped out in copying, or, more probably, purposely omitted in deference to his criticism that packed metaphors were out of place in such a context. This reference therefore is no reason for discrediting Bhāsa's authorship of the extant *Svapna*.

vi—Bhōja

6. Bhōja (c. 1000 to 1055 A.C.) in his *S'ringāra-prakāśa* (xii), gives in detail the plot of the 5th Act of the *Svapna*, referring to it by name, and deriving its name from the dream which forms the pivot of the play. He says indeed that the king goes to Samudragṛha to see Padmāvatī, who is reported to be unwell, but, not finding her there, goes to sleep in her bed, and,

dreaming of Vāsavadattā, sees her in fact, and sleeping talks to her. Bhōja's evidence, therefore, is entirely in favour of Bhāsa's authorship of the extant *Svapna*. In the same work, the *Avimāraka* also is mentioned.

vii—Sarvānanda

7. Sarvānanda, in his *Amarakōśa-ṭīkāsarvasva* (1159 A.C.) apparently says that the *Svapna* furnishes an example of *kāma-śṛngāra*, and is concerned with Vāsavadattā's, and not, as in the extant *Svapna*, Padmāvatī's, marriage (Trivandrum Ed—p. 147). The passage runs as follows:—विविधः शृंगारो धर्मार्थकामभिन्नः। तत्राद्यो यथा नन्द्यन्त्यां ब्राह्मणभोजनं। द्वितीयः स्वदिशमात्मसात्कर्तुमुदयनस्य पद्मावतीपरिणयोर्थशृंगारः। तृतीयः सप्तवासवदत्ते तस्यैव वासवदत्तापरिणयः कामशृंगारः।

But Bhōja, and, as will be seen presently, Śāradātanaya and Śāgaranandin also concur in making Padmāvatī's marriage the theme of the *Svapna*. Besides, if *Svapna* should exemplify *kāmaśringāra*, no illustration would be left for *artha śringāra*, though there were at least two plays that Sarvānanda could have cited as examples thereof, the extant *Svapna* and the *Tāpasa-Vatsarāja*, with almost the same plot, cited in so early a work as the *Lōchana* of *c.* 1000 A.C. (p. 152). The correct reading must therefore be that सप्तवासवदत्ते should come after द्वितीयः instead of after तृतीयः, and the mistake should have occurred in copying. The corrected text would imply that in the *Svapna* Udayana married Padmāvatī to enable him to recover his kingdom, and this is what we find in the extant play. But then *kāma-śringāra* would have no example, and the reason therefor would be that it needed no examples, being the common theme of most Sanskrit plays.

viii—Śāradātanaya

(8) Śāradātanaya of the 12th cent. A. C., in his *Bhāvaprakāśa* (viii), illustrates *praśānta-nāṭaka* by discussing in detail the entire plot of the *Svapna*. Vāsavadattā was separated from the king and entrusted to Padmāvatī ; the king, seeing a peculiar mark on Padmāvatī's forehead, found that Vāsavadattā was alive, and passionately called on her by name, saying to her एहि वासवदत्ते, क्व यासि etc. : then, finding Ghoshavatī, he seeks for Vāsavadattā, and, addresing the *vīṇā*, laments that its sight has revived his dormant yearning for her to whom the *vīṇā* was dear, quoting in this connection the verse चिरप्रसुप्तः found in the extant *Svapna* (vi. 3) ; and the play ends without

such words as किं ते भूयः प्रियं कुर्यां (what more shall I do to please thee ?) It is evident that this analysis follows the extant *Svapna* closely ; but in the extant play, the king's discovery of Vāsavadattā's existence from the mark on Padmāvatī's forehead is not mentioned, and the words एहि वासवदत्ते and क्व यासि are not spoken by the king. Dr. Gaṇapati Śāstrī has shown that, after the verse शय्यायां (v.8), we should read

किञ्च, पद्मावत्या मुखं वीक्ष्य विशेषकविभूषितम् ।

जीवत्यावन्तिकेत्येतत् ज्ञातमेव पुरा मया ॥

(Moreover, Once on Padmāvatī's face I did a beauty mark unique observe,

And knew at once alive was she, Avantī's princess, my beloved.)

It will be seen that only the words भूमिभुजा यथा of Śāradātanaya need to be changed to एव पुरा मया, and this change Śāradātanaya might have made to suit his context. The reason for the omission of this verse in the extant play seems to be that the copyist was a scholar, with a nice taste, who perhaps thought that it would be better, if the knowledge of Vāsavadattā's existence came to Udayana with a shock for the first time in the dream scene, and that, if Udayana had already known she was alive, it was strange he should have said nothing about it even to his confidant Vasantaka, before the dream-scene confirmed his impression. Such omissions are usual in the Malabār manuscripts of even the *Śākuntalā* and the *Mēghadūta*, and for the same reasons. For instance, the verses न खलु and कुल्याम्भोभिः of the *Śākuntalā* (i) are not found in the Śrīrangam edition, based on Malabār manuscripts, and the same edition of the *Mēghadūta* based on the commentary of the Malabār scholar Pūrṇa-Sarasvati omits as many as ten verses, which formed part of the poem so early as c. 800 A. C., when Jinasēna wrote his *Pārśvābhyudaya*.

The words एहि वासवदत्ते (Go, Vāsavadattā) said to have been used by the king must have existed only in Śāradātanaya's bad memory, as they are quite out of place in the dream-scene, as the king would, on the contrary, want to detain Vāsavadattā, and as they conflict with the words क्व यासि, (where art thou going ?) also said to have been used by the

king. It is only natural therefore that we do not find them in the extant play. The words क्व यासि, on the other hand, find a proper place between the stage-direction सहसोत्थाय and the king's speech वासवदत्ते ! तिष्ठ तिष्ठ (*Svapna* with comm. 1924. p. 111), and were probably omitted because, when Vāsavadattā was slipping out, it would be more natural for the king, who had risen in haste, to say 'stop ! stop !' than the leisurely 'where art thou going ?' Śāradātanaya's evidence therefore shows that Bhāsa's *Svapna* has come down to us substantially intact, with only such omissions as were dictated by an over-nice critical taste.

ix—Rāmachandra and Guṇachandra

(9) Rāmachandra and Guṇachandra of the 12th century A. C. quote from the *Svapna* by both the author's and the play's names, a verse पादाक्रांतानि not found in the extant play, but which Dr. Gaṇapati Śāstrī has inserted in a suitable context (p. 76). The king says in this verse that some lady must have been sitting on the slab, but, seeing him coming, must have slipped away, because the flowers seemed trodden under-foot, and the slab was warm. This verse was probably omitted for the reason that it would be natural for the king and his friend to exchange confidences, as they do immediately, only when they are quite unsuspicious of the possible presence of a third person who might overhear their conversation.

x—Sāgaranandin

(10) Sāgaranandin, in his *Nāṭaka-lakṣaṇa-ratna-kōśa*, quotes the end of the prologue of the *Svapna* as follows :—

यथा स्वप्नवासवदत्ते, नेपथ्ये सूत्रधारः उत्सारणां श्रुत्वा पठति अये कथं तपोवनेप्युत्सारणा। विलोक्य कथं मन्त्री यौगन्धरायणो वत्सराजस्य राज्यप्रत्यानयनं कर्तुकामः पद्मावतीयजनेनोत्सार्यते इति। उत्सारणाशब्दोच पुर्वकप्रयोगमुत्सार्य नाटकार्थसूचक इति प्रयोगातिशयः।

Now because the phrasing thereof differs materially from the corresponding passage of the extant play (p. 6), Dr. Sylvain Levi has argued that the extant play is only an adaptation of Bhāsa's work. Dr. Gaṇapati Śāstrī, on the other hand, points out that the use of the *unpoetic* पद्मावतीयजन in place of the usual पद्मावतीजन indicates that Sāgaranandin was only paraphrasing in his own words and in the indirect form the *poetic* speech of the *Sūtra-dhāra* found in the extant play. This inference is confirmed by the use of the words नेपथ्ये उत्सारणां श्रुत्वा and the placing of नेपथ्ये (behind the scenes) before

सूत्रधारः. Moreover, in the passage as quoted by Sāgaranandin, we are directly informed, before the play begins, that Yaugandharāyaṇa is desirous of recovering Vatsarāja's kingdom for him, while in the extant play, this information is more dramatically left to be gathered by the audience from the dialogues of the first Act. Dr. Thomas notes further that the *utsāraṇā* (order to move on) would not be addressed specifically to one individual Yaugandharāyaṇa alone, as Sāgaranandin apparently states, and that the use of the word *paṭhati* (*lit.* repeats) for *remarks* is unusual. I may add that the words *paṭhati* is in dramas used only before a verse, and that therefore the remarks of the *Sūtra-dhāra* should have been expressed only in verse, as in the extant play. We must therefore conclude that Sāgaranandin was only quoting from a bad memory, and not directly from the *Svapna*, and that therefore his evidence, so far as it goes, only confirms Bhāsa's authorship of the extant play.

xi—Sōma prabha

(11) Lastly, Sōmaprabha, in his Prākrit *Kumarāpāla-pratibōdha* (1185 A. C.) narrates the story of Udayana, substantially as it is found in the *Pratijnā*, and quotes a verse therefrom (iii-9) in the original Sanskrit.

We may therefore conclude that the literary references are, so far as they go, quite consistent with Bhāsa's authorship of the published plays, and, in some cases, they are entirely in favour of such authorship, and that therefore Bhāsa was in fact the author of these plays.

Chronological Limits

I shall now attempt to fix the date of Bhāsa. It is certain that he must have lived before *c.* 500 A. C. as Kālidāsa refers to him as a famous dramatist, and Kālidāsa himself lived not later than the first half of the 6th cent. A. C. Dr. Gaṇapati Śāstrī argues indeed that, from the use of the words *purāṇa* (old) and *prathita-yaśah* (far-famed) in relation to Bhāsa, we must infer that Bhāsa lived long before Kālidāsa. This is scarcely necessary, as *purāṇa* is only used in opposition to *nava* (new) and *vartamāna* (living), and therefore properly applies to all works which are not new, or whose authors are dead. Kālidāsa's work is moreover said to *supersede* (*atikramya*) the works of Bhāsa and others, and such works must therefore be in present possession

of the stage, instead of having been long consigned to the oblivion of the shelves. Kālidāsa indeed pleads for a trial of his nascent genius against the established fame of still living forces and not of forgotten classics. Here are his own words in their English rendering :—

Not all is good that is merely old, nor poem new unfit to hear.
The wise discerning only choose, but fools by others blind are led.

The lower limit of Bhāsa's date is therefore only *c.* 500 A. C. But scholars are by no means agreed as to the upper limit of Bhāsa's date.

Pāṇini and Bharata

(1) Dr. Gaṇapati Śāstrī contends that Bhāsa's grammar is pre-Pāṇinian and his dramaturgy pre-Bharatan, on the grounds that he does not conform to the rules of Pāṇini, and that the *Bāla charita* and the *Abhisheka* represent a battle and a death on the stage, thereby infringing Bharata's rules, and that therefore Bhāsa must have lived before *c.* 600 B. C. But it is a big assumption that all dramatists necessarily observed the rules of Pāṇini and Bharata, in preference to popular usage, and that grammar and dramaturgy never outgrew their bounds. The admittedly later Kālidāsa too likewise infringes Pāṇini's rules (*Kumāra* i. 34 ; *Mēgha*-Pāṭhak Ed.-st 8, 23, 38, 51, 63, 87 ; *Raghu* ii. 33 ; v. 27 ; ix. 61 ; xii. 19 ; xiii. 36 ; xvi. 86), and the *Bhāṇas* of Vararuchi and others break at least that rule of Bharata (V. 154), which requires the mention of the author's name in the prologue. The *Nāgānanda* represents death, and the *Viddhaśālabhanjikā* (*c.* 900 A. C.) marriage and sleep on the stage. Bhāsa's plays moreover all refer to the closing benediction by the name of *Bharata vākya*, and the *Avimāraka* is aware of a *Nāṭya śāstra* (ii). The use of the word *Nāṭya-śāstra* indeed indicates that Bhāsa refers, not to the *Naṭa-sūtras*, known to Pāṇini (iv. 3, 110, 111), but to Bharata. Pāṇini and Bharata therefore do not enable us to fix the limits of Bhāsa's date.

Śramaṇaka

(2) The *Pratijnā* (iii) mentions a Śramaṇaka who is addressed as Bhagavan, and the *Avimāraka* (v) says that a Śramaṇaka is known by his *chivara* (rag) and uses *Raktapaṭa* as a synonym for Śramaṇaka. The word Śramaṇa may no

doubt apply to both Hindu and Buddhist monks, but the *chīvara*, and the titles Bhagavan and Raktapaṭa are characteristic only of Buddhist monks. Bhāsa must therefore have lived after Buddha founded his order of monks in *c.* 590 B. C. at the earliest.

Darśaka

(3) Padmāvatī's brother Darśaka is said in the *Svapna* (p. 14) to have been the king of Rājagṛha, and must therefore have been the Darśaka, son of Ajātaśatru of the *Purāṇas*, who ascended the throne in *c.* 520 B. C. at the earliest. Moreover, the Buddhist *Sutta-nipāta* and other early *sūtras* clearly make Udayana Vatsarāja and Chaṇḍa Pradyōta of Ujjain contemporaries of Buddha and of Darśaka's father Ajātaśatru. We must, therefore infer, not that there was an earlier Darśaka, who was Pradyōta's contemporary, but that the *Purāṇas* mistakenly treat the collateral Pradyōtas of Ujjain and Śaiśunākas of Magadha as successive dynasties of Magadha. Bhāsa therefore could not have lived before *c.* 520 B. C.

Kauṭilya

4. One verse नवं शरावं is common to Kauṭilya (x. 3) and the *Pratijnā* (iv. 3), and Dr. Gaṇapati Śāstrī contends that Kauṭilya quotes from the *Pratijnā*, and that this fact is indicated by Kauṭilya's own words अपोह श्लोकौ भवतः introducing the verse. But Kauṭilya introduces his own verses also by similar words तच्च एतत् भवति (vii. 6, 9), and it is as likely that the *Pratijnā*, in accordance with Kauṭilya's instructions, cites this verse, supplied by Kauṭilya himself, to inspire soldiers on the eve of war with enthusiasm, as that Kauṭilya quotes the *Pratijnā* as his authority for the procedure he advises, because the context in both is the same. Yaugandharāyaṇa, indeed, himself admits that all his plans and courses were based on the *Artha-śāstra* (iv. 13). The last *pāda* यो भर्तृपिण्डस्य कृते न युध्येत् is quoted by Vāmana (v. 2.28) as an instance of faulty usage, and Dr. Gaṇapati Śāstrī argues that it must therefore have been taken from a *kāvya*. The inference is not a necessary one, but admitting it, it would only follow that Vāmana took it from the *Pratijnā*, and not that the *Pratijnā* itself was not quoting Kauṭilya. We may therefore infer that Bhāsa, in all probability, lived after Kauṭilya of c. 300 B. C. unless indeed the extant *Kauṭilīya* is not an authentic work.

Patanjali

5. Patanjali (c. 150 B. C). in his encyclopœdic *Mahā-bhāṣya*, which refers to almost everything known in his time, mentions two plays named *Kaṃsa-vadha* and *Bali bandha* (iii. 1.26), and an *ākhyāyikā* named *Vāsavadattā* (iv. 2.60 ; iv. 3.87), but finds nothing to say of Bhāsa's plays, not even of the *Svapna*. Bhāsa must therefore have lived after c. 150 B. C.

Aśvaghōṣa

6. Aśvaghōsha and Bhāsa have each one verse, not only embodying the same ideas, but almost identical in expression. The only difference is that Aśvaghōṣa's verse is free and direct, while Bhāsa's is constrained and expressed in the passive voice, as may be seen from the verses themselves quoted below for comparison.

काष्ठं हि मथ्नन् लभते हुताशं भूमिं खनन् विन्दति चापि तोयम् ।
निर्बन्धिनः किञ्चन नास्त्यसाध्यं न्यायेन युक्तं च कृतं च सर्वम् ॥
(Buddha-charita xiii. *60).*

काष्ठादग्निर्जायते मथ्यमानात् भूमिस्तोयं खन्यमाना ददाति ।
सोत्साहानां नास्त्यसाध्यं नराणां मार्गारब्धाः सर्वयत्नाः फलन्ति ॥
(Pratijnā i. *18),*

Only the later author would have been forced to alter the natural construction of the verse, and therefore Bhāsa must have been the later author. This inference is perhaps confirmed by the fact that Aśvaghōṣa's Prākrit is more archaic than that of Bhāsa, but any inference from a comparison of Prākrits is vitiated by two factors (i) the manuscripts of Aśvaghōṣa's plays are very ancient and come to us from very near his own time, while those of Bhāsa's are quite recent, and the tendency of copyists is to modernise the Prākrit passages ; (ii) but the Prākrit of Malabār manuscripts of even later plays retains archaic forms. These two factors neutralise each other somewhat, and, since Bhāsa's plays are extant in only Malabār manuscripts, in his case an inference from a comparison of Prākrits may not be far wrong, though caution may still be needful. But, even dropping the argument from the Prākrits, we may reasonably conclude that Bhāsa was the later author. Now Aśvaghōṣa was the spiritual *Guru* of Kaniṣka (c. 120 A. C.), according to the *Samyukta-ratna-piṭaka* and *Dharma-piṭaka-nidāna* translated into Chinese in 472 A. C. (Bunyio Nanjio : *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka*—

nos. 1329, 1340). Bhāsa could not have therefore lived before c. 150 A. C. Thus he lived between c. 150 and c. 500 A. C.

Bhāsa's Identity

To determine the date of Bhāsa more definitely, it is necessary to ascertain his identity. The clue to this is furnished by a comparism of the *Chārudatta* with the *Mṛchchhakaṭika*. Assuming Bhāsa's authorship of the *Chārudatta*, most scholars are of opinion that the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* is only an expanded version of the *Chārudatta*. But I have shown that there is no reason to infer the common authorship of the *Chārudatta* and the *Svapna*. The question of indebtedness as between the *Chārudatta* and the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* has therefore to be determined independently.

Chārudatta Incomplete

In the first place, it should be noted that the extant *Chārudatta* is incomplete.

(1) It is wanting in both the *mangala-ślōka* and the *Bharata-vākya*;

(2) The love-story of Vasantasēnā makes no progress in the extant play;

(3) In the 4th Act, Vasantasēnā expresses her intention of returning Chārudatta's necklace, and even the title *Durdina* of the next Act, as it is found in *Mṛchchhakaṭika* (v), is indicated in her maid's penultimate speech; but in the extant play Vasantasēnā's intention remains unfulfilled;

(4) Both Samvāhaka (ii) and Sajjalaka (iv. 7) desire to prove their gratitude to Vasantasēnā for her timely help to them, but they are given no opportunity of doing so;

(5) Śakāra threatens Chārudatta and Vasantasēnā with dire consequences, the one for interfering with his intrigue, and the other for rejecting his overtures; but it is not shown what shape his mischief will assume, and how it will be counteracted;

(6) Chārudatta's reflection in the 1st Act (i. 6) that even the sins of others are visited on the heads of the poor, does not become significant and prophetic in the extant play, as it does in the *Mṛchchhakaṭika*, where Chārudatta is falsely accused of murdering Vasantasēnā for the sake of her jewels;

(7) Similarly Sajjalaka's prayer (iv. 7), that the evil which the foes of Chārudatta and Vasantasēnā may intend them

should react on themselves, does not become prophetic of S'akāra being 'hoisted with his own petard' as in the *Mṛchchhakaṭika*. It is therefore clear that the *Chārudatta*, as it is, is incomplete.

But left incomplete

But the references to the secondary plot of Āryaka's conspiracy, found in the 2nd and 4th Acts of the *Mṛchchhakaṭika*, have no counterpart in the *Chārudatta*, and this secondary plot could not have therefore formed part of the intended sequel. Both the manuscripts moreover of the extant *Chārudatta* alike end with the 4th Act, and one of them has the colophon अवन्तिसुन्दरीकथा चारुदत्तम् (*Chārudatta* ended). We must therefore conclude that, if the extant *Chārudatta* is incomplete, it is because the author himself left it so for some reason or other. If therefore *Chārudatta* was the original work, S'ūdraka must be credited with the original authorship of at least six Acts, and an author capable of composing the larger and more interesting portion of the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* may reasonably be credited with the authorship of the whole.

Other considerations also lead to the same conclusion.

Chārudatta and Mṛchchhakaṭika i-Vāmana

(1) Vāmana (*c.* 800 A. C.) quotes the verse यासां बलिः (v. 1. 3.) found in both the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* (i. 9) and the *Chārudatta* (i. 2). But his reading follows neither absolutely, but is a blend of both. For instance, he follows the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* in reading विलुप्तपूर्वः and the *Chārudatta* in reading यासां बलिर्भवति and तास्वेव पूर्वबलिरूढयवाङ्कुरासु. He seems therefore to have been aware of both the versions and to be quoting from memory. This inference is confirmed by the fact that he quotes the passage व्यसनं हि नाम सोच्छ्वासं मरणं (iv. 3. 23), which seems a misquotation of दारिद्र्यं खलु नाम मनस्विनः पुरुषस्य सोच्छ्वासं मरणं found only in the *Chārudatta* (i), and also the passage द्यूतं हि नाम पुरुषस्यासिंहासनं राज्यं (iv. 3. 23) which is found only in the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* (ii). But Vāmana evidently had a great regard for Sūdraka, whose work, he says, abounds in the *ślēsha guṇa* (iii. 2. 4), and therefore S'ūdraka could not have been a mere plagiarist. In the opinion of Vāmana therefore S'ūdraka was the original author, and *Chārudatta* only an abridged version. Later authors like Dhananjaya (*c.* 1000 A. C.) moreover mention with respect only the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* (*Daśa-rūpaka*—pp. 29, 45

59 and 90), and ignore the *Chārudatta* altogether; and, what is more significant, Dhananjaya refers to the gamblers among the roles of the *Mṛchchhakaṭika*, and these have no counterpart in the *Chārudatta*.

ii-Humour

2. The humour (*hāsa*) for which Jayadēva says Bhāsa was famed, is found only in the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* (ii), as the *Chārudatta* has omitted the entire scene of the gamblers' brawl, evidently deeming it fit only to "tickle the groundlings". One characteristic moreover of Bhāsa's dramas, that they should include episodes, is satisfied only by the *Mṛchchhakaṭika*, as the *Chārudatta* has wiped out all traces of Āryaka's conspiracy. Of the two therefore, *Mṛchchhakaṭika*, is more likely to have been Bhāsa's work, than the *Chārudatta*.

iii-Kharapaṭa

3. The scientific thief Śarvilaka of the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* invokes in his labours the aid of Kārtikeya, the god of thieves, and of their masters Kanakaśakti, Dōvavrata, Bhāskaranandi and Yōgāchārya (iii). But his double Sajjalaka of the *Chārudatta* invokes the aid, not of these extinct fossils, but of the latest and greatest of the masters Kharapaṭa (iii). Now Kharapaṭa was one of the names of Mūladēva, as Śivarāma informs us, on the authority of a *Kōśa*, in his commentary on Subandhu's *Vāsavadattā*, and Mūladēva is the hero of Śūdraka's *Padma-prābhritaka*, and was a courtier of Vikramāditya, king of Ujjain (*Kathāsaritsāgara* c. 1070 A. C. *tarangas* 89 & 124). Kharapaṭa is said in the *Matta-vilāsa* (p. 15) to have composed a *śāstra* on thieving. The *Chārudatta*, therefore, which betrays a more up to date knowledge of the science of thieving must be the later and more improved version of the *Mrichchhakaṭika*.

iv-Attitude to Buddhism

4. But the most decisive argument for this conclusion is to be found in the references to the Śākya Śramaṇakas (Buddhist monks) in the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* and the *Chārudatta*. In the *Mṛchchhakaṭika*, the *Samvāhaka* is said to have become a Śākya Śramaṇaka as a sign of moral reformation (ii). He later on proves the sincerity of his reformation by helping Vasantasēnā in the time of her need, and scrupulously observes Buddha's sexual prohibitions by delicately raising her, not with his hand, but by a creeper, and gives expression to the Buddhist faith that bliss is for him alone, who is restrained

in hand, mouth and senses (viii). His good services are in the end rewarded by his being made chief of all the *vihāras* (x). It is thus clear that Buddhism was held in honour, when the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* was composed. The *Chārudatta*, on the other hand, mentions the Buddhist monks (Śākya Śramaṇakas) only to defame them as being sleepless in the pursuit of women (iii), and evidently thinking the life of a Buddhist monk to be too bad a fate for a good man like the *Samvāhaka*, makes him only a non-Buddhist *parivrāṭ* (ii). When the *Chārudatta* was composed, therefore, Buddhism had so far deteriorated that Buddhist monks were suspected of sensuality and therefore despised and disliked. This change in the popular attitude towords Buddhism was not sudden, but the effect of centuries. Fā-hien, who visited India in 399 to 414 A. C., found Buddhism prosperous, but beginning to decline. In the *Mudrā-Rākṣasa*, of the 6th cent. A. C. (vii. 5), composed by a Hindu author, the conduct of Chandanadāsa, in sacrificing his life for his friend Rākṣasa is said to have transcended the nobility of even the Buddhas. The theme of the *Nāgānanda*, likewise the work of a Hindu Śrī Harsha, is the noble self-sacrifice of Jīmūtavāhana Bōdhisattva, Bāṇa (c. 620 A. C.), also a Hindu, speaks in terms of praise of Buddha, Dharma and Saṃgha, Buddhist teachings, rules and philosophy, Avalōkitēśvara, Raktapaṭas (Buddhist monks), *Upāsakas*, Bōdhisattva Jātakas, *chaityas*, *śīla*, *ahiṃsā*, and abstinence from meat-eating (*Harsha-charita*. Nirṇaya-sāgar Ed pp. 236—238 ; *Kādambarī*. Peterson's Ed. p. 208) ; and even at the end of the 7th cent. A. C. the Hindu Māgha says that wise men of their own accord honour the words of Tathāgata (*Śiśupāla-vadha* ; *kavi-vaṃśa-varṇana*—st. 2). But already the tide had begun to turn. Hiuen Tsang, who visited India in 629 to 645 A. C. found Buddhism flourishing only where it was supported by powerful kings. The Pallava Mahendravarman of the same period represents Buddhism, in his *Matta-vilāsa*, as an object of popular ridicule. Therein a Kapālī says that Buddha was a greater authority on thieving than Kharapaṭa himself, in that he has compiled his *Tripiṭakas*, stealing ideas from the Vēdānta and the Mahābhārata (p. 15). What is worse, the *Śākya-bhikṣu* himself, an inoffensive and

kindly person, is represented to have understood Buddha's teaching so little, as to think Buddha has permitted luxurious living, meat and cool drinks, and regret that the Omniscient one, who was so gracious, should prohibit wine and women. So he reflects and begins to suspect that Buddha himself might have permitted them, but that the impotent and jealous Elders of the Buddhist Church might have tampered with the text of his teachings ; he feels therefore he will be doing the Saṃgha a good turn by discovering and publishing such suppressed passages (p. 12). But at the end of the play we are left wondering what has become of his researches in this direction. The curious reader need only turn to the *Chārudatta* to learn that the honest Bhikṣu's valuable researches have not been in vain, for we find that after all the Buddhist monks have either recovered the lost treasure, or resolved to have their own way, text or no text. It is no wonder therefore that we find Subandhu (c. 650 A. C.) viewing Buddhism with intense aversion, ridiculing its attempts to argue away the visible world, and rejoicing at its discomfiture at the hands of the Mīmāmsakas (*Vāsavadattā*. Śrīrangam Ed. pp. 175, 176, 229) : and that Bhavabhūti (c. 730 A. C.) employs the Buddhistnun Kāmandakī as a go-between in a love intrigue, in his *Mālatī-Mādhava*, as if it were nothing out of the way. The *Chārudatta*, which represents a further stage in the degradation of Buddhism, cannot therefore be dated before c. 750 A. C. nor, as it was known to Vāmana (c. 800 A. C.) much later. We may therefore safely conclude that the *Chārudatta* is only an abridged version of the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* and that it was compiled in c. 750 A. C. The *Daridra-Chārudatta* that Abhinavagupta refers to in his commentary on the *Bharata-nāṭya-śāstra* (on xix. 13) might have been this abridged version or, more probably still, it might have been an alternative title for the *Mṛchchhakaṭika*, of which we have perhaps an indication in दरिद्रः किल चारुदत्तः (i. 6).

Śūdraka and Bhāsa

The rhetoricians, from Daṇḍin onwards (*Kāvyādarśa*-ii. *233*) are very fond of quoting the verse लिंपतीव to illustrate different *alaṃkāras*, but they do not agree as to its authorship, Vallabhadēva attributing it to Vikramāditya, Śārngadhara to Vikramāditya and Mēṇṭha jointly, and the *Kāvya-prakāśa*

commentators to Śūdraka. The verse is found in both the *Bāla-charita* (i. 15) and the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* (i. 34), not to mention the *Chārudatta* (i. 19). Now great poets like Bhāsa and Śūdraka, when they borrow from others, recast the ideas in their own mould, and issue them forth instinct with the stamp of their own genius. When that is not done, but, on the other hand, not only the ideas, but the expression too is identical, the only alternative is between plagiarism and, identity of authorship. Since neither Bhāsa, nor Śūdraka, could be guilty of plagiarism, we have to infer that, as already indicated by the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* having the same characteristic features as Bhāsa's plays, they were identical. We have therefore to examine the point still further and ascertain if the inference is confirmed independently also.

Identity confirmed i-Limpatīva

(1) To begin with, the verse already mentioned लिंपतीव is attributed to different authors, including Śūdraka, but not to Bhāsa. If Bhāsa and Śūdraka had not been identical, we should expect some one or other to ascribe the verse to Bhāsa also This fact therefore is a confirmation, however slight, of the identity.

ii-Same features in their works

(2) Śūdraka's *Padma-prābhritaka* exhibits the same characteristic features as Bhāsa's plays. It too begins with the words नान्द्यन्ते ततः प्रविशति सूत्रधारः followed by the *mangala-śloka*, uses the word *sthāpanā* in place of *prastāvanā*, omits all mention of the author or his work, is brimful of humour, represents a girl playing with a ball as in the *Svapna*, and expresses similarly graceful and elegant ideas in crystalline, felicitous and melodious diction, exhibits the same keen observation of nature and acute insight into the workings of the human heart, and in the happy phrasing of Dr. Thomas "it touches on many sides of life, and touches nothing that it does not adorn" The *Mṛchchhakaṭika*, in addition to the above qualities, exhibits also dramatic skill, vigorous dialogue and a noble restraint in pathos, like the *Svapna*. But it may be thought that the prologue of the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* is in a different style altogether. This is because the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* is a posthumous work, and its prologue was composed, not by Śūdraka himself, but by some one else, shortly after his death, who prepared it for the stage, and that is why the *Sūtra-dhāra's*

speech opens in Sanskrit and ends in Prākrit, and the *Bharata-vākya* refers to kings in general and not to any one king in particular. The *Chārudatta* evidently omits this opening speech in Sanskrit for the reasons that it would betray the real authorship and that it did not form part of the original work. It may also be objected that the *Padma-prābhritaka* reviles a dissolute Buddhist monk Śankhilaka, thereby throwing doubt on the identity of its author with that of the *Mṛchchhakaṭika*, which betrays a more generous attitude to Buddhism. But, as may be seen from the recently published *Avantisundarī-kathāsāra*, this Śankhilaka was a historical character, who tried to murder Śūdraka himself, and it speaks highly of Śūdraka that he did not allow Śankhilaka's exceptional demerits to warp his general attitude towards Buddhism, for he says in this very play, as translated by Dr. Thomas, "Oh ! the immaculateness of the Buddha's teaching, befouled by such evil monks, such vain shavelings, and yet held in honour every day. However, the crow's droppings do not defile the water of the holy place." We should not moreover apply the same standard to a *Bhāṇa* (low comedy) as to a *Prakaraṇa* (regular drama). This item of evidence also is therefore a substantial confirmation of the identity of Bhāsa and Śūdraka.

iii-Vatsa rāja-charita

(3) The editor of the *Padma prābhritaka* informs us that Śūdraka was the author of another play *Vatsarāja-charita*, which is an alternative title of the *Pratijnā.* If the *Vatsarāja-charita* should prove to be identical with the *Pratijnā*, that would be conclusive evidence for the identity of Bhāsa and Śūdraka.

iv-Bhāsa and Śūdraka never distinguished

(4) It is also remarkable that no *early* author mentions Bhāsa and Śūdraka side by side as different authors. I use the word *early* advisedly, as it is possible that later authors, not knowing their identity, might refer to them separately in the same context. Kālidāsa mentions Bhāsa, but not Śūdraka, as his dramatic predecessor. Bāṇa, who makes Śūdraka the hero of his *Kādambari*, omits him in his list of previous and contemporary authors, but mentions Bhāsa (*Harsha-charita*—intr. ; pp. 1-6 ; 41, 42). Vāmana, as we have seen, quotes Bhāsa, but mentions only Śūdraka. Kulaśēkhara-varman, in

mentioning his dramatic predecessors in the prologue to his *Tapatī-samvaraṇa*, names Śūdraka, Kālidāsa, Harsha and Daṇḍin (whose dramas are mentioned nowhere else), but not the famous Bhāsa. The conclusion is therefore irresistible that Bhāsa and Śūdraka were identical.

v-Bhâsa a king

(5) The *Bharata vākyas* of Bhāsa's dramas invariably refer to a Rājasiṃha, who was, or was hoped to become, sole ruler of the country bounded by the Himālaya and the Vindhya, and extending from sea to sea, that is of Hindusthān. Rājasiṃha was therefore the name or title of the emperor, in whose time Bhāsa's dramas were composed. It is not unusual for dramatists to indicate the ruling king in the *Bharata-vākya*, without however detracting from its general applicability, as may be seen from the *Mālavikāgnimitra*, the *Mudrā-Rākṣasa*, and the *Mattavilāsa*. The use of the words '*our* Rājasimha' (नः राजसिंहः) moreover clearly indicates that the word Rājasiṃha was meant in particular to apply to the ruling king. The opening benedictions again of the *Svapna* and the *Avimāraka*, "May Balarāma protect *thee*," and "May Nārāyaṇa award *thee* the entire earth" clearly indicate that the author himself was the ruling king, and that the benedictions were intended for himself, as the plural should have been used, if they were meant for the audience, and as the prayer that all those present should be kings would be meaningless. The royal author was evidently seated among the audience, at the first publication of his plays, and the benedictions were addressed to him. The author was therefore himself a king and sole lord of Hindusthān. This fact is a strong confirmation of Bhāsa's identity with Śūdraka. I may add that my friend Mr. G. Harihara Śāstrī, editor of the *Madhurā-vijaya*, drew my attention to the peculiar nature of the benedictions in the *Svapna* and the *Avimāraka*, but for the inference therefrom I am alone responsible.

vi-Jvalana-mitra

(6) Vākpatirāja of *c.* 720 A. C. gives Bhāsa another name Jvalana-mitra (*Gauḍavahō*. st. 800); and Jvalana-mitra is obviously only a metrical *paryāya* (synonym) of Agnimitra, like Puṣpapura and Kusumapura for Pāṭaliputra. Now Agnimitra is given as a synonym for Śūdraka in a *Nāma-mālā* cited in Kṣīrasvāmi's commentary on the *Amarakōśā* (c. 1100

A. C. Oka. Ed. p. 122). This fact, taken with the other considerations mentioned above, is almost conclusive as to the identity of Bhāsa and Śūdraka, which may therefore be now accepted. It seems that Agnimitra dropped the title Bhāsa and adopted the title Śūdraka, when he became king.

Śūdraka's Date

This identification of Bhāsa with Śūdraka enables us to fix his date more definitely still. The *Mṛchchhakaṭika* mentions Nāṇaka (i. 23), evidently so named from the Elamite goddess Nanaia, who first appears in India on Kaniṣka's coins. But this fact does not take us beyond c. 150 A. C., the upper limit already arrived at. The Kumārikā-khaṇḍa of the *Skanda-Purāṇa* places Śūdraka in Kali 3290=189 A. C. but, as it also dates the Nandas in Kali 3310=209 A. C. and Vikramāditya in Kali 4000=899 A. C. which we know to be absurdly mistaken, its evidence is of no value, and we are left no wiser than we were.

Planetary astrology

But the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* betrays full knowledge of planetary astrology. In the 6th Act (st. 9, 10), it refers to the malefic influence of decrepit Jupiter, Mars and comets; and of the sun in the 8th sign, the Moon in the 4th, Venus in the 6th, Mars in the 5th, Jupiter in the 6th and Saturn in the 9th signs; and in the 9th Act (st. 33), it says that Mars and Jupiter were enemies, a view mentioned by Varāhamihira only to be discredited (*Bṛhat-Jātaka* ii. 15-17), which has moreover become obsolete since his time. Śūdraka therefore lived after the Hindus had acquired full knowledge of planetary astrology, but not later than the age of Varāhamihira. This fact should enable us to fix his date definitely. For, Hindu astronomy has been studied chronologically. The *Nakṣatra* system is of purely Hindu origin, for, though attempts have not been wanting to derive it fron a foreign source, the names of the *Nakṣatras* are purely Hindu, and the system has not yet been traced in the same form anywhere else. The names of the planets are likewise purely Hindu, and bear no corespondence to their foreign counterparts. The Hindus must therefore have themselves independently discovered and named the planets. The words *vāra* and *rāśi* are also of Hindu origin, but the conventional order of the weekday names based on the Greek division of the

day into 24 *hōras* and the likewise conventional pictorial representations of the solar signs including the Balance (*tulā*) are identical or almost identical with those of the Greeks. Independent origins are therefore impossible for the week-day names, and the solar signs, but the chronology of their use is uncertain. There can be no doubt however as to the origin of Hindu planetary astrology, for most of the *indispensable* technical terms of astrology are purely Greek, and have no Sanskrit equivalents. The following technical terms are purely Greek, and are used in the same senses as in Paulus Alexandrinus. 1. *Hōrā*; 2. *Drikāṇa*; 3. *Kōṇa*; 4. *Āra*; 5. *Āsphujit*; 6. *Liptā*; 7. *Kēndra*; 8. *Trikōṇa*; 9. *Jāmitra*; (10) *Anaphā*; (11) *Sunaphā*; (12) *Durudharā*; (13) *Kēmadruma*; (14) *Vēśi*; (15) *Āpōklima*; (16) *Panapharā*; (17) *Hibuka*; (18) *Dyutam*; (19) *Mēshūraṇa*; and (20) *Harija*. The work of Paulus alone contains nearly the whole of the technical terms adopted from the Greek; and the Hindu planetary astrology is based primarily on that of Firmicus Maternus (336-354 A. C.). in whose work the astrological system of the 12 *mansions* occurs for the first time, and on that of Paulus Alexandrinus (378 A. C). Hindu astrologers themselves had no hesitation in acknowledging their indebtedness to the Greeks. Varāhamihira says that the Greeks, though they were Mlēchchhas, were honoured like Rishis, because of their skill in astrology (*Bṛhat-saṃhitā* ii. 15); and he refers in particular to Puliśa, who lived *not long before his own time*, (*Pancha-siddhāntikā*. i. 10), and whose meridian Yavanapura must, from its longitude, be Alexandria (*ibid.* iii. 13). The Puliśa of Yavanapura (=Alexandria), who lived not long before Varāha, must therefore be identical with Paulus Alexandrinus of 378 A. C. It is therefore certain that the Hindus borrowed their planetary astrology from the Greeks only after 378 A. C. This year therefore is also the upper limit for S'ūdraka, who betrays full knowledge of planetary astrology.

On the other hand, Varāha is said to have died in S'aka 509=587 A. C. (Āmarāja's comm. on Brahmagupta's *Khaṇḍa-khādya*). But he himself uses S'aka 427=505 A. C. as the epoch of his astronomical calculations (*Pancha-siddhāntikā*. i. 8), and it is usual for astronomers to give the date of their

own *Siddhāntas* for such epochs. We may therefore reasonably infer that he wrote in 505 A. C. That scrupulously accurate and unusually well-informed astronomer Albērūnī (1030 A. C.) also says that Varāha preceded himself by 525 years and wrote the *Pañcha-siddhāntikā* in S'aka 427 = 505 A. C. (*India*—Eng. tr. Sachau—i. 392 ; ii. 7, 51, 86). It is therefore certain that Varāha wrote in 505 A. C. and he did not therefore, in all probability, die so late as 587 A. C. S'ūdraka's lower limit is therefore c. 505 A. C.

Kings of Mālva

S'ūdraka must therefore have lived between 378 and *c.* 505 A. C. We learn from the *Mṛchchhakaṭika*, the *Padmaprābhritaka*, and Bāṇa's *Kādambari*, that he was king of Mālva, with his capital at Vidiśā, the modern Bhilsā. But from 378 to 436 A. C. we know the rulers of Mālva were 1) Chandravarman ; 2) his brother Naravarman ; 3) the latter's son Viśvavarman ; and 4) *his* son Bandhuvarman (*Epi. Ind* xiii. no. 9 ; xii. no. 35 ; Fleet : *Gupta Inscriptions*—nos. 1, 17, 18). Then the Guptas conquered Mālva, and in 455 to 457 A. C. we find Skandagupta, west of Mālva, in Kāṭhiāwāḍ, and in 473 A. C. Kumāragupta II acknowledged as suzerain over Mālva (Fleet : *Gupta Inscriptions*—nos. 14, 18). S'ūdraka could not therefore have ruled over Mālva before c. 475 A. C. The limits of his date are therefore narrowed to the last quarter of the 5th century A. C. and this therefore must be his period of rule over Mālva.

Conclusions

I shall now sum up my conclusions.

(i) Bhāsa is the author of only 9 plays (1) *Svapna* ; (2) *Pratijnā* ; (3) *Abhiṣeka* ; (4) *Pancha-rātra* ; (5) *Dūtavākya* ; (6) *Bāla-charita* ; (7) *Avimāraka* ; (8) *Padmaprābhritaka* and (9) *Mṛchchhakāṭika* ;

(ii) The authorship and date of (1) *Pratimā* ; (2) *Dūta-Ghaṭōtkacha* ; (3) *Madhyama* ; (4) *Karṇabhāra* and (5) *Ūrubhanga* are uncertain ;

(iii) *Chārudatta* is only an abridged version of the *Mṛchchhakaṭika* compiled in *c.* 750 A. C. ;

(iv) Bhāsa is identical with S'ūdraka, king of Mālva (*c.* 475 to *c.* 500 A. C.) ;

(v) Bhāsa's plays have come down to us almost intact, with some omissions.

EARLY INDIAN POETESSES

(Prof. Haranchandra Chakladar m.a.)

Poetry was the medium through which Indian thought sought to find expression from the earliest times and Indian women, with their natural instinct for art, have contributed their quota to the poetic literature of their country, in every period of the development of its civilisation and culture. Whether as inspired seers through whom the Vedic hymns were revealed, or as singers of the sweet and tender couplets in Prakrit, the popular speech of the millions, or again, as poetesses writing in the polished and elegant, though sometimes artificial, stanzas of classical Sanskrit – in all the different phases of the development of Indian poetry, ladies in India are found to have taken no mean part. From the time of Ghoshā, the Vedic seer,—who in the early Vedic age, several millenniums ago, poured out a spontaneous offering out of the abundance of gratitude to the Aśvins, the healing gods, whose ministration did send her a man to love and adore—up to Toru Dutt, whose mightingale voice did seek utterance in a foreign tongue, in a foreign land, we can trace an unbroken series of Indian poetesses who can take no insignificant position beside the singers of the other sex.

Here we shall confine ourselves to the poetesses of the earliest period of Indian poetry, viz. that of the Ṛgvedic hymns. Ancient Indian works on Ṛgvedic literature like the *Bṛhad-devatā* of S'aunaka and the several *Anukramaṇîs*, have recorded Indian traditions about the authorship of the hymns and in many cases these traditions are supported by the mention of the names of the authors in the hymns themselves. Though in some cases we have reasons to doubt the validity of these traditions, yet there is no question that they are in the main reliable, especially when we consider that the greatest care was taken in India in very early times to keep up the ancient national literature in its purity. These ancient records assign to female seers sometimes single verses and sometimes groups of them often running into whole hymns.

The *Ārshānukramaṇî* and the *Bṛhad-devatā* have specially brought together a list of the female seers (*brahmavādinyaḥ*) of whom they enumerate twenty-seven[1], but many of them are of a mythic character and it is

1. *Bṛhaddevatā*, ii. 82-86.

with only the group of nine who, according to the *Bṛhad-devatā*, "sang the praises of the deities" that we are more nearly concerned. But even here we have to dismiss at least two viz. Aditi, the mother of the gods, and Juhū, the Brahmajāyā, as having too much of a mythic character. A second group of nine in this list 'converse with seers and deities' and though we may claim some of them as genuine authors of hymns and verses, we are not sure if we may look upon all of them as poetesses in our sense of the term, there being several denizens of heaven included among them, such as the wife and the mother of Indra, Urvaśī—the Apsaras, Saramā—the canine messenger of the gods, the nymphs of the rivers, and so on. The remaining group of nine seers is entirely beyond our ken, they being not only the seers of their respective hymns but also the deities addressed in those hymns, so that they sang of their own thoughts and doings (*Bhāva-vṛttāni*), each one of them 'praising herself as the deity'; to this last group belong S'rī, Lākṣā, Sarpa-rājñī, Vāc, S'raddhā, Medhā, Dakṣiṇā, Rātrī, and Sūryā Sāvitrī. As we are speaking of only genuine human beings who might be held responsible for any verse or group of verses attributed to them, we leave aside the goddesses who lauded their own selves as well as most of those of the second group who held converse with seers and deities. We may also exclude from our consideration, Upaniṣad and Niṣad, seers of some verses in the *khilas*, or apocryphal hymns as these do not belong to the authoritative text. Our list is thus reduced to eight female seers—Ghoshā, Godhā, Viśvavārā, Apālā, the sister of Agastya, Lopāmudrā, S'aśvatî, and Romaśā—whom we may look upon as the real authors of the hymns or verses assigned to each, depending upon the statements of the works we have spoken of.

Ghoshā

Ghoshā, the first lady in the above list, has made the largest contribution of all. Two entire hymns (39 and 40) in the tenth *Maṇḍala* of the Ṛgveda are attributed to her. Hers was a family of great seers: her grandfather, Dîrghatamas, is the seer of many Ṛgvedic hymns, a singer whose praises are sung by the Ṛgveda itself—"the chief (Brahmā) of those who seek to obtain the object of their pious works and their leader (charioteer)"[1]; the *Bṛhaddevatā* tells us how Dîrghatamas was

1. *Rigveda* I, 158, 6. Trans. Wilson.

thrown into a river by his servants and was carried down-stream to the Aṅga country, when finding Uśij, a slave-girl of the king, fondly devoted to himself, he begot on her the Ṛṣi Kakṣîvat[1] who in his turn is also a seer of numerous Ṛgvedic hymns. This Kakṣîvat was the father of Ghoshā; but though born of such distinguished ancestors, Ghoshā unfortunately could not find a wooer who would seek her hand, as she had the curse of white leprosy and she was growing to be an old maid in the house of her father when the twin healing gods, the Aśvins, who are also sung by the name of the Nāsatyas, came to her relief and freed her from the loathsome infection. She speaks from her very soul when she sings in praise of the twin gods, "You Nāsatyas, are the good fortune of a damsel growing old in her father's mansion; the protectors of the abject, of the blind, of the feeble, they call you the physicians of the sacrifice."[2] And her father, Kakṣîvat, sings again and again of the glories and achievements of the twin gods and is full to overflowing with thankfulness for the cure they effected of his dear daughter: "I, the son of Uśij," says Kakṣîvat in a hymn of his, "address to you (Aśvins) audible praises, in like manner as Ghoshā praised you for the removal of her white-tinted (skin),"[3] and again he refers to the same wonderful cure, "You bestowed, Aśvins, a husband upon Ghoshā, growing old, and tarrying in her father's dwelling."[4]

Her fore-fathers had long been singing the glories of the twin gods: Dîrghatamas, her grandfather, in two hymns extols the deeds of the Aśvins who cured him of blindness and were of great help to him in his long life of a hundred years and more, and to her father's hymns in praise of these gods we have already referred. Both the hymns of which she is the seer are addressed to the Aśvins whose great deeds in the hoary past of the Indian Aryans are extolled by her, and her son, Suhastya, too, sings to the same gods and in the same metre as his mother.[5] Many are the achievements of the Aśvins sung in the hymns of Ghoshā and they have formed a rich store from which have been gleaned historical facts of great importance.

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1. *Bṛhaddevatā*, ed. Macdonell, iv. 21—25.
2. *Riv.* x. 39, 4.
3. *Riv.* I. 122, 5.
4. *Riv.* I. 117, 7.
5. *Riv.* x. 41.

Let Ghoshā herself tell her own story : the husband that she obtained appears, from her own words, to have lost a former wife whose loss he was bewailing when he applied for the hand of our poetess ; and for him, for his health and wealth, she prays to the twin gods.

Addressing the Aśvins, she sings again with reference to herself :— "The damsel, Aśvins, has been born ; let him in search of a bride approach her ; for him let shoots of corn sprout up ; by virtue of your deeds of love for him let the streams flow as if down an incline, for him who shall not be liable to lose his life at the hands of any one, let there be the power towards her, let there be power to exercise the rights of a husband towards her.

"The husbands, Aśvins, that pray with tears in their eyes for the (long) life (of their wives), husbands who get for them a seat at the sacrifice, who hold them long locked up in embrace, who get the darling child for the manes (for offering them oblations), to such husbands the wives bestow happiness by embraces.

"We understand not this : do you, Aśvins explain it well, how it is that the young husband loiters in the house of the youthful bride. This is our desire, Aśvins, that we repair to the dwelling of my husband, youthful, vigorous, manly and devoted to his wife.

"Aśvins, rich in food, lords of water, twin associates, may your good will come down upon us, control you the desire in our hearts. Ye have been my protectors, nay, being loved and adored, reach the habitation of my husband with joy, O Aśvins, while at the house of my man do you bestow prosperity, and a heroic son upon me who am always ready to extol your deeds ; lords of the waters, do you make the fords (on the way to my husband's house) easy to get across and remove the tree that stands on the road and any evil-minded man (that may withstand us).

"Aśvins, twin gods of goodly aspect, where, in what country, among what people, are you taking your pleasure to-day? Who is it that detains you? To whose house have you repaired ? Is it to that of a sage who sings your praises or to a devotee offering you sacrificial oblations ?"[1]

Godhā

The story of the next Brahmavādinī poetess of the Ṛgveda is told in a few words. Her contribution to the Veda, according to the

1. *Riv.* x. 40.

Sarvānukramaṇī, consists of a verse and a half, the seventh verse together with the last hemistich of the sixth, of hymn 134 of the tenth *Maṇḍala*,[1] the rest of the hymn having been revealed to Māndhātṛi, the son of Yuvanāśva. Whether she bore any connection with Māndhātṛi is more than we can tell, the Vedic literature offering no light on her life or deeds. The first hemistich of which she is the seer is addressed to Indra. "Thou dost subjugate (thy foes) under yourself, O Maghavan, as a goat with its forefoot does with a branch."[2] The next verse is addressed to the Viśva-devas, the all-gods : "We injure you in no way, ye gods," it goes on, "nor do we inflict any annoyance with the teaching of the Mantras. We take entire hold of you with wing and arms, as it were."[3]

Visvavārā

Viśvavārā was a Brahmavādinî lady of the Atri family to the members of which is attributed the authorship of the whole of the fifth *maṇḍala*. The family seems to have been spread over a wide area that embraced the rivers Paruṣṇî and the Yamunā in itself.[4] The hymn of six verses attributed to her[5] also belongs to the fifth, the family *maṇḍala* of the Atris.[6] In the first verse of her hymn we find her at dawn making her approach to the sacrificial fire when it is blazing bright, with the sacrificial ladle in hand ready to offer from it to the gods. Let her speak for herself: "The full-flaming fire throws out his beams in the glowing firmament, facing the dawn he shines far and wide, chanting the glories of the gods with hymns of obeisance (*namobhih*) and with the ladle of butter full of oblations, Viśvavārā proceeds towards the east, to the sacred fire."[7] She appears to be a married wife praying for mutual concord between the pair whom the nuptial knot has tied. Again we give her words as she prays for a happy wedded life, and for riches wherewith to carry on the domestic duties and at the same time for overpowering the activities of the enemies.

1. Kātyāyana, *Sarvānukramaṇî*, ed. Macdonell, pp. 43–44.
2. *Riv.* x. 134, 6 (b). Trans. Wilson.
3. *Riv.* x. 134, 7.
4. *Vedic Index*, I. 17.
5. *Riv.* v. 28.
6. Kātyāyana, *Sarvānukramaṇî*, ed. Macdonell, p. 19.
7. *Riv.* v. 28, 1.

"Agni, do thou repress our foes to ensure our great good fortune; let the riches brought by thee be of the highest and best. Make perfect, O Agni, the wedded life of the wife and husband by mutual concord and restraint and do thou overpower the strength and energies of all those who would be hostile to us."[1] This verse of noble thought has been quoted in the S'ukla Yajurveda.[2] This hymn of Viśvavārā is of importance as showing the high position occupied by women in the Ṛgvedic times. It shows her taking an equal part in the sacrifice and in her short but vigorous hymn Viśvavārā reveals herself to be a lady of forceful personality, dignified and restrained, and withal she shows her woman's heart when she prays for an atmosphere of love and concord in her home.

Apālā

Apālā also was a daughter of Atri to whose family, we have seen, Viśvavārā belonged. She gives vent to her afflictions in impassioned utterances in the hymn she addresses to Indra, and that finds a place not in the family book of the Atris, but in the eighth *maṇḍala*. It is said that with this hymn she invoked Indra to free her from her skin-disease and there are references in the hymn itself to this fact. The story of her life is given in the *Bṛhaddevatā*[3] but Sāyaṇa quotes it from an earlier source, the *S'āṭyāyana Brāhmaṇa*, where it is found in greater fulness.

Apālā, a daughter of Atri, was afflicted with a skin-disease, so that hair would not grow on her skin. For this she was hated by her husband and was forced to repair to her father's residence and there she made up her mind to devote herself to Indra and win his favour.[4] How she at last was blessed with the favour of that great god and purged of her bane is thus beautifully narrated in her own words in the hymn:

"A damsel, while going to the water to fetch it in a pitcher, found a piece of the Soma-plant in the path. While coming back to her house, she thus spoke, 'For Indra, the lord of the gods shall I press and prepare thee, for S'akra, the mighty one, shall I press thee and make thee ready for offering.'[5] With these words Apālā threw the soma-pieces into her

1. *Riv.* v. 28, 3.
2. *Vāj. Saṁ.* xxxiii. 12.
3. *Bṛhaddevatā*, vi. 99—106.
4. *Riv.* viii. 91, 4.
5. *Riv.* viii. 91, 1.

mouth, and as she walked began to crush them between her teeth which gave out a sound as of the friction of two pieces of stone. Indra, as he heard the sound of her jaws, thought it proceeded from stones pressing soma for sacrifice and hastened to the spot, but when he saw that it was Apālā's teeth that were producing the sound and not soma-stones, he turned his back to Apālā and was going away. Then Apālā thus called after him : "O Thou that goest from house to house, a hero, shining and resplendent in thy glory (for a drink of *soma*), do thou drink this *soma* pressed by my teeth—this *soma* together with fried grains of barley, with *karambha*, with cakes as well as with the chanting of hymns." She added further, "We would know thee, but we know thee not (as thou comest) on the path." With these words she addressed the soma-juice in her mouth, "O soma, flow thou forth for Indra slowly and yet more slowly, in slow drops as it were."[1] Then did Indra drink the *soma* from her lips and it is for this perhaps that the *Bṛhaddevata* says that Indra had fallen in love with her[2] when he had seen her in the lonely hermitage of her father. And now that Indra had been so propitious to her, she exclaims in triumph, "Many times let Indra grant us power, many things let Indra give us, let him repeatedly make us rich, many a time have I incurred the hatred of my husband and been forced to wander away (from him), but now may we be united to Indra."[3] And then asked Indra, "What would you have, Apālā, my darling?" And she prayed, "These three places, Indra, do thou make them all to grow abundantly—the bald head of my father, and his (barren) field and my body. This our field which is barren, and my body (afflicted with skin-disease) and again my father's (bald head),—do thou make all of them full of hair"[4] "Make me, O S'akra, to have alundant hair, (and) to be faultless limbed (and) fair-skinned." Hearing this Indra was mightily pleased, and "passing her through the carriage-aperture, (between the body) of the car and the yoke, drew her forth three times. Then she became fair-skinned[5]. And out of gratitude Apālā sang—"O S'atakratu, thou of hundred sacrifices,

1. *Riv.* viii. 91, 2—3. Sāyaṇa explains the last part, "at first slowly and then rapidly."

2 तामिन्द्रश्चकमे दृष्ट्वा विजने पितुराश्रमे। *B. D.* vi. 99.

3. *Riv.* viii. 91, 5.

4. *Riv.* viii 91, 5–6.

5 *B.D.* vi. 104–5.

three times didst thou purify Apālā, dragging her through the hole of the chariot, through the (narrower) hole of the cart and the (still narrower) aperture of the yoke; and there didst make her have a skin resplendent like the sun."[1]

Agastya's Sister

The sister of Agastya contributed a single verse to a hymn[2] of the re t of which her sons, the Gaupāyanas, are the seers. In this verse she exorts king Asamāti, a mighty monarch of the Ikṣvāku family to come to the aid of her sons, the nephews of Agastya. It appears that one of her sons, Subandhu, lay dead or dying and her other sons seek the help of the mighty king, Asamāti, the Ikshvāku, whom the mother also exports to hasten in his chariot to go to their aid. "Yoke the red horses to your chariot for the nephews of Agastya, and overcome, Rājā, all the niggard withholders of oblations." In the remaining five verses her sons invoke Subandhu to life, and in the last one, all the brothers touch Subandhu whom they have resuscitated back to life. The *Bṛhaddevatā*[3] gives the legend connected with the hymn. Four Ṛṣis, the sons of Agastya's sister, had been the domestic priests, of the Ikṣvāku king, Asamāti who, however, dismissed them and appointed two crafty priests in their place. These latter fell upon one of the brothers, Subandhu, with their crafty power and their magical art, and from the pain caused by their attack Subandhu swooned and fell. The others revived him and the four were reinstated by the king in their office as domestic chaplains.

Lopāmudrā

Lopāmudrā the wife of Agastya, is the seer of two verses in a hymn[4] dedicated to Rati, the Goddes of love. Lopāmudrā is a devoted wife who has served her lord faithfully and long, but her husband, the great sage, practises austerities, looks upon continence as the highest virtue and keeps away from her, lest the fickle and unsteady female should beguile the firm and resolute man[5]. The fond wife feels sad and miserable, bereft of her beloved lord, thinks herself neglected and claims his love and

1. *Riv.* viii. 91, 7.
2. *Riv.* x. 60, 6.
3. *B.D.* vii. 84—102.
4. *Riv.* I. 179, 1—2.
5. *Riv.* I. 179, 4.

company, pointing out that mighty sages of yore who talked with the very gods had not deserted their wives. Let us hear her own impassioned appeal: "For many a long year in the past, both by day and by night, as well as in the mornings, have I been wearing myself out serving thee diligently; now decay following upon advanced years impairs the beauty of my limbs. What, then, can now be done? The husbands should meet their wives.

"Those ancient sages that spread the truth far and wide, who talked of truth with the very gods, did beget children, nor did they break their penances thereby, because they found not the end. Therefore should wives—the partners at their sacrifices, be approached by their husbands."[1]

Agastya could no longer resist her logic and we are told in the last verse of the hymn that the venerable sage discharged both his obligations, both *kāma* and *tapas*, both his duties of domestic as well as of ascetic life, and from the gods he obtained the fulfilment of his desires.[2]

S'AŚVATĪ

S'aśvati is called in the Ṛgveda the Nārī, the woman, *par excellence*, and the Nārī "among women, is she who is distressed when her husband is distressed and rejoices when he rejoices," as the *Nītimañjarī* defines her.[3] She had been undergoing severe penances for long years for the recovery by her husband the Yādava Āsaṅga, the son of Playoga, of his manliness which he had lost. In the one verse[4] with which she is credited, she bursts out with joy at the success her penancees have achieved: "Joy, dear husband, now thou art capable of enjoying (life)."

ROMASĀ.

If we are to believe Sāyaṇa, Romaśā is a Brahmavādinī of no mean parentage, being a daughter of Bṛhaspati himself. The single verse for which she is responsible, is an outburst of youthful joy at the first consciousness of the charms of youth, when the girl feels that she is a woman. Her husband, the king Bhāvya Svanaya, a prince of unequalled might, who

1. *Riv.* I. 179,1—2. In the translation, the recently published German translation by Geldner has been followed.
2. *Riv.* I. 179, 6.
3. See note by Macdonell, *BD.*, translation, p. 55.
4. *Riv.* viii. 1. 34

ruled on the banks of the Indus,[1] had ridiculed her on her tender age and immaturity ; on this she retorts with a childlike challenge : "Feel me closely ; deem me no longer an immature girl, I am covered with down all over like a ewe of the Gandhārins."[2] Her husband's dominions being on the Sindhu, Romaśā was naturally familiar with the ewes for which Gandhāra was famous.

This young girl Romaśā is a contemporary of Ghoshā, as we find Kakṣîvat, the father of the latter poetess receiving immense wealth from her husband, and the two verses giving the talk between the king and the queen is tagged on to a hymn of Kakṣîvat without any connection with the main body of the poem with which they differ also in metre, the only connection being that the two verses relate to the king whose power and liberality Kakṣîvat sings in the verses that precede.

1. *Riv.* I. 126. 1.
2. *Riv.* I 126. 7.

SĀSANA AND JAYAPATRA

(PANDIT AMARESWAR THAKUR, M.A.)

[*Lekhyas* or documents are primarily divided in ancient law books into two classes : *rājakiya* (public) and *laukika* or *jānapada* (private). The former again has many varieties and most important of them are *Sāsana* and *jayapatra*. Some account of these two is given in the following few pages.]

SĀSANA

Sāsana in the law books means a donative grant. Yājñavalkya says : 'when a king makes any grant of land, village or garden or makes a *nibandha*, he should leave the terms committed to writing for the information of future kings.'[1] The term *nibandha* has been explained in different ways by different commentators. Viśvarūpāchārya takes it to mean permanent endowment.[2] Devaṇabhaṭṭa and Aparārka take it in the sense of an arrangement made through the intervention of the king for money to be given annually or monthly to a Brāhmaṇa or a deity by traders or other wealthy persons.[3] Devaṇabhaṭṭa further observes that the merit arising out of the gift accrues to the king inasmuch as he induces the actual donors to make it.[4] Vijñāneśvara takes the words *pratigraha* and *nibandha* as synonymous.[5] *Pratigraha* means a donation generally. Another explanation offered by him of the term seems to indicate that a document was needed when a piece of land was leased out for rent which was to be given either in cash or in kind. The lessee was to pay for instance, a certain sum for a certain amount of produce in the land taken on lease or a share in the

1. दत्त्वा भूमिं निबन्धं वा कृत्वा लेख्यं तु कारयेत्। आगामिभद्रनृपतिपरिज्ञानाय पार्थिव:॥ *Yāj.* I. 318.
2. निबन्धोऽक्षयनिधि:।
3. निबन्धो वाणिज्यादिकारिभि: प्रतिवर्षं प्रतिमासं वा किञ्चिद्धनमस्मै ब्राह्मणायास्मै देवतायै वा देयमित्यादि प्रभुसमयलभ्योऽर्थ:। *Sm. ch.* p. 125.
4. अत्र यद्यपि धनदातृत्वं वाणिज्यादिकर्तुस्तथापि निबन्धकर्तुरेव पुण्यं तदुद्देशेनैवेतरस्य प्रवृत्ते:। *Sm. ch.* p. 125.
5. प्रतिगृह्यते इति प्रतिग्रहो निबन्ध:। *Mitākṣarā* on I. 320.

produce itself.[1] Chaṇḍeśvara explains the term *nibandha* as assignment of what is settled with certainty such as a fixed gain from a mine or the like.[2] We think, however, that *bhumiṁdattvā* and *nibandham kṛtvā* refer to two distinct things, the former to secular donations i.e. grants to private individuals not in any way connected with religion and the latter to religious endowments, i.e., donations and endowments made to Brāhmaṇas, Gods and religious institutions.

Both these kinds of grants are to be registered in inscriptions termed *Sāsana*. The materials on which these inscriptions are to be recorded are mainly two, namely copper-plates and pieces of cloth according to Yājñavalkya, Bṛhaspati and Vyāsa.[3] Viśvarūpāchārya comments that *bhūrjapatra* (i. e. bark of the birch tree) is never to be used for this purpose, evidently owing to its perishableness.[4] As a matter of fact the ancient inscriptions that have come down to us recording grants and endowments are mostly written on copper-plates and many of them style themselves on this account *tāmraśāsana* or copper-plate grants. We have come across no inscription written on a piece of cloth.

The most important thing in connection with royal charters is that they should be precisely dated. A precise statement of the year, the month, the fortnight and the day on which a grant is made should be recorded in the plate.[5] We know from many inscriptions that dates could be given in words as well as in numerals. The specification of the details of the donor and the donee and of the donation forms also a very important factor in all records relating to grants. The precepts of the legal treatises are that the king should state the names of himself and his three imme-

1. निबन्ध एकस्य पर्णभरकस्य इयन्ति पर्णानि तथा एकस्य क्रमुकफलभरकस्य इयन्ति क्रमुकफलानीत्युक्तलक्षणः। *Mitrākṣharā*, II. 121.

2. निबन्ध आकरादौ नियतं लभ्यम्। *Vivādaratnākara*, chap II.

3. *Yāj.* I. 319.
दत्त्वा भूम्यादिकं राजा तास्रपट्टे तथापटे। शासनं कारयेत्..... ॥ (Bṛhaspati)
राज्ञा तु स्वयमादिष्टः सन्धिविग्रहलेखकः। तास्रपट्टे-पटे वापि विलिखेद्राजशासनम् ॥

4. पटवचनं भूर्ज्जनिवृत्त्यर्थम् Bālakṛiḍā on *Yāj.* I. 319.

5. अब्दमासतदर्धाह्नी राजमुद्राङ्कितं तथा etc. (Vyāsa)। *Sm. ch.* p. 129.
समामासं तदर्धाहनृपनामोपलक्षितम् etc.—*Sm. ch.* p. 126.
.....वर्षमासादि धनाध्यक्षाक्षरान्वितम् etc.—Viram p. 192.

diate male ancestors.[1] Viśvarūpāchārya thinks that the names of the female ancestors should also be stated.[2] The name of the grantee, his father's name, his family and caste and the name of the Vedic school to which he belongs should also be mentioned in the record.[3] It should also contain such particulars as the value of the donation or, in the case of bequest of land, the statement of the area and its description by boundaries.[4] The document, according to the legal treatises, is to be composed by the *Sandhivigrahkārī*, an officer for peace and war.[5] *Sandhivigrahakārī* is an official or military title and its synonymous title is *Sandhivigrahalekhaka.*[6] This title is signified by *Sandhivigrhika* in the Nītivākyāmṛita and in the inscriptions. It will be interesting to note in this connection that it is distinctly mentioned in many copper-charters that they were written (*lekhita*) by the *Sandhivigrahika.* The *Sandhivigrahika* according to the Nītivākyāmṛita is to be well versed in all languages, acquainted with the rules of the different *āśramas* and castes and is to know all kinds of scripts. He should also be able to write well and read quickly. The words *vilikhet* in the injunction of Vyāsa and *likhitam* in the inscriptions used in respect of the *Sandhivigrahika* in all probability refer to the composition or drawing up of the record and not to actual writing. This conclusion seems irresistible from the high position that the *Sandhivigrahika* or *Mahāsāndhivigrahika* held in the administration as well as from the nature of the qualifications which he is said to have possessed. His duty was only to compose and draft the record. The writing of it on the plate was left to the *lekhaka* or the professional scribe. A *lekhaka* is mentioned in the *Arthaśāstra*[7] as a person possessed of minis-

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1. *Yāj.* I. 315. श्रादावेवाभिलेखनीयाः पूर्व्वपुरुषास्त्रयः (Viśvarūpa); वंश्यान् प्रपितामह पितामह पित्राख्यान्.....*Sm. ch.* p. 126.
2. वंश्यत्ववचनात् स्त्रियोऽपि। on *Yāj.* I. 315.
3. प्रतिग्रहीतृजात्यादिसगोत्रब्रह्मचारिकम्। स्थानं वंशादि पूर्व्वं च etc....(Parāśara p. 123).
   दत्तं मयामुकायाथ दानं सब्रह्मचारिणे...*Sm. ch.* p. 127.
4. प्रतिग्रहपरीमाणम्...etc. *Yaj.* I. 320.
5. राज्ञा तु स्वयमादिष्टः सन्धिविग्रहलेखकः। (Vyasa); Parāśara p. 122.
   तामपट्टे पटे वापि विलिखेद्राजशासनम्॥
6. Prakīrṇaka samuddeśa. 2.
7. तस्मादमात्यसम्पदोपेतः सर्व्वसमयविदाशुग्रन्थश्चार्वक्षरो लेखनसमर्थो लेखकः स्यात्। Kau. II. 10.

terial qualifications, acquainted with all sorts of customs, skilled in composition, a good and legible hand and an expert in reading. References to *lekhaka* are also found in the injunctions attributed to Vyāsa and Prajāpati.[1] A distinct mention of *śāsana lekhaka* is found in a verse occurring in the Rājanītiratnākara.[2] It is said here that he should be intelligent enough to understand a thing though it is said only once, smart in writing, sharp in reading and versed in all the *śāstras*. The evidence of inscriptions also corroborates the view that the composer and the writer were generally two different persons. They are separately mentioned in the Mandasore Stone Inscriptions of Kumāragupta and Bandhu Varman as *kartṛ* and *lekhaka*. The *lekhaka* is termed *kāyastha* in the Kapāleśvar grant of Mahābhāva Gupta. This is strictly in accordance with an injunction of Viṣṇu.[3] It is also evident from this inscription that the *lekhaka* belonged to the office of the *Sandhivigrahika*. From the double expression *racayāñcakārā* and *lilikhe* used in reference to one and the same person, it is only reasonable to suppose that when the *lekhaka* happened to be an exceptionally brilliant man the task of composition also was left to him. The text of Vyāsa which says that the *Sandhivigrahakārī* or the *lekhaka* should write (i.e. compose) the royal grant under orders of the king should be understood in this sense.

The process of engraving comes next. It is denoted in the inscriptions by the term *utkīrṇa*. The engraver had under the guidance of the *Sandhivigrahika* to follow the writing on the plate and impress it with his tools. In the Kapāleśvar grant of Mahābhāva Gupta referred to above the engraver and the writer are mentioned as two different persons.

Another important thing in connection with a royal charter is that it should be authenticated. The methods of giving authentication are mainly two. First it should be sealed with the royal seal[4] and secondly

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1. सन्धिविग्रहकारी च भवेद् यद्यपि लेखकः। *Sm. ch.* p. 146.
   कार्य्यो यत्नेन महता निर्णयो राजशासने।
   राज्ञा स्वहस्त तन्मुद्रा लेखकाचर दर्शनात्॥ *Sm. ch.* p. 146.
2. सकृदुक्तं गृहीतार्थो लघुहस्तो जिताक्षरः।
   सर्वशास्त्रसमालोची एष शासन लेखकः॥ p 21.
3. राजाधिकरणे तन्नियुक्त कायस्थकृतं etc....Viṣṇu VII. 2.
4. मुद्रितं राजमुद्रया (Vyāsa) *Sm. ch.* p. 128.
   राजमुद्राङ्कितं तथा (Vyāsa) *Sm. ch.* p. 129.

it should be given the *svahasta*[1] or the king's own hand, i.e. an autograph signature of the king from whom the charter emanates. From many inscriptions we know that sometimes an actual representation of a sign-manual was given and that it was occasionally represented by some marks. In plate 39 (*Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum* vol. III) there are some wavy lines under the words *svahasta* and these are evidently intended to represent some kind of sign-manual. 'The custom of attaching royal authentication to charters has given us a large and highly interesting series of ancient Indian seals, some of them presenting devices only, others only legends, and others both legends and devices and some of them being of an extremely elaborate kind'.....

Another essential thing in connection with a royal charter is that it should be provided with the expression *rājādeśena*[2] meaning 'by order of the king himself.' This expression shows that the official in charge of the drawing up of the charter could not do it without an express order from the king.[3] This order was either given directly or communicated through an officer. When it was directly given, the custom required that the fact should be recorded as such in the charter itself. As a consequence we find such expressions as '*ājñāsvayaṁ*' (the order is that of the grantor's own self) '*svamukhājñā*', '*ājñaptiḥ svamukham*', (the order is that of the grantor's own mouth), '*svamukhājñayā utkīrṇam*, (engraved at the order of the grantor's own mouth) etc. mentioned in many royal grants. When the sanction to draw up the charter was not directly given, it was communicated to the office of the *Sāndhivigrahika* through an officer ordinarily styled *dūtaka* in the inscriptions. Another regular title of the officer who carried the king's sanction and order to the officer concerned was *ājñā dāpaka* (conveyor of orders) as is evident from the Ujjain grant of Vākpatiraja of Dhara. The same office is referred to in such expressions also as '*ājñāmahāmahattara*' Gauri

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समुद्राङ्क' ... (Viṣṇu) Viram p. 194.
मख्तिं राजमुद्रया ... Viram p. 193.
समुद्रीपरि चिह्नितम् ... *Yāj.* I. 319.

1. स्वहस्तकाल सम्पन्नं ... *Yāj*, I. 320 ; स्वहस्तं च लिखेत् स्वयम् ; Parāśara p. 123.
राजस्वहस्तचिह्नेन ... *Sm. ch.* p. 128.
2. राजादेशेन संयुतम् ; *Sm. ch.* p. 128.
3. Vyasa's injunction स्वयं राज्ञा समादिष्टः etc. (*Sm. ch.* p. 128.) points to the same conclusion.

Sarmā' (the order is conveyed by the Mahāmahattara Gaurisarmā), '*ājñaptih Siyasarma*' and '*ājñaptih Dama Kirttibhojakah*'. Hindu law texts do not mention any such office as that of the *dūtaka* but we find in a text attributed to Vyāsa the mention of *dūtas* and *mahattaras* as persons among others to be addressed by the king in connection with formal grants with a view to give them pubilicity.

It is also enjoined in a text of Vyāsa that the king should put the *pramāṇa* and *sanniveśa* with his own hand just like the *svahasta*.[1] These two terms have been explained by the Mitākṣarā. *Pramāṇa* means dimension which is to be specified in *bighās* or other land-measure, and *sanniveśa* should be taken in the sense of site, i e. the houses or lands by which the property is bounded on all sides.[2] Mitramiśra sees no utility in observing this rule strictly. According to him the specification of *pramāṇa* and *sanniveśa* may be put by others as well for the king.[3]

Another legal precept in connection with a royal grant is that it should bear the words 'this is known by me' from the donor and that it should bear the signatures of the head of the department concerned with its drafting and delivery as well as of the writer (*lekhaka*).[4]

We have seen above that a royal grant should be sealed in order to make it authentic beyond all manner of doubt. Mitramiśra and Devaṇabhaṭṭa hold on the strength of the words *dadyāt* and *dattam* used in the injunctions of Viṣṇu and other authorities relating to royal grants, that such grants should also be delivered.[5] The actual delivery into the hands of the grantees was done not by the king himself but by the local officials who drew up and prepared the charters. We know from the *Subraniti*

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1. सन्निवेशं प्रमाणञ्च स्वहस्तं च लिखेत् स्वयम्, Viram. p 193.
2. सन्निवेशस्तु वै पूर्वापरदिग्विभागपरिच्छिन्नः सम्यङ्निविष्टो गृहक्षेत्रादिः।
   प्रमाणं निवर्त्तनादि भूपरिमाणम्। *Yāj.* II. 6.
3. तयो राज्ञस्वहस्तलिखनानियमात्, Viram p. 194.
4. ज्ञातं मयेति लिखितं दत्त्वा, *Sm. ch* p. 129.
   तदध्यक्षकरचिह्नितम्; Viṣṇu, VII. 2; अध्यक्षाक्षरैर्द्धृतम् (Vyasa), *Sm. ch.* p. 129.
   स्वनाम तु लिखेत् पश्चात्, *Sm. ch.* y. 128.
5. इदञ्च राज्ञा प्रतिग्रहीत्रे समर्पणीयम्; Viram. p. 194.
   राज्ञा दत्तं शासनाख्यं स्यात्;
   एतच्च प्रतिग्रहीतुः समर्पणीयम्; *Sm. ch.* p. 128.

that these officials had to keep copies of all documents that bore the king's seal such as grants etc.[1] It is said there, 'after the lapse of time kings may entirely forget or may have a mistaken impression of what they did; so officers should keep copies of the royal writs to serve as reminders in case of doubt or forgetfulness.' These copies served also another purpose. We know from Manu that even royal grants were some-times forged inspite of all precautions.[2] The Madhuvana record of A.D. 630 of Harśavardhana of Thāneśwar and Kanauj bears evidence to the forgery of royal grants. A reference to forged copper-plates may also be found in another inscription recorded in the *Indian Antiquary*, VOL. XXX p. 2 1 ff. So it is just possible that whenever any doubt arose as to the genuineness of a royal grant the office copy was looked upon as the best means of verification. A text of Kātyāyana seems to imply, however, that ordinarily the authenticity of a royal charter was not to be confirmed by the usual and ordinary tests of truth. It declares that a royal charter free from the use of vulgar expressions and accompanied by 'possession' on the part of its holder, bearing the king's seal, sign-manual and other marks is to be regarded as genuine.[3] According to another text a document provided with the king's *svahasta* and sealed with his own seal is equal to an attested document in all affairs.[4] Evidently such documents were in ancient times judicially recognised without any question as to their genuineness. A text of Prajāpati also goes to corroborate this view. It says that royal charters are by all means to be admitted in evidence for the decision of doubtful matters; they do not require any other formal proof except the fact that they bear a seal and a sign-manual.[5] The reasons of the extraordinary degree of confidence placed in all public documents are not far to seek. First they emanated from the highest authority in the land and secondly

1. राजाद्यङ्कितलेख्यस्य धारयेत् स्मृतिपत्रकम्। कालेऽतीते विस्मृतिर्वा भ्रान्तिः सञ्जायते नृणाम्॥ II. 226.
2. IX. 232.
3. मुद्राशुद्धं भुक्तिशुद्धं सचिह्नकम्।
राज्ञः स्वहस्तसंशुद्धं शुद्धिमायाति शासनम्॥ *Sm. ch.* p. 146.
क्रियाशुद्धमपशब्दानन्वयादिरहितम्।
4. राज्ञः स्वहस्तसंयुक्तं स्वमुद्राचिह्नितं तथा। राजकीयं स्मृतं लेख्यं सर्व्वेष्वर्थेषु साक्षिमत्॥ Viram, p. 195.
5. कार्यो यत्नेन महता निर्णयो राजशासनात्। राज्ञः स्वहस्तो मुद्रालेखकाक्षरदर्शनात्॥ Viram p. 199.

all possible care was taken to give them a wide publicity. We find some *smṛti* texts which lay down that a royal grant should contain an address made by the king to the officials, the messengers, the physicians, the *mahattaras*, the relatives and even the *mlecchas* and *chandālas* in the land to the following effect : 'I for the increase of religious merits of my father and mother and of myself make this grant to-day to So and So, son of So and So, who belongs to the Vedic school So and So'.[1] Other *smṛti* texts inform us that the king was to declare in the grant itself for the information of future kings and ministers that the grant would hold good till the sun and the moon lasted and that it was to descend by right of inheritance to the son, grandson and more remote descendants and that it was never to be reduced or repudiated and that it was entirely exempt from all *bhāvyas*. He was also to declare that the reward of making a gift was residence in paradise for sixty thousand years and the punishment of repudiation was condemnation to hell for the same period.[2] We know further that the grant was to contain a request from him to all future kings for the making of gifts in the following verse :—

सामान्योऽयं धर्मसेतुर्नृपाणां
काले काले पालनीयो भवद्भिः ।
सर्वानेतान् भाविनः पार्थिवेन्द्रान्
भूयो भूयो याचते रामभद्रः ॥

A royal charter is essential, as Devaṇabhaṭṭa observes, not to complete or validate a gift, for a gift is valid as soon as the donee approves of it.[3] It is necessary in so far as it serves to make a gift recorded in it permanently endurable.[4] Yājñavalkya speaks of making a royal grant perma-

1. कुटुम्बिनोऽथ कार्य्यस्थदूतवैद्यमहत्तरान् । म्लेच्छचण्डालपर्यन्तान् सर्व्वान् संबोधयन्निति ॥
मातापित्रोरात्मनश्च पुण्यायासुकसूनवे । दत्तं मयासुकायाथ दानं सब्रह्मचारिणे ॥
Parāśara p. 123.

2. अनाच्छेद्यमनाहार्य्यं सर्व्वभाव्य विवर्ज्जितम् । चन्द्रार्क समकालीनं पुत्रपौत्रान्वयानुगम् ।
दातुः पालयितुः स्वर्गं हर्तुर्नरकमेवच । षष्टिं वर्षसहस्राणि दानच्छेदफलं लिखेत् ॥
षष्टिं वर्षसहस्राणि दानच्छेदफलं तथा । आगामि नृपसामन्तबोधनार्थं नृपो लिखेत् ॥
Sm. ch. p. 127. Julius Jolly accepts the reading *bhāga* for *bhāvya* and explains it as diminution by the allotment of shares to the king's attendants and so forth.

3. एतच्च शासनं न दानसिद्ध्यर्थम् । तस्य प्रतिग्रहेणैव सिद्धेः । *Sm. ch.* p. 128

4. किन्तु दानस्य स्थैर्य्यकरणार्थम् ; *Sm. ch.* p. 128.

nent. What he means by it is, Devaṇabhaṭṭa points out, that the gift registered in such a grant should be made permanent.[1] These grants were intended undoubtedly to have the effect of title and in fact copper-plate grants are themselves the actual title deeds and certificates. Viśvarūpāchārya says that a gift of land may be made permanent by *Bhūmicchidranyāsa*.[2] *Bhūmicchidranyāya* is the expression generally occurring in the inscriptions. This term has not been explained by any one satisfactorily. The expression *Bhūmicchidra* is found in Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*[3] and it means according to Prof. Shamsastri division of land : Bühler quotes three lines from Yādava's Vaijayantī and explains that *bhūmicchidra* means land unfit for tillage.[4] *Bhūmicchidranyāsa* as used by Viśvarūpāchārya may be understood to mean placing holes (ditches) in the land. These holes or ditches might have served as boundary marks for the lands given.

A technical rule in connection with a royal edict is that it should be written in a refined language, i e., Sanskrit and be free from all vulgar and ungrammatical expressions. Authorities all agree that it should never be written in a local dialect.[5]

Jayapatra

When a person gets possession of a movable or immovable property by means of adequate proofs or when he becomes victorious in a dispute regarding partition or is acquitted from a grave accusation, then the king who might have tried the case personally or through the chief judge should give him a decree which is called *jayapatra* (lit. a document of success).[6] A *jayaptra* should generally comprise the matter adduced

1. अनेनैवभिप्रायेण याज्ञवल्क्येनाप्युक्तम् स्वहस्तकालसम्पन्नं etc., *Sm. ch.* p. 128.
2. भूमेश्छिद्रन्यासेन ; Bālakriḍā on *Yāj.* I. 320.
3. Kau II. 2.
4. *Epigraphia India*, Vol. I. p. 174. भूमिच्छिद्रं कृष्ययोग्या etc.,
5. सुलिष्यनपशब्दोक्ति। इदञ्च साधुशब्दैरेव लेखनीयं न लौकिकवत्तदनियमः ; तस्मिन्नित्य लौकिके देशभाषादिप्रतिषेधो न ; etc., Viram p. 193. राजशासनवन्न साधुशब्दनियमोऽत्रेत्यभिप्रायः, Mitākṣharā on *Yāj.* II. 89.
6. जङ्गमं स्थावरं येन प्रमाणेनात्मसत्कृतम्।
भागाभिशापसन्दिग्धे यः सम्यग् विजयी भवेत् ॥
तस्मै राज्ञा प्रदातव्यं जयपत्रं सुनिश्चितम्। (Vyā-a) Vīramitrodaya p. 194.
Parāśaradharma Samhita reads सुलेखितं for सुनिश्चितम् p. 124.
Smriti chandrikā reads भागाभिशापसन्दिग्धः, p. 129.

to be proved, the answer, the judge's ruling as to on whom the burden of proof should lie and his decision.[1] It should bear the royal seal and be signed by the chief judge and other *sabhyas* or members of the tribunal.[2] Kātyāyana ordains that the king as well as the *sabhāsads* (the judges) should give their *svahastas* or sign-manuals to it in accordance with the general rules for writing documents.[3] As to what matters should be contained in a *jayapatra* we should also look to a verse of Vyāsa which runs as follows :—[4]

पूर्व्वोत्तरक्रिया पादं प्रमाणं तत् परीक्षणम्।
निगदं स्मृतिवाक्यञ्च यथा सभ्यविनिश्चितम्॥
एतत् सर्व्वं समासेन जयपत्रे विलेखयेत्॥

Mitramiśra points out that owing to the separate mention of the word *pramāṇa* which means proof, *kriyā* should be taken in a different sense. It may be taken in the sense of *pratyavakalita* which means nothing but the deliberation of the judges as to on which party the burden of proof will lie.[5] *Nigada* means the depositions of witnesses.[6] So the verse just quoted declares that a *jayapatra* should contain the plaint, the answer, the deliberation of the judges as to on whom the burden of proof should lie, proofs and their examination, the depositions of witnesses and last of all the injunctions of the legal treatises as interpreted by the members of the judical tribunal. Kātyāyana has two verses on the subject. Both of them seem to suggest that there should be a definite order to be followed in putting the contents in a *jayapatra*. But as there is no agreement between these two verses as regards the contents, the order suggested by

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1. यथोपन्यस्तसाध्यार्थसंयुक्तं सोत्तरक्रियम्। सावधारणकञ्चैव जयपत्रकमिष्यते। (ब्रह्मवशिष्ठ) Mit. on II. 91.
2. 'प्राड्विवाकादिहस्ताङ्कं मुद्रितं राजमुद्रया। सिद्धेऽर्थेवादिने दद्याज्जयिने जयपत्रकम्। (ब्रह्मवशिष्ठ) Mit. on II. 91.
3. सिद्धेनार्थेन संयोज्यो वादी सत्कारपूर्व्वकम्। लेख्यं स्वहस्तसंयुक्तं तस्मै दद्यात्तु पार्थिवः। सभासदश्च ये तत्र स्मृतिशास्त्रविदः स्थिताः। यथा लेख्यविधौ तद्वत् स्वहस्तं तत्र दापयेत्॥ *Sm. ch.* p. 130.
4. *Sm. ch.* P. 129. Par. Dh. Sam. P. 124. Viram. p. 194.
5. प्रमाणस्य पृथग् ग्रहणात् क्रियापदेन प्रत्याकलितमत्रगृह्यते। सभ्यानामर्थिप्रत्यर्थिनोः कस्य क्रिया स्यात् इति परामर्शलक्षणस्य प्रत्याकलितस्य, etc., *Mitak*, on II. 8.
क्रियापदं क्रियाभिमर्शनपादं प्रत्याकलितमिति यावत् *Sm. ch.* p. 130.
6. निगदं साक्षिवचनम्। *Sm. ch.* p. 130.

them is not also identical. Thus one of them says that the first thing to be placed iu a *jayapatra* should be the plaint and the answer and then the deliberations of the chief judge and other *sabhyas* or members of the tribunal or the members of the corporation as the case may be ; then should be put the view of the legal treatises on the subject-matter of the suit in question and last of all the concurrrence of the judges.[1] A Hindu judgment shows that this concurence was expressed by some such expression as *sammatiratra*[2] and followed by the signature of the judge giving the concurrence in his own handwriting.[3] The other verse of Kātyāyana declares that the contents of a *jayapatra* should be the pleadings, the deposition of each and every one of the witnesses, the manner in which the suit is decided and the actual decision of the suit. All these should find place in a *jayapatra* one after another in the order indicated, in pursuance of the rules for writing documents in general.[4] Raghunandana thinks[5] that the purpose of putting all these things in a *jayapatra* is to show that the judgment has been thorough in all respects. The utility of some of the contents of a *jayapatra* is also felt, Raghunandana further thinks, when the question of retrial comes up. Thus the prayer of the defeated party for a retrial with a plea quite different from that taken by him previously as revealed by the *jayapatra* will not

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1. अभियोक्तभियुक्तानां वचनं प्राङ्निवेशयेत् ।
   सभ्यानां प्राड्विवाकस्य कुलानां वा ततः परम् ॥
   निश्चयं स्मृतिशास्त्रस्य भंतं तवैव लेखयेत् । *Sm. ch.* p. 130.

2. 'A judgment of a Hindu Court in Sanskrit'—*Calcutta Weekly Notes* Vol. XXIV. No. 38.

3. मतलेखनं तु स्वहस्तेन । *Sm. ch.* p. 130.

4. अर्थिप्रत्यार्थिवाक्यानि प्रतिज्ञा साचिवचस्तथा । निर्णयश्च यथा तस्य यथा चावधृतं स्वयम् ॥ एतद्यथाचरं लेख्यं यथापूर्व्वं निवेशयेत् ॥ Raghunandan *Vyavahāratattva* p. 60. *Sm. ch.* reads प्रतिज्ञा साचिवाक् तथा...in the first line and लेख्यं in the last line. p. 130.

One of the meaning of the word *akṣara* is document and hence *yathākṣaram* evidently means 'according to the rules of document.'

5. ततश्च भाषोत्तरे क्रिया च पत्रसाक्ष्यादिकं निर्णयो जयपराजयावधारणम् निर्णयकालावस्थित मध्यास्थेत्यादिकं सर्वं लेखनीयं, निरूपणस्य सम्यक्त्वप्रदर्शनार्थम् । Vyavahāratattva p. 60. see also Vivādarṇavasetu (manuscript).

be entertained. To put it in a concrete form, when the *jayapatra* shows that he was defeated by the submission of *mithyottara* (plea of denial) his application for a retrial with *kāraṇottaru* (plea of special exception) will be disallowed.[1] In like manner an application for a retrial is also to be rejected when it is seen from the *jayapatra* that the proofs proposed to be adduced are of different kinds from those by which decision was previously arrived at.[2] Now in the absence of any mention of reply and proofs in the *jayapatra* it would have been impossible to ascertain what kind of reply the defendant gave on the previous occasion or what kind of proof was resorted to. The value of a *jayapatra* as a whole is also immense to a defendant when he takes the plea of *res-judicata*. Because according to Bṛhaspati and Vyāsa it is one of the principal means by which this plea can be substantiated.[3]

Jayapatra seems to have several varieties and one of them is mentioned in a text of Kātyāyana. This text declares that when the complainant establishes his case by adducing evidence the *jayapatra* given to him is called *paśchātkāra*. We quote the text below :—

निरस्ता तु क्रिया यत्र प्रमाणेनैव वादिना।
पश्चात्कारी भवेत्तत्र न सर्वासु विधीयते ॥

Devaṇabhaṭṭa points out that the word *pramāṇa* in this text indicates that the term *paśchātkara* may be applied to a *jayapatra* only when the four parts of a judicial proceeding are in existence and recorded in it.[4] When there are only two parts, that is to say, when on account of the submission of *satyottara* by the defendant, adducement of proof and *pratyākalita* (deliberation as to on whom the burden of proof will lie) become unnecessary the record of victory containing these two parts,

1. तथाहि भाषीत्तरलिखनं हेत्वन्तरेण पुनर्न्यायप्रत्यवस्थानविषेधार्थम्। नहि गृहीतमिति मिथ्योत्तरेण पराजितस्य पुनः परिगीधितं मया इति प्रत्यवस्थानं सम्भवति। Vyavahāratattva (p. 60.) Vivādabhangārṇava (manuscript).

2. प्रमाणलिखनन्तु पुनः प्रमाणान्तरेण न्यायनिषेधार्थम्। Vyavahāratattva p. 60.

3. उत्तरे स्याच्चतुर्थं तु समाप्तिजयपत्रकम्। (Bṛhaspati) प्राङ्न्यायोत्तरे साक्षि जयपत्रयोरन्यतरेणासाधयम् वादी न प्राग्विजयोत्थभि प्रायः। *Sm. ch.* P. 119.
प्राङ्न्यायेजयपत्रेण प्राड्विवाकादिभिस्तथा। सत्यं वादी समाप्नोति यद् यत्रेन निवेदितम्· (Vyāsa), *Sm. ch.* p. 119.

4. प्रमाणेनैवेति वदंश्चतुष्पादव्यवहार एव पश्चात्कारी न द्विपादव्यवहार इति कथयति।

namely the plaint and the answer should be called *jayapatra* and not *paścātkāra*.[1]

The term *paścātkāra* occurs also in the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya in the following rule :—

घाताभियोगमप्रतिब्रुवतस्तदहरेव पश्चात्कारः ।[2]

Prof. Sham Sastri has taken the term in the sense of 'sentence of punishment' and rendered the passage as follows :—

Sentence of punishment shall be passed the very day that a defendant accused of assault fails to answer the charge made against him.

We think, however, that the term *paścātkāra* occurring in the *Arthaśāstra* is not far different in meaning from that of the Dharmaśāstra. For the true meaning of the rule just referred to we should look elsewhere. It is laid down in the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* that in a capital offence, theft, assault and abuse, where a cow is the cause of action, in slander and aggression, in a law suit where the character of a woman is involved or where the right over a slave girl is disputed, the defendant should be made to answer the charge immediately.[3] Kātyāyana also echoes the spirit of this rule by saying that the proceedings should be speedy and immediate in actions done very recently.[4] If we interpret Kauṭilya's rule in the light of the texts of Yājñavalkya and Kātyāyana it would mean that judgment (*paścātkāra*) should be passed the very day the defendant fails to answer the charge of assault against him. We fully agree on these grounds, with Prof. Jülius Jolly that *paścātkāra* of Kauṭilya seems to contain a reference to the *jayapatra* of the Dharmaśāstras.[5] The real importance of the mention of *paścātkāra* in the *Arthaśāsrta*

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1. द्विपादव्यवहारे तु भाषोत्तरान्वितं जयपत्रमस्योक्त्वा, पश्चात्कारस्यैव तत्रासदनुवादकत्वेन प्रतिषेधात् । The four parts of a judicial proceeding according to Kātyāyana are पूर्व्वपक्ष, उत्तरपक्ष, प्रत्याकलित and क्रियापद ; Vijñāneśvara does not regard प्रत्याकलित as a distinct division and according to him the four parts are भाषापाद (same as पूर्व्वपक्ष) उत्तरपाद (same as उत्तरपक्ष), क्रियापद and साध्यसिद्धिपाद. (*Sm. ch.* p. 27 and Mit. on *Yāj.* II. 8).

2. *Kau.* III. 19.

3. साहसस्तेयपारुष्यगोऽभिशापात्यये स्त्रियाम् । विवादयेत् सद्य एव कालोऽन्यवेच्छया स्मृतः । II. 12.

4. सद्यः कृतेषु कार्य्येषु सद्य एव विवादयेत् । कालातीतेषु वा कालं दद्यात् प्रत्यर्थिने प्रभुः ॥ *Sm. ch.* p. 94 ; and again सद्यः कृते सद्य एव etc. p. 95.

5. A Javanese Jayapatra, *Calcutta Weekly Notes*, Vol. XXV. No. 32.

should not be lost sight of. It undoubtedly serves as an evidence of the great antiquity of Indian *jayapatras*.

The Mitākṣarā mentions another kind of document *hīnapatra* by name. We know from a text of Kātyāyana that contradiction, hostile attitude towards the witnesses and the judges, non-appearance, silence and abscondence after being summoned—these are five of the causes of non-suit.[1] We know further from some legal texts that the party non-suited, though he will not forfeit his claim to the subject matter of the suit, is liable to be punished.[2] Now in order to punish him on some future occasion a judgment of non-suit is to be put on record[3] and such a record is called *hīnapatra* by the Mitākṣarā perhaps in contradistinction to *jayapatra*.

From a text of Bṛhaspati and the interpretation put on it by Devaṇabhaṭṭa it appears that a record of defeat was sometimes awarded to the defeated party and it was also named *jayapatra*.[4] Asahāya more appropriately calls it *parājayapatra*.[5]

We cannot conclude this topic without a further reference to the judgment of a Hindu Court which is contained in a *jayapatra* edited by Mr. K. P. Jayaswal.[6] This judgment besides showing how a *jayapatra* was generally written, what were to be its contents and how they were to be arranged amply illustrates the rules of judicial procedure as obtained in ancient India. It shows also, Mr. Jayaswal points out, 'how stiff, severe

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1. अन्यवादी क्रियाद्वेषी नोपस्थाता निरुत्तरः। आहूतप्रपलायीच हीनः पञ्चविधः स्मृतः। इति तत्र नजयपत्रकमस्ति, अपि तु हीनपत्रकमेव। *Mit.* on II. 91.

क्रियाद्वेषी is explained thus : सभ्याश्च साक्षिणश्चैव क्रिया ज्ञेया मनीषिभिः। तां क्रियां द्वेष्टि यीमीहात् क्रियाद्वेषी स उच्यते॥

2. *Yāj.* II. 16 ; अन्यवादी पणाः पञ्च क्रियाद्वेषी पणा दश। नोपस्थाता दशद्वौच षोड़शैव निरुत्तरः। आहूत प्रपलायी च पणान् दाप्यस्तु विंशतिं॥ Vivādataṇḍava (manuscript). शास्त्रीऽप्यर्थान्नहीयते। *Mit.* on II. 91, हीनवादी दण्ड्योभवति न प्रकृतादर्थाद्धीयते। *Mit.* on II. 91.

3. तत्र कालान्तरे दण्डप्राप्त्यर्थम् *Mit* on II. 91.

4. अन्यवाद्यादि हीनेभ्य इतरेषां प्रदीयते। उक्तानुवाद रूपिद्धं तत्र स्याज्जयपत्रकम्॥ इतरेषां हीनवादिनामित्यर्थः।

5. वादिप्रतिवादिनोः सभ्यैरेकवाक्यतयोच्चरित जयपराजयपत्रप्रकटीकृतनिर्णयम्। The extant Sanskrit text reads मात्र for पत्र, but Prof. Julius Jolly seems to prefer the reading पत्र. S.B.E. Vol. XXXIII. 65.

6. *C. W. Notes*, Vol. XXIV, No. 38.

and dignified, technical, methodical and scrupulously formal a Hindu judgment used to be' and 'how the provisions of Hindu law were applied in actual administration of law.' Another remark of Mr. Jayaswal made in a separate and illuminating article[1] on this judgment will bear repetition : "the procedure followed in Hindu courts in respect of civil trials was as precise as is observed to day in any modern court of law in any part of the civilized world. We are apt to regard the present system of laws and its administration as a recent revelation to the new world. But the remnants of the laws and literature that have survived foreign invasions in India are progressively convincing us every day that the political and legal institutions of ancient India could by no means compare unfavourably with those that have replaced them in modern times.' The matter under the judgment is an original suit brought by one Tularam Sarman jointly with his co-sharers against Maninath Sarman for getting possession over a domestic slave girl. The defendant wins the case and the *jayapatra* is given to him. In it are first mentioned the names of the parties in full. Then it records the gist of the plaint and the nature of the answer given to it by the defendant. Then follow the deliberations as to on which party the burden of proof should lie. As the defendant submits a *mithyottara* it is ruled that the plaintiff is to be put on proof. Issues are next settled and adjournments dealt with.[2] The plaintiff's proposal to call in a single witness is disallowed on the authority of Dharmaśāstras. Then the defendant prays for permission to resort to the proof of ordeal and this also is not granted on the authority of legal treatises. After all these the plaintiff is declared to have lost his case. A very important point of law regarding the proof of possession which we shall have occasion to refer to is also discussed. All these things are put in the *jayapatra* one after another. It is in the handwriting of and signed by the chief judge (*prāḍvivāka*) and addressed to other judges who form the tribunal. They also sign it and declare their 'concurrence herein' *(sammatiratra)*. The *jayapatra* is full of references to the precepts of celebrated sages, learned disquisitions and subtle arguments on many principles of Hindu law and everything done in it is in strict accordance with the directions of the Hindu law texts.

1. *Calcutta Weekly Notes*, Vol XXIV. No 37.

2. Here the plaintiff makes default and is non-suited; but he does not lose his claim to the subject matter of the suit. Proceedings therefore are in retrial. This is in accordance with the ruling of the Mitākṣarā.

Another *jayapatra* deserves mention in this connection. It it not in Sanskrit but in ancient Javanese. It formed the subject matter of a Dutch paper by Dr. Brandes, the substance of which is given by Prof. Jülius Jolly in an interesting article in an issue of the *Calcutta Weekly Notes*.[1] A special importance attaches to this Javanese *jayapatra* mainly for the reason that the rules of Javanese law books, as pointed out by Dr. Brandes tend to corroborate the close relationship of Javanese law with the Dharma-śāstras of India. 'Thus the four parts of a judicial proceeding in Javanese law, viz, the plaint, declaration. pleadings and judgment are very similar to, if not identical with, the four parts of an Indian trial, viz, plaint, answer, examination and judgment. The rule that making default in the court causes loss of one's suit may be traced to the maxim of Nārada (1.2.32) that he who takes to flight after receiving the summons shall lose his suit. The rule regarding the *jayapatra* or document of success, which the successful party (or both parties) is to receive from the Court, whenever the sentence has been pronounced in accordance with the law book, agrees with the ruling of the *smṛtis*, E.g. where Vṛddha Vaśiṣṭha states that the successful plaintiff after having proved his cause, shall be given a *jayapatra*, and where Bṛhaspati ordains (VI.3), that the whole transanctions in a suit shall be recorded in the document stating the success (of the claimant or defendant).'

1. Vol XXV, No. 32.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF
A FEW JAIN ARDHAMĀGADHI TEXTS
WITH THE TEXTS OF THE BUDDHIST PALI CANON.

[PROF. P. V. BAPAT M. A.]

Similarity in the main incidents of the lives of Mahavīra and Gautama Buddha.

A study of the life-accounts of the two great founders of the religious sects of the Jains and the Buddhists reveals several interesting similarities. Their births in the kṣatriya families, their childhood spent in great luxury, their disgust with worldly pleasures, their wandering in search of the way to salvation, their self-mortification, their attainment of omniscience, their life-pursuits as wandering preachers and their final Parinirvāṇa, offer striking similarities. In certain cases this similarity is even extended to the several minute details of their lives. Mahāvīra's conception, birth, renunciation, enlightenment and death on one and the same Nakṣatra (the Hatthuttarā Nakṣatta), have their counterparts in Gotama Buddha's birth, Bodhi (enlightenment) and Parinirvāṇa on one and the same day—the full-moon day of Vaiśākha.[1] Miracles are said to have taken place at the birth of both of them. A god or gods try to persuade both of them to preach the doctrine to the people. In the case of both of them we find that Sakka accepts their hair, when it is cut off by them.[2] Mahāvīra's exclamation incorporating his firm determination to abstain from sins (Sabbaṃ me aparṇijjaṃ pāpaṃ) may be fully compared with Gotama Buddha's famous tenet, 'Sabba pāpassa akaraṇam' [Dhp. 183].

When thus we find such striking similarities even in the lives of the founders of these two religious sects, it is no wonder if we find these similarities carried on extensively

1. Āyā. II. 24. 20. M. N. 26.11.

2. Āyā. II. 24. 20. cf. Jātakaṭṭhakathā (Nidānakathā) ed. by Prof. Kosambi, Sect. 104.

in their teachings, or the religious practices introduced by them, the rules of guidance prescribed by them for the monks and nuns, their attitude towards women, the importance attached by them to qualities like self-control, self-contentment etc., their disregard for magic charms and incantations, their scruples for the preservation of life, their preference of internal purity to the external one, their attitude towards the doctrines of contemporary philosophers or religious sects, and their ideas of the final state of deliverance. What is more is that we find the similarities not only in thought but even in words and expressions that are used to convey those thoughts. There are hundreds of phrases and expressions which are common to both the Jain and Buddhist texts.

Let us turn, first, to passages referring to contemporary philosophical beliefs or religious practices found in both the Jain and Buddhist texts.

References to philosophical views or religious beliefs and practices.

The views of contemporary philosophers like Pūraṇa Kassapa,[3] Mopphali Gosāla,[4] Ajita Kesa Kambali[5] and Pakudha Kaccāyana[6] are found in almost similar words in the passages referred to below in the footnotes. Among the disputatious philosophers prominently mentioned are the Kriyāvādis, Akriyāvādis, Agnānavādis, and Vainayikavādis in the Jain books.[7] In the Mahāvagga (vi. 31) also, we find three of these mentioned, where Gotama explains away the several names of philosophical heretics which may be used with reference to himself and which may be partly justified.

Reference to Cātuyāma Saṃvara is also found in both the Jain and Buddhist texts, though the Buddhist books sometimes give a wrong interpretation to that term (cf. Dīgha I. 2. 7. I. 2. 29; M. N. 56th sutta). The explanation given of the same term in Dīgha vol. III, 25th sutta, however,

3 Sūya. II. 1. 10th sutra; cf. Dīgha. 2. 17.

4. Uttā 166. "Naṭṭhi uṭṭhāṇe.....niyayā savva bhāvā." cf. Dīgha 2. 20. Natthi Attakāre.....pariṇatā".

5. Sūya. I. 1. 1. 11-12; cf. Dīgha 2. 23.

6. Sūya II. 1. 10th sutra. cf. Dīgha 2. 26.

7. Sūya I. 6. 27; I. 12. 1.

mainly agrees with the Jain idea of the four vows of Pārsva, the predecessor of Mahāvīra. The Jain doctrine of Leśyas resembles, curiously enough, the sixfold classification of mankind referred to in Buddhist books.[8] The asectic practices like those of abstaining from food specially prepared for them or of taking food only once in too, three, four, eight or thirty days, are met with in both kinds of texts.[9] The practice of Uposatha on the 8th day or the last day of a fortnight is common to both the Jains and Buddhists. Some special vows (in addition to the usual ones) are to be observed on that day, which is to be spent as a holy day, both by the monks and the laity. Both the Jains and Buddhists classify their community into four main divisions —Bhikṣus, Bhikṣunis, Upāsakas and Upāsikās. Corresponding to the Jain theory of 24 Tīrthankaras, we find among the Buddhists also a theory of 24 (or according to another version, 27) predecessors of the historical figure of Gotama Buddha[10].

The argument about the inefficacy of baths is often tendered in both the Jaina and Buddhist texts. If purity lay in baths, then the worst criminals or sinners would be sure of reaching the state of absolution or deliverance by diving into water morning and evening. Following the same strain of argument it is further said, that if deliverance consisted in such baths, then even water-creatures like fishes, tortoises, serpents or crocodiles would attain that final state of bliss.[11]

Just as we find references to the Jain views or Jain practices in Buddhist books, so also we find references in

8 Ang. vol. III. p. 383 (P.T.S.) ; also in the comm. on the Dīgha, 2nd Sutta ;

9. Sūya. I. 9 14 ; I. 11.14 ; II. 6.40 ; also I. 2.9 ; cf. Dhp. 70.

10. Jāt. p. 56.

11. Sūya I. 7.13-17 ; cf. Passage quoted by Prof. Kosambi in his Marathi book on बुद्ध, धर्म, संघ (the conversation of a Brahmaṇa and Puṇṇikā Bhikṣuṇī). Also cf. the Sanskrit stanzas quoted by Mr. B. Bhaṭṭācharya, M.A. in his article "Glimpses of वज्रासन", p. 141, of the *Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference*, Madras (1924).

Jain books to the Buddhist views as well as views of contemporary philosophers. A Jain text ascribes to the Buddhists the view that happiness can be obtained only by leading a life of ease and comfort:—"ihamege u bhāsanti sātaṃ sāteṇa vijjati" [Sūya I. 3. 4. 6] ; a Buddhist text also refers exactly to the same charge that was levelled against the Buddhists by the Niganṭhas—a term used in Pali texts for the Jains.—

"Na kho āvuso Gotama sukhena sukhaṃ,
Dukkhena kho sukhaṃ adhigantabbaṃ".
[M. N. 14th sutta ; Para 7.]

Mention is made in both kinds of books of several philosophers sticking to their own respective views which they proclaim from the house tops, while at the same time they condemn others who hold views different from theirs.[12] Both the extremes are to be avoided and the middle path is to be followed.[13] Attachment for what is old or new, or what is present, is to be avoided.[14] Belief in the doctrine of karma and that the merit or worth of a man depends not upon high or low birth but upon one's own actions, is strongly supported in both the texts.[15] One must keep oneself away from the doctrines of eternity or non-eternity.[16]

Miscellaneous parallel passages

There are certain miscellaneous passages where we find a good deal of similarity between the Jain and Buddhist texts; as for instance, the passage in सूय II. 1. 30th on low arts, professions which are forbidden to both the Buddhist and Jain monks, may be fitly compared with the Pali passage in the Dīgha Nikāya I. 21-27. Gandhāri vijjā referred to in the former passage is also met with in the Kevaṭṭa Sutta (Para 4) of the Dīgha. Āhavvaṇi of the Jain text corresponds to Āthabbaṇa of the Suttanipāta stanza 927, which

12. Sūya. II. 6.11.12 ; cf. S. N. 824, 825, 879, 882, 904.

13 "Ubho ante anupagamma majjhimā Paṭipadā Tathāgatena abhisambuddhā" ; cf. Sūya. II. 1.14th sutra.

14. Āyā I. 4.4.6, Sūya II. 6.19 ; cf. Dhp. 348,421, S. N. 645, 944, 949, 1042, 1099.

15. Utta. XXV. 32 cf. S. N. 136, 650, 651.

16. Sūya. II. 5.2. II. 5.4. cf. Buddhist aversion for Sassata & Ucchedā diṭṭhi.

moreover contains some other low arts like those of interpreting dreams or cries of birds, or close proximity of certain stars or practice of medical science for gaining one's livelihood. The cattāri bīyakāyā of Sūya II. 3. 43rd Sutta (Agga bīyā, Mālabīyā, Porabīya and Khandhabīyā) together with the bījabījā which the commentator ascribes to Nāgārjuniyas, correspond to the five mentioned in Dīgha I. 1. 11 (Mojjhima Sīla). So also the passage Sūya II. 1. 9th sutra : "Ādāhaṇāe parehiṃ nijjai,.....paccāgacchanti" closely resembles that in Dīgha 2-23. "Āsandipañcamā purisā.....bhavuti." Also compare Sūya. II. 1. 9th sutra : "Uḍḍhaṃ pādatalā ahekesagga matthayā tiriyaṃ tayapariyante jīve" with M. N. 10th Sutta, para 6, "imameva kāyaṃ uḍḍhaṃ pādatalā adho kesamatthakā tacaparīyantaṃ pūraṃ."

Generalisations on universal truths

There are certain generalisations or universal truths found to be common in both the Jaina and Buddhist books and in not a few cases the ideas are expressed in similar words. "Dullabhe'yamṃ Samussae" [Sūya I. 15. 17], "Māṇussaṃ khu sudullahaṃ" [Utta. XXX. 11] may be compared with "kiccho manussa paṭilabho" [Dhp. 182]. Telling a lie even in joke is forbidden.[17] Similarly the idea that one's own relatives or possessions can afford no perfect security or cannot save us from the inevitable is common to both the Jain and Buddhist texts;[18] so also the ideas that one is the maker or master of oneself and that therefore one need not depend upon others, or that one's own self is difficult to be controlled,[19] and that if one's own self is not properly restrained it would do us more harm than what an enemy can do.[20] The company of fools is always to be avoided and that if one does not secure, as a friend, any

17. Sūya I. 14.21, I. 14.19. cf. the famous Buddhist sentence "Hassāpi musā na bhaṇissāmîti evaṃ hi te Rāhula Sikkhitabbaṃ" in the Rāhulovādasutta (M. N. 61th sutta).

18. Sūya I. 1.5, I. 9.7, I. 2.3.16 ; cf. Dhp. 62, 288.

19. Āyā I. 3.3.9, Utta. XX. 12, XX. 37 ; cf. Dhp. 160, 380, Utta I. 15, cf. Dhp. 159.

20. Utta. XX. 48 ; cf. Dhp. 42.

person superior to or at least equal to oneself, it is better to remain alone.[21] Knowing that life is dear to all and comparing oneself with others, one should abstain from doing harm to any animal or living being, and should cultivate friendly feelings for all animals in all directions.[22] Self-control is highly extolled in both kinds of texts.[23] A man practising self-mortification, such as taking food only once a month, is not worth even the sixteenth part of him if he has not understood the law.[24] No person is liable to be free from death.[25]

The picture of a monk.

The picture of a Jaina monk portrayed in Jain texts closely agrees with that of a Buddhist monk described in Buddhist books. Leaving behind all his relatives and possessions, a monk is to stay in forests away from the inhabited areas[26]. He should be calm and quiet, bearing all the inclemencies of heat or cold, or the bites of gnats and mosquitoes and should overcome all delight or disgust[27]. He should cultivate forbearance, should not retaliate even when he is abused or struck by others[28]. He should keep away his rod and should have none to oppose.[29] He may go to towns and villages for merely securing food and while going he should be perfectly restrained with his eyes down-cast and looking only a few yards ahead[30]. When he goes to inhabited areas, he has to accept food, good or bad, whatever comes to his lot[31], avoiding at the same time that which is specially prepared for him[32]. He should be moderate in his food[33]

his behaviour

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21. Āyā I. 3. 2. 3, Utta. XXV. 5 ; cf. Dhp. 62, 330, S. N. 47.

22. Āyā I. 2. 3. 8 ; cf. Dhp. 130 cf. Āyā I. 2 3 12. I. 9. 3 7. (5), cf. Sūya II. 6. 41, I. 13 23 ; Utta VIII. 10 cf. Dhp. 142, 405. Sūya I. 14. 14 cf. S N 149

23. Utta. IX. 34 cf. Dhp. 103 ; 24. Utta. IX. 44 cf. Dhp 70.

25. Āya. I. 2. 3. 8, I. 4. 1. 4. cf. S. N. 576, 578.

26. Āyā I. 2. 6. 7 ; I, 5, 3, 15, I. 9, 3, 2. cf. Utta XV. 4. S N. 72, 338, 960, 969.

27. Āyā I. 13. 18, I 2, 6. 6 cf. Utta. XXI. 21. Ang. IV. 1. 3rd vagga. S. N. 964, 966, 969. M. N. 2nd sutta, para 6.

28. Utta. II. 24.27 cf. Dhp. 389, S. N. 932, 971.

29. Āyā I. 9. 3. 7. (5), I. 3. 3.19, Sūya I. 13. 23, II. 6.41. cf. Dhp. 142, 405 405, S.N. 365. 30. Āyā II, 12. 1. 6 cf. S. N. 922, 927.

31. Āyā II. 10. 9. 4 cf. S. N. 366. 32. Sūya. I. 9-14, I. 11. 14, II. 6. 40.

33. Āyā I. 2. 5. 7, Sūya I. 8. 25 cf, Dhp. 185. Ud. IV. 6.

and should not accept delicious food unless absolutely necessary on account of sickness[34]. He should not manifest any signs of pleasure or displeasure whether he gets food or not[35]. **his food**

As for the clothes, a Jain monk appears to have been allowed the use of cloth, if he thinks that he cannot overcome the sense of shame of wandering naked just as a Buddhist monk is allowed the three *Civaras*[36]. He cannot, however, accept high or costly pieces of cloth. They must be of rough, coarse cloth.[37] Even the names used for these pieces are similar—Antarijjagaṃ, cf. Pāli Antarāvāsakaṃ, Uttarijjagaṃ, cf. Uttarāsangaṃ. Saṃghāḍi, cf. Saṃghāṭi. **his clothes**

He should not keep any store of food, clothes or other things that he uses. He should take with him, as a Buddhist monk is asked to do, all his clothes when he goes on his begging round, like a bird flitting in the air with all its wings[38]. He does not engage himself in any worldly trades, nor does he earn his livelihood by prescribing medicines or by interpreting signs, prognostications or dreams or by telling prophecies.[39] **His abstinence from (i) low arts**

He abstains from attending all kinds of shows such as dances, or theatrical performances appealing to the vulgar tastes or from listening to all kinds of music—vocal or instrumental.[40] He should not adorn himself with any kinds of ornaments or fine clothes. He should, in fact, care little for external appearance including even cleanliness. This tendency on the part of the Jains has led them, rather to an extremity—that is, to the aversion of all kinds of baths, or even washing of the teeth or mouth.[41] Abstaining **(ii) music & shows** **(iii) baths**

34. Āyā II. 10. 10. cf. Pāci. 39.

35. Āyā I. 2. 4. 13, I. 2. 5. 8, Utta. II. 30 cf. S. N. 712.

36. Āyā I. 8. 7. 1 ; also comp, "Je Bhikkhū tivatthehiṃ parivusite pāyasatutthehiṃ tassa ṇaṃ ṇo evaṃ bhavati, cauttharṃ vatthaṃ jāissāmi. 37. Āyā II. 14. 1. 6, 14 1. 8 cf. Mahā. I Sec. on four Nissayas.

38 Āyā II. 14. 2. 2, Utt. VI. 16, cf. S. N. 924 ; Dīgha 2.66—"Seyyathā pi, mahārāja pakkhi sapuno.....Samādayeva pakkamati."

39. Āyā I. 2. 5. 4, 13. 2. 14 ; Utta, II. 33, VIII. 13, XV. 7, XX, 45 ; Sūya I. 12, 9-10 I. 14. 19 ; cf. Niss 20 ; S. N. 360, 927, 929 ; Dīgha I. 23-25. (Sec. on 'mahasīla'.)

40. Āyā II. 20.14 cf. naccagīta vādita ssanā veramaṇī.

from baths is considered as essential as abstaining from the company of women: "Virate siṇāṇāisu itthiyāsu (Sūya I. 7. 22.)." This extreme tendency of the Jains could not but have an effect even upon the practical Buddhists.

His observation of the rules of moral conduct.

There is a rule laid down for the Buddhist monks that it would be an offence, to be dealt with according to law, to take a bath in less than a fortnight except on occasions specially mentioned.[42] He should care more for the internal purity to be attained by observing rules of moral conduct. He abstains from murder, theft, falsehood and incontinence. These four rules of the Buddhist Pañcasīlas exactly correspond to the four of the pañcamahavvayāiṃ of the Jains.

His regard for the sanctity of life.

The scrupulous care observed by the Jains for the sanctity and preservation of life could not but have an effect upon the Buddhists. Here also the Jains went to an extremity while the Buddhists were guided by the practicability of the problem in fixing certain limitations. The Jains, for instance, abstain from the use of all cold water, while the practical Buddhists were content with the rule of avoiding the use of water when it is full of insects. "Yo pana bhikkhu jānaṃ sappāṇakaṃ udakaṃ paribhuñjeyya, Pācittiyaṃ (Pāci. 62). Even if the remains of food are to be thrown away, the Buddhist takes care to see that he throws them on the ground where there is little grass, or in water where there are few insects (appaharite vā appāṇake udake). The origin of Vassāvāsa (staying together in one place for the rainy season) is traced in both kinds of texts—Jain and Buddhist—to the same scrupulousness for the sanctity of life.[43] The Buddhist monk is forbidden to kill any animal for maintaining oneself,[44] nor is he allowed to take flesh which he knows,[45] hears or suspects to have been specially

41. Āyā I. 9 4. 2. (1); Utta. II. 9, Sūya II. 1. 15; II. 4. 67th sutra.
42. Pāc. rule 57. "Yo pana bhikkhu orenaddhamāsaṃ nahayeyya aññatra samayā pācittiyaṃ."
43. Āyā II. 12 1. 1. cf. Mahā III. 3. 1.
44. Mahā VI. 31. "Na ca mayaṃ jīvitahetu pi sañcicca pāṇaṃ jivitaṃ voropeyyāma."
45. Mahā VI. 31. "Na bhikkhave jānam uddissakaṭaṃ maṃsaṃ paribhuñjitabbaṃ."

prepared for himself. It must be 'tikoṭiparisuddham'. The same regard for the sanctity of life is responsible for the rules prohibiting the Buddhist monk from digging the earth or cutting trees and other vegetation.[46]

His abstinence from theft, falsehood

Abstaining from theft and falsehood is equally insisted upon.[47] Telling a lie is not allowed even in joke.[48] This commission of sin is represented in both kinds of texts as threefold—*i.e.* when one oneself does it, or causes others to do it, or when one gives consent to it when it is done by others.[49]

and the company of women.

Buddhism and Jainism being both of predominantly ascetic tendencies, we cannot expect them to be allowing the monks to move freely in the society of women. On the contrary, we see that both kinds of texts advise them to avoid their company and keep themselves away from their talk, laughter and music. They should not even gaze at them [No lāsu cakkhu samdhejjā (Sūya I. 4. 1. 5)]. This exactly corresponds to the advice Gotama gave, just before his Parinibbāṇa, to his favourite disciple, Ānanda, who asked for his Master's advice, as to how the Bhikkhus should behave towards women.[50] We cannot expect from these sects a very charitable view of womankind. Women are considered as obstacles in the progress of men towards the final state of deliverance and though they are difficult to be got rid of, all the same they deserve to be cast aside as mire and dirt.[51] A Bhikṣu as it were falls down from his holy life of celibacy, even if he listens to the talk, laughter or singing of women, sitting on the other side of a wall, partition or a curtain, or even when he remembers his past dalliance with them.[52]

He not only abstains from committing moral sins but

46. Pāci 10 and 11. 47. Āyā. II. 16. 1. 1; Sūya I. 3. 4. 19.
48. Sūya I. 14. 21, I. 14. 19. cf. 17 foot-note above.
49. Āyā II. 24. 40-42, I. 10. 22 cf. S. N. 394, 395, 397.
50. Dīgha II. 16. 5. 9.
51. Utta. II. 16-17, Āyā. I. 5.4.5. Sūya I. 3. 4. 16, I. 4. 1. 13, I. 7. 22.
52. Utta. XVI. 8. Āyā II. 24. 43; Ang. VII. 5th, vagg, Sinh ed. p. 651-52, also cf. V. M. I. p. 38-39 (Sinh. ed.)

His indifference to worldly honour or respect.

is also far from having any hankering after honour and respect.[53] He never allows the peace of his mind to be disturbed by profit or loss, pain or pleasure, praise or censure, fame or no fame.[54] Thus leaving behind all worldly things, he cultivates meditation in a place of retirement in the forest, without allowing himself to be cowed down by any fears, real or imaginary.[55] He is free from all ties. He has feelings of equanimity for all. He cares not either for life or death.[56] He cuts his Saṃsāra and is on the path towards the final state of deliverance.[57] When he has attained this final state of deliverance, he is above all description. No words are adequate to describe him. "Sabbe sarā ṇiyaṭṭanti takkā jattha ṇa vijjati,

Mati tattha ṇa gāhitā oe appatiṭṭhāṇassa kheyaṇṇe.[58]"

His ineffable state when he attains the final state of deliverance

We have seen so far from the detailed parallelisms given above, how the subject-matter in both the Jain Ardhamāgadhi and Buddhist Pali texts is found to be similar in many respects. Now let us turn to the other aspect of the question—I mean, the form of presentation or the manner of expression.

Parallel similes, metaphors or illustrations.

We find that there are many similes, metaphors or illustrations which are common in both the Jain and Buddhist texts. As for instance, the simile of a mountain not being shaken by the wind,[59] that of wind not meeting with any resistence from a net,[60] that of a lake with a clean and transparent water,[61] that of a big boar being fed on food,[62] that of a Māluvā creeper entangling itself with all the

53. Utta. XV. 5 ; Sūya I. 2. 2. 16. I. 9. 21 ; cf. Dhp. 73—74.

54. Utta. XIX. 90 ; cf. Dhp. 81 ; Ud. III. 3. Dhp. 83.

55. Sūya. I. 2. 2. 15-17 ; S. N. 810 ; M.N. 4th Sutta (para 3.) Devnāgari edition.

56. Sūya. I. 10. 24 ; I. 11.22.

57. Utta. XXIX. 4.

58. With this stanza from Āyā. cf. S. N. 1074, 1076. Ud. VIII. 10.

59. Utta. XXI. 19, Sūya I. II. 23, Āyā II. 2. 5. 3. cf. Dhp. 81, Ud. II. 3-4.

60. Sūyā I. 15. 8. cf. S. N. 71, 213. 61. Ayā I, 5. 5. 1, Sūya I. 2. 2. 17, cf. Dhp. 82.

62. Sūya I. 7. 25 cf. Dhp. 325.

branches of a tree,[63] that of the Moon being the chief of all the constellations of stars,[64] that of a serpent casting off its slough,[65] that of a cowherd who does not become the master of the cows he is in charge of, by simply counting them,[66] that of a mirage, or foam or bubbles in water with which the physical body is compared,[67] that of the bright sun in the sky.[68] The cutting of attachment is compared to the cutting off of a lotus growing in the S'arat season.[69] The muni or the Brāhmaṇa not attached to any worldly things is compared to drops of water on a leaf or a lotus.[70] The similes of fire[71] covered with ashes, or a strong elephant sixty years old,[72] or a gambler and his die[73] are also met with. The illustrations of a carpenter cutting off his wood for the wheel of his carriage,[74] of a hero or an elephant standing at the brunt of the battle,[75] or of muñja and isikā, or asi and kosi[76] are also to be found. The simile of 'as firm as an island' also often occurs.[77]

This similarity is further extended to many phrases and expressions and in not a few cases also to words—

Parallel phrases and expressions.

Veyaranīṃ'bhiduggāṃ [Sūya I. 5. 1. 8] Cf. Atha Vetaraṇim panaduggaṃ [S. N. 674]

Vippariyāsamuventi [Āyā I. 2. 6. 3] Cf. Vipariyāsamenti.

Jassa natthi mamāyitaṃ [Āyā I. 2. 6. 4] Cf. Yassa natthi mamāyitaṃ [S. N. 950]

63. Sūya, I. 3. 2. 10 cf. Dhp. 162, S. N. 272.
64. Sūya I. 6. 19, Utta. XXV. 6 cf. S. N. 569.
65. Āyā. II. 25.....(?) cf. Magasutta in S. N.
66. Utta. XXII. 45 cf. Dhp. 20.
67. Utta. XIX. 13. cf. Dhp. 46, 170.
68. Utta. XXI. 23 cf. Ud. I. 3.
69. Utta. X. 28 cf. Dhp. 285.
70. Utta. XXV. 26. cf. Dhp. 401, S. N. 71, 213. 811, 812.
71. Utta. XXV 18. cf. Dhp. 71.
72. Utta. XI. 18 cf. M. N. 35th sutta, para 3.
73. Utta. V. 16. cf. Dhp. 252.
74. Sūya I. 4. 1. 9 cf. M. N. 5th sutta, para 8.
75. Āyā I. 9. 3. 8. I. 9. 3. 13, II. 25. 2 cf. Dhp. 320, M. N. 61st sutta.
76. Sūya II. 1.9th sutra cf. Dīgha 2.86.
77. Āyā I. 6.5.5 cf. Dhp. 25, 236, 238.

Ukkuñchaṇa-vañcaṇa-māyā-ṇiyaḍi-kūḍa-kavaḍa-sāi-sampayoga bahutā [Sūya II. 2. 29th sutra]

Cf. Ukkotana-vañcana-nikati-sāciyoga.....[Dīgha I. 1. 10]

Esa dhamme dhuve ṇiie sāsae [Sūya II. 4. 64] Cf. Esa dhammo dhuvo nicco sassatisamo.

Puvvuṭṭhaī pacchāṇivātī. [Āyā I. 5. 23] Pubbuṭṭhāî pacchānipātî.

Iccattham gaḍhie loe [Āyā I. 5. 23] Ettha gattito loko.

Uḍḍham ahe tiriyaṃ disāsu [Āyā I. 8. 18] Cf. Uddhaṃ adho ca tiriyaṃ ca [S. N. 155]

Āhārovacaiyā dehā [Āyā I. 8. 3. 5], sarīragaṃ āhārovaiyaṃ, Cf. Āhāropacito deho.

Ahuṇā pabbajito [Āyā I. 9. 1. 1] Cf. Acirappabbajito.

Māyaṇṇe asaṇapāṇassa [Āyā I. 9. 1. 20.] Cf. Mattaññū hohi bhojane.

Kivaṇavaṇīmage [Āyā II. 10. 2. 1] Cf. kapaṇaddhikānaṃ vanīpakānaṃ.

Gāme vā adu vā raṇṇe [Āyā I. 8. 8. 7] Cf. Gāme vā yadi vā'raṇṇe [S. N. 119].

Uccārapāsavanaṃ [Sūya II. 2. 29] Cf. Uccāra passāva.

Nāidūramaṇāsanne Cf. Nātidure nāccāsanne.

Jahāvāī tathākārī Cf. Yathāvadī tathākārī.

Asaṃsatto gihatthehi Cf. Asaṃsaṭṭho gahaṭṭhehi.

Kā arati ke āṇande [Āyā I. 3. 3. 8] Cf. Ko nu hāso kimānando [Dhp. 146]

Aicchantaṃ [Utt. XIX. 5] Cf. Aticchatha bhante.

Ārattaṃ virattaṃ maṇikuṇḍalaṃ saha hiraṇṇeṇa itthiyāo parigijjha tattheva rattā [Āyā I. 2. 3. 5]

Cf. Ārattarattā maṇikuṇḍalesu puttesu dāresu ca yā apekkhā [Dhp. 345]

Diṭṭham suyaṃ mayaṃ vinnāyam [Āyā I. 4.14]

Cf. Diṭṭha-suta-muta-viññātesu. [S. N. 1086]

Adiṭṭhānaṃ asuyāṇaṃ amuñaṇaṃ [Sūya II. 7.81st sutra]

Adiṭṭhaṃ asutaṃ mutaṃ aviññātam [S. N. 1122].

Aṇiṭṭhe akante appie asubhe amaṇunne amaṇāme dukkhe ṇo suhe [Sūya II. 1, 13th sutra] may be compared and contrasted with Pāli iṭṭha kantā manāpā piyarūpā kāmūpasamhitā rajanīyā. [M. N. 13th Sutta, para 4.]

Similar words

Here is a list of some of the words which have close affinity in form and meaning :—

Sayaṇāsaṇa Cf. P. Senāsasana, Lūha Cf. P. Lukha, Seha, Cf. Sekha, vusīmao Cf. vusīmato, ṇīwāra Cf. niwāpa, macciya Cf. maccā, mātiyā, bhūipaṇṇe Cf. bhūripañño, Savvarātiṇiya, rātiṇie, apārātiṇiya Cf. rattaññū, uccāvayāṇi Cf. uccāvacā, ehii Cf. ehiti, vigayagehī Cf. vigatagiddho, āraṃpāraṃ Cf. orapāraṃ, tumaṃtumaṃ Cf. tuvam tuvaṃ, vihūṇayaṃ Cf. vidhūpanam, uddesiyam, uddissā ya jaṃ kaḍaṃ Cf. uddissa kaṭaṃ, parīsahā Cf. parissayā, Lecchaī Cf. Licchavī ; Uggaputte Cf. Uggā (rājaputtā) ; paḍihaṇavaṃ Cf. paṭibhānawā ; virūvarūve Cf. virūparūpāni, āyāragoyar Cf. ācāragocara, veyāvadiya or veāvacca Cf. veyyāvacca, Saṃghāḍio Cf. Saṃghātiyo, ahāsaṃ-thaḍameva (Saṃthāragaṃ) Cf. Yathāsanthatikangaṃ (dhutangaṃ), dhamaṇisantae Cf. dhamaṇisanthato, māyaṇṇe Cf. mattaññū, ukkuduo Cf. ukkuṭiko, appakukkue Cf. (appa) kukkucco, milakkhuā Cf. milakkhukā, dhorejjasīlā Cf. dhorayhasīlā, acchahiṃ Cf. acchanti, Saṃlcha Cf. Sallekhā, Samussae Cf. Samussayo, vāsāvāsa Cf. vassāvāsa, nivvāṇam Cf. nibbāṇam, bubbua Cf. bubbulaka, Cāujjāmo (dhammo) Cf. Cātuyāma (Saṃvaro,) pinnāga Cf. piññāka, Saraṇaṃ (in the sense of recollection) Saritāni, Kahāvaṇa Cf. Kahāpaṇa Āhavvaṇim Cf. Āthabbaṇam, paṇḍaga, Cf. paṇḍaka, addhāṇaṃ, Siṇāyaga Cf. Sināṭaka, Sirīsavā Cf. Sarisapā.

There are certain other words which are both identical in form and meaning : bondī, āmagandho, Kali, maha (in the sense of festival), Cīvara, Gandhārī (vijjā), Santhava, āsava, bherava etc.

Some of the Buddhist technical terms are also met with in Jain Ardhamāgadhi literature—Vijjā and caraṇa, aroppa, bhipphu yaṇaṃ (like hīnayāna, mahāyāna, vajjrayāna, bhadrayāna etc.)

Identical words.

Occasionally we find similarity even in the idiom of the language ; for instance, Jeṇeva Bhagavaṃ Mahāvīre teṇeva uvāgacchai [Sūya II. 7. 81] may be compared with the Pali idiom in 'Yena Bhagavā tenupasaṃkami', or in some peculiarity as the dropping of the final rasal in the genetive plural form of a substantive. We find asuāṇa eāṇa etc.

Similarity in certain peculiarities.

used for asuāṇaṃ, eāṇaṃ etc., just as we find in Pāli Buddhāna for Buddhānaṃ.

The words like 'evaṃ me sutaṃ' which generally we have to read at the beginning of a Pāli sutta have their counterpart in 'Snaṃ me ānsaṃ' of a Jain text.

The mnemonic ennumerations which are abundantly met with in Pali literature, particularly in the Anguttara nikāya and Abhidhamma Piṭaka, like three fires, four floods, five nīvaraṇas, six causes of quarrels, seven saṃbojjhangas, eight vimekkhas, ten dhammas etc., have their parallels in eight madas, nine kinds of Baṃbhagutti, ten kinds of Bhikkhudhāmmas, twenty-one sabalas, twenty-two Parisehas, twenty-five Bhāvanas etc. So also for the word 'Pe'. (Peyyālaṃ) used to avoid the full repetition of a famous passage, or a passage that has occurred in full previously, we find the word 'Jāva' used in Ardhamāgadhi Jain texts.

Thus we have seen now that there is a close similarity observed between the Jain Ardhamāgadhi and Buddhist Pāli texts, not only in the subject-matter or thought but also in the form or manner of expression.

When we see that references in Jain books to the views of contemporary philosophical heretics agree substantially with the views expressed in Buddhist Pāli books, when several generalisations or universal truths are expressed in similar words, when the rules of conduct dictated for a Jain monk, when his outward appearance, his mental and moral equipment, his indifference towards all worldly arts which may be of use to him in securing a living, his attitude towards woman, or profit and loss, his meditation and the state of his final deliverance have a strikingly close resemblance with the rules guiding the conduct of a Buddhist monk, and with the general picture that is drawn of him in Buddhist texts, and when further we see that the similes, metaphors, and illustrations, the phrases, expressions and even words used to convey those thoughts are similar and when there is agreement even in certain peculiarities of both the literatures, what conclusion can we reasonably draw from them?

Do they not show that both Pāli and Ardhamāgadhi literatures must have originally grown together side by side in a province and must have considerably acted and reacted upon each other? We know that the founders of these two sects were contemporaries, living together and doing their life-work in the same province of the so-called middle country (majjhima deśa) adopting, for the propagation of their own faiths, the same peripatetic methods of preaching their doctrines and thus trying to secure followers for their own religious systems. Under these circumstances, it would really have been a wonder if they had not exercised immense influence upon each other*.

* Prof. A. Berriedale Keith in his article "Pāli, the language of the southern Buddhists" in the Sept. 1925 issue of the *Indian Historical Quarterly* has summarised the various views regarding the origin of Pāli. Geiger (who is in general harmony with Windisch) holds that Pāli is actually a variety of Ardhamāgadhi, while Lüders merely holds that it is a western dialect—not precisely specified—into which Ardhamāgadhi works have been translated. Prof. Keith also states that the texts in Ardhamāgadhi had an immense influence on the form of the Canon of the Buddhists.

But are we really justified to say that Ardhāmāgadhi forms the basis of Pāli or that the latter is a variety of Ardhamāgadhi, or that the texts in the Ardhamāgadhi have been translated into Pāli? I believe, this is doubtful. But this is altogether a new issue which may be discussed in a separate paper.

ABBREVIATIONS

Ang—Anguttara Nikāya	Niss—Nissaggiya Pācittaya
Āyā—Āyāranga Sutta	Pāci—Pācittiya
Dhp—Dhammapada	S. N—Suttanipāta
Dīgha—Dīgha Nikāya	Sūya—Sūyagaḍanga
Jat—Jātakaṭṭhakathā (Nidānakathā)	Ud—Udāna
Mahā—Mahāvagga	Utta—Uttarajjhayaṇa
M. N.—Majjhima Nikāya	V. M.—Visuddhimagga.

The references are mostly to Devanāgari editions whenever available. In the case of Mahā, the Roman character edition and in the case of other Pāli books (not printed in Devanāgari script) Sinhalese editions have been used, unless otherwise referred to.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE SĀTAVĀHANA KINGS—

The date of Gautamîputra Śātakarṇi and his son

(DR. R. C. MAJUMDAR M.A., P.R.S., PH. D.).

The accepted view about the date of Gautamîputra Śātakarṇi and his son was expressed as follows by Mr. Rapson in his *Catalogue of the Andhra Coins* in the year 1908.

"The last recorded date of Nahapāna is Śaka 46=124 A. D., but there is no evidence to show how long he continued to reign after this date (P. xxvi)...Gautamîputra's conquest of Nahapāna seems undoubtedly to have taken place in the 18th year of his reign. We therefore have the equation :

Gautamîputra's year 18=124 A. D., or 124 A. D.+x." (p. xxvii) "Gautamîputra Śrī Śātakarṇi (last recorded year, 24=A. D. 130+x) was succeeded by his son Vāsiṣṭhīputra Śrī Puḷumāyi who is known to have reigned for at least 24 years. It is evident, then, that he must be identified with the 'Śātakarni, Lord of the Deccan,' whom Rudradāman (inscr. dated Śaka 72=A. D. 150) twice in fair fight completely defeated, but did not destroy on account of the nearness of their connection (p p. xxxvii—xxxviii)."

This view has since been challenged in some of its essential aspects by two distinguished scholars, Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar and Mr. R. D. Banerji. I propose to show in the present paper that they have failed to invalidate the conclusions put forward by Mr. Rapson.

Mr. R. D. Banerjee has tried to show in his paper on 'Nahapāna and the Śaka Era'[1] "that the dates in the inscriptions of Nahapāna's son-in-law Ushavadāta at Nasik and Karle and of his minister Ayama at Junnar, cannot be referred to the same era as that used on the inscriptions and coins of Chashṭana's dynasty" (p. 285) and "As the era used in the coins and inscriptions of Chashṭana and his line is the Śaka era of 78 A. D., therefore the era used in the records of Nahapāna's son-in-law and minister must be some earlier one." (p. 288). It would, of course, necessarily follow that the dates of Gautamîputra and Puḷumāyi will also have to be pushed back to a period considerably earlier than that suggested by Mr. Rapson.

(1) J. R. A. S. 1917 pp. 273-289.

Mr. Banerji seeks to establish his proposition by showing that the accepted views produce a variety of impossible results. I shall consider these points one by one.

(1) Mr. Banerji argues: "Suppose we agree that Nahapāna was dethroned by Gautamîputra Śātakarṇi in the year 46 of the Śaka era, which was also the eighteenth regnal year of the Andhra king. Then we find that Gautamîputra held Nasik for six years at least, and was, to some extent, the contemporary of Rudradāman. Then Gautamîputra's son Vāśishṭhīputra Puḷumāyi held Nasik in the year 6 of his reign. Between the 6th and 19th regnal years of Puḷumāyi, Rudradāman may have vanquished him once and occupied Nasik. But Nasik was regained by Puḷumāyi sometime before his nineteenth regnal year, and he was certainly in possession of it in the twenty-second year of his reign. The year 22 of the reign of Vāsiṣṭhī-putra Śrî Puḷumâyi cannot be placed earlier than Śaka 74 and that is possible only if we admit the year 24 to be the last year of Gautamîputra's reign. But according to the Girnar inscription of Rudradāman the double defeat of Puḷumāyi was accomplished before the year 73 (sic) of the Śaka era. Consequently this chronological arrangement must be regarded as faulty." (op. cit. p. 277-78)

Here Mr. Banerji has tacitly assumed that Rudradâman had twice defeated Puḷumâyi, and twice occupied Nasik before the year 73 of the Śaka era. The Girnar inscription, which is our sole authority on this point, and is dated in the year 72, merely says that Rudradâman "inspite of having twice in fair fight completely defeated Śātakarṇi, the lord of Dakshiṇāpatha, on account of the nearness of their connection did not destroy him." (*Ep. Ind.* VIII. P. 47). There is nothing to warrant the assumption that the occupation of Nasik followed the defeat of Puḷumâyi on any or both of these occasions. Indeed there is not only no evidence that Nasik was ever occupied by Rudradāman but the available evidence almost furnishes a convincing proof to the contrary. The Girnar inscription gives a long list of countries conquered by Rudradāman but the Northern Mahârâshṭra in which Nasik is situated is not included therein. Professor Rapson, therefore, quite reasonably concluded that it remained in the possession of the Andhras and was not subdued by Rudradāman (p. xxxvi). Mr. Banerji argues that "the Girnar inscription of Rudradāman clearly states that among other countries Aparânta was acquired by that prince", but "it is hardly possible to

conquer Aparânta *i. e.* Northern Konkan, before subduing Northern Mahârâshṭra *i. e.* the Nasik and Poona Districts" (p. 287). A study of the physical features of the country seems to show, however, that it is quite possible for a king of Surâshṭra to conquer Konkan without the previous conquest of the Nasik and Poona Districts. The Konkan is a long narrow plain that stretches along the Arabian Sea and gulf of Cambay, and ultimately merges into the plains of Surâshṭra. It is bounded on the east by the great chain of mountains called the Sahyâdri range, and it is on the tableland formed by these mountains that the Nasik district is situated. "The highest part of the ridge is that which immediately faces the Concan" and the mountains, "except in places rendered more practicable by the British Government, can only be ascended by narrow paths and defiles, sometimes so precipitous that a led horse can with difficulty keep his footing"[2] A king of Surāshṭra can, therefore, very easily march along the plain and make himself master of the Northern Konkan without having anything to do with the mountainous tracts above A look at the map of the Andhra countries given in Rapson's *Catalogue of Andhra Coins* will leave no doubt on the point. There is thus nothing to show that Rudradāman ever conquered Nasik and Mr. Banerji's argument therefore cannot be said to have carried great weight.

(2) Mr. Banerji argues : "The Girnār inscription of Rudradāman clearly states that he himself acquired the name of Mahākshatrapa, and that he acquired the countries mentioned in that inscription by his own prowess. As Kachcha or Cutch is one of the countries mentioned there, it must be admitted that Rudradāman had finished the work of conquering these provinces from the Andhra king before the year 130 A. D. which is the date of the Andhau Inscriptions" (op. cit. p. 286).

It is very difficult to follow the line of argument here. Girnār inscription proves that Cutch and several other countries were conquered by Rudradāman sometime before the year 72 (= 150 A. D.). The Andhau inscriptions merely show that one of these, Cutch, was in possession of Rudradāman as early as the year 52 (130 A. D.). But how does it follow that the other countries, to which not even the slightest reference is made in the Andhau Inscriptions, were also conquered at the same time? There is nothing to warrant the assumption that

(2) Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, Cambray's Edition Vol. 1 pp. 45.

all the countries mentioned in the Girnār Inscription were conquered by Rudradāman at one and the same time. He might have conquered Cutch, which was furthest from the Mahratta countries, as early as the year 52, and the other countries during the interval between that date and the year 72 in which the Girnār Inscription was composed. The conquest of Cutch does not even show that Rudradāman had already entered into a struggle with the Andhra kings for the reconquest of Kshatrapa territories, for Cutch is not included in the list of territories conquered by Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi and there is no evidence to show that he or any Andhra king did ever conquer it. For all we know, therefore, the Andhra kings might have been in possession, in the year 52, of all the territories wrested from the Kshatrapas by king Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi.

(3) Mr. Banerji holds that "It is certain that Puḷumāyi was the contemporary of Chaṣṭana ; therefore his father Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi belongs to a much earlier period than Rudradāman, the grandson of Chashṭana" (p. p. 287-288) The obvious implication is, of course, that the date of Gautamīputra Sātakarṇi must be pushed back considerably before 130 A. D. the earliest recorded date of Rudradāman.

The thing which Mr. Banerji holds as certain is, however, far from being so. I have had occasion to refer to this point in my article on "The date of Chaṣṭana" (*J. A. S. B.* 1914, p. 225) but apparently it has escaped the notice of Mr. Banerji. I find no reason to alter the views I had there expressed viz. that it does not necessarily follow that the two kings whom Ptolemy mentioned, in passing, in connection with two cities were contemporaries. The only fair deduction from Ptolemy's remark would be that both of them had ruled within the memory of the generation to which Ptolemy belonged, or from which he got his latest report about India.

Another point also suggests itself to me in this connection. The actual wording used in the Cutch inscriptions of Rudradāman are "Rājño Chāshṭanasa Ysāmotikaputrasa Rājño Rudradāmasa Jayadāmaputrasa varshe dvipaṁchāse' 50. 2. ....."[3] As has been observed by Mr. Bhandarkar and Mr. Banerji, the absence of any connecting link between the two names makes the records difficult to understand. Mr. Bhandarkar has removed the difficulty by supplying the word

(3) I adopt the final rendering of Mr. Banerji in *Ep. Ind.* Vol. xiv, p. 23.

'Pautrasa' after 'Ysāmotikaputrasa' and Mr. Banerji has accepted this emendation. It is, however, difficult to think that all the five inscriptions should commit a similar mistake. In any case an emendation is necessary only in those cases where the text as it actually stands offers no meaning at all. Here, however, the actual text properly means that in the year 52 both Chashṭana and Rudradāman ruled conjointly. Mr. Bhandarkar has himself adduced several arguments to show that Jaydāman did not succeed his father as a ruler. It may be supposed, therefore, that Jaydāman predeceased his father and the latter, when old and infirm, associated his grandson with himself in the sovereignty of the kingdom. In any case this is the plain inference to be derived from the inscriptions and there seems to be no reason for emending their texts unless it can be shown to be opposed to established facts. Now according to this view Puḷumāyi and Chaṣhṭana might be contemporaries of each other either in 130 A.D. or sometime after that.[4]

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(4) Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar has accepted this suggestion (*Ind. Ant.* 1918 p. 83, fn. 78) but Mr. R. D. Banerji has severely criticised the view (*Ep. Ind.* Vol. xvi, p. 22). He remarks that "Apart from the possibility of such an event in India, nobody ever having thought or tried to prove conjoint reigns of two monarchs except Messrs. Bhandarkar, there is sufficient evidence in the Andhau Inscriptions themselves to prove that the Author of the record was quite ignorant as to the exact relationship between Chāshṭana and Rudradāman."

As to the first point, the cases of the joint rule of Strato I and Strato II (*Cambridge History* p. 553), Azes I and Azilises, Azilises and Azes II (Ibid, p. 572) Vonones and Spalahores, Vonones and Spalagadames (Ibid p. 574) Rājendra and Rājādhirāja Chola are enough to repudiate the dogmatic views of Mr. Banerji. It may be noted in passing that in 1908 Mr. Banerji himself tried to prove the conjoint reigns of Kanishka and Huvishka (*Ind. Ant.* 1908, p. 61).

The second contention of Mr. Banerji *viz.* that the author of the inscription did not know the exact relationship between Chāshṭana and Rudradāman can hardly be taken seriously. The author of the inscription has referred to Chāshṭana as the son of Ysāmotika and Rudradāman as the son of Jayadāman; so he knew the genealogy of the family from beyond Chāshṭana's time, and yet we are to suppose that he was ignorant of the relationship between Chāshṭana and Rudradāman. And Mr. Banerji finds sufficient evidence thereof in the fact that the writer of the inscription simply used the title 'Rājan' and not 'Rājan kshatrapa' before Chāshṭana and Rudradāman. Mr. Banerji obviously forgets that such a thing is not very unusual. Apart from the commonsense view that when a ruler has more than one title, sometimes one may be omitted, one need only refer to the case of Nahapāna who is referred to as 'Rājan and kshatrapa' in his inscriptions but simply as Rājan in his coins. It is needless to discuss any further the absurd position taken up by Mr. Banerji. One is tempted to repeat what Prof. Lüders wrote about certain views of Mr. Banerji, 'Surely the pages of *Epigraphia Indica* are not meant for such disquisitions'.

It will thus appear that all the contentions of Mr. Banerji stand on extremely weak basis and as such he cannot be said to have been successful in invalidating the conclusions of Mr. Rapson.

I next turn to a consideration of the views put forward by Prof. Bhandarkar. The two important points on which this scholar differs from Mr. Rapson are briefly these.

(1) That Gautamiputra Sātakarṇi and Puḷumāyi were reigning simultaneously, the latter as viceroy in the Deccan and the former as supreme ruler, but at his old capital Dhānyakaṭa (p. 69)[5]

(2) The Sātakarṇi of the Girnār Inscription who was twice defeated by Rudradāman cannot possibly be any other than Gautamīputra Sātakarṇi.

As regards the first, Mr. R. D. Banerji, in his paper referred to above, has adduced several cogent arguments to prove that it is impossible to maintain Mr. Bhandarkas's views in this respect. (pp. 279 ff). To these I may add what I think to be the real facts about the cave no. 3 at Nasik on which Prof. Bhandarkar has based his theory. It appears that the cave was constructed either in, or sometime before, the 18th year of Gautamīputra Sātakarṇi and consecrated in the joint name of the king and his mother. This clearly follows from the inscriptions nos. 4 and 5 (Ep. Ind. VIII pp 71,73). The important portion of the inscription No. 5 is thus translated by Senart :—

"Order of the king, to be made over to Sāmaka, the officer at Govadhana. In the name of the king Sātakaṛi Gotamiputra *and of the king's queen-mother*,[6] whose son is living, Sāmaka, the officer at Govadhana..... shall be told thus : "we have here on mount Tiraṇhu formerly given to the mendicant ascetics dwelling in the cave which is a pious gift of ours, a field in the village of Kakhaḍī".

Prof. Bhandarkar remarks on this passage as follows : "what is worthy of note here is that cave no. 3 in which the inscription is engraved, is spoken of by Gautamîputra as a pious gift of his to the Buddhist mendicants". Mr. Banerji also accepts the same view when he remarks that "from another insciption on the eastern wall of the verandah we learn that the king Gautamîputra Sātkarāi claims this cave to be his

(5) *J. Bo. Br. R. A. S.* Vol. xxiii. The pages in the text refer to this article. Prof. Bhandarkar has since elaborated his views in an article in *Indian Antiquary*, 1918 p. p. 69ff.

(6) The italics are my own.

own religious gift."[7] Both these distinguished scholars thus look upon the passage as denoting that the cave was a gift of Gautamīputra alone.[8] But what is then the significance of the preamble that the royal officer was to be told so and so in the name of the king as well as that of the queen-mother. If the gift had been that of the king alone there was no necessity to introduce the name of the queen-mother. To my mind it appears quite clear from the inscription that the queen-mother had some share in the gift of the cave and this view is strengthened by the inscription no. 2 on the same cave where we are expressly told that the great queen Gotamī Balasirī, "caused the cave to be made quite equal to the divine mansions." These two statements can only be reconciled either in the way I have stated i. e. by looking upon the cave as a joint gift of the king and the queen-mother or by accepting the views of Mr. Banerji that the cave was dedicated by Gautamīputra in or before the 18th year of his reign, and subsequently after his death, his mother caused the cave to be enlarged by adding chambers, which she claimed to be her own benefaction.[9] The two views may be again reconciled by supposing that the original cave was a joint gift of the king and his mother but chambers were subsequently added to it by the mother alone.

The manner in which Prof. Bhandarkar seeks to reconcile the two is not quite clear to me. Thus he remarks : "But, as the long inscription in it informs us, the cave itself was caused to be made and dedicated

(7) op. cit. p. 282.

(8) Prof. Dr. R. Bhandarkar notes in his last article that Gautamīputra "was the donor along with his mother."

(9) Prof. Bhandarkar who has personally inspected the caves is of opinion, both from the position of the inscriptions and the engineering point of view, that it is almost impossible to believe that the different parts of the cave could have been constructed in different times. It appears, however, that the Inscriptions nos 4 and 5, which mention Gautamīputra Sātakarṇi are incised on the east wall of the veranda, while the inscriptions nos. 2 and 3 which refer to the gift of Gautamīputra's mother and son are engraved on the back wall of the veranda above the entrance *Ep. Ind.* VIII p. p. 60,65,71,73). There is nothing therefore in the position of the Inscriptions which precludes the view that the veranda was excavated during the reign of Gautamīputra and the inner chambers constructed in that of his successor. As regards the engineering point it remains to be explained by means of cogent arguments, why the simple operation of extending the cave by excavating further into the rock could not have been undertaken by the workmen of Pulumāyi. On this point see Mr. Banerji's second article in *J. R. A. S.* 1925, pp. 1 ff. which fully corroborates the above view.

to them by his mother Gautamī in the regnal year 19 of his son, Puḷumāyi. If cave no. 3, as we have thus seen, was granted in the 19th year of Puḷumāyi's reign, and if in the year 24 his father Gautamīputra speaks of it as his own pious gift, is not the conclusion irresistible that Gautamīputra was living when the cave in question was made over to the Buddhist monks i. e. in Puḷumāyi's 19th regnal year, and that the year 24 of the other inscription, although it records a donation of Gautamīputra, must be referred not to his, but to Puḷumāyi's reign ?" (op. cit. p. 71).

But even if we assume that Gautamīputra was living when the cave was made over to the Buddhist monks by his mother, how does it explain the fact that both the son and the mother claim the cave to be his or her own pious gift ?

It may be argued that if we look upon the cave as a joint gift of Gautamīputra and his mother both of them must have been living in the 19th regnal year of Puḷumāyi when the cave is said to have been caused to be made and dedicated to the Buddhist monks according to the Ins. No. 2.[10] Now this inscription records the gift of the cave to the Bhadāvanīyas and the grant of a village to the latter in the 19th year of Puḷumāyi. It also mentions that the cave was caused to be made quite equal to the divine mansions', but there is nothing to show that it was so caused in the same year. Nay, we are in a position to prove definitely that it was certainly caused to be made before the 19th year of Puḷumāyi, for we have an inscription (no. 4) on the wall of the same cave, dated in the year 18, and whether it refers to the reign of Gautamīputra or Puḷumāyi, it is certainly earlier than the 19th year of Puḷumāyi. It may be concluded, therefore, that the cave (either the whole or a part of it) was certainly excavated before the 19th year of Puḷumāyi and it was possibly consecrated in the joint name of Gautamîputra and his mother. In any case Prof. Bhandarkar's argument quoted above cannot be maintained and there remain to be dealt with only the two arguments of Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar quoted with approval by Prof. Bhandarkar. (op. cit. p. 69).

Referring to the fact that 'Gotamī' is spoken of as the mother of a king and the grandmother of a king, Dr. Bhandarkar argues that if the object of the writer was to represent Balaśrī's special claim to honour,

(10) This argument has been adduced by Prof. Bhandarkar in his last named article (p. 82).

that is better served by supposing that her son and grandson were great kings at one and the same time. Now, in the first place, there is no reason to assume that the writer of the inscription had in view any special claim to honour, far less that it was his object to represent the same, when he used the expression "the mother of a great king and the grandmother of a great king". He might have made a simple statement of facts. But can it be denied that it really was a special claim to honour that Balaśrî was mother of a great king and grandmother of a great king, though not at the same time? Almost every royal mother is of course both the one and the other but it falls to the lot of very few to see that they are such. It may very well be that the real claim to honour advanced, if at all, on behalf of Balaśrî, was, not that her son and grandson were king at the same time, but that she lived long enough to witness the glorious reigns of both. Secondly Dr. Bhandarkar argues that "If Puḷumāyi became king only after Gautamîputra" the latter must have died nineteen years before the dedication of the temple and it certainly is not what one acquainted with the manner and motive of Hindu inscription writers would expect that a king who had been dead for nineteen years should be highly extolled in the inscription and the reigning king altogether passed over in silence." It must be noticed, however, that the present case is an exceptional one, the like of which is to be hardly met with anywhere else. The inscription purports to be the sentiment of one who does not owe the same allegiance to the reigning king as an ordinary subject would, and is not therefore under a similar obligation to extol his virtues or valour. While, on the other hand, the dead king to whom no reference would ordinarily be made by any subject of his successor was her dear and beloved son, the memory of whose prowess was perhaps all that was left to console her in her old age and decrepit condition. Full nineteen summers had indeed passed by since the death of that valiant hero. But the tale of his valour and victories certainly lived in the memory of the populace no less than in the fond heart of the old mother. She was now dedicating in the holy Triraśmi mountain, the very mountain that was won back to the family by the valiant arms of her son, a cave which either wholly or in part was possibly excavated by and consecrated in the joint name of herself and her son. It was an occasion on which the memories of her son would most naturally be revived and it was a worthy place to have his career of conquest and

glories recorded in detail. And as we have said above the peculiarity of the case explains the absence of any sort of reference to the reigning king. Another explanation is afforded by a passing remark of Mr. Rapson.[11] He says that the manner in which the conquests of Gautamīputra are narrated seems to indicate that these had recently passed away from the family. So, very likely, the inscription was written soon after Rudradāman had reconquered all those territories, and when the vanquished pride would most naturally fall back upon the memory of past glories, as the only means to soothe itself.

I have thus disposed of all the arguments advanced by Prof. Bhandarkar and there remains therefore no ground for the conclusion that Gautamīputra and Puḷumāyi reigned simultaneously in different parts of the empire.[12]

I next turn to the second proposition advanced by Prof. Bhandarkar *viz.*, that the Śātakarṇi of the Girnar Inscription who was twice defeated by Rudradāman cannot possibly be any other than Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi. His argument may be stated in his own words. "It has just been shown that in 52 Rudradâman had vanquished Śātakarṇi and retaken his ancestral dominions. This Śātakarṇi must, therefore, be the one who flourished before 52" and "it was he [Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi] who was living before 52" (p. 69). It may be at once conceded that the conclusion certainly follows from the premises. It has been already shown, however, that the main premise itself is erroneous (see pp. 109-10). Prof. Bhandarkar argues : "It will thus be seen from the wording of the Cutch Inscriptions of Rudradāman quoted above (*viz* Rājño Chāshṭanasa Ghsamotika putrasa rājño Rudradāmasa Jayadāmaputrasa Varshe dvi paṃchāśe 50,2 phaguna bahulasa dvitiyâm 15,2) that in the year 52 he was, like his grandfather, rulling over the dominions of his dynasty. Rudradâman thus must have defeated Śātakarṇi and regained his ancestral territory before 52" (op. cit. pp. 68—69).

But as I have already remarked, an inscription which merely proves that Rudradāman was ruling over Cutch in the year 52, cannot be adduced as a proof that Rudradāman had vanquished Śātakarṇi and

(11) Rapson's "*Andhra Coins*", p. XXXVIII.

(12) The assumption also involved some incongruities which have been pointed out by Mr. Banerji (op. cit. p. 281).

retaken his ancestral dominions before the year 52, more so as Cutch could have been brought into subjection without any fight with the S'âtakarṇis, there being nothing to show that it did ever belong to them.

There is thus no necessity to assume that the Andhra king defeated by Rudradāman must have lived before 52, and as Puḷumāyi was the Andhra king who occupied the throne during the period between c. 130 and c. 152 A. D. he may be taken as the opponent of Rudradāman as described in his Girnār Inscription. The history of the period may therefore be reconstructed somewhat as follows :—

Nahapāna was defeated by Gautamîputra S'ātakarṇi sometime after 124 A. D., when his family probably became extinct. For a time most of the Kṣatrapa territories passed into the hands of the conqueror who survived his conquest for more than 6 years. A rival family of Kṣatrapas, founded by Chashṭana, however, soon rose into importance and under its able leader Rudradāman gradually reconquered most of the lost territories. The reconquest was probably facilitated by the fact that the valiant Gautamîputra had died in the meantime, leaving the reins of Government to a weak successor. The story of this renewed struggle cannot be described in detail, but it seems certain that by the year 150 A. D. or thereabouts i. e. in less than 20 years after the death of Gautamîputra, his successor was twice defeated by Rudradāman with the loss of Konkan and other territories north of Nerbudda that were conquered by his valour. There is no reason to suppose that the renewed struggle was commenced by Rudradāman during the life-time of Gautamîputra, and for all we know it was probably commenced at the time of his successor. The net result of the struggle that thus extended over two generations was the liberation of the Northern Mahārāshṭra country from the yoke of the foreigners. It also appears that the two ruling dynasties were bound by some ties of relationship though its exact nature cannot be determined.[13]

(13) No hypothesis can be built upon the fragmentary Kanheri Inscription of Sateraka, as its purport cannot be made out with any certainty.

[N.B. This paper was originally written in 1918. Mr. Banerji has since published a second article in *J. R. A. S.* 1925 pp, 1 ff. But practically all the points, excepting arguments based on palaeography, have been dealt with in this paper. I omit these last, as it is my object to prove that Mr. Rapson's conclusions cannot be assailed on historical grounds. The palaeographical discussions require a separate treatment altogether. While I keep an open mind as regards the palaeographic test I am convinced that Mr. Banerji has failed to substantiate his position on merely historical grounds.]

THE ASOKAN LAW OF SCHISM

[Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerjee M.A., P.R.S., Ph.D.]

The Sārnāth Pillar Edict and the Pillar Edicts at Kauśāmbī and Sanchī form a group by themselves by their reference to the common subject of schism in the Saṃgha, and to the king's measures to prevent and punish it. In these edicts, Asoka appears in the role of the 'Head of the Church and Defender of the Faith' as it were, but it must be noted that this role was not assumed by Asoka by an autocratic exercise of his sovereign powers, but was forced on him by the injunctions of the very faith he followed. Indeed, Asoka's attitude towards schism is determined and dictated by the Buddhist canonical law on the subject. This law seems to have developed by stages which may be traced in some of the sacred texts of early Buddhism.

These texts describe different degrees in the offences leading up to schism, as well as degrees in their punishments. The *Mahāvagga* [X. 1, 6, etc.], for instance, mentions in an ascending order differences, among the members of a Saṃgha as 'altercation (bhaṇḍanaṁ), contention (kalaha), discord (vigraha), quarrel (vivāda), division (saṃgha-bheda), disunion (saṃgharāji), separation (saṃghavavatthānaṁ), and schism (saṃghanānākaranaṁ) or dissolution of the saṃgha.' Again, in *Chullavagga*, VII. 5, disunion (saṃgharāji) is distinguished from schism proper (saṃghabheda). Disunion can happen only in smaller saṃghas of members numbering from four to nine. A schism means a break-up of a saṃgha of more than nine members. It is caused by a difference of opinion on 18 points concerning (*a*) what is or what is not Dhamma (*b*) what is or what is not Vinaya (*c*) what has or has not been (i) taught and spoken (ii) practised and (iii) ordained by the Tathāgata and (*d*) offences and rules regarding them [*Ib.* VII. 5, 2 ; *Mahāv.*, X. 5, 4, 5]. The same points are mentioned again in *Chullav.*, IV. 14, 2. as creating a *Vivāda*, but a distinction in made between *Vivāda* and *saṃghabheda*. In a *Vivāda*, the point at issue was to be decided finally by the Saṃgha, and there the matter must rest. The dissenter must bow to the decision of the Saṃgha. But sometimes a difference of opinion may be pressed

too far, either honestly, or with an evil intention, knowing that it would in either case result in the saṃghabheda. The intention to cause a saṃghabheda is absent in a Vivādādhikarana.

There were also certain legal restraints imposed upon the attempts at causing saṃghabheda. These attempts were valid only from a member of the saṃgha who was under no disability (pakatatta), who belonged to the same community (samāna saṁvāsaka), and who resided within the same boundary (samānasīmāyathita). Next, the vivāda could not be placed before a saṃgha of less than 9 members, as already stated, i.e., the saṃgha should be large enough to admit of 4 members to each side of the dispute, and of the ninth member who was the Salāka-gāhāpaka. Thus to produce a schism there should be at least four regular bhikṣus to agree on the point raised, and bring it before a chapter of nine with pourpose prepense to cause a division, whether knowing that the point was wrong or doubtful [*Chullav.* VII. 5, 5], or believing it, without due deliberation, to be right [*Ib.* 5, 6]. It appears from *Chullav.*, VII. 5, 6, that the latter position was not condemned. Secession from conviction or conscientious objection was not condemned. There was no embargo laid on honest differences of opinion, on freedom of thought.

Along with the offences leading towards saṃghabheda or dissolution of the saṃgha and schism, the texts contemplate different degrees and grades of penalty corresponding to such offences. The first punishment inflicted on a schismatic is that of *Nissāraṇa*, or his temporary removal from the saṃgha [*Mahāv.* X. 5, 14], during which he was subjected to Parivāsa, or living apart, for 5 or 10 days, and Mānatta or living under restraint for 6 days, as laid down in the *Pātimokhha*, *Saṃghādisesa*, 13. His restoration, *Osāraṇa*, was permitted, if the accused expressed his acknowledgment of the guilt. [*Mahāv. ib*]

We may also note in this connection that the *Pātimokkha* brings the promotion of saṃghabheda under the class of saṃghādisesa offences, i. e, offences for which atonement from beginning to end can be granted only by the saṃgha. The offence, according to the same text, is defined as (a) causing division (Cheda) in the saṃgha that is at union (samagga); (b) persistently raising issues calculated to cause division. The offence may be commited by a single bhikṣu or by a number of bhikṣus, as his partisans, who would then be equally guilty with him. Thus though the offence against the saṃgha is sufficiently serious, it is not visited by the

extreme penalty of permanent expulsion in the *Pātimokkha* which may be taken to lay down the earlier form of the law. The *Pātimokṣa* would reserve the extreme penalty for Pārājika sins, the offences against morality such as adultery, theft, murder, or frauds (by claiming superhuman powers).

The extreme penalty for schism is, however, laid down in *Mahāvagga*, I. 60, 67 and 69. It is called *nāsana*, which is definitive and permanent expulsion from the saṃgha, and is to be distinguished from (a) suspension or temporary excommunication, *ukkhepana*, for a bhikṣu refusing to admit or atone for the offence commited or to renounce a false doctrine [*ib.* I. 79] ; and (b) temporay banishment, *pabbājana*, for bhikṣus guilty of causing by their conduct scandal to the saṃgha. Both (a) and (b) may however, be revoked on repentance [*Ib.* ; *Mahāv.* X. 6].

It is difficult to see what kind or degree of schism or saṃgha bheda and of the punishment of expulsion are meant by Asoka in his use of the expressions *bhetave* and *ānāvāsasi āvāsayiye* in the edicts in question. If he was for complete and irrevocable expulsion of the heretical monks, he must be understood to have taken his stand upon the three passages of the *Mahāvagga* cited above, together with a fourth passage, *Mahāva III.* 11,5, which describes as a 'grievous sin' the causing of divisions (bheda) in the saṃgha and permits the good bhikṣu to dissociate himself from the heretics who commit this sin.

Along with the deportation of the heretical monks to non-monastic residences (anāvāsa), Asoka inflicts upon them the further penalty of disrobing them, replacing their yellow, by white robes. For this punishment there is no canonical sanction, unless it is implied in the mere fact of the expulsion of the monks from the monasteries. Some of the Asokan legends, however, relate actual cases of Asoka enforcing this penal code of his Edicts against schismatics. Thus the *Mahāvaṃsa* (v. 270) relates how Asoka once arranged an assembly of the community of bhikṣus in its full numbers' in the Asokārāma. He then called to him in turn the bhikṣus of the several confessions and asked them : "Sir, what did the Blessed one teach ?" And they each expounded their wrong doctrine. And all these adherents did the king cause to be *expelled* from the Order (upapabhajesi).' In the *Samantapāsādika*, Buddhaghosa records the further fact that Asoka expelled those heretical monks after giving them white robes (setakānivalthani datva). Thus once more the legends have confirmed the inscriptions of Asoka by

their mention of practical application of the law of the Edicts against schism to concrete cases.

It is interesting to note in conclusion that this Buddhist law relating to schism has its counterpart in the Brahminical law, according to which mischief-makers who tried to create or foment dissensions in the village communities and assemblies were punished by banishment. It was the traditional duty of the king to uphold the laws, agreements and the constitution (*samaya*) by which the various local bodies, groups, and communities, such as Kula, Jāti, Janapada, or saṃgha, organised and governed themselves, and to punish those who violated them by deportation [See the smṛiti texts quoted in my *Local Government in Ancient India*, 2nd Edition, Oxford.]

Thus the spiritual sovereignty assumed and asserted in these edicts by Asoka was not something which he had arrogated to himself as an arbitary autocrat, but had behind it the sanction of both Brahminical and Buddhist Law.

SOME THOUGHTS UPON BUDDHIST ART IN INDIA

[Prof. K. Saunders litt. D.]

One of the greatest services which Sir Asutosh Mookherjee did to India was to set a group of her scholars free to study her great past. He realized that Indian scholarship was faced with a great task—almost neglected. And much remains to do.

The west is perhaps more awake to-day to the beauty and value of Ancient Indian Art than India herself ! Many European books are being published which suggest that the period of neglect is over and that the west has overcome its first repulsion from that which was strange. In India, on the other hand, there are, I think, relatively few who know the great things of this Art from any first-hand acquaintance with them. There is, of course, the group of scholars working so ably in the Archæological Department, to whom we are all deeply indebted ; and there are a few others ; but the fact remains that educated India as a whole pays comparatively little attention to her ancient treasures. To take a simple example—we have recently been presented with a book which describes the journey to Ajantā as though it were a long and perilous pilgrimage. The writer, a Bengali Artist, has written with great charm, and has given us a vivid account of the hardships and dangers of his adventure. Yet one is continually meeting tourists from the west who make this trip as a matter of course ; and a very simple and delightful trip it is. Ajantā is in fact accessible within fifteen hours of landing in Bombay ; and if one has the necessary permission from the Nizam's Government, its splendours can be seen under ideal conditions. The Curator of the caves is an artist of no mean distinction,—Mr. Syed Ahmed ; and with his enthusiasm and expert knowledge to guide, one can learn a very great deal about the nature and motives of Buddhist art, with almost no preliminary training.

No one can know India who does not study this art ; and it cannot be studied merely in Museums. How little do the stones of Amrāvati in the British Museum and at Madras tell one who has not visited some great stupa like that of Sānchi. Even the Bahrut rail in the Indian Museum at Calcutta speaks with no living voice until one has seen its Jātakas in their true setting as at Ajantā or Sānchi.

To enter the great horse-shoe-shaped valley of Ajantā, with its long circle of caves, is to have the eye of the imagination opened, and to see once more the long procession of the Brothers of The Yellow Robe, making the *pradakṣina* round these great chaityas ; it is to hear echoes of their mournful chants resounding from these vaulted roofs : *Sabbā Dūkshā* ; *Sabbā Ancicā* ; "all is sorrowful, for all is transient." This is the lesson of these glorious frescose. Here monks themselves, or artists at their bidding, have sought to bring home to themselves and to the masses, this, the central theme of their religion. It is the contrast between the vain show and pomp of the world and the abiding satisfactions of the spirit.

Puzzled at first at finding so much that is sensuous in these haunts of the monk, so many lovely women with their charms scarcely veiled, so joyous a panorama of nature, with its animals, trees and flowers, so frank an acceptance of the facts or legends of the early life of Sākyamuni, the mind soon comes to realize that all this is but a foil to set forth the calm repose and self-control of the central figure. It is to show us the beauty of Nirvāṇa that we are first shown the sensuous beauty of the world. That the artists enjoyed both we need not doubt. They were men leading unnatural lives, and they painted fair women with something of the same joy with which men at the North Pole discuss a good dinner ; but their motive was to call men away from the lure of the senses to inner self-mastery.

And these scenes brought home to them the questions of motive. Why did the Great Hero resist such temptations to power on the one hand and to pleasure on the other ? Very soon the Buddhist mind answered this question in two ways. While it was no doubt for the sake of his own salvation from Saṃsāra, it was also out of pity of mankind—*Lokassa Anukampaya*. And so they began to draw upon the Jātakā stories. From over five hundred and fifty they chose a few which embody the central theme of self-sacrifice. On three of the four gates of the chief Stupa at Sānchi we find the Chchaddanta Jātaka, the story of the six-tusked elephant who as the Buddha-to-be yielded up his tusks to the envious queen of Benares. This story appears again in a gorgeous fresco at Ajantā, now almost destroyed and by hooliganism ; and, side by side with it are to be found the Mahākapi and the Vessantara Jātakas, which teach the same lesson. These are the famous stories of the great-hearted Monkey-king who gave his life for his tribe, and of the Generous Prince

THE HOUSE OF SIR ASUTOSH

Facing p. 124.

who kept nothing for himself—not even wife and children and they recur at Bārhut, Sānchi and Amrāvati. No doubt, the earliest sculptors of the Asokan period influenced the sculptures of the Andhra and Gupta periods ; but, at any rate, they all understood the meaning of these noble stories, which are the living core of popular Buddhism to-day, and which might well be more widely used in the schools of Asia to bring home the great lessons of service and self-lessness.

These, then, are the two central themes of early Buddhist art ; the beauty of Nirvāṇa, like moonlight in contrast with the garish glare of the noon-day sun ; the beauty of the life of sacrifice for the sake of others. With these great thoughts in mind, the artists set themselves to paint. And their works reveal also careful study and clear understanding of the beauty of the human form, and of Nature's loveliness. What is there more lovely in religious art than the figures of the young wife and child of Sākyamuni as they bow before the Princely Monk, in Cave I at Ajantā ? They have come to ask for their rights as wife and child ; they remain to worship his spiritual greatness. In the same spirit the sculptures of Amrāvati show us in an exquisite medallion the contrast between the mad elephant trampling and slaughtering his way through the city, until meeting the Master, he kneels at his feet and takes the dust off them. Such is the contrast between the whirlpool of the senses and the calm of the spirit—between the changing and the changeless ! And deeper still in the philosophy of these artists is the old Indian contrast of the one behind the many. From Ajantā to Borobodur this thought shines through Buddhist no less than through Hindu art. Borobodur is perhaps the most perfect expression of it. We pass through gallery after gallery of Jātaka scenes, or of the "play-life" of the *Lalita Vistara* ; we rise past images of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas until we come on the central platform to the one behind the many—the simple form of the historic Sākyamuni on his Diamond Throne. This is the purpose of the great Mahāyāna Scripture,—the *Saddharma Pundarika*—which sets forth the one way behind the many, and the one historic Buddha as the inner meaning of the many Buddhas. It was artists of this school who produced the frescose of Ajantā. As the sun sets the Curator will guide you to the largest of the frescoes. Here the setting sun lights up the figure of the historic Sākyamuni in the inner shrine, and the two glorious forms of the Bodhisattvas—Padmapāni and Vajrapāni—lotus and vajra in hand. These superb figures serve but as door-keepers, pointing

on to the great Hero, seated on his diamond-throne. Such also is the plan of the great Buddhist temples in China and Japan ; and the student will find at Horiuji in Japan echoes and influences which are unmistakeable.

All this may be obvious to the scholar ; yet far too much time has been spent seeking to prove the foreign influence at work in this art ; and, it has been too little emphasised that from Barhut to Borobodur and from Ajantā to Horiuji, it is essentially a national Indian art, developing by clear and recognisable stages. Even of the art of Mathurā we may say that while it is somewhat influenced by that of the Frontier, it is still more evident that it is of the the same stock as that of the Asokan period and of the later Guptas. Again if India borrowed, she also gave freely. This is clear at Borobodur and Horiuji, to say nothing of Chinese Turkestan and Cambodia. That she borrowed is evidence of vitality ; that she borrowed such bad art as that of the Greeco-Roman artisans whose work is reflected in most of the Gandhāra Sculptures, is evidence of feeble vitality ; she was wise in turning back to more truly native forms of art.

Having visited Ajantā the mind is prepared to receive the impressions of another supreme work of art only a night's journey away—which like Ajantā, has been reserved for posterity by the skill of archæologists, albeit at the eleventh hour. Sānchi should be seen first in the opalescent light of an early spring morning ; and, again at sunset with its fine sandstone aglow with rosy colour. How superb are its gateways with their solid yet airy grace, and their long Elephant processions, and their pageants of early Indian society. It is a great art and with the Curator Mr. Ghosal to guide one or with Sir John Marshall's masterly "Guide to Sanchi" there is nothing one can not see well in a day's visit.

And the roots of this art always reminds us of India itself : they may be traced deep down in her soil by comparing Stupa II with its flat reliefs and its awkward anatomy with the grace of the deeply incised figures of the main Stupa. Whatever foreign influences may have been at work this is "essentially a national art, having its roots in the heart and faith of the people, and giving eloquent expression to their spiritual beliefs and intuitive sympathy with nature." So writes Sir John Marshall in his work of restoration here and his work at Taxila is beyond praise. May the torch which he and Sir Asutosh have lit be handed on till Indian scholarship shines ever more brightly.

ABOUT THE OLD POLITICAL LITERATURE OF INDIA AND THE VARIOUS WRITERS

[PROFESSOR DR. JULIUS JOLLY, PH.D., D.LITT. M.R.A.S. (Hony)]

Since I reported at the meeting of Heidelberg, 1911, about the International Union, making comparisons between jurisprudence and political economy concerning the contents of the newly discovered old Indian book of instruction on Kauṭiliya's *Arthaśāstra*, quite a number of writings dealing with this work have come into existence, partly in Europe and in yet a greater extent in the land of its origin. By this keen interest in the obscure Sanskrit text, which is by no means easy to understand and which, in spite of all the learned investigations and researches, remains in many ways obscure still, as also the interest regarding the whole political literature of old India, is brought out the great importance of this literature which shows us the native culture of India in quite a new light.

Among the Indian investigators, to whose works I will confine myself in the following report, the most distinguished for bold outlines is Professor Benoy Kumar Sarkar, a Bengalee, who in his numerous works, English, German and French, draws intellectual parallels between old Indian theories and the teachings of European thinkers, with which he has made himself familiar. Sarkar's political aims are far-reaching and he upholds the idea of expelling all European nations from his Young Asia, to organize native kingdoms, no matter under what conditions and administration. The tendency to colonize and the autocracy of the white races should give way to a complete equalisation of the white and coloured races, as has already been demanded by the Japanese Consul at the Congress of Versailles. To Germany, which, through the loss of colonies, is excluded from the ranks of colonial powers, he assigns by this pan-Asiatic policy, an active part ; in her predicted struggle for freedom she must unite with the nations whose aim is the same, as Egypt, Persia, Afghanistan and India. These tendencies agree with the efforts of Young Asia, according to some Chinese statesmen.[1]

(1) B. K. Sarkar.

Sarkar protests rigorously against the one-sided conception to consider India as the wonderland of mysticism and proves his view by quoting the German writers of romance, who believed to have found in India their paradise, the land of their dreams. From the old political literature of India one can conjecture that it was a highly organized country, having an extensive government hierarchy with fixed salaries, an enlightened despotism, large armies, a state industry combining sea and land commerce, (economic) political and religious societies. The ancient Indians fortified the towns, and agriculture, mining and industry were highly developed. Their cotton industry was a very ancient one, since even the mummies of Egypt were swathed in Indian cottons.

About the origin of the monarchical government in the world, we learn from the ancient Indian politicians that in primitive times *Matsyanyāya* was prevalent, which permitted the strong to overpower the weak, just as the big fish devour the little ones. For this reason men chose the prime ancestor Manu as their sovereign (ruler) and in return for his protection, they gave him the sixth part of the harvest and the tenth part of the goods sold. Sarkar compares the Indian's right of fishing with the natural condition mentioned by Hobbes & Spinoza, which also consists in anarchy and in a universal warfare. According to the Indian interpretation, the kings alone had the power to inflict penalties which put an end to this state of thing, and he compares this power with the teaching of the doctors of the church, which points out that the government of kings is the consequence of the sinfulness of mankind and is to be considered as a punishment from God for the crimes of men. Taking politics in a wider sense, Indian theoreticians teach how the extention of a state (*Maṇḍala*), with a conqueror in the centre, is brought about, and how the conqueror, after overcoming the neighbouring states, tries to extend and strengthen his dominions. The ruler of the frontal adjoining state is the natural enemy of the conqueror ; he is followed by a friend ; this one by a friend of the enemy ; further by a friend's friend ; and a friend's friend's enemy is ruler of the backward adjoining state. Likewise is the ruler of the backward adjoining state to be considered an enemy ; he is followed by the friend behind, then the enemy's friend at the back, etc. To these is added a neutral and intermediate state, so that such a circuit of states comprises twelve countries, including the dominions of the conqueror. Sarkar tries to illustrate this somewhat schematically, but shows that even in primitive India where a petty government prevailed there was a

characteristic comprehension of the international relations, by referring to European conditions. The same Indian theory is applied by France when it supports Poland against Germany on one side, and against Russia on the other. Similarly, Italy's Hungarian sympathies are a natural consequence of Italy's enmity with Jugoslavia, which is explained by their geographical positions. These parallels were much more applicable in the Middle Ages than in modern times, as the number of states in Europe then was much greater than it is now. It is inexplicable why the learned Indian in his patriotic endeavours to bring into prominence the superiority of the political constitutions of India, denies the existence of theocratic government in India. He further might show clearly at the same time that the wide-spread Caesarism in Europe, compared with the government of India, is a purely worldly one. Consider, for example, how the Maharatta states of the present day, rose through the guidance of orthodox Brahmans, as so many other spiritual states of old India.

A patriotic tendency similar to that expressed in the writings of Sarkar, is shown by another Bengalee, Prof. U. Ghosal of Calcutta, in his treatise on the *History of Hindu Political Theories*, from the earliest times to the end of the first quarter of the seventeenth century after Christ. In the preface he opposes the frequently quoted remarks of Max Muller, who characterizes the Indian people as a nation of philosophers, and India as a land holding no position in the political history of the world. On the contrary, the idea of government by the Indians was highly developed, and political organization was an essential means, not only to regulate the whole life of the people, but also to offer them the possibility of existence (subsistence). The songs of *Rigveda* already speak of a well-organized monarchical government with the deification of kingship; in like manner, King Trasadasya identifies himself with Varuṇa and Indra, the two principal deities of *Rigveda*. In the *Brāhmanas*, the king, in his character as organizer of the great sacrifice of the state, is compared to the god Indra. Of course, besides the king, the Brahman likewise was elevated to godhood, from which follows the doctrine of the necessary amalgamation of the priests and warriors, the union of church and state. But already in the *Dharmasūtras*, the oldest lawbooks, it is remarked that the king is an official (public officer) to whom his subjects give the sixth part of their earnings, in consideration of the protection they receive and this theory interwoven with the whole development of the Indian (civic rights) political law,

An unjust practice of the kingly right of government is sinful and must be atoned for by some penance. Later on, a secular political science (state-craft), the *Arthaśāstra*, comes into existence and draws up rules by which the administration of government by the king is regulated for the welfare of the state. The king is not obliged to observe the moral laws of the citizens (middle-class people) as is shown, for example, by the countenancing of fraudulent profits derived from the people in times of financial need ; likewise by the violent removal of rules in disfavour. The enormous epic *Mahābhārata* abounds in political instructions and regulations, which contain a mixture of religious and practical principles (rules). They declare that the most sacred obligation of the king is to protect his subjects, and they advise him, moreover, to observe the mean between too great a severity and too great a leniency. According to Ghoshal, great progress in the path of democracy was made by Buddhism through the creation of the figure of a king 'mahasāmmata', which means "the great chosen one", so called because he was once chosen by an overwhelming multitude of the people, when the land was oppressed by thieves and robbers. This happened after the cessation of the Golden Period. He was the most beautiful, the most powerful and the most gracious man in the whole country, and as a reward for the protection of the people, he received the sixth part of the rice harvest, according to the old Brahman legend mentioned already. The analogy of the theory of agreement with the "contract social" of Rousseau is apparent with Buddhism. The legend of the elected king 'mahasāmmata', was transplanted to Tibet and Burma as well.

Ghosal also examined the political literature of the Jaina sect, which is applicable to Buddhism, but came to conclusion therefrom that it rested altogether on the above-mentioned doctrines (teachings) although they claim Ṛṣabha, the legendary king of the Jainas, to be the founder of the Indian political government. The latest law-book on politics, composed by the well-known student of law, Mitramisra, to which the author refers, belongs to the seventeenth century and contains little originality. A little older than Ghosal's book are the publications of the well-known student of Sanscrit, Jayaswal of Patna, in the journals, viz. *Calcutta Weekly Notes*, *Modern Review*, and *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* 1913—1915. This scholar pursues his investigations particularly with the purpose of proving the existence of old republics, as well as the existence

in India of kingdoms which were ruled by despots. Hildebrand points out (*Old Indian Polity*, 1923, 81-84) that these passages refer rather to the old aristocracies, than the actual republics. The Saṅgas of the *Arthaśāstra* also are only the associations of the military nobility. It is clear that the Indian scholar of the present time is actuated by patriotic motives to take a practical interest in proving the existence of adjustments of liberty and democratic tendencies in India long ago. The works of N. N. Law in Calcutta are distinguished by their thoroughness and originality. He has cleared up many obscurities and greatly improved upon the well-known English translation of the *Arthaśāstra* of Shamasastri. His first book, "*Studies of Ancient Hindu Polity*" (1914), based on the principles of the *Arthaśāstra*, treated of mining (metallurgy), irrigation and meteorology, cattle-raising and woodcraft, horse and elephant-breeding, the right to protection on the high road, currency, navigation and commerce, medical and hygienic arrangements (precautions), census of the people, courts of justice and legal proceedings, rights of obligation, especially legal and illegal contracts, the right of purchase and sale, loans and securities, depositions of service, and deeds of partnership. This gives one the impression of a highly developed culture, especially with regard to the early epoch about 300 B. C., to which the author of the preface of this work, R. Mookerji, would like to transfer the *Arthaśástra*, in conjunction with European researchers. But this assumption is very uncertain, nor does it gain in certainty by the daring assertion about the alleged historic meaning of certain passages of the *Arthasāśtra*, by which Mookerji seeks to support his hypothesis. In my opinion, which I base on the work of R. Smith and my new edition of the *Arthaśástra*, it only began in the third century after Christ, perhaps even later, according to the references contained therein regarding alchemy and gold-making. In his shorter, but significant, treatise about *Inter-state Relations in Ancient India* (Calcutta 1920), Law has minutely examined the above-mentioned theories of ancient Indian politicians, regarding the state circuit of twelve countries, translated many obscure technical terms into more accurate and correct language, and illustrated by drawing the position of the states to one another. Instead of saying "neutral state", Law calls it "superior state", because this state is described as the mightiest in the first zone, superior to the different other states and which, therefore, plays the principle role in the state system. Among the different kinds of the treaties of peace, the "golden" one is

the best, because it brings about mutual confidence, while a peace which demands war-compensations does not inspire the same confidence. (Consider, for instance, the Treaty of Versailles.) *The Aspects of Indian Politics* (Oxford 1921) is to be considered the author's principal work, to which Keith, the well-known Sanscritist, has added a preface, in which he emphasizes the similarity of those theories with the political endeavours of the Hindus. He also contests the alleged extreme old age of the *Arthaśástra*, and exposes its author's practical sense, shown in his antipathy for extreme Brahmanism. Law himself treats of the political system in nine chapters :.....the council of state, the palace priest, the succession to the throne, the education of princes, the king's daily routine, the history of the principal civil service, (public offices), the theories for the development of the kingdom, and the religious side of Indian polity (statesmanship), Out of different hypotheses about the origin of the Indian empire, the greatest probability is accorded to the tracing back of the kings to the patriarchs of the primitive ages. Stress is also laid on the importance of the personal qualifications of the aspirants to the throne, just as in an Indian family at the present time, the eldest son is not always chosen as the head of the house, but a younger member of the family, who distinguishes himself by his good qualities, can be chosen for the position. The religious principles of the government are minutely discussed. According to the Indian conception, the government has not only to provide for the material welfare of its subjects, but it is also considered as a spiritual asylum, which leads through the attainment of man's three aims in life—duty, gain and pleasure—to salvation. The king is a great deity, who is even able to create other worlds, and to depose other deities from their positions. According to the different phases of his activity, he is considered equal to the different deities, for example, he should confer benefits on his subjects like the god Indra who caused rain to fall on the earth, or he should govern the people like the god of death.

The rights and duties of the subjects are graduated according to their ranks, the Brahmins, who represent the religious side of the state, occupying the first position. Various religious celebrations are prescribed to avert evils and afflictions which menace the state (government), and also to promote the advancement and welfare of the state. A minute description is given in the *Atharvaveda* The installation of a king, emperor, crown-prince or field-marshall into their respective high

offices is connected with various religious celebrations, which can be compared with the coronation ceremonies practised by the people of the west.

Kalidas Nag, a Hindu, who lives in France, describes in French the diplomatic theories of ancient India: "Les theories diplomatiques de l' Inde ancienne at l' *Arthasāśtra*," (Paris, 1923). It describes in four chapters the diplomacy of the Veda (the sacred book of the Hindus), the epics, the schools, and the *Arthasāśtra*. A fifth chapter follows these, containing deductive reasonings and two appendices which deal with the occurrence of expressions relating to diplomacy, and the geographical facts in the *Arthasāśtra*. Espionage is highly developed in the *Arthasāśtra*, which serves not only to keep an eye on the officers of state and the criminals of its own country, but is also employed to obtain information of the neighbouring states, either hostile or neutral. Secret agents are employed in various disguises; also cryptic writings and symbolic signs are made use of. Spies are considered to be the eyes of the king, because through his spies the king's eyes are opened. The chief aim of this diplomacy is the prevention of war; likewise, according to the law books, the four diplomatic means, kindness, bribery, dissensions and force are employed; the latter may only be used in extreme cases when the other means fail. According to the *Arthasāśtra*, the consequences of war are damage, expenses, the leaving of home (emigration), and the commission of sin. Therefore, if the advantages of war and peace balance each other, peace is preferable. When victory has been gained, the new subjects should be won by kindness and even the good qualities of the opponents should be put in the shade by a double exercise of kingly generosity and kindness towards the conquered party. At the conclusion of war, when peace is declared, hostages of high rank, especially princes, are to be kept as securities of the peace, but these princes will receive many instructions as to how they can, by the help of friends and disguises, escape from the enemy's custody. It is of importance to the commander in-chief to have an able ally, whereat the question arises whether greater advantages are to be derived from an ally who has at his disposal many men, or one rich in gold. At first sight, the former ally seems to have the advantage, because a large army inspires fear and obtains quick results; but in reality, an ally who is rich in gold is better, because money is always useful, and can even buy an army, and everything one wishes for. The existence of hirelings is shown by the classification of the troops.

There were hereditary or inheritable troops, paid troops, army corps, auxiliary troops and aborigines (primitive tribes). The contracts need not always refer only to war and peace, or different alliances; there are also contracts about common (joint) acquisition of land, about the cultivation of uninhabited (waste) stretches of land, about joint labour, as for example, the erection of fortifications. These political negotiations (transactions) were the cause of much intrigue, whereby the more cunning tried to outwit the other party and the ally became an enemy, or reversely, the enemy changed to a friend. Regarding the chronologic question about the beginning of the existence (origin) of the *Arthaśāstra*, Nag takes a middle course, because he suspects a gradual completion of this law-book on politics. In the same way, the books on medicine in India were several times revised, which was necessary on account of the climate. By this repeated copying of the manuscripts some alterations and additions were unavoidable. According to Nag, who quotes here Finot and Pelliot, the geographical names in the chapter on the treasures and jewels of the king, speak most distinctly against an earlier origin of the whole treatise, although the political science, as such, is very ancient. Jurisprudence, especially, is traced back to the epoch long before Buddhism. The late discovery of the *Arthasāstra* is explained by the fact that it was altogether repressed and forgotten, owing to the purer morals of a younger century, till it re-appeared in a library of South India.

Prof. J. N. Samaddar of Patna has edited a series of lectures, which he had delivered in the University of Calcutta, concerning Indian Economic History under the title, "*Lectures on The Economic Condition of Ancient India*" (Calcutta 1922). He deals there with the beginning of economics, economic ideas in the law book of Manu, the two great epic poems taken from an economic point of view, the economic conditions of the Maurya time, e. g. the *Arthasāstra*, and the economic life in the Buddhistic Jātakas. Concerning the conditions in the Vedas, the writer refers especially to Kaegi and the *Vedic Index* of Macdonell and Keith. For the Buddhistic epoch, his writings are based on the well known economic studies of Mrs. Rhys Davids, who furnished the inspiration for his work. The opinion held that the sea was unknown to the Indians of the Rigveda is disputed and the early existence of a marine trade is tried to be proved, as also a primitive metallurgy and the use of coined money. A clear view is given of the laws of Manu and the contested question whether the entire ground and soil belongs to the king,

as held by some, or that there existed individual ownership of fields and the king was overlord of the soil. Agriculture is in both epics dealt with as the principal source of the material existence and Sītā, the heroine of the *Rāmāyana* is the personified furrow. A more severe tendency, however, condemned agriculture, as the iron plough hurts the soil and the living beings (creatures) that are in it. From the *Arthasāśtra*, which according to the author belongs to 300 B. C., are especially mentioned the descriptions of the royal officials and their economic doings, the census of the people and statistics, commerce, navigation and road-making. The interesting extracts from the Buddhistic fairy tales refer especially to land and sea trade, caravans, the export of peacocks to Babylon, pawned signet rings and other pledges, rich merchants, commercial roads, names of coins and the like, thus giving a picture of a high civilisation. In his new work which is at present in print, titled "*The Glories of Magadha*", Samaddar gives a description of the old capitals and universities of these famed lands of Buddhism.

For a broad survey as well as for a summary of the political history of India, we are indebted to C. L. Chand, a counsel and lecturer in Lahore. From the three volumes '*Introduction to the History of Government in India*', only Part I., the Hindu period, is of interest. It is very readable, but offers scarcely anything new in his synopsis of the Pre-Mahomedan epoch. Also the information of Greek, Chinese and Arabian travellers about the conditions in India are largely taken into account; naturally also, detailed extracts from the *Arthaśástra* are given, besides extracts from *Sukranīti* ('Manual on Politics', translated from the Sanscrit by Sarkar). At first, the king was only the chosen leader of the people in war, not a judge or administrator, while the supreme (highest) power was in the hands of the national assembly. Only during the epic period, when larger states were formed and the general conditions were consolidated, that the kings became hereditary princes of peace, protectors of their subjects, and possessors of criminal jurisdiction, while the national assembly withdrew. Later on, a graduated hierarchy of Government officers was introduced and a responsible council of state and ministry were established. The duty of protection on the part of the king extended even to the liability to compensate for whatever thieves had stolen from his subjects, and, for this purpose, he levied certain taxes. Buddhism increased the care of Government for the welfare of the people, but weakened the military strength of the country by forcing young men,

capable of bearing arms, to enter the cloister. The history of the caste system, especially of the "Four Class" system is minutely described. Among the crimes, the most prominent are insults (libel), outrage (real injury), theft, robbery, and moral faults. The punishments are of various degrees from a mere reprimand to the most acute capital punishment. The most frequently imposed punishments consist of fines, as stated in the Chinese Books of Travel in India. Evidences of guilt are proved either by human witnesses, producing written documents to prove the long-standing ownership of the contested property, or failing this, the case is decided by calling to aid divine intervention.

To complete the review, I mention below a few of the more recent works by Indian scholars, of which, however, I only know some quotations from "*Ancient Indian Polity and Administrative Government*" ; R. V. R. Aiyangar, "*Some Aspects of Indian Polity*", Madras 1916 ; P. N. Banerjea, *Public Administration in Ancient India*", London, 1916 ; D. R. Bhandarkar, "*Carmichael Lectures*", Calcutta, 1919, (a treatise on the right of fishing, the origin of the monarchy, the limits of the power of kings, organization of republics, etc.) ; R. C. Majumdar, "*Corporate Life in Ancient India*" (On Indian Republics), Calcutta, 1919 ; R. Shamasastri, "*Evolution of Hindu Polity*", Calcutta, 1920, etc. As O. Stein correctly remarks, these works by Indian researchers are now difficult to review and still less are all of them attainable. Just at the conclusion of this article, I received from India the very extensive (540S. gr. 8o), beautifully arranged work by Jayaswal, "*Hindu Polity*" : *A Constitutional History of India in Hindu Times* by K. P. Jayaswal, Calcutta, 1924. The first part deals with the republic, the second with monarchy in India, and the author, who seems very widely read, has collected the materials to prove his arguments from various sources. Any important passage in the epic *Mahābhārata* is given in the original and translation. The interpretation of *Gaṇa* as republic remains doubtful, and I once more quote Hildebrand, who refers to the families of the nobility, headed by petty (lesser) rajas of the land. Precautions should be taken to prevent their joining the enemy and they should remain faithful to their leaders. In his other works, too, *Gaṇa* refers to corporations not republics. Neither has the author been successful in representing the Sanghas as a republic, although his recent explanation of the difficult passage about the Sanghas in *Arthaśāstra* XI, 1. 4, may be correct. In the part which treats of

monarchy much new material has been collected about the adjustment of estates, but the author goes too far in investing an ancient Indian parliament with most extensive powers, like the deposition and installation of kings, the right of granting or refusing taxes, the nomination of ministers, the remission (mitigation) of laws, etc. An interesting chapter deals with the influence of the hermits and begging monks, as also the opinion of the people, on the Government. The theory that all land and property belonged to the king is emphatically refuted and declared un-Indian. On the whole, this work is to be appreciated as a distinguished production.

The common characteristic tendencies, noticeable in all the preceeding works, consist in the bringing into prominence the existence of the state in place of the one-sided stress laid on philosophy and religion here in India, and to draw the attention rather more to the democratic and republican forms of state and the rights and duties of corporation as in ancient India. The monarchical government appears somewhat limited, on account of the conditions imposed for the protection of the subjects and good government, as also by considering the king as a state officer paid by the people. A combination of these seemingly pure scientific tendencies with the modern spirit of liberty and self-development is unmistakable. It is to the interest of the Swarajists to call attention to similar revolutionary tendencies mentioned in the literature of their country. For this reason the majority of authors adhere to the belief in the genuineness and old age of the *Arthasāstra*, although the proofs are insufficient; and much as one may sympathise with the liberal tendencies of these Indian researchers, their views on history as well as their results are to be considered with care, and one cannot altogether acquit the above-mentioned authors of the blame of not demarcating History from Politics.

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