



138 THE SHUTARGARDAN PASS

to make themselves acquainted with the territories which had been assigned to their rule by the treaty.

On the 5th May a reconnaissance was made to the top of the Shutargardan Pass, and on the 12th five reconnoitring parties were employed simultaneously on the range of hills between the Paiwar Kotal and the Mangiar Pass. On the 1st June General Roberts made a reconnaissance to the Lakarai Pass, where the road passes over the Safed Koh, which forms the watershed on the western side of the Hariab Valley. The primary object was to join hands with the Khyber Field Force, but the party from Gandamak did not succeed in getting through the Babar Ghilzai territory. The route from the Hariab was found to be difficult, and indeed impassable for an army, unless considerable labour was expended in improving it. The ascent to the kotal lies through dense forest, and is very steep. The summit of the pass is overhung by precipitous cliffs, and is so narrow that it could be easily blocked. It is broken into four small ridges, or kotals, which of course would facilitate its defence. The descent on the western side appeared to be even steeper than the ascent, and the road beyond, as far as could be seen, was closed in by hills, and seemed to be most unsuitable for the passage of troops in the face of an enemy.

On the 2nd the Major-General, with an escort of No. 2 Mountain Battery and a wing each of the 92nd Highlanders and 5th Gurkhas, marched to the village of Dabuzai, about three-quarters of a mile from the right bank of the Karaia. Thence he visited the principal settlements of the Ahmad Khels in the lower part of the Sirkai Valley, and on the following day he explored the range of hills above the left bank of that stream. "The view from this range was," says General Roberts, "extremely interesting, for through the country lying at our feet will be found, as I believe, the easiest commercial and military route between Afghanistan and India. All the information which I have succeeded in obtaining regarding the road describes



it as fairly level and capable of being made a good road for wheeled carriages without difficulty. It is said that the late Amir Sher Ali brought his bullock guns into Kurram by this route."

On the 6th June the reconnaissance moved from Ali Khel over the Istiar Pass to the villages of Istiar, and thence to Karaia. This pass is between the Paiwar and the Sapri defile, and although not so difficult as the latter, can never be made as practicable as the Paiwar. The General had now seen all the passes over the Paiwar range, and had no doubt that when the time came to carry a cart-road over it, the best line would be found to be that at the Spingawai, which presented no very serious difficulties.

On the 8th a reconnaissance was made with the 12th Bengal Cavalry up the valley of the Hushan stream in the Chakmanni country. The tribes in these villages had not at first been friendly, but had now come in and made submission, with offers of service, and it was hoped that the reconnaissance would cause the submission of the Mangal tribe, as a whole.

"On the 9th June," says General Roberts in his despatch, "escorted by the 12th Bengal Cavalry, I reconnoitred the valley which forms the principal entrance to the hilly district inhabited by the Makhbils.

"This independent tribe has not had much intercourse with us since we entered the Kurram territory; but just before I left Ali Khel, a deputation from the tribal council arrived at our camp expressing their desire to live on good terms. The men were hospitably entertained, and accompanied us to Karaia. At their invitation, I visited the valley; and we were received with every expression of goodwill. The *maliks* have agreed to take Captain Woodthorpe to the top of one of the highest peaks in their territory, from which, they say, the whole country can be seen, and promised to conduct him back to Kurram by a new route, which we have not yet explored. The Makhbil villages, which



we saw, were poor hamlets belonging to the Warukhi section of the tribe, but the valley was wide and open, and presented no military obstacles. The Makhbil tribe will remain independent of our rule; but I gladly took advantage of the opportunity to cultivate friendly relations with them, and to extend our acquaintance with the topography of the country.

"It will be observed that these reconnaissances have all been executed with the active co-operation of the people themselves. To use their own expression, they have lifted to us the *parda* (curtain) of their country, and they have taken a curious pleasure in pointing out to me the particular places they had intended to defend, if we had entered the country as an enemy. The results will, no doubt, possess a political, in addition to their geographical value, and will, I have a confident hope, conduce materially towards the permanent tranquillity of this district. In a military point of view, the local knowledge we have gained cannot fail to be useful."

On the 15th June Major-General Roberts marched with three guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, 200 sabres of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, and 200 rifles of the 5th Punjab Infantry to the boundary of the Chakmanni territory. There the troops were left in support and the General and staff, accompanied by a *badraga* or safe-conduct, proceeded some 8 miles from camp to visit the Mangal villages of Laji. It soon became evident, however, that the tribesmen were hostile and not under the control of the *badraga*. It was, therefore, determined to retire, and a message was sent to the officer in charge of the troops to move up the valley to support the reconnaissance. This was done; and although the Mangals fired a few shots, wounding a havildar and a *malik* of the Hasan Khel Jajis, and followed the party a short distance, the march back to Karaia was accomplished without further interruption. The reconnaissances were now completed, and the General on the following morning marched to Shalozan, to supervise



SNIPING OUTRAGES

141

the arrangements in progress for hutting the troops at that place, and to give the troops and transport animals a much-needed rest.

One or two unfortunate outrages marked the end of June and the beginning of the month of July.

On the 25th June Dr. W. B. Smyth, of the Indian Medical Department, was murdered by robbers near the *serai* at Sapri when on his way to Thal. The crime had no political significance, but the offender was traced to the Watazai division of the Zaimukhts.

On the 28th June some working parties of the 11th and 21st Bengal Infantry, when cutting brushwood near Balesh Khel, were fired into; and two of the number, who were beyond the picquets, were killed by Massuzai Orakzais. Some camels also were fired on when grazing, and other unprovoked attacks were made in the same neighbourhood, at the instigation, as it was supposed, of persons who lived in Sadda and Durani. Accordingly General Roberts ordered Lieutenant-Colonel M. H. Heathcote, Road Commandant, to surprise and surround Sadda with troops, to seize all the Massuzai and Alisherzai Orakzais living within its limits, and to deport them to Kohat. This order was successfully executed on the 30th June, when seventeen men were arrested and sent to be lodged in the Kohat jail. The effect was good, and the headmen of Sadda afterwards came up to head-quarters on the Paiwar Kotal to express their contrition, and to pray for the release of the prisoners. They were told that this would not be done until the whole *jirgas* of the Massuzai and Alisherzai divisions or clans of the Orakzai tribe made their submission. In the meantime Balesh Khel was strengthened with three guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery.

The general health of the troops in the Kurram Valley was good. A few sporadic cases of cholera occurred at Thal, but it did not assume an epidemic form. Its presence, however, determined the Major-General to delay the departure to the lower country



142 END OF THE FIRST CAMPAIGN

beyond Thal of the British troops, who had hitherto been quite free from the disease.

The climate of the valley was good, the heat never excessive, and at Shalozan it was quite cool by the end of July.

The mortality amongst the camels, however, was very great, in consequence of which General Roberts recommended that the regimental organisation of transport should be broken up and that the animals should be collected at Thal, where good grazing was procurable.

The Major-General also urged the importance of completing a cart track from Thal, and he advocated the laying down of a tramway or light railway from Rawalpindi or Kohat to Kurram, repeating his belief that the natural line for traffic between India and Kabul was through the Kurram Valley.

Excellent political relations had been formed with Padshah Khan, the chief of the Ghilzais near the Shuturgardan, and our most advanced outpost at Ali Khel, in the Hariab Valley, was entirely free from any annoyance by the tribesmen. This satisfactory arrangement was undoubtedly of material assistance in the advance of the following autumn.

On the 23rd July Major-General Roberts took leave of the Field Force and proceeded to Simla, and with this event the first campaign in the Kurram Valley may be said to have terminated.¹

¹ For distribution of troops on the conclusion of the campaign, see Appendix VIII.



CHAPTER V

OPERATIONS OF THE FIELD FORCE IN SOUTHERN
AFGHANISTAN FROM OCTOBER, 1878, TO AUGUST, 1879.

ON the 27th September, 1878, the appointment of Major-General M. A. S. Biddulph, C.B., to the command of the Quetta Reinforcement¹ was sanctioned by the Government of India; and the following instructions were issued by the Adjutant-General in India to General Biddulph:

"I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to inform you that, with the sanction of Government, you have been appointed to command the troops now at or proceeding to Quetta. His Excellency desires to impress upon you that the force you are about to command not being in British territory, but in the country of a friendly prince, all requisitions for supply, or demands of any description on the Government or people, must be made through the British political officers attached to the Agency. To gain the goodwill of the ruler, chiefs and inhabitants of Baluchistan must be to you and to the officers and men under your command a matter of primary importance.

"You will, at as early a date as possible, place yourself in immediate communication with Major Sandeman, the Governor-General's Agent for Baluchistan. His Excellency cannot too forcibly impress upon you the necessity of cordially co-operating with that officer in every object tending to further the views of Government.

"Political considerations bearing on our position in

¹ *Vid. sup.* p. 5.



CSL

144 INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL BIDDULPH

Baluchistan must guide your disposition of the force, subject only to critical necessity and the safety of the troops.

"The concentration of forces at Quetta is strictly a defensive measure, necessitated by present political complications with Afghanistan, and its command will impose on you the maintenance of Quetta with the integrity of the Baluch country, and the covering of your lines of communication. It is impossible to foresee contingencies which may present themselves; but his Excellency has full confidence in your judgment, and requires of you to remain strictly on the defence, or rather in such a defensive-offensive attitude as, in case of hostile demonstrations in your immediate vicinity, would restrict action, without orders from the Commander-in-Chief, to within a day's march of Baluch territory.

"On no account, however, is the boundary of Baluch territory to be crossed, or offensive initiative resorted to in the first instance, without the authority of Government received through the Commander-in-Chief. The force at Quetta should be so disposed as to enable a small body to protect the depots and permit the remainder of the troops to remain in the field. Care must be taken to secure the best available accommodation for a general reserve hospital at Quetta, as also to provide for large depots of ordnance and commissariat stores. Whilst providing for these immediate requirements, you must bear in mind the likelihood of some 3,000 men being permanently cantoned at Quetta.

"There is no point which will demand more attention than the protection of soldiers, followers, and animals from the vicissitudes of climate. Every endeavour must be made to secure for all, at the earliest date, the warm clothing, blankets, and necessaries sanctioned by Government, and constant inspection be applied to insure that the same are maintained, and that all available shelter in the way of huts or tents is secured for their protection.



BIDDULPH AT MULTAN

145

"Experience has shown the necessity of providing for intercourse, for purposes of trade and barter, between the people of the country and the soldiers and followers of our camps. To protect villagers and ensure order, a non-commissioned officer, British or Native, of the provost marshal's establishment, must invariably be told off for duty at the market allotted for the purpose.

"The strictest discipline must be maintained amongst followers. They should be prohibited from entering villages and wandering about beyond prescribed limits or in unfrequented tracts. Grass-cutters and camels must invariably proceed in a body under escort, and in such directions as, after consultation with the political authorities, you may indicate.

"In conclusion, I am desired to remind you of the necessity of impressing on all economy in the expenditure of ammunition, and of constant supervision over the maintenance of supply and reserve, as, although individually only occupied by you, eventualities may hereafter cause Quetta to become a most important post for the re-equipment and supply of other troops."

Major-General Biddulph reached Multan on the 8th October, whence, after opening the sealed orders which awaited him there, he proceeded immediately to Rajanpur. Here he was joined by a portion of the head-quarters staff, and with the assistance of Mr. Fryer, the Deputy Commissioner, all possible arrangements were made for the supply of the troops on their march to Quetta. On the 20th October the Major-General and staff, with Mr. Fryer, started for Quetta *via* Lehri and the Bolan Pass, marching as far as Lehri in company with E-4, Royal Artillery, and the 70th Foot. Some stages of this march presented exceptional difficulties for the passage of artillery. Moreover, the 70th Foot were hampered by a large and increasing sick list, in consequence of which, at Mr. Fryer's suggestion, both the above corps handed over their provision columns, numbering about 650 camels, to be conducted by Mazari escorts. Arriving at Lehri, General Biddulph



left the troops to continue their march, and pushed rapidly on to Quetta, which place he reached on the 9th November.

The situation there at the time of his arrival was not encouraging; the garrison was too small for its position, and had been further weakened by effects of the feverish influences always present at the close of the hot weather. Moreover, the faulty position of the cantonments was, at a critical time like the present, a constant cause of alarm and watchfulness. Not only did the close neighbourhood of the Kakar border, and of a considerable range of hills, afford opportunity for the secret maturing of hostile movements, but even the main roads between Kandahar and Kalat were not covered by the station.

The duties which first engaged the attention of the Major-General on his arrival, were arrangements for the supply and sanitation of the large camp, which was suddenly growing up near the station, and the equipment of the troops for field service. With these objects in view, and with the assistance of the political officers, purchases of all kinds of country produce were made; buildings suitable for the reception of the numerous sick were prepared and a base hospital opened; such measures as were possible, in the absence of *bildars* or a proper establishment of sweepers, were taken to provide for the cleanliness of the camps and the surrounding ground, while roads of some extent between the camps were constructed under the direction of Captain W. Bissett, R.E.; finally the scale of baggage was remodelled and the weights increased to allow a sufficiency of warm clothing to be carried both by troops and followers.

Meanwhile the country was reconnoitred as far as Kuchlak, where a depot of supplies was opened, and the roads as far as the Afghan frontier were examined.

On the 9th November a telegram was received from the Quartermaster-General directing a movement to be made into Peshin. This order gave an entirely new aspect to the operations of the Major-General, who lost no time in communicating with Major Sandeman.



QUETTA AND MULTAN DIVISIONS 147

“And it is due to him,” writes General Biddulph, “to say that by his forethought, and the energy of himself and Mr. Bruce, the Quetta Force was able to take the field, and the way paved for the advance of General Stewart’s division to follow after.”

In reply to an enquiry from head-quarters, the Major-General announced his readiness to make a forward movement with an advance force of 900 men and six guns into Peshin territory on the 21st November, and into the Peshin Valley on the following day. The composition of the Quetta and Multan Divisions on that date was as follows :

*KANDAHAR LINE.**Quetta Division.*

Major-General M. A. S. Biddulph, C.B., R.A.	Commanding.
Lieut. S. F. Biddulph, 34th Foot	Aide-de-Camp.
Major G. B. Wolseley, 65th Foot	Assistant Adjutant-General.
Captain R. McG. Stewart, R.A.	Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Captain H. B. Hanna, Bengal Staff Corps	Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Colonel H. Moore, C.I.E., Bombay Staff Corps	Assistant Quartermaster-General <i>for special duty.</i>

Medical Department.

Deputy Surgeon-General J. Hendley, Army Medical Department	Principal Medical Officer.
Surgeon-Major W. G. N. Manley, v.c.	

Commissariat Department.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. Lane, Bengal Staff Corps	Officiating Assistant Commissary-General.
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Engineer Department.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. Hichens, R.E.	Commanding Royal Engineer.
Captain W. S. S. Bisset, R.E.	Field Engineer.
Captain W. G. Nicholson, R.E.	Field Engineer.
5th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.	
Engineer Field Park.	



148 QUETTA AND MULTAN DIVISIONS

Artillery.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Le Mesurier	Commanding Royal Artillery.
Lieutenant F. H. G. Cruickshank	Adjutant.
Major F. V. Eyre	Commissary of Ordnance.
E-4, Brigade, Royal Artillery	Major T. C. Martelli.
No. 3 Mountain Battery, Punjab Frontier Force	Captain J. Charles.
No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery	Captain R. Wace.
Ordnance Field Park.	

Cavalry.

Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser, c.B., Bengal Staff Corps	Commanding.
Captain H. R. Abadie, 9th Lancers	Brigade-Major.
1st Punjab Cavalry	Major C. S. Maclean.
2nd Punjab Cavalry	Colonel T. G. Kennedy.
3rd Sind Horse	Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. P. Malcolmson.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. Lacy, 59th Foot	Commanding.
Captain M. H. Nicholson, General List, Bombay Infantry	Brigade-Major.
70th Foot	Colonel H. de R. Pigott.
19th Punjab Infantry.	Colonel E. B. Clay.
30th Bombay Infantry (Jacob's Rifles)	Major F. T. Humfrey.

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General T. Nuttall, Bombay Staff Corps	Commanding.
Captain W. W. Haywood, 1st Battalion, 14th Foot	Brigade-Major.
1st Punjab Infantry	Major F. J. Keen.
26th Punjab Infantry.	Lieutenant-Colonel M. G. Smith.
32nd Punjab Infantry (Pioneers)	Lieutenant-Colonel H. Fellowes.
29th Bombay Infantry (2nd Baluch Regiment)	Lieutenant-Colonel G. Nicholls.



QUETTA AND MULTAN DIVISIONS 149

Multan Division.

Lieutenant-General D. M. Stewart, C.B., Bengal Staff Corps	Commanding.
Lieutenant N. R. Stewart, 68th Foot	Aide-de-Camp.
Captain E. Molloy, Bengal Staff Corps	Interpreter.
Colonel J. Hills, C.B., V.C., R.A.	Assistant Adjutant-General.
Major E. F. Chapman, R.A.	Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Major G. V. Prior, 100th Foot	Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Captain A. Gaselee, Bengal Staff Corps	Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Captain R. F. C. A. Tytler, General List, Infantry	Deputy Judge Advocate.

Medical Department.

Deputy Surgeon-General A. Smith, M.D., Army Medical Department	Principal Medical Officer.
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Commissariat Department.

Colonel T. H. Sibley, Bengal Staff Corps	Deputy Commissary-General.
Colonel M. J. Brander, Bengal Staff Corps	Assistant Commissary-General.

Engineer Department.

Colonel R. H. Sankey, R.E.	Commanding Royal Engineers.
Major A. Le Mesurier, R.E.	Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant C. F. Call, R.E.	Assistant Field Engineer.
Lieutenant E. S. E. Childers, R.E.	Assistant Field Engineer.
Lieutenant G. R. R. Savage, R.E.	Superintendent of Field Telegraphs.

3 companies, Sappers and Miners.
Engineer Field Park.

Artillery.

Brigadier-General C. G. Arbuthnot, C.B., R.A.	Commanding Royal Artillery.
Captain A. D. Anderson, R.A.	Brigade-Major.
Colonel E. J. Bruce, R.A.	Commanding Siege Train.
Major W. H. Noble, R.A.	Staff Officer, Siege Train.
Captain R. A. Lanning, R.A.	Adjutant.



150 QUETTA AND MULTAN DIVISIONS

Major C. Cowie, R.A.	Commissary of Ordnance.
A-B, Royal Horse Artillery	Colonel D. Macfarlan.
I-1, Royal Artillery	Major H. C. Lewes.
D-2, Royal Artillery	Major E. Staveley.
G-4, Royal Artillery	Major Sir J. W. Campbell, Bt.
13-8, Royal Artillery (Siege Train)	Major E. S. Burnett.
16-8, Royal Artillery (Siege Train)	Major J. H. Blackley.
5-11, Royal Artillery (Heavy)	Major C. Collingwood.
6-11, Royal Artillery (Heavy)	Major J. A. Tillard.
8-11, Royal Artillery (Siege Train)	Major H. H. Murray.
11-11, Royal Artillery (Mountain)	Major N. H. Harris.
	Ordnance Field Park.

Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General W. Fane, C.B.	Commanding.
Captain H. H. F. Gifford, 13th Hussars	Brigade-Major.
15th Hussars	Colonel J. E. Swindley.
8th Bengal Cavalry	Colonel B. W. Ryall.
19th Bengal Lancers	Colonel P. S. Yorke.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. Barter, Bengal Staff Corps	Commanding.
Captain C. M. Stockley, 2-9th Foot	Brigade-Major.
2nd Battalion 60th Rifles	Colonel J. J. Collins.
15th Sikhs	Colonel G. R. Hennessy.
25th Punjab Infantry	Colonel N. Barton.

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. J. Hughes, 63rd Foot	Commanding.
Captain A. G. Handcock, Bengal Staff Corps	Brigade-Major.
59th Foot	Major J. Lawson.
1st Gurkha Regiment	Colonel R. S. Hill.
3rd Gurkha Regiment	Colonel A. Paterson.
12th Bengal Infantry	Colonel R. H. Price.



THE RESERVE

151

As a reserve to General Stewart's force, a mixed division of Bombay and Madras troops was ordered to assemble in lower Sind, composed as follows, to concentrate at Sukkur and Jacobabad:

Major-General J. M. Primrose,	Commanding.
C.S.L.	
Lieutenant E. O. F. Hamilton,	
2nd Foot	Aide-de-Camp.
Colonel E. A. Green	Assistant Adjutant-General.
Major Lloyd	Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.
Captain A. B. Stopford	Deputy Assistant Quarter-master-General.

Medical Department.

Nil.

Commissariat Department.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Shewell Divisional Commissariat Officer

Engineer Department.

Major Le Mesurier, R.E. Field Engineer.
No. 2 Company Bombay Sappers, and 2 companies Madras Sappers.

Cavalry Brigade.

Colonel J. E. Swindley, 15th
Hussars Commanding.
14th Hussars.
1st Sind Horse (Bombay).
1st Madras Cavalry.

Artillery.

Major W. H. Caine B-B, Royal Horse Artillery.
Major H. F. Pritchard H-1, Royal Artillery.

Bombay Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. Phayre Commanding.
Major C. J. Burnett Brigade-Major.
83rd Foot.
1st Bombay Infantry (*Grenadiers*).
19th Bombay Infantry.



A FORWARD MOVE

Madras Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General A. C. Mac-	
Master	Commanding.
Captain S. W. Bell	Brigade-Major.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Knowles	67th Foot.
	30th Madras Infantry.
	36th Madras Infantry.

The forward movement of the several corps from Quetta was complicated by the necessity for commanding and medical officers to remain behind to hand over the sick in person to the medical charge of the base hospital. With a view to carrying out this arrangement, the first line of troops put into the field was composed of detachments, from which every sick or ailing man was withdrawn; and the head-quarters were left to move with the second line as soon as the necessary arrangements could be made. With the object also of facilitating the rapid movement of troops in all directions, small but complete bodies of all arms were formed, which were supplied on departure from Quetta with seven days' supplies of food and two days' firewood. The commanders of these small bodies were advised to keep up their supplies of food, which they were very well able to do.

There being no Commissariat agents, all the necessary arrangements for maintaining their supplies were to be made by the commanders of columns, who were also to begin purchasing for depots.

On the 19th November the first forward movement was made by a reconnaissance under the Major-General, consisting of two guns of the Bombay Mountain Battery, 100 of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and a wing of the 29th Bombay Infantry. On the same day the 32nd Punjab Pioneers moved to Kuchlak and set about making a road over the Margha Kotal. The detachment mentioned above was on the 20th reinforced by two guns of the Peshawar Mountain Battery and a wing of the 1st Punjab Infantry, and on the 22nd November, war having been proclaimed against the



Amir, the whole (except the wing of the 29th Bombay Infantry) marched to Huramzai on the Lora River. On the 25th November the main body of the force marched to Saiad Yaru Karez, and on the 27th to Haikalzai, whence Major-General Biddulph joined a reconnoitring force which had been pushed forward from Quetta under Colonel Clay, consisting of two and a half battalions, two mountain guns, and two squadrons. This reconnaissance extended as far as Khushdil Khan Kala in the Peshin Valley, which was reached on 1st December, and the General returned to head-quarters at Haikalzai with full information regarding all the outlets from the Peshin Valley.

On the 4th December a reconnaissance under Colonel T. G. Kennedy, comprising the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, 26th Punjab Infantry, and two mountain guns was despatched from Haikalzai into the Peshin Valley, with orders to reconnoitre the Khojak, Khojani, Roghani, and Gwajha Passes, as well as the road through the Ghazarband Pass between Quetta and Gulistan Karez.

In the meantime the 1st or Multan Division under Lieutenant-General D. M. Stewart had been steadily advancing from Multan and up the Bolan Pass; thence the Lieutenant-General and staff proceeded rapidly to Quetta, where he arrived on the 8th December, and on that date assumed command of the Southern Afghanistan Field Force. Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser had joined his cavalry brigade, and Brigadier-Generals R. Lacy and T. Nuttall assumed command of the two infantry brigades of the 2nd (Quetta) Division.

On the 9th December and following days the force at Haikalzai made a further advance, and on the 11th Major-General Biddulph in company with Lieutenant-Colonel J. Browne, R.E., and Lieutenant-Colonel W. Hichens, Commanding Royal Engineer, visited the Khojak Pass and explored the different tracks with a view to the selection of the best route for the passage of the army across the Khwaja Amran range.

The two roads in use were that which was made



by the British troops in 1839-42, and the route over the Gwajha Pass. The latter was much the easier, but owing to the difficulty of getting water in sufficient quantity for a large number of troops at any time of the year, and the great probability that there would be none at all at two of the halting-places during the hot weather, it was determined that the Khojak route should be opened. It was decided that the best thing to do would be to repair the old British road, which had, in the course of some forty years of entire neglect, fallen into such a state that the passage of a laden camel had become almost impossible.

Accordingly, on the 12th, Lieutenant-Colonel Hichens marched from Abdullah Khan Kala, where divisional head-quarters had been established, with a small column, *viz.*—

2 guns, Peshawar Mountain Battery	} Under Colonel Kennedy,	
50 sabres, 2nd Punjab Cavalry		} 2nd Punjab Cavalry.
1st Punjab Infantry		

This column encamped on the south side of the Khojak, about 2 miles below the kotal. Lieutenant-Colonel Hichens had with him the 5th and 9th Companies, Bengal Sappers and Miners, the former extremely weak (two years at Quetta having reduced their working strength to less than 50 men), whilst the 9th Company was also much below its strength.

Besides them there were the 32nd Pioneers under Lieutenant-Colonel H. Fellowes ; a working party of the 26th Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel M. G. Smith ; Captain Nicholson, R.E., with the Engineer Field Park ; Lieutenants E. S. Hill and C. Maxwell with No. 5, and Lieutenant Sharpe, R.E., with No. 9 Company.

On the 13th December, whilst a squadron of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry crossed the Khojak and reconnoitred as far as Chaman, the majority of the advanced brigade under Brigadier-General Nuttall pushed forward and occupied the pass, and work on the road at once



began; the Sappers and Miners with the working party of the 26th Punjab Infantry worked on the south side of the kotal, and the Pioneers on the slope towards Chaman. Notwithstanding the difficulties of the undertaking the work progressed so rapidly that on the evening of the 14th Lieutenant-Colonel Hichens was able to report the road fit for cavalry, infantry, and baggage animals. Accordingly the small column under Colonel Kennedy passed over on the following day with 450 camels and encamped at Chaman.

Nevertheless, the slope on the north side remained terribly steep even for camels, and it was clear to Lieutenant-Colonel Hichens that, apart from the necessity of keeping this road clear for camel traffic, it would be quite impossible to make the descent practicable and safe for wheeled artillery in less than ten days or a fortnight. He accordingly determined to construct a ramp, or slide, down the bed of a water-course which descended tolerably straight from that part of the kotal over which the old road ran, and down which the guns, limbers, and wagons could be passed by ropes. The slope of this ramp was as much as 29° to 31° for between 450 and 500 feet of its length, after which it fell into the bed of a nala with a moderate gradient and joined the old camel road some 400 yards lower down, from which point the road into Chaman presented no difficulties. A broad platform was provided on the kotal at the top of the slide, where guns could be placed, and whence the ropes by which they were let down were worked by parties of infantry. The top of the ramp was turned slightly to the right, in order that the guns might not have to pass over the beam and sand-bags which had to be placed there to lessen the friction of the ropes; this turn was also in conformity with the natural lie of the ground, and saved much cutting, which would, moreover, have considerably cramped the platform above. It was at first thought that this curve on so steep a slope might present some difficulties to the lowering of the guns; but when



properly handled, they passed down without the smallest difficulty. Stiff bollards well strutted and securely fixed were placed in pairs at the sides of the ramp, over which the ropes could be turned and the stress of the pull taken off the working party at the top. Even heavy guns could have been let down thus with ease and safety.

Lieutenant-General D. M. Stewart arrived at Abdulla Khan Kala on the 14th December, and on the 16th visited Chaman with Major-General Biddulph and Colonel Hichens. A site for a fortified post was laid out there, and the work at once began, after which the Generals returned to Abdulla Khan Kala, where the head-quarters remained for the present.

On the 21st December the passage of the Khojak by the main body of the 2nd Division began, the troops passing by a march of $8\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Abdulla Khan Kala to Charjat (afterwards styled "Camp Khojak Pass").

The field batteries, under the superintendence of Lieutenant-Colonel Le Mesurier, occupied two days in crossing, and the transit could not be effected more rapidly. E-4, Royal Artillery, was the first to make the passage. The plan adopted was to drive to the summit on the first day; then park all the carriages on ground prepared for them at the top of the incline. Next day the horses were watered and led to the foot of the steep portion of the incline and there picketed; the gunners, assisted by working parties of infantry, then proceeded to lower down the ordnance and carriages. This was best done by unlimbering the carriage and letting each portion down separately by means of two long ropes reaching to the bollards at the summit. Lieutenant-Colonel Hichens timed No. 2 gun E-4, and from the moment of starting from the top of the slide to the time when the ropes were cast loose at the bottom was $9\frac{1}{2}$ minutes; and there was no reason why any gun or wagon should have taken longer. A-B, Royal Horse Artillery, also crossed in this manner; and



"besides these two batteries," write Lieutenant-Colonel Hichens, "I-1, Royal Artillery, and its wagons were let down without any accident of which I have heard."

Meanwhile a thorough examination had been made of the Gwajha Pass over the Khwaja Amran range by the cavalry of a small column commanded by Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser, which crossed the Gwajha on the 16th December, bivouacked that night and joined the force at Chaman on the 17th.

Colonels Le Mesurier, R. A., and R. H. Sankey, R. E., accompanied this reconnaissance, and tested the possibility of making a line suitable for the heavy guns along the foot of the Khwaja Amran range direct from Gwajha to Chaman. The distance is about 27 miles, and the line was found to be quite unsuited for the objects in view, although a track was met with and water was abundant in two places, the first at Iskan Khan, $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Gwajha, and the second from a *karez* about the same distance short of Chaman and a mile north of the debouchure of the Roghani Pass.

The pass itself, although rendered difficult by heavy gradients and the obstruction of rocks projecting from the sides or of large boulders, presented no insuperable obstacle to the passage of all arms. At the same time it was evident from the first that the road over the Khojak Pass would be very liable to block if no other were available for return carriage. It was for three reasons particularly necessary to relieve this pressure: first, the want of transport rendered necessary the return from the front of the camels of one corps to help others or to bring over commissariat supplies; secondly, convoys of stores arrived daily, the camels of which had to be sent back for further supplies after depositing their load at Chaman; thirdly, a large addition was made to the troops of the 2nd Division originally detailed to cross. The 15th Hussars, A-B, Royal Horse Artillery, 11-11, Royal Artillery, and escort, and I-1, Royal Artillery, and all reserve ammunition were ordered to move by the Khojak. Moreover the 1st Punjab Infantry



was now ordered back from the front to Gulistan Karez, thus necessitating an extra return movement, and a loss of working power.

It was decided, therefore, that the Gwajha Pass should be improved without delay, and on the 23rd December Colonel Sankey, R.E., began work with a party, 120 strong, of the 32nd Pioneers. Next day the rest of the Pioneers, the 2nd Baluchis (29th Bombay Infantry), and the 9th Company of the Sappers arrived, making a total strength of 526, and up to the end of the month the work was pushed rapidly forward without intermission, so that on the 30th December it was practically complete. "No portion of the road was less than 13 feet in width, and the curves were so widened as to prevent any difficulty being experienced by the heavy guns with their long teams of bullocks," writes Colonel Sankey. With the exception of the quarter of a mile immediately west of the kotal, the gradients were good throughout. Here, however, they could not be made less in some places than one in nine.

During this period work had not slackened on the Khojak and at Chaman, though sickness interfered a good deal, and the redoubt at the latter place consequently progressed but slowly. On the Khojak Pass the track was widened, and the gradients so far decreased by zig-zags as to admit of the passage to and fro of laden camels. A considerable portion of the road through the narrow gorge on the south side was avoided by this road, and the traffic was much relieved.

At the same time the carriage road, since constructed, was laid out roughly under Colonel Hichens' supervision, and a new camel-road, from the point on the southern road where the gorge begins to contract, was carried over the hill to the right, joining the wheel-road near the kotal; this was a valuable addition to the means of transit on this side of the kotal, as the worst and narrowest part of the gorge road was avoided and the constant pressure there relieved. "This road



DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS 159

was suggested and almost laid out," says Lieutenant-Colonel Hichens, "by Major-General Biddulph, R.A."

As soon as this second camel-road was completed, all difficulties ceased, and the movement of troops and convoys from both sides went on simultaneously without a hitch.

Meanwhile on the 26th December General Stewart moved his head-quarters to Gulistan Karez, and on the following day orders for the distribution of the Field Force were issued as follows :

1ST DIVISION.

Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General W. Fane, Commanding.

15th Hussars.		8th Bengal Cavalry.
19th Bengal Lancers.		

1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. Barter, Commanding.

2-60th Rifles.		15th Sikhs.
I-1, Royal Artillery.		

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. J. Hughes, Commanding.

59th Foot.		12th Bengal Infantry.
1st Gurkhas.		3rd Gurkhas.
D-2, Royal Artillery.		

2ND DIVISION.

Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser, Commanding.

1st Punjab Cavalry.		3rd Sind Horse.
2nd Punjab Cavalry.		A-B, Royal Horse Artillery.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. Lacy, Commanding.

19th Punjab Infantry.		32nd Pioneers.
E-4, Royal Artillery.		



IN TWO COLUMNS

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General T. Nuttall, Commanding.

1st Punjab Infantry.

26th Punjab Infantry.

2nd Sikhs.

G-4, Royal Artillery.

5th Company Sappers and Miners.

RESERVE ARTILLERY.

5-11, Royal Artillery.

11-11, Royal Artillery.

6-11, Royal Artillery.

No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain
Battery.

No. 2 Jacobabad Mountain Battery.


During the last few days of 1878 the remaining troops of the 2nd Division were moved across the Khojak to Chaman, leaving a company of the 1st Punjab Infantry posted at the summit of the pass, where they were ordered to hut themselves and make a fortified post to guard the communications.

A field officer was appointed to the special charge of the traffic, and definite instructions issued to him for the guidance of all concerned. About 900 camels could, if necessary, be passed over from the south side of the Khojak daily, and about 700 returning camels could cross at the same time. Heliographic communication greatly assisted the movement of transport.

The Lieutenant-General now issued Field Force Orders for the army to move forward in two columns, on separate lines of route, and to converge in the Takhtapul district.

The right column was formed by the 2nd Division, under General Biddulph, which was to advance from Chaman and the Khojak. The left column was composed of the 1st Division, accompanied by Field Force head-quarters, and was to follow the Gwajha route (with the exception of A-B, Royal Horse Artillery, I-1, Royal Artillery, 11-11, Royal Artillery, and the 15th Hussars, which crossed the Khojak).

The joint advance guard of the two divisions was commanded by Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser, and



WESTERN DESCENT FROM THE KHOJAK PASS



PROGRESS OF THE COLUMNS 161

was divided in turn into two columns, composed as follows :

Left or Gwajha column under Brigadier - General Palliser.	{	15th Hussars, 123 sabres.
	{	1st Punjab Cavalry, 219 sabres.
	{	A-B, Royal Horse Artillery, 2 guns.
	{	25th Punjab Infantry, 419 rifles.
	{	32nd Pioneers, 539 rifles.
Right or Khojak column under Colonel Kennedy.	{	2nd Baluch Regiment, 266 rifles.
	{	4th and 9th Companies, Sappers.
	{	15th Hussars, 79 sabres.
	{	2nd Punjab Cavalry, 200 sabres.
	{	3rd Sind Horse, 30 sabres.
	{	A-B, Royal Horse Artillery, 2 guns.

The left column marched on the 1st January, 1879, from the vicinity of the Gwajha Pass to Lalgoli Daud or lake, on the next day to Kunchai, and on the 3rd January to Shah Pasand, covering about 17 miles each day. This advance column was followed at one day's interval by the remainder of the 1st Division and Field Force head-quarters, which consequently reached Shah Pasand on the 4th January, whilst the advanced column proceeded on that day to Shadezai on the Mel stream. The right column left (Old) Chaman on the 2nd January and camped near the bed of the Kadanai River beyond Spin Baldak, where supplies had been collected beforehand by political and cavalry officers. The main body of the 2nd Division followed its advance column on the following day. The advanced party of this division, moving one day in front of the main body, reached Mel Manda on the 4th January, whilst the division in rear moved by brigades to Humai Karez, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles beyond Gatai, and Fatehulla on the Kushobai stream about 5 miles west of Humai Karez, respectively.

On the 5th January the two columns of the respective advance guards moved in concert by the Ghlo and Kurkura Kotals from the Mel Valley into the Takhtapul Valley. Major G. Luck, 15th Hussars, with 100 sabres of the 15th Hussars and 28 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry, was ordered to make a reconnaissance of the Kurkura Kotal by which the left column was moving.



On nearing this pass some Afghan scouts were seen retiring over it, and on debouching into the open country on the other side, the valley was found to be swarming with the enemy's cavalry. Major Luck immediately formed his detachment into two lines, the first composed of one troop of the 15th Hussars and of the small party of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, with the second line of one troop of 15th Hussars in support. In this formation the detachment moved forward at a gallop to meet the advancing cavalry of the enemy, who, however, turned about when the troops got to within 200 yards of them, and retired, firing as they went. The troops pursued for some distance, but the country being full of ravines and very stony, they halted, dismounted, and opened fire with their Martini-Henry carbines, the effect of which was seen to be that a few saddles of the retreating force were emptied. However, on following up the retreating foe, one prisoner only was taken, although a quantity of baggage was captured, which had been thrown away during the flight. Major Luck, having received orders from the Brigadier-General, now withdrew his party towards the pass with a view to drawing the enemy after him, so as to bring them under the fire of the guns, which were advancing through the pass.

Meanwhile the advanced party of the right column also came in sight of a body of hostile cavalry, and on receipt of orders from the Brigadier, Colonel Kennedy pushed on with his cavalry and guns, and was able to bring the latter into action at ranges varying from 2,200 to 1,300 yards. The enemy then withdrew, pursued across the Ghlo Pass by the cavalry and guns of the column.

Brigadier-General Palliser, having issued orders to the right column to push on against the enemy, hastened with all his available cavalry to join Major Luck, who was halted on the further side of the Kurkura Pass. He then advanced against the retiring parties of Afghans, until the sound of artillery from the Ghlo Pass on the right caused him to change his direction towards that



EFFECTIVE ARTILLERY FIRE 163

point. Accompanied by the cavalry under Major Luck, the Brigadier and staff reached the north side of the Ghlo Pass in time to charge a body of the enemy who were retiring before the right column, and inflicted on them as much loss as the tired condition of the horses would allow. Immediately after this encounter the guns and cavalry of the right column debouched from the pass.

The guns of the left column had meanwhile arrived at a trot in the Takhtapul Valley, and struck across the low hills in the same direction as the cavalry, and for about a quarter of a mile experienced some difficulty in advancing, owing to the very rough nature of the ground. An order was, however, received from Brigadier-General Palliser directing the guns to follow the *kafila* road on the left and below the ridge of hills, over which the cavalry had crossed. After proceeding 4 or 5 miles, and on reaching the village of Saif-ud-din, a large body of the enemy's horsemen appeared on a hill to the right front about 1,700 yards distant. The scouts of the escort reported that the enemy were in great force. Therefore, as none of the cavalry or infantry supports were in sight, the officer commanding the battery considered it advisable to retire the guns slowly for a short distance, while intelligence of the position of the enemy was despatched to the infantry, who were coming up in rear. This force of the enemy did not alter its position until the infantry under Colonel H. Moore, C.I.E., arrived, and the Brigadier-General coming up shortly afterwards from the right, ordered the guns to open fire. Captain H. de la M. Hervey, 1st Punjab Cavalry, was then ordered to advance and throw out dismounted skirmishers, while the guns were brought up behind a mound. After the skirmishers had fired some twenty rounds, they remounted and retired, and, as expected, the enemy followed in numbers, and were again fired on by the guns with effect. The main body of the enemy now withdrew out of range and sight, but their skirmishers still held their



ground, though beyond carbine range, and remained hovering about. The Brigadier-General, therefore, ordered three companies of the infantry to be brought up; and after a few rounds from two companies of the 2nd Baluchis, the effect of which could not well be ascertained owing to the coming darkness, the whole force, with the exception of a strong picquet, retired to camp near Saif-ud-din.

The enemy numbered from 1,000 to 1,200 horsemen in all, and their loss was estimated at 100 killed and wounded; while the casualties among the troops were one officer and six men, 15th Hussars, wounded, and one jemadar and three sowars, 1st Punjab Cavalry, wounded.

The enemy retired through Deh-i-Haji to Kandahar, and retreated from Kandahar two days later towards Herat. A few of the same cavalry came subsequently into the British camp and offered to take service with us.

The two divisions of the Field Force, continuing their march without further interruption, effected their junction, as had been previously arranged, at Abdur Rahman on the 6th January. Here a redistribution of the cavalry and advance guards took place, after which the march was resumed towards Kandahar, the divisions still moving on separate roads, *viâ* Deh-i-Haji and Kushab.

At Khushab, about 7 miles south of Kandahar, on the 7th January information reached General Stewart that Mir Afzal Khan, Governor of Kandahar, having disarmed the two infantry battalions of the garrison, had fled towards Herat with only 200 horsemen and accompanied by all the officials of the city except the Deputy Governor or *Naib*. At the same time a deputation arrived bearing a letter of submission from the latter.

At 3.30 p.m. on the following day General Stewart arrived at the Shikarpur gate of Kandahar, and, with the 1st Brigade of each division, marched through the city and encamped outside the Kabul gate. The 2nd Brigades had been previously halted some miles from Kandahar and were kept in rear for a few days.



A large crowd of the inhabitants assembled outside the gate to witness the arrival of the troops, and numbers more lined the streets along which they passed. Their attitude was perfectly impassive, showing neither fear, hostility, nor pleasure. The shops in the streets and the bazaar were open, with the exception of the larger establishments whose owners had lost confidence on the departure of the late Governor.

On the following day the troops entered the city freely. The shops were all opened, and although it was not considered necessary to quarter any large body of troops within the city, guards were stationed at each of the gates, and a wing of the 25th Punjab Infantry occupied the square in the centre of the town.¹

The first few days of the British occupation were marked by two acts of violence, the first of which, however, had no connection with the bearing of the Afghans towards the invading army. On the afternoon of the 10th January, Major O. B. St. John, Political Officer, was riding through the town with an orderly and accompanied by Nawab Ghulam Husain Khan, who had been appointed to conduct the civil government of the city, when a man suddenly sprang forward and fired a pistol full in Major St. John's face. The horse he was riding fortunately swerved, and the bullet missed. The assassin then drew sword, but was quickly felled by the orderly, captured, and imprisoned. Almost immediately afterwards, in another part of the town, Lieutenant H. V. Willis, of E-4, Royal Artillery, was attacked by a fanatic while standing in front of a shop, and severely stabbed with a long knife. The man rushed through the crowd and wounded several soldiers, but was stopped by Captain Hervey, 1st Punjab Cavalry, and then cut down and killed by a mounted trooper of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry. Lieutenant Willis's wound

¹ The advance on Kandahar was not effected without considerable wastage in transport. Many of the hired camels were in poor condition when first engaged, and their owners did not accompany them to Kandahar; 11,912 dead camels were counted on the road between Chaman and Kandahar after the first advance.



166 THE GARRISON AT KANDAHAR

was found to be very serious, and he died a few days afterwards. These occurrences produced some disturbance in the city, but the people shut their shops quietly; and though the streets could not be cleared, strong patrols moved about them. All stray soldiers were ordered back to camp, and after a time the excitement abated. On enquiry the man who had attempted to assassinate Major St. John proved to be a Pathan sepoy, formerly in the service of the Khan of Kalat, whence he had deserted. It appeared that he had mistaken Major St. John for Major Sandeman, for whom he had conceived an intense hatred.

On the 14th January¹ the following troops were detailed to form the garrison at Kandahar, and to take up their quarters in the citadel:

Garrison in the citadel of
Kandahar under Brigadier-
General Nuttall.

{ 1st Punjab Cavalry.
E-4, Royal Artillery.
5-11, Royal Artillery.
6-11, Royal Artillery.
59th Foot (wing).
12th Bengal Infantry.
26th Punjab Infantry.

Major St. John remained at Kandahar as Political officer, and the Nawab Ghulam Husain Khan as Civil Governor. Captain W. Bisset, Assistant Field Engineer, and Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. Lane, Assistant Commissary-General, formed the staff; and Lieutenant Worgan and signallers of the 59th kept up signalling communication between the citadel and both divisions.

On the same date the Lieutenant-General with the head-quarters 1st Division and the 2nd (Brigadier Hughes's) Brigade left Kandahar to execute a reconnaissance in force to Kalat-i-Ghilzai, while Major-General Biddulph was ordered to undertake a similar movement, with the 2nd Division, towards the Helmand.

The march of the 1st Division was ordered as follows:

¹ For the distribution of the S. Afghanistan Field Force on this date, see Appendix IX.



AT KALAT-I-GHILZAI

167 **CSL**

The Cavalry Brigade one day's march in advance under Bri- gadier-General Fane.	{ 15th Hussars. 8th Bengal Cavalry. 19th Bengal Lancers. A-B, Royal Horse Artillery.
Main column and head- quarters.	{ D-2, Royal Artillery. G-4, Royal Artillery. 11-11, Royal Artillery (4 mountain guns). 59th Foot (wing). } 2nd Infantry Brigade 12th Bengal Infantry. } under Brigadier- 3rd Gurkhas. } General Hughes.
One day's march in rear.	{ 2-60th Rifles. } 1st Brigade under Briga- 15th Sikhs. } dier-General Barter. 25th Punjab Infantry. }

Leaving Kandahar on the 14th, a party of the advance guard, under Colonel J. Browne, R.E., reached Kalat-i-Ghilzai without opposition on the 20th January, and entered the fort. The garrison, which had consisted of some 500 or 600 of the Amir's militia, had retreated towards Ghazni, after first removing the large stores of grain and forage which had been collected in the fort, into the neighbouring villages, to prevent their falling into the hands of the British.

The Lieutenant-General arrived at Kalat-i-Ghilzai on the 22nd January, and the main body of the 1st Division remained encamped there until the 2nd February. This time was utilised to obtain a complete survey and reconnaissance of the surrounding country. The temper of the neighbouring sections of the great Ghilzai tribe was found on the whole to be friendly, although little dependence could be placed on them, and unprotected stragglers were always liable to be attacked. All requisitions were, however, complied with, and supplies came in freely.

Towards the end of January two reconnoitring columns were despatched respectively into the Arghandab and Arghastan Valleys, neither of which was well known. The first, composed of two guns 11-11, Royal Artillery, one squadron 19th Bengal Lancers and the 25th Punjab Infantry, and commanded by Colonel Barton, left Kalat-i-Ghilzai on the 24th January, marched to Sehnum, whence large quantities of grain were sent



ATTACK BY GHAZIS

back to divisional head-quarters, and after a thorough reconnaissance and survey of the district returned by Arghasu, Chinartu and Soznai to Kandahar, where the column arrived on the 28th February.

The second column was commanded by Colonel B. W. Ryall, 8th Bengal Cavalry, and was composed of two guns 11-11, Royal Artillery, 100 sabres 15th Hussars, and the head-quarters and one squadron 8th Bengal Cavalry. This column was also joined on the 1st February by the 3rd Gurkhas under Colonel A. Paterson. Moving by Akram Khan and Wali Muhammad Kala the force crossed the Khushk-i-rud Valley to Sundarzai on the Arghastan River. The only noticeable incident of the march was an attack made on the camp at Wali Muhammad Kala by three *ghazis* supported by a small body of armed men on foot and a few horsemen. The leading men were shot down as they dashed into the camp, and the rest immediately fled up the hills pursued for some distance by the Gurkhas. With this exception no hostility or opposition was met with, either from the population of the villages or the chiefs.

On the 21st February the column marched 5 miles to camp at Mandi Hissar, where it was broken up, the 15th Hussars joining the head-quarters of the regiment, then at Mandi Hissar *en route* to India. The 8th Bengal Cavalry, also ordered to India, was here joined by a troop which had been on detached duty, and remained at the same camp. The two guns 11-11, Royal Artillery, escorted by the wing of the 3rd Gurkhas under Colonel Paterson, rejoined the camp of Lieutenant-General Stewart's force outside Kandahar on the 22nd February.

Meanwhile the Lieutenant-General with the head-quarters of the 1st Division, after remaining at Kalat-i-Ghilzai till the 2nd February, had marched back to Kandahar, where he arrived on the 11th February.

It is necessary now to return to the 2nd Division, which left Kandahar on the 16th January to execute



a reconnaissance in force to Girishk and the Helmand.
The column was composed as follows:

Cavalry Brigade.

One day's march in front under Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser. { 2nd Punjab Cavalry (Colonel T. G. Kennedy).
3rd Sind Horse (Colonel J. H. P. Malcolmson).

Lieutenant B. L. P. Reilly, Commissariat Officer.

Captain W. A. Lawrence, Transport Officer.

Artillery.

Lieutenant-Colonel Le Mesurier, R.A. { 1-1, Royal Artillery.
11-11, Royal Artillery
(2 guns).
No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery (4 guns).

Lieutenant H. C. E. Lucas, Commissariat Officer.

Lieutenant M. K. Martin, Transport Officer.

Engineers.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. Hichens, R.E. { 5th Company Sappers.
10th Company Sappers.
Field Park.
Two pontoon boats.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. Moore, Political Officer.

Captain Luckhardt, Principal Commissariat Officer.

Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. Lacy { 70th Foot.
19th Punjab Infantry.
32nd Punjab Pioneers.
29th Bombay Infantry.

Major H. J. Barton, Executive Commissariat Officer.

Captain W. G. Thomas, Transport Officer.

Lieutenant J. E. Dickie, R.E., in charge of signalling.

Head-quarters
2nd Division
under Major-General M.
A. S. Bid-
dolph, R.A.

Supplies for three days for natives and for twenty days for British troops were provided on leaving Kandahar. No forage for cattle was taken. All the camels and baggage animals available were required for the carriage of the force thus equipped; these were procured with some difficulty, and contained a large number of weak and sickly animals.

The movement towards Girishk was made chiefly with a view to tap new sources of supply, feed the force, examine the country, and await further orders. Rapid movements were, therefore, unnecessary and would, indeed, have been difficult with the transport at



hand, and with the obligation imposed on the force of procuring supplies from the country traversed.

The column reached Karez-i-Ata, 31 miles from Kandahar, on the 23rd January. Thence two roads strike off to Girishk, of which Major-General Biddulph chose the southern and longer one as it passed through a comparatively better supplied district. At the same time Colonel O. V. Tanner, 2nd Baluch Regiment, with a small detachment was despatched by the direct road *viâ* Khushk-i-Nakhud to cover the right flank of the column. On the 26th January such difficulty was found in obtaining supplies for the division from the barren country through which it had to pass that General Lacy's brigade was ordered to fall back on Karez-i-Ata, and to draw its supplies from Kandahar, the advance guard being first reinforced by No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery, the 10th Company of Sappers with the pontoons, and the 32nd Pioneers; on the 31st January half a battalion of the 2nd Baluchis (29th Bombay) also joined the advance column from General Lacy's brigade. With this force the Major-General advanced to the Helmand, and arrived at Abazai opposite Girishk on the 29th January. The fort of Girishk on the further side was immediately occupied, and ground selected for camps on both sides of the river. On the right bank General Palliser commanded with the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, 3rd Sind Horse, Sappers, and 32nd Pioneers, who were encamped south of the fort facing the direction of the Herat road. The divisional head-quarters and remainder of the force remained on the left bank of the river.

The halt on the Helmand lasted from the 2nd to the 13th February, during which time the whole force was fully occupied either with the duties of obtaining supplies, with reconnaissances and surveys, or with the task of arranging a ferry and commencing the construction of a trestle bridge over the river from rough timbers obtained on the spot. The bridge was not completed.



By the middle of February the supplies in the vicinity of Girishk were beginning to fail. To relieve the district, therefore, a reconnaissance in force was despatched southwards under Colonel Nicholetts to Kala Bist, and the opportunity was taken to complete the survey already commenced between the Helmand and Arghandab Rivers. This column was also joined by Major-General Biddulph and staff. On the 15th, however, orders were received for the return of the division to Kandahar, in view of the reduction of the Southern Afghanistan Field Force, and arrangements were accordingly commenced with that object.

All the country in the vicinity of Girishk had been drained of supplies; and before a move could be effected the arrival of a convoy from the Garmsel district, with supplies collected from 30 to 40 miles to the south-west, had to be awaited. Nevertheless by the 22nd the whole of the force on the right bank of the river was moved across, and on the 23rd the retirement began, the cavalry brigade under General Palliser acting as the rear guard. Meanwhile rumours were rife of a hostile movement amongst the Alizai Duranis of Zamindawar, and a small force was sent up the left bank of the Helmand under command of Colonel Malcolmson, 3rd Sind Horse, to watch the fords from Zamindawar in the neighbourhood of Sarwan Kala and Sangin; this body encamped the same evening at Haidarabad. Next day Colonel Malcolmson's detachment fell back on Yakhchal, and thenceforward became the rear guard of the division, moving one march in rear of Major-General Biddulph's force during its retirement on Kandahar.


At 7 p.m. on the 26th February a note from Colonel Malcolmson reached the Major-General commanding the 2nd Division, then encamped at Karez-i-Ata, stating that he had been attacked by considerable numbers of the enemy, and asking for reinforcements. Before, however, the reinforcements reached the rear guard, the enemy had been defeated and driven off under the following circumstances.



Colonel Malcolmson with his detachment (3rd Sind Horse, 266 sabres; 29th Bombay Infantry, 118 rifles) had encamped on the 26th at Khushk-i-Nakhud, when at 4.20 p.m. the videttes reported that a body of the enemy was advancing to attack the camp. The enemy were visible in very large numbers advancing from the the NNW. with flags flying, over the crest of some rising ground, $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the camp. The troops fell in and the infantry were ordered to advance, and to get the enemy as soon as possible under their fire, and then to draw them on by retiring into the open ground, which extended for about a mile to the front and left of the camp.

The infantry opened fire at about 500 yards, on which the enemy, apparently to avoid the fire, edged off to their right, thus overlapping the left of the troops, their intention evidently being to pass the flank of the troops and to occupy the huts and walled gardens of the village of Sultan Ali Khan on our left. In this, however, they were frustrated by the advance of the 3rd Sind Horse, under Major W. Reynolds, who charged their left centre, and after a fierce hand-to-hand fight lasting about ten minutes the enemy were forced to retreat though still disputing the ground fiercely.

Major Reynolds was now ordered to pursue, while Colonel Malcolmson, with a portion of his men, tried to intercept a small body of the enemy who were making for Sultan Ali Khan; but a broad and deep karez defeated his purpose, and the Afghans succeeded in reaching shelter. An infantry attack on the village was ordered, and only countermanded in consequence of a report (which proved to be a false alarm) that an attack was threatened against the opposite side of the camp. Meanwhile the cavalry and part of the infantry had pursued the enemy's left wing for some distance when, as night was falling, the troops were recalled, the camp was struck, and the camp equipage, treasure, etc., placed in an enclosure adjoining the Nurzai Fort. This





position was held during the night, which, however, passed quietly.

The strength of the enemy was computed to have been 1,500 men, of whom 500 were *ghazis*¹ and 50 cavalry. Abu Bakka, a notorious robber chief, was reported to have been killed, and 200 others.

Major Reynolds, 3rd Sind Horse, early in the affair received a bullet wound, but still led his squadron to the attack, and so became engaged in personal encounters with several of the enemy, when his horse fell with him in a *karez*, and before he could recover himself he was cut down and hacked to pieces. The casualties included also four men of the cavalry killed and Colonel Malcolmson and twenty-three men wounded, besides a loss of twenty-eight horses.

On the 27th February the main column halted, and the Major-General and staff, with signallers, rode back to Khushk-i-Nakhud, returning with Colonel Malcolmson's rear guard, which rejoined the head-quarters of the 2nd Division the same evening. The next day the division marched to Hauz-i-Madat, and on the 1st of March reached Sinjiri, whence the head-quarters and most of the troops reached the camp outside Kandahar on the 2nd March.

While the operations detailed above were in progress but little had occurred to disturb the troops left at Kandahar and the garrisons of the various posts on the line to India. Some outrages were, however, committed towards the end of January in the neighbourhood of Spin Baldak by a band of marauders under a chief named Lashkar Khan. A small column was sent out from Chaman to punish the offending villages, and in a skirmish on the 21st January a party of 26 sabres 3rd Sind Horse and 10 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry under Lieutenant H. Wells, R.E., scattered the marauders, killing Lashkar Khan, his two sons, and his nephew.

Early in February instructions were received by Lieutenant-General Stewart relative to the return to

¹ So-called religious fanatics.



REDUCTION OF FORCES

India of part of the South Afghanistan Field Force, and accordingly on the 13th idem the following were ordered to hold themselves in readiness for the march:

15th Hussars.	1st Gurkhas.
8th Bengal Cavalry.	12th (Kalat-i-Ghilzai) Bengal
E-4, Royal Artillery.	Infantry.
I-1, Royal Artillery.	1st Punjab Infantry.
Peshawar Mountain Battery.	26th Punjab Infantry.
70th Foot.	32nd Pioneers.
5th and 9th Companies Sappers and Miners.	

The column was ordered to proceed by the Thal-Chotiali route into the Derajat, thus opening up a road the probable value of which had long been urged by military authorities. Major-General Biddulph was appointed to command the force, and the above-named corps left Kandahar or the surrounding posts between the end of February and the 15th March.

In consequence of this reduction the force remaining in Afghanistan was reorganised as follows, Brigadier-General Hughes being placed in command at Kandahar for the direction of all garrison and camp duties:

Royal Artillery Division.

Colonel A. C. Johnson, R.H.A., Commanding.
Captain J. Keith, R.A., Adjutant.
Lieutenant F. C. W. Eustace, R.H.A., Orderly Officer.

Royal Engineers.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. Hichens, R.E., Commanding.
Staff as before.

Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General C. H. Palliser, Commanding.
1st Punjab Cavalry. 19th Bengal Lancers.
2nd Punjab Cavalry. 3rd Sind Horse.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. Barter, Commanding.
2-60th Rifles. 15th Sikhs.
25th Punjab Infantry.



A TIME OF QUIET

175

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. J. Hughes, Commanding.
59th Foot. 3rd Gurkhas.
29th Bombay Infantry (2nd Baluchis).

The remainder of the spring passed almost without incident. Rumours reached Kandahar from time to time of the activity at Herat of Ayub, the younger brother of Yakub Khan; and the Durani rising in Zamindawar occasioned a good deal of disorder in the valley of the Helmand, round Girishk; but almost the only open hostility against the British occurred in the Peshin district, where on the 27th March a party of 30 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry, and 176 rifles 30th Bombay Infantry, under Major F. T. Humfrey, was attacked by a large body of Barechis near Saiadbut, in Shorawak. The enemy were completely dispersed, and the collision did much to effect the tranquillising of the district. Meanwhile several important reconnaissances were in progress, notably that of the Khakrez district executed in April by a force under Brigadier-General Palliser, c.b., and the survey of the Toba Plateau by Captain H. Wylie in May.

At the end of the latter month, as has been seen, the Treaty of Gandamak was concluded, but it was decided, chiefly on account of the impracticability of retiring in the hot season, that the withdrawal of the British forces could not take place till the autumn, and no alteration took place, therefore, in the location of the troops (see Appendix X.). On the 23rd July Sardar Sher Ali Khan, who was appointed Governor of Kandahar under Yakub Khan, arrived at the city, and arrangements were immediately made between him and the Lieutenant-General for the administration of the town and district pending the evacuation of the country by the British. During the summer some further reconnaissances were effected, but the efforts of the authorities were principally directed towards meeting a serious outbreak of cholera, from which the troops




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176

MASSACRE AT KABUL

both at Quetta and Kandahar suffered severely during July and August. At the end of August detailed orders were published relative to the return of the South Afghanistan Field Force to India, and the evacuation actually began on the 1st September, when the movement was suddenly stopped by the news of an outbreak at Kabul on the 3rd September and the massacre there of the British Resident and his escort.





CHAPTER VI

FROM THE PEACE OF GANDAMAK TO THE MASSACRE OF THE KABUL EMBASSY.

ON the 7th July, 1879, a despatch was sent by the Government of India to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, which, after setting forth the circumstances immediately preceding the rupture with the Amir Sher Ali Khan, and describing the strategic weakness of the Indian frontier before the war, alluded to the principal objects which the Government hoped to attain after the unprovoked affront received from the Amir had been appropriately avenged. Foremost among these objects was the more complete establishment of British influence in Afghanistan, and the rectification of the frontier, for which (says the despatch) "no great extension of territory was required. All we needed was the permanent command, not of passes extending far into the interior of the vast mountain tract beyond our border, but of those which, piercing the extreme eastern edge of that tract as it rises immediately above the plains of India, constitute the only practicable approaches to our empire from beyond its northern and western confines. The main defiles of the Mohmand and Afridi hills, converging towards Peshawar, are peopled by independent tribes and have never belonged to the Amirs of Kabul. For the command of these passes it would probably suffice, after clearing them of the Amir's troops, to reserve to ourselves the payment and control of the pass tribes.

"The valley of the Kurram, rising eastward from the Punjab border between Kohat and Thal, terminates

at the Shutargardan, a high ridge of the Safed Koh range. And an army holding that position would command, on the one side Kabul and Ghazni, on the other, easy access into India. Our southern frontier, as before observed, had been greatly strengthened by our arrangements with Kalat, which gave us a strong position above the Bolan Pass. From Western Afghanistan, however, all the approaches to this position debouch in the fertile district of Peshin, which, bounded by the Khwaja Amran range, constitutes the great natural granary of Quetta. Holding Peshin, and commanding the issues of the Khojak Pass, we could descend at will upon the plains of Kandahar, or advance to meet an enemy in the open field; whilst no enemy could debouch upon our own plains by the Bolan without first besieging and taking Quetta (no easy task), and then forcing a long and difficult pass, of which we hold the issues. For these reasons we regarded the permanent military command of the Kurram and Peshin districts as essential to the complete rectification of our frontier. But all such objects could certainly be attained without wholesale annexation, and possibly even without any actual acquisition of territory."

The despatch then emphasises the unpopularity of Sher Ali's military rule in Afghanistan, the downfall of which would not, therefore, ensure the hostility of the Afghan people. Thence it proceeds to describe the operations of the campaign, pausing only to consider the question of the advance to Kandahar in the following paragraph:

"Our longest line of operations lay in the direction of Kandahar. And it was, therefore, necessary that the force operating on this line should be proportionally stronger, as, whilst its transport and supply were more difficult, the rapidity of its movements was less essential to the primary objects of the campaign than that of the Khyber and Kurram Columns. In order to cripple the financial resources of the Amir, it was deemed desirable



THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION 179

to expel his authority from the richest districts of Western Afghanistan; and for the purpose the temporary occupation of Kandahar was clearly requisite. Such a measure, moreover, was dictated by two other considerations of a more far-reaching character. In the event of a complete disintegration of the Kabul power, we could not allow Kandahar to fall into the hands of any chief or state whose possession of it we had not previously approved on conditions dictated by ourselves; and in the event of re-established relations with a ruler of united Afghanistan, the power of restoring Kandahar to such a ruler, also on our own conditions, could not fail to give us a most advantageous position from which to negotiate the terms of peace. The permanent retention of Kandahar, however, has never formed part of our political programme. And no endeavour has been spared during the war to render our temporary occupation of it as little burdensome as possible to its inhabitants. The command of the Kandahar force was entrusted to General Stewart. And his instructions were to carry out a reconnaissance in force as far as the Helmand and Kalat-i-Ghilzai, ascertaining the features and resources of the country in that direction, and attacking any enemy he might find within striking distance, but not establishing himself at any point beyond Kandahar."

Having related the course of events which led to the Peace of Gandamak, the despatch treats of the particulars of the Treaty, and again refers to the territorial question as follows:

"The territorial concessions imposed upon the Amir are light, and involve no permanent alienation of any part of the dominions claimed by his Government. The Khyber Pass has never formed part of those dominions, while the districts of Peshin, Sibi, and Kurram are retained by the British Government under an assignment. For the better protection and security of our frontier, and for the proper maintenance of communications with our advanced garrisons, which



180 THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION

will observe and command the three principal passes into India, it was essential that these three districts should remain in our hands. But we have entertained no projects for establishing ourselves permanently in the interior of the country, or for occupying any posts not absolutely required for the defensive purposes explained in the 11th paragraph of this despatch. Accordingly, the towns of Kandahar and Jalalabad are restored by the Treaty of Gandamak to the Amir of Kabul. The passes of the Khojak mountains will be carefully kept under our own control; and it is probable that the hill skirts of the Peshin country, like the upper districts of the Kurram Valley, will provide fresh and valuable sanitarium for our troops. But the local experience recently acquired by our expedition into Western Afghanistan has fully confirmed our previous impression, that the strategic value of Kandahar exists only in connection with a system of frontier defence much more extensive than any we now require, or have ever contemplated. It is reported to be a position of no material strength; it can be easily turned; and the surrounding country could not support a large military force. Kandahar is now easily accessible from our advanced position in Peshin, and can, at any time, be occupied without difficulty; but the permanent occupation of it (involving the maintenance of long lines of communication) would have considerably increased our military expenditure without strengthening our military position. It is, however, mainly on political grounds that the retention of Kandahar was excluded from the conditions of the Treaty of Gandamak. Such a condition would have been extremely painful to the Amir, and detrimental to the strength and credit of his Government. Without Kandahar it would be difficult for the central authority at Kabul to maintain any effective hold upon Herat; and the foreign occupation of so important a city, in the interior of his dominions, would have been inconsistent with those relations of friendship and mutual confidence



which the Treaty was designed to establish between the British Government and the Amir of Afghanistan.

“Similar objections applied to the retention of Jalalabad. As a military position, that town offers no advantages not better secured by a garrison on the Landi Kotal ridge. It can at any moment be seized by a rapid advance from the Khyber; and to hold it as a permanent frontier garrison would require the prolongation, as far as Gandamak, of a troublesome line of military communications. Such an extension of our frontier, though necessarily increasing our permanent military expenditure, would also, no doubt, increase our permanent political influence over the adjacent tribes and petty chiefships to the north-east of the frontier thus extended. But the only political advantage thereby acquired would be the means of utilising those tribes and chiefships as a barrier, in case of need, against the action of any hostile power at Kabul; and for the control or punishment of such action material guarantees, far more effectual, are provided by the Treaty, which secures to us the permanent military command of Kabul from the crest of the Shutargardan. In short, we have framed the Treaty with an earnest desire to render the conditions of it not only consistent with, but also conducive to, the maintenance of that friendly and mutually advantageous footing on which it re-establishes our relations with Afghanistan; and from those relations we have laboured to eliminate every appreciable cause of irritation and disunion.”

The despatch concludes with a tribute to the conduct of the troops engaged in the campaign, a sentiment which was repeated with greater detail in an Order of the Governor-General in Council dated the 11th July.

On the 4th August a vote of thanks was moved in both Houses of Parliament to the Viceroy of India, the Commander-in-Chief, and the military forces engaged; while a despatch from the Secretary of State to the Government of India, dated the 7th August, conveyed the cordial approval of Her Majesty's Government of



the several articles of the Treaty of Gandamak as well as of the general policy of the Indian Government.

Meantime, immediately on the conclusion of the Treaty of Gandamak, the Amir Yakub Khan returned to Kabul, while Major Cavagnari proceeded to Simla to report personally to the Viceroy on the late events, and to discuss the future action of the Government.

For every reason it was deemed desirable that, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, and with the Amir's own proposal (as expressed in his letter to Major Cavagnari of the 29th March), the British Resident should take up his appointment at Kabul without delay. Major Cavagnari was himself nominated for this important post, and during his stay at Simla the constitution of his staff and escort was carefully considered. The circumstances under which he was about to repair to Kabul, namely, at the *special desire* of the Amir, to reside as a friend at the Amir's capital, within the Amir's own stronghold and in close proximity to the Amir's own residence, precluded the possibility of his being accompanied by a strong military force, such as had been detailed to accompany Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission. Moreover, the dangers to which the Embassy was specially liable were such as might be provoked by quarrels or misunderstanding between the excitable townspeople and the soldiers of the escort. It was, therefore, at Major Cavagnari's personal request that his staff and escort were reduced to most moderate dimensions, and were finally restricted to a secretary, Mr. Jenkins, a medical officer, Dr. A. H. Kelly, and a military attaché, Lieutenant W. H. P. Hamilton, in charge of a carefully picked escort of twenty-five Guides Cavalry and fifty infantry of the same corps.

Major Cavagnari left Simla on the 6th July, 1879, and arrived at Thal, on the British frontier, on the 14th idem. The following day he joined Major-General Roberts's headquarters at Kurram, whence he was escorted by the Major-General and a small force of all arms to Karatiga in the Hazar Darakht defile, where



DEMEANOUR OF THE AMIR 183


was the new frontier line between British Afghanistan and the dominions of the Amir. Here the Envoy was received by Sardar Khushdil Khan, late Governor of Turkistan, who had been deputed by the Amir to conduct him to Kabul, and on the 19th July Major Cavagnari took leave of General Roberts and, with his escort, joined the Afghan camp. On the following day the march towards Kabul was continued, the capital being reached on the 24th. The Embassy was met with every token of friendship and respect, and its members were lodged in a commodious building, considered one of the best dwelling houses in Kabul, situated in the Bala Hissar, about 250 yards from the Amir's palace.

Throughout the month of August the demeanour of the Amir towards the Embassy was most friendly, and although the unsettled state of the country indicated that Yakub Khan's authority was small beyond the walls of his capital, while the *mullas* and the anti-British party lost no opportunity of exciting the hostility of the people towards the British alliance, yet the Envoy (who had meantime been created a Knight Commander of the Bath) appeared satisfied with the good faith of the Amir, and with the position of the Embassy at Kabul. As late as the 30th August, Sir Louis Cavagnari wrote as follows :—" I personally believe that Yakub Khan will turn out to be a very good ally, and that we shall be able to keep him to his engagements." How ill-founded was this belief, or at least how little reliance could be placed on the Amir's authority over his turbulent subjects, was soon to be but too clearly proved. The story of the tragedy which brought to an end this second attempt on the part of the British Government to establish an envoy at the Afghan Court is best told in the words of one of the few credible witnesses who survived to tell the tale, Resaldar-Major Nakhshband Khan, of the Guides Cavalry, who was on furlough at the village of Afshar, 2 miles from Kabul, when the events related occurred.



"Some two or three days after the arrival of Sir Louis Cavagnari and the Mission, six regiments of infantry arrived at Kabul from Herat. They encamped for three days at Deh-i-Bori, about one *kos* distant from Kabul. On the morning of the fourth day they marched in order through the streets of Kabul, headed by their officers, and with bands playing. While marching along they shouted out, abusing the Envoy by name, asking why he had come there, etc. They also abused all the Kizilbashs, saying that they were not men, and that they (the Herati soldiers) would show them how to act. That they would soon put an end to Cavagnari. They then marched out of the city to their camp at Sherpur. The residents of the city said nothing to them. They appeared neither pleased at what was going forward, nor the reverse. I was present when this took place, and at once took the news to the Envoy, who said, 'Never fear; keep up your heart. Dogs that bark do not bite.' I said, 'These dogs do bite, and there is real danger.'

"The Envoy said, 'They can only kill the three or four of us here, and our deaths will be well avenged.' I then went to Mr. Jenkins and told him what I had heard and seen. He asked me if I had been to the Envoy; and if so, what he had said about it. I told him what had passed, and Mr. Jenkins said, 'What the Envoy says is very true. The British Government will not suffer from losing the three or four of us here.' A day or two after this, these Herati regiments were all paid up most of their arrears of pay, and were given forty days' leave to visit their homes. At this time cholera was raging violently. About 150 men out of their number died in one day, and the men dispersed to their homes in a fright, placing their arms in the Bala Hissar. They did not even wait for their leave certificates. Up to date none of these troops have returned. In my opinion the greater part of them will not rejoin, though some of them may do so. The Commander-in-Chief (*Sipah Salar*), Daud Shah, was present when the



THE RESIDENCY, KABUL—FRONT VIEW



STORY OF THE TRAGEDY

185

troops marched through the city as above mentioned, and was also abused by them. He did not reply at all. Some of my own countrymen were serving in these regiments. On my asking them what the meaning of all this was, they answered, 'Do you think soldiers would have acted thus without orders? We were ordered to act as we did by our officers, and to shout out as we marched about.' I called upon a well-to-do Hindu, whose son is a servant of Sardar Ibrahim Khan (the elder brother of Yakub Khan). He knows the 'ins and outs' of what goes on in the houses of the great men. He had been to see the Envoy twice before. I called him up and sent him to report to the Envoy. He went towards the Residency for that purpose. He came back to me and told me that the Amir's sentry would not let him pass, and stoned him. I reported this to the Envoy, who said, 'It is untrue. The man lies.' The next morning another man endeavoured to get speech of the Envoy. This man was also stopped by the sentry. I don't know who this man was. But I reported this also to the Envoy, and asked him, 'What is the use of you being kept like a prisoner, and no one allowed to come near you?'

"He answered, 'I will have that sentry removed.' A day or two after this the sentry was removed by the Envoy's order. Lieutenant Hamilton was sent to order the sentry's removal, which was accordingly done. I heard that the Amir was very angry at the removal of this sentry. A day or two after this the Envoy asked me whether I knew what the Amir's intention was—to travel with him to the frontier as he had engaged to do at Gandamak, or whether he intended not to go?

"I have omitted to mention one thing. Before the arrival of the six regiments from Herat mentioned above, the Envoy, agreeably to a suggestion of mine, wished to pay Wali Muhammad Khan a visit to condole with him on the death of his mother. The Envoy said that he wished, first of all, to ask permission from the Amir before going. He did so, and the Amir answered,