



‘Whilst this was the work of the “plough,” Outram was to raise and command a corps of Bhils, who were to be employed as military police in the wilder parts of the country, to stop marauding and gang robbery, to rid the country of tigers and other wild beasts, and to do whatever else was required to render life and property in the province secure.

‘It is difficult to convey an adequate idea of the difficulties which beset both classes of officers. The country, unsurveyed and imperfectly known, was everywhere covered with dense jungle; the climate was often malarious and dangerous to health; but the great difficulty of all was the seeming impossibility of gaining the confidence of the Bhils, and inducing them to accept the well-meant measures devised for them by the British Government.

‘This was mainly owing to the manner in which they had been treated by our predecessors, the Mahratta governors of the province, who had adopted a system of forcible retaliation, often accompanied by treachery, which had rendered the Bhils suspicious of everything offered to them by their civilised fellow-men. The following anecdote may illustrate the kind of treatment the Bhils used to receive from their Mahratta rulers. About forty-five years ago I was trying, as assistant Magistrate, a magisterial case, in which two Bhils were accused of theft, when a Brahmin of high rank under the Mahratta government came in to draw the pension which had been assigned him after the conquest. He sat and listened with some interest to the proceedings till the case was concluded, and then remarked that “the *sahib* was taking a great deal of unnecessary trouble; that these kind of people would go on thieving as long as there was anything to steal; and that formal trials and civilised punishments were altogether misapplied in their case.” I asked him how he would deal with them, and he said, “Well, I was once employed in Candeesh myself, when I was a young man, under a Soubedar famous for the vigour of his administration and the peace he maintained in the country. These Bhils were then very troublesome, and after sundry expeditions, with very little result, the Soubedar came to the conclusion that formal military operations were useless against such an enemy. He, therefore, desisted from sending out detachments of troops, and having managed to communicate with some of the Bhil chiefs, invited them to a conference. At the conference he told them that he had



become convinced of the necessity of making it worth their while to abstain from plundering, and that if they and all the chiefs of the neighbouring forest country would meet him, he would arrange terms by which they would be in the receipt of fixed money allowances. The bait took, and on a day appointed they all assembled to have a grand feast to ratify the arrangement made, when the Soubedar caused troops who had been in concealment to fall upon them, and they were all exterminated." In answer to my expressions of horror at such a proceeding, my visitor informed me "that it would doubtless have been wrong had they been reasonable beings, but they were little better than monkeys, and had all the attributes of wild beasts, and could only be dealt with by measures similar to those necessary for exterminating beasts of prey"—and he left me with evident pity for the philanthropic weakness which prevented a young Englishman from agreeing to the lessons of age and experience.

Such had been the treatment to which the Bhils had been used under our predecessors, and it was long before Outram and those who joined him in the undertaking could regain the confidence of the Bhils, even sufficiently to induce them to join his camp.

One young officer who gave me graphic accounts of his early life with Outram was Douglas Graham—afterwards well known as one of the most daring huntsmen in Western India; some thirty-five years ago, the companion of Sir William Harris in his mission to Shoa, the southern kingdom of Abyssinia; and later again, political agent at Kolapoor in the southern Mahratta country. Graham had come out strongly recommended by some of his Scotch connections to the Governor, the Hon. Mount Stuart Elphinstone, and as soon as Mr. Elphinstone had gauged the capacity of his young *protégé*, he told him that he thought he could not do better, in order to make a man and a soldier of him, than send him up to assist Outram in the task on which he was then engaged, the civilising of the Bhils, and raising a corps for the protection of life and property in the wilder parts of Candeech, to be composed entirely of that race under officers, some native and a few Europeans, carefully chosen from the ranks of the Bombay army.

Young Ensign Douglas Graham accordingly journeyed up to join Outram (mounted on a pony, the only means of conveyance at that time), by paths through jungles, which are now traversed by

the great railway from Bombay to Calcutta over the Thul Ghaut, Nassik, the famous Hindoo city of pilgrims, and Maligam, the headquarters of the troops which garrisoned Candeesh, were almost the only towns he saw till he joined Outram at a village on the verge of civilisation on the eastern skirts of the great chain of the Syadri Ghauts. Outram had come to this village at the earnest request of the inhabitants, who represented to him that—suffering as they always did from the depredations of the tigers, who had almost the whole of the country between that and the Surat coast to themselves—their existence had been made quite intolerable by a huge tigress, who preyed upon their cattle and occasionally their women and children. She had taken up her abode in a long tunnel, cut through a spur of a hill, in more prosperous times, by the Mogul rulers of Baglan, to convey to the village the water of a distant stream. Douglas Graham found Outram with a few Bhils recently attached to him by what they had heard of his hunting prowess, planning with the villagers his scheme of operations against the tigress. She had ensconced herself in the tunnel, a passage of considerable length through a hill composed of soft *tufa*, which had been cut out sufficiently to enable two men, stooping, to walk abreast and clear the water channel of obstructions. The water was, at that dry and intensely hot season, only a few inches deep, and afforded a pleasant lair to the tigress after her nightly foray. The villagers could not tell, as she had walked along the watercourse, by which end she had entered, and there were places inside large enough for her to turn, so that it was impossible to say which way she might be lying in watch for anything she heard approaching. Outram's first question to his young friend was, "whether he had brought his gun." Of course he was answered in the affirmative, and the single-barrelled fowling-piece, duly inspected, was pronounced to be strong enough to be loaded with ball; in fact, Graham, for the last two days of his journey, had been convinced that there were beasts of prey behind every bush, and like a brave young Scot had charged his piece with a bullet, determined to do his best in any encounter which might offer. He saw that Outram was evidently musing whether it was fair to deprive his young assistant of a chance of distinguishing himself, or whether it might not be better to wait till he was more practised as a shot. Graham felt bound in honour to



press his right to accompany his chief, so Outram explained to him that they would have to walk in with the water over their ankles, and stooping, with the certainty that the tigress would hear their approach, and would turn round and enable them to see her position by the glare of her eyes. "We will go in as quietly as we can," he said, "but if you catch a sight of her eyes, take a very steady aim and fire between them: take care not to fire too high, and you will be sure to hit her in some bad part. If she cannot turn round in the tunnel she will come straight to us, and you must throw yourself flat on your face; do not mind the water, but keep your head low, and she will to a certainty make for the light behind us, and get out into the open; be sure you take good aim between the eyes." This was a comfortable position for a boy perhaps of sixteen, but Graham begged not to be left behind, and accompanied his chief, devoutly praying, as he afterwards confessed, that the tigress might go out at the other end and give them a chance on more equal terms. This she did, and Graham had the gratification of putting a shot into her before she was killed among the bushes on the outside, having satisfied his chief that the youth was made of the right stuff for a Bhil agent's assistant.'



APPENDIX C.

PACIFICATION OF THE MAHI-KANTA, page 148.

THE following extract from the 'Bombay Gazette,' published in 'Allen's Indian Mail' of March 1, 1879, appears to be a fitting addendum to a chapter relating Outram's experiences and work in the Mahi-Kanta. Though the name of this distinguished officer may not have been mentioned by the framer of the address presented to Sir Richard Temple, it is probable that among the Europeans and natives in whose presence it was read and responded to, there may have been one, or more than one, to whom it would naturally occur in connection with the reforms inaugurated at the dawn of the preceding half century :—

'SIR RICHARD TEMPLE AND THE MAHI KANTA CHIEFS.—During his recent tour in Guzerat H.E. the Governor of Bombay held a durbar at Sacha, which was attended by thirteen chiefs of the Mahi Kanta, headed by the Maharaja of Edar. One Thakore was offended at the place assigned him and went away, and a second was accidentally absent. After the presentation, H. H. the Maharaja of Edar read the following address with a strong, clear voice, and distinct, tolerably correct pronunciation, showing a fairly good knowledge of English :—

"To his Excellency the Honourable Sir Richard Temple, Bart., G.C.S.I., C.I.E., Governor of Bombay.—May it please your Excellency,—I beg on my own behalf, and on that of the other chiefs, sirdars, and people of this province, to bid your Excellency a hearty welcome to the Mahi Kanta. Your Excellency is the second Governor of Bombay that has visited this province. We hail your arrival, and rejoice that you should see and judge with your own eyes the vast changes and various reforms that have taken place since the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone paid a



visit to the Mahi Kanta more than half a century ago. Owing in a great measure to the policy adopted by that statesman, rapine and violence have given way to peace and tranquillity. Where there were marauding bands of robbers and outlaws, a thriving and prospering agricultural population now till the ground, secure of reaping the fruits of their toil, and the habits of nearly all classes have changed for the better, while education is extending even to the Koles. We cordially acknowledge that to the protection of the British Government the Mahi Kanta is indebted for this happy change, and we trust that under its fostering care the people of this province will rise still higher in the scale of civilisation. We rejoice in your Excellency's visit, not merely on official grounds, but also because we are glad to meet thus face to face the statesman whose administrative ability and untiring energy are so renowned throughout India. In conclusion, we beg to express our sincere and grateful thanks for the kindness you have shown, and to assure your Excellency of our firm loyalty and unswerving devotion to our gracious Sovereign Queen Victoria, Empress of India, and we pray that you will be pleased to lay these our sentiments at the foot of the Imperial Throne."

'In reply his Excellency said that he was glad to make the personal acquaintance of the Mahi Kanta chiefs in their own province, and to hear an address in English so well read by the Maharaja of Edar. His Excellency was aware that an English education was not within the reach of all of them at present, being more or less expensive, but hoped that such vernacular education as was obtainable would be availed of for the rising generation. His Excellency was glad to be able to visit the Mahi Kanta, and to see for himself the state of the province. He enjoined the Thakores to make it their business to increase the productiveness of their territories and ameliorate the condition of their subjects, by carrying out irrigational projects, by the careful study of agriculture, and by introducing reforms. His Excellency animadverted on the Byad system, regretting the frequency of disputes between the Thakores and their relations and dependents; and ascribed it to the faulty system of allotting to the Byads some portion of land or village property, whilst reserving the right of levying certain local imposts on the produce or tenure of these allotments. His Excellency advised the Thakores to accord to the Byads some means of



subsistence less calculated to cause trouble and dissatisfaction, averring that a small allotment free of reserve was much better than a large assignment burdened with some bond of contention. On the other hand, his Excellency admonished the Byads not to embarrass their tribal rulers, the Thakores, by factiousness, and warned them that such conduct would be gravely discountenanced by Government. In conclusion his Excellency congratulated the Thakores on the complete abolition of female infanticide. — *Bombay Gazette*.

What a contrast does the educated Maharaja of Edar present to the Fath Singhs and Suraj Malls of Captain Outram's time!



APPENDIX D.

FIRST ADVANCE INTO AFGHANISTAN, page 168.

THE occurrences of April 1839, as regards the Bombay column, were not of an importance or interest commensurate with the progress of an army of invasion or occupation in a country so disturbed as Afghanistan. The experiences gained, however, were useful, and may be studied with advantage by present and future soldiers, merchants, or travellers. Let us examine them as handed down to us, and select the more salient passages on the record. Attacks and robberies, or attempted robberies, by Baluchis were very frequent, and required to be met with spirit and promptitude. Severe examples were made to deter the offenders; but their audacity knew no bounds and, on the very skirts of the camp, camels were driven off and camel-drivers stripped of their property in the broad light of day. During the six marches through the Bolan, only on one day, the second, were the troops with whom Outram proceeded really opposed, and they suffered no loss in repulsing their adversaries by means of a cavalry charge. Not so with the Major-General, who was a march or two in rear. His baggage was attacked with considerable spirit at the pass; forty-nine camel-loads of grain were carried off, five horses killed, and three troopers wounded. On the other hand, many of the enemy are said to have been then slain by our men. Beyond Kwatta, at Haikalzai, the rear guard was fired on and a camp-follower missed, but no further harm done; beyond Haikalzai, a peon was cut down and three camels and an officer's horse were abstracted without redress obtained; but few, if any, like misadventures, between the Bolan and Kandahar, have place in Outram's journal, as coming under his own observation. He mentions, however, that, as at the Bolan, so, before and after joining the artillery at the Kohjak Pass, General Willshire was subject to molestation, and that his brigade



had had several affairs with horsemen hovering about the baggage, in which upwards of fifty of the assailants were killed, with the loss of only two or three on our side.

The Bengal column and Shah's contingent had been harassed by these attacks on a larger scale : and their losses must have been more considerable. With reference to the proceedings of the mixed force in its integrity, it was estimated that at least five hundred Beluchis, Kákars, and Afghans, had fallen before our soldiers since leaving Shikarpúr and Larkhána; the casualty roll on our side showing thirty or forty killed in open combat, besides some hundreds of followers murdered. The loss in baggage animals, owing to death, desertion of drivers, abandonment, robbery, and the many causes presenting themselves in a country where forage was scarce, water not always procurable, and travelling dangerous and difficult, must be set down at a very high figure. Sir Willoughby Cotton's regiments and detachments had so suffered from defective commissariat arrangements that, on arrival at Kwatta, the men composing them were placed on half-rations, and the camp-followers on an allowance barely sufficient to support nature. If, in such case, human beings died of starvation, the lot of beasts of burden could hardly have been less cruel.



APPENDIX E.

HONOURS AWARDED TO OUTRAM, page 209.

BUT for the General's unexplained silence regarding his varied services as extra aide-de-camp, Outram's brevet for Kalát would have been a lieutenant-colonelcy, probably accompanied by a C.B.-ship. Indeed, he was actually on the list for promotion to that rank, but at the eleventh hour some occult influence in London prevailed to cancel it. As it was, he remained a major till 1843, much to the prejudice of after-advancement, for his regimental promotion was exceptionally slow, and always lagged far behind his brevet rank.

It is pleasant to remark that among the most active of those admirers whose kind exertions, twenty years later, secured the success of the 'Outram Testimonials,' was one whose warm friendship for him dated from the time when they served together on the Commander-in-Chief's staff in Afghanistan, viz. the second Lord Keane of Ghazni. And although both Sir William Macnaghten and Lord Auckland had been fully aware of the Bombay captain's outspoken condemnation of their Afghan policy, it in no way affected their generous recognition of his merits. They not only showed their confidence by selecting him for responsible duties, but they omitted no opportunity of expressing their unreserved approbation of his manner of fulfilling them. A friendly correspondence with the high-minded Envoy continued till his tragic death. His last official letter is that noticed in the text, intimating the grant of the Order of the Duráni Empire.

The Governor-General's approbation did not evaporate in public and private expressions of commendation. It marked out, for the young Bombay 'political,' a wider and more responsible field of action than any available within his own Presidency.



MR. ROSS BELL, page 224.

MR. ROSS BELL, of the Bengal Civil Service, was designated by Lord Auckland as 'an officer of tried energy and intelligence.' Much has been said and written of this gentleman's love of display and of the pomp and parade attendant on his movements from place to place, in the fulfilment of his official duties. Contrasted with the simpler ways of Colonel Pottinger and his assistants, it is quite intelligible that the style of living and moving of the Upper Sind magnate was considered by many to be unnecessarily costly and luxurious. But we believe the difference to have been as much one of Englishmen's habits generally in the two Presidencies of Bengal and Bombay, as of idiosyncrasy. In other respects, Lord Auckland was well satisfied with his nominee; and from first to last, throughout the late Mr. Ross Bell's short career in Sind and Baluchistan, did not hesitate to express himself in the strongest terms of the importance and value of his services. Unfortunately, a weak state of health, brought on by an ungenial climate, greatly aggravated the difficulties of his position. Regulation and precedent, which commonly guide and render smooth the routine of Indian *kachahris*, were almost wholly wanting within the limits of a Baluchistan political agency. Their place would here be supplied by common sense, knowledge of native character, moral and physical courage, tact, energy, and sound discrimination: and no amount of high principle and zeal could atone for the absence of qualities such as these.

It may be well here to say a few words on our relations with Upper Sind at the time of Mr. Ross Bell's agency. If Lower Sind was important as the seat of the higher class local government, the Amirs of Khairpur, or the Upper Sind districts, were far from insignificant members of the Talpur clan, and could boast a family history quite as interesting as that of their cousins lower down the river. One 'Kaka,' or 'Bijan,' was the common ancestor, from whose son, Hotak, sprang the respective founders of the two houses of Haidarabad and Khairpur, and whose other son, Manik, numbered among his immediate descendants the first ruler of Mirpur. His grandson Shahdad, eminent among the Baluch settlers in the country during the rule of the Kalhoras (who preceded the Talpurs), was perhaps more than an ordinary



landholder, and exercised a sort of feudal sway in the land of his sojourn. First of the family to quit his native hills and take service in Sind, he had brought many Baluch followers to the newly adopted standard. These had not the patience to remain long in obscurity; and stirring times were near to test their prowess and nationality. On the death of Shahdad, his sons Chákar and Bahram became the recognised heads of the Sind Talpurs. The murder of the latter, and other acts of violence and oppression committed by the chiefs in power, brought about a revolution; the government was subverted; and eventually Sohrab the son of Chákar, in Upper Sind, and Fath Ali, Ghulam Ali, Karm Ali, and Murad Ali, sons of Bahram in Lower Sind, together with Tara in Mirpur, became the *de facto* sovereigns of the country.

It is of Sohrab and his children we have now to speak. He had aided in the expulsion of the Kalhoras from Haidarabad, and might therefore reasonably claim a share of the spoil in the general partition of the province; but the tract which fell to his lot was insufficient to satisfy his ambition, and he was not long in extending its limits. To this end, both Bhawalpur and the Afghans were destined more or less to contribute a quota; the first, on clear compulsion, the second, with comparative indifference to the transfer of ownership.

One hundred and forty years ago, the Persian conquerors of Dehli, under the leadership of Nadir Shah, possessed themselves of extensive lands west of the Indus. The helpless Sindians were driven to Umarkot and the Eastern deserts. On the death of Nadir in 1747, Ahmad Shah Abdalli raised up a new kingdom between Northern India and Persia, which, while it saved the former country from the aggressions of the latter, made little change in it otherwise, for it merely replaced there one plunderer by another. The Afghan monarch was an awkward neighbour; invaded on his own account, and scattering his followers over Sind and the Punjab, demanded a certain amount of black mail from the inhabitants in return for holding his hand. In Sind this tribute became hereditary, both to givers and receivers. Throughout Ahmad Shah's reign every art and evasion was called into play to get rid of the incubus; but the Afghan was needy and could never dispense with the money. When taking the province from the Kalhoras, the Talpurs had also taken the debt, but, more fortunate than their



predecessors, they found means of staving off the liability. The relief, however, was not permanent, nor was the claim suffered to become obsolete. Taimur Shah, the less formidable successor of Ahmad, had been quieted by pretexts; the next king, Zamán, had accepted a shabby settlement in lieu of arrears; and Shuja-ul-Mulk, brother to Zamán, had followed the latter's example. Nay more, the Amirs of Sind had so far turned the tables on their old oppressors, as to abstract Shikarpur from the hands of its local governors, and make that important possession their own. Suddenly, new interests arose; the question of Sind tribute was revived with a purpose hitherto unknown; a new power had interfered to exhume the buried accounts; and the debtors were consigned to so-called justice. We have already shown the nature of the tribunal before which the Amirs were arraigned, and the sentence passed upon them. British mediation is a serious affair in circumstances such as these.

But Sohrab himself had retired from public life in 1811, and made over the dignity and cares of government to his eldest son Rustam, with whom, twenty years later, Alexander Burnes opened treaty relations. This popular and kindly chief not only suffered from his hospitable attention to strangers, but was doomed, through the intrigues and ambition of a near relative, to experience hard treatment in his own home. Even prior to the negotiations of 1831, he had begun to be involved in domestic and dynastic perplexity. His father had but recently died at a very advanced age—probably in his ninetieth year—and, before dying, had contrived, by wills and codicils, to throw disorder into his succession. Abdication of the *riyásat*, or office of *Ráis*, had been followed by marriage with a young wife, and this wife had presented old Sohrab with a son, when the son of a former wife, Rustam, was a quinquagenarian, and busily engaged in directing the affairs of State. In process of time the child became a man, and a covetous and very aspiring man, who rested not until he had brought his venerable half-brother to ruin. Indian history knows the youngest son of Sohrab as Mir Ali Murad of Khairpur. His career affords a remarkable illustration of Sindi-Baluch character, and may be studied with advantage by our own political officers in India, as well as by native candidates for Government service. To the first it should supply an incentive to understand our subjects as closely



as these strive to understand their rulers, and with better results. To the second it should be a caution to deal heedfully and, as much as in them lies, honestly, with individual representatives of the British Government, who are not all cast in the same mould nor professors of one and the same political creed.

ESTABLISHMENTS IN SIND AND BALUCHISTAN, page 229.

With reference to Outram's scheme, submitted to Mr. Colvin in August 1840—of the first-class assistants in Sind and Baluchistan, Captain Edmunds was already in the Kalāt State, Lieutenant Leckie was at Haidarabad, and Lieutenant Postans at Shikarpur. It was proposed to complete the number by nominating Captain French to Upper Sind. Of second-class assistants, as there were six (*i.e.* Captains Kennedy, Gordon, and Kynvett, with Lieutenants Eastwick, Hammersley, and Whitelock) at the time, on the roll of officers employed in the agency, one was in excess of the proposed number. But the supernumerary officer would be available to fill one of the vacancies in the third class, in which four new names were submitted for approval, *viz.* Captains Hart and Christal, Lieutenant Pelly and Lieutenant Agar. Under the old system of separate agencies for Upper and Lower Sind, Captain Bean was the political agent at Kwatta (for Shāl), but as he might not elect to remain under the arrangement which placed his office among the limited agencies, his tenure was not treated as a permanent one. Three officers, Messrs. Brown, Varden, and Wallace, then employed in Sind and Baluchistan, were not included in the programme, because it was understood that the first had resigned, and the two last would be compelled, by ill-health, to leave the country. Lieutenant Eastwick, a second-class assistant, had, moreover, gone on sick leave to Karachi.

EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, page 241.

The busy Political Agent's voluminous correspondence abounds in suggestive comments upon Afghan events generally, but space

forbids lengthened quotation. In a letter to Colonel Sutherland, dated December 26, 1841, for submission to the Governor-General if deemed advisable, he reviews the existing situation :—

‘I had long contemplated the possibility of the Afghan explosion, and revolved in my mind the most creditable, and least disadvantageous, way of shaking off the Cabool connection, if it should become necessary ; and in that case, what arrangement would best secure our influence in Afghanistan. . . . To allow ourselves to be *driven out*, or to *withdraw*, under *present circumstances*, would, I really think be tantamount to throwing up our hold on India, for such a declaration of weakness would be a death-stroke to power principally based on opinion. *That*, therefore, is not to be thought of, I trust : neither will the necessity occur, I confidently hope, for humiliating capitulation by any of our garrisons throughout the country, every one of which is capable of holding its position on the defensive until spring, if provided with ammunition, of which, I trust, every post has a sufficiency, at least for mere defence, behind walls which need not call for much expenditure ; and I have every expectation that among so mercenary a people, provisions will be obtained without difficulty, after the first enthusiasm of the revolt abates, and the vigilance of the besiegers begins to relax and dissension to arise, as inevitably must result from delays in attaining their objects. I rely upon it, that by the time for our troops to advance on Cabool, from Jellalabad and Candahar, the league will be greatly weakened, if not entirely broken ; and that little or no opposition will be offered, or if so, nothing that will not be overcome by fresh and eager troops, at infinitely less cost than the weak and worn-out brigade under Sale suffered on retirement from that capital. . . . I would, after the *resubmission* of the chiefs, admit their right to choose a king for themselves, since the national voice has declared against Shah Soojah, . . . on the condition of a British representative being retained at that court, and pledges for due deference to British counsels. A Barukzye would most likely be nominated ; and if Dost Mahomed, it would be to our advantage.’

How accurately these anticipations were in accordance with actual facts, the events of 1842, the journals of Eyre, of Mohun Lall, and of Lady Sale fully testify. But the ‘military crime’ (as he expressed it) witnessed at Kabul, and the non-provisioning of Ghazni, were beyond the ken of those who, like himself, had based



their predictions of the safety of the large and well-provided force upon knowledge of place and people, and upon ordinary military considerations. He writes to Sir J. Carnac on February 10, 1842 :

‘I have proved a false prophet, alas ! as regards the issue of affairs at Cabool ; but who could conceive that five thousand British troops would deliberately commit *suicide*, which literally has been the fate of the Cabool garrison ? From first to last such a tissue of political and military mismanagement the history of the world has never shown.’

After commenting in detail upon the errors committed, he concludes : ‘Within my own charge, I confidently trust to all going on well, in spite of the volcano around us. . . . you will see that I then (in 1839) predicted everything that has come to pass so far as the *Affghans* are concerned, though certainly I never could have believed that *our troops* in that country could be humbled to such a depth of degradation.’



APPENDIX F.

TREATMENT OF MAJOR OUTRAM, page 291.

IN reference to the peculiar treatment of Major Outram described in the text it would be unfair to his memory to pass by altogether the spontaneous expressions, however eulogistic, of two such competent observers as Henry Lawrence and Mountstuart Elphinstone. The former remarks in his already quoted article in the 'Calcutta Review' of September 1845 :

'In the year 1838, Outram carried to Affghanistan a character such as could not be paralleled by any officer of his standing in India. His services during the first Affghan war were second to those of no officer then and there employed. And had he remained in the Ghilzee country, or at Khelat, many of our disasters might have been averted. But it is by his civil management, first of Lower Sind, and then of both the Upper and Lower Provinces, and of all Beloochistan, that Outram has won our highest admiration.

'When the European inhabitants of Calcutta trembled for our Indian Empire—when, in the highest places, men grew pale at the evil tidings from Affghanistan—Outram held his frontier post with a firm hand, a brave heart, and cheerful tone that *ought* to have been contagious. Vigilant, conciliatory, courageous, he managed, with his handful of troops, not only to prevent the Ameers from taking advantage of our disasters, but to induce them to aid in furnishing supplies and carriage for the *relieving*, then considered the *retreating*, army. The merits of his exertions on that occasion are little understood. He obeyed as was his duty; but he did not the less clearly perceive the ruinous tendency of the Government orders. He had the moral courage to sacrifice his own immediate interests by stemming the then prevalent tide of cowardly counsel.'

Regarding Hammersley's fate, Sir Henry remarked : 'Outram's



chivalrous defence of his assistant, Lieutenant Hammersley, is one of the many instances in which he advocated the right, at the peril of his own interests. Hammersley was as brave, as honest-hearted a young soldier as ever fell a victim to his duty. We knew him well; and no man who did so need be ashamed to shed a tear over his fate. He was literally sacrificed for telling the truth—a truth, too, that was of vital importance to the beleaguered Candahar army—nay, to the interests of British India! Peace be to the memory of this noble fellow!

Mr. Elphinstone thus writes to one of the Directors of the East India Company in 1843: 'Besides his ample share in the planning and conduct of various military enterprises, his political services for several years have been such as it would be difficult to parallel in the whole course of Indian diplomacy. We forced a subsidiary grant and tribute on Sind; we made open war on the Brahoes of Khelat, killed their chief, and took their capital; and on these two powers, all our communications with Candahar depended. To keep them quiet, and prevent them thwarting our measures, would have been difficult even in times of peace and prosperity; yet such was Colonel Outram's management as to obtain their cordial co-operation during the whole of our dangers and disasters in Afghanistan. Our movements in every direction from Candahar depending on the country supplies we received from them, all of which they might have withheld, without any show of hostility or ground of quarrel with us, had they been disposed for more open enmity—General England's detachment could neither have retired or advanced, as it did; and it is doubtful whether Nott himself could have made his way to the Indus, through the opposition and privations he must have suffered in such a case. In an advance towards Cabul, he certainly could not, without the assistance he received through the Sind and Khelat country.'

APPENDIX G.

CONDITION OF THE AMIRS IN UPPER SIND, p. 313.

THE letter from which extracts are given in the text was written from Kháirpur on January 26. One of two days' earlier date from the same place, had put the General in possession of certain facts and figures, illustrating the reduced circumstances of the Upper Sind Amirs—brought about by our interference—which Sir Charles frankly acknowledged to have 'grieved him exceedingly.' The following extract will convey some notion of the money value of the territory and revenues lost to the chiefs:—

'The balance which now remains to the Ameers of Upper Sindh is rupees 14,29,000, and you are bound, I understand, to make good to Ali Moorad his share of the ceded country, which he claims to the value of 1,50,000 and which, in addition to his original territory of 2,95,000, gives him rs. 4,45,000. Added to this you are, I believe, pledged to give him one-fourth of the remaining property of Upper Sindh (or, of rupees 14,29,000)=rupees 3,57,250—Total rupees 8,02,250. Consequently, all that will remain for the support of the other Ameers and their families and feudal chiefs and dependents, as well as most of the Belooch chieftains who have hitherto enjoyed Jaghires in the portion of the territory to be made over to Meer Ali Moorad (who will undoubtedly eject them all sooner or later to make room for foreign mercenaries, relatives, and countrymen of his minister Ali Hoossein, and Afghans whom Ali Moorad particularly patronises)—will be rupees 6,26,750, who formerly enjoyed rupees 17,44,000, the revenue shared among them previous to our entering the country (exclusive of Ali Moorad's portion).



APPENDIX H

EXTRACTS FROM A DESPATCH OF THE HONOURABLE THE COURT OF DIRECTORS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY: DATED SEPTEMBER 25, 1845, NO. 25, page 379.

3. On the death of the late Rajah at Kolapoor in November 1838, it became the duty of the British Government to make arrangements for the government of that country during the minority of the present Rajah. The treaty of 1829 had given us the right of appointing a minister, but your predecessors preferred to give their support to the administration which might be acceptable to the persons of greatest influence in the State itself. The Sirdars of Kolapoor had mostly attached themselves either to the Rajah's mother (Tara Bæe) or to the Diwan Sahiba, widow of a previous Rajah. After a short and successful attempt to combine these parties in a joint administration, the Diwan Sahiba was made Regent, and the two principal Sirdars of her party, Rowjee Wukuns and a Dinkur Row Guicowar, were appointed to assist her, as Karbarrees (or ministers), with the aid of another Chief named Moro Punt.

4. The arrangement proved a failure, the corruption, profusion, and incapacity of the Administration led you in the beginning of 1843 to set it aside and to banish the two Karbarrees, Rowjee Wukuns and Dinkur Row Guicowar, from the seat of government. In our letter dated February 28, No. 3, 1844, paragraphs 3 and 7, we approved this course.

5. The attempt was now made to form an administration from the other of the two rival parties, that of Tara Bæe, the Mæe Sahib. A Regency was formed consisting of the Raj Adnya (the principal Sirdar of that party) and Hindoo Row Guicowar, a Mahratta Chief, of whom Mr. Townsend, at that time Political Agent, entertained a high opinion. It was intended still to



retain Moro Punt, as a member of the Regency, but he declined to act.

6. The new administration proved itself equally incompetent with the former. In a letter dated September 12, 1843, Mr. Townsend, after representing various instances of its 'inertness and folly' declared that 'no actual revenue settlement had been made for the last two years,' that 'for that period no exact accounts of income can be given,' that the 'corruption and mismanagement at Colapore are on a gigantic scale,' that every reform was utterly hopeless 'under a management so devoid of energy as that of the Raj Adnya'—'whether imbecility or knavery be the cause, whether fear of those around him, or a hope that the Agent will be changed and a change of measures adopted, I cannot say for certain, but the result is the same, nothing is done towards a reform, things continue at the worst.' On January 15, Mr. Townsend reiterated his conviction of the 'indolence, inefficiency, and deceit' of the 'Raj Adnya,' and said that to effect any improvement while he is Karbarree is out of the question. He reported that it had been impossible by any amount of importunity to obtain from the Karbarree the accounts of receipts and disbursements since the Rajah's death, and that 'his yads to the Durbar were mere waste papers.' He expressed, as he had previously done, his conviction that it was necessary to appoint as chief manager a person wholly independent of the Durbar of Kolapoor.

7. The two Kolapoor parties having thus successively proved their unfitness to be entrusted with office, you abandoned the attempt to form an exclusively native administration; and, on the recommendation of Mr. Townsend, Dajee Kristna Pundit, a servant of the British Government and Dufterdar of Dharwar, was placed at the head of the Regency. With him were at first associated Hindoo Row Guicowar, a member of the preceding ministry, and Kassinath Punt, the government Akhbār-navis. These individuals, however, were shortly suspended by Mr. Reeves, who had succeeded Mr. Townsend as Political Agent. The grounds of their suspension were, in the case of Hindoo Row, that the administration of which he had formed a part was found to have left a great deficiency in the treasury, and to have, immediately before giving up office, unauthorisedly, and (it was suspected) corruptly, released a number of Enams which had been attached. The suspension of



Kassinath Punt was caused by his having withheld from Mr. Reeves a knowledge of the release of the Enams and by various complaints of his having abused the influence which he derived from his office of Akhbār-navis; and we must here remind you that the inquiry into the conduct of this individual has never been completed, Mr. Reeves (in consequence, no doubt, of the subsequent press of more urgent duties) having never furnished the additional information called for in your Secretary's letter of October 2, 1844.

8. On April 5, 1844, Dajee Kristna Pundit commenced his functions as chief minister of Kolapoor. On July 22 the first manifestation took place of armed opposition to his administration. The Ghudkurees or hereditary garrison of the fort of Boodarghur shut the gates against the Mamlutdar, and were immediately joined in their insubordination by those of Samunghur. Attempts were made by Mr. Reeves to open a communication with the Ghudkurees for the purpose of conciliation, but without success. The only grievance which they alleged was that the number of Mamlutdars of the Kolapoor State having (for reasons of economy) been reduced, the forts had no longer, as before, Mamlutdars to themselves, but were included in larger districts. It was from the first the opinion of Mr. Reeves and of Dajee Kristna that the Ghudkurees acted at the instigation of some persons of influence at Kolapoor.

9. A force under Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace marched from Belgaum on September 16, to reduce the refractory forts and reached Samunghur on the 19th. The Ghudkurees persevered in their resistance. From a variety of causes, among which imperfect information respecting the strength of the fort (for which imperfection it is very difficult to account) appears to have been the principal, the defence was unexpectedly and most unfortunately protracted, and Samunghur did not fall into the hands of our troops until October 13, when it was taken by storm. During the interval the insurrection had become general. The town of Chickodee in the British territory was surprised, and its treasury plundered. The Ghudkurees of Munshur, a fort in the Kolapoor country, but overlooking that of Sawunt Warree, commenced aggressions upon the last-mentioned territory. The strong forts of Punalla, and Pownghur in the northern part of Kolapoor were placed in a state of defence. The troops at Kolapoor itself, under a leader named Babajee Ahirakur, seized upon the minister Dajee



Kristna, and upon the young Rajah's tutor, threw them into confinement at Punalla, and recalled the former Karbarrees, Rowjee Wukuns and Dinkur Row Guicowar, whom, together with the Dewan Sahib, they reinstated in the administration.

10. After the capture of Samunghur and the defeat of a party of the Kolapoor insurgents who were on their way to relieve that place, the primary object was to suppress the insurrection at Kolapoor itself. For this purpose Lieutenant-Colonel Outram (who, having volunteered to proceed to the scene of disturbance, had been placed by your Government under the orders of Mr. Reeves) moved forward with a light detachment towards Kolapoor, and in a few days succeeded in obtaining peaceable possession of the town and fort and of the Rajah's person. A large portion, however, of the Sebundy, headed by Babajee Ahirakur left the place and continued in arms. Before Lieutenant-Colonel Outram was admitted into the town he had promised (on condition of immediate submission) what was called an amnesty, and this measure, being in the first instance imperfectly reported to you, appeared to you extremely objectionable. On further explanation, however, it appeared that (besides the exception made of all who were concerned in the affair at Chickodee, or who had committed any other act of aggression against British territory) the chiefs themselves had received no promise of pardon, in case they should afterwards prove to have instigated the rebellion, and the amnesty altogether was conditional upon establishing the existence of grievances. Lieutenant-Colonel Outram gave every facility and even encouragement to the troops and people to make their grievances known. Very few complaints, however, were made, and these were not only trifling, but appeared on examination to be unfounded. The Karbarree Dajee Kristna came out with unblemished character from the investigation, and the amnesty was nullified by the failure of an essential condition.

11. The movement of Major-General Delamotte's force against Boodurghur, which had been suspended while Kolapoor itself was in insurrection, was now resumed, and on November 10 the Major-General obtained possession of the fort, having first granted terms to the Ghudkurees considerably more favourable than was consistent with the intention or even the orders of your Government, and this too although Babajee Ahirakur and his followers



had been admitted into the fort and were hurried out at one gate while Major-General Delamotte entered by another.

12. Boodurghur is at no great distance from Munohur, and the force under Major-General Delamotte was about to proceed against the latter place when it was summoned to the northward in consequence of the intelligence that Lieutenant-Colonel Ovens (who was on his way to Kolapoor by order of Government to assume the temporary management of that State) had been waylaid and carried off by the Ghudkurees of Punalla. The necessity of this northward movement was the more unfortunate as at the same time a formidable insurrection broke out in the Sawunt Warree. The Phond Sawunt family (who since their pardon by Government appeared to have resumed their former turbulent habits) rose in arms, and persuaded Anna Sahib, the son of the Surdessye, to go off with them to Munohur. In a short time no part of Sawunt Warree could be said to be in the possession of the Government, except the town itself, and the posts actually held by detachments of troops. Plundering incursions were also frequently made into British territory towards Baitsee and Parghur on the one side, Rairee, Vingorla, and Malwa on the other.

Paragraph 13, referring to the imprisonment of Colonel Ovens, states: 'We must express our satisfaction . . . that Mr. Reeves and Lieutenant-Colonel Outram refused to listen to any propositions from the insurgents previously to his release. That release, when it took place, not having been accompanied by any offer of submission, except upon conditions which could not be granted to armed insurgents, it unhappily became necessary to storm the fort; and the chief insurgent leader, Babajee Ahirakur, fell in the assault.'

The origin of the insurrection is thus sketched and commented on:—

16. The territory of Kolapoor contains thirteen forts, twelve of them hill-forts, and in point of situation among the strongest in the world. Of these thirteen, eleven have on this occasion been in arms against our Government, the exceptions being the two forts of Gunjundurgur and Sewghur, belonging to the dependent Chief of Bowra. The resistance has in general been obstinate; no less than six of the forts were either taken by storm or evacuated after a first unsuccessful assault. Besides this, all, or nearly all



its troops were concerned in the establishment of the unauthorised Government at Kolapoor.

17. According to your statement, 'there are strong reasons for believing that there is not a single person of any note connected with the Kolapoor State who will not be found more or less implicated in the late unlawful proceedings in that territory.'

18. Such a display of hostility cannot in our opinion be explained by the intrigues of a few persons, or by any partial or local dissatisfaction. The feeling must have been national. What has taken place is not an insurrection of disaffected subjects against the Kolapoor Government, but a general rising of the Kolapoor State against the British power.

19. The British Government had given no just cause for any such manifestation of animosity. Its interference in the affairs of Kolapoor had been entirely disinterested, having no other aim than the benefit of the Rajah and of the State. Nor had it attempted any fundamental alteration of existing institutions. Its object had been to correct gross abuses and to secure the better working of the existing machinery of government.

20. The motives of the Kolapoor Sirdars and those of Ghudkurees require to be distinguished.

21. Mr. Reeves and Lieutenant-Colonel Outram have made a careful investigation in relation to both.

22. From the evidence forwarded with Mr. Reeves' letter dated December 30, 1844, it appears that before the commencement of operations against Samunghur (but not before the Ghudkurees began their resistance) Babajee Ahirakur and other leaders of the Sebundeas had a secret interview with Dinkur Row Guicowar; that the prolonged resistance of Samunghur determined their subsequent conduct; that several of the Mankurries or dignitaries of the State, came into their views at an early period; that after the seizure of Dajee Kristna 'all the Mankurries, and Huzzrias of the Putucks assembled, and in the presence of Dinkur Row, Rowjee Wukuns, Humunt Bahadoor and both Princes, all touched the Maharajah's idol, and bound themselves by an oath to be faithful to one another, and to obey the two Karbarrees, Rowjee Wukuns and Dinkur Row; and that they immediately despatched agents to seek assistance from Goa and Sawunt Warree.' The motive assigned is dissatisfaction at the appointment of a foreign Kar-



barree. On the part of those connected with the two previous administrations, resentment at the loss of power and of legitimate or corrupt emolument was the obvious inducement. On the part of the military leaders the motive was said to be that they were now under a Karbarree sent by the British Government with whom nobody's intercession had any weight, who did not send for any of them, and to whom they could not apply for any presents, which they used to do when they were under their own Karbarrees.

23. There is evidence to show that even after the Chiefs at Kolapoor had ostensibly submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, some of them were in communication by emissaries (Lallgeres Gossavee, Sukharam Ghutkey, and others) with the Ghudkurees of Punalla; it seems even probable that the seizure of Lieutenant-Colonel Evans was brought about by information received from Kolapoor, and it was the arrival of Sukharam Ghutkey and Lallgeres Gossavee of Punalla which, after the Ghudkurees had almost resolved to submit, decided them to hold out. It is asserted the Ghudkurees and Babajee Ahirakur expected that the Dewan Sahib and the Rajah's brother would come out and openly counter-ance their resistance, and there is considerable reason to believe that such was really the intention of those persons, though frustrated by Lieutenant-Colonel Outram's vigilance. On the several points, however, which relate to Punalla, Mr. Reeves (as appears from his letter of March 19) is much less decided in his opinion than Lieutenant-Colonel Outram.

24. The motives of the Dewan Sahib and the Kolapoor Sirdars for the course they adopted are obvious, and those of the leaders of the Kolapoor troops are also sufficiently intelligible. But the Ghudkurees were differently situated. They do not appear to have been deprived of any illicit gains by reforms in the administration.

25. There is, however, no sufficient reason to believe that any instigation from Kolapoor preceded the first acts of insubordination by Samunghur and Boodurghur Ghudkurees. The evidence points rather to the conclusion that the discontented at Kolapoor were encouraged to what they did by the previous resistance of the Ghudkurees, and especially by the prolongation of the siege of Samunghur.

26. We feel little doubt that the Ghudkurees of the two forts



were originally acted upon by fear of encroachment upon their rights and privileges, though they may have been encouraged to prolong their resistance by inducements held out from Kolapoer.

27. It has been proved that the rights of the Ghudkurees had not in fact been encroached upon. Their only actual grievance was that their forts and the villages from which they derived their revenues were merged in larger revenue districts; and even this arrangement had been adopted (though not carried into effect) under the Karbarrees who preceded Dajee Kristna Pundit in the administration. But under the former system the Mamlutdar was under the orders of the Chief of the Ghudkurees who communicated directly with the Darbar. Under the new system the Chief of the Ghudkurees was under the orders of the Mamlutdar, a change naturally offensive to their pride, and which in minds probably distrustful of the general tendency of our system might easily appear to be a preparation for placing the districts altogether under Khalsa management. They might also very reasonably presume that the revenue officer of a large district would be less acquainted with, and less careful of, their rights than an officer who resided in the midst of them; who was, ostensibly at least, under their orders; and who, having the charge of their district and of no other, was in a manner identified with themselves.

28. The evidence of the Boodurghur prisoners transmitted by Mr. Reeves in his letter of December 3, 1844, gives strong confirmation of these opinions. Although the durs of the Ghudkurees had not been interfered with by the new Mamlutdar, it appeared that alarm had been given by counting their houses and fruit-trees, and the privilege of sealing with their own seal all the orders and letters issued from the fort had been discontinued. It is also asserted that they had been threatened with the discontinuance of some minor privileges.

29. Mr. Reeves says 'they had ample opportunity afforded them for making known all circumstances in their condition which they felt irksome and grievous.' But men who were accustomed, as these doubtless were, to look upon their military prowess, and the strength of their forts, as the only security for their prescriptive rights against the usurpations of even their own Government, naturally shut the gates of their fort on the first serious indication of what they deemed a purpose of encroachment.



Paragraph 34 is illustrative of the enlightened spirit and sound judgment of the Court. It states:

That portion of the Kolapoor troops who did not quit the place with Babajee Ahirakur, nor commit any subsequent acts of insubordination, have been pardoned unconditionally, and you have directed 'that their former situations and privileges be continued to them as long as they conduct themselves properly.' At a later period an amnesty was tendered to the Sawunt Warree insurgents, except the leaders and those personally implicated in any outrage, provided they laid down their arms within a certain time. We should have been glad if, on the termination of military operations in the Kolapoor country, a similar amnesty could have been granted to the misguided subjects of that State. You have determined that such of the Kolapoor offenders as it might be necessary to bring to justice (including the Sirdars Rowjee Wukuns and Dinkur Row Guicowar), should be tried by Mr. Imsden aided by native assessors. By a subsequent arrangement, those taken in our own territory of the Conlon are to be tried by Mr. Brown, an acting judge of the Sudder Adawlut on circuit.

We conclude our extracts with the nine following paragraphs:—

38. The forts of every description are to be dismantled (except that, with respect to Munsonfosh and Munohur, you were waiting for a report from Lieutenant-Colonel Outram), the functions of the Ghudkurees, an hereditary garrison, being thus superseded; the Ghudkuree system is to be abolished, but the hereditary privileges of the Ghudkurees are to be retained by them (except when lawfully forfeited) on conditions to be clearly stated and understood by them, that their services are to be made available for other useful State purposes, such as a local police force for every district, &c.

39. The military force of the State, already limited by treaty to 400 horse and 800 infantry, is to be disbanded, saving (we trust) the faithful execution of any promises which have been given to the portion of the Sebundy who, as already noticed, had received a full pardon from Government.

40. A local corps, similar to that of Sawunt Warree, is to be formed, and employment given in it to as many as possible of the able-bodied Ghudkurees; to such of them as cannot be employed



either in this manner or on police duties you intend to hold out encouragement for engaging in cultivation.

41. An addition of three companies and a second in command is to be made to the Sawunt Warree local corps, and some portions of the forfeited possessions of the chiefs of the insurrection in that territory are to be bestowed as rewards on those who have adhered to our interests.

42. The little territory of Vishulghud, subordinate to Kolapoor, has been taken, for the present, under British management.

43. Finally, Lieutenant-Colonel Ovens having resigned the offices of Resident at Sattara and the command of the troops at that station, you have conferred those appointments upon Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, in consideration of the gallant and energetic spirit in which his operations in Sawunt Warree have been undertaken, and the ability with which they have been carried into execution.

44. To all these measures we have the satisfaction of giving our entire approbation.

45. In consideration of the zealous and valuable aid which Chintamun Row, the Chief of Sanglee, has afforded to your Government, both in troops and by advances of money during the disturbances, you recommended that, as one of the most gratifying marks of honour which could be conferred upon that respectable Chief, a sword, with a suitable inscription, should be presented to him by the Court. We shall take immediate steps for carrying this suggestion into effect.

46. In conclusion, we feel it a duty to express our sense of the vigour and promptitude with which the powers and resources of your Government have been placed at the disposal of the officers entrusted with the immediate conduct of the late operations. We must also applaud the sincere desire which you have manifested to ascertain and redress all real grounds of complaint, and we trust we shall find that you have been equally disposed to make due allowance for even groundless apprehensions and to be satisfied with the fewest and least severe examples, consistent with making the needful impression on the minds of the disaffected.



EXTRACTS FROM SIR JAMES OUTRAM'S MINUTE
OF JANUARY 2, 1860.¹

ON THE AMALGAMATION OF HER MAJESTY'S INDIAN FORCES WITH
THE BRITISH ARMY. (75 Paragraphs.)

The so-called mutiny.—Bear in mind how unspeakably great had been our recent obligations to the European troops of the East India Company, as well as to their glorious comrades of the Royal Army, who had cheerfully laid down their lives to save an empire that then appeared tottering to its fall. Think of the marvellous deeds of valour they had just performed, of the privations and hardships they had endured, and of the (to them) heavy losses which many of them had sustained beyond the destruction of that *kill* for which alone they could hope to obtain compensation. Remember that the Press had long teemed with denunciations of the Government on the ground that we were cruelly negligent of the claims of our own countrymen, while, as was alleged, we were needlessly caressing and enriching natives who had but scanty claims on our consideration. Recollect that for years past a painful conviction had pervaded the Army that the Government had not behaved fairly to it in the matter of prize—a conviction which led to the destruction, in Lucknow alone, of property to the extent of many tens of thousands of pounds—to the destruction, indeed, of all frangible property which could not be appropriated by the captors, who (and the men were *not* Company's soldiers) declared that 'Government should make nothing by it.' Keeping all these facts in view, let us place ourselves in the position of the Company's European soldiers, when informed that, owing to financial difficulties arising out of that mutiny which they had so zealously and successfully aided in subduing, they were—on what they regarded as a lawyer's quibble—to be deprived of that re-enlistment (with

¹ These Minutes are referred to in Book III. Ch. VI., near the close of the Second Volume.



the bounty which that re-enlistment implied) to which the Prime Minister of England had declared them fully entitled. And doing this we must admit that some allowance should be made for their conduct.

Injustice to India of amalgamation.—But granting, as I readily do, that for all the purposes of *real soldiership*—for marching, for bivouacking, roughing it in the field, and fighting, Indian regiments are superior to those that have not had the like experience of the real and distinctive elements of military life; I cannot admit either the policy or the equity of upsetting the military system under which India was gained and has been maintained—dealing a grievous blow at our Eastern Empire, imposing vast burdens on our Eastern native fellow-subjects, and inflicting cruel wrongs on six thousand English gentleman who have well acquitted themselves of their duties, though unfortunately they have but little aristocratic interest, and no Parliamentary or Press influence, simply that an increased number of the regiments of Her Majesty's Line may acquire a greater practical knowledge of their profession. If the real objects of the proposed amalgamation be merely to give Indian experience to a greater number of Royal regiments, let the twenty-four corps of the line and four regiments of cavalry, which before the mutinies were found sufficient to supplement the local force, be relieved every ten, every seven, or if need be every five years, the Imperial Treasury bearing the additional cost.

Comparative cost.—It is a fact that the local European corps of India actually cost less than the line regiments supplied from England. The pay of officers and men is alike—their rations, clothing, &c., the same. But, partly owing to the costliness of the separate dépôt system, two companies of each regiment being kept up in England—partly owing to the greater sickness to which, as a rule, they are subject for the first few years of their service—the fact is as I have stated it. The average number of line regiments coming out to India before the mutinies was $1\frac{3}{4}$ per annum: under the amalgamation system it would, even with reliefs only after fifteen or twenty years' service, be five or six per annum, involving a proportionably increased cost to the State.

The cadets of the old régime.—They have come out to India as boys—healthy, ingenuous, manly boys, ignorant of the enjoyments and dissipations of 'life' in England, and full of eager expectations



in respect of the country which is to be their *home* for the next twenty or thirty years. On their arrival they have been thrown into close contact with men who had resided long in India and acquired a knowledge of its people, its languages, its religions, and its civil and military history. From these they have taken their tone—acquiring from them a vast fund of information not to be obtained in books, and practical maxims, the result of the experience of many generations. Associating with such men, they have early become ‘ambitious to emancipate themselves from griffinhood’—in other words, to acquire a thorough familiarity with the country, its customs, and its concerns. Taking readily to field sports, they have necessarily been thrown into intimate intercourse with the natives under circumstances which begot in them kindly feelings towards the latter. They have thus early learned to penetrate below the surface of the native character, to admire its good features, and to understand and guard against its less amiable peculiarities; and thus did they acquire that knowledge of the workings of the native mind which enabled them in after-life to discharge with efficiency, and in kindness, the various military, political, departmental, and administrative duties assigned to them. Such were the men, and such was the training of the men, who have hitherto commanded the regular and irregular corps of the local army; who have been the private friends and official counselors of the chiefs and nobles and gentry of India; who have managed and controlled those enormous commissariat and other military establishments, through the working of which the native masses are brought into contact with Europeans; who have wandered amongst the rural population, and been brought into intimate relations with it in the pursuit of sport, and when officially engaged in conducting surveys, adjudicating disputes, constructing bridges, roads, and tanks, suppressing violence, redressing wrongs, and performing those numberless miscellaneous duties that so constantly devolve on military officers in this country. Deeply interested in the native masses, such men were to be found sitting for hours under the shade of a village tree in earnest colloquy with the people—listening to their tales, answering their questions, clearing their minds of misapprehensions, giving them advice, and rendering them practical aid in many ways. . . . It may be said that when amalgamation takes place, India will be supplied as before with young men



who, inspired by the prizes which the staff and departmental offices hold out, will exert themselves as earnestly and as successfully in the acquisition of local knowledge and experience as their predecessors of the local army. I reply :—‘ the thing is impossible ; the lads may bring the same earnestness, but it is impossible they can achieve equal success. They will not be placed under those conditions of early association and local training to which, much more than to formal study, the success of their predecessors was due. . . .’

[The Appendices A and B to Sir James Outram’s ‘ Amalgamation ’ Minute of January 2, 1860, must be read as a whole in order to obtain any idea of the elaborate scheme for the instruction of both private and officer, and of the equally elaborate scheme of organisation of the army staff in all grades, military and medical, which their one hundred and fifty paragraphs or clauses set forth. The following are selected from those which, in Appendix A, relate to the professional prizes to be held out for attainment by privates of the Indian Local European Army.]

Commissions.—I desire to replenish the local force with a higher class of men than those who form the present average of our British armies—to entice into our ranks the steady, sober, and moral peasants and artificers of Britain, and steady, sober, moral, and intelligent men of a still higher parentage and education, but of humble means and uninfluential connections. Such men I would seek—in the interests of the State, and for the honour and moral influence of our nation in this country—to attract to our colours by opening to every private of high moral character and superior zeal and ability, the opportunity of working his way up to the highest of our staff appointments and the highest of our military ranks and commands. I propose to make such a feat difficult of accomplishment—too difficult to awaken any reasonable jealousy of those who enter the army as commissioned officers, but still sufficiently practicable to the worthy, the able, the resolute, the industrious, to offer a strong inducement to such to enter the service.

Unattached commissions.—And I propose to allow steady, sober, intelligent, and industrious privates to attain the dignity of a commission on still lower terms. I propose to allow *any* private who by professional excellence and good conduct has raised himself to the position of a non-commissioned officer, and who having for a



certain length of time served with honour in that position, has possessed himself of the accomplishments (general and professional) required of an ensign aspiring to a lieutenant's commission, to earn for himself, as of right, by honourable service as a non-commissioned officer, an ensign's commission, with subsequent promotion according to certain defined rules. Without contending against the conversion of deserving non-commissioned officers into *regimental* commissioned officers, I abstain from recommending it as part of my scheme. I only ask that they should be furnished with *unattached* commissions; and I propose to employ them (with the position and all the social considerations attaching to commissioned officers) in the various departments and administrative posts now held by 'clerks,' 'deputy' and 'assistant commissaries,' 'conductors,' &c., whose monthly salary is equal to and above that of regimental ensigns, lieutenants, and captains. . . .

Results of proposed scheme.—And what would not be the advantage to India of the presence of such a body of men as our European local corps would become under the moral influence of the class of men I speak of, and under the influence of that fine spirit of emulation in steadiness, and mutual accomplishment, which the adoption of my scheme would induce? In what respects is that scheme impracticable? As to its expense, even if it did to a small extent increase the annual military outlay of the country, it would still be cheapness itself as compared with the cost of the amalgamation scheme; and I am convinced that if fair play be given to my scheme in its integrity—which involves superior sanitary arrangements, the encouragement of industry, &c.—the health and longevity of the troops would be so improved that a very considerable saving would be annually effected in hospital expenses (a terribly large item), invaliding charges, &c. The retiring pensions I propose conferring on unattached officers would probably be less, certainly not greater, than the average amount of retiring pensions enjoyed by uncovenanted civilians.

[From 'Supplementary Minute' by Sir James Outram, of February 11, 1860, intended as an additional appendix to his 'Amalgamation' Minute of January 2, 1860. (114 paragraphs.) On Sanitary and General Improvements for the well-being of the European soldier in India.]

'Board ship' arrangements—Officers.—Considerable care should



be taken in the selection of the officers placed in command even of the smallest detachments. I solemnly declare that I would rather a detachment were put under the control of the captain of the ship, than subjected to the command of a military officer inexperienced in, or unsuited for the management of European soldiers—of a tyrannical, hard, unsympathising, foul-mouthed man—of a puppy who, considering duty a bore, cares not to disguise his feelings; or even of a good-natured, well-meaning man of indolent and slovenly habits, given to the perfunctory performance of his work. Still more do I deprecate recruits being placed under an officer who cannot command himself, whether his inability to do so arise from want of temper or from intemperance in the use of wine. Yet, painful as it is, I am constrained to confess that I have known of many cases, in which such exceptionable men have been placed in charge of recruits; in fact I know that I accurately describe the present state of matters when I say that, in the nomination of officers to the charge of troops, these special qualifications for the officer are little considered. It is assumed that any man who has served a certain number of years in the army, and obtained a certain rank, is fit for the post. But this is a grievous mistake. Thrown together as officers and men necessarily are on board ship, no evasion of duty on the part of the former, no disingenuous fudging of work, no vicious habits, no deficiency in the qualifications for command, no indifference to the feelings or comfort of the men, can possibly escape the observation of the latter, who, poor fellows, have not much else to observe. And little idea can be formed, by those who have not investigated and pondered over the matter, of the demoralisation and permanent contempt for authority—nay, of the positive vindictiveness towards all exercising it—which may thus be acquired by soldiers in the course of a four months' voyage; to say nothing of the evil habits into which they fall, under the *ennui* of a long confinement on board ship, when deprived of that of which they never ought to be deprived—the ever-vigilant control and paternal guardianship of a firm, but benevolent, conscientious, and intelligent officer. . . .

Non-commissioned officers on board.—But, besides subalterns, the commanding officer should have a staff of experienced and efficient non-commissioned officers, in a proportion of not less than one to every fifty men. And, as well to secure an adequate supply of



these for every batch of recruits, as in acknowledgement of the great merits of that most estimable body of men, I would recommend that four non-commissioned officers per regiment should annually receive an eighteen months' modified furlough to Europe. . . .

Instruction on board.—In my former Minute I recommended that, so far as might be practicable, the systematic course of instruction in which the men had been engaged in *dépôt* should be continued on board ship. . . . But in addition to the ordinary school tuition thus recommended, it is, I think, desirable that the troops should be instructed in matters specially relating to the country whither they are proceeding: what to look for, and 'how to observe' that which will be presented to their eyes—the general geographical and ethnographical features of India—its climatic peculiarities, the influence of these on health, and the mode in which their morbid tendencies may best be neutralised. These are topics on which the medical and other officers would generally be competent to enlighten the men. But to avoid all risk of this species of instruction being neglected, I would recommend that a course of lectures (prepared under authority by some competent person) should be printed and supplied to the commanding officer of each detachment, together with an adequate supply of maps, pictures, models, and diagrams for their due illustration. . . .

Two or three hours per week, devoted by each of the officers to the instruction of those solicitous for it, in drawing, mathematics, fortification, or such other branches as they might be qualified to teach, would be but a slender tax on them, and might hereafter prove a boon of exceeding value to some of their humbler fellow-voyagers. A single hour *per diem*, devoted by each officer to friendly conversation with the men on the library books they were perusing, would not be missed by him, and could hardly fail to be appreciated by them.

And no one who has seen much of the European soldier on his first arrival in India can doubt that the lessons thus given (in Hindustani colloquial phrases, &c.) would prove to him very useful, smoothing away many of his early difficulties, and saving him from many an imposition, and many a fracas with natives. Were the medical officer to devote three hours per week, on a four months' voyage, to the instruction of such men as chose to avail themselves of his offer, in bandaging, in the use and application of tourniquets,



in the art of extemporising these by sticks and handkerchiefs—and in other such-like minor items of surgical procedure, I feel assured he would find an abundance of apt pupils.

Punishment of the 'brute' on board.—Adequately aided by the non-commissioned officers who, I have recommended, should be sent with each detachment, I believe it to be perfectly possible for a firm and judicious commanding officer entirely to put a stop to the use of that coarse and prurient language, intended for the women's ears, which, too generally, I believe, is made use of in the lower deck at night. I am as averse as any man can be to corporal punishment; but I do not hesitate to say that, were I in command of troops on a sea voyage, I would for the third offence of this nature, scourge the filthy scoundrel's back till he howled in very agony. The first offender I would put on bread and water for forty-eight hours, keeping him a prisoner near the wheel the whole time, if the weather permitted: the second I would additionally subject for a week to fatigue work of the hardest and most menial character: the third, as I have said, I would appeal to in the only way in which such a degraded animal could be successfully appealed to on board ship—by the torture of his unmanly carcase. The offence is a brutal and a cowardly one—its possible results very dreadful; and the punishment should be that suited to a brute and a coward, and one calculated by its severity to prevent a repetition of the offence by the same man, or by others.

Effect of careful attention to 'board ship' life.—And I maintain that, under a judicious system of training during a four months' voyage, very much may be done to invigorate the constitutions of our men, and to repair the evil effects of previous enervating habits—very much to enhance their efficiency as soldiers—very much to beget in them a taste for reading and simple and innocent recreations—very much to fortify them against the temptations, and moral and constitutional dangers, to which they will be exposed on landing—and very much indeed to awaken and foster in them kindly, grateful, and reverential feelings towards their commissioned superiors, by practically demonstrating to them that their present comfort and future welfare are objects of affectionate solicitude to the latter.

Refinement in barracks.—But I confess myself one of those who believe that external circumstances very powerfully influence the



inner man—that there is a very intimate connection between material and moral refinement. Every argument in favour of substituting neatness for squalor in the dwellings of the humbler classes in civil life, appears to me as logically establishing the propriety of elevating mere neatness into elegance. And every argument in behalf of uncostly and modest elegance, which is valid in respect of the civil population, I conceive to be *a fortiori* applicable to their military brethren. . . .

I ask not for the dandyism, but for the decencies of the mess-house, for extreme cleanliness, and for such little elegancies as matting for the floor, chicks for the doors and windows, uncostly but artistically commendable prints for the walls, chairs and benches a little above the roughest products of bazaar manufacture, trays (be they of the coarsest tin) to preserve the tables from the stains of porter mugs and coffee cups, metal plates for receiving pipe-ashes, and decent spittoons. . . .

Canteens.—Whatever decision be arrived at as regards the appearance and furniture of our military canteens, let us, at all events, do our utmost to induce our soldiers to seek such refreshments as they require (or fancy they require) where wholesome beverages are supplied to them, rather than go in quest of them to the vile dens which are, and ever will be, accessible to them, be our cantonment regulations ever so stringent. Give them, in our own canteens, shade and coolness (by punkahs and tatties when necessary) in the day-time—abundant illumination in the evenings—light, unadulterated beer to any extent they choose to pay for—wholesome spirits (that is spirits as little prejudicial as absolute purity can render them), when only spirits will satisfy their morbid cravings—and though they may at times exceed, their excesses will injure them less than if practised in the hot dirty bazaars, where the veriest poison is sold under the name of liquor—and where the drinking den and the brothel, when not identical, are conterminous. In the canteens they will, at least, be under surveillance and control, and when tipsy they can be at once removed to their barracks, thus avoiding the scandal and injury which the public display of their debauchery inflicts on the British name and the Christian faith. And just in proportion as we carry out the recommendations I have made in this and my previous Minute, and supplement these recommended measures by compelling our canteen-keepers to furnish



rich, strong, delicious coffee, genuine and well-made tea, and good and cheap ginger-beer, lemonade, and soda-water—by bestowing on our canteens the comforts, in the *English-looking* elegancies for which I plead—by supplying them with the means of innocent and sedentary recreation—and by covering their tables with the lightest of light and amusing, but wholesome, periodical literature—just in the same proportion shall we win our soldiers from the love of alcohol, and gradually give them a distaste for those coarser excitements in which only at present can the rougher of them realise what they call ‘life and fun,’ but from which not a hundred-brigadier-power, however energetically exerted, could *drive* them until substitutes are provided such as I have suggested.

Mental culture.—I would endeavour to supply stimuli to mental culture, and to furnish its means, to those whom the regimental school, and the prizes it holds out, fail to attract thither. And I look, in the event of the arrangement above recommended being adopted, to the officers of our military stations supplementing the efforts of Government by the delivery of lectures to the men on many interesting subjects.

Effects of such a system.—That, by providing him with amusements and offering him remunerative employment, you will convert a drunkard into a sober man, or a bad soldier into a good one—inspire a grumbler or a ‘lawyer’ with contentedness and the spirit of prompt and willing obedience—drive out invincible indolence from a lazy fellow, or confer smartness on the man of slovenly tastes and habits—I do not for a moment suppose. But I do believe that you may reclaim those who are only negatively bad, and confirm those who have good and healthy principles, and keep in the right path an overwhelming majority of those who hereafter join the army; elevating them in their own and the world’s estimation, preserving their health, vastly enhancing their efficiency, and bestowing upon our own military service a prestige which shall make it popular amongst classes higher in the social scale than those from which its ranks are now mainly recruited.



FROM A MINUTE BY SIR JAMES OUTRAM,
OF FEBRUARY 21, 1860.

ON 'MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS AFFECTING THE ORGANISATION AND
EFFICIENCY OF THE INDIAN ARMY.' (30 Paragraphs).

The 'individuality' of the soldier.—I believe that the tendency of our military system has been mischievously to repress his *individualism*, to weaken his sense of personality, and thus to check the development of that intelligent consciousness of personal capacities, and of that desire to multiply his resources of independent action, the want of which is apt to prove most lamentable in many of the contingencies of active service. . . . I believe that much more could (and ought to) be done, to augment the *individual* efficiency and practical knowledge of our men. . . . I would not leave the matter one altogether of choice. I would *compel* our men to acquire a practical knowledge of everything that could influence their individual comfort, safety, and efficiency, in every conceivable contingency of active service. I would take care that each soldier was thoroughly indoctrinated in all such practical expedients and their philosophy, as are, for example, laid down in Mr. Galton's useful little book, 'The Art of Travel.' . . . He should, moreover, be made thoroughly to understand the *rationale* of all the movements, formations, and evolutions, to the mechanical performance of which he is drilled. He should be habituated to contemplate, and to frame for himself rules of action in trying emergencies, which may at any time occur on field service—such, for instance, as those in which detached posts lose their commissioned and non-commissioned officers, or pickets are cut off from their supports (as has happened sometimes in jungly districts during the recent campaigns and in the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy, for hours, and even



days together). He should be not only theoretically, but practically trained to the procedure and precautions indispensable in that street, suburb, and jungle fighting to which no judicious leader will ever unnecessarily expose him, but which it is impossible always to avoid in the conduct of military operations. Very much more attention should be paid to his perfection in marksmanship than I fear is, or at all events used to be, the case. . . . I conceive moreover that *every* infantry soldier (and not merely a percentage of each corps) should be taught artillery drill, and often exercised in it, so as to keep him qualified to act as a gunner on any sudden emergency. . . . Four or six hours per week, in the hot season, devoted to (what for want of a better term I shall call) 'the theoretical instruction of their men,' would not be an excessive demand on the captain of a company and his subalterns. . . .

Practical drills.—I believe that they might be advantageously substituted for some of the regular 'horse in the mill' battalion parades, in which zealous commanding officers luxuriate morning and evening in the cold season, and which, in some regiments, are carried to an extent that not only wearies, but positively *stupidifies* both officers and men. It is amidst ruined buildings, and the debris of old villages, hedges, cornfields, tops of trees, broken ground, the unequal banks of nullahs, &c. &c., that the 'light infantry drill' of the smooth parade-ground can alone be perfected into that which will often be demanded of the soldier in the field. . . .

Military topography.—I hold it to be a primary duty with each officer above the rank of lieutenant, on the arrival of his regiment at any station, to familiarize himself most thoroughly with its military topography. I would that I could lay my hands on Sir Henry Lawrence's remarks on this subject. . . . Like all his words, they were words of wisdom; and as the voice of that great and good and sagacious man, speaking from his grave, they would have an influence far beyond that which I can hope will be accorded to my own feeble utterances.

Independent commands.—Most earnestly do I advocate—and for the reasons so ably and forcibly adduced by Sir Bartle Frere—the maintenance of the present arrangement by which each of the three older Presidencies is provided with a separate army. And with him I most sincerely believe, that the less we trammel our commanders—whether regimental, brigade, divisional, or chief—with



'regulations,' and the more we allow them full scope for the play of their individual energies—so long as we scrupulously exclude from commands of every kind any save those most fit to hold them, the more efficient will be our armies.

Red-tape and suspicion.—When we catch a rogue let us punish him with exemplary severity; but let us not perpetuate a system which seems to assume that every officer would be a rogue if he could, and, by its infinity of invidious checks, almost exonerates our functionaries from any regard for the pecuniary interests of the public not prescribed by the strict letter of the regulations.

Most of the details I have given involve *principles*—all of them I deem of practical importance—and when I have seemed to urge for adoption that which has been already adopted, I have merely meant to express my conviction that it has not been carried out as it *might* and *ought* to be carried out.

As regards Sir James Outram's forebodings of the evil results of amalgamation of the Royal and Indian armies, we recall attention to the following extract from a letter which appeared in the 'Times' of September 15, 1864, from its Calcutta correspondent, writing after a three years' experience of the dreaded measure :

'Everyone acquainted with military affairs can perceive that the "amalgamation" of the Indian and English armies has not worked well. Indian officers used to take a sincere interest in their labours: they knew their men well, they tried to turn them into efficient soldiers, they were content to spend their days here in the discharge of duties of which they were proud. Be the cause what it may, it is certain that this is all changed. Queen's officers hate the country with a bitter hatred, and the army has been weakened by illiberality and injustice. The disadvantages of destroying the Indian army,—disadvantages which such men as Lord Stanley, Sir John Lawrence, Sir James Outram, Sir R. H. Vivian, and Colonel Durand foresaw when they opposed the amalgamation,—are working their full measure of evil. The army now shares the feeling which is so prevalent in English society here of hating the country, and the ever-present desire to get home. Is it desirable to strengthen these views in the army?'



A despatch from Lord Cornwallis, written in 1795 to the Court of Directors, contains the following important paragraph, which, if forgotten in the letter, is not obsolete in spirit :

‘The conditions on which the European non-commissioned officers and soldiers at present in the Company’s service have enlisted cannot be altered, and therefore those men who do not choose on receiving a new bounty to re-enlist voluntarily on the usual terms in the King’s service can only be required to perform the engagements in India which they have contracted to the Company, subject during those periods to the Articles of War (which in no essential point differ from those of His Majesty) under which they enlisted, and after the expiration of those engagements they are to be furnished with passages to Europe in the Company’s ships.’

The above extract, found among Sir James Outram’s papers, was on a proposal, in 1795, to transfer the Company’s army to the Crown.

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