



## CLOSE OF THE YEAR

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carriages could now traverse without interruption the whole roadway between Peshawar and Jalalabad. The transport service had been systematically organised, and was carried out by convoys of camels under the superintendence of transport officers at each stage. Besides heliographic communication, a telegraph line was erected by the Sappers, and, with the exception of occasional isolated outrages by marauders, chiefly Afridis, the communications between Peshawar and Jalalabad were held in comparative security.





## CHAPTER III

### OPERATIONS OF THE PESHAWAR VALLEY FIELD FORCE FROM JANUARY TO JUNE, 1879.

ON the news of Sher Ali's flight and of Yakub Khan's succession to power being received by the Government of India, Major Cavagnari, the Political Officer with the Peshawar Valley Force, was instructed to make every endeavour to open communications and to arrive at a friendly understanding with the new ruler. These efforts met, however, with but little success, and the political situation in December, 1878, remained unchanged.

The month of January, 1879, passed without many incidents of importance. A parade of the Jalalabad garrison took place on New Year's Day, followed by a *darbar* held by the Lieutenant-General, at which, however, the attendance of chiefs was neither large nor representative.

Progress was made during the month in improving the defences, communications, etc., in and around the head-quarters of the division.<sup>1</sup>

The telegraph was pushed on towards Jalalabad, and was completed as far as Dakka; but, as the line was always liable and constantly subject to interruption, heliographic stations were also completed between that place and Jamrud, and signallers kept hard at work.

Cavalry posts for escort duties were established between Dakka and Jalalabad at Basawal, and four miles from Batikot.

Considerable loss was suffered by the transport owing

<sup>1</sup> For distribution of Peshawar Valley Field Force on 1st January, 1879, see Appendix IV.





## YAKUB KHAN'S INTENTIONS

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to the effects of the cold on the camels. It was therefore arranged to retain at Jalalabad and at Batikot (where there was tolerable grazing) only 1,500 camels, this number being sufficient to move one-half of the force there with six days' supplies, should occasion arise, at twenty-four hours' notice.

The remainder of the camels belonging to the 1st Division were directed to be employed in bringing up supplies to Dakka from the rear, as no difficulty was experienced in obtaining local camel transport between Dakka to Jalalabad.

A defensive post was constructed near the Kabul gate of Jalalabad, and a bridge over the Kabul River was built in three lengths of 170 feet, 170 feet, and 232 feet, the roadway being 8 feet wide. Improvements of the road near Peshawar were also hurried on by the Sappers and Miners, as well as between Landi Kotal and Jalalabad, in order to facilitate the collection of stores at the last-named place. For the storage of supplies there two sheds were constructed, each 140 feet long, and a three-months' supply of *atta*, etc., was collected at the head-quarters of the division.

The weather continued fine, though snow fell in the latter part of the month and the cold became severe.

From Kabul came news that the city was quiet. Yakub Khan had six regiments there, and as time passed on it was rumoured that great disaffection existed amongst these forces, and even that one cavalry regiment had deserted in a body.

Yakub Khan's intentions were undoubtedly warlike; he issued orders to the Ghilzai chiefs to the effect that the whole tribe, the most powerful in Afghanistan, was to assemble at Jagdalak, but that the chiefs alone were to proceed to Kabul for instructions as to their future programme. The assemblage of so many levies at Jagdalak evidently indicated hostile intentions; and, had the Ghilzais obeyed the summons, the formation of a strongly entrenched camp at Jalalabad would have been necessary.





The tribe did not, however, seem inclined to comply with Yakub Khan's orders, and, on the contrary, tendered its submission to the British early in January. Submissive letters were received from most of the chiefs in Kabul, and on the 14th January the Saiad of Kunar waited upon Sir Sam Browne at Jalalabad, and seemed anxious to place himself on good terms with the Government. Probably he was decided in this course by hearing of the occupation of Kandahar, news of which reached the British head-quarters two days later. The Saiad was a man of much influence amongst the Mohmands: indeed, the ex-Amir had trusted to his religious sway to preach a *jihad*<sup>1</sup> against the British.

The only active military operations during January were an expedition against the Mohmands and a second raid into the Bazar Valley. The former was undertaken at the instance of the Political Officer, to whom the headmen of Sangar Sarai in Kama had applied for assistance against the Baizai clan of the Mohmand tribe. It appeared that these tribesmen had been incited to acts of aggression by the chief of Goshta as well as by the Saiads of Shergarh in Kama, and it was accordingly decided to send a force, consisting of the Frontier Brigade of the 1st Division, under Brigadier-General Jenkins, to punish the Mohmands and capture the refractory Saiads.

A detachment of 100 men of the 20th Punjab Infantry and 25 sabres of the 10th Hussars, under Lieutenant F. D. Battye, proceeded to Ali Boghan to act as support and to watch the fords; the main column, consisting of two guns Hazara Mountain Battery, 50 sabres Guides Cavalry, and 250 Guides Infantry, under Brigadier-General Jenkins, with Major Cavagnari, Political Officer, marched from head-quarters at 5 a.m. on the 11th January, forded the Kabul and Kunar Rivers, and, under the guidance of Kalu Khan (Barakzai), the chief of Besud, reached Shergarh about 11 a.m. The headmen at once came out and surrendered themselves; but, whilst they were being secured, a body

<sup>1</sup> Religious war.





## SUCCESS OF THE EXPEDITION 45

of ninety Mohmands, who had been plundering in the neighbourhood, made their escape from a small fort called Telian under fire from the two mountain guns, leaving behind them their loot and plundered cattle. The march of the detachment was then resumed to Sarai, where, by invitation of Mir Akbar Khan of Mayar, it halted at his fort, which he had prepared for the reception of the troops.

On the 12th the small force marched to Sarai, and thence to Ali Boghan, where the guns and baggage were ferried over on four rafts prepared for the purpose, whilst the horses and mules forded the river in about three feet of water a mile lower down. In places the water was so deep that some of the cavalry horses were obliged to swim, the men suffering severely from the icy coldness of the water. Some of the rear guard, who lost their footing near the right bank, were got out of the water by Lieutenant F. D. Battye in a state of great exhaustion, and were sent back to camp. Although the distance from Mayar to Jalalabad is only 12 miles, yet the march was distressing to men and animals, owing to the cold in crossing the river. The troops had to move for more than a mile, carrying ammunition on their heads, in water from  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 feet deep, with a very stony bottom.

The object of this expedition was fully attained, and the Saiads from Shergarh sent as prisoners to Peshawar.

On the 24th January, at the request of the Political Officer, another small detachment marched 10 miles north from Basawal to punish the villagers of Nikati and Raja Miani, who had been concerned in the murder of a *bhisti* of the 17th Foot. This detachment consisted of:

	Officers.	Men.	
17th Regiment . . . . .	4	100	Under Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Utterson, 1-17th Foot, with Mr. A. F. Cunningham as Political Officer.
4th Battalion Rifle Brigade . . . . .	2	50	
4th Gurkhas . . . . .	3	50	
Guides Cavalry . . . . .	1	25	
Sappers and Miners . . . . .	1	7	

The villagers tried to escape, but five were killed and seventy-five taken prisoners. A good many of the





## 46 SECOND BAZAR VALLEY EXPEDITION

prisoners were brought in, but the larger number were released. The villages were burnt; 500 head of sheep, 200 head of cattle, and some mules were captured.

On the same date the troops from head-quarters who were to operate in the Second Bazar Valley Expedition commenced their march.<sup>1</sup> This Expedition was the result of Major Cavagnari's representations that an excellent effect would be produced by a temporary occupation of the valley. Accordingly it was arranged to concentrate three columns—two from the 2nd Division Peshawar Field Force, starting respectively from Jamrud and Ali Masjid, and one, which was to start from Basawal, from the 1st Division.

The Jamrud Column, under Lieutenant-General Maude, who conducted the operations, marched on the 24th January; that from Ali Masjid marched on the 25th under Brigadier-General Appleyard; while the troops from the 1st Division started on the same day from Basawal under Brigadier-General Tytler.

The Jamrud and Ali Masjid Columns united at Burj on the 26th January, and then pursued their way into the Bazar Valley, meeting with but little open opposition, though there was a good deal of night firing on the picquets. The whole force concentrated in the Bazar Valley at 4 p.m. on the 27th January, and camped in a strong position in the plain.

	<i>Jamrud Column.</i>	<i>All ranks.</i>
Artillery .	{ D-A, Royal Horse Artillery (2	
	guns on elephants), 1 division .	28
	{ 11-9, Royal Artillery, 1 division .	22
British Infantry	{ 1-5th Fusiliers . . . . .	313
	{ 1-25th Foot . . . . .	316
		679
Native Cavalry .	13th Bengal Lancers . . . . .	145
Native Infantry	24th Punjab Infantry . . . . .	356
Madras Sappers	. . . . .	55
		556
	Total	1,235

<sup>1</sup> For a fuller account of this Expedition see *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India*, Vol. II.





## DETAILS OF THE COLUMNS

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*Ali Masjid Column.*

	All ranks.
Artillery . . . 11-9, Royal Artillery, 1 division . . .	18
British Infantry 51st Foot . . . . .	213
	<hr/> 231
Native Infantry { 2nd Gurkhas . . . . .	312
{ Mhairwara Battalion . . . . .	320
Sappers . . . . .	31
	<hr/> 663
Native Infantry { 6th Bengal Infantry from Landi	
{ Kotal . . . . .	311
	<hr/> 974
Total	<hr/> 1,205

*Basawal Column.*

	All ranks.
Artillery . . . 11-9, Royal Artillery, 1 division . . .	25
British Infantry { 1-17th Foot . . . . .	361
{ 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade . . . . .	210
	<hr/> 596
Native Cavalry . The Guides . . . . .	32
Native Infantry 4th Gurkhas . . . . .	201
Sappers and Miners . . . . .	43
	<hr/> 276
Total	<hr/> 872

This column was joined at Chinar by the following :

	All ranks.
British Infantry 1-17th Foot . . . . .	52
	<hr/> 52
Native Infantry { 27th Punjab Native Infantry . . . . .	104
{ 45th Sikhs . . . . .	257
	<hr/> 361
Total	<hr/> 413
GRAND TOTAL	<hr/> 3,725

There was no doubt of the hostility of the Zakha Khel Afridis. Directly the force entered their country, it was fired upon night and day ; the inhabitants had also deserted their villages and fired them, although promised by the Political Officer that they should not be





molested. None of the tribesmen showed themselves in the daytime to the troops, but they hung about the hills and ravines, and fired on small parties when they had a chance. Lieutenant-General Maude determined now, in accordance with his instructions, to reconnoitre in force the Bukar Pass towards the Bara Valley, and since the country was unknown, and there was a probability of resistance, a force of 1,000 men, with 2 guns, moved on the 28th of January to cover the reconnaissance.

From Halwai, two miles from camp, to within 1,100 yards of the Bukar Pass, considerable opposition was offered by the united Afridi clans, although with but small effect. At 4.15 p.m., General Maude, having obtained a good idea of the country about the pass, ordered the force to retire on the camp. The rear of the troops reached camp at dusk, the enemy not venturing beyond the high ground near Halwai.

The casualties on this occasion were Lieutenant R. H. L. Holmes, 45th Sikhs, one sergeant, Royal Artillery, one sepoy, and two followers wounded.

On the 29th January, 450 men under Colonel G. H. Thompson, 6th Bengal Infantry, were detached to destroy the towers of Halwai. The Afridis showed in even greater numbers than on the previous day; but, nevertheless, the detachment performed its task of blowing up the towers. The return march of the detachment was again harassed by the Afridis, but the party fell back in good order towards the camp, and inflicted a loss estimated at twenty men on the enemy, the British casualties being three sepoy and one follower wounded.

General Maude now telegraphed to Army Headquarters for instructions as to his future movements; while awaiting the arrival of the same an urgent message arrived recalling the Basawal Column, as an attack was expected on Jalalabad and Dakka. At the same time the Zakha Khel clan of the Bara Valley offered their submission and friendship, and the Lieutenant-General, having received instructions to act on his own judgment,





## FORT SALE

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accordingly determined to retire. The three columns left the Bazar Valley on the 3rd February, and regained their several destinations unmolested on the following day.

Meanwhile at Jalalabad intelligence was received of the death of the Mir Akhor, and of the serious illness of the Amir at Mazar-i-Sharif. At the end of January news arrived of the death of the Amir, but it was not confirmed, although the rumour created considerable excitement at Kabul. At the same time some uneasiness was caused amongst the tribes by the Bazar Expedition, and a rising of all the Afridis was apprehended.

On the 28th January a cipher message from Peshawar informed Sir Sam Browne that a body of Mohmands and Utman Khels, numbering some thousands, were assembling with a view to attack Dakka or Jalalabad on the 7th February in combination with an attack from Kabul. According to trustworthy information, an army of 20,000 Mohmands and Utman Khels had actually been seen on the 2nd February assembled on the hills beyond Kunar under instructions from Kabul, and the tribes had been aroused by the relations of the Saiads who had been sent as prisoners to Peshawar from Shergarh. An attack by this force was hourly expected, and the artillery positions were occupied and extra picquets thrown out. Trenches were dug round the commissariat lines, and every precaution taken against any sudden and unexpected attack; while reconnoitring parties were sent towards Gandamak and in the direction of Kunar.

The apparent imminence of the danger caused Sir Sam Browne to give orders early in February for the repair of the old British fort of Jalalabad, now to be called Fort Sale and situated about three-quarters of a mile to the westward of the British camp. This was accordingly done, and the place rendered tenable by troops, the position being high and dry, and uncommanded by any hill or elevated ground.

Meanwhile the collection of Mohmands was variously





reported as having broken up, and as gathering in force and, in conjunction with the Bajauris and Utman Khels, making preparations for a night attack on the commissariat stores.

Although the British camp had nothing to fear from any such attack from the disaffected tribes, yet the friendly tribes across the river in the Kama district were not by any means safe; and as they had shown goodwill to the British (always excepting the recusant chief of Goshta), it was necessary to assist them.

On the 6th of February intelligence reached Sir Sam Browne that the Mohmands were descending on Goshta; and on the same day also a message from Captain W. North, R.E., commanding the Sappers at Girdi Kach, announced that the Mohmands were entering Kama across the river and about a mile distant in front of his camp, in number 5,000 foot and 50 horse.

It was then too late in the day to do more than order a force to move on the following morning from Jalalabad under the command of Brigadier-General Macpherson into Kama, as well as a column under General Tytler *via* Chardeh to Goshta, and the cavalry brigade under General Gough to the fords at Ali Boghan.<sup>1</sup>

At 4.15 a.m. the column under General Macpherson crossed the Kabul River by the recently constructed trestle bridge with the object of attacking the hostile tribes reported as raiding in Kama. Rapidity of movement giving the only chance of success, the cavalry were ordered to press on as quickly as possible across the

<sup>1</sup> Cavalry	{ British—1 troop 10th Hussars. Native—100 sabres 11th Bengal Lancers.	} Under General Macpherson.
Artillery	{ Hazara Mountain Battery.	
Infantry	{ British—250 men 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade.	
	{ Native—300 men 4th Gurkhas. 300 men 20th Punjab Infantry. 150 men 1st Sikh Infantry.	
82 Sabres Guides Cavalry.		} Under General Tytler.
2 Guns 11-9, Royal Artillery.		
318 Rifles 1-17th Foot.		
1 Squadron 10th Hussars.		} Under General C. Gough.
1 Squadron 11th Bengal Lancers.		
2 Guns I-C, Royal Horse Artillery.		





Kunar River and to seize the spur at Telian, while four companies of the 20th Punjab Infantry were detached to occupy the *kotal* to the north-east. The remainder of the infantry were to make for Landabuch at a quickened pace, and all transport was to follow, escorted by the 1st Sikh Infantry.

The country between the Kabul and Kunar Rivers is much intersected with watercuts and irrigated land. It was, therefore, impossible for the cavalry in the darkness to advance on a larger front than half sections, since on many of the bridges there was room only for a single horseman. However, the left bank of the Kunar was reached at 6.25 a.m. without accident. Here the cavalry halted for ten minutes until the light was good enough to enable it to advance, which it did with great caution, through the numerous rice-fields, in which some few of the horses got bogged, and arrived at Shergarh by 7.15 a.m.

The possession of the Telian spur would have enclosed the enemy in Shergarh and adjacent villages, which they were supposed to be still occupying; but the raiders had begun their retirement during the night, and small parties only could be seen on the rocky ridge above Telian. These opened fire on the 10th Hussars and 11th Bengal Lancers, but 30 of the Hussars and 12 of the Lancers, dismounting, occupied the knoll at the southern extremity of the spur, and from it returned the enemy's fire, while the Hazara Mountain Battery fired a couple of rounds, shell and shrapnel, at 1,000 and 1,800 yards' range. Soon after 8 a.m. the infantry came up, when the cavalry went on in pursuit of the retiring tribesmen through the Mayar villages towards Girdai, but without succeeding in overtaking any of them. As nothing was to be seen of the enemy, the mountain battery was sent back escorted by the cavalry, reaching Jalalabad by 7 p.m.

The infantry bivouacked near Jalalud-din, returning to Jalalabad the following morning. In crossing the Kunar several men and mules were washed away, but happily no lives were lost.



The columns under Generals Tytler and C. J. Gough marched as arranged from Basawal and Jalalabad respectively to Chardeh and Ali Boghan. The Guides cavalry in the former force managed to ford the river north of Chardeh, and reconnoitred three miles beyond the river as far as the foot of the hills, returning with the news that Akbar Khan's village had been attacked the evening before and his son slain. The 17th Foot and the guns, being unable to ford the river, remained on the south side to cover the retirement of the cavalry.

Brigadier-General Gough's mounted force marched from Jalalabad to beyond Ali Boghan, but seeing that the troops beyond the river would not be engaged, returned to camp.

It was afterwards ascertained that the Mohmands and Bajauris had not heard of the Mir Akhor's death, and had come down to carry out their share in the proposed combined operations, unaware that that event had caused the Khugianis and Shinwaris on the south and the Ghilzais on the west of Jalalabad to abandon their projected attack on the British camp.

On the 22nd February a column 900 strong with two mountain guns, under Brigadier-General Jenkins, left camp for Charbagh, in the Laghman Valley. The Alingar River was crossed on the 23rd, Tigri was reached the next day, and the return effected on the 25th without having met with any opposition.

The country now seemed to have settled down. On the 5th February the sons of the late Mir Akhor had come in and tendered their submission, and promised to bring in the Khugianis; and the Zakha Khel Afridis also appeared inclined to keep their engagements.

On the 16th February the Sardar Wali Muhammad from Kurram (where he had submitted to General Roberts) arrived at the British camp, and was received by the General Commanding with the usual ceremonial visits. He remained with Sir Sam Browne's division until peace was concluded.

At this time it was rumoured from Kabul that the





inhabitants were anxious for the advance of the British army to relieve them from the great oppression which was being exercised by Yakub and his officers. But there was every reason to believe that the regular Afghan soldiery was very bitter against the British, and anxious to redeem the defeats it had experienced. The majority of Yakub's army was said to be cantoned on the Siah Sang heights, close to the city. Here there were 3,000 cavalry, 6 regiments of infantry, with 25 guns, the remainder of the army being at Butkhak. There was also a force at or near Ghazni, estimated at 4,000 cavalry, 6 regiments of infantry, and 30 guns. Yakub Khan was reported to be in good health and most active in organising his troops and in encouraging the military ardour of his people, and to be greatly aided in this by the preaching of the *mullas*. The advance of the British to Jalalabad was made the subject of appeals to the passions and fanaticism of the Afghans, and it was considered certain that hostilities would be resumed as soon as practicable.

Such was the state of affairs when, on the 24th February, the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir F. P. Haines, with the head-quarters staff, arrived on a tour of inspection at Jamrud from Peshawar; and after having reviewed the 2nd Division and inspected the field hospitals and water-tanks, proceeded to Ali Masjid, where he halted for the night. The heights between Jamrud and Shahgai were crowned by the 5th Fusiliers from Ali Masjid, and the flanking parties were supplied by the 51st Light Infantry. No shots were fired, and men of the friendly tribes, posted at intervals all along the roads, represented a very orderly and thoroughly effective system of police. Sir F. P. Haines arrived at Jalalabad, and inspected Sir Sam Browne's division on the 28th February. He remained until the 3rd March, when he returned to Peshawar.

The Commander-in-Chief and his staff carefully examined the neighbourhood for a suitable site for cantonments, and inspected the camp, stores, bridges,





works, and picquet posts; and orders were given for huts to be built at once on the low flat hills which stand about 2,000 yards south of the city of Jalalabad. Fort Sale (named in memory of the defence of Jalalabad in 1841) had already been commenced, enclosing the sheds built for stores previously mentioned.

Whilst the Commander-in-Chief was at Jalalabad, letters arrived from Yakub Khan announcing the death of the Amir Sher Ali at Mazar-i-Sharif on the 21st February. This event quite altered the state of affairs, as it was evidently easier to grant terms to a new sovereign than to Yakub Khan as merely the *alter ego* of the late Amir, and the negotiations, which had been some time in progress, would now, it was hoped, be rapidly concluded.

The death of Sher Ali terminated a phase of Afghan history as momentous to British interests as that which had ended in 1863 with the life of Dost Muhammad Khan. Far inferior to his father in many of the latter's more striking and manly qualities, Sher Ali had amply justified the judgment of the Dost in selecting him as his heir in preference to any other of his sons. The commencement of his reign had been marked by a series of revolts against his authority, to which any but a ruler of very exceptional determination and force of character must have succumbed. Except for a brief period, when the death of his favourite son completely prostrated the energies of his emotional temperament, Sher Ali never allowed the successes of his adversaries to dishearten him or to go unchallenged, and after a stern struggle he won his way to power, unaided by aught but his own high qualities as soldier and ruler.

A day or two before the news of Sher Ali's death came a letter from Yakub Khan, dated the 20th February, to Major Cavagnari re-opening the question of negotiations which had remained in abeyance since the failure of the latter's overtures in December. A week later this was followed by another letter, dated the 26th February, announcing the death, on the 21st





February, of his father, Sher Ali Khan, and in conciliatory terms desiring the adjustment of "the accidental quarrel" between the Afghan and British Governments, and the renewal of friendly relations.

On the 5th March, Major Cavagnari replied to Yakub Khan's letters, expressing in suitable terms his sympathy and regret for the death of Sher Ali. This letter was addressed to "Sardar Yakub Khan," no intimation having as yet been received that Yakub had succeeded his father. On the 7th March a second letter was despatched, in reply to Yakub's of the 20th February, explaining the terms upon which the British Government was prepared to arrange a peace and revive its friendly alliance with Afghanistan. It was decided that this letter also should not be addressed to Yakub as Amir, although it was couched in suitable and courteous terms. The conditions demanded by the Viceroy in this letter were the renunciation by the Amir of authority over the Michni and Khyber Passes, and over the tribes which border on the same; the establishment of a British protectorate in the districts of Kurram, Peshin, and Sibi; the invariable adjustment of the foreign relations of the Kabul Government in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government; and the residence of British agents and their escorts in Afghanistan.

On the 16th March two more letters arrived from Yakub. One of these, addressed to the Viceroy, announced the death of the late Amir and his own accession to the throne in accordance with the will of his father and the wishes of the people. The other, dated the 12th March, was a reply to Major Cavagnari's letter of the 7th. It was on the whole satisfactory; the only condition which Yakub declined to accept was that which provided for the renunciation of his authority over the Khyber and Michni Passes and the independent tribes in the vicinity and for the retention of Kurram, Peshin, and Sibi under British protection and control. With regard to the reception of European British





## 56      NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKUB

officers, Yakub specially stipulated that they should reside at Kabul only, and should abstain from interference in the affairs of Afghanistan.

It now appeared that, matters having progressed thus far, misunderstandings might best be removed by a personal conference between Major Cavagnari and Yakub. Accordingly measures were taken, when sending an answer to Yakub's letter of the 12th March, to convey a hint that, if a favourable opportunity should arise, an invitation to Major Cavagnari to visit Kabul might be productive of good results. To this communication, which was dated the 23rd March, Yakub Khan replied promptly on the 29th of that month. He laid stress on his ready acceptance of two of the conditions proposed to him, and on his determination to regulate his future conduct in strict conformity with his profession of loyalty to the British Government. He earnestly deprecated the remaining condition relating to a cession of territory, entreating that it might be waived. Finally, he expressed his readiness to receive Major Cavagnari at Kabul and discuss the matters at issue.

Meantime the Commander-in-Chief reached Peshawar on the 7th March, and held a council, at which the General Officers commanding the 1st and 2nd Divisions were present, and from that station gave orders for a redistribution of the 1st and 2nd Divisions in view of the probability of a further advance being ordered. It was decided that the 1st Division should be concentrated at Jalalabad, while the 2nd Division was to be so disposed as to occupy the line from Jamrud to Barikao, inclusive of both those posts. On the vacation of Jalalabad by the 1st Division, the 2nd Division was to furnish a garrison for that post, being augmented by the 39th Bengal Infantry, a cavalry regiment, and a wing and headquarters of the 9th Lancers from Taru. The 1st Division was to be augmented by the 51st Light Infantry and the heavy gun battery, and held in readiness to move forward on Kabul at short notice.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Appendix IV.





## TROUBLE AT MAIDANAK

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On the 17th March a serious attack was made on a survey party by the inhabitants of some Shinwari villages.

Captain E. P. Leach, R.E., Assistant Superintendent of Surveys, having just completed a survey of the country southward towards Mazina and Mahrez, started again from Barikao to Zarbacha on the 15th March for a further survey by Chilgazai. He was escorted by 50 sabres Guides Cavalry under Lieutenant W. R. P. Hamilton and 100 rifles under Lieutenant F. M. Barclay, of the 45th Sikh Infantry.

On the 17th the surveying party, with Lieutenants Hamilton and Barclay and 40 sabres and 40 rifles, left their encampment at Zarbacha, and, accompanied by Yar Muhammad, the Khan of Mahrez, proceeded to Chilgazai, from which village the *malik*, Umra Khan, met the party and consented to show them the way to a hill about four miles farther south, from which a survey of a considerable extent of the Safed Koh spurs could be made. Within half a mile of the summit the cavalry were halted and left in charge of Jemadar Muhammad Sharif of the Guides, with instructions, in case of attack, to hold the position, but to send the horses down a ravine under cover.

On the survey party showing themselves on the crest of the hill, several shots were fired and drums beaten in the group of villages, known as Maidanak, along the valley below, about a mile east of the position, and numbers of armed Shinwaris were observed rushing out of their houses and making for the low hills below this position. Umra Khan was sent down to reassure these people, but without much effect. A steady fire was opened on the survey party, which now began to retire towards the cavalry. Thereupon a body of about fifty men, armed with knives, made a rush at them. Lieutenant Barclay, wounded by a musket-shot through the shoulder, was carried by four of his men in front of the retiring party, a jemadar with about ten or fifteen men following, and Captain Leach, R.E., with the remainder brought up the rear. The enemy had





nearly succeeded, however, in surrounding the small party, when Captain Leach ordered the escort to fix bayonets and charge, and with his little band of Sikhs drove back the tribesmen and recovered the point last occupied by the survey party. The villagers now showered stones on them from 15 to 20 yards' distance, but only three attempted to rush in on the party, and these were all despatched. Meanwhile the troops behind opened fire, and in about five minutes they had the satisfaction of seeing the enemy beat a retreat, when the survey party joined the cavalry without further molestation. During this struggle, when the enemy came to close quarters, a havildar of the 45th Sikhs was shot through the head, and at the same time Captain Leach received a slight knife-cut on the left arm. There were no more casualties, and the enemy made no further attack against the rear guard of cavalry. It was 2.30 p.m. when the survey party began to fall back, and 4.30 p.m. when it reached the plain.

About 300 men attacked the survey party, but not more than half that number were able to bring their weapons into play. The enemy lost 9 men killed.

Sir Sam Browne expressed his high opinion of the gallant and spirited conduct of Captain Leach, which he brought to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief, and recorded his belief that the personal gallantry and determination of Captain Leach, R.E., on whom devolved the duty of covering the retirement, saved the small party of infantry from annihilation. Captain Leach subsequently received the Victoria Cross for his gallant conduct during this affair.

Brigadier-General Tytler was sent with a column<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Brigadier-General Tytler's column, 21st March, 1879 :—

Brigadier-General Lytel's Column				
Artillery	4 Mountain guns . . . . .	50		} Total 788.
Cavalry	{ 11th Bengal Lancers . . . . .	61	} 112 sabres	
	{ Guides Cavalry . . . . .	51		
Infantry	{ 1-17th Foot . . . . .	197	} 520 bayonets	
	{ 4th Gurkhas . . . . .	102		
	{ 27th Punjab Infantry . . . . .	172		
	{ 45th Sikhs . . . . .	49		
Sappers and Miners	. . . . .	106		





## THE SURVEY COMPLETED

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to punish this unprovoked attack; but since a general conflict with the Shinwari tribe at this juncture would have been most undesirable, Major E. R. Conolly, who accompanied the column as Political Officer, was instructed to obtain reparation if possible without open hostilities. The force left Barikao after midnight on March 21st, and reached Maidanak at daybreak. Here it was reinforced by a detachment from Basawal, consisting of:

34 Sabres 11th Bengal Lancers.	} Under Lieut.-Colonel Ball-Acton, 51st Regiment.
100 Rifles 1-17th Foot.	
300 Rifles 51st Light Infantry.	

The valley was penetrated as far as Girdai by the column, and several village towers were blown up there and at Maidanak. Fines were levied on the same villages, and the survey of the district having been completed the force withdrew without having encountered any opposition.

Three days previously a foraging party under a jemadar had been fired upon near Deh-Sarakh. The camels were sent to the rear, and the party retired in good order on Pesh Bolak, followed by 300 or 400 Afridis to within two or three miles of Pesh Bolak. On the return, therefore, of Brigadier-General Tytler from Maidanak he was directed by Sir Sam Browne to punish this fresh outrage, and at 1 a.m. on the morning of the 24th March he led a force of 500 bayonets, 150 sabres, and 2 guns against Deh-Sarakh, the locality in which the offending villages were situated. Major Conolly, Political Officer, again accompanied the column from Basawal, and after the complete surrender of Maidanak no opposition was expected.

By 5 a.m. the force (composed as under<sup>1</sup>) had

<sup>1</sup> Column under Brigadier-General Tytler, 24th March, 1879

Artillery	2 Guns 11-9, Royal Artillery.	
Cavalry	{ 11th Bengal Lancers	90
	{ 13th Bengal Lancers	60
Infantry	{ 1-5th Fusiliers	150
	{ 1-17th Foot	250
	{ 27th Punjab Infantry	50
	{ 2nd Gurkhas	50





## FIGHTING AT MAUSAM

reached the high ground at Pesh Bolak, when General Tytler and the cavalry pushed rapidly to the front, the guns and infantry following as quickly as possible. The advance party reached Mausam, which had been chiefly implicated in the raid, a large village situated on high ground sloping down to the Pesh Bolak plain, fortified in the usual manner, and protected on the east by a deep *nala*, and by a lesser one (about 200 yards) to the west, on the other side of which was a level plateau. About a mile north of Mausam, at the bottom of the slope, were three small villages close to each other, near which the cavalry halted while the Brigadier examined the position. Whilst making this reconnaissance, General Tytler detached Lieutenant H. R. Heath with a party of the 11th Bengal Lancers up the deep *nala* on the east of Mausam, to cut off the retreat of the people in the rear. At once the *tom-toms* began to beat, and the tribesmen crowded out on the walls and in front of the village, while others collected in the *nala* and on the level plateau beyond. At the same time fire was opened on the troops from the village in front, from the *nala*, and from the farthest of the three villages in rear.

A portion of the cavalry was at once dismounted, and replied to the enemy's fire until the arrival of the infantry and guns. Two companies were then extended against Mausam, and two told off as supports. The guns were unlimbered, and commenced to shell the place at 750 yards' range. At the same time the cavalry, under Captain D. Hamilton Thompson, 13th Bengal Lancers, was directed to cross the western *nala* lower down, where it could not be seen, and to charge the enemy if a favourable opportunity occurred.

A desultory matchlock fire was maintained by the enemy until the battery opened fire, when they at once began to evacuate the fort; and although they stubbornly disputed the possession of every tower and wall as long as possible, yet they gradually retired before the infantry advance. So occupied were the enemy on









the plateau across the western *nala* with the attack on the village, that they only observed the approach of the cavalry when it was too late to retreat. Opening fire as Captain Thompson gave the order to charge, about 300 Afghans in line four or five deep received the cavalry with an irregular volley, which killed two men and wounded six or seven more. The enemy then fled, pursued as far as the foot of a small range of hills by the Lancers, who cut down or speared at least fifty of them. The arms of the dead Afghans were collected, and the cavalry rejoined the main body.

The enemy retired to a distance of about 1,800 yards, where they seemed to consider themselves safe, until some shells from the battery caused them to beat a rapid retreat over the brow of a hill beyond the *nala*. The village of Mausam was occupied and the towers were blown up, after which the troops withdrew to their first position. Here another halt was made to blow up the towers of Darwazai, the village from which shots had been fired on the rear of the column.

As soon as the troops abandoned Mausam, the enemy crowded into it and occupied all the surrounding heights, forming a sort of semi-circle round the position of the British. When the Darwazai towers had been blown up and the village set on fire, the column commenced a very leisurely retreat by alternate lines of skirmishers, with skirmishers on both flanks, halting now and then for the guns to come into action against large masses of the enemy, who now began crowding on the rear and flanks, sometimes coming within 80 or 100 yards of the skirmishers, and making as though they would come to close quarters. This running fight was continued for four miles up to the walls of Pesh Bolak, where the column halted. The tribesmen here hung about in large masses a mile and a half off for upwards of an hour, but they made no further hostile demonstrations.

The casualties of the enemy were large, for they buried upwards of 160 men the following day; the loss





of the troops was very small, only 2 sowars killed and 12 wounded. Brigadier-General Tytler specially brought to notice the conduct of Captain D. Hamilton Thompson, 13th Bengal Lancers, and of the officers and men under his command. He attributed the success of the day's operations largely to the promptitude and gallantry displayed by Captain Thompson, and to the manner in which he handled the cavalry during the retirement. The names of Kot-Dafadar San Singh, 11th Bengal Lancers, and of Lance-Dafadar Ayub Khan, 13th Bengal Lancers, were brought prominently to the notice of the General for special reward.

These operations were followed a few days later by another and more considerable expedition. On the 31st March Sir Sam Browne ascertained that Asmatulla, the principal chief of the Ghilzais, had descended into Kats Laghman (the alluvial plain along the right bank of the Kabul River to the north-west of the Siah Koh range). With him was a gathering of 1,500 followers to stir up the people against the troops, to attack the friendly Ghilzais, and to incite the Khugianis to rise. The latter tribe, it appeared, was assembling a few miles south-west of Fatehabad on the Kabul road.

It was decided to despatch two columns; one, under Brigadier-General Macpherson, into Kats Laghman; another, under Brigadier-General C. S. Gough, against the Khugianis near Fatehabad.<sup>1</sup>

General Macpherson's column was to march at 9 p.m. on the 31st March across the Siah Koh by the Jawara-Miana Pass, and to cut off the enemy's retreat by the right bank of the Kabul River, in which operation he was to have the assistance of 600 *khasadars* (Afghan levies).

The success of the expedition depended on secret and rapid movements, and the cavalry of this column,

<sup>1</sup> Brigadier-General Macpherson's column :

Hazara Mountain Battery.  
300 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade.  
300 4th Gurkhas.

300 28th Punjab Infantry.  
1 Squadron 10th Hussars.  
1 Squadron 11th Bengal Lancers.





## DISASTER TO THE 10TH HUSSARS 63

under the command of Major E. A. Wood, 10th Hussars, and accompanied by Mr. Jenkins (the Assistant Political Officer) and Wali Muhammad, was despatched at 9.30 p.m. across the river by the ford below the site of the trestle bridge at Jalalabad, which had been removed on the 29th March. The squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers led the way across; and as the moon was a week old it was fairly light, and they passed over in safety. Some mules followed, and it was noticed that they were bending down the stream; but it was known that there was such a bend in the ford, while the light was insufficient to show that the mules were off their legs and swimming. The whole squadron of the 10th Hussars, following the lead of the mules, was suddenly swept over into water 6 or 7 feet deep, and running like a mill race. The squadron was moving in half sections, and must have been nearly 150 yards long when it was swept away. Captain R. C. D. E. Spottiswoode, Lieutenant the Hon. J. P. Greenwood, and Lieutenant C. S. Napier were riding in front, and Sub-Lieutenant Grenfell in rear. They escaped with the greatest difficulty.

The first notice of this disaster was brought to the camp at Jalalabad by 28 riderless horses galloping into the cavalry lines, followed by a few men, who brought information of what had occurred. Another troop of Bengal Cavalry was ordered to leave the camp at 4 a.m. on the 1st April, and to follow Major Wood, who pushed on with the remainder of his force to the hills above Charbagh, which he reached at 6 a.m. Everything was done which could be thought of to render assistance to the missing men. Nine elephants of the heavy battery, as well as a strong detachment from the field hospital, under the direction of the Assistant Quartermaster-General, proceeded to the river and commenced a diligent search by the light of a large fire. In the morning the bodies of 19 men and 10 horses were found, and one officer and two or three men were taken alive off a sandbank in the river.

The loss of the 10th Hussars was 1 officer (Lieutenant the Hon. J. P. Greenwood) and 19 men.





tenant F. H. Harford), 3 sergeants, 1 farrier, 42 rank and file, and 13 horses. Most of the bodies found were wounded about the head, apparently by kicks received in the struggle in the water. This ford had been selected by the Political Officer, but it was not staked across, nor were any of the others in the Kabul River, on account of the objections of the Kama villagers.

Meantime the infantry column under General Macpherson, leaving camp at 9 p.m., followed the Kabul road for 9 miles, and then, turning sharp to the north, made its way through irrigated land, traversed by watercourses, till the river Surkhhab was reached.

The mules of the Hazara Mountain Battery were much delayed in the darkness by the flooded fields and water-cuts near the stream, until at last a ford was found  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the village of Tatangi-i-Nawab Jabbar Khan, which was crossed without difficulty, and the village at the foot of the Siah Koh Pass reached soon after daylight on the 1st April. Here a halt was made for the column to close up.

The march over the Siah Koh was beset with difficulties. In many places the road had to be made passable for the mules and guns over ascents and descents, across large boulders and layers of rock, so that it was 10 a.m. when the crest of the Jowara Miana Pass (elevation 5,300 ft.) was gained.

From this point Major Wood's cavalry could be observed north of the Kabul River, and the column pushed on, the advanced party of the Rifles reaching the level cultivated ground at 1.15 p.m., and finding there that Asmatulla had fled and his followers dispersed. Bahram Khan's fort near the river was now occupied by the column. Although the mules only carried half loads, the difficulties of the route were such that the rear guard did not arrive till 2 o'clock p.m. on the following day, 2nd April.

The distance marched by the column was not extraordinary, being only 25 miles; but the nature of the route tried the endurance of the troops to the utmost.






# DISTRICTS OF BESUD, KAMA AND GOSHTA

TO ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONS OF 11<sup>TH</sup> JANUARY, 7<sup>TH</sup> & 8<sup>TH</sup> FEBRUARY 1879 & 20<sup>TH</sup> & 21<sup>ST</sup> MAY 1880.

Nº 2

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## POSITION OF THE ENEMY

65

The rear guard had to assist in passing the mules over difficult places, and in carrying and reloading the ammunition and provisions.

A reinforcement of one hundred of the 51st Light Infantry, two hundred of the Guides Infantry, and one hundred of the 1st Sikh Infantry, under Major R. B. Campbell, Corps of Guides, had meanwhile left Jalalabad with a convoy of stores to join Major Wood's force. But the Political Officer having received information of the escape of Asmatulla, this reinforcement was recalled.

As previously arranged, Brigadier-General C. Gough's column<sup>1</sup> left Jalalabad at 1 a.m. on the 2nd April, and arrived near Fatchabad whilst it was yet dark. About 1 p.m. it was reported by the cavalry patrols of the Guides under Ressaldar Mahmud Khan, which had been thrown out towards Gandamak, that large bodies of men were advancing with flags from the direction of Khoja Khel south-west of the camp.

The whole force got under arms, and intelligence being received of the continued advance of the enemy, Major W. Battye with the Guides Cavalry was directed to advance along the Gandamak road.

Three hundred infantry and two troops of cavalry having been left to protect the camp under Colonel C. McPherson, the Brigadier-General with three troops of Hussars and four guns of I-C, Royal Horse Artillery, followed Major Battye's Guides, the remainder of the infantry, about 700 men, advancing as quickly as possible afterwards.

The enemy were found to be posted on the crest of a plateau, both flanks resting on steep sides which overlooked the cultivated valleys below. The crest of the ridge was strengthened by breastworks, and completely

<sup>1</sup> Brigadier-General Gough's column :

2 Squadrons 10th Hussars ; Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Ralph Kerr.

2 Squadrons Guides Cavalry ; Major Wigram Battye.

I-C, Royal Horse Artillery (4 guns).

1-17th Foot, 400 men ; Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson.

300 27th Punjab Native Infantry.

300 45th (Sikhs) Native Infantry.

1 Company Sappers and Miners.





## DETERMINED FIGHTING

commanded the whole front, which sloped gently down towards the troops, except at the top, where the slope was steep.

The front of the enemy's force was about a mile in extent, and its numbers probably not less than 5,000. The right of their front nearest to the camp was the key of their position.

The cavalry and artillery advanced to within 1,200 yards, and the latter opened fire. The enemy met this fire by throwing out lines of skirmishers from their right. The mounted troops and guns were therefore ordered to retire across the plateau in the hope of drawing the enemy out of their very strong position, whilst the infantry came up on the left with the view of carrying the enemy's right.

As was expected, this retirement was immediately followed by the enemy, who came streaming out from behind their breastwork. As the infantry came up, they were brought into action on the left, and ordered to make a continuous advance, the 1-17th Foot and 27th Punjab Infantry in the front line, with the 45th Sikhs in reserve.

They were met by a determined resistance, the flags of the Afghans keeping well to the front in spite of the heavy fire of our infantry.

Here Lieutenant N. C. Wiseman, 17th Foot, followed by two or three of his men, charged one standard bearer and ran him through, but the gallant officer was instantly surrounded and cut to pieces. The enemy now showed signs of giving way, upon which an order was sent to the cavalry on the right to attack on the first favourable opportunity. But before this order was received both regiments charged successfully. The three troops of the Guides, under Major Wigram Battye, charged straight to the front, and the 10th Hussars to the right front, which the Afghans were trying to turn.

These decisive charges completely defeated the enemy, but with the loss of the gallant Major Wigram Battye, who fell dead at the head of the Guides from a





## THE ENEMY DISPERSED

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shot in the chest, having previously received a wound through the thigh, which, however, had not deterred him from still leading his men. Lieutenant Hamilton, Guides Cavalry, was awarded the Victoria Cross for his gallantry in this action.

The entrenched position was carried, and from this height the enemy could be seen flying in every direction and dispersing into the numerous forts and villages dotting the richly cultivated valleys.

The cavalry were forthwith sent in pursuit, while the horse artillery guns fired upon any closed bodies of the enemy that were seen. The three troops of the 10th Hussars under Lord Ralph Kerr, and the Guides under Lieutenant Hamilton, pursued the enemy close up to the walls of Khoja Khel, cutting up numbers of them.

The troops were then ordered to retire to camp, as the enemy were completely dispersed. The action commenced about 2 p.m., and by 4.30 p.m. the enemy's position was captured. The estimated loss of the Afghans was between 300 and 400 men, while the casualties among the troops amounted to two British officers, one native officer (Ressaldar Mahmud Khan,<sup>1</sup> Guides), together with a loss of 20 horses and 3 men killed, and 4 native officers and 36 men wounded. On the 4th April Brigadier-General Gough marched against the Khugiani strongholds near Gandamak, several of which he destroyed. This further action resulted in the complete submission of their chief, Haidar Khan. The Commander-in-Chief brought prominently forward to the notice of Government the gallant conduct of the troops at Fatehabad, and their skilful handling by Brigadier-General Gough. In the death of Major Wigram Battye the army had sustained a severe loss, and the Government of India had been deprived of the services of a most distinguished and gallant soldier; while the loss of so brave a soldier as Lieutenant Wise-

<sup>1</sup> This intelligent native officer was killed in personal combat with one of the enemy, whom he slew.





## 68 SUCCESS OF THE EXPEDITIONS

man, 1-17th Foot, was also to be deplored. The tribesmen engaged in this action were all Khugianis, but the Ghilzais were hovering about in the neighbourhood, and had not General Gough taken the initiative they would certainly have joined the Khugianis, in which case the British would have had to encounter a much larger force.

The object of both these expeditions had been thus satisfactorily accomplished. Asmatulla fled to Kushi-nand, his followers dispersed, and the Khugianis had received a most severe lesson. Nearly all the headmen of that tribe came in subsequently and made their submission.

Macpherson's column returned to Jalalabad by the Darunta Pass and by a ford over the Surkhab  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles higher up than the one previously used. The Hazara Mountain Battery, with an escort of 200 native infantry, was detached to reinforce Gough's column at Fatehabad; and on the 4th April Brigadier-General Tytler also arrived at that place with the remainder of the 2nd Brigade. The combined troops then marched 9 miles southwards from camp to Khugian and destroyed three towers belonging to people who had joined in the attack of the 2nd April.

While these events were in progress, preparations for the proposed advance of the 1st Division from Jalalabad were being pushed on. The new road from Basawal *viâ* Ambar Khana and Lachipur, which had the advantage of running along the bank of the river, and thus being well supplied with water throughout, was now completed. Brigadier-General Appleyard with the heavy battery, the 51st Light Infantry, and some Madras Sappers and Miners arrived at Jalalabad on the 24th March. The head-quarters 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Tytler, consisting of the 17th Foot and part of the 11th Bengal Lancers, arrived on the 27th. The great difficulty now was to procure transport; carriage was urgently required, and it was proposed to utilise that of the 2nd Division.







P-66 **CSL**

# ACTION OF FATEHABAD April 2<sup>nd</sup> 1879.

Nº 6  
Y



FC Royal Horse Artillery ++++  
Guides Cavalry .....  
Enemy (Khugianis) .....  
Breastworks

10<sup>th</sup> Royal Hussars .....  
British Infantry .....  
Figures denote successive positions.

London, John Murray.





## BREAKDOWN OF THE TRANSPORT 69

Sir Sam Browne's estimate of his requirements is given in his telegram of the 21st March, 1879, to the Quartermaster-General at Camp Shink :

"Deaths, desertions, and sickness have reduced my original numbers, and originally I never had enough for supplies as well as for troops. The 1st Division requires, for baggage, ammunition, and three days' rations, camels 4,158, mules 2,432; for twenty-seven days' supplies, camels 4,742: total camels 8,900, mules 2,432. We possess between this and Peshawar, camels 4,015, mules 1,680."

On the 2nd April the Quartermaster-General reported that 5,967 camels and 2,163 mules were deficient, and, notwithstanding a considerable reduction of carriage, the complete breakdown of the transport was reported by Colonel C. M. MacGregor, who now joined the division as Chief of the Staff, to be most serious.

Arrangements were, however, progressing for the move forward; and on the 7th April the post and telegraph offices were transferred to Fatehabad. Meantime a committee had been appointed to determine on the best sites for the various posts to protect the line of communications from Jamrud to Jalalabad.

On the 8th April the Government of India notified to the Commander-in-Chief that it would be expedient on political grounds that Gandamak should be occupied, and on the 9th Sir Sam Browne was requested by the Commander-in-Chief to detail such force as appeared to him expedient for the occupation of that place, bearing in mind the desirability of including in it two battalions of British infantry, so as to secure for them a more salubrious climate than that of Jalalabad.

Up to this time the troops had been in excellent health, all the sick and weakly having been sent back to India. The percentage of British and natives in hospital was respectively 3·6 and 4·27; all of these were suffering from slight ailments, nor had any cholera, fever, dysentery, or other serious illness appeared;





## 70 FINDING NEW CAMPING GROUND

therefore the climate of the valley of the Kabul River may be regarded as healthy up to the middle of April. But as the year advanced a move to higher and more open encampments was considered desirable.

From a military point of view, also, the advance to Gandamak was advantageous. The position afforded facilities for the collection of supplies; it was also sufficiently advanced to admit of easy communication should events necessitate a further move of the army towards Kabul. In communicating with Sir Sam Browne on the subject, the Commander-in-Chief insisted on the necessity of carefully selecting a position capable of defence by a comparatively small force, but which might be required to cover considerable quantities of stores and munitions, together with a field hospital. It appeared to Sir Frederick Haines that, if possible, one or more existing *garhis* (or walled enclosures), such as are found in every Afghan village, should, if possible, be secured and covered by field works, so as to form a strong defensible post, within which, of course, the existence of an ample water-supply would be an indispensable necessity. After occupation, every endeavour was to be made, and every available animal employed, to store provisions, and to bring up to this advanced base all provisions, grain, etc., required for a future advance, together with reserves of ammunition, artillery, and small-arms, such as would enable the 1st Division in the least possible time to respond to any urgent call for immediate movements.

At length on the 12th April the long-looked-for forward movement commenced, and Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Browne's divisional head-quarters with a small column of the 1st Brigade left Jalalabad at 5 a.m., and marched to Bawali, a distance of 12 miles. Next day the column proceeded about 12 miles to Nimla, joined *en route* by part of the force at Fatehabad, and on the 14th it arrived at Safed Sang, which was found to be more suitable for occupation than Gandamak.

On the 17th April the troops at Fatehabad were





ordered to join divisional head-quarters at Safed Sang; and the garrison of Fort Sale near Jalalabad was detailed as follows:

Cavalry	3 troops, 11th Bengal Lancers.
Artillery	E-3, Royal Artillery (1 division).
British Infantry	100 51st Light Infantry.
Native Infantry	{ 1st Sikhs.
	{ 1 Guides Infantry.
Sappers and Miners	1 company.

The remaining portions of the 3rd Brigade, namely, two divisions of E-3, Royal Artillery, and head-quarters 51st Light Infantry, marched for Safed Sang on the 25th.

The Fatehabad detachment reached Safed Sang on the 20th and the camp there was on the same day shifted to higher and better ground on the southern slopes of the Nimla plateau.

Meanwhile the field telegraph, which had reached Fatehabad on the 10th April, was pushed on thence with the head-quarters' force, communication being kept up uninterruptedly during the march by the aid of the mule ground line.

The position of Safed Sang commands the whole of the country on three sides, the remaining side being the one towards Fatehabad, the holding of which was not likely to occasion difficulty. The heights of the camps at Fatehabad, Nimla, and Safed Sang were respectively 2,300, 3,700, and 4,500 feet, thus giving a rise of over 2,000 feet, which was desirable from a climatic point of view, as the weather grew warmer.

Safed Sang is distant from Jalalabad about 30 miles. The road for the first 12 miles is fatiguing, being either stony or knee-deep in sand as far as Fort Rozabad, which place is situated on the bank of an affluent of the Surkhab, and furnishes excellent accommodation for at least 250 infantry and 50 cavalry. A signalling station was established here on the highest tower of the fort.

From Rozabad (Bawali) to the next post the distance





## GANDAMAK

is about 9 miles, the route running past the village of Fatehabad at about 4 miles. This post was named Fort Battye, being within sight of the battlefield of the 2nd of April, where Major Wigram Battye was killed. It was entrenched and put in a thorough state of defence, and garrisoned by 150 Punjab Infantry and a troop of 11th Bengal Lancers. The distance from Fort Battye to Safed Sang or Gandamak, where the head-quarters 1st Division were concentrated, is 9 miles; the road was not good, but was quickly improved by the Sappers.

Gandamak is about 3 miles beyond Safed Sang. The camp at the latter place was strongly situated on the summit of a barren, stony ridge, where the heat in summer is very great during the daytime, although the temperature at night, by reason of the excessive radiation, is comparatively low. The great drawback to the place was the dust, which necessitated two changes of site; otherwise the situation was secure and the water-supply excellent.

On the 15th April Colonel MacGregor (Chief of the Staff) again brought to notice the deficiency of transport, together with other questions regarding the general working of the Commissariat Department. In consequence of this General Maude was directed to transfer to the 1st Division all serviceable camels in excess of 1,500, and all available mule carriage, in view of a possible advance on Kabul from Gandamak.

On the 9th April a slight skirmish took place in the Haft Chah Valley resulting in a loss to the enemy of 15 men, but with this exception there were no hostilities during the middle of the month.

In consequence of incessant rumours<sup>1</sup> that the Mohmands were gathering with hostile intent, and were about to cross the Kabul River in order to attack Dakka or some other point in the line of communications, a column of the following strength under command of Lieutenant-Colonel O. Barnes, 10th Bengal

<sup>1</sup> These rumours were discounted by the Political Officer.





## NEUTRALS AT KAM DAKKA 73

Lancers, commanding at Dakka, marched from that place on the 21st April to ascertain the number and character of the threatening force:

- 2 Guns C-8, Royal Artillery.
- 1 Squadron 10th Bengal Lancers.
- 3 Companies, Mhairwara Battalion.

This reconnaissance proceeded as far as Kam Dakka, a village on the same side of the Kabul River, 7 miles below Dakka; the force found here that the south side of the river was clear of the hostile tribesmen, and accordingly returned to Dakka without experiencing any opposition except exchanging a few shots across the river, where, according to unanimous report, the Mohmands were in great strength. The guns, being unable to move along the goat path which clings to the spur overhanging the Kabul River, remained with an escort at Loi Dakka.

On this result being telegraphed to divisional headquarters, the Political Assistant, Major Conolly, who was in camp at the time, urgently recommended the despatch of two companies of the Mhairwara Battalion to Kam Dakka to protect its inhabitants.

Instructions were wired to this effect, and accordingly Captain O'Moore Creagh, with 138 officers and men of the battalion, marched at 5 p.m. on the 21st from Dakka and reached Kam Dakka 11 p.m., after experiencing considerable difficulty in getting the mules over the hills in the dark.

On arriving Captain Creagh was surprised to find that the villagers were very far from desiring his presence or protection, which would, they said, have no effect but to bring on them the anger of their fellow-tribesmen. Their demeanour was anything but friendly; they refused to allow the detachment to enter the village, and on the following morning they persisted in limiting their alliance to remaining neutral in the fighting which was now imminent. From 5 a.m. on the 22nd hostile Mohmands were crossing the river





## A CRITICAL POSITION

and gathering in crowds on the hill in front of the place where the detachment was camped. There appeared little chance of reinforcement during this day, and Captain Creagh made such dispositions as seemed possible for defence. As the attack of the Mohmands developed, Captain Creagh gradually drew back, until about 8 a.m., when, having been reinforced by 30 men with ammunition, he finally established his detachment in a graveyard, his left resting on the Kabul River. Here he set to work to construct rough breastworks, while the advance of the enemy was kept in check by skirmishers, and the baggage, followers, and animals were collected under cover of the river bank. Scarcely were these preparations completed when the skirmishers were driven in, the tribesmen swarmed down the hills and completely surrounded the position.

From 9 a.m. till 3 p.m. the defence continued, the enemy, who numbered about 1,200, several times making assaults on the entrenchments and being repulsed only by bayonet charges. About 2 p.m. the assailants had closed round the troops to a uniform distance of from 70 to 90 yards. At 3 o'clock the ammunition began to run low, and the position became most critical, when the enemy suddenly appeared to be moving away from right to left, and immediately afterwards a small reinforcement of 40 infantry arrived, under Captain D. M. Strong, 10th Bengal Lancers, having pushed on in front of a relieving column which had been sent out from Dakka under his command. This addition of strength, however, was not sufficient to dislodge the enemy nor to effect a withdrawal of the detachment without considerable loss, but a few minutes later a further reinforcement appeared in the shape of a troop of the 10th Bengal Lancers under Lieutenant C. E. Pollock. Captain Strong immediately took command of this from his subaltern, and delivered a vigorous charge against the enemy, driving them from their position, dispersing them in all directions, some seeking refuge by rushing into the river, while the





## WITHDRAWAL FROM SATTA PASS 75

remainder fled to the hills on the right under the fire of the two mountain guns and infantry. Captain Creagh's detachment now charged out of the entrenchment, and then returned to carry off the dead and wounded, while the cavalry covered the withdrawal.

Almost at the same time a company of the 1-12th Foot and two guns of 11-9, Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, arrived opportunely from Colonel Norman's column, under Major J. B. Dyce, R.A., who assumed command; the guns opened on the masses of the enemy, who were again collecting, causing them to beat a precipitate retreat.

It had been the intention of Lieutenant-Colonel Barnes, commanding at Dakka, that after the relief of the Kam Dakka detachment the Satta Pass leading to that place should be held for the night, and the enemy attacked on the following morning with all the available troops. Major Dyce, however, did not consider it practicable to hold the pass owing to the fatigue which the men had undergone, and the want of water, rations, and ammunition. The withdrawal of the original force and reinforcements under Captain Strong and Major Dyce was consequently effected. The combined column arrived at 8 p.m., the enemy following it up closely and keeping up an incessant though almost harmless fire.

Meanwhile, on the 21st April, a reconnoitring column<sup>1</sup> under Colonel F. B. Norman, 24th Punjab Infantry, had been despatched from Landi Kotal by General Maude, who considered, notwithstanding the reports of the Political Officers, that the situation required clearing up. Colonel Norman's column marched *via* Kam Shilman to Sarobi in the Prang Darra, where they encamped. Next morning the two mountain guns with their escort were pushed on up the Loi Shilman, over the Shilman Ghakhe Pass, and the foresight of General Maude was rewarded by the assistance they gave in extricating Captain Creagh's detachment.

<sup>1</sup> 11-9 Royal Artillery, 2 mountain guns. | 24th Punjab Infantry, 4 companies,  
1-12 Foot, 4 companies. | and a few sowars.





## GALLANTRY REWARDED

On the 22nd further reinforcements were sent from Basawal as well as from Landi Kotal on the situation of the Kam Dakka detachment becoming known.

On the morning of the 23rd, at 6.30 a.m., a force composed as under<sup>1</sup> consisting of all the available troops, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel C. J. Sillery, 1-12th Foot, moved from Dakka to the Satta Pass, over which the cavalry and Gurkhas advanced, while the guns were posted so as to command the river and the road. A few tribesmen were observed on the opposite bank apparently preparing to cross on a raft, but a shell from a mountain gun dispersed them, and no other hostile parties were seen.

The remainder of Colonel Norman's column effected a junction with this force at Kam Dakka in the afternoon after a toilsome march, and remained there without molestation during the night, while the Dakka column returned to its own station the same evening.

The casualties among the troops in the affair of the 22nd were 6 killed and 18 wounded: the enemy lost about 200 killed.

The admirable gallantry displayed by the detachment of the Mhairwara Battalion was highly eulogised by the Commander-in-Chief; Captain Creagh was recommended for and awarded the Victoria Cross, and Captain Strong was brought to the special notice of the Commander-in-Chief for the judgment with which he had delivered a most effective charge against the enemy at a very critical moment.

On the 3rd May General Sir Sam Browne telegraphed to Simla that Yakub Khan had left Kabul that day for Safed Sang to negotiate terms of peace. It is necessary now to sketch the course of the negotiations which led to this result.

We have seen how on the 29th March the Amir

<sup>1</sup> C-3, Royal Artillery, 6 guns.  
11-9, Royal Artillery, 4 mountain guns.  
10th Bengal Lancers, 1 squadron.

1-5th Fusiliers, 1 company.  
1-12th Foot, 2 companies.  
Mhairwara Battalion, 1 company.  
2nd Gurkhas, 2 companies.





wrote to Major Cavagnari expressing his readiness to receive a British Mission to consider the terms of a treaty. Notwithstanding the friendly tone of this letter, a few days later a communication from Yakub to the Khugianis was intercepted, dated the 4th April. In it the Sardar praised the tribesmen for their gallant resistance at the battle of Fatehabad, and exhorted them not to fear the infidels, against whom he (Yakub) was ready to launch an irresistible force of regular troops and *ghazis*. It continued: "Then, by the favour of God, and in accordance with the verse 'Verily, God has destroyed the powerful ones,' the whole of them will go to 'the fire of hell for evermore.' Therefore, according to the sacred text, 'Kill them to the extent of your ability.'"

It having been decided that, notwithstanding this letter, negotiations with Yakub should not be broken off, Major Cavagnari addressed a letter to His Highness, dated the 7th April, saying that the British Government acquiesced in the Amir's suggestion that a British Mission should be deputed to Kabul, and would appoint one as soon as intimation was received that the requisite arrangements for its reception had been made. Subsequently the Viceroy, in replying to Yakub's announcement of Sher Ali's death, and his own accession to the throne, intimated that he had decided to depute Major Cavagnari to Kabul and had invested him with authority to communicate unreservedly with the Amir upon the questions at issue; and that Major Cavagnari might be considered the representative of the Government of India.

Bakhtiar Khan, bearing Major Cavagnari's letter, reached Kabul on the 12th. Councils were at once held and the manner of receiving the British Mission was discussed in secret conclave. There was reason to believe that Yakub's advisers, two of whom, Sardar Sher Ali and Shah Muhammad, had just returned from Tashkent, were counselling him to abandon the English alliance and to trust to Russia. In these circumstances





Bakhtiar Khan, in the hope of securing the reception of the British Mission, advised Yakub to visit the British camp in person, a suggestion which was favourably received and ultimately adopted. On the 24th April Bakhtiar returned to Safed Sang, bringing two letters from the Amir, in one of which he proposed a visit to the British camp.

According to Bakhtiar Khan's account Yakub was afraid to receive a British Mission, lest it should undermine his authority at Kabul, and so compel him to accept such conditions as the British Government might choose to dictate. Moreover there was a strong military party at Kabul averse to peace, and it was doubtful whether Yakub would be able to protect the Mission from insult. Reports received from Kabul tended to show that the Amir's authority was unable to restrain the lawlessness of the mob and the soldiery, who plundered in the open street with impunity and even threatened to pillage the late Amir's treasury. They were only appeased by the payment of a large instalment of the arrears due to them.

In view of these reports the proposal that the Amir should come to the British camp was considered by the Viceroy to be preferable to the despatch of a British Mission to Kabul. Major Cavagnari was therefore ordered to reply in friendly terms accepting the offer and promising to accord His Highness an honourable reception. On the 28th April Bakhtiar Khan reached Kabul and delivered his letter. On the next day he received the following reply from the Amir, stating that His Highness would start from Kabul on the 3rd May :

*From Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir of Kabul, to Major Cavagnari, C.S.I., Political Officer.*

"I beg to write this friendly letter to inform you that your very friendly communication, dated 25th April, 1879, sent by the hands of the worthy and intelligent Munshi Bakhtiar Khan, reached me at a very fortunate moment.





## YAKUB AGREES TO TERMS

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"Its gratifying contents, which notify the marks of noble friendship and give the glad tidings of the tokens of great affection between the two sublime States, have afforded me unbounded joy. The Munshi above mentioned has strung one by one on the thread of description the pearls of your friendly hints and the verbal messages with which you, actuated by the motives of most sincere friendship, entrusted him, and thereby he has opened the door of happiness and joy to the face of my heart, inasmuch as the grasp of the desire of having an interview with the (British) officers of high rank, and holding a happy conference with them, has taken hold of the skirt of my heart. I will, please God, set out from the capital (Kabul) for my destination on Monday, the 3rd May, 1879 (= 10th Jamadi-ul-Awal). Further, what can I write beyond expressions of friendship?"—Kabul, 30th April, 1879 (= 7th Jamadi-ul-Awal).

As has been related, Sir Sam Browne telegraphed the news of Yakub Khan's departure from Kabul on the 3rd May. This meant that the Amir accepted the principal demands of the British Government, including the cession of the Khyber and Kurram Valleys and the appointment of a British Resident. "The Kabul campaign," said Sir Sam Browne, in a telegram of 3rd May, "may now be regarded as terminated."

On the same date another sign of the favourable condition of affairs was furnished by the arrival in camp of Asmatulla Khan, the influential chief of the Ghilzais, who came to tender his services to the British General, and whose example would, it was expected, be followed by the whole of his tribe.

On the 6th May the approach of the Amir was announced. Ground was selected and tents pitched for his accommodation and that of his following, and on the 8th he arrived at the British camp at Gandamak, accompanied by his suite, and by an escort of the 10th Hussars and Guides Cavalry, who with Major Cavagnari had gone out to meet him. A royal salute of 21 guns was accorded to him, and the whole route





## VISIT OF THE AMIR

across the valley to the conical hill overlooking the Kabul road (where the remnants of the ill-fated 44th Regiment made their last stand in 1841) was lined with British troops. At the further end of the line the Amir was met by Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Browne, accompanied by his staff, and he rode into camp between the General and the Political Officer. There were on parade 156 officers and 4,595 non-commissioned officers and men. A guard of honour of 100 British infantry (1-17th Foot) received the Amir at his camp, where all arrangements for his comfort had been made.

The Amir appeared to the observers to be about 30 years of age, rather above the middle height; he seemed civil and cheerful, but said he was yet suffering from the effects of his imprisonment.

At 3 p.m. the Political Officer paid a visit of ceremony to the Amir, and at 4 p.m. Sir Sam Browne visited him. Congratulatory telegrams were then exchanged between His Highness and the Viceroy at Simla. Later on he paid a return visit to Sir Sam Browne, being received by a guard of honour of the 51st Light Infantry, and a salute of 21 guns being fired on his arrival and departure.

On the 10th May the serious negotiations commenced.

Considerable difficulty was encountered in bringing the Amir to terms on the territorial questions, and he combated any cession of country to the British with an obstinacy which Major Cavagnari characterised as "childish perverseness." After several interviews between the Political Officer and Yakub Khan or his advisers, the basis of an agreement was at length settled at a private interview between the former on the 17th May. On the 19th the commercial and telegraph clauses of the treaty were discussed, and notwithstanding incessant and often irrelevant additions and amendments on the part of the Amir, who evinced considerable suspicion, the tact and ability of Major Cavagnari brought matters to a close on the 26th May.






# COUNTRY IN THE VICINITY OF KAM DAKKA

CSL

To illustrate Affairs of 21<sup>st</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1879, and 15<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> January 1880.  
Route of troop 10<sup>th</sup> B.L. ---  
Cap. Greagh's Force ---  
Enemy ---  
Camel track =====  
Mule ---


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London, John Murray.

W & A K. Johnston, Limited, Edinburgh & London





GUARD OF HONOUR TO AMIR YAKUB KHAN, GANDAMAK, MAY 1879





## THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL 81

On the same day the Treaty of Gandamak<sup>1</sup> was formally executed. Mr. Jenkins, Assistant Political Officer, immediately started with it for Simla. It was ratified there by the Viceroy on the 30th, and it was received again at Safed Sang in time to be presented to the Amir on the morning of the 6th of June in full *darbar*.

Meantime, the Afridis and Shinwaris along the line of communications were reported to be more active than ever in cutting off unarmed camp followers and stray camels, whilst the telegraph line also was continually being cut at intervals; it was calculated that upwards of 50 miles of telegraph wire had been stolen during the occupation, probably, as it was suggested, by the so-called friendly picquets of *jazailchis*.

Nevertheless the news of the negotiations had already produced a good effect in dispersing the tribes who were assembled in Bajaur and Swat to join in a *jihad* against the unbelievers.

The question of the possibility of an immediate withdrawal<sup>2</sup> now became of first importance. On the 10th May a conference was held at Government House, Simla, over which Lord Lytton presided, and at which the Surgeon-General of the British Forces, Dr. Ker-Innes, and Dr. Cuninghame, the Sanitary Commissioner, were invited to express their opinions on the possibility of withdrawing the troops through the Khyber in the midst of the hot weather.

Previous to this date an outbreak of cholera at Peshawar had much increased the dangers and difficulty of withdrawal. Precautions were immediately taken, and sites suitable for cholera camps were selected, in case the disease should appear among the troops of the Field Force.

As early as 30th April Dr. J. Hanbury, Principal Medical Officer of the 2nd Division at Landi Kotal, had drawn up a detailed statement of the measures to be

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix V.

<sup>2</sup> For distribution of Field Force on the 26th May, see Appendix VI.





adopted to arrest the advance of cholera in the pass, which was published in Divisional Orders. Examining posts and cholera hospitals were established at Jamrud and Ali Masjid, where every human being was inspected on arrival and departure, examining tents being pitched and guards posted at the entrance and exit of each camp. A detached cholera hospital was also provided, and a medical subordinate was placed on duty with the guards for the purpose of inspecting incoming and outgoing convoys.

In spite of these measures, however, a fatal case of cholera occurred at Ali Masjid on the 6th May. The disease rapidly spread amongst the coolies employed by the Engineers: seventeen cases and twelve deaths occurred up to the 12th May, and on the 14th and 15th idem two cases, one of them fatal, were reported at Jalalabad. Yet, so far as was then known, Afghanistan was otherwise free from cholera, and previous history and experience led to a belief that, although a serious outbreak was to be feared in the Peshawar Valley, yet it was not likely that the epidemic would spread up the Khyber till later in the year.

On the 25th May a medical committee, under the presidency of Surgeon-General Ker-Innes, recommended the withdrawal of the troops from the Jalalabad Valley, on the ground that cholera had already broken out there, and there was reason to fear that it might increase. Moreover, there had been numerous cases of enteric fever among the British troops; and, with no better protection than small tents, there was grave cause to fear that the men would suffer much during the hot weather, not only from enteric fever, but also from other diseases consequent on exposure. There could be no question that, from every point of view, it would be of the greatest benefit to get the troops into quarters.

The memorandum concluded: "We have considered the matter with the anxious care which its importance demands, and have come to the conclusion that the alternative courses which present themselves are more





## THE MEDICAL REPORT

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or less fraught with risk and danger, but that, under all the circumstances of the case, no such sanitary reasons now exist for retaining the troops in Afghanistan as would outweigh the political and financial reasons which, we understand, press for their return. Unfortunately, in this particular year and at this particular time, the choice is a choice of evils, and the troops, whether they remain or whether they return, will form a source of great anxiety for some time to come. These remarks do not apply immediately to that portion of them quartered at Gandamak; but as we apprehend that the question must be answered as regard the whole force, and not only as regards any one part of it, they need not be considered separately. If it should be resolved to withdraw the troops, there are certain special precautions which we would recommend for adoption, both with reference to the season of the year and the prevalence of cholera; and these we propose to submit at once in a separate memorandum."

Surgeon-General Ker-Innes indicated in his forwarding report the data and reasoning on which the foregoing conclusion was arrived at:

"The time was May. Cholera was present in the Khyber route and Peshawar Valley: it was extending to the north, and even threatening Kabul at a later date. If the troops marched into India, they marched into cholera; if they remained, it advanced on them. But, assuming that they remained, it would be necessary for them to continue at their posts until October; for past experience has sufficiently shown that cholera, when once it has invaded the Peshawar Valley, may be expected, speaking broadly as the result of past epidemics, to localise itself there from May to November. And, in addition to the augmentation of sickness from other and ordinary causes, such as fever, both malarial and enteric, and dysentery, there was the prospect, if not the absolute certainty, of the troops having to incur such additional risk from heat apoplexy as in the Punjab, the portion of the country nearest Afghanistan about





## SANITARY PRECAUTIONS

which we have any accurate data, which increases at the end of June, doubles in July, and remains in full activity in August and September."

A decision once arrived at, prompt action became essential, and instructions, embodying the views entertained by the Surgeon-General as to the expediency of the return march, and the conditions under which it might best be undertaken, were forwarded to the responsible medical officers.

Considering the nature of the march, and the time of year at which it was to be undertaken, an unusual amount of sickness was anticipated, and it was consequently imperative that every practicable precaution should be taken. It was recommended, as a first and essential step, that an experienced medical officer should be attached to the Quartermaster-General's Department as Sanitary Field Inspector, charged with the duty of advising the military authorities in the selection of encamping sites, preservation of water-supply, and sanitation of the several camps and rest depots *en route*; and especially with the initiation of the medical and hygienic arrangements for the troops and rest depots on the line of march. This duty was delegated to Surgeon-Major Porter.

At the same time other recommendations were made in regard to the formation of standing camps at easy marching distances from one another, old camping-grounds being avoided, and the double-fly European privates' tents being made available; marching in the evening was advocated in as open order as possible; the issue of refreshments, chiefly in a liquid form, half way and at the end of the march; the issue of meals at regular hours; the division of the rum ration into two issues.

By the end of May the cholera was severe, especially among the British troops at Landi Kotal and among the natives at Ali Masjid. There were nearly 200 sick, all serious cases, in the British field hospital at Safed Sang, and each corps there had from 20 to 60 men attending





## THE FIELD HOSPITAL

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daily for medicine. There were 200 sick in the native hospital at Safed Sang and 150 at Jalalabad, and these hospitals were filled very rapidly owing to the wretched condition of the followers of the force.

Notwithstanding this state of things, the military authorities decided on the withdrawal, and orders were issued that the British portion of the 1st Division should march in four bodies. The Field Hospital, 1st Division, Safed Sang, was thereupon divided into four sections, each section complete in itself as regards medicines, instruments, servants, and purveyors' stores. There were five medical officers and five medical subordinates with the field hospital :

British troops from Safed Sang.	1st Section	{ 10th Hussars . . . . . I-C, R.H.A. . . . .	} Surgeon-Major H. Cornish.
	2nd Section	{ 13-9, R.A. . . . . 4th Battalion Rifle Bri- gade. . . . .	} Surgeon-Major J. F. Supple.
	3rd Section	{ E-3, R.A. (2 divisions) . . 51st Light Infantry . . .	} Surgeon-Major G. J. H. Evatt.
	4th Section	{ 1st Battalion 17th Foot. . Fishbourne and Surgeon H. Charlesworth.	} Surgeon-Major J. E.
British troops from Jalalabad	(E-3, R.A. (1 division) . . . . .		} Surgeon-Major A. H.
	(51st Light Infantry . . . . .		} Ratigan.

The European strength at Safed Sang on 31st May was 2,679, which gave an average strength of 669 to each of the four sections.

With respect to the native regiments, the regimental system was maintained, each regiment having one medical officer.

Immediately on orders being issued for the retirement, every effort was made to despatch the commissariat stores and Engineer Park from Jalalabad. From that place to Dakka (40 miles) they were to be conveyed by rafts, and two wharves were accordingly constructed at Jalalabad for their embarkation. On the 3rd June the first despatch from the upper wharf took place, and on the 4th the regular service of rafts began. Some of these rafts were made of inflated skins, others of light pontoon casks ; and others again of timber.



## REMOVAL OF STORES

Meanwhile the troops of the 1st and 2nd Divisions were already on the move towards India, beginning with the 25th Foot, which left Dakka for Peshawar on the 31st May.

On the 7th June the Amir left Gandamak, having completed all arrangements with Major Cavagnari as to the reception of the Mission at Kabul; and on the same day Sir Sam Browne and divisional head-quarters left Safed Sang, and Major Cavagnari started immediately for Simla to confer with the Viceroy. The field telegraph line was also rolled up between Safed Sang and Fort Battye, communication being maintained by heliograph.

On the 8th June Brigadier-General Tytler's brigade, forming the rear guard of the Peshawar Field Force (as it had also found the advanced guard), vacated the camp, and the last British soldier left Gandamak. The field telegraph was rolled up one day's march in advance of the rear guard, and its place taken by the heliograph under Lieutenant Whistler Smith, R.E. The rear guard consisted of:

27th Punjab Infantry (for Dakka).  
45th Sikhs (for Mardan).  
Hazara Mountain Battery (for Dakka).  
Guides Cavalry (for Peshawar).

In spite of the unwearied exertions of the Sappers under Major Blair the stores from Jalalabad were not all despatched by the 10th, and consequently the march of the rear guard was delayed to admit of the remainder, some 25,000 maunds of stores, being shipped down the river. On each raft one or more sappers were sent as guard, and in this manner two companies, as well as all the pioneer workmen, were despatched to Dakka. It was also found feasible to send down a large number of native invalids, including cholera patients.

On the morning of the 11th June the divisional head-quarters staff and numerous other officers embarked on rafts, and before night all the stores remaining were





down at the wharves; and, by carrying on the preparation of the rafts all night, everything was cleared off by 6.30 a.m. on the 13th, so that the rear guard could march that day. A little wetting to the food supplies was incurred, but no loss whatever to the Engineer stores. None of the defensive works constructed at Jalalabad were demolished, but were handed over intact to the Amir's Government.

From Jalalabad to Dakka signalling was not maintained after the telegraph line was rolled up, owing to the difficulty of establishing detached stations on Samar Khel Koh above Ali Boghan, from which only could communication be kept up between the Chardeh and Jalalabad plains. Signallers, however, accompanied the rear guard so as to open communication, if necessary.

Sir Sam Browne left Landi Kotal for Peshawar on the 16th June, by which date the evacuation of the line held between Landi Kotal and Gandamak had been completed.

Meantime, the troops had suffered considerably from cholera during their march from Gandamak to India. The 10th Hussars lost 34 troopers and 3 camp followers. The Rifle Brigade suffered more severely still—viz. 2 officers and 46 men, besides 6 from sunstroke. The 17th Regiment lost the comparatively small number of 9 men, and the 51st Light Infantry 13 men. Three medical officers and an officer attached to the Transport also succumbed to this disease.

The effects of the return march are thus described in Surgeon-General Ker-Innes' narrative:

"A march at this time of the year in Afghanistan involved exposure to a temperature ranging from 110° to 115° Fahr. in the shade; and, in spite of every precaution, the suffering of the troops was, as might have been expected, great. The men were in indifferent health from long exposure and inactivity in a trying climate. Their recall to India was evidently welcome and popular, and they started with a considerable degree of alacrity and cheerfulness, and throughout