



abandon one of the smooth-bore guns, owing to the exhaustion of the horses. The large dilapidated masonry tank was some little distance from the road, and on reaching it Slade found the General, who, as has been seen, had arrived there some time before with the cavalry under Nuttall.

As the column came up men and horses rushed to the water, and for an hour and a half the struggle there continued, the crowd being constantly increased by the arrival of fresh stragglers. Even at the end of that time many of the men had not yet succeeded in reaching the tank, and numbers of others had not been able to obtain a drink of water. Major Leach therefore urged General Burrows to prolong the halt, but a report had reached the General that the enemy were already opening fire on the rear of the retreating force, and on these grounds he refused to remain longer at Hauz-i-Madat. The order was given for the cavalry to resume the march, when Leach again represented that the men at the tank would be left behind, and, with General Burrows's permission, he rode back with five sowars to recall them. The column left Hauz-i-Madat about 1 a.m. on the 28th July.

Brigadier-General Burrows wrote as follows of the retreat: "Towards dusk a report came from the rear that the enemy were pressing on the rear guard, and I sent General Nuttall back with the cavalry to remain until they were finally beaten off.

"Subsequently I took the cavalry across to Atakarez to water, and rejoined the guns at Hauz-i-Madat. At this place Slade had succeeded in finding some water for the wounded officers and men with him.

"Lieutenant Maclaine, R.H.A., went away to look for water here, and was not seen again.

"I waited a couple of hours to collect any stragglers there might be in the neighbourhood, and sent out a party of cavalry under Major Leach, V.C., R.E., who volunteered to go to search for them. I could not delay longer, as I feared a panic amongst the cavalry,



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and that they might leave me without protection for the guns. Some shots from *jazails* and matchlocks from surrounding villages were magnified into the enemy's guns pursuing us; every clump of trees on the sides of the road were troops of cavalry threatening our flanks; and all sorts of scares were constantly occurring."

Lieutenant Geoghegan, of the 3rd Light Cavalry, now relieved Lieutenant Monteith in command of the troops left in rear to escort the guns. This officer remained for some considerable time at Hauz-i-Madat after General Burrows left, and waited for all the men to come back from the water, the report about the guns of the enemy being in the rear proving to be entirely without foundation.

The gun teams were by this time completely exhausted, and Slade was forced to abandon the store limber wagon and spare gun-carriage, and to yoke the bullocks to the guns. Even with this assistance the guns had some difficulty in keeping pace with the cavalry, and General Burrows, who now remained behind with Captain Slade, accordingly sent Major Leach forward with an order to Nuttall "that the cavalry were to go easy, and allow the guns to come up." The cavalry nevertheless did not check their pace, and continued to press forward until an interval of fully three miles separated them from the rear guns. Major Leach was therefore sent with a second order directing the cavalry to halt, and by the time that he delivered it the cavalry were nearing Ashikan, while General Nuttall, with his orderly officer, Lieutenant J. Monteith, was a mile in rear.

At this point, and again at Ashikan, long halts were made, the latter place being reached about 5 a.m., at daybreak; here the two howitzers were abandoned. The gun teams still struggled gallantly on, and to assist them General Burrows ordered the cavalry to lend some horses, so that the limbers carrying wounded men might be brought on.



After leaving Ashikan shots were heard in front, and again an alarm, groundless as before, was raised that the enemy were pursuing in rear. The fact was that the inhabitants of Ashikan were firing on the retreating force, and Lieutenant Whitby, 1st Bombay Infantry, was killed while passing the village. At Sinjiri, which was reached at about 7 a.m., the firing was renewed, but no serious opposition was offered to the progress of the column or to its passage over the River Arghandab, which had to be crossed here. Nevertheless it was only with great difficulty that the guns were dragged over the heavy ground of the river-bed by the exhausted teams, and it was found necessary to abandon one of the smooth-bores. Meanwhile the rest of the column was halted, and when the crossing was half completed, the advance guard of a supporting force from Kandahar under Brigadier-General Brooke, consisting of 40 sabres of the Poona Horse under Captain J. W. Anderson, appeared in sight. From this time the retreating troops were relieved of the work of securing their own protection; Captain Anderson's sowars took up a position at the river-bank and saw the stragglers safely across, and then brought up the rear.

At Kohkaran General Brooke's head-quarters were met, and here a halt was made of over an hour, the wounded men were put into doolies, and stragglers were allowed to close up.

The surviving portions of General Burrows's brigade left Kohkaran at about 8.45 a.m., and marched on without further opposition until the villages close to Kandahar were reached. At about 9 a.m. Captain Slade was obliged to abandon another 6-pr., as the horses could not move it and the battery was exposed to heavy fire from the villages, but the limber with its freight of wounded was brought on. Numbers of the Duranis had taken up their position here, in the neighbourhood of Abbasabad, to harass the British troops, but their attack was repulsed by the fire of the infantry



and of the guns of C-2, and after some delay the passage through the now deserted villages was effected. The cantonments were reached by the head-quarters of the cavalry brigade at about 2 p.m., and the citadel of Kandahar half an hour later, the men having been incessantly on the move for 33 hours, in which they covered the 45 miles between the scene of the disaster and Kandahar.

The four horse artillery guns of E-B reached Kandahar safely, but the loss sustained by the battery in action and during the retreat was cruelly heavy.

The total number of men belonging to the brigade under General Burrows engaged at Maiwand was 2,476.

Of these the following casualties were reported, viz. :

	Killed and missing.	Wounded.
British Officers	21	8
„ Troops	296	42
Native Officers	11	9
„ Troops	643	109
Total	<u>971</u>	<u>168</u>
Followers	331	7
Horses	201	68

Names of Officers killed.

Captain P. C. Heath, Brigade-Major.

Major G. F. Blackwood, Commanding E-B, R.H.A.

Lieutenant E. G. Osborne, R.H.A.

„ T. R. Henn, R.E.

„ W. C. Owen, 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry.

Lieutenant-Colonel James Galbraith, Commanding 66th Foot.

Captain E. S. Garratt, 66th Foot.

„ W. H. McMath, 66th Foot.

„ F. J. Cullen, 66th Foot.

„ W. Roberts, 66th Foot.

Lieutenant M. E. Rayner, 66th Foot.

„ R. T. Chute, 66th Foot.

2nd Lieutenant A. Honeywood, 66th Foot.

„ W. R. Olivey, 66th Foot.

„ H. J. O. Barr, 66th Foot.



LOSSES AT MAIWAND

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Lieutenant C. W. Hinde, 1st Bombay Grenadiers.
" C. G. Whitby, 1st Bombay Grenadiers.
Captain H. F. Smith, 30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).
Lieutenant W. N. Justice, 30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).
" D. Cole, 30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).
Besides 11 Native Officers.

Names of Officers wounded.

Captain T. Harris, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Lieutenant H. MacLaine, R.H.A. (taken prisoner and afterwards murdered).
" N. P. Fowell, R.H.A.
" A. M. Monteith, 3rd Sind Horse.
" H. Lynch, 66th Foot.
Surgeon-Major A. F. Preston, 66th Foot.
Lieutenant-Colonel H. S. Anderson, 1st Grenadiers.
Captain J. Grant, 1st Grenadiers.
Major J. S. Iredell, 30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).
Beside 9 Native Officers.

There were lost at Maiwand a large quantity of arms and accoutrements, including over 1,000 rifles and carbines, and about 600 or 700 swords and bayonets.

The ammunition expended was as under :

—	9-pr. shell and case.	S.B. shot and shell.	Small arm.
In action	1,473	487	382,881
Lost in Ordnance Field Park	448	...	278,200
Total	1,921	487	661,081

The following were the losses among the transport, including some afterwards shot as unfit :

Camels.	Ponies.	Mules.	Bullocks.	Donkeys.
1,676	355	24	79	291

DEFEAT OF BURROWS

CSL

A total number of 455 transport followers and drivers, including one native 1st class inspector, were killed or missing.¹

About 2 o'clock on the morning of the 28th July news was brought by a jemadar of the 3rd Sind Horse to Kandahar that General Burrows had been defeated with heavy loss and that the survivors of his force were retreating to the capital. This news was confirmed an hour or two later, and before day broke shots were heard in all the surrounding villages, showing that the whole country was up in arms.

No time was lost in sending out a column to cover the retreat of General Burrows, and within an hour Brigadier-General Brooke started along the Kohkaran road with the following small force :

Poona Horse, 40 sabres (Captain J. W. Anderson).

C-2, R.A., 2 guns (Captain W. Law).

7th Royal Fusiliers, 70 rifles (Lieutenant R. P. B. Rodick).

28th Bombay Infantry, 100 rifles (Major F. C. Singleton).

This column left Kandahar at 5.30 a.m. and moving as quickly as its small numbers and the precautions necessary for its safety would allow through the gardens and enclosures of the suburbs, in all of which were armed and hostile men, it reached Kohkaran at 9 a.m. Here, as has been seen, a junction was effected with Brigadier-General Burrows.

On the appearance of the force the village was hastily evacuated by a large body of armed men, who had previously been harassing and killing all small parties of fugitives from the British force. The enemy were kept at a distance until Brigadier-General Burrows and the remnants of his column had passed; the ford over the Arghandab was held meanwhile, as has already been related, by Captain Anderson and his sowars.

Brigadier-General Brooke then began his return march, picking up on the way all stragglers from the retreating force.

¹ For strength and composition of Ayub Khan's force see Appendix XXVIII.



For about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles the march was unmolested, but information was then received from the front that the hills and walled enclosures around Abbasabad were strongly occupied by the enemy. The two guns of C-2, under Captain Law, together with a cavalry escort, were at once pushed forward; Brigadier-General Brooke followed with the remainder of the cavalry and, passing through General Burrows's force, pushed on, throwing out skirmishers to clear the gardens and villages. This was effected with trifling loss and the enemy were driven from the hills by the fire of the guns. The column then passed through Abbasabad without difficulty. Brigadier-General Brooke's force again halted and formed up after clearing the village, until General Burrows's force had passed. A company of the 7th Fusiliers was sent back to keep the outskirts of the village clear of the enemy, and to bring in all stragglers. The force then returned to cantonments, which were entered about 1.30 p.m.

At Kandahar the whole day was spent in removing the troops, baggage, sick and wounded into the citadel.

The cantonments of Kandahar, from their position below the Pir Paimal and the Picquet and Karez hills, as well as from their lack of an independent water-supply and their isolation from the commissariat and ordnance stores in the citadel, were quite untenable. It was evident that the whole population of the surrounding country was hostile; Ayub's victorious army might be expected at Kandahar within a few days, and the course adopted of defending the city seemed therefore to be the only one possible under the circumstances.

The abandonment of the cantonments was, however, completed with more than necessary haste, so much so that in several instances stores and baggage were left behind and lost. This was especially the case as regarded the removal of the engineering stores from Rahim Dil Khan's garden. By some mistake the guard was withdrawn before this duty could be completed; only a few sick sappers were left in charge of the post



530 LOSS OF ENGINEERING STORES

under Lieutenant G. T. Jones, R.E., and as men from the adjacent villages had already begun to show themselves on the garden walls, Colonel J. Hills ordered this small party to retire as quickly as possible; consequently the whole of the sappers' tents, tools, and materials belonging to the field park had to be abandoned, because sufficient transport was not on the spot to carry them away. Subsequently a party under Lieutenant Jones was sent back to the garden, but could only bring away some of the men's kits and a part of the company equipment, and a good deal of valuable property, both public and private, was left behind.

The only articles saved from the field park were some boxes of guncotton and a few barrels of blasting powder; the Royal Engineer operations therefore depended entirely on tools obtainable from the ordnance department and on regimental equipment. Fortunately these were obtainable in sufficient quantities; but no detonators were available for the guncotton, the want of which was severely felt. The whole of the demolitions, however, outside the city were completed without the use of explosives.

Shortly after dusk, Brigadier-General Brooke having reported that he could see no signs of any more of the fugitives from Maiwand coming in, and all the sick and as much as possible of the baggage having been removed from cantonments, the whole of the British force was withdrawn within the city walls, and the gates were closed.

The city of Kandahar has a quadrilateral *enceinte*, the length of its sides being approximately as follows:

Shikarpur Gate front	.	.	.	about 1,300 yards.
Herat Gate front	.	.	.	" 1,987 "
Eedgah Gate front	.	.	.	" 1,178 "
Kabul Gate front	.	.	.	" 1,700 "
Total	.	.	.	<u>6,165</u> "

The walls were of solid sun-dried mud, of an average



THE POSITION AT KANDAHAR 531

height of 30 feet, and breadth 15 feet on the north and east fronts; the ditch was 18 feet deep on those fronts; while at the south-west bastion, and between that point and the Herat Gate, there was hardly any ditch at all. Flanking fire was obtained from small circular bastions, forty-nine in number, but much dilapidated; each gate was covered by two such bastions. The curtain or parapet wall had an average height of 8 feet, its thickness varying considerably. Great numbers of outlets existed, such as canals and underground passages. These were filled up and *fougasses* placed in them.

It is doubtful if the citadel could have been held if once the outer wall had been forced. The supply of water would then have had to be obtained from a single well, and the artillery square, commissariat yard, and enclosures were all commanded by adjacent houses, while the citadel wall at this point was only a few inches thick. The danger which was therefore most feared by the garrison was an assault by the Afghans on the city walls. But the wire entanglement and the sandbags which were constructed without loss of time on and around the parapets are said to have occasioned fears of hidden mines, etc., in the minds of the *ghazis*, and within ten days from the beginning of the siege the defences of the city had been so strengthened that there was little fear of a successful attack. All the gates were protected by *abattis*, and it was known by experience that heavy mud walls have a resisting power equal, if not superior, to that of solid masonry, as was proved by experiments made in 1879 with a 6·4-in. howitzer upon the walls of old Kandahar; and the actual results obtained with the 40-prs. and 9-prs. during the siege upon the villages of Deh Khoti and Deh Khoja confirmed this fact.

The night of the 28th July passed quietly, though a few shots were heard in the direction of the cantonments, and at about 10 p.m. the Sadar bazaar, which was chiefly constructed of light wood and matting, was set on fire.



CORPS.		BRITISH.				NATIVE.			ORDNANCE. ¹		TRANS- PORT.	
		Officers.	EFFECTIVE.	SICK.	Total.	EFFECTIVE.	SICK.	Total.	Horses.	Guns.	8-in. mortars.	Bullocks.
			Non-commissioned officers and men.			Non-commissioned officers and men.						
Cavalry.	Poona Horse .	5	5	213	11	224	226
	3rd Sind Horse	5	5	358	9	367	396
	3rd Bombay											
	Lt. Cavalry .	6	6	354	29	383	355
Artillery.	E-B, R.H.A. .	4	115	19	138	123	4
	C-2, R.A. .	5	101	14	120	81	4
	5-11, R.A. .	4	90	1	95	12	4	2	372
British Infantry.	7th Fusiliers .	24	620	45	689	10
	66th Foot .	12	241	70	323	7
Native Infantry.	1st Bombay Grenadiers .	6	6	273	72	345
	4th Bombay Infantry .	7	7	533	21	554
	19th Bombay Infantry .	6	6	586	27	613
	28th Bombay Infantry .	7	7	671	36	707
	30th Bombay Infantry .	5	5	319	77	396
Sappers.	No. 2 Company Sappers	1	1	59	7	66	7
Total .		97	1,167	149	1,413	3,366	289	3,655	1,217	12	2	373

Officers 97
 Effective non-commissioned officers and men 4,533
 Sick 438
 ——— 4,971

Total 5,068

Camels 1,021
 Bullocks 135
 Ponies 602
 Mules 68

¹ Also one 6-pr. S.B. gun.



From the beginning of the siege parties were daily employed in improving the defences and strengthening the walls and gates, the latter by plates of sheet-iron. Gun platforms, traverses, ramps, and banquettes were constructed on the walls. All houses abutting on the city walls were, as far as possible, demolished, trees were felled, buildings and walls which could give cover to an enemy were levelled, so as to leave an enceinte of open ground round the city, and a wire entanglement constructed all round the foot of the walls.

Nothing was seen of Ayub Khan's soldiers until the afternoon of the 30th July, when a party of cavalry appeared near Kalachi-i-Haidar Khan, about a mile north-east of the city. An effort was made to lure them into the plain, but without success. On the 31st, however, a body of *ghazis* and mounted men having occupied Khairabad, they were attacked by a troop of the Poona Horse and 2 companies each of the 7th Fusiliers and 28th Bombay Infantry, who drove them out of the place into Deh Khwaja with a loss of about thirty. One of our sepoy was killed and three men wounded.

On the 1st August large numbers of men appeared on the hills near Kalachi-i-Haidar, and on the following day a reconnoitring party of the Poona Horse, who proceeded to that place through the Sadar bazaar and cantonments, were followed as they retired by shots from the enemy, who came streaming out from Abbasabad. A working party near the south-west bastion, around Mehr Dil Khan's garden, was also fired on, together with its covering party of the 7th Fusiliers and 4th and 28th Bombay Infantry, who, advancing in turn, killed several of the enemy with a loss of one sepoy killed and one private wounded.

On this date rations for artillery horses and officers chargers were reduced to 8 lb. of grain and 18 lb. of *bhusa*; those for native cavalry horses to 6 lb. of grain and 14 lb. of *bhusa*.

General Primrose assumed supreme political control



DESULTORY FIRING

on the 2nd August, Colonel St. John acquiescing in this arrangement.

The enemy now appeared daily on the Picquet Hill and the heights near Baba Wali, as well as in the Sadar bazaar and cantonments, from which they kept up an occasional rifle fire on the city walls.

On the 4th August a redistribution was made of the troops on the walls, 300 being allotted to each face, a first reinforcement of 200 at the Chaharsu and a second reinforcement of 100 in the Topkhana square.

The remaining men, on the alarm sounding, were to fall in on their private parade grounds, followers to be in places appointed by officers commanding regiments. Signallers to be posted in each angle bastion.

On the 6th of August firing on the working parties was continued, and Lieutenant G. A. C. de Trafford and a private of the 7th Fusiliers were wounded. The numbers of the enemy were evidently increasing and Ayub's troops pitched their camp on the Picquet Hill, the encampment being further extended on the next morning to the north of the hill.

The firing of the enemy began earlier than usual on the 8th August, and was supplemented by an Armstrong gun, which opened fire at 5 a.m., from the Picquet Hill. In consequence of this, orders were issued on the 9th for the men of the garrison to be kept as much as possible under the west walls of enclosures, so as to screen them from the enemy's fire.

In the course of that day a spy came in and reported that the whole of Ayub's army was now encamped at Chihil Zina, near the north end of the ridge to the west of old Kandahar, and was contemplating a night assault on the city.

From day to day the firing went on in a desultory fashion without any noticeable incident, and was answered by the guns of the garrison whenever opportunity offered. A skirmish took place on the 12th, when a party of the 7th Fusiliers and 19th Bombay Infantry rushed a walled garden outside the Herat face



A SORTIE PLANNED

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of the town, with the object of demolishing the walls, and killed several of the enemy, including the Governor of Farah ; our losses were one private killed, one private and eight sepoy wounded. Lieutenants G. T. Jones and E. A. Waller, R.E., very gallantly brought a wounded man of the 19th Bombay Infantry out of action under a heavy fire.

Several attempts had been made during this time to communicate with General Phayre, but it was seldom that a messenger either going or coming could elude the vigilance of the enemy (Achakzais) on the road, and several had been captured and put to death. On the 11th August, however, a letter was received from General Phayre, and a reply was sent back at once by the man who brought it.

On this date a fresh distribution of the garrison was made as follows :

Eedgah front	400
Herat front	{	Topkhana Gate	.	.	.	176
		Herat Gate	.	.	.	324
Shikarpur front	400
Kabul front	{	Kabul Gate	.	.	.	334
		Bar Durani Gate	.	.	.	166
Chaharsu reserve	200
Topkhana square reserve	100

On the 13th August the idea of a sortie was for the first time definitely put forward by Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hills, Commanding Royal Engineers, and on the 15th the details of the plan were discussed by that officer with General Primrose. The limited numbers available necessitated a modification of Colonel Hills's original plan ; but General Primrose agreed with that officer in his opinion that the attitude of the enemy in attempting a complete and careful investment of Kandahar by occupying and fortifying the adjacent villages, rendered a sortie absolutely necessary to make the Afghans show their hand.

Before resorting to this measure General Primrose

carefully searched the villages to the south and east of the city with artillery and mortar fire, but without any apparent result. He therefore determined to bombard one village heavily, and then to put some infantry through it.

The village selected was that of Deh Khwaja, situated to the east of the city, exactly opposite the Bar Durani and Kabul Gates, and running almost parallel to the city wall, distant from the former gate 600 yards, and from the latter 950 yards.

In making the selection the following points influenced the General and the officers of the council of war :

- I.—The village, Deh Khwaja, was isolated from the main body of the enemy's regular troops, who were encamped beyond Ab-basabad, some 4 miles west of the city, with Kandahar between them and Deh Khwaja, and therefore out of supporting distance.
- II.—The only supports available for the village would have to come from the south and pass over ground on which the British cavalry could act with effect.
- III.—The village lies on the regular road from Mandi Hissar to Kandahar, and it was most important that this road should be cleared and kept open for the advance of General Phayre, as the Khushab road was studded with villages, which, if held in succession by the enemy, could only have been forced at immense cost.
- IV.—Artillery had been fired from this village, and the General was anxious to ascertain what number of guns the enemy had in position there, and what was the calibre of the guns. This information was necessary, as all reports from Maiwand agreed that Ayub Khan had with him thirty guns,



including two batteries of 12-pr. Armstrongs. Up to date he had only unmasked two Armstrong guns, and it was therefore a matter of importance to prevent his establishing an overpowering artillery fire within 1,000 yards of the walls.

V.—It was desirable to confine the enemy's artillery to positions perpendicular to the shorter faces of the city walls, as batteries placed opposite the east and west fronts would take these faces respectively in reverse.

VI.—The disarrangement of the enemy's dispositions to the east would practically limit his attack to the west and south fronts, as the ground to the north is open and devoid of cover.

Accordingly on the 15th August Brigadier-General Brooke was ordered to attack the village of Deh Khwaja on the following morning, the village being previously shelled from the walls, and the advance of the troops covered by the fire of one 40-pr., two 9-prs., and two 8-inch mortars.

The artillery was ordered to open fire at 4.45 a.m., and the infantry to leave the Kabul Gate at 5 a.m.

Brigadier-General Brooke made his own dispositions for carrying out the projected attack, which were as follows :

“ I.—The force will be divided into three columns as follows :

1st	{ 7th Fusiliers (2 companies) 19th Native Infantry (2 companies)	} Under Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Daubeny.
2nd	{ 7th Fusiliers (2 companies) 28th Native Infantry (3 companies)	} Under Lieutenant-Colonel T. R. Nimmo.
3rd	{ 7th Fusiliers (1 company) 19th Native Infantry (2 companies) 28th Native Infantry (1 company)	} Under Colonel C. T. Heathcote.

“ II.—To each column will be attached an Engineer officer with a proportion of sappers with tools and powder-bags



DUTIES OF THE COLUMNS

“III.—A medical officer and sick carriage will accompany each column. The reserve ammunition will remain within the Kabul Gate. Arrangements for carrying an ample supply of water are to be made by all commanding officers.

“IV.—The following will be the duties assigned to each column :

“*The first column* will, on leaving the Kabul Gate, take the road to the right, and after proceeding 150 yards along it, advance towards the south of the village, the advance being covered by skirmishers, and the details carried out as may seem best to Colonel Daubeney, with reference to the features of the ground and the resistance offered. The object of this column is to seize a good position at the south of the village from which to advance to the north of the village, driving out all the enemy who may be met there.

“*The second column* will conform to, and follow the movements of the first; but on reaching the village will seize a position on the right of that taken up by the first column. Both columns will make their advance in as open order as possible.

“*The third column* will remain within the Kabul Gate awaiting orders. The duty assigned to them will probably be to enter the village at the main entrance, and seize the enclosure on the left of the entrance where the gun embrasure is, and clear that part of the village.

“The other instructions will be issued to the commanders of the first and second columns by the Brigadier-General on their reaching the south of the village.



"The cavalry brigade under Brigadier-General Nuttall is under orders to co-operate, and will be on the east and south of the village."

As previously arranged, the cavalry quitted the Eedgah Gate at 4.30 a.m., and trotted round into the position assigned, a few shots being fired at them, but at very long ranges, and doing no damage. The guns opened fire at 4.45 a.m., and at 5 a.m. the first two columns of infantry debouched from the Kabul Gate, making for the south of the village, which they entered under a heavy fire of musketry at 5.30 a.m.

At this moment numbers of *ghazis* were seen making their way to Deh Khwaja, across the open ground to the south of the village. They were at once charged by a troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry under Lieutenant Geoghegan, and driven back with heavy loss into broken ground, where further pursuit by the cavalry was hopeless, but where they were exposed to the fire of a 40-pr. in the south-east bastion under Lieutenant W. S. Plant.

The cavalry now formed up to the south of Deh Khwaja waiting for another opportunity to charge. Meanwhile the infantry were steadily making their way through the village, beating down all opposition. Once more the *ghazis* in large numbers tried to cross from Bala Karez to the support of Deh Khwaja; but Major R. J. Le P. Trench, 19th Bombay Infantry, met them with three well-directed volleys, which turned them; Brigadier-General Nuttall thereupon seized the opportunity, and charged again with the 3rd Light Cavalry and Poona Horse, dispersing and cutting up many of them, and they again took shelter in the *nalas* and broken ground.

Meantime the enemy's fire in the village had entirely ceased, and the programme arranged by General Brooke had been carried out as regarded all three columns. Nevertheless, General Brooke having already sent back word to the Lieutenant-General that his position was untenable, he had in consequence unfortunately been



ordered to retire. On re-forming, therefore, after the second charge Brigadier-General Nuttall received a note from Brigadier-General Brooke asking him to cover the retirement of such of the infantry as were still south of the village, into the Kabul Gate.

In consequence of this request the cavalry was withdrawn towards the Kabul Gate, covering the retirement of the supporting infantry, which with Trench's companies fell back to the city.

This retirement, however, left the infantry columns in the village entirely unsupported, and allowed the enemy's reinforcements to move up from the south, with the object of entirely cutting off the British force. In the face of determined resistance, the first two columns under Lieutenant-Colonels Daubeney and Nimmo forced their way through Deh Khwaja, debouching at about 7 a.m. from the northern end, whilst the third column under Colonel Heathcote held its ground near the centre of the village until ordered to withdraw. These three columns then began to fall back, the two former from the north of Deh Khwaja to the Eedgah Gate, and Colonel Heathcote's column from the western entrance of the village to the Kabul Gate. They rallied to a certain extent behind walls in the fields; but they suffered terribly in extricating themselves. As soon as their retirement began, the enemy again occupied the village and reopened fire, and to the whole brunt of this the columns were exposed, while the cramped nature of the ground prevented them from moving in anything but close formation.

During the retreat Brigadier-General Brooke, whilst supporting Captain Cruickshank, R.E., whom he had brought out of the village severely wounded, was shot down whilst crossing a piece of open ground to gain the shelter of a wall.

At length by 7.30 a.m. the disastrous retirement was completed. The firing had entirely ceased, and the enemy were seen streaming away from Deh Khwaja,



carrying some of their dead with them. Their loss was said to have been very heavy, several chiefs of note having been killed, and one of the two guns in the village destroyed.

Whilst the fighting was going on in Deh Khwaja the enemy opened artillery fire on the city from Picquet Hill, and from a gun in position about 1,200 yards from the west face of the city wall. They also attempted to form up their infantry in the old cantonments under cover of this fire; but such was the steadiness and accuracy with which our guns were served that they were unable to do so, and within an hour their artillery fire was silenced, and one gun on Picquet Hill dismounted.

The total number of British troops engaged was 1,556, and the casualties, as follows, were 223 in number:

	Officers.	British troops.	Native troops and followers.
Killed . . .	8	24	74, including 1 native officer.
Wounded . .	6	30	81, including 5 native officers.

Of these 31 were cavalry casualties, which arm had also 72 horses killed and wounded.

Names of Officers killed.

Brigadier-General H. F. Brooke.
Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Newport, 28th Bombay Infantry.
Major R. J. Le P. Trench, } 19th Bombay Infantry.
Lieutenant F. C. Stayner, }
2nd Lieutenant F. P. Wood, } 7th Fusiliers.
E. S. Marsh, }
Captain G. M. Cruickshank, Royal Engineers.
The Rev. G. M. Gordon, Chaplain, Church Missionary Society.

Officers wounded.

Colonel T. R. Nimmo, 28th Bombay Infantry.
Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Shewell, Deputy Commissary-General (afterwards died).
Colonel J. H. P. Malcolmson, 3rd Sind Horse.
Major T. B. Vandeleur, 2-7th Fusiliers (afterwards died).
Captain W. Conolly, 2-7th Fusiliers.
Surgeon A. K. Stewart, Poona Horse.

"No words of mine," wrote General Primrose, "can express my appreciation of the cool and gallant behaviour



of all ranks. Brigadier Brooke was killed whilst attempting to save the life of Captain Cruickshank, R.E., and by his death the service and the country have suffered a heavy loss. Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Newport, 28th Native Infantry; Major R. J. Le P. Trench, 19th Native Infantry; Captain G. M. Cruickshank, R.E.; Lieutenant F. C. Stayner, 19th Native Infantry; and 2nd Lieutenant F. P. Wood, 7th Fusiliers,—all died whilst leading their men in the most forward manner; and 2nd Lieutenant E. S. Marsh, 7th Fusiliers, was killed in helping to bring in Lieutenant Wood, who was then severely wounded. The Rev. G. M. Gordon, Church Missionary Society, was also mortally wounded whilst attending the men under a heavy fire; and I take this opportunity of paying my small tribute of admiration to a man who, by his kindness and gentleness, had endeared himself to the whole force, and in the end died administering to their wants.”

General Primrose also brought to notice the gallant conduct of Lieutenant W. St. L. Chase, 28th Bombay Infantry, who, under a “heavy fire carried a wounded man from the front into a place of safety,” also of Private Ashford, 7th Fusiliers, who accompanied and remained with Lieutenant Chase. These afterwards received the Victoria Cross.


In the course of the next few days some correspondence took place between Ayub Khan and Colonel St. John with regard to Lieutenant Hector Maclaine, who was a prisoner in the camp of the former, and who was, Ayub stated, treated with every consideration. An effort was made to effect an exchange of Lieutenant Maclaine for the son of the Sartip, but to this proposal Ayub Khan refused to consent.

Meanwhile the investment of Kandahar continued and the enemy kept up a daily artillery fire from Picquet Hill, the deserted British head-quarters, and Deh Khati to the south of the city. But the garrison, already encouraged by their success in the sortie of the 15th, were further cheered by the news that a relieving



TO ILLUSTRATE SIEGE AND OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 1880.

Nº 10
(Y)



From a sketch by Major Leach. R. E.

London, John Murray.

W. & A. K. Johnston Limited, Edinburgh & London



force was being collected at Quetta and that a strong division under Sir Frederick Roberts was marching towards Kandahar from Kabul. At first this news seemed only to cause the enemy to redouble their efforts to entrench their position, but at length on the 24th August a great commotion was observed in the Afghan camp. Guns were seen moving towards Baba Wali, and hundreds of horsemen crossed the knolls near Gundigan. At 10 o'clock in the day it became evident that the enemy had broken up their camp, and were making for the Khakrez route. A Ghilzai who had been sent out by Colonel St. John to Kushk-i-Nakhud and had been made prisoner, came in this day, and stated that the *ghazis* had dispersed, that the guns from the General's garden had been withdrawn, and that the army was going to Baba Wali; also that there had been an altercation on the previous day between Ayub and the *ghazis* about assaulting the city. The cause of this disturbance was the news that a British force had arrived at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and that Abdur Rahman had been declared Amir at Kabul.

In consequence of this information, on the following day the Assistant Quartermaster-General, with a party of the Poona Horse, rode out to reconnoitre, and found Baba Wali strongly held, but the country round quite deserted. Passing through Deh Khwaja the bodies of Colonel Newport, Captain Cruickshank and others were found, and on the return of the party to Kandahar arrangements were made for their burial. On the same day Major Vandeleur of the 7th Fusiliers died of his wounds, received during the sortie of the 15th August.

At length, about 12 noon on the 27th August, a heliograph was seen flashing in the east: communication was difficult at first owing to the dense haze, but when established it was ascertained that General Gough was at Robat, with two regiments of Bengal Cavalry. The Assistant Quartermaster-General rode out with Colonel St. John and arrived there at 5.30 p.m., and thus established communication with the advance guard of



Sir Frederick Roberts's force. The Assistant Quarter-master-General remained at Robat until the next day, and saw the Bengal Division march in.

With the arrival of the Bengal force in the neighbourhood of Kandahar the trying four weeks of siege were brought to an end. The garrison had meanwhile suffered both from wounds in action and from disease, and from the 28th July to the 1st September there were admitted into hospital—

	Sick.	Wounded.
European Troops	187	86
Native „	340	83
	<hr/> 527	<hr/> 169
Total	<hr/> 696	

It has already been mentioned that at the beginning of the siege the general health of the men improved under the influence of the excitement which the presence of the enemy caused. Later on, however, it began to decline, owing to the usual causes which affect the health of besieged garrisons—the want of fresh vegetables, accumulation of large numbers of men and animals in a limited space, etc.

The fighting men had half an ounce of lime-juice daily until the 25th August, when the supply became exhausted. Great attention was paid to sanitation by the medical officer, Surgeon-Major J. Arnott, appointed to that special duty, and by Colonel G. F. Beville, the Provost-Marshal; but owing to the villages in the immediate vicinity being occupied by the enemy, whose fire reached up to the walls, it was difficult to convey dead animals and general débris to any distance from the city, and there was consequently much difficulty in keeping the city and environs clean.

Before relating the incidents of Sir Frederick Roberts's relieving march, we must pause to notice in a few words the course of events on the southern line of communications after the receipt of news of the Maiwand disaster.

This intelligence reached Major R. Westmacott,



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Road Commandant, on the 28th July, and at 11 a.m. on that day communication with Kandahar ceased. Working parties were immediately put on to strengthen the defences of Chaman, all the smaller posts were withdrawn to that place, and every preparation made to resist attack. The whole country was in a turmoil of hostility, and reports were rife of a projected night attack on Chaman, but although the post was fired on and an effort was made by the tribesmen to waylay a convoy in the Khojak Pass on the 3rd August, yet it was safely conducted to Chaman by Major Westmacott, and no further attack was made.

The telegraph wire had meanwhile been cut, and it was not until the 13th August that Major Westmacott was able again to relay it to Kala Abdulla. It was again cut on the 15th but repaired the same day, and Major Westmacott having warned the villagers on both sides of the Khojak that they would be held responsible for its preservation, it was not again interfered with.

No further noticeable incident occurred until the end of the month, and on the evening of the 31st the advance cavalry brigade of General Phayre's relieving force, under Brigadier-General H. C. Wilkinson, reached Gatai, and moved forward next day towards Kandahar.



CHAPTER XVII

THE MARCH OF THE KABUL-KANDAHAR FORCE, UNDER SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, AND THE BATTLE OF KANDAHAR

As already related in a previous chapter, the news of the disastrous defeat of General Burrows's brigade at Maiwand, and of the consequent withdrawal of the Kandahar force within the walls of that city, reached Kabul by telegraph on the 28th July.

It was at once perceived by Generals Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts that the relief of General Primrose by way of Sind could only be carried out with delay and difficulty at that season of the year; and they therefore considered the possibility of rendering assistance by the movement of troops from Kabul. Accordingly, when called upon by the Viceroy for his opinion, Sir Donald Stewart did not hesitate to counsel the immediate despatch of a force from Kabul, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, to accomplish the object in view, and insisted on the necessity of selecting the pick of the troops under his command with the most efficient transport, thus making every effort to ensure the success of the undertaking.

The news of the decision of the Government of India to follow this advice was received on the 3rd August. It was decided that the force should leave Kabul on the 8th August, that being the earliest possible date, and it was estimated that Kandahar would be reached on the 2nd September.



Meanwhile, during the last week of July, the negotiations which had been for some time proceeding with Sardar Abdur Rahman, with a view to placing him on the throne of Kabul, had advanced satisfactorily towards a conclusion. It was now decided that his assistance should be openly asked in obtaining supplies for the force which was about to march against Ayub. Since, however, at such a crisis it would have been unsafe to place too much reliance on Afghan assurances of aid, every effort was made to ensure, by careful preparation, complete independence in the execution of the movements contemplated.

The following paragraphs, dealing with the nature of the proposed undertaking and with the measures taken to ensure its success, are taken from a paper read by Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Chapman, the Chief of Sir F. Roberts's Staff, at the Royal United Service Institution on the 9th March, 1881:

"A march conducted without a base of operations or communications of any kind through a hostile country, and towards a point presumably in the possession of an enemy who had been recently successful, could only be warranted by such necessity as had arisen; in this instance, however, the wisdom which prompted the measure, and the courage which executed it, sprang of experience and of the confidence which claims success as certainty.

"The result justified the conception, and the march from Kabul to Kandahar has been recognised as a great achievement. It will be remembered that at the time it was undertaken, and until a crushing defeat had been inflicted upon Ayub Khan at Kandahar itself, the movement was condemned in no measured terms by military critics, its originators being judged to have acted in complete disregard of the principles of military science. With troops, however, trained and equipped as were those selected for the undertaking, a commander may, humanly speaking, anticipate success in any enterprise.

“It is important to draw attention to the quality of the troops constituting the *corps d'armée* from which Sir Frederick Roberts's force was drawn, to lay stress on their superior physique, and to recall the fact that officers and men had gone through together the training of a lengthened period of active service. It is not too much to say that, in fighting power and intelligence, the troops in question could not be surpassed, whilst their equipment was in the very highest order.

“The measures of thoughtful preparation carried on during the few days that remained to Sir Frederick Roberts before the movement commenced may be classed under two heads:

- (1) The selection of the troops, followers, and baggage animals.
- (2) The survey and completion of equipment.

“No record of the work thus undertaken would be complete which did not set forward very prominently the self-abnegation and high military capacity evinced by Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, who was in supreme command at Kabul, and who, without reference to the difficult task of withdrawal by the Khyber, which was to be his share of the programme, placed unreservedly at Sir F. Roberts's disposal the entire resources of the North Afghanistan Field Force, in transport and equipment: nor would it be possible to pass by without respectful recognition the singleness of purpose and true genius with which the two commanders devoted themselves to perfect the machinery which it was intended to employ in the execution of a difficult enterprise. The spirit they evinced became the leading principle that guided all ranks in the task of preparation.

“It is hard to appreciate fully the difficulties which beset a commander in the selection of troops for special



service: it is at the same time important, in reviewing the duty which devolved on Sir Frederick Roberts when called on to name particular regiments for the service in hand, to recognise that the exceptional hardships and difficulties involved in the undertaking were exactly understood by the rank and file of the army.

"The sentiment with which the announcement that a force would march to Kandahar was received was that of a strong sense of duty, rather than the enthusiasm of troops who had their reputation to make. Very many of the corps serving at Kabul, more especially native corps, had been for two years absent from their homes; they had seen a good deal of fighting, and had suffered heavy losses in action and through sickness. The native troops in Northern Afghanistan had welcomed the possibility of an early withdrawal to India, and very justly felt themselves entitled to rest. It was not with eager desire that the honour of marching to Kandahar was sought for, and some commanding officers of experience judged rightly the temper of their men when they represented, for the General's consideration, the claim of the regiments they commanded to be relieved as soon as possible from field service. I lay stress on this fact, and claim for those officers who subordinated their own wishes in the interest of the soldiers they commanded, as also for the General who acted on their representations, an insight into the character of our native troops the result of long experience.

"It is not easy to estimate the confidence created by such knowledge as was thus brought to bear on the question of selection, nor rightly to describe the sense of duty and of absolute trust in their commanders which marked the behaviour of the troops at this time.

"The enthusiasm which carried Sir Frederick Roberts's force with exceptional rapidity to Kandahar was an after-growth evolved by the enterprise itself,



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and came as a response to the unfailing spirit which animated the leader himself."

On the 3rd August the detail of the force placed under the command of Sir Frederick Roberts for the relief of Kandahar, and styled the Kabul-Kandahar Force, was published as follows :

		BRITISH.		NATIVE.
		Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men	Officers, Non-commissioned officers and men.
Staff		79
<i>Cavalry.</i>				
Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, C.B., V.C.	9th Queen's Royal Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Bushman	19	318	...
	3rd Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. D. Mackenzie	7	...	394
	3rd Punjab Cavalry, Major A. Vivian	9	...	408
	Central India Horse, Lieutenant-Colonel C. Martin, C.B.	11	...	495
		46	318	1,297
<i>Artillery.</i>				
Colonel A. Johnson, Commanding Royal Artillery.	6-8, R.A., Mountain Battery, Major J. C. Robinson	6	95	139
	11-9, R.A., Mountain Battery, Major J. M. Douglas	6	95	139
	No. 2 Mountain Battery (Derajat), Major G. Swinley	5	...	140
		17	190	418



THE KABUL-KANDAHAR FORCE 553

Major-General J. Ross, C.B.
Major R. G. Kennedy, A.C.M.G.
Major G. de C. Morton, A.A.G.

	BRITISH.		NATIVE.
	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	Officers, Non-commissioned officers and men.
<i>1st Infantry Brigade</i> —Brigadier-General H. Macpherson, C.B., V.C.			
92nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Parker	19	651	...
23rd (Punjab) Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Collett	8	...	701
24th Punjab Infantry, Colonel F. B. Norman	7	...	575
2nd (Prince of Wales's Own) Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Battye	7	...	501
	41	651	1,777
<i>2nd Infantry Brigade</i> —Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C.B.			
72nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Brownlow	23	787	...
2nd Sikh Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Boswell	7	...	612
3rd Sikh Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Noel-Money	7	...	570
5th Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Fitzhugh	8	...	561
	45	787	1,743
<i>3rd Infantry Brigade</i> —Brigadier-General C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E.			
2-60th Rifles, Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Collins	21	616	...
15th Sikhs, Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. Hennessey	10	...	650
4th Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel F. F. Rowcroft	7	...	637
25th Punjab Infantry, Colonel J. W. Hoggan	8	...	629
	46	616	1,916
TOTAL	274	2,562	7,511

N.B.—These numbers were ultimately slightly increased by the discharge of sick men from hospital, giving a total of all fighting ranks, European and Native, 9,987 men.

Sir D. Stewart's force, marching in the opposite direction in the spring, numbered 5,414 of all fighting ranks.



THE STAFF

The following appointments were made to the Staff:

Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Chapman, R.A., Chief of the Staff.
Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. A. Lockhart, D.A.G.
Colonel A. C. Johnson, R.A., C.R.A.
Lieutenant-Colonel Æ. Perkins, R.E., C.R.E.
Major R. Kennedy, A.Q.M.G.
Major G. de C. Morton, A.A.G.
Captain the Hon. C. Dutton, A.Q.M.G.
Major Boyes, D.A.A.G.
Major Hastings, Principal Political Officer.
Deputy Surgeon General Hanbury, Principal Medical Officer.
Major R. Combe, 10th Hussars.
Captain A. D. Macgregor, 92nd Highlanders. } D.A.Q.M.G.'s.
Captain Gaselee, B.S.C. }
Lieutenant Spratt, R.E. }
Major Pretymann, R.A., A.D.C. and Commandant at head-quarters.
Major Cowie, R.A., Commissary of Ordnance.

The Commissariat and Transport Staffs (respectively under Major A. R. Badcock and Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Low) included the following officers:

<i>Commissariat.</i>		<i>Transport.</i>	
Captain A. T. Rind, B.S.C.		Captain W. A. Wynter, 22nd Foot.	
Lieutenant C. M. Fitzgerald, B.S.C.		" G. H. Elliot, B.S.C.	
" H. M. Hawkes, B.S.C.		" G. R. Macgregor, B.S.C.	
" Lyons Montgomery, B.S.C.		Lieutenant L. E. Booth, 33rd Foot.	
		" H. J. Elverson, 2nd Foot.	
		" R. B. Fisher, 10th Hussars.	
		" R. H. Wilson, 10th Hussars.	
		" G. C. Robertson, 8th Foot.	

The transport included 1,589 yabus (Afghan ponies), 4,511 mules, 1,149 ponies, 912 donkeys, and 6 camels with hospital equipment.

The hospital was accompanied by 2,192 bearers, 115 doolies and 321 dandies, besides 286 ponies, 43 donkeys, 3 bullocks, and the 6 camels from the transport enumerated above. Commanding officers were warned to communicate with the Chief Director of Transport and to exchange such of their regimental baggage animals as were unfit for continued work.

The scale of baggage and camp equipage allowed, after some modifications, was finally fixed as follows:

To every European officer (this allowance to include camp equipment)	1 mule
To 8 officers for mess	1 "
To each staff officer on account of authorised office	80 lb.



BAGGAGE AND CAMP EQUIPAGE 555

BRITISH TROOPS.

Adjutant's Office	80 lb.
Quartermaster's Office	80 „
Paymaster's Office	80 „
To each company for books	20 „
For carriage of line gear of mounted officers	2 mules.
Carriage of armourer's tools	1 mule.
For Quartermaster's stores	400 lb.
Entrenching tools, infantry	12 mules.
Kit allowance per man	24 lb.
For each public and private follower	10 „

(Camp equipage was not taken for followers, public or private.)

Cooking pots according to Kabul scale, per troop or company	240 lb.
Per troop or company for carriage of arms of sick	1 mule.

Cavalry.

Camp equipage for veterinary stores	2 mules.
Entrenching tools (cavalry)	1 mule.
Armourer's, farrier's and saddler's shops (cavalry)	3 mules.
Mule <i>pukals</i> per troop, company or battery	2 „

Camp Equipage.

To each sepoy <i>pāl</i> of two tents	45 men.
„ „ <i>lascar</i> „ „ „ „	25 „
„ „ Mountain Battery tent	10 „

NATIVE TROOPS.

Cavalry.

The native cavalry marched with their regimental ponies only, for the conveyance of camp equipage, equipment, and cooking-pots. Each regiment received animals from the Transport Department for hospital and supplies as follows:

For armourers, farriers, and saddlers	3 mules.
For officers	80 lb.

For each bazaar, two *bantias* or attendants were allowed; these were permitted to take one mule or pony for requisite supplies.

For the carriage of arms of sick one mule was allowed per squadron.

Infantry.

For each native officer, inclusive of camp equipage	30 lb.
(Medical subordinates to rank as native officers.)	
For each native soldier, inclusive of camp equipage	20 „
For each public and private follower	10 „
Armourer's tools	1 mule.

Cooking pots.

For each native officer	10 lb.
For each company	160 lb.
Officers	80 „
For carriage of arms of sick per company	1 mule
Bazaar as for cavalry.	



SUPPLIES

The special pioneer equipment of 23rd Pioneers.

Quartermaster's stores 250 lb.

For Mountain Batteries.

Quartermaster's stores 130 „

Mule *pakhals* per troop or company, 2 per battery . . . 1.

None but authorised officers' chargers were taken, but to admit of officers being mounted when on baggage guard, officers commanding British infantry regiments were allowed to arrange for three ponies, the property of officers accompanying the regiment.

Officers' attendants were restricted to one personal servant, one groom for each horse, and one servant for every three officers in mess.

The supplies taken were as follows :

For British Troops (in regimental charge).

Tea, sugar, rum, salt	30 days.
Preserved meat	2 „
Bread-stuff.	5 „
Atta for followers	5 „

For Native Troops and Followers (in regimental charge).

Rum (for men who drink spirits)	8 days.
Atta	5 „
Dhal and salt	30 „

Sheep—Estimated requirements for 10 days.

Commissariat reserve.

Army food	500 lb.
Lime-juice	200 gallons.
Preserved vegetables (all that were available.)	

Bakeries and butcheries, with other necessary commissariat establishment, as detailed by the Deputy Commissary-General, accompanied the column.

The question of the amount and the nature of the artillery force which it would be advisable to attach to the division, was one which had been the subject of much anxious consideration. In his telegram of the 3rd August conveying his approval of the arrangements for the march from Kabul, the Commander-in-Chief expressed the opinion that, Ayub having thirty-six guns including a battery of breech-loaders, "mountain artillery is not sufficient to cope with Ayub's artillery,



THE QUESTION OF ARTILLERY 557

which is admirably served." Other considerations, however, induced him afterwards to modify this opinion, as described in the following paragraphs of Sir Frederick Roberts's despatch:

"In the detail of the forces it will be noted that the strength in artillery was not in proportion to the strength of the other branches. But there were strong reasons which made it desirable that the artillery with the column should consist only of mountain batteries. The whole question was one of grave importance, and it was not without due consideration decided that the force should proceed to Kandahar unaccompanied by wheeled artillery.

"The object was to reach Kandahar in the shortest possible time; and it was not improbable that the main road would have to be left, should the Afghan army at Kandahar endeavour to make its way towards Ghazni and Kabul by the valleys of the Arghandab or the Arghastan.

"The nature of the ground throughout Afghanistan is such that artillery can never be safely employed with cavalry alone, unsupported by infantry. Nor is rapidity of movement so much required of artillery in countries like Afghanistan, as the power of being able to operate over the most difficult ground without causing delay to the rest of the troops."

These reasons, united with the fact that a heavy battery as well as horse artillery would join the force at Kandahar, finally led to the decision that no wheeled carriage should accompany the Kabul-Kandahar Column.

At length, on Saturday, the 7th August, the arrangements for the march of the force were complete and its approximate strength then stood as follows:

British troops (including officers)	2,836	} . 9,987
Native "	7,151	
Staff officers' horses		190
Cavalry horses		1,779
Artillery mules		450
Followers		7,000
Transport animals		6,000



558 COMMENCEMENT OF THE MARCH

Meanwhile such of the troops as had been selected to form part of the Kandahar Column from the 3rd Division, Northern Afghanistan Field Force, or the columns at a distance from Kabul, had moved to within easy reach of that city on the 5th August. The next day the Cavalry Brigade under General Hugh Gough went into camp on the Bimaru plain, while the 1st Infantry Brigade, under General Macpherson, camped on the grassy plain between Siah Sang and Sherpur; the 2nd Infantry Brigade moved into Sherpur cantonments and the 3rd Infantry Brigade encamped close to the Bala Hissar.

On Sunday, the 8th August, the march began, the Cavalry Brigade moving to Chaharasia, the 1st and 3rd Infantry Brigades to Beni Hissar, and the 2nd Brigade to Indaki. The force was, however, not yet complete; 11-9, Royal Artillery (3rd Brigade), and the Central India Horse (a wing from each of the two regiments) were moving by forced marches up the Khyber line. The battery joined its brigade on the evening of the 8th, and a wing of the Central India Horse on the same day, but the other wing was delayed at Butkhak by a flood, which rendered the river impassable, and only caught up the Cavalry Brigade at Saiadabad on the evening of the 9th August.

Momentous as were the issues involved in the undertaking, yet the march itself from Kabul to Kandahar was not marked by sufficient incident to necessitate a detail of its daily progress. The following extract from the Divisional Order Book (which was quoted by Colonel Chapman in the lecture above mentioned) may be inserted as indicating the plan adopted during the earlier stages of the march:

“No. 10. *Camp, Zargunshahar, August 10th, 1880.*—When two or more brigades march together, the following will be the order of march:

1. Troops constituting the fighting line, with the first reserve of ammunition, rations, and cooking-pots for European regiments, doolies, and dandies.



THE RATE OF MARCHING

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2. Field Hospitals.
Ordnance Park.
Treasure.
Engineer Park.
Led horses.

The baggage of brigades massed, and moving in the order of movement of corps.

3. The rear guard as may be detailed.
The baggage will be controlled in brigades by brigade transport officers.

All followers, with the exception of officers' *syces* and cooks accompanying British regiments, will remain with the baggage, and will be under the control of the Provost-Marshal and his establishment.'"

With reference to the rate of marching, Colonel Chapman says:

"Although halts were ordered at regular intervals, it was found impossible to assimilate the pace and preserve a regular rate of marching. When the Highlanders led the column the Gurkhas were worn out by their efforts to keep up, and when the Gurkhas were in front the pace became generally so slow as to fatigue the Europeans and the Sikhs; yet it was very important for brigade commanders to strive at a uniform rate of marching, and to adhere to the halts of 10 minutes ordered at the end of each hour of march, as well as the breakfast halt of 20 minutes fixed for 8 o'clock.

"It will be readily understood that the collection and distribution of food, fuel, and forage, together with the establishment of markets within the limits of each brigade where the inhabitants might find a sale for articles of supply, necessitated an elaborate system; the work of marching, camping, and supply rested, however, with no inexperienced soldiers; it was not very often during the entire length of the march to Kandahar that the British troops had to substitute *chupatties* for the regular bread ration, and no instance



560 DEARTH OF WOOD AND WATER

was brought to notice in which either a soldier or a follower failed to receive his ration. The principle applied in marching, in the formation of camps, as well as in the distribution of supplies and forage, was that each individual in the moving body should, as far as possible, depend upon his own exertions. In the formation of camps, the positions of brigade and regimental head-quarters were, as far as was practicable, the same on each day, and were readily recognised; everything was left to regimental agency, and action in brigade was rarely necessary. A sufficiency of wood for the bakeries attached to British regiments was obtained with the greatest difficulty; the country is almost devoid of trees, and except near villages and when it was possible to take the roofs off the houses, strong fatigue parties had to be told off to dig up the roots of the *southern wood* and shrubs which fortunately abounded. A fair price was invariably paid for the wood, and it was found that the inhabitants were for the most part willing to sell their houses; the native troops were, however, most frequently reduced to collecting the roots of the southern wood, and on it the followers depended for fuel.

"After leaving the Logar Valley, water was, as a rule, only found at more or less extended intervals. This caused much difficulty in selecting the site of each day's encampment, with due regard to the length of the march and the presence of a sufficient supply of water.

"Long stretches of desert had often to be traversed without a drop of water, causing great inconvenience and suffering to man and beast marching under a burning sun. Fortunately, when a stream was found, the water, as far as Kalat-i-Ghilzai, was generally good and fairly plentiful. The climate showed great variations of temperature between day and night, at times as much as 80°. The sun was throughout the day very powerful, and the nights comparatively cold until Kandahar itself was nearly reached. This caused great



inconvenience to the troops, who had to march in the same clothes when the thermometer was nearly at freezing point as when it reached 110°. They also suffered greatly from constant sand-storms, and from the suffocating dust raised by the column on the march. It must also be noticed that the moon was in its first quarter when we left Kabul: the comfort derived from its light after a weary day's march, and in the preparation for an early start, cannot be over-estimated."

To turn to the diary of the march and to such details as need special notice.

August 9th.—Cavalry Brigade from Chaharasia to Saiadabad. 1st Infantry Brigade from Beni Hissar to Saiadabad (14 miles). 2nd Infantry Brigade from Indaki to Saidabad. 3rd Infantry Brigade from Beni Hissar to Saidabad.

August 10th.—Cavalry Brigade continued its march on the left bank of the Logar River, and, passing through the Tangi Wagajan, reached a point in the open country opposite Hisarak. The 1st and 3rd Infantry Brigades and divisional head-quarters marched along the right bank to near Zargunshahar (12 miles), whilst the 2nd Brigade, following a road nearer the river, continued past Zargunshahar another 4 miles to Dadu Khel.

August 11th.—Cavalry Brigade to Barak-i-Barak, along the left bank of the Logar, *viâ* Unai Saiadan and Deh Moghalan. 1st and 3rd Infantry Brigades to Patkao-Roghani (17 miles). 2nd Infantry Brigade crossed the Logar near Dadu Khel and marched over a pass across the low range abutting on the river from the west to Barak-i-Barak.

August 12th.—Cavalry and 2nd Infantry Brigades across the Logar at Ursak or Warsak, *i.e.* the spur $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of Amir Kala, and over the Zamburak Kotal to near Saidabad (16 miles). 1st Infantry Brigade to Warsak, near Amir Kala (11 miles). 3rd Infantry Brigade to Amir Kala.

Opposition was expected at the Zamburak Kotal,



but none was met. The kotal, however, itself presented a serious obstacle to the progress of the baggage animals,¹ and, though the cavalry got most of their animals over the pass that day, the whole of the baggage of the 2nd Brigade had to halt at Warsak, and the brigade had to bivouac without tents or baggage at Saidabad. One hundred men of the 5th Gurkhas held the pass during the night, and next morning recovered the baggage of the Cavalry Brigade which had been left behind. The thermometer showed 92° in the tents, although the height of the camp at Warsak was 6,800 feet above the sea; the night, however, was cold, especially on the summit and at Saidabad.

August 13th.—Cavalry and 2nd Brigades to Jakin, near Haidar Khel. 1st Brigade over the Zamburak Kotal to Haidar Khel (16 miles). 3rd Brigade up the Logar River, through the Tangi Wardak to the junction of the new Shonaz stream, and up it to Haidar Khel.

August 14th.—The whole division concentrated at Shashgao (11 miles).

On this day the whole force started at the same hour, 4 a.m. A block was caused about 3 miles from Jakin by all the troops and baggage having to converge upon one narrow road, and the rear brigades were consequently delayed two hours; after this, however, the road widened, and, the country being open, the troops moved along rapidly on a broad front. The rear guard got in at 6 p.m.

August 15th.—To Ghazni (15 miles—a total of 89 miles in seven days). The Sher Dahan Pass was crossed after being seized by a mixed advance guard. This was the only day until Kandahar was reached that the cavalry did not perform the entire duties of advance guard. At Ghazni Sir Frederick Roberts was met by the Governor, and received from him the keys of the

¹ The Zamburak Pass was crossed in the opposite direction by two brigades of Sir D. Stewart's force, each accompanied by a battery of wheeled artillery, on the 1st and 2nd May.



city gates. The force encamped on the plain to the east of Ghazni, between the city and the suburb of Roza.

A battalion occupied the citadel during the day while supplies were being collected in the town, and guards and sentries were placed in and around Ghazni.

August 16th.—To Ergatta (20 miles).

The 3rd Brigade followed the main road, and was joined by the 2nd Brigade, which had followed a line of its own across country to the west.

The Cavalry Brigade were in advance of all, the whole starting at 4.30 a.m. The baggage followed its respective brigades, and the rear was brought up by the 1st Brigade, immediately preceded by its baggage. The road was a fairly good one, but as the entire force had to move by but one road for two-thirds of the distance, progress was slow. The baggage animals were now beginning to show signs of distress from continuous marching, and the above causes, added to the length of the march and a severe dust-storm, which blew during the afternoon, much delayed progress, so that the rear guard did not reach camp at Ergatta till 9 p.m.

At Nani the force diverged from the road, and the baggage animals were unloaded and allowed to graze for a couple of hours in the surrounding fields. But for this timely and judicious halt and feed, many animals would doubtless have succumbed to the fatigues of this trying march, which was a severe test to the men as well as the animals, both by reason of its length and of the absence of water for the last 7 miles. The camping ground at Ergatta was bad, and the only water-supply was from a narrow but deep watercourse, full of treacherous quicksands, which brought many of the baggage animals to grief, while the water was soon fouled by the passage of the column at several points.

No local supplies were forthcoming; indeed none existed, and many of the animals remained unfed. This evil, however, was mitigated by the halt and feed which had taken place at Nani.



August 17th.—To Chardeh (13 miles).

During this march a cavalry patrol was fired on, and at Chardeh the villagers showed considerable reluctance in complying with requisitions, asserting that they had previously been looted by ghazis. A good supply of forage, however, was forthcoming for the baggage animals. In the evening 300 men were sent out to seize and impress for transport purposes 300 *Powindah* camels from an encampment within sight; some slight resistance was offered at first, but eventually an amicable arrangement was arrived at and the camels were brought into camp, 170 of them being taken on by the force.

On this day a letter was brought in by a messenger from the officer commanding at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, Colonel O. V. Tanner, dated the 12th August, giving news from Kandahar up to the 8th, to the effect that the place was closely invested, but that the garrison had two months' supplies and fifteen days' forage for the animals. Round Kalat-i-Ghilzai the country was quiet, and its garrison was awaiting with confidence the early arrival of the Kabul force.

August 18th.—To Karez-i-Oba (16 miles).

August 19th.—To Mukur (14 miles).

The cavalry covered the front of the advance, the infantry moving by brigades in three parallel lines, with rear guards formed of two companies from each of the four regiments of each brigade.

August 20th.—To Kala-i-Juma (21 miles), in the same formation.

August 21st.—To Kajai (13 miles).

Heliographic communication was here opened direct with Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and news was received of the sortie by the troops of the Kandahar garrison against the village of Deh Khojah on the 16th August, in which Brigadier-General Brooke and eight other British officers fell.

August 22nd.—To Tazi (17½ miles).

The heat had now noticeably increased, and the



march was consequently begun at 2.30 a.m. At Tazi the thermometer reached 96° in the tents.

August 23rd.—To Kalat-i-Ghilzai (16½ miles, total 225 miles in 15 days).

The march again began at 2.30 a.m., and on arrival at Kalat-i-Ghilzai the force encamped on the open plain between the fort and the River Tarnak. The garrison here was found all well, and the commanding officer had anticipated the arrival of the column by collecting a considerable quantity of stores and forage.

The progress of the Kabul force had been so satisfactory up to this point, that Sir Frederick Roberts, having received reassuring reports from Kandahar, determined to rest his division by halting at Kalat-i-Ghilzai over the 24th August. The news of his arrival there and of his plans were announced to the Government of India in the following message, received at Simla on the 30th August:

“*Kalat-i-Ghilzai, August 23rd.*—The force under my command arrived here this morning. Authorities at Kandahar having stated on the 17th instant that they have abundant supplies and can make forage last until the 1st September, I halt to-morrow to rest troops, and more especially the transport animals and camp followers.

“The force left Ghazni on the 16th, and has marched 136 miles during the last eight days. The troops are in good health and spirits. From this I purpose moving by regular stages, so that the men may arrive fresh at Kandahar.

“I hope to be in heliographic communication with Kandahar from Robat, distance 20 miles, on the 29th. If General Phayre reaches Takht-i-Pul, I should also hope to communicate with him and arrange a combined movement on Kandahar. I am taking the Kalat-i-Ghilzai garrison with me, making the fort over to Muhammad Sadik Khan, a Tokhi chief, who had charge of the place when we arrived in 1879. The present Governor, Sardar Sherindil Khan, refuses to



remain. We have met with no opposition during the march, and have been able to make satisfactory arrangements for supplies, especially forage, which at this season is plentiful. The cavalry horses and artillery mules are in excellent order. Our casualties to date are one soldier 72nd Highlanders, one sepoy 23rd Pioneers, one sepoy 2nd Sikhs, and two sepoys 3rd Sikhs, dead; one sepoy 4th Gurkhas, two sepoys 24th Punjab Native Infantry, and a dafadar 3rd Punjab Cavalry, missing; six camp followers dead and five missing. The missing men have, I fear, been murdered. I telegraphed from Ghazni on 15th, and from Oba Karez on the 13th August."

This halt at Kalat-i-Ghilzai was much required by both the troops and the animals, and was thoroughly appreciated. All the soldiers and followers were inspected with regard to their fitness for marching further, and the Lieutenant-General visited the hospitals.

As mentioned in the above message, Sir Frederick Roberts, being of opinion that it would be inconvenient to keep open communication with Kalat-i-Ghilzai for some time to come, determined to withdraw its garrison and to take it on with the Kabul-Kandahar force. All the necessary arrangements for this purpose were made during the halt of the 24th August, and the next morning the column was augmented by the garrison, of the following strength:

3rd Sind Horse (100 sowars).
C-2, R.A. (2 guns).
66th Foot (2 companies).
29th Bombay Infantry (2nd Baluchis).
British and native details.

August 24th.—Halt.

August 25th.—To Jaldak ($15\frac{3}{4}$ miles). The troops had to march on a single line, the country being confined.

At Jaldak a wing of the 2nd Baluchis, which had preceded the force by a day, had collected 700 maunds of flour and a large stock of bhusa.



August 26th.—To Tirandaz (16 miles), in the same formation.

Here a message was received from Kandahar that the siege had been raised on the 23rd, and that on the morning of the 24th Sardar Ayub Khan had struck his camp and retired to Mazra over the Baba Wali Kotal in the Arghandab Valley, where he was said to be entrenching his camp.

August 27th.—To Pomazai (15 miles).

On this date the 3rd Bengal Cavalry and 3rd Punjab Cavalry, the whole under Brigadier-General H. H. Gough, starting at 1 a.m., made a double march of 34 miles to Robat, and succeeded in establishing heliographic communication with Kandahar. As related in the last chapter, Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, the Resident, and Major F. J. S. Adams, Assistant Quartermaster-General, immediately rode out from Kandahar to General Gough's camp, and complete connection was thus successfully restored with the garrison.

The next morning (August 28th) the main body of the Kabul-Kandahar force marched 19 miles to Robat, the sick and weakly men being halted half way at Khel-i-Akhund, under the escort of the Kalat-i-Ghilzai garrison.

From information received at Robat from Kandahar, and from what General Roberts heard from other sources, he was led to believe that Ayub Khan intended to make a stand, and was strengthening his position, which was said to extend from Gundigan to Kotal-i-Murcha.

Upon receipt of this news it was decided to make a halt at Robat on the 29th August to rest both men and animals, and to divide the remaining distance to Kandahar (19 miles) into two short marches in order that the force might arrive fresh and fit for action at Kandahar.

Soldiers, followers, and transport animals were much fagged by the long and continuous marching, and somewhat exhausted by the daily increasing heat, and many of the men were suffering considerably from sore feet.



On the whole, however, the health of the force was wonderfully good, and there was no sickness of a serious nature. Unfortunately, however, Sir Frederick Roberts was laid up with fever for several days about this period, and was seriously ill at a time when his mind was necessarily occupied by heavy and anxious work. But with the arrival at Robat the suspense and strain of the forced marches from Kabul were at an end; the much discussed and hazardous venture had arrived within measurable distance of a successful termination, and at the head of a well-trying and hardy army the General could look forward with confidence to the impending struggle with the Afghan forces. Since leaving Kabul the force had covered 280 miles in 20 days, or 19 marches.¹

During the halt of the 29th a letter was received by Sir Frederick Roberts from General Phayre, dated Kala Abdulla, the 24th August. He expected to leave that place on the 30th, and, provided that he encountered no greater difficulties than he had hitherto met with, he hoped to reach Kandahar about the 8th September.

The receipt of this letter from Major-General Phayre precluded the possibility of General Phayre's division arriving at Kandahar in time to co-operate with the Kabul force. This Sir F. Roberts much regretted, as he was well aware of the strenuous exertions that officer had made to relieve the beleaguered garrison, and the privations and hardships which he and his troops had undergone to effect this object. He wrote to General Phayre to continue his advance, but not to knock up his men or transport animals by forced marches.

On the 30th August General Roberts's force marched $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles to Mohmand, and the next morning at 3.30 it started on the remaining 12 miles to Kandahar. The advance guard was composed of the 3rd Bengal Cavalry, two guns of C-2, Royal Artillery, and the

¹ For the condition of the transport animals on arrival at Kandahar, see Appendix XXXV.



92nd Highlanders, and preparations were made to meet possible opposition in the neighbourhood of the city before a position could be occupied for the camp. Generals Primrose and Burrows rode out to meet Sir Frederick Roberts, who led his force to the southern face of Kandahar, in front of the Shikarpur Gate. Arriving there at 8.30 a.m. the men breakfasted and the baggage animals were unloaded, watered, and fed, after which, at 10 a.m., the 1st and 3rd Brigades again moved off towards the camping ground. The position which Sir Frederick Roberts determined to take up was to the west of the city, with his right on the cantonments and his left touching Old Kandahar, thus covering the city, besides giving him the advantage of a good and ample supply of water, and placing him within striking distance of Ayub Khan's camp. The facilities for water, in fact, rendered the choice of this spot almost a necessity, as no other such existed elsewhere, all other sources of supply having been cut off. On the other hand, it was reported that, on the previous day, the enemy had occupied the Karez Hill, a rocky and steep though not lofty eminence which commands the cantonments and the one water-supply available. But on reaching this place, the advanced brigades found it unoccupied, and, with the exception of a few shots fired at the advance guard from distant orchards, no opposition was offered, and the movement was accomplished without any resistance. Nevertheless the camp was within the range of the enemy's guns on the Baba Wali Kotal, and the best had to be made of the position by keeping the troops as much as possible under the lee of the Karez Hill.

The baggage was now ordered up, with the cavalry and 2nd Brigade of infantry, which were at the time on baggage and rear guards; and by 3 p.m. the troops were tented. The sick (940 in number) with Sir Frederick Roberts's force had been accommodated in the hospitals in the city.

Immediately after the camp had been established,



picquets were sent out to the northern spur of the Kohkaran Hill, the villages of Abbasabad and Chihil Dukhtaran Hill, the Karez and Picquet Hills, all of which were occupied without opposition. But large numbers of Afghans were observed on the Baba Wali Kotal, and entrenching parties were at work on the low range of hills which runs south-east from the main ridge above the village of Ahmad Khan.

From such a cursory examination of the ground as General Roberts was able to make on his arrival in the morning, he was quite satisfied that any attempt to carry the Baba Wali Kotal by a direct attack would be attended with very severe loss. He determined, therefore, to turn it.

To enable the Lieutenant-General to decide how best this operation could be carried out, it was necessary to ascertain the strength and precise extent of the position occupied by the enemy. He was anxious to obtain this information without delay, and he therefore ordered a small column under the command of Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, and accompanied by Colonel Chapman, R.A., Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, to start at once and make as complete a reconnaissance as possible. This column was composed of—

3rd Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. D. Mackenzie.
15th Sikhs, Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. Hennessey.
11-9, R.A. (2 guns).

The reconnaissance started at 1 p.m. from the left of the British position near Old Kandahar, and proceeded towards the high ground immediately above the village of Gundigan and Murghan. Here the infantry and guns halted, while the cavalry advanced some 2 or 2½ miles, avoiding the numerous orchards and enclosures, and coming out in front of Pir Paimal village, where the enemy was found to be strongly entrenched.

As soon as the enemy's fire along this line had been drawn, the cavalry fell back, while, at the same time, the two mountain guns of 11-9 were brought into



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action, partly to test the range and also to check the enemy, who were now observed to be passing rapidly into the gardens near Gundigan. General Gough's reconnaissance was at this time 1,800 yards from the guns the enemy had placed near Pir Paimal.

After a few rounds from the guns, the retirement of the infantry and artillery of the reconnaissance to within the line of picquets was ordered. The instant General Gough's troops began to fall back, the enemy advanced in great strength and pressed the infantry, and they eventually assembled in such large numbers, and endeavoured so persistently to follow, that the whole of the troops of the 3rd Brigade and part of those of the 1st were ordered to fall in.

Just before dark some reinforcements were sent out from the 3rd Brigade towards Kohkaran, to support the retirement, and by nightfall the troops were safely in camp, the object of the reconnaissance having been successfully accomplished.

Meanwhile, from about 4 p.m. till a little before dark, three guns on the Baba Wali Kotal had kept up a desultory fire on the camp. Their practice was good, and they had got the range accurately, so that shot and shell were pitched all round the camp, but without doing any damage. This fire stopped entirely after dark. Occasional sharp outbursts of musketry throughout the night, along the line of picquets to the west, showed that the enemy were present and in considerable numbers, and the picquets were consequently strengthened during the night.

The total casualties on the 31st August were five killed and fifteen wounded. The reconnaissance afforded Sir Frederick Roberts all the information that he required, and he decided to attack the enemy the following morning.

As soon as the General's plans were formed, his orders were issued for the troops to breakfast at 7 a.m., and for one day's cooked rations to be carried by all ranks. Brigades were to be in position by 8 a.m.; tents



were to be previously struck, and were to be stored with the kits in a walled enclosure. Officers commanding divisions and brigades, with the second senior officers of brigades, were ordered to assemble at 6 a.m.

At the same time, in compliance with instructions from the Lieutenant-General, Major-General Primrose directed E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, escorted by two companies of the 7th Fusiliers and four companies of the 28th Bombay Infantry, to join the Cavalry Brigade under General Gough at the village of Gundigan at 9 a.m. on the morning of the 1st September. 5-11, Royal Artillery (four 40-prs.), four companies of the 7th Fusiliers, the 4th and 19th Bombay Infantry, with a party of sappers, under Brigadier-General Burrows, were to take up a position at Kalachi-i-Haidar at 8 a.m., and remain there during the day for the purpose of threatening the Baba Wali Kotal and watching the Kotal-i-Murcha. Brigadier-General Daubeney with four companies of the 66th Foot and two companies each of the 1st and 28th Bombay Infantry were to relieve the Kabul Force in the line of picquets from Picquet Hill by Karez Hill to Chihilzina.

On the morning of the 1st September Sir Frederick Roberts, who on that date assumed supreme command of the troops in Southern Afghanistan, explained personally to the officers commanding divisions and brigades his plan for the day's battle.

This plan was, briefly, to threaten the enemy's left on the Baba Wali Kotal, while the main attack turned his right by the Pir Paimal village. With this object in view the 3rd Infantry Brigade, which was to make the demonstration against the kotal, was formed up in rear of the low hills which covered the front of the British camp, while the 1st and 2nd Brigades, those intended for the main attack, were massed behind Karez Hill.

The Cavalry Brigade of the Kabul Force was drawn up under Brigadier-General Gough in rear of the left,



in readiness to operate by Gundigan towards the bed of the Arghandab River, so as to threaten the rear of Ayub Khan's camp and endanger his line of retreat towards Girishk and Khakrez. E-B, Royal Horse Artillery (four guns), under Major J. A. Tillard, two companies of the 2-7th Fusiliers, and four companies of the 28th Bombay Infantry were, as mentioned above, placed at the disposal of General Gough, whose orders were that if, when firing began, the ground in his front should be clear, he should, with his infantry and guns, occupy the position above Gundigan, which had been so useful during the reconnaissance of the previous day, and should then push his cavalry brigade from that point to the bed of the Arghandab, where he would close the line of retreat to the Helmand and touch that which led towards Khakrez.

The disposition of the Bombay Division has been already described; C-2, Royal Artillery, was ordered to join the 1st Brigade of the Kabul Force, to which 6-8, Royal Artillery (screw guns), was already attached.

Brigadier-General Nuttall's cavalry moved out at 7.30 a.m., and was followed at 8 a.m. by General Daubeney's brigade, which occupied the ground allotted to it as follows:

- 2 companies 1st Bombay Infantry were posted on Picquet Hill.
- 2 companies 66th Foot on Karez Hill.
- 1 company 66th Foot between Karez Hill and Picquet Hill.
- 1 company 28th Bombay Infantry between Chihilzina and Karez Hill.
- 1 company 28th Bombay Infantry watching the gardens in left rear of Chihilzina.

Shortly afterwards Brigadier-General Burrows marched out and took up a strong position in the old cavalry and Jacob's Rifles lines, an excellent position being found for 5-11, Royal Artillery, about 100 yards to the right of Picquet Hill.

The dispositions above described were completed soon after 9 o'clock, and fire was opened from Captain Hornsby's 40-prs. upon the Baba Wali Pass at about 9.20 or 9.30 a.m., engaging the guns on the kotal. The



latter replied with much spirit until about noon, when they were apparently turned against the troops who were attacking the Afghan right by Pir Paimal.

Meanwhile it had been clear from a very early hour in the morning that an offensive movement was contemplated by the enemy, who evidently regarded the withdrawal of General Gough's reconnaissance on the previous evening as a further success to themselves. The villages of Gundigan and Gundi Mulla Sahibdad were held in strength, and a desultory fire was brought to bear on the British front from the orchards connecting these two villages, while an ill-directed fire was also opened from the Baba Wali Kotal, which was held in force during the greater part of the day's operations. This point in the enemy's line was crowded with ghazis, while some of Ayub's regular cavalry held the comparatively lower hills and slopes in front of the position occupied by the 40-prs. of 5-11. Instead of waiting for the British advance the Afghans were making every preparation for a counter-attack, and the movement of large numbers of their troops was covered by the fire of their skirmishers from the line of the Gundi Mulla and Gundigan villages.

Under these circumstances the advance of the British cavalry was necessarily delayed until the main infantry attack could be developed, the signal for which was the opening fire of Major Hornsby's 40-prs. at about 9.30 a.m.

The instructions given by Major-General Ross, commanding the Infantry Division, were that Brigadier-General Macpherson with the 1st Brigade should make his first attack on the village of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, after which he was to clear the enemy from the enclosures which lay between that village and the low spur of the hill short of Pir Paimal. General Ross further ordered Brigadier-General Baker to advance in a westerly direction, keeping touch with the 1st Brigade on his right, and clearing the gardens and orchards in



his immediate front; and Brigadier-General MacGregor was ordered to support in advance of the village of Abbasabad.

The batteries C-2 and 6-8 were held in readiness behind the Karez Hill to cover the infantry advance, and at about 9.30 a.m. two guns of C-2 moved to the right of that hill and opened fire against the village of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad; there they were shortly afterwards joined by the rest of the battery, which kept up a fire on the village until masked by the advance of the 1st Brigade. The battery then limbered up and followed the 1st Brigade during the remainder of the day; they came into action again on the left of the village of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, but the enemy dispersed before they could open fire.

The shell fire of the batteries was very effective, but the enemy found cover in underground chambers in the village of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad. The infantry attack upon this village was made by Colonel Battye's 2nd Gurkhas and Colonel Parker's 92nd Highlanders respectively. The remaining two regiments of Macpherson's brigade—*viz.* the 23rd Pioneers under Colonel Collett and the 24th Punjabis under Colonel Norman were in support. The village was carried in a most dashing style, Gurkhas and Highlanders vying with each other in the rapidity of their advance. The enemy withdrew sullenly and slowly, a good number of the ghazis remaining to the last in the village to receive a bayonet charge of the 92nd.

Meanwhile the 2nd Brigade under General Baker had been threading its way through the lanes and walled enclosures which lay in their line of attack, and became engaged whilst clearing the orchards. The resistance encountered was most stubborn, the enemy being well protected by the high mud walls, which they had carefully loopholed. The loss suffered in clearing these enclosures was necessarily severe, and here Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow was killed while gallantly leading his regiment, the 72nd Highlanders.



Captain St. J. T. Frome and Lance-Sergeant Cameron, of the same regiment, also fell here.

Of the regiments of this (the 2nd) Brigade, the 72nd Highlanders and the 2nd Sikhs had the chief share of the fighting. They were the two leading battalions, and frequently had to fix bayonets to carry positions or to check the determined rushes of the enemy. General Baker spoke in high terms of the gallant behaviour of these two regiments, and noticed especially the manner in which a charge of the enemy was repulsed by the 2nd Sikhs under the able and immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Boswell.

Finding that their position in the villages of Gundi Mulla and Gundigan was no longer tenable, the enemy now fell back, withdrawing their right towards Pir Paimal. The forward movement of Macpherson's and Baker's troops was continued, after the capture of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad and its surrounding gardens, almost without a pause, and after severe fighting these brigades forced the enemy back from Pir Paimal and rounded the spur of the hill near that position.


As soon as Sir Frederick Roberts heard from Major-General Ross of the success of the troops under his command, he determined to support their further advance by the 3rd Brigade, which had hitherto been drawn up in front of the village of Abbasabad. The capture of Pir Paimal had brought the British in rear of the Baba Wali Kotal, and feeling that nothing had now to be feared from the enemy's left, the Lieutenant-General pushed on to complete the discomfiture of their main position.

"At this stage," writes Colonel Chapman, "Ayub Khan must have realised that the day was lost to him, and as soon as the advancing British troops were in rear of his position on the Baba Wali Pass, his regular troops at once made off through the thick gardens and orchards of the Arghandab Valley, the Herat regiments towards Zamindawar, and the Kabuli regiments by the Arg-



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Panorama of Battle of Kandahar
1st September 1880
Showing position of troops at 12 noon.

W & A. K. Johnston, Engrs. Edinburgh & London

London, John Murray.



THE ENEMY ROUTED

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handab Valley; but it was almost impossible to ascertain exactly the manner in which they dispersed. The Sardar Ayub Khan must, about this time, likewise have secured his own safety by flight."

Meanwhile Major-General Ross, seeing the advantage already gained, and knowing that he could rely upon the courage and eagerness of his troops, had very wisely determined to press forward without waiting for reinforcements.

The position to which the enemy retired after the capture of Pir Paimal lay to the south-west of the Baba Wali Kotal, commanding an open piece of ground and covering the camp at Mazra. This position was strongly entrenched, and the enemy seemed likely to make a determined stand; reinforcements were being rapidly pushed up from their reserves, while the guns on the Baba Wali Kotal were turned round, so as to increase the fire of artillery which was brought to bear upon Roberts's force.

It was evident that this position must be stormed without delay by the victorious brigades. Recognising this, the 92nd Highlanders, 2nd Gurkhas, and part of the 23rd Pioneers rushed forward, and with resistless gallantry, in which Major G. S. White, of the 92nd, and Sepoy Inderbir Lama, of the Gurkhas, were conspicuously foremost, drove the enemy from their entrenchments at the point of the bayonet.

At the same time the last stand of the Afghans round three guns on the extreme left was broken down by a gallant charge of a half battalion of the 3rd Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. N. Money.

The enemy were now completely routed, but, owing to the nature of the ground, it was impossible for Major-General Ross, who was commanding in the front line, to realise the extent of the victory he had won. Expecting, therefore, that the enemy would take up a fresh position further on and continue their resistance, he ordered the 1st and 2nd Brigades to halt and replenish their ammunition.

CAPTURE OF AYUB'S CAMP

When this had been done and the troops had advanced about a mile, Major-General Ross found himself in sight of the whole of Ayub Khan's camp, standing deserted and apparently as it had been left in the morning when the Afghans moved out to the attack, and by 1 o'clock was in possession of both camp and ordnance.

With this camp Ayub Khan lost all his artillery, numbering thirty pieces, excluding the two recaptured guns of E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, which had been taken at Maiwand.¹

The enemy had meanwhile made good their retreat, and further pursuit with infantry being hopeless, the two brigades were halted on the far side of the village of Mazra, where they were shortly afterwards joined by the 3rd Brigade under Brigadier-General MacGregor.

While the infantry attack had been developing successfully as above described, Brigadier-General Gough's cavalry had not been equally fortunate in reaching the enemy.

Major Tillard with the four guns of E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, reported himself to General Gough at 9 a.m., and was immediately ordered to come into action on the Kohkaran road and to clear the low hills near the village of Gundigan. The fire of the guns was met by heavy musketry fire (which was, however, soon silenced) and also by artillery fire from two guns at the foot of the south-west spur of the Pir Paimal, which made good practice, and which the guns of E-B were unable to silence.

When, however, the enemy fell back from Gundigan, E-B with its escort of 7th Fusiliers and 28th Bombay Infantry advanced to the hills above that village and remained in that position for the remainder of the day.

At the same time Gough's cavalry advanced rapidly, scouting as far as Kohkaran, and then proceeded to execute the extended turning movement entrusted to

¹ 6 iron B.L.R. 9-pr. guns; 16 bronze M.L. S.B. 6-pr. guns; 2 12-pr. howitzers; 2 4.5 mountain guns; 4 3-pr. mountain guns.