



or hold out. Moreover, the movement up the Pass was equally so to prevent the hill tribes rising, and closing the Bolan Pass, and stopping our communication altogether; independently of the moral effect of that movement in favour of our captive countrymen in Afghanistan under any circumstances, and of our cause, should it be determined to relieve our positions. Whatever may happen elsewhere, I am under no apprehensions of the Ameers of Scinde openly committing themselves, or that their united powers could shake us here if they did; but I am relying on our being reinforced by one regiment from Ferozepore, which is necessary for the security of this extensive and straggling cantonment.

To Mr. Willoughby he also wrote on the same date, forwarding a copy of the letter from which we have last extracted. In this he says:—

I think Brigadier England wrong to move on to Pisheen as he appears to intend, before the remainder of his brigade ascends the Pass, for that movement will *now* do no good either to General Nott (who says he is not prepared to send an escort to receive the supplies) or to any one else; whereas, his remaining at Quetta a week longer, will enable his rear detachment to join, and deter the tribes from attempting to oppose it going up the Pass,—or, he would be at hand to aid the ascent of the troops should they do so. As General England is not prepared to march on to Candahar till his *whole* brigade is assembled, surely he should wait till the rear detachment joins him, when the mere fact of his doing so *insures* its safety, which otherwise *may be* jeopardised.

Being at Quetta, he was ready to carry on the supplies to the Kojuck, had General Nott been prepared to send so far to receive them; *but the latter not being so*, and, moreover, it having been determined that Brigadier England's whole brigade is to take on the supplies the whole way, what possible use can there be in moving off from Quetta to *Pisheen*, there to await the junction of his rear detachment, at too great a distance to support it in the Pass should it be opposed?

Outram was no diplomatist in the too commonly received sense of the term 'diplomacy.' Had he belonged to the





times of Machiavelli and Richelieu, or moved in the social spheres of Talleyrand and Metternich, he could not have shared the laurels of success with adepts such as these. Open and honest in his ordinary dealings, only under some strong conviction of doing service to his country could he have been otherwise than plain-spoken. But reticence may be a virtue on occasions: and he could not brook that the rumour of our proposed abandonment of Afghanistan should be spread abroad one moment before the dread fiat to that effect had gone forth. 'Don't let out,' he said to Lieutenant Hammersley in the postscript of a note dated March 28: 'that Government contemplates ultimately withdrawing from Afghanistan. It is satisfactory to find, however, that it is determined to re-establish our power in the meantime. *That* I shall let out readily enough.' The very day on which this note was written, occurred a serious disaster to our troops. General England was defeated at Haikalzai, a village in the Pishin valley, about 30 miles above Kwatta, suffering a loss of 27 killed and 71 wounded. He had left the latter cantonment, escorting treasure, *en route* for Kandahar, without awaiting a detachment in completion of the full force at his disposal which had yet to work its way through the Bolan. His reasons for moving thus early, contrary to Major Outram's advice and General Nott's orders, were stated to be the want of forage at Kwatta, and the probability of obtaining a better supply at Kal'a Abdullah, four marches beyond. At this place, some eight miles east of the mouth of the Khojak Pass, he had purposed to remain until joined by the remainder of his brigade.

This serious mishap was retrieved on April 28, exactly one month after its occurrence, when the enemy's position at Haikalzai was attacked and carried by General England, with a loss of 10 wounded only, and the brigade passed on, with its treasure convoy, to Kandahar. But its effect was not fa-





avourable to British prestige, weakened the influence of British political officers, and materially embarrassed the local government. There arose from it, moreover, questions of a disagreeable nature, the discussions of which were attended with bitterness, though confined to our own camp. On one side it was urged that the military authorities had been misinformed of the strength of the enemy and the erection of stockades; on the other, the accuracy of the information afforded was defended in both respects, and the supposed importance of the enemy's defensive works was disallowed. The controversy found its way into the Bombay newspapers, and in one of them—the 'Times'—an account of the Haikalzai disaster appeared, so closely resembling the general's own official despatch on the subject dated two-and-twenty days before, as to lead to the impression that the text of that record had through some unknown agency been made available for the public enlightenment before attaining the period of legitimate publicity. Outram felt keenly the matter of this premature publication for two especial reasons. First, because he considered the reflections made therein upon the conduct of the *sipahis* engaged to have been unjust, and based upon wrong assumptions; and secondly, because he could not acquiesce in the censure awarded his assistant, Lieutenant Hammersley, for want of proper acquaintance with the disposition and movements of an enemy which had successfully opposed our troops in their advance from Kwatta.

As regards the native soldiers, it was his belief that they would ever follow and ably second a European leader. They had 'already proved on fifty occasions,' he maintained, that they were 'able and willing to meet Afghans in the field—aye, and always beat them too when led against them, without any other European assistance than that of their European officers.' In the case of Lieutenant Hammersley, Outram's open and generous advocacy brought him under the displeasure of





the higher authorities. Construing the remand of that officer to regimental duty as consistent with temporary retention of appointment, pending a further inquiry into the supposed cause of his removal from political employ, Outram took upon himself if not actually to suspend a Government order, certainly to interpret it to the advantage of his subordinate, whom he looked upon as a hardly-treated Government servant. He kept Hammersley in his post at Kwatta, on the fair plea of urgent requirements; and addressed letters on his behalf to Generals Nott and England, and Colonel Stacy. But those were busy times, and there were not many who, in the midst of heavy, responsible, and very serious work, would willingly go out of their way and devote their little leisure to inquiring into an individual grievance on which, if they had not themselves already spoken, the opinion of superior authority had been openly expressed. Among the names of men who came forward on the occasion that of Outram was almost the only influential one denoting a thorough-going, fearless advocate of the officially condemned lieutenant. It is little to be wondered that the result was failure to establish his case; and to his request that his assistant might be allowed to draw office allowances up to date of final decision on his appeal, the Secretary to Government with the Governor-General informed the political agent that compliance was impossible. 'It would,' to quote the despatch, 'sanction the step which you took of suspending that officer's removal from his situation, pending a reference to the Governor-General as to the ground upon which you assumed that he had been removed.' This decision, however, was never communicated to poor Hammersley, who died three days before the date which it bore. His mind had become seriously affected by the treatment he had experienced, and this treatment formed the subject of his incoherent utterances to the last. What Outram himself anticipated, as the





result of his chivalrous stand on behalf of his subordinate, we find in a letter to Mr. Willoughby:—‘See this correspondence about Hammersley, which I take it will end in his Lordship sending me to my regiment.’

Lord Ellenborough’s despatches, or the withdrawal orders, written on April 19, have given rise to much comment and controversy. We have no intention of discussing their merits in these pages, or comparing them with the previous instructions to Generals Nott and Pollock, Sir Jasper Nicolls, and Mr. Clerk, of March 15. Such a criticism of general policy belongs to history rather than biography. But one arrangement of the Government of India, ruling the subordination of the political to the military authority in Lower Afghanistan, Sind, and Baluchistan—in other words, investing General Nott with the chief political as well as military control in those parts—directly affected Outram. His first impression, on receipt of it, was that the change in his position was due to a too free expression of opinion in his correspondence with General England, of which a copy had been submitted by himself for the Governor-General’s information. The conclusion was natural enough under the circumstances: for this was not the sole instance in which the tone of his Calcutta letters, contrary to former practice, might be judged significant of mistrust or even censure, quite as much as of confidence or cordiality. At the same time, he admitted the wisdom of leaving the military commander unfettered and wholly responsible during the operations of war; and in due course received a laconic reply to a question put on the subject to Captain Durand, explaining that the extension of Major-General Nott’s command had no reference to him individually, but was part of a general measure.

Mr. Clerk, having forwarded a copy of two important letters he had addressed to Government, regarding the possible military movements and political questions to which





the violent death of Shah Shuja had given rise, Major Outram thus wrote officially to Mr. Maddock on May 2, 1842 :—

‘ We are well-informed that Kelat-i-Ghilzie and Candahar are amply provisioned at present ; and General Nott, having the means of keeping a strong brigade in the field, to which will be added Major-General England’s brigade, now marching on Candahar, insures the command of the resources of the country, communication with Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and the ability to provision that fortress and Candahar to any extent requisite. Upwards of 20 lacs of treasure are now at the disposal of General Nott, which, with the facility of selling bills on India, arising from so large an introduction of specie, removes any apprehension of want in that respect for a long time to come. A sufficiency of medicines, rum, &c., for six months for the whole force above the pass is now with the army. I believe, also, that a considerable supply of ammunition has been taken on by Major-General England. . . . ’

He then proceeds to estimate the probable strength of the Kandahar garrison, when reinforced, the means of carriage available, and the defensive arrangements requisite for posts such as Kwatta, Dadur, Sibi, and Chatar, adding :—

‘ So long as we are in power at Candahar, there is no risk of disturbance below the passes in Cutchee or Sind.

‘ I have thus shown that General Nott will have it in his power, on the junction of the Bombay troops, either at once to take the field at the head of 10,000 men in support of General Pollock’s advance upon Cabool—leaving every military position throughout southern Afghanistan, Beloochistan, and Sind in sufficient strength ; or, should the forward movement from Jellalabad be delayed for a season, his troops may maintain their present positions so long as necessary.



... I now proceed to state what are our prospects of securing increased means in camel-carriage for further reinforcements during such delay.'

The details then given in respect of camels would hardly interest the reader, however indicative of the writer's capacity to deal with the most practical of commissariat questions in the East. His conclusion is thus expressed:—

'With the above means, and the carriage which can be hired in this country, I estimate that two strong brigades could be equipped in time to ascend the Bolan early in October next, so as to pass through Shawl and reach Candahar before the severity of winter.'

The proposals contained in the remainder of the letter are based on the hypothesis of a concentration of the whole force, for the cold weather, at Kandahar, after the re-occupation of Kabul. They embrace the question of the future government of Afghanistan, and suggest the fitting course to facilitate the return to India of the British troops. We add one paragraph which bears directly upon a leading topic of the past year's campaign, and involves a consideration which may at any time be revived:—

'As so immediately connected with the interests of my charge (Beloochistan), I may be allowed to offer an opinion on the Candahar portion of the arrangement: 1. If this were a separate kingdom under Timour Shah, maintained by a British subsidiary force, our troops could always be supported *viâ* the Bolan or Sonmiâni routes (for the late temporary suspension of our communication could never have occurred had the simple precaution of securing water in Killa Abdoolla been taken, or a fortified post been placed in the Kojuck Pass); they would never have to encounter the vicissitudes of the extremes of climate; we should secure as





commanding an influence over the neighbouring kingdom of Cabool as if our armies continued there—because its principal channels of commerce would lay through the Candahar territory, on which the ruler of Cabool would rather depend than either the routes through the Khyber and Punjab on the one side, or Balkh and Bokhara on the other; even the products of those countries would reach Cabool more cheaply, safely, and perhaps more expeditiously by the well-protected (as they might be under this arrangement) roads from Shikar-poor, or Herat, *viâ* Candahar; we could exercise an equally commanding check to the maturing of hostile designs against British India, either at Cabool or Herat; and we should the better secure our engagements to Kelat. 2. Leaving Timour Shah in possession, but without military support, our influence at Candahar would always be paramount from being in power on the Indus, and commanding her communications with India, but of course, without military support Timour's kingdom would be liable to constant anarchy, commerce would not be fostered, and the territory of our ally, the Khan of Kelat, would be liable to infringement. . . . Whether those evils, or the advantages on the other side, are of sufficient magnitude to warrant the expense and inconvenience of maintaining a large army at such a distance as Candahar, it is not my province to discuss; and the question which must arise as to how we are to maintain our pledges to Kelat under the second arrangement, can be considered hereafter if required.'

It has been remarked, with truth, that Indian officials of the higher grades are often much overtasked in the performance of their professional duties; and that the daily routine of a London Government office is, as a rule, child's play to that of a zealous, conscientious, and responsible Anglo-Indian functionary, engaged in civil and political administration. If





this be so in ordinary times, how much stronger would be the argument under the influence of the crisis resulting to British India from the Kabul insurrection of 1841? Outram's work at Sakhar—for the ten weeks of his sojourn there in the hot weather of 1842—if judged from his correspondence only, must have been arduous in the extreme. Yet contrasted with like evidences of the immediately preceding months at Dádar, it was much in accordance with his usual practice. At these times, the number of his correspondents, the precision and frequency of his semi-official communications to each, the scope, length, and minute detail of his strictly official despatches, addressed on one occasion to the Supreme Government, on another to Bombay, or to Generals Nott, England, or Farquharson—cannot but strike the observer as marvellous. They certainly give speaking testimony to the clearness of head and exceptional ability of the writer.

On May 10, Outram received a letter from Mr. Maddock, in which was the following sentence:—‘Unless you should have received instructions of a different tenor from General Nott, you will, without prejudice to your health, at the first convenient period proceed to Quetta, or to such other point as may enable you to give the greatest aid in facilitating the movements of Brigadier England and the Major-General.’ The same day he wrote to Captain Durand:—

I have to-day received his Lordship's orders to proceed to Quetta, and shall make immediate arrangements for doing so, which I might have hesitated to do, supposing that the order arose from my own proposition to you in my letter of the 18th ultimo. This had chiefly in view to induce General England to advance to General Nott's support, that event having happily been already accomplished; but as I observe Mr. Maddock's letter, dated 28th, has taken twelve days on the way, mine of the 18th could hardly have reached you on the 28th, or tenth day. I conclude, therefore, that the order for my proceeding to Quetta must be solely caused





by his Lordship's opinion that my place is above the pass just now ; and as I can with perfect confidence entrust the conduct of affairs here to Lieutenant Brown during my absence, I must admit that Quetta is the most important position for my exertions—to facilitate so delicate an operation as the retreat of a large army down mountain defiles before an elated enemy ; and moreover to carry into effect the necessary arrangements of our future relations with the Khanate of Kelat, prior to the abandonment of the upper countries, on the subject of which I addressed Mr. Maddock officially on the 7th instant.

You must be well aware that it is at some personal risk I shall pass the burning plains of Outchee so late in the season, or ascend the Bolan when no military escort is available for me ; and I remind you of this circumstance, not with any view to enhance my services, which I value not as anything equal to what is due by me to my Government, but in the hope that this, perhaps my last opportunity of advocating a policy which I deem vitally essential to our interests in India, may be permitted to me—should you see no objection to lay my humble opinion privately before his Lordship, which it would be presumptuous in me to have intruded officially through Mr. Maddock.

You have seen with what confidence General Nott looks forward to the result of a combined advance on Cabul from Candahar and Jellalabad. General Pollock also appears to have no doubts on the subject, provided carriage can be furnished to him before the proper season to advance is past, which I consider may be any time from the beginning to the end of June or even July. In the meantime dissensions between the Barukzye and Suddozye factions with, probably, the secret influence of the Kuzzilbash tribes on our side, will weaken the enemy to such a degree that while the one party would hail our support with delight, the other would be in no condition to oppose our entrance to the capital ; nor, even allowing that the enemy did continue united to oppose us, can there be a doubt of the result, at a season when the harvest is available, and the climate is congenial to our troops. Even supposing that the Bala Hissar is held against us, I should be equally confident of speedily reducing Cabul with General Nott's siege train (four 18-pounders), in addition to the splendid field artillery with Generals Pollock and England, and also at Candahar, and we know that the rebels are deficient in gun ammunition.





Had I any personal military reputation, however great, I should have no hesitation in staking the whole on this result, i.e. that we should take Cabul, by the end of June or July, dictate our own arrangements there, and march on Ghuznee (which need not be approached by General Nott on his advance to Cabul, as it can be turned), having taken which, winter the whole army at Candahar, if too late to pass Quetta (although during ordinary years the Bolan Pass may be descended at all times), and *then* withdraw from Afghanistan on such terms as will preserve us and our allies—the Sikhs, Brahoes, and Sindians—from future insults at the hands of the Afghans.

Or, should General Pollock be disabled, by deficiency of carriage, from a forward movement this season, and find it inconvenient to support his large army at Jellalabad, he might leave adequate garrisons there and in the Khybur, and await his time at Peshawur, while General Nott can preserve his positions at Kelat-i-Ghilzie and Candahar, by securing his communication with Quetta by a post in Kojuck, without a chance of the enemy attempting any one of those positions, disheartened by previous failures, and by seeing them newly stored, reinforced, and strengthened. To this alone General Nott would confine his operations this season, if our final triumph is put off till the next. Moreover, his troops could be better supplied while thus divided, than if all were united on one spot, and he would be more ready and able to take the field when the time arrived, with a certainty of meeting no opposition on the side of Kelat-i-Ghilzie at all events.

If, therefore, a *temporary* retirement on Quetta only is contemplated—which the orders to General Nott to destroy the defences of Candahar and Kelat-i-Ghilzie would denote—I would beg most earnestly to advise that the orders to General Nott be so far modified as to leave it to his own discretion either to abandon or sustain his present positions, at any rate till October, before which period he could not descend the Bolan Pass, or traverse Cutchee, on account of the heat.

By remaining as at present, he commands, and will gather in, the resources of the country sufficient to provide for the campaign next season, if it cannot be concluded in this; he holds all the strong positions and a secure communication throughout the country from Sukkur to Kelat-i-Ghilzie; he breaks the confidence of the enemy, whose dissensions in the meantime he would be in a posi-





tion to take advantage of, should any particular turn, favourable to the views of his Lordship, in the interim occur; he insures the safety of the Cabul prisoners who, so long as we hold our positions in the country, would be preserved by those in whose possession they are, with a view to making their own terms when we re-assert our power, which they will dread so long as we do not withdraw; he reverts agitation in Scinde and Beloochistan so long as he remains in power at Candahar; and he preserves his troops in health and plenty, who, if all are brought to Quetta during the hot season, will suffer from that dreadful climate, even more severely than last year, owing to the assemblage of so large an army on the spot; while the valley of Shawl and neighbouring districts under Kelat would be unable to afford provision and forage for so long a period.

How far you may deem yourself warranted in communicating the opinion of so humble an individual as myself to his Lordship I cannot judge; but such is my opinion, founded on some practical experience and much consideration, i.e. that if Generals Pollock and Nott are allowed to exercise their own discretion as to advancing on Cabul this season, they may very probably find that they can do so without risk of failure; but that, if the campaign is deferred for a season, we shall be in a much better condition to enter upon it at our convenience by retaining our present positions until then, which we *can do without difficulty*.

I think an apology to a comrade, having the honour and interests of our country equally at heart, can hardly be required for this letter, which, however, I leave to your discretion, and that of Mr. Maddock—should you both do me the favour to exercise your judgment upon it—whether or not to lay before his Lordship.

I hope to have everything ready to leave this by the 15th, and to arrive at Quetta in a few days, being unencumbered with baggage or followers, who cannot pass through Cutchee now.

True soldier as he was, Outram, as will be seen, resolved not only to obey the letter of the instructions received, but to carry out in a loyal spirit the duties required at his hands. He was, however, mortal, and could not but feel aggrieved at the *modus agendi* adopted towards him, so different from





that to which he had been accustomed under former masters. Opening his heart to Mr. Willoughby, he has left us another letter bearing the same date as that just laid before the reader, but couched in a different strain. 'I go up,' he writes to the friendly and sympathising secretary, 'to officiate in the immediate neighbourhood, and as the humble subaltern of General Nott, where so lately I was supreme; I pass through the heat of Cutchee, and the dangers of the Bolan, to the deadly climate, privations, and annoyances of Quetta, from a comfortable house, and the comparative ease and luxury of this station—with certainly less cheering prospects, under *these* circumstances, but with undiminished zeal, and determination to fulfil the duty assigned to me, however degrading that may be in my opinion, and however lowered my personal position; but I must here in justice to myself add, that it is not my intention to remain in this country, in the subordinate capacity so assigned to me, one hour after the withdrawal of the army, and hostilities have ceased; when the necessity for a *military dictator* in these countries no longer existing, I should degrade myself by continuing in a lower position than that to which Government had thought proper to raise me, and in which, so far from in a single instance incurring displeasure, every act of mine has been highly approved, and every measure successful. Unless, therefore, the Court of Directors are pleased to order that, on the termination of hostilities in Afghanistan, General Nott's political powers over me are withdrawn, I most assuredly must respectfully resign the line in which I have so long endeavoured to serve them, and join my regiment, a poorer man than when I left it, nearly twenty years ago.

'It is in no bitter spirit I write this; these are simply the feelings of an honourable man willing to do his duty so long as he can do so without dishonour, but not gro-





velling enough to submit to the least degree of *disgrace*. As such you have long known me, my dear friend, and ever shall know me while I live.

‘I might have hesitated, probably, so strenuously to urge an immediate advance on Cabool, *now the Shah is removed*, had we not been fully equal to the task but *being so*, and having been at the cost of throwing the troops into Afghanistan, why now stop half-way?’

Fifteen days later, he transmitted intelligence to General Nott, which appeared to warrant the assumption that if he and General Pollock could advance that season on Kabul, they would carry everything before them. Stating his own opinion that Lord Ellenborough’s orders of April 19 were based on the supposition that Nott’s actual strength was insufficient to carry out the objects in view, and that the advanced positions of Kandahar and Kalât-i-Ghilzai would be untenable in winter, he dwelt upon his Lordship’s evident intention to recommence active operations at a later period, when reinforced from England. ‘I still hope,’ he continued, ‘that late favourable events in Afghanistan . . . may induce Lord E. to allow you to exercise your own discretion as to whether or not to prosecute the campaign at once, or to hold on your present positions.’ Then, after discussing the present and prospective means of carriage for the army, and stating in detail the number of camels and bullocks available, or likely to be available, for possible movements, he thus referred to home intelligence which had recently arrived by the Overland:—

‘This does not look as if the instructions Lord Ellenborough received by this Mail would authorise *backing out* of the scrape we have got into; and I have every hope we shall soon see the consequences of the home advice in new instructions from his Lordship of a more wholesome tenor





than those of the 19th ult. I leave this on the 1st proximo, and expect to be at Quetta on the 10th, where I shall be ready to receive, and most willing to execute, your commands.'

Accordingly, on the night of June 1, installing Lieutenant Brown in his own vacated post at Sakhar, he left that place to repeat the old, dreary, and perilous journey to the Passes beyond the desert. The frontier posts of Khan-garh, Chatar, and Sibi were taken on the way, and subjected to minute inspection. Reaching Dádar on or about the 8th, he was delayed there two days, to enable him to move rapidly through the Bolan, and on the night of the 11th he was again at Kwatta. Here Outram remained until the end of September, to play, as he had done elsewhere, an active and important part in the drama then engaging the attention of our statesmen at home and in India—and, be it added, to contribute materially towards its happy *dénouement*. But his personal action, while patent to the world about him, was unrecognised where it should have been rewarded: in some cases it was misrepresented, and, as we shall have to show, an incident of zeal on his part was magnified into deliberate error. At first there were, amid the thunder-clouds, gleams of sunshine and other signs of fair weather. Notwithstanding the little consideration evinced towards their political agent in the matter of subordinating his work to military control, and the doubtful courtesy of the curt replies to his references, the authorities in Calcutta were occasionally pleased to throw out expressions of approbation at a devotion out of the common order. 'His Lordship wrote to you,' are Captain Durand's words, in a letter of May 21, replying to Outram's of the 10th idem, already reproduced *in extenso*, 'upon the subject of your moving up to Quetta prior to the receipt of your request for permission





to go there; and with the hope that it might be done without too great a risk on your part of health and safety. His Lordship anticipated that neither of these considerations would by yourself be allowed to weigh against a call for your services where deemed most necessary; but still, he fully appreciates the readiness with which you willingly incur such risks in the execution of your duty.' Again, on learning of his later movements, the private secretary was instructed to forward to him the Governor-General's approval. 'I am directed . . . to inform you that his Lordship highly appreciates the public zeal you have manifested in the performance of your duty at much personal risk, by proceeding at this season to Quetta, where your exertions are especially required in aid of Major-General Nott's army.' Between five and six weeks later, came the merest scrap of a note written by Lord Ellenborough himself, in which was the following passage:—'I am much gratified by the accounts received from you to-day of the extent of carriage now at Major-General Nott's disposal, and of the facility with which you think it can be immediately increased. It is essential that the Major-General's army should have furnished to it ample means of moving in any direction; and I indulge the hope that, through your zealous and able exertions, this has now been done.'

Perhaps, however, the highest as the most substantial testimony to the value set upon his services by the Indian Government would have been the despatch of May 22, had its provisions ever been carried into effect. This paper was a remarkable one in its way, pregnant with matter, and withal brief and business-like. It opened with a quasi-lament over a system which admitted the employment, in countries to the north of India, new to our intervention, of a number of British officers equal to that of the salaried *employés* in H. M. diplomatic service throughout Europe. It expressed





the Governor-General's intention to reduce this overgrown institution to within reasonable limits, and sketched out an administrative staff for the Lower Indus, consisting of an envoy, with private secretary, and three secretaries of legation, besides whom, and a commandant of escort, no European officers would be required. It gave the envoy power to nominate and remove any and every member of his establishment, and to leave their distribution and disposal under his absolute control. It touched upon the delicate question of individual fitness, for the service contemplated, of certain European officers then in Sind or Baluchistan. Finally, Outram was requested at once to prepare nominal lists of natives whom he would propose to employ, together with a note of the duties to be entrusted, and salaries to be awarded, to each; and, as a climax to the whole project, the last of the twenty paragraphs in the despatch informed him that he himself was to be the Envoy. Thus was it worded: 'It is necessary for me to acquaint you that, on the formation of the reformed establishment, it is the intention of the Governor-General to bestow upon you the appointment of Envoy, his Lordship being perfectly satisfied with the zeal and ability you manifest in the discharge of your duty.'

But the promise here held out was not fulfilled; and, as we have already led the reader to infer, Outram never *was* the Envoy. He replied with sufficient fulness to the requisition made, to elicit an expression of the Governor-General's pleasure, in finding that his 'zealous attention' had been given to the subject; but there the matter dropped. Only he was desired, without waiting his Lordship's final orders, to adopt 'every practicable means of economy' to reduce the expense of the offices under his supervision, an object to which it will be remembered he had already turned his thoughts with substantial result.





Had the situation been more favourable to the work required, he would have fulfilled these Government behests both readily and completely. But he had other and more urgent work to attend to, in the interests of the same Government in Kalát, and to these he gave his first spare hours. In this instance, his views were, unfortunately, not those of the Governor-General. Again, had there been no Kabul disaster to repair, and had our troops never penetrated the passes of the Bolan or Khaibar, Outram would have found ample occupation of his time in putting on a sound basis British relations with Sind and Baluchistan. In neither country had our interference produced a result on which the nation, in or out of Parliament, could be heartily congratulated: and where justice has been once superseded by expediency, it is not always easy to prove satisfactorily, to comparative strangers, that the act is a mere exception to the rule. As it happened, the exigencies of the moment made Afghanistan a primary consideration; but Baluchistan, represented by Kalát, was not to be shelved or set aside; for, even in connection with the larger State, it had a special political value. To Sind we shall have to revert a little later.

During his stay at Dádar, in the winter of 1841-42, a period to which we have already referred, Outram's hands were indeed full. Had it been possible, he would then have gladly devoted himself exclusively to secure to Kalát a good government, and to enhance generally the influence of its Khan. But the urgent nature of his exceptional duties on the occurrence of the crisis in Kabul, and for many months afterwards, not only forbade the concentration of his energies on any isolated measure of diplomacy, but took him away for a time from the side of his Brahúi *protégé*. Thus, in March 1842, under the pressure of circumstances, the young chief had been deprived of his two best friends and supporters.





Colonel Stacy—rejoining his regiment to accompany Brigadier General England up the Pass, and share in the reverse as well as after-success at Haikalzai—had been replaced, in attendance on the Khan, by Captain Pontardent, of the Bombay artillery. Just three days later, Outram himself left Dádar for Sakhar, whither, for the time, he was to shift his head-quarters. But the political agent would allow neither locality, nor the pressure of internal politics, to draw off his attention wholly from his double charge, or lessen his responsibility a whit in the conduct of our relations with Kalát or Sind. His correspondence with the new agent at the former place was continuous and comprehensive. Among the topics discussed in it, none had a greater importance than the ownership of the Shál district, better known to us under the more popular name of Kwatta, its principal town.

Early in May, from the furnace of his summer quarters at the Sakhar residency, Outram put before the Governor-General his proposal—since virtually adopted by Lord Dalhousie and his successors—to substitute pecuniary for military help to the Khan of Kalát, upon the withdrawal of British troops from Kandahar. To this end, he recommended that a lakh and a half of rupees (15,000*l.*), the sum originally suggested by Captain French, be given—ostensibly, and in some sense practically—in commutation for tolls as well as remuneration for protection of merchandise. At the same time, he enclosed extracts from demi-official letters which he had addressed to Mr. Colvin in the beginning of the year, on the policy to be pursued with the Kalát State in the contingency that had now arisen, viz., our impending withdrawal from Afghanistan. As the writer was informed, in reply, that his correspondence, when embracing matter of a political nature, should be submitted through Major-General Nott, disposal of the reference became an affair of considerable





duration. Two despatches on the subject were transmitted to the General. A fortnight after, he wrote this 'demi-official' to Mr. Maddock:—

'General Nott merely acknowledges the receipt of my various letters relating to Kelat, but gives me no instructions whatever, or any intimation of what are his views. Neither does he appear into to intend to enter any consideration of the subject; for in a private letter to Lieutenant Hammersley he thus expresses his opinion: "When the Government gave me political authority, it could only have been intended the power of putting my veto on what I may deem injurious; it could not have been meant that I should interfere with details. The charge of an army of 25,000 men is quite enough." Seeing that I can look to no instructions from the General regarding the settlement of Kelat, and considering that our future quiet in Sind depends so much on a wise permanent arrangement with the chiefs of Baluchistan before we leave this country, I shall be obliged again to solicit his Lordship's consideration to the subject. . . . As I have been directed to address Government only through General Nott, officially, I must trouble you in a demi-official form, so soon as I receive a reply to a reference I have made to Captain Pontardent.'

But between the date of his second despatch to General Nott, and this letter to Mr. Maddock, he had written to the former officer asking for sanction to make over to Kalát the districts of Shál and Sibi, in the spirit of Lord Auckland's intimation that it might be good policy if the Khan were 'made to feel our disposition to give to him and his tribes this accession of power and of territory so soon as our difficulties in Afghanistan should be brought to a close.' The young Khan had behaved loyally towards us throughout a





period of disquiet and disturbance. Even on the very day that the assistant political agent at Kwatta heard of General England's reverse at Haikalzai, that officer reported well of Nasir Khan's fidelity. 'The Khan is staunch to us,' he then wrote, 'but would like a Barukzai at Kandahar.' There were other reasons why Lord Auckland's views of a fitting reward to Kalát should be acted on in anticipation of the winding-up of our relations with Afghanistan. To Outram's mind, the aspect of affairs in his neighbourhood gave an urgency to the case which brooked neither delay nor circumlocution. We quote from two paragraphs of his letter to the Major-General:—

'It appears to me that by now placing the territories in question in the Khan's hands, he will be enabled to secure their possession before the withdrawal of our troops, which, if delayed till that event, he might be unable to effect; and as I can see no advantage to us from holding them (further than merely continuing their general control as at present but on *his* behalf), I think that in fairness to the Khan we should now make them over, and during the remainder of our stay assist him in establishing government.

'Should any treaty be entered into with any of the Afghan powers, I beg to suggest that the cession of Shál and Sibi be formally stipulated; otherwise, the Khan being in possession of those districts will be a plea for the Afghans making war on him, whom we are bound by treaty to protect against foreign enemies. Although the late Khan of Kelat was not possessed of Sibi at the time we took possession of the Khanate—and that district, though once in his possession, had generally continued an appendage to Kandahar—still, as the high road of the Afghans into Kachi (which the fortress of Sibi commands), as well as being a check on the hill tribes, and as a natural fortress of Kachi, I would most strongly





recommend that it be not given up to the Durrani on any consideration. . . . ?

How the general regarded the acknowledgment of his political suzerainty, expressed by the submission to him of the political agent's proposals, may be gathered from his already quoted letter to Lieutenant Hammersley ; but perhaps the following full text of his reply to two out of the three references on the Shāl and Sibi transfer will not be bad presumptive evidence :—

Kandahar, June 28.

‘ My dear Sir,—I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letters as per margin.

‘ (Signed) W. NORT, Major-General.’

At this particular juncture, there were dangerous intriguers moving about the State of Kalāt. One Muhammad Sadik, a leader of Afghans hostile to Shah Shuja's cause, was seeking to bring about a coalition of Brahūis against the British power ; and one Muhammad Sharif, who had fled from British custody at Sakhar, was supposed to be plotting with similar intent, using Muhammad Sadik as his instrument. Outram would have rejoiced in receiving renewed sanction to strengthen the Anglo-Brahūi alliance, and so defeat the machinations of its opponents, by an act of such palpable friendliness as restoring a whole district to the Khan's territorial possessions. But the unwillingness of the Calcutta magnates to take so decisive a step was a difficulty not easily to be removed without a bold stroke of individual responsibility. Time was precious ; opportunities once missed might never occur again. There was no veto against carrying out Lord Auckland's expressed wishes referred to by Outram. The latter, reasoning from experience that he was right, and risking the rest, took upon





himself to do that for which he had vainly asked sanction, and to which sanction, if withheld, had not been refused. He cut the Gordian knot by making over Shál to the Khan, acquainting the Supreme Government with the circumstance, and soliciting authority to dispose in like manner of the district of Sibi.

As an independent exercise of judgment, the accomplished fact was coldly accepted and curtly noticed by Lord Ellenborough and Major-General Nott. Neither censure nor approval of the policy followed were vouchsafed in either case. In the letter addressed to Major Outram on the occasion from the Governor-General's head-quarters at Allahabad, we read that 'it may have been expedient to transfer Shál to the Khan of Kelat at that particular time, if it were determined that it should ultimately belong to him'; while the communication from Kandahar, acknowledging the report, 'with pleasure,' and adding, 'I daresay the Government will approve of your proceedings regarding Shál,' qualifies the courtesy so evinced by the words immediately following:—'but it was my wish to retain Quetta until my army encamped there; this would have been convenient. I regret you did not wait for my orders.' Fortunately, Outram could inform the General that the transfer would in no way interfere with his arrangements; for that our military occupation of the town would remain as before, and the resources of the district were at his disposal. More trouble, however, was involved in disposal of the question at Allahabad.

The despatch of the Supreme Government did not confine itself to the abstract fact of the transfer effected under Lord Auckland's implied sanction. It dealt with certain collateral circumstances. Outram, in excess of zeal for the interests of the State, having had recourse to a diplomacy foreign to his nature, had laid himself open to a charge of error; and the action thus taken, though not even noticed by his immediate





superior at Kandahar, was commented upon by the Governor-General in a manner which could not but wound him grievously. Not a word of objection to his proposal had been communicated by Government; so that when the General declared himself unwilling to interfere in political matters, he interpreted his position to be that of a responsible officer, virtually authorised to act on the responsibility vested in him. In this view he had addressed the Khan to the effect that he had received authority to make over the district to his Highness, as though 'a reply on the subject had just been received.' We quote from Outram's own letter, in which he certainly did not make the best of his case, but reported the occurrence against himself with the most ingenuous frankness and persuasion of rectitude. And he further aggravated his imputed offence by laying before Government a copy of his letter to Captain Pontardent, instructing that officer to explain to the Khan that the political agent had come to Kwatta mainly with the object of carrying out the transfer aforesaid—a statement strictly in accordance with the announcement contained in his letter to Captain Durand of May 10, already quoted. In the last-noted communication the two main objects of his projected move to Kwatta were specified—viz., to facilitate the retreat of the army down the passes, and to 'carry into effect the necessary arrangements of our future relations with the Khanate of Kelat, prior to the abandonment of the upper countries, on the subject of which I addressed Mr. Maddock officially on the 7th inst.' The restoration of Shál, in accordance with Lord Auckland's unrepealed instructions, was unquestionably the most important of these necessary arrangements, and, of the two objects, the settlement of Kalát affairs was that which most called for the presence of the political agent in person.

The term 'error' has been applied to Outram's procedure: but assuredly it was something more than the desire to





dispense even-handed justice which prompted a rebuke such as this :—

‘The Governor-General will not now consider to what extent, if at all, and under what circumstances, if any, it may be justifiable to resort to fiction in political transactions, but his Lordship must observe that to resort to fiction in communications to a native chief, without the shadow of justifying necessity, if any such there can be, is conduct inconsistent with the character which he desires the diplomacy of India to maintain, and calculated to shake the confidence of the Government in the fidelity of the communications it may receive from its own officers.

‘The Governor-General trusts that he shall never again have occasion to remark upon similar conduct, which he has witnessed with the greater regret on the part of an officer so able and so zealous in the performance of public duty as you have heretofore shown yourself to be.’

Outram’s reply was respectful and dignified. We quote from the concluding paragraphs of an important public despatch which introduces the personal exoneration, as it were, incidentally :—

‘In conclusion, I beg to be allowed to express my regret that my measures should have caused the severe displeasure of Government, and with the utmost deference to declare that throughout my public career no measure of political expediency, however urgent, has ever in my mind warranted a wilful departure from, or perversion of, the truth, such as I understand to be imputed to me in the despatch alluded to.

‘In the enclosures to my despatch to your address . . . I intimated the necessity for making over Shál and Sibi to Kelat before evacuating Baluchistan—a measure, the prospect





of which the late Governor-General had authorised me to hold out to the Khan. In your reply . . . no objection was made to that proposition, but I was directed to communicate in all matters relating to Kelat through Major-General Nott. It never occurred to me, consequently, that any objection was intended to the transfer of Shál, which I naturally considered one of the most important measures to be carried into effect previous to our withdrawal from Baluchistan, and a part of the final political settlement with the Kelat State . . . the principal object of my being sent up to Quetta, as a matter of course—although to aid General Nott to withdraw the troops was certainly specified, and was considered by me as a consequent duty.

‘. . . Your despatch . . . adverts to there not having been “the shadow of a necessity” for the communication to the chief of what is designated “a fiction”—I had declared in . . . my letter on which you thus animadvert, that the necessity was extreme, in the following words which I beg leave to quote, to save the trouble of reference: “I hope the measures I have had recourse to, with a view to counteract such designs—which, if successful, would have thrown Baluchistan into a flame, and involved a war with the Brahúis—will be approved by his Lordship, and have the desired effect.”

‘Under this explanation, I sincerely and earnestly hope that I may be exonerated in his Lordship’s mind from the supposition that I could wilfully pervert truth under any circumstances; and at the same time I submissively claim for any errors of judgment which I may inadvertently commit, such indulgent consideration as his Lordship may deem just to an individual situated as I here am, with no instructions or precedents to guide me; . . . harassed in body and mind by my incessant endeavours to forward the public service; kept in ignorance of the measures intended by the authorities at Kandahar, which I am expected to forward; and surrounded





by a fanatical and treacherous people whom I have to preserve in good faith, although naturally opposed to us by religion, and by awe of our enemies their neighbours—besides being goaded by recent recollections of the many hardships they have suffered at our hands, such as spoliation of their territory, sacking of their capital, and slaughter of their Khan and principal chiefs. In successfully working as I have been under these disadvantages to effect almost impossibilities, and at the sacrifice of health and every reasonable comfort, I had hoped to earn the approbation of his Lordship's Government; but although so bitterly disappointed, I shall not relax in the slightest degree my endeavour to forward the public interests.<sup>2</sup>

We have purposely dwelt upon an ungracious passage in the high and honourable career under review, hitherto little discussed, because it relates to a charge which, in the heat of much-to-be-deplored after controversy, was the severest that could be revived against James Outram; and because the rude form of its expression so affected his sensitive temperament that, were we to slur over the incident or leave it wholly unnoticed, our biography would be unwarrantably incomplete.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Lushington, an advocate of Lord Ellenborough's policy, in *A Great Country's Little Wars*, thus speaks of the restoration of Shál: 'The portion of his dominions taken from him (the Khan of Kelat) has since been restored by Lord Ellenborough. It is worth observing that to this single act of justice we may attribute the subsequent tranquillity of the country.' Further on, he alludes to this measure as 'almost the only spot upon which the eye can dwell with pleasure, in the dark history of our four years' supremacy beyond the Indus.'

*Palmarum qui meruit ferat!* How can we doubt that this act of justice, and the efforts of Outram and his assistants in 1841-2, paved the way for a better understanding with the Baluchis in later years, the full fruit of which has been seen in our operations of 1878-9. When Dr. Stocks travelled through these regions in 1850, he found the name of Outram still honoured above all others in Baluchistan. He transmitted to him a letter from one Kurd chief, old Allah Dinah, of Merv, with a postscript from another, in which the former offers 'to be always ready, as in 1842, to perform any service that may be re-





Not many hours after despatch of his letter reporting the cession of Shál, Outram was present at the capture of Muhammad Sharif, effected by Lieutenant Hammersley in command of a party of Púna horse. He explains with characteristic modesty and consistent self-denial, that he had himself accompanied his political assistant merely to afford the weight of his 'authority for any ulterior measures that might have been necessary.'

Though General Nott must have received his famous permission to withdraw *viâ* Kabul on July 20, Outram could only thus write on August 1 to Mr. Willoughby: 'Not being honoured with his Lordship's confidence regarding what is to be done by General Nott, and the General having bound Rawlinson to the strictest secrecy, he is unable to inform me; I can but give you, therefore, such insight into what is intended, as I glean from officers of the camp who have correspondents at Kandahar. This, it appears, is decided: i.e. that General Nott takes the bulk of his army northward, and General England brings the remainder this way.'

We need not linger over the events of that memorable month of August, during which Generals Nott and England moved out of Kandahar, the one in the direction of Kabul, the other in that of Kwatta; or of the still more memorable month of September, when Ghazni was deprived of the Somnát gates, and Generals Nott and Pollock entered Kabul from different sides, triumphantly to reassert the power of British India. Throughout the two months named, Outram was at his post, ever active and busy, striving to

quired of him; while his comrade, Syud Wais Shah, of Mastung, 'desires remembrances of former passages and adventures of the road,' adding that 'many others, be they of greater or lesser note, hold yet good memory of Outram Sahib.' Allah Dinah told Dr. Stocks that he was ready at Outram's call, with his whole clan, to open the Bolan and act according to orders.





fulfil the instructions, while conscious of the unjust displeasure of the Supreme Government; marvellously successful in counteracting the opposition, and obtaining the support of those among whom he was placed; and finally securing, in despite of many and serious obstacles, the practically safe and unobstructed passage through the Kohjak to Kwatta of General England's troops on their way back to Sind and India, the 'impedimenta' of the column being carried on Brahûi camels. Constant mental worry, and the distress naturally caused by the death of his assistant, Lieutenant Hammersley, at whose bedside he had watched for several nights, brought on an affection of the brain, which might have terminated fatally in the case of a man of less seasoned strength, and which compelled him, hardy as he was, to employ Captain Richardson as a temporary amanuensis. But his energy and fine spirit carried him safely through the crisis.

A letter to his old friend Mr. Bax gives a graphic view of what was really a most critical act in the drama then in progress. Its date is September 6. Elsewhere he speaks of his illness as having 'speedily brought him to the brink of the grave':—

We have weathered a storm, which had long been brewing in this quarter—fomented by the Ameers' agents from Scinde, and Mahomed Sadeeq and Saloo Khan, rebel Affghan leaders, all of whom were striving to cause the Brahoes to rise—the former, with a view to occupy us above the passes, while they should disturb the small force in Scinde, the latter that the Candahar troops should be unable to detach towards Cabool. All these schemes were thwarted, however, by various precautions and counter-workings, and by the capture of the principal mover, Mahomed Sherif—a Syud who escaped from confinement at Sukkur (two days after I left that station to come here), at the instigation of the Ameers' minister, who deputed him to embroil the Brahoes with us. I 'chuppaced' (surprised) him in the midst of the Kakur tribes,





whom he had enrolled for the purpose of bringing against us here, simultaneously with certain disaffected tribes of Brahoes (who had been successfully tampered with), and the Affghan rebels. This averted the first convulsion; but a second nearly followed when it became known that Candahar was evacuated, and that only a very small force was to return this way, having no Europeans in its composition, and scarcely any artillery, and no cavalry, the main body of the forces being taken on by General Nott to Cabool. This caused the mischief-brewers again to bestir themselves in the endeavour to seduce the Brahoes to join in opposing General England in the Kojuck, and to close the Bolan Pass. Suffice it to say that in this again they were foiled, and not only have the Brahoes continued faithful, but they will also fulfil their pledges to supply our forces with the requisite carriage cattle (6,000 camels), for which we are dependent on them, General Nott having taken almost every beast of burden with him. The very delicate operation of passing the troops down the Bolan, when having the appearance of a *retreat*, will, consequently, be effected without opposition, I trust, and with the aid, moreover, of the very tribes whom it was scarcely but fair to expect, *under such circumstances*, wou'd at least do all in their power to discompose us, if not openly turning against us. . . .

From the above you will observe that I have incurred his Lordship's displeasure, and that I have been ill. The first was caused by my taking on myself to restore the province of Shawl to Kelat, after in vain seeking instructions for two months (having stated that its immediate restoration was essential to preserve the Brahoes faithful)—*which restoration had previously been pledged by Lord Auckland!!* Notwithstanding which, and our treaty with the Khan of Kelat, Lord Ellenborough was for leaving him and the Affghans to scramble for what we ourselves had robbed Kelat of in the first instance! My having taken this . . . on my own responsibility, caused the extreme wrath of his Lordship. . . . So much for my own affairs—Oh! by the bye, I forgot the allusion to my late illness; it was a serious bout of brain fever, of which I thought little, and the doctors thought serious. Now to turn to the satisfactory fact that our troops *are* on the march (though at the eleventh hour, and doing what ought to have been done two months ago) to Ghizni and Kabul.'



To his mother he wrote cheerily at the same time :—

‘We are about to withdraw to Sukkhar, and then we shall have 10,000 men, which insures the peaceful management of our affairs in Sind, and all will be satisfactorily settled by the end of the year. In the course of this month we move down into the plains, and by about the middle of next, not a British soldier will be on this side of Sukkhar. In the intended new arrangements, I am to be styled Envoy, with Secretaries of Legation, &c.—higher titles than Political Agent and Assistants—but I do not expect any increase of salary. The duties of my new appointment will be quite a sinecure compared to what it was heretofore, when I had personally to traverse all Sind and Baluchistan with fifteen Assistants scattered over the country. . . . Everything is quiet within my charge; and I am enabled, without difficulty, to furnish the means of moving our troops from the people of the country, which is satisfactory, considering how strenuously it has been the endeavour of our enemies to turn the Brahûis against us for some time past, and how much their people had suffered at our hands until their Khan submitted a year ago.’

On or about October 1, he bade farewell to Kwatta. Before leaving, he despatched one of his last letters to his esteemed friend and trusted adviser, Colonel John Sutherland. In this he ‘poured out his vexations’ on public and private matters, and entered into a long account of the ungenerous treatment which he had experienced at the hands of the Supreme Government. And it was unjust as well as ungenerous; but the climax had not yet been attained. Another injury was to be inflicted, the cause of which can only be traced, on the one hand, to that secret pernicious influence which affects an Indian pro-consul as well as a European Court, and, on the other, to the infatuation yielding to that influence. He thus unburdened himself to his confidant :—

‘Human nature could hardly be tried beyond what I have had to endure during the past few months. The disgrace





of our Cabul disasters; the bare thought of the possibility of the more disgraceful abandonment of our honour and of our imprisoned countrymen, which was contemplated; the anxiety regarding my own Mahomedan charge; all this of a public nature have I had to endure—which, however, could be compensated by the retrieval of the honour of our army, insured by the order to march on Cabul, although issued at the eleventh hour, were it not for anxiety regarding the prisoners who *now* are jeopardised, but would not have been so had we advanced, as we could have done and should have done, two months earlier. Now for my private vexations. I complain not of military supersession, because where warfare is likely to occur, the responsibility should never be divided, and of course should rest on the military commander; I complain not of being bandied like a racket-ball, up and down this abominable pass, because it is my duty to go wherever it is thought I am most required; but I do complain of the *lackey* style in which I am treated by the Governor-General; of the bitter reproof he so lavishly bestows on me when he thinks me wrong, and I know I am right; of the withering neglect with which he treats the devoted services of those in my department; of the unjust sacrifice of one of my most deserving assistants; of the unceremonious dismissal of five others without any communication to myself whatever on the subject. Such treatment (caused solely by his Lordship's vexation at my advocacy of the advance on Cabul and poor Hammersley's cause) would have goaded many men to madness; but I verily believe it has been the resurrection of me from the very jaws of death—like Marryat's middy—for, when in extreme danger the other day (brought on, by the bye, by attendance on the death-bed of poor Hammersley, whose death the medical men declare was accelerated, if not positively caused, by the treatment he received), the most insulting letter I ever received in my life . . . arrived; my





eager desire to reply to which gave a fillip to my system from which I benefited at any rate.'

Accompanying General England through the only part of the Bolan Pass where molestation was considered likely, and himself aiding to flank the heights at the head of Brahûi auxiliaries, he pushed on alone to Dâdar. Here he prepared his long report of the evacuation of Baluchistan, and of the services rendered by himself and the officers under his orders during the critical period through which they had lately passed. At the expiration of three days, he rode rapidly into Sakhar. There were reasons for this speed, independently of political requirements and the storm-cloud overhanging the province to which he was returning. He had to report himself to a new superior officer—one whose acquaintance he had yet to make, and whose sympathy he sought to enlist, if not for himself, at least for those who had done good service in his department. But it is now time to introduce a new actor, destined to play an important part in the drama of which the closing scene was to be laid in Sind.

In the autumn of 1841, Major-General Sir Charles Napier, a tried soldier of the Peninsula, and ex-governor of Cephalonian, then in his sixtieth year, accepted from Lord Hill the offer of a command in India. Arrived at Pûna, after taking over his military charge, he did not restrict his attention to the mere neighbourhood of his place of sojourn, but soon turned his thoughts to the critical state of British relations with Afghanistan. Before long he had submitted to Lord Ellenborough, among more general remarks, his opinion on the operations necessary to be undertaken for recovering our prestige and strengthening our position in that quarter. Eventually, in August 1842, he was directed to proceed to Sind and assume command of the troops there





and in Baluchistan, with entire control over the political agents and civil officers. If the action of their chief be any criterion, this nomination was neither distasteful to the latter, nor unexpected by them. Some months prior to its notification, Outram, with a view to securing the presence of a military leader fitted by rank, experience, and energy, to direct the movements requisite to retrieve his country's reputation, had set his eye upon the old soldier as the wanting man for the left bank of the Indus, and sought to impress upon Mr. Willoughby his own conviction to that effect. 'Despatch him in a steamer,' he wrote unreservedly to the secretary on April 14, 'even if he has to stop at Sukkhar.' Referring again to the wished-for arrangement in a letter to Captain Durand of April 16, he says of the proposed nominee: 'General Napier, whose character seems formed for such a crisis.'

The General had been at Sakhar for about a week when Outram arrived there on October 12. There is every reason to believe that their mutual regard was as genuine as their first meeting was outwardly cordial. They consulted together freely and unreservedly on the more urgent political questions of which they had to take professional cognisance; and the long Dádar report was willingly delivered over to the superior officer for submission to the Governor-General. Especial attention was given to the pending negotiations with Sind, where both the Haidarabad and Khairpur rulers were, more or less, disposed to resist the demands of the British Government. It is not improbable that the return of General England's troops may have led to the supposition that we had been compelled to evacuate Afghanistan, and thus encouraged them in their unfriendliness. Under the orders of Government, communicated before his departure from Kwatta, Outram drew out a return of complaints against the Amirs for submission



to Sir Charles Napier. Before receipt of this paper the General had himself commenced a memorandum of observations on the occupation of Sind for the Governor-General's information. Among many pertinent paragraphs one asserted that several chiefs had neglected their treaty obligations; and pleaded 'abundant reasons' why, in the position then held by us in the country, we should take to ourselves Karáchi, Sakhar, Bakhar, Shikarpur, and Sabzalkot. With reference to this view, Outram repeated his impression that the parties who had 'most deeply committed themselves' were Mirs Rustam and Nasir Khan of Khairpur, and Mir Nasir Khan of Haidarabad. But the proposals involved a considerable amount of detail, into which it would be impossible to enter. We will therefore only add, to this notice of them, that the 'memorandum' was completed after personal communication with Outram, to whom the original sketch was handed for perusal. 'His experience of these countries,' wrote Sir Charles Napier, 'his abilities, and the high situation in which he has been placed by the Governor-General, render his opinion very important.' 'Since his arrival,' he continued, 'he has given me every assistance.'

On October 22, Outram told Mr. Willoughby: 'I work with hearty goodwill under Sir Charles, because he works heartily with me, and sympathises in my degradation.' The term is a strong one; but the severest blow of all had not then been delivered. On October 26, as we gather from a letter of that date again addressed to Mr. Willoughby, Outram had been remanded to his regiment, and the political establishment had been dissolved. Of the promised appointment of Envoy to the States on the Lower Indus, not a syllable was said. Neither by official nor semi-official communication was a word of explanation on the subject offered. The order bore date the 20th of the month; and thus it ran:—





'The Governor-General requests that Major-General Sir C. Napier will express to Major Outram and the other political officers, his thanks for the zeal and ability they have manifested in the collection of the means of carriage and supply, and in their various transactions with the native chiefs and tribes, tending to facilitate and secure the descent of the several columns of the army.'

Such was the only recognition, such the only reward, ever vouchsafed to Major Outram and his hard-wrought assistants, so far as Lord Ellenborough and the Government of India were concerned: and in point of fact the only official return Outram ever received for 'these three eventful years' of exceptionally arduous and important service, was this curt remand to regimental duty. Nevertheless Lord Auckland stated in the House of Lords on February 26, 1843: 'He took that opportunity of saying that, throughout these transactions, to no man in a public office was the public service under greater obligations than to Major Outram; a more distinguished servant of the public did not exist, and one more eminent in a long career.' And the President of the Board of Control, Lord Fitzgerald, in reply, expressed his 'cordial' concurrence in the terms applied by Lord Auckland to Major Outram's services.<sup>1</sup>

The reasons assigned by Outram himself for Lord Ellenborough's displeasure are detailed in the letter to Mr. Willoughby of October 22. Be it observed that in each case he had *deliberately* sacrificed his own interest to the demands of right and public honour:—

'My real offences being such as he cannot forget, i.e. my advocating poor Hammersley's cause, and opposition to the disgraceful retreat (from Afghanistan) once determined on; for in the only instance in which he fancied he had room to find fault, he has tacitly admitted that I was in the right—at least so I read the acknowledgment of my letter defending the cession of Shál, without comment or disapproval, which otherwise would have been expressed freely enough, I presume. . . . As my name does not go up with his despatches, announcing the Kabul victories, of course I shall have no share in the honours that will be showered. . . . But I regret nothing that has passed; indeed you are well aware that I fully laid my account to suffering personally in the cause





Many personal regrets at the treatment experienced might be added to many personal testimonials of unrequited service, to prove how public opinion was shocked at this unexpected result of a campaign to the success of which Outram had so essentially contributed. But we content ourselves with an extract here and there from the papers before us.

The late Brigadier-General John Jacob was, at this time, a subaltern in command of the Sind Horse. His services in protecting the line of march of the returning troops through Kachi had been handsomely acknowledged by General England, who had attributed to his exertions 'the miraculous tranquillity of the country,' and who had given him charge of the outpost of Khangarh—now Jacobabad—with two companies of infantry and two guns, in addition to his own irregulars. 'I have just received,' he wrote to Outram on October 27, 'your letter . . . about the abolition of the politicals. As far as we small fry are concerned it must be a matter of perfect indifference, I should think, to all; but *everyone* must be indignant at the . . . way in which *you* have been treated. . . . Pray accept my best thanks for all your kindness to me. One thing you may be sure of, namely, that no man was ever looked on with more profound respect and admiration than yourself, not only by your friends, but the very party against you. They might as well try to put out the sun as to throw your services in the shade!'

Much in the same strain is Colonel Sutherland's letter of October 31, in which he writes:—

'I was . . . prepared to congratulate you on attaining the highest office in the department, and you may judge of the dismay with which I received last night the order of the 19th. I could not at first believe that it applied to *you*, and I of Hammersley, months ago; and were it all to do over again, I would not vary my course. I am prepared for the worst, and fully expect it.'





cannot yet believe that it is intended to affect you injuriously. . . . If services such as yours are not to be rewarded, what is to become of us who have been leading inglorious lives in tranquil India; and if his Lordship seeks to reward only military services, where, in the lists of those who have most distinguished themselves, or raised the military reputation of their country, will he find anyone more deserving than James Outram?’

An address from the clerks of the Sakhar agency, under date October 29 - among the eight signatures to which are those of men who did much good after-service in Sind, in higher and more responsible positions—was full of gratitude and sympathy. The language may have been a little soaring and ambitious, but there can be no doubt that its spirit was genuine, and that the good wishes expressed in it were sincere. To Outram this evidence of appreciation must have been gratifying; and none the less so because it especially acknowledged the kind consideration he had shown for the personal welfare of each member of his establishment in seemingly trivial but really significant acts.<sup>1</sup>

On October 28, Sir Charles Napier had officially written his compliance with Major Outram's request to proceed, when convenient, to Bombay, intimating at the same time that a steamer had been placed at his disposal. ‘I cannot allow you to leave this command,’ he added, ‘without expressing the high sense I entertain of your zeal and abilities in the public service, and the obligations I personally feel towards you for the great assistance which you have so kindly and so diligently afforded to me; thereby diminishing in every way the difficulties that I have to encounter as your successor in the political department of Sind.’

Nor was this all that the newly arrived commander had

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix F.





to say of one whose single-minded usefulness and nobility of character had been foreshadowed to him during his short stay in Bombay, and personal acquaintance with whom set the seal of truth upon local report. We learn from the journals of the day that on November 5, a public dinner was given to Major Outram by the Military Society at Sakhar, on the occasion of his departure from Sind. At this, nearly one hundred officers of the three Presidencies were present; among them Sir Charles Napier, who, as chairman, spoke as follows:—

‘Gentlemen,—I have told you that there are only to be two toasts drunk this evening; one, that of a lady (the Queen) you have already responded to, the other shall be for a gentleman. But before I proceed any further, I must tell you a story. In the fourteenth century there was in the French army a knight renowned for deeds of gallantry in war, and wisdom in council; indeed, so deservedly famous was he, that by general acclamation he was called the knight *sans peur et sans reproche*. The name of this knight, you may all know, was the Chevalier Bayard. Gentlemen, I give you the “Bayard of India,”<sup>1</sup> *sans peur et sans reproche*, Major James Outram, of the Bombay army.”’

<sup>1</sup> This honourable epithet has since become permanently linked to the name of Outram. The fitness of the connection was quite recently referred to in an anniversary sermon, grandly eloquent in its simplicity, delivered by the Dean of Westminster to a crowded congregation in the Abbey.





## CHAPTER X.

1842—1843.

Back in Sind again.—The Amirs and their Downfall.—Extracts from Journal.—  
Defence of Haidarabad Residency.—Embarkation for England.

IF Outram's departure from Sind occasioned a spontaneous ebullition of personal regard on the part of his many friends in that province, his return to Bombay was, in every sense, a moral triumph. A Government letter, acknowledging his report of arrival, expressed the great satisfaction with which the Governor in Council had perused Sir Charles Napier's letter to his address, on taking charge of the political department he had vacated, and further assured him of the 'high gratification' which the Bombay authorities had derived 'from observing the eminent zeal and ability' with which he had 'discharged the important duties confided to him during the three past eventful years.' And in token that these were not mere words of compliment, the Governor, ten days after his arrival, offered him command of the Puna horse, an appointment just placed at his Excellency's disposal; stating his regret that there was then no post available which, in point of responsibility and emolument, would approach nearer to those he had already held in the Western Presidency, 'with such distinguished advantage to the public service, previous to . . . joining the Commander-in-Chief, in the field.'

But Outram was not disposed to remain in India one day longer than necessary, unless the State really required his presence. The formation of an army of reserve at Firúzpur had certainly made him scent possible warfare, and he had





written to Captain Durand on the subject before leaving Sakhar. But Lord Ellenborough's reply to his request to be allowed to perform in the field the military duty for which he had become available, received in Bombay, held out little prospect that his wishes would be gratified. His Lordship, it was set forth, would with pleasure make use of his services for active operations, but he trusted that there could be 'no necessity, after return of the army from Afghanistan, for any such taking place.' The Bombay appointment, honourable as it was, offered no temptation to him to forego his homeward visit after nearly twenty-four years of almost incessant work. So returning his grateful acknowledgments for the Governor's consideration, he declined the cavalry command on the plea of having sent in his application for a year's furlough.

How it was that the home project was again deferred, and that the further aid of the superseded political agent was again required in Sind, under a new designation but for the solution of an old question, we shall leave Outram to relate presently in his own words. It so happened that he was invited to a public dinner organised by the community of Bombay for the purpose of bidding him an honourable farewell, and testifying to him, on his embarkation for Europe, that his Indian career had been highly appreciated by his fellow-countrymen in the East. At this banquet all political and official matters were carefully eschewed; and Mr. Fawcett, of the house of Remington and Co., who presided on the occasion, being hampered by no ties or traditions of the covenanted service, must have been regarded as a thoroughly independent chairman. Among other happy eulogies on the guest of the evening, he said: 'Well has he been compared by a gallant officer, in another place, to the knight who, above all, bore the character of being *sans peur et sans reproche*—the noble Bayard, the pride of chivalry, the glory of France; for like him, bold in the field, wise in council, courteous and gentle in the chamber, wherever he





has moved he has been admired, respected, and beloved. The whole course of his service has been so marked with distinction that, were I to endeavour to follow it, I should have to trespass too long on your patience.

But the speaker was compelled to add that, contrary to the original object of the great gathering, their guest would need encouragement for renewed work rather than their good wishes for temporary repose. Relieved from his duties, and about to revisit his native land, he had just re-appeared among them. Now, under sudden exigency, at the call of the State, he had been replaced in harness :—

‘With that readiness to sacrifice all personal considerations which marks his character, knowing that the post of duty is that of honour, without hesitation he is preparing to return, and a few hours will see him on his route. Those who know him best cannot but be assured that, whatever the duties may be that will be entrusted to his charge, they will be fulfilled in a manner beneficial to the public interest, and honourable to himself. . . . We will not say “Farewell,” but we will cheer him on his course.’

A few days later, a similar entertainment followed at the club—more of the nature of an affectionate recognition of a comrade’s merits by members of the civil and military services—but we have no space to quote the expressions of confidence and esteem to which utterance was then given. Truly, the sunshine of social and official sympathy which the battered ‘regimental captain’ found awaiting him when he returned, a snubbed and degraded man, to those who had known him best and longest, was well calculated to cheer the warm heart which had so long chafed and toiled under the mysterious despotism then ruling the destinies of India. It encouraged him as he entered on one more phase of depressing duty under circumstances which his own journal will best explain :—





‘Having made every preparation for returning to England after twenty-four years’ absence, on the first application for leave from my duty that I had ever made—taken my passage in the steamer which was to sail on January 2, 1843—written by the previous mail to my wife and mother to meet me in London (from Edinburgh) by February 10 or 12—and in the belief that the Government of India had no further occasion for my services after the summary manner in which I had been dismissed, on November 15, from the political control of Sind and Beloochistan, without thanks or acknowledgment of any sort (and even without the direct communication from Government which courtesy, at least, would dictate towards a person who held one of the most responsible situations in India, and who had committed no error, or, at least, had been accused of none)—I was surprised at receiving, on December 12, the following letter directing me to return to Sind, should Sir Charles Napier require me, but without expressing the slightest consideration for my own wishes or convenience, and without any reference to the Bombay Government, and its Commander-in-Chief, at whose disposal I had been placed.

“From the Secretary to the Government of India.”

“To Major Outram, &c., &c.

“d/ Camp Buddee, November 24, 1842.

“Sir,—Major-General Sir C. Napier having intimated a wish to employ you as a Commissioner for the arrangement of the details of a revised treaty which is to be proposed to the Ameers of Sind, I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General will sanction any such appointment; and you will hold yourself in readiness to proceed to join the Major-General as soon as you may receive from him the notification of his requiring your services.

“I have, &c., &c.

“(Signed) T. H. MADDOCK.”





‘The summary manner in which I had been removed from my late important charge, where I had been so long the representative of Government, and the uncereemonious manner in which I was ordered back to serve in a subordinate capacity where I had previously been supreme, caused my most intimate friends to advise my declining again to place myself at the Governor-General’s disposal to the sacrifice of my private interests, especially considering my previous treatment at his Lordship’s hands, and the ungracious manner of my recall to Sind.

‘But the principle which has ever guided me throughout my career of service—implicit obedience to the orders of Government (and when, as in this case, *orders* were conveyed, and no option was left to me)—I had no hesitation in following on this occasion, and accordingly replied as follows :—“Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 24th ultimo; and to forward, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, the copy of a letter I addressed in consequence to the Political Secretary to the Government of Bombay, with that gentleman’s reply, and of my letter to the Adjutant-General of the Bombay army, in accordance with which I purpose embarking in a steamer which proceeds to Sind to-morrow. I expect to arrive at Sukkur about the 30th instant. Dated Bombay, December 13.”<sup>1</sup>

‘My departure from Bombay was delayed till December 16, in consequence of the arrival, by the Suez mail on December 14, of General Ventura, for whom the steamer in which I was to proceed to Sind was directed to be detained a couple of days. The only notice I received from the Governor-General of the devotion to Government I had thus

<sup>1</sup> We regret that economy of space compels us to omit the letter which Major Outram drafted in his journal as expressive of what he would have written had he considered his private conscience and feelings prior to public duty.’





displayed, was the simple acknowledgment of my letter through his secretary.'

Outram embarked on the date stated in the steam-frigate 'Semiramis,' which anchored off the Hujamri mouth of the Indus on December 21. He then shifted into the 'Euphrates,' one of two river-steamers towed by the larger vessel, and moved up the stream. On December 24, after dark, he was at anchor off the Haidarabad agency. During her upward course from Thatta, the Euphrates had been hailed by numerous boats bringing deputations from the several Amirs sent to welcome their old acquaintance and adviser, and anxious to obtain his assistance under the continually recurring perplexities which met them at every new step in the negotiations with his countrymen and successors. To avoid embarrassing discussions, he had been compelled to pass them by on the plea of insufficient time. At Haidarabad also, though he left the landing-place at an early hour in the morning of the 25th, he found messengers from the Amirs begging him to await visits from their masters; and excused himself from receiving them on board much in the same words used to the deputations. He, however, availed himself of the occasion to address a letter to the *darbār*, thanking the chiefs for their attentions, and expressing regret at inability to attend upon their Highnesses then, with a hope to return soon from Sakhar, after consultation with Sir Charles Napier.

The journal continues :—

'The information I obtained during my voyage up the Indus, and my previous knowledge of the chiefs of Sind, satisfied me that the reports of their warlike preparations were unfounded, probably promulgated by themselves, in the hope that our demands would be less stringent, if we supposed them in any way prepared for resistance. . . . I well knew