



part of the frontier officers in their political capacity as may be considered advisable with the view of establishing a personal influence for good among the chiefs and tribes. Any attempt to bring the country between the settled districts of British India and Burma under our direct administration, even in the loosest way that could be contrived under Act XXXIII. Vic., Cap. 8, or to govern it as British territory is to be steadily resisted. No European planter is to be allowed to accept any grant beyond the line or under a tenure derived from any chief or tribe<sup>(1)</sup>.

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(1) Political Proceedings, February 1872, No. 131.



## CHAPTER XIII.

## THE NAGA TRIBES. B.—THE SEEBSAUGOR NAGAS.

The tribes occupying the low hills to the south of the Seebsaugor district have been in close communication with our local officers ever since the first annexation of Assam. The Assamese Government had at times indeed claimed them as its subjects, and Purunder Sing is known to have asserted successfully his right to share with the Nagas the produce of the salt manufacture of the lower hills. The hill chiefs, when the Native Government was strong, came down annually bringing gifts, that may perhaps have been considered to be tribute. It has in fact been conjectured that the inhabitants of this tract are descended from settlements of hill mercenaries of various tribes planted here by the ancient Ahom Kings, and the variety of the tribal dialects is adduced to support this. However that may be, it is certain that several of the chiefs had received grants of *khats* or lands, and of *cheels* or fishing waters on the plains, and enjoyed assignments of *pariks* like the ordinary Assamese nobility.

The tract occupied by the clans of whom we have any knowledge may be taken to extend back for 30 miles from the frontier of Seebsaugor to the Patkoi Range, and to run for 60 miles from east to west. The tribes in this tract are termed '*Boree*' or dependent; beyond them in the recesses of the Patkoi are many '*Abor*' or independent clans, of whom we know little save from some one or other of them occasionally figuring in a raid. The Abor trade is chiefly conducted through the medium of the '*Boree*' clans, which last, in spite of their title, are really more powerful than those beyond them.

In the years 1840-44 our dealings with the '*Boree*' villages became more direct and intimate. State of things in 1840. Captain Brodie, then Principal Assistant to the Governor General's Agent, drew attention to the fact that the perpetual quarrels subsisting between the different villages and clans showed a dangerous tendency to boil over, as it were, into the plains, where our revenue-paying villages offered themselves a tempting prey to savages already armed for internecine strife, and when in fighting humour not very particular as to the precise direction of their raids. Brodie, therefore, suggested that he should be allowed to bring them all under formal agreement to the British Government, and exact a small annual tribute as token of submission, and the course of events led very shortly to the acceptance of his proposals.

From the records of 1840 it appears that the Nagas living near Jeypore, the Namsang, Pani Dwár, and Bor Dwár Nagas, lived chiefly by manufacturing salt, which they retailed to the people of the plains.<sup>(1)</sup> There were in the lower hills eighty-five salt wells in all, of which the Government was allowed to be absolute owner of only three, enjoying merely a right to a certain number of flues or fire-places at each of the others. These rights Purunder Sing had regularly asserted, but our officers had contented themselves with levying a duty of 20 per cent. on all salt brought down to the regular markets for sale. Early in 1841 the Government abolished these duties, thereby giving a great stimulus to the intercourse between the Nagas and the plains.<sup>(2)</sup>

A missionary, Mr. Bronson, had for some years resided among the tribes, teaching them Christianity and the art of cultivating tea.<sup>(3)</sup>

Mr. Bronson's mission. The Governor General's Agent thought so highly of this gentleman's work, that he asked Government to give Rs. 100 a month towards his Naga schools. Government, however, at this time thought it improper to give direct aid to missions, even when working among savage tribes, forgetting perhaps that it had made grants in 1829 to the Garo missions with very fair results, but it agreed to pass for a year any small sums shown in the Agent's contingent bill and not exceeding a monthly maximum of Rs. 100, "for objects of practical utility connected with the improvement of the Naga country, and spent with the view of leading its population into habits of industry." The mission school was kept up till Mr. Bronson was compelled, by illness, to leave the place.<sup>(4)</sup> While it lasted it was very successful, as many chiefs of the eastern tribes sent their sons to him for instruction. It is interesting to note that Mr. Bronson, who knew these Nagas better than any European before or since, was all in favour of Brodie's plans of direct and active control. He reported that the only effect of our tacit surrender of our rights in the salt mines had been to make the tribes independent and insolent as they had never been before. His prognostications were certainly supported by subsequent events, for in March 1841 the Nagas of Teeroo and Kapung Dwárs attacked a party of Assamese on the road to Borhâth; and the chiefs refused to attend when summoned to explain their conduct.<sup>(5)</sup> Guards had therefore to be posted to close the passes to trade and so to coerce the hillmen into submission. This being done during the rains, when there is little traffic between hill and plain, had not much effect, and in the cold weather Brodie was ordered to enter the hills with a party of troops to compel all the chiefs to enter into

(1) Revenue Proceedings, 27th September 1840, Nos. 7 and 8.

(2) Revenue Proceedings, 8th August 1842, Nos. 125 and 126.

(3) Political Proceedings, 11th May 1840, Nos. 128 and 129.

(4) Political Proceedings, 22nd November 1841, Nos. 1 to 24.

(5) Political Proceedings, 19th April 1841, Nos. 78 and 79.



engagements, such as had already been taken by a few of the clans, binding them to keep the peace towards one another and towards our subjects.

In January 1842 Captain Brodie began his tour for the pacification of the Naga Frontier between the  
Brodie's tour, 1842.      Dikho and the Bori Dihing.

He found in this tract ten different clans—

(1) The Namsangias with	... 8 villages.
(2) „ Bordwarias with	... 8 do.
(3) „ Panidwarias with	... 10 do.
(4) „ Mutons or Kooloongs with	... 4 do.
(5) „ Banferas with	... 4 do.
(6) „ Jobokas with	... 4 do.
(7) „ Changnois with	... 8 do.
(8) „ Mooloongs with	... 5 do.
(9) „ Jaktoongias with	... 8 do.
(10) „ Tabloongias with	... 13 do.

The Mooloong Raja, head of the Teroo Dwár, was the most powerful of the Naga chiefs, and the Changnoi Raja, of Namsang, ranked next to him. To the latter all the Nagas from the Dikho to Jeypore paid tribute.

Brodie took engagements from all the chiefs to abstain from outrages in the plains, to be responsible for the surrender of offenders within the limits of their Dwárs, to discontinue hostilities with other tribes, leaving Government to punish any attacks made on them, and, finally, to abstain from importing Naga children as slaves to British territory. All existing feuds he settled. The villages in these parts were found situated on high hills surrounded by ditches and barricades indicating an ever present fear of attack. Each village had a large building or morung, where hung a hollow tree that was beaten to give the alarm of an enemy's approach. In the morungs the skulls of slain foes were also kept. In one morung Brodie counted 130 of these trophies. The arms used were spear, dao, and cross-bow. All the men went nearly naked, a thin rattan passed twice round the loins being the prevailing fashion among a large section of the people. The chiefs were distinguished by girdles of brass-plates. An Assamese, Neeranye Deka Phokon, who had been an officer under Raja Poorunder, gave much assistance to Brodie in his tour, and was made Superintendent of the Naga frontier on Rs. 30 a month. The whole population was estimated at between 40,000 and 50,000.

The agreements thus accepted by the chiefs were not in every case or all at once successful in preventing raids by subordinate sections of tribes. In November 1842 the Khettree Nagas, a clan owning some sort of fealty to the Changnoi Raja, attacked a friendly village, and when Captain Brodie, attended by the Namsang and Bor Dwár Nagas,



to whom the village belonged, went<sup>(1)</sup> up to enquire into matters, they even attacked him; and he was compelled to retire till troops came to his assistance.<sup>(2)</sup> The Khettrees then deserted their village and withdrew to the inner hills.

In January 1844 Captain Brodie made a tour through the western clans lying between the Dikho and the Doyeng. His report mentions in detail the villages visited and gives the title of chief to the head of each; but from other papers it would appear that on this side the

Brodie's tour, 1844.

tribes arranged themselves in six groups; the Namsangia (not the same as the Namsangias of the east), with four villages; the Dopdaria, with twelve villages; the Charmingaya or Asringaya, with six villages; the Hatheegurhiya, with seven villages;<sup>(3)</sup> the Doyengiya or Torphatia, with eleven villages; and the Panihatia, with ten villages. The Panihatias and Doyengias are described as branches of the Lhota Naga tribe.\* No information is given by Brodie as to the probable strength of these western clans. He was met on his tour by the chief of the Seema Nagas, a powerful clan of the inner hills, ruling over 14 villages, who desired to open a trade with the plains; and he obtained a certain amount of information regarding the names of various Abor communities, of which we hear nothing nowadays. They are probably now known under other appellations. Generally he remarked that the Boree Nagas to the east of the Dikho seemed more powerful than those to the west, and were more under a settled form of government by chiefs. They held also apparently a somewhat effective control over the Abor tribes of the interior—a state of things which did not obtain between the Dikho and the Doyeng. The western communities were found to be disorganised and democratic, and their principal men being ordinarily drunk had no authority in the villages, and could not be trusted. Still Brodie cherished hopes that, “though no absolute confidence could be placed on such vile people as the Nagas,” the arrangements made by him, and which were similar to those effected in the eastern tract, would prevent their disturbing the peace of the plains.

To each of the Dwárs in this quarter was attached a Kotokie or clan representative to be the channel of communication between the Government and the tribe ordinarily using that Dwár. These

The Naga Kotokies.

men were paid by a remission of the poll tax, and under our revenue system received a remission on their land equal to the amount

\* The Lhota Nagas were long afterwards included within the Naga Hills District. In a report of 1871 they are stated to have 10 villages, only one of which, Sonareegaon, entered into an agreement with Brodie. They claimed possession of a *khal* in the plains of 160 bighas in extent, and usually come down to trade by the route of the Doyeng. (Judicial Proceedings, October 1871, Nos. 202 to 204; December 1871, Nos. 279 to 281.)

(1) Political Proceedings, 4th January 1843, Nos. 149 to 151.

(2) Political Proceedings, 1st February 1843, Nos. 91 to 93.

(3) Political Proceedings, 19th October 1844, Nos. 123 to 126.



of the old remission of poll tax. Some of the Kotokies also managed the khats or grants held by different Naga chiefs on the plains, and from reports of 1871 it may be gathered that they, being generally Assamese, have in most instances succeeded in appropriating these lands altogether. One of these khats still claimed by the Nagas is Bhitur Namsang, and their rights over this were acknowledged in 1871.<sup>(1)</sup>

The total number of Kotokies in Sebsaugor was eighty-eight, and the total revenue remission on account of Nagas (Kotokies and Khats) was Rs. 797.<sup>(2)</sup> Government agreed on Brodie's suggestion to give the Lhota Nagas some lands on the Dhunsiri, and to compensate some other chiefs for lands formerly held by them, but which had become lost to them.

In 1846 an attack upon the Boree Naga tribes of Changnoi and Tangroong by some Abor Nagas (called Longhas), accompanied by Singphos or Shans, took Brodie<sup>(3)</sup> again into the hills. It was supposed that the Singphos had come from the valley of the Kyendwen in Burma, and some anxiety was felt locally as to the possibility of a Burmese inroad, but nothing more was heard of them, and the thing died out.

The plan that Brodie proposed for future management was that every village should be visited periodically by an officer with a strong escort to prove to the people that they could easily be got at. Then he meant uniformly to insist on their referring all quarrels to the Sebsaugor officials, and he intended to punish contumacy by fine, occupation, or otherwise. Where an Abor tribe attacked a Boree clan, he did not propose retaliatory expeditions, but trusted to negotiation to bring in the Abors to submit themselves to our officers. In brief, the policy proposed here as elsewhere on the north-east frontier during the early days of our occupation of Assam was one of active control, and tolerably vigorous interference in tribal matters.

It was at first found necessary from time to time to prove to the chiefs by show of force that the Government intended them to keep to their engagements.

In April 1844, for instance, the Bor Mootuns attacked the Banferas, and Brodie had to send up troops<sup>(4)</sup> to enforce his demand for the offenders. The expedition brought down the chief of the

(1) Judicial Proceedings, September 1871, Nos. 47 to 49.

(2) Political Proceedings, 18th January 1845, Nos. 58 to 61.

(3) Political Proceedings, 23rd May 1846, Nos. 28 and 29.

(4) Political Proceedings, 15th May 1847, Nos. 14 to 18.



offending tribe a prisoner to the plains. Again, in April 1849, the Namsang Nagas committed<sup>(1)</sup> a murder on the plains, and a similar plan was adopted to compel obedience. The offenders were, however, in this case given up as soon as the troops showed themselves at any of the villages reached by Captain Brodie. Generally it was inferred that the Nagas in this part were too entirely dependent<sup>(2)</sup> on the plains to afford to quarrel with us. It was Brodie's opinion that only a little time was required to make them see that we were determined to stop outrages, and in fact the frontier settled down and became perfectly tranquil. As a rule no difficulty was found in getting the tribes to act up to their engagements.

The events of the next few years were unimportant.

In April 1851 some Banfera Nagas committed a cruel murder in Sebsaugor on the Dhodur Allee (the frontier road running along the foot of the hills and at that time representing the line of our revenue jurisdiction), and then fled to the Juboka villages.<sup>(3)</sup> On our closing the Dwár the Juboka Raja gave them up.

In March 1852 the Lhota Nagas attacked Borpathor and killed some few persons, but were beaten off by the villagers. The Commissioner on this ordered<sup>(4)</sup> the resumption of two khats at Nagoora and Jamoogoori, hitherto held by these Nagas, till the murderers should be given up, and muskets were given to the Borpathor men to defend themselves in case of future attack. The result of these steps has not been traced, but certainly no further raid or outbreak was reported to Government.

In the cold season of 1853-54, there was an outbreak between the Namsang and Bor Dwár Nagas.<sup>(5)</sup> The Sebsaugor Principal Assistant, however, brought about an amicable settlement.

Other cases of murders by Sebsaugor Nagas are reported in 1854-55, but the chiefs always gave up the accused on demand.

Soon after this the policy of Government with reference to these tribes was radically changed. Non-interference became the rule, and our officers were not encouraged to visit the hills or to keep up intercourse with the hillmen. The Boree Nagas, however, on the Sebsaugor frontier continued to be generally well behaved. They frequented the

(1) Political Proceedings, 7th July 1849, Nos. 30 and 31.

(2) Political Proceedings, 5th July 1850, Nos. 55 to 57.

(3) Judicial Proceedings, 8th April 1852, No. 162.

(4) Judicial Proceedings, 20th January 1853, Nos. 120 to 125.

(5) Judicial Proceedings, 6th April 1854, Nos. 180 to 184.



plain markets regularly and combined to exclude therefrom the Abor Nagas of the upper hills. The charms of trade appeared indeed to have taken so strong a hold on the clans in this quarter, both Boree and Abor, that it was almost the only frontier on which the policy of closing the markets on occasion of a murder or outrage by hillmen was

speedily followed by surrender of the guilty parties. In April 1861 the Dwárs were closed to Naga traders by order of the Commissioner of Assam, in consequence of the murder of one Tonoo Cachari in the Gelaki Dwár, used by the Namsang and neighbouring clans. In February following, the Nangota Abor Nagas, who were not known to us to be the guilty tribe, surrendered five of their number as those who had committed the murder. This surrender, it appeared, they made under pressure brought to bear on them by the Boree Nagas of Tabloong, Jaktoong, Kamsang, and Namsang, who being much distressed by the closure of the Dwárs threatened to attack the Nangotas if they did not give up the offenders. In March 1863<sup>(1)</sup> a murder was committed in Mouzah Oboipore of Seesaugor by Banfera Nagas; and at the close of the same month the guard-house in Gelaki Dwár was burnt down by a raiding party belonging apparently to some of the Abor tribes. It was never distinctly brought home to any of them, and the Government did not on this occasion order the closing of the Dwárs.

Some alarm was, however, felt at these disturbances on a usually tranquil part of the frontier; and when in 1866 it was reported that Naga trading parties were wandering about Seesaugor armed, contrary to custom, with spears and dāos, stringent orders were given for disarming temporarily all Nagas who passed the police out-posts. In November

#### Attack on Gelaki.

1867 the Gelaki guard-house was again attacked at night,<sup>(2)</sup> and some of the constables killed. The outrage created much excitement among the European settlers of the neighbourhood, which was not certainly lessened by a subsequent attack upon a village not far off. Every possible motive was suggested to account for the outbreak. Every known clan was suspected in turn. One officer thought the prohibition to carry spears to market had something to do with the raid. Another was convinced that the encroachments of tea planters in the hills were unsettling all the frontier tribes. A third thought survey operations had excited their suspicion. The Dwárs were at any rate closed to trade; the out-posts strengthened; and neglected stockades hastily repaired. The stoppage of trade again proved a successful policy. The Tabloong, Namsang, and other Nagas, who were now carrying on a most profitable traffic with the tea gardens, which they could not afford to

(1) Judicial Proceedings, May 1863, Nos. 391 to 395.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, December 1867, Nos. 57 to 64.

Judicial Proceedings, February 1868, Nos. 12 to 24.

Judicial Proceedings, March 1868, Nos. 216 and 217.

Judicial Proceedings, June 1868, Nos. 136 to 139.



lose, speedily combined, and in a few months' time they succeeded in tracing out the raiders, and arresting by force or strategy two of their leaders, who were delivered over to the British authorities for punishment. These men proved to belong to the Yungia Abor Nagas, a remote clan in the upper hills, who actuated by a love of plunder and a craving for skulls had led a stealthy war party through the trackless jungles to the plains below; and had, as they said, attacked the police station under the notion that it was a settlement of ryots—a mistake not very creditable to the discipline of the post.

In 1869 the Changnoi<sup>(1)</sup> Nagas were charged by a tea planter with carrying off three labourers from his garden on the pretence that they were escaped slaves. The Nagas were communicated with by the Deputy Commissioner and denied the charge, declaring that the men had left the garden because they did not get their wages. The Nagas were warned not to take the law into their own hands, and the planters advised to cultivate a good understanding with their savage neighbours and to avoid engaging hillmen unless they were prepared to face difficulties arising from such relations.

The rapid extension of tea cultivation along this frontier gave rise to considerable correspondence between 1869 and 1873.\* The limit of the revenue jurisdiction of Lukhimpore and Sebsaugor to the south was, as above noticed, the old frontier road called the Dhodur Allee and Ladoigurh road. Although the Government claimed as British territory the whole country up to the boundaries of Manipur and Burma, it had hitherto treated the Naga tract as outside Assam for all civil purposes. The tea planters had long since in many places, both in Lukhimpore and Sebsaugor, taken up lands south of the revenue line, in some instances paying revenue to us, and in others to the Naga chiefs. The earlier settlers found it to their interest to conciliate the Nagas, and troubled themselves little about Government protection. But now the fashion of claiming police assistance in every little difficulty came into vogue, and the Government had to consider what course it should adopt. The question acquired prominence from a quarrel<sup>(2)</sup> between a planter and some Changnoi Nagas in Lukhimpore early in 1871, which led to serious apprehension of Naga raids.

\* An account of the Boree Nagas between the Dikho and Doyeng as they were in 1873 will be found in the Appendix.

- (1) Judicial Proceedings, April 1869, Nos. 274 to 276.  
 Judicial Proceedings, February 1870, Nos. 110 and 111.  
 (2) Judicial Proceedings, March 1871, Nos. 273 and 274.  
 Judicial Proceedings, April 1871, Nos. 1 to 3.  
 Judicial Proceedings, April 1871, Nos. 39 to 41.  
 Judicial Proceedings, April 1871, Nos. 194 to 196.  
 Judicial Proceedings, April 1871, Nos. 223 to 232.  
 Judicial Proceedings, May 1871, Nos. 36 and 37.  
 Judicial Proceedings, September 1871, Nos. 30 to 46.  
 Judicial Proceedings, March 1872, Nos. 113 to 115.



At length in 1872 the occurrence of a massacre of Borlangia Nagas perpetrated by Kamsingias within two miles of a tea garden showed that measures for defining clearly the limits of Naga territory towards the plains could no longer be deferred. Under the provisions of the Inner Line Regulation already described, such a boundary was accordingly laid down, compensation being paid to the Nagas for the area occupied by those tea gardens which lay beyond the Inner Line.

The later references<sup>(1)</sup> to the Sebsaugor Nagas contain an account of differences between them and one Mr. Minto, tea planter, which do not seem to have been of any great importance. There appear also to have been also certain intestine quarrels brought to the notice of our officers. With the tribal disputes of Nagas beyond the Inner Line the Government does not now interfere, save so far as the good offices of the Deputy Commissioner of Sebsaugor may serve to bring about peace.

In 1875 an attempt made to complete the survey of the Eastern Naga Hills led to serious results. Lieutenant Holcombe, Assistant Commissioner of Jaipur, and the Survey Party under Captain Badgeley, were on the 2nd February treacherously attacked at Ninu, a Naga village four days' march from the plains. Lieutenant Holcombe and eighty men were butchered, while Captain Badgeley and fifty men were wounded. Captain Badgeley succeeded in bringing off the remnants of the party, and a military expedition sent up promptly to the hill (in March 1875), destroyed the offending villages, and recovered the heads of the murdered men, and nearly all the arms and plunder taken by the Nagas. In 1876 a small force again escorted a survey party through the hills, and again burnt Ninu which refused to surrender some of those concerned in the massacre of 1875.

Lieutenant Holcombe's murder and consequent expedition.

Since then the Nagas on this frontier have given no trouble directly; but the Namsingias and Bordwaris have for years been at feud among themselves, and there is always some danger of a collision between the members of these or other warring clans taking place within our border. Petty occurrences of this description have indeed more than once been reported, but the offending villages have hitherto readily submitted to the fines imposed on them by our officers for violating our territory. An American Baptist Missionary, the Reverend Mr. Clarke, has for some years past been settled in the Naga village of Molong Kong, south of Amguri, and his labours are apparently bearing fruit in leading to the settlement of blood feuds, and a desire on the part of those villages which have come under his influence to live at peace

<sup>(1)</sup> Political Proceedings, January 1873, Nos. 20 to 22.

Political Proceedings, March 1873, No. 43.

Political Proceedings, June 1873, Nos. 56 to 59.

Political Proceedings, November 1873, Nos. 73 to 82.

Political Proceedings, December 1873, Nos. 8 and 9.



with their neighbours. They are, however, exposed to attacks from the outer tribes, against which they desire to have the assistance of Government. They have been told that they must depend upon themselves, show a firm front, and avoid all provocation to quarrel. The local trade with the Nagas is largely developing, and even the remoter Lhota Nagas are now found visiting our markets and showing a wish to maintain commercial intercourse with the plains. Altogether the state of the South Lukhimpore and Sebsaugor frontier is at present satisfactory. The latest information gives the strength of the tribes thus—going from east to west:

	Villages.	Population.
1. Namsangias or Jaipurias	... 30	25 to 30,000
2. Bordwarias	... 10	10,000
3. Mutonias	... 4	4,000
4. Jabokas or Banferas, or Abhoi-purya	... 12	20,000
5. Sangloi or Changnoi	... ?	20,000
6. Tabloong or Naked, including Moolungs, Jaktungs, and Tablungs	... 30	25,000
7. Tribes on the Patkoi	... ?	10,000



## CHAPTER XIV.

## THE NAGA TRIBES. C.—THE ANGAMI NAGAS.

Crossing the Doyeng westward, we come to the tract known as the country of the Angami Nagas. For long years the tribes inhabiting this tract were supposed to be a powerful homogeneous race of highlanders. The fact, however, is that here, as on the Seebaugor frontier, the country is divided among cognate but warring clans, which have all, until very recent times, been ready to raid indifferently upon neighbouring villages or upon British territory as opportunity offered or the prospect of plunder prompted. Our relations with these tribes have from a very early date been troubled; and the problem of their management is in fact only now being solved.

We began to hear of them soon after the close of the earliest of our wars with Burma.

The importance of opening up direct communication between Manipuri Expeditions of 1832 and 1833. Assam and Manipur\* was at that

time much insisted upon, and it was in the course of explorations directed to this end that we first came into conflict with the Nagas of these hills. In January 1832 Captains Jenkins and Pemberton led 700 Manipuri troops with 800 coolies from the Manipur valley, *via* Popolongmai, Samoogoodting and the Dhunsiri to Mohung Dijooa on the Jumoona.<sup>(1)</sup> They had literally to fight their way through the whole Kutcha and Angami Naga country. So irritated were the hillmen by this invasion that British troops were sent to Mohung Dijooa to protect Assam from a threatened inroad of the united clans. In the cold season following (1832-33) Raja Gumbheer Sing of Manipur, accompanied by the Manipur Levy under Lieutenant Gordon, again marched through to Assam by a route a few miles to the east of Jenkins' track.<sup>(2)</sup> They too had to fight almost every step of the road. Facts came to light which made it clear that the object which Gumbheer Sing had in view was the permanent conquest of the Naga Hills. The ambitious Manipuri would have been a very dangerous neighbour for our vassal Purunder Sing, whom we were then endeavouring to establish on the throne of Upper

\* It was even proposed in 1831 to make over to Manipur the defence against Burma of the whole Sadiya Frontier.

(1) Political Proceedings, 5th March 1832, Nos. 69-71.

Political Proceedings, 20th March 1833, No. 110.

Political Proceedings, 30th April 1832, No. 43.

(2) Political Proceedings, 14th January 1833, Nos. 69-70.

Political Proceedings, 30th March 1833, No. 110.

Political Proceedings, 30th May 1833, No. 105.



Assam, and the Government began to feel uncomfortable in prospect of Gumbheer Sing's operations.<sup>(1)</sup> It did not absolutely prohibit him from subjugating the Nagas; but it forbade him to descend into the plains on the Assam side. Captain Jenkins, when reporting with Pemberton in 1833-34 on the North-East Frontier, proposed to give up to Manipur definitely all the hills between the Doyeng and Dhunsiri. This proposal did not receive any formal approval, but it came to be supposed in a general kind of way that Manipur exercised some sort of authority over the southern portion of the Naga Hills. In 1835 indeed the forest between the Doyeng and the Dhunsiri was declared to be the boundary between Manipur and Assam.<sup>(2)</sup>

But besides all the complications arising out of the question of the extent of Manipuri jurisdiction and of communication between that State and Assam, we were brought into contact with the Angamis in

The North Cachar Hills under Tularam. another way, viz., by the acquisition of Cachar with its hill territory, running up as this did between the Angami Hills and the Khasi Hills, to the very confines of Nowgong. Cachar was formally annexed to British territory on 14th August 1832<sup>(3)</sup> on the death of its Raja, Govind Chunder, who left no descendant either lineal or adopted. The principal Chief in the North Cachar Hills at the time of annexation was Tularam Senaputty. This man was the son of Kacha Din, a table servant of a former Raja of Cachar, and had himself been an orderly in attendance on Govind Chunder. Kacha Din had been appointed by the Raja to some office in the hills and had rebelled in 1813. Govind Chunder enticed him down to the plains and had him assassinated. Tularam then set himself to avenge his father's death, and now by the aid of the Burmese, now by his own levies, managed to hold out against every effort of the Raja to expel him from the hills. In 1828 Tularam made over his levies to his cousin Govind Ram, who, after defeating Govind Chunder in the last attempt made by that prince to reconquer the hills, turned upon Tularam and drove him into Jaintia. In 1829 Tularam, with the assistance of the Manipuris, expelled Govind Ram, who then submitted himself to Raja Govind Chunder. At this stage Mr. Scott, the Governor General's Agent, anxious to stop the constant border warfare, induced Govind Chunder to assign to Tularam a definite tract of country to be recognised as his separate fief,<sup>(4)</sup> bounded on the west by the Kopili, north by Bhateebagram, south by the Julinga as far as Keynugur Mukh, and east by Samseyagram. After the annexation of Cachar, this territory was reduced in area<sup>(5)</sup> as a punishment

(1) Political Proceedings, 19th December 1833, Nos. 85-93.

(2) Political Proceedings, 11th February 1835, No. 90.

(3) Political Proceedings, 9th July 1832, No. 16.

(4) Secret Proceedings, 14th August 1829, No. 5.

(5) Political Proceedings, 29th October 1832, Nos. 132-133.

Political Proceedings, 3rd December 1832, Nos. 103-104.

Political Proceedings, 31st July 1834, No. 22 A. C.

Political Proceedings, 16th October 1834, Nos. 52-54.



for the murder by Tularam of two British subjects, and his jurisdiction was restricted to a tract lying between the Dhunsiri and Doyeng, the Naga Hills and the Jumoon, a pension being also allowed him of Rs. 50 per mensem. This tract lay on the eastern side of North Cachar, and was about 2,224 square miles in extent.\*

When in 1835 our hill villages in North Cachar were found to be constantly suffering from Naga exactions and raids, the Government conceived that the duty of controlling the hostile Nagas devolved jointly upon Tularam and

the Manipur State, as the two powers holding jurisdiction over at least some portions of the Naga Hills. It was proposed, therefore, that a line of posts to protect our subjects should be established by Tularam and the Manipuris at Semkhor and along the neighbouring Naga frontier.<sup>(1)</sup> Tularam protested earnestly that he had no control over the Nagas or any means of checking their raids; while Manipur, whose only system of control consisted in raids as savage as those of the Nagas themselves, did occupy Semkhor for a time and harass the Nagas in a desultory way, the only effect of which was to bring down the hillmen upon our villages in force as soon as the Manipuris had withdrawn. Captain Jenkins, now Commissioner of Assam, who knew something of the real position of Manipur in these hills, urged upon Government the impropriety of encouraging that State in its career of aggression against the Nagas. Its troops got no pay, and had to live on the plunder of the villages they occupied. The only effect of Manipuri occupation had been to exasperate the tribes. The Government was not prepared itself to take over the Naga country, and still inclined to regard the Manipuris as the *de facto* masters of the hills. It therefore persisted in calling upon Manipur to occupy the country of the Angamis and arranged at the same time to depute a detachment of sepoys under a European officer to prevent any needless outrage by the Manipuri levies. The very terms of the instructions issued for the guidance of this officer showed that in Calcutta the Government had no clear knowledge of either the geographical or political situation.

The continued remonstrances of the Assam Commissioner led at length to a cancelment of the call upon Manipur, and a European officer was in 1837 ordered to occupy a post near the Naga country and

Cancelment of the foregoing invitation.

\* Tularam held the most of this till 1844, when he made over its management to his sons, Nokkolram and Brijnath Burmon. From them it was resumed in 1854 by Government on account of raids committed upon the Nagas, the family getting small pensions instead with a grant of revenue-free land.

Political Proceedings, 19th October 1844, Nos. 78 to 78.

G. O. No. 441, dated 14th October 1853.

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 22nd November 1836, Nos. 37-39.  
Judicial Proceedings, 17th January 1837, Nos. 72-74.



endeavour to bring the Chiefs to terms.<sup>(1)</sup> The expectation of fresh war with Burma prevented his actual deputation for the time; but the Court of Directors having now condemned emphatically the policy of making over to Manipur fresh tracts of mountain country for conquest or management, the first renewal of raids led in 1838 to a revival of the proposal to depute some English officer to deal locally with the Naga difficulty. The raising of a small Cachari levy was sanctioned to assist in this especial service, and the whole tract of North Cachar was transferred to Assam and attached to the district of Nowgong, under the belief that the Assam officials could deal more effectually with frontier matters of the kind than those of Dacca to which Cachar belonged. Mr. Grange, Sub-Assistant at Nowgong, was chosen to conduct the first Angami expedition. He was directed to investigate fully the causes of the Angami raids, and to endeavour to punish the Chiefs of the large villages of Konemah and Mozemah who were known to be implicated in these outrages. Owing to mismanagement, Mr. Grange was not properly supplied with troops and carriage, and his expedition degenerated into a somewhat hurried march through a part only of the Naga Hills.

Mr. Grange discovered that a great trade in slaves was carried on by the Angamis with Bengali merchants: and that one main object of the raids was to procure supplies of such slaves. The villages most frequently attacked were small settlements of Naga stock occupying clearings in the south of Tularam's hills.

Several of the independent Naga villages received Mr. Grange in a friendly spirit. At Beremah he was shewn the remains of a circular fort built by Raja Kishen Chunder of Cachar, who had, the Nagas said, once invaded their hills. He saw also an old 10-pounder which the Raja had left behind him on his retreat. Possibly this trophy was exhibited by way of a significant hint; for, though some clans made professions of amity, hostile war parties hovered constantly about the camp, and speared one or two of the sentries. The brother of the Chief of Konemah came down to see what the stranger wanted, and Mr. Grange, unable to punish, was compelled to speak him fair. Ikkari also, the powerful Chief of Mozemah, who had led most of the raiding parties in Cachar, a perfect savage, wild and suspicious, wearing a collar fringed with hair of his enemies' scalps, came down to see for himself what the camp was like. Him Mr. Grange induced to swear not again to molest the Company's villages. The oath was solemnly ratified, Ikkari and Mr. Grange holding opposite ends of a spear while it was being cut in two, and strange to say was for some time honourably kept. Mr. Grange was too weakly

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 28th February 1837, Nos. 65-67.

Judicial Proceedings, 25th April 1837, No. 17.

Judicial Proceedings, 19th September 1837, No. 7.

Political Proceedings, 25th May 1835, No. 3.

Political Proceedings, 21st November 1838, Nos. 104-108.

Political Proceedings, 9th January 1839, Nos. 160-163.



supported to say anything about restoration of captives. He fixed, however, the position of the villages that had raided on Cachar, and found a way out of the hills to Assam *via* Samoogoodting,<sup>(1)</sup> at which place he advocated the establishment of a permanent military post.

It had already been decided that the Cachar hills, north of the

Discussions of policy.

water-pent, should be controlled from Assam and placed under Nowgong.

The question was now debated as to how this control was to be exercised. The Nowgong authorities proposed to make the hills a substantive district, under a separate officer, to assess a house tax on the subordinate Nagas, and station thannas in the hills. But the whole returns would have been only Rs. 3,000 yearly, against an expenditure of over Rs. 16,000, and this scheme was not approved. Captain Jenkins, the Commissioner, proposed simply to attach the tract to Nowgong, giving an extra Assistant to that district,<sup>(2)</sup> who should visit the hills in the cold weather. He advised that Mr. Grange should again visit the Angamis by the Samoogoodting route, receive the submission of those Chiefs who might be willing to be subject to us, and place a thanna of Shans on the Dhunsiri. He might at the same time be allowed to punish any villages that did not submit. Captain Jenkins insisted that the boundary line between Assam and Manipur and Assam and Cachar must now be clearly defined to be the water-pent of the great ridge of mountains. Manipur, he suggested, should be compelled to co-operate with us in bringing the Nagas into subjection to our rule. Upon this the Government said that it had never contemplated anything more than the exercise of a general political control over the hill tribes, and, if necessary, the establishment of a military post to overcome the ill-disposed and give protection to the peaceable. Anything beyond this was not desired. It sanctioned, however, Mr. Grange's deputation to receive the submission of the Angami Nagas, to confirm the doubtful in their good disposition, and to choose a post in easy communication with Assam or Cachar, at which to place a permanent garrison under a Native officer for protection of our subjects and to encourage communication. At this post a market was to be established. No interference with the internal management, even of Tularam's tribes, was to be allowed. Though the original orders of the Government were thus restricted, I cannot find that it raised any formal objections<sup>(3)</sup> to a further letter of Captain Jenkins, in which he reported his having instructed Mr. Grange to subdue all the Angamis north of the water-pent, and his having invited Manipur to subdue all south of it. This subjugation was, he explained, only to be carried far enough to stop outrages, and especially affected the Chiefs of Mozemah

(1) Political Proceedings, 10th July 1839, No. 56.

(2) Political Proceedings, 14th August 1839, Nos. 107-109.

(3) Political Proceedings, 2nd October 1839, Nos. 89-90.



and Konemah, the principal leaders of raids. From these Chiefs hostages for good conduct were to be demanded. But all the hillmen were to be told that we had no wish to interfere with their internal affairs. All that we sought was peace and free intercourse;<sup>(1)</sup> and all who acknowledged our virtual supremacy and gave a small tribute were to be admitted to terms.

A party was ordered to march from Manipur to co-operate with Mr. Grange. He entered the hills via Samoogoodting on 24th January 1840. Here the villagers were unwilling to receive him, but he overawed them into compliance. Thence he pushed across the hills to Hoplongmai or Popolongmai expecting to meet the Manipuris, but found that they had turned back without waiting for him. He went on two marches towards Manipur to a point between Yang (= Tzukquama) and Moocelong (= Tokquama). Here he found to his astonishment that the Nagas were avowedly hostile to Manipur, and not tributary as had been given out by that State. The only traces of Manipuri occupation were the charred beams of Naga huts. The people of Popolongmai, Tzukquama, and Tokquama, seeing in Mr. Grange only an ally of Manipur, attacked him in a defile, but he beat them off and burnt down the half of Popolongmai inhabited by Angamis, the other half being discovered to be inhabited by Cachari Nagas, subservient to the Angamis. The expedition resulted in the burning of five villages and the capture of eleven Naga prisoners.<sup>(2)</sup>

The effect of these somewhat strong measures was apparently to stop the raids, for it was reported in 1841 that there had been no raids in Cachar<sup>(3)</sup> during 1840, and a continuance of the expeditions from Assam was recommended. Soon after Mr. Grange had returned from the hills the second time, the two Ganw Boorahs, or Chiefs of Samoogoodting, came down and entered into written engagements<sup>(4)</sup> to be friendly, expressing a wish to settle on the plains. Lands east of Mohung Dijooa were promised them, and the Naga prisoners were all released, but it does not appear that any active steps were taken to induce a Naga immigration to the plains.

Proposals for constructing a great road across the hills to Manipur were about this time rejected on the score of expense. Lieutenant Biggs, Principal Assistant in charge of Nowgong, was, however, authorized to enter the hills and make a leisurely and, if possible, friendly progress from village to village, conciliating the Chiefs by personal intercourse and bringing to bear on the people that nameless attraction which

(1) Political Proceedings, 1st January 1840, Nos. 112-13.

(2) Political Proceedings, 25th May 1840, No. 118.

(3) Political Proceedings, 19th April 1841, Nos. 107-108.

(4) Political Proceedings, 15th June 1840, Nos. 93-99.



frontier officers are supposed, and often with justice, to exercise over uncivilized races. In 1841 Lieutenant

Biggs' Expedition, January 1841.

Biggs carried out his tour.<sup>(1)</sup> He

met with no opposition, and concluded friendly agreements with most of the leading communities. A depôt for salt was at their request opened at Demapore. The Dhunsiri was fixed as the boundary between the British districts and the Angami tract. The Government directed that a repetition of these friendly visits should be made from time to time, mainly with a view to the suppression of the slave traffic carried on by the Nagas with the Bengalis of Sylhet. The boundary between the Angamis and Manipur was to be finally settled, to prevent irritation on that side, and a road was to be opened to Samoogoodting from the plains. A nominal tribute was to be taken from the Nagas as soon as they could

be brought to consent to its payment. To arrange the boundary, Lieutenant Biggs marched across

the hills in the cold weather of 1841-42. It was decided, in conference with Captain Gordon, Political Agent at Manipur, that "commencing from the upper part of the Jeerie River, the western frontier of Manipur, the line of boundary formed (1) by the Dootighur Mountain, or that range of hills in which the Mookroo River takes its rise, east on to the Barak River; (2) by the Barak River up to where it is joined by the Tayphani River, which flows along the eastern line of the Popolongmai Hill; (3) by the Tayphani River up to its source on the Burrail range of Mountains; and (4) by the summit or water-pent of the Burrail range on to the source of the Mow River flowing north from that point towards Assam, was the best boundary between Manipur and the Angami country: 1stly—Because the Angami Nagas and all the inferior tribes subject to their influence occupy the mountainous part north of the boundary here given, and have together been the perpetrators of all the acts of aggression which have been committed of late years both in Cachar and Manipur. 2ndly—Because along the western portion of the boundary here proposed, the whole of the villages south of it, which were before near this frontier, having been from time to time destroyed by the tribes from the north, and their inhabitants obliged for protection to locate themselves further south, a considerable tract of mountainous country in this direction is completely deserted. 3rdly—Because along the portion of the boundary here proposed to the east of Popolongmai the Angami tribes are separated from the Nagas of Manipur by a lofty range of mountains, across which little, if any, communication takes place. 4thly—Because the Manipur Government not having at present any control or authority over the villages to

(1) Political Proceedings, 1st March 1841, Nos. 55-56.

Political Proceedings, 22nd March 1841, Nos. 92-93.

Political Proceedings, 18th April 1841, Nos. 79-80.

Political Proceedings, 19th July 1841, Nos. 101-106.

Political Proceedings, 13th September 1841, Nos. 107-108.

Political Proceedings, 8th October 1841, Nos. 55-56.

Political Proceedings, 7th March 1842, Nos. 38-39.



the north, and the Angamis not possessing any influence over those to the south of this proposed boundary throughout its whole extent, its adoption would not disjoin connected tribes or separate any village from a jurisdiction to which it has been long attached, as would be the case were any portion of the country north of the line suggested made over to the Manipur Government."

A proposal to establish a British out-post on the Popolongmai hill was negatived. The attempt to make a road to Samoogoodting failed.

In spite of some desultory raiding in Cachar and Manipur the Angamis, as a whole, seemed anxious at this time to cultivate friendly relations with the authorities at Nowgong.<sup>(1)</sup> They came down to the station, and entered into agreements to obey Government, to pay yearly tribute, and to abstain from internecine feuds. The Chiefs of Konemah and Mozemah made up an old quarrel in the presence of our officers, and all seemed as promising as Government could wish. Raids were not by any means entirely stopped, but it was hoped that things were in a fair way to a peaceful solution.

In April 1844, however, when an Assistant was sent up to collect the first year's tribute, the Chiefs defied him and absolutely refused to pay.<sup>(2)</sup> They followed this up by a series of daring raids, in one of which they overpowered a Shan out-post and killed most of the sepoy. Retribution was speedily had by the local troops for these outrages, but

Eld's Expedition, December 1844.

so little discrimination was shown in the mode of its exaction, that Government was compelled to censure the local officers for burning villages that might well have been spared. The correspondence shows that Manipuri troops had at this time again been actually helping one Naga clan to attack and destroy another. It seemed impossible to get Manipur to carry out honestly the orders of Government. The necessity of occupying the hills with a strong force as a permanent measure was again discussed, and again a middle course was adopted. In

Butler's Expedition, November 1845.

November 1845 Captain Butler,<sup>(3)</sup> Principal Assistant of Nowgong, was deputed to the hills with a force and made a peaceable progress through the country, conciliating the tribes and mapping the topography. He succeeded in inducing the Chiefs to come in to meet him, and they even paid up their tribute in ivory, cloth, and spears.

(1) Political Proceedings, 1st June 1842, Nos. 16-13.

Political Proceedings, 12th April 1843, Nos. 76-78.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, 10th September 1844, No. 211.

Political Proceedings, 16th November 1844, Nos. 73-76.

Political Proceedings, 28th December 1844, Nos. 86-89.

Political Proceedings, 1st February 1845, No. 146.

Political Proceedings, 23rd May 1845, Nos. 69-72.

Political Proceedings, 27th June 1845, Nos. 125-28.

(3) Political Proceedings, 23rd May 1846, Nos. 30-31.

Political Proceedings, 20th June 1846, Nos. 27-29.

Political Proceedings, 19th September 1846, Nos. 18-19.

Political Proceedings, 14th November 1846, Nos. 17-21.



The Chiefs told Captain Butler that they had no real control over their people, and had absolute authority only on the war-path. The different villages eagerly sought our protection, but it was only to induce us to exterminate their neighbours. As soon as the expedition left the hills, the tribes recommenced their raids on the plains and on one another. Butler came to the conclusion that only a strong permanent post in the hills would effect any good. The Governor General's

Butler's second Expedition, November 1846-47.

Agent, however, preferred the plan of annual expeditions. In 1846-47 Captain Butler again<sup>(1)</sup> visited the

Angamis, and the same farce of agreements, oaths, and presents was gone through. As the result of this tour a road was opened from Mohung Dijooa to Samoogoodting, a new stockade and grain godowns were erected at Demapore, and a market established at Samoogoodting. With reference to this last measure Captain Butler remarked that he had placed it in charge of a Sezawal named Bhogchand *with authority over the whole Angami tribe*, because he had been ordered to do so, but he saw little chance of the villagers supplying the post voluntarily.

Bhogchand appears to have been a man of much personal bravery,

Bhogchand Darogha.

with but little discretion. He had brought himself first to the notice

of Government in 1847 through the bold and skilful manner in which he brought away a small party of Shan sepoy who had been set upon by overwhelming numbers of Nagas in the hills. He appeared from his nerve and fearlessness to be well qualified to hold charge of the new advanced post, and at first all went satisfactorily. As the first effect of its occupation over a thousand Nagas visited Nowgong to trade in 1848. Unfortunately Bhogchand was not content to let well alone. He was ambitious of quelling by direct interference the internecine quarrels of the clans, and was constantly urging the establishment of advanced posts.<sup>(2)</sup> At length he succeeded in getting leave to place a guard in the village of Mozemah which was apprehensive of an attack from the neighbouring community of Konemah. Before he set out for this duty, some time in April 1849, a letter was received by him from one Huri Das, Cachari, calling himself a darogah of the Manipuri Government, saying that "certain Angami Nagas" had attacked a Manipuri village, and calling on him to arrest the culprits.<sup>(3)</sup> Captain Butler, to whom the matter was referred, as no village of Angamis was named, told Bhogchand to go to Beremah, which was near where Huri Das was supposed to be, to confer with him; but as Huri Das was a doubtful character, having been in Nowgong jail in 1843, on suspicion of having assisted Konemah to attack Mozemah, a reference was made to Manipur about him. Captain McCulloch, the Agent there, replied

(1) Political Proceedings, 24th April 1847, Nos. 37-40.  
Political Proceedings, 3rd June 1848, Nos. 136-38.

(2) Political Proceedings, 17th June 1848, Nos. 97-99.

(3) Political Proceedings, 17th November 1849, Nos. 156-71.



(13th May 1849) that Huri Das had certainly been in the employ of Manipur, but being sometime before suspected of malpractices had been summoned to the capital, an order which he had evaded. Captain McCulloch suspected that Huri Das had himself instigated Konemah to attack Mozemah. He said there was no regular agent of Manipur on the Frontier. Emissaries from the capital were sometimes sent out, but made no permanent stay. Bhogchand, nevertheless, set out to meet Huri Das, taking Mozemah on his way. The two Chiefs of this village, Nilholy and Jubeelee, were at feud about land, and Jubeelee had (it appeared) been aided by Cacharis sent by Huri Das. Nilholy, on the other hand, had been helped by the Konemah people. One of Jubeelee's adherents had lately been killed. On Bhogchand's arrival both Chiefs met him, and, in compliance with his orders, built the stockade for the new post. Bhogchand then insisted on Nilholy's pointing out those of his followers who had killed Jubeelee's man, and when they were pointed out, he at once arrested the offenders. Nilholy upon this left the village in dudgeon. Bhogchand, to be strictly impartial, next arrested seven Cacharis of Jubeelee's party and disarmed them, and started to escort his captives to Samoogoodting. Bhogchand had a firm belief in the prestige of a British constable, and conducted the whole of the proceedings exactly as he would have done those in a case of riot on the plains. The Nagas at first seem to have been stunned by what must have appeared to them his sublime audacity. But at night both parties, Nilholy's and Jubeelee's, united to attack him at Prephemah where he had encamped; and his guard running away, Bhogchand fell pierced by spears. It was afterwards stated that he had neglected all ordinary precautions, disbelieving utterly in the possibility of the Nagas venturing to attack him. It was also asserted that he had not been altogether clean-handed in his dealings with the clans; but he was undoubtedly a brave man, and fell in attempting the impossible task of controlling a horde of savages with a handful of nervous policemen, for the Shan sepoys who formed his guard were merely an armed police.

The Governor General's Agent now reported to Government that if we wished to recover our influence in the hills, we must systematically burn granaries and crops to enforce our demands for the surrender of those concerned in Bhogchand's murder. This was the Manipuri plan, and the Nagas thought much better of them than of us. We marched up the hills, held big talks, and marched back again. No one could stand against us, it is true, but we never did much damage, all the same. The orders of Government on this affair were these:—

The President in Council has learnt with much regret the failure of the endeavours which have been so long and perseveringly made to induce the Naga tribes to live quietly and peaceably, as evidenced by the deadly feuds reported still to exist among themselves, and by the recent acts of atrocity committed by some of them upon officers and subjects of our Government. His Honor in Council is so strongly impressed with a conviction of the absolute necessity which exists for the adoption of the most stringent and decisive measures in regard to these barbarous



tribes, in order to deter them from a repetition of these outrages upon our people, that he is willing to leave a very wide discretion in your (Captain Jenkin's) hands as to the steps to be taken during the approaching cold season.

The Government of India has certainly been always most averse to resort to such extreme measures, as burning villages, destroying crops, granaries, and the like; and as respects these Naga tribes in particular, very great forbearance has been shewn. For some years a policy, entirely conciliatory in its character, has been adopted towards them; unceasing efforts have been made to induce them to live on terms of amity with each other, and to refrain from committing those horrible acts of cruelty to which they were known to be addicted. These efforts, however, seem unhappily to have been quite unproductive of any good result; and the recent murder of one of our police officers in the execution of his duty, followed up as it has been by a deliberate attack of one of our frontier posts, in which two police sepoy have been killed, has rendered it imperatively necessary, in the opinion of the President in Council, that immediate and severe measures should be resorted to, in order to convince the tribes that such acts of outrages cannot be committed with impunity. His Honor in Council desires, however, that the officer who may be entrusted with the execution of such measures during the next few months should receive from yourself specific instructions for his guidance. The discretion which the Government is willing to place in your hands should not be delegated by you to others except on very emergent grounds. As far as it may be possible so to arrange, no village should be burnt, nor the crops of any village destroyed, except those which you may yourself point out to be so dealt with, in the event of a non-compliance by the clans to whom they belong, with the demands which you may consider it necessary to make upon them for the surrender of those who are known to have been concerned in the recent attacks upon our subjects.

An expedition was accordingly despatched<sup>(1)</sup> to avenge Bhogeband's death, and plenary powers of granary burning, in case of armed resistance, were, under a liberal interpretation of the Government sanction, confided to it by the Governor General's Agent. In December 1849 it set out, but the Officer in command fell ill. A friendly village which it occupied was burnt while the troops were attacking another not far off, and the detachment had to make a hurried retreat. The Nagas celebrated the occasion by a series of raids all round the border. Indications were not wanting that other tribes were becoming uneasy, and that vague feeling of trouble in the air well known to Frontier Officers began to make itself felt. Manipur was said to be fomenting disturbance by under-hand intrigue. Shans of various septs were wandering about the hills. The need of strong measures of repression was very clearly marked.

Nearly all the local officers at this time considered that the only plan likely to succeed with the Angamis was boldly to enter their hills, locate an officer in charge of them, enable him to establish a chain of posts across the country, and give him an armed levy of 500 men to maintain order.

Early in March 1850 Lieutenant Vincent returned to the hills, re-captured Mozemah<sup>(2)</sup> and burnt down part of Konemah. He established himself in a stockade at Mozemah and remained there during the

(1) Political Proceedings, 22nd December 1849, No. 102.

Political Proceedings, 19th April 1850, Nos. 277-97.

Political Proceedings, 7th June 1850, Nos. 139-42.

(2) Political Proceedings, 7th June 1850, Nos. 139-48.

rains, punishing villages round about which had been concerned in outrages, and receiving the submission of some of the Chiefs; but after holding his own for some months, the steady hostility of the Nagas became so formidable that he felt compelled to concentrate all his forces at Mozemah itself, and to call for assistance from the plains. Major Jenkins ordered up a strong force with guns, to march as soon as the road was fit.<sup>(1)</sup> Government approved of this, as Lieutenant Vincent was in danger; but pointed out how the situation falsified the sanguine predictions of the easy conquest of the hills in which some officers had indulged. It ordered that, after a blow had been struck, the Chiefs should be called together, and the position Government meant to hold towards them clearly explained. What this position should be it called on the Commissioner to report, suggesting at the same time that all the recent hostility had arisen from our interfering in the internal feuds of the tribes.

Lieutenant Vincent submitted a very good report on his first and second expeditions, and on the whole Angami question. He showed that in every Angami village, there were two parties, one attached to the interest of Manipur and the other to the British, but each only working for an alliance to get aid in crushing the opposite faction. The hope of getting help from Manipur against us, and their inability to understand how Manipur was under our influence, had led to so much protracted fighting. Even now, though aid was not openly given by the Raja, no doubt Manipuris helped the tribes, and were found in the hills from time to time. The attacks on our villages, so far as could be traced, were always made by the Manipuri factions, and never by those who looked to us for alliance. Any English officer entering the hills and taking up his post at a Naga village was looked on merely as the ally of the Teppremah or Assamese faction, and not as the representative of any paramount power. Hence an officer establishing himself should take up an independent post and not locate himself in a Naga village. Besides the 'grand clans' in each village, there were in each portion many sub-divisions adhering to one side or the other; hence indiscriminate burnings of villages should be avoided as injuring friends as well as foes.

Meantime in December 1850, the tenth Naga expedition left to

Tenth Expedition, 1850.

relieve Lieutenant Vincent. After with difficulty capturing a strong Naga fort at Konemah and fighting a bloody battle against great masses of the tribes at Kekremah, the troops were eventually in March 1851<sup>(2)</sup> withdrawn from the hills. In 1851 no fewer than 22 Naga raids were reported, in which 55 persons were killed, 10 wounded, and 113 taken captive.

Raids of 1851.

It is true only 3 of these raids were positively traced to Angamis, but they were most of them

(1) Political Proceedings, 20th December 1850, Nos. 298-313.

(2) Political Proceedings, 13th June 1871, No. 97.

Political Proceedings, 1st August 1851, Nos. 117-18.



committed in North Cachar by Naga tribes who must almost certainly have been Angamis.

Immediately after the capture of the stockade above Konemah the Policy now laid down—Non-interference. Commissioner of Assam submitted his views as to the future policy to be pursued towards the Angamis. He admitted that it was now practicable to withdraw our troops from the hills without detriment to our military reputation, but he feared that such quick withdrawal would involve the certain destruction of the friendly clan of Mozemah, unless the Manipuris, of whose secret aid to the hostile Nagas he entertained no doubt, could be restrained from aiding them further. If this could not be done, he apprehended that, after the annihilation of Jubeelee's clan, which would be the last blow to our authority in the hills, the most daring outrages would be committed upon our villages throughout 200 miles of frontier, as no system of defensive posts could possibly restrain an enemy to whom every mountain torrent was a highway, and no forests, however dense, were impassable. He also represented that, now that the leading traits of the Angami character had been ascertained, we might by gradual means take advantage of them to effect a progressive reform. Though wild, bold, and ruthless, the savages we now knew were very intelligent and exceedingly anxious for traffic and gain. This disposition had hitherto manifested itself only in the trade they carried on in slaves, for obtaining which they committed most of their depredations, but recently they had commenced a more beneficial barter, exchanging articles of their own produce for the necessaries and luxuries to be obtained in our markets; and this spirit the Agent expected could be turned to a profitable account if our connection with them was not altogether stopped. He therefore suggested that the post at Mozemah should be retained experimentally for one year.

Captain Butler, the Principal Assistant at Nowgong, recommended an entirely different course. He urged the immediate and complete abandonment of the hills, our interference with the internal feuds of the enemy having in his opinion proved a complete failure. Captain Butler stated that the Mozemah people had no further claims on our protection, having been reinstated in their village, and the fortified post of their enemies having been effectually destroyed. Lieutenant Vincent, the Junior Assistant, urged the policy of retaining our control over the hills.

After a full consideration of these several proposals, the course recommended by Captain Butler was adopted by the President in Council, and the troops were directed to be withdrawn to Demapore, the friendly clan of Mozemah being offered the option of remaining at Mozemah, relying solely on their own strength, or of taking refuge in our territory.

These orders were afterwards approved by the Governor General, Lord Dalhousie, in the following Minute of the 20th February 1851:—

I concur in the conclusion to which the Hon'ble the President in Council has come respecting the relations to be maintained with the Angami Nagas, and consider that His

Honor has judged wisely in directing the withdrawal of the force which has been sent, and of the post which has been established in advance in that country.



I dissent entirely from the policy which is recommended of what is called obtaining a control, that is to say, of taking possession of these hills, and of establishing our sovereignty over their savage inhabitants. Our possession could bring no profit to us, and would be as costly to us as it would be unproductive. The only advantage which is expected from our having possession of the country by those who advocate the measure, is the termination of the plundering inroads which the tribes now make from the hills on our subjects at the foot of them. But this advantage may more easily, more cheaply, and more justly be obtained by refraining from all seizure of the territory of these Nagas, and by confining ourselves to the establishment of effective means of defence on the line of our own frontier.

I cannot, for a moment, admit that the establishment of such a line of frontier defence is impracticable. Major Jenkins describes the troops who compose the Militia and the Police as active, bold, and hardy. With such materials as these, there can be no impossibility, nor even difficulty, in establishing effective lines of frontier defence, if the plan is formed by Officers of capacity, and executed by Officers of spirit and judgment. This opinion is not given at random. The peace and security preserved on other portions of the frontier of this Empire, where the extent is greater and the neighbouring tribes far more formidable, corroborate the opinion I have given.

As it is impolitic to contemplate the permanent possession of these hills, so it seems to me impolitic to sanction a temporary occupation of them. We have given our aid to the friendly tribe and replaced them in their villages. We have destroyed the military works and have "broken and dispirited" their enemies. I can see, therefore, no injustice or impropriety in leaving that tribe to maintain the ground which is now its own.

Our withdrawal now, under the circumstances above described, when our power has been vindicated, our enemies dispersed, and our friends re-established, can be liable to no misrepresentation, and can be attributed to no motive but the real one, namely, our desire to shew that we have no wish for territorial aggrandizement, and no designs on the independence of the Naga tribes.

And as there is, in my judgment, no good reason against our withdrawing, so there are good reasons why we should withdraw.

The position of the European Officer and of the troops during last season appeared to me far from satisfactory. I should be very reluctant to continue that state of things in another season. The troops so placed are isolated; they are dependent, as appears from Major Jenkins' letter to Lieutenant Vincent, on the Naga tribes for their food, and for the carriage of supplies of every description; while Major Jenkins evidently has no great confidence that even the friendly tribe, for which we are doing all this, can be relied upon securely for supplying the food of the force which is fighting its battles.

For these reasons I think that the advanced post should be withdrawn now, at the time of our success, and when we have executed all we threatened. Hereafter we should confine ourselves to our own ground; protect it as it can and must be protected; not meddle in the feuds or fights of these savages; encourage trade with them as long as they are peaceful towards us; and rigidly exclude them from all communication either to sell what they have got, or to buy what they want if they should become turbulent or troublesome.

These are the measures which are calculated to allay their natural fears of our aggression upon them, and to repel their aggression on our people. These will make them feel our power both to repel their attacks and to exclude them from advantages they desire, far better, at less cost, and with more justice, than by annexing their country openly by a declaration, or virtually by a partial occupation.

With respect to the share the State of Manipur has borne in these transactions, I must observe, that the reasoning by which Major Jenkins is led to assume that Manipur has been abetting the Nagas is loose in the extreme.

If, however, better proof of the fact be shown, and the complicity of Manipur either recently or hereafter shall be satisfactorily established, there can be no difficulty in dealing with it.

In such case it would be expedient to remind the Rajah of Manipur that the existence of his State depends on a word from the Government of India; that it will not suffer his subjects, either openly or secretly, to aid and abet the designs of the enemies of this Government; and that if he does not at once control his subjects and prevent their recurrence to any unfriendly acts, the word on which the existence of his State depends will be spoken, and its existence will be put an end to.



the increase of Police which is asked should be granted, and Major Jenkins should be desired to submit his scheme of frontier posts when it is prepared, together with a map showing its disposition.

In conclusion I would observe that I have seen nothing in these papers to change the unfavourable opinion I expressed of the conduct of affairs relative to the Angami Nagas, as it appeared in the documents previously transmitted to me.

In 1853<sup>(1)</sup> the Government consented to appoint a European Officer to the charge of North Cachar, to protect our villages there from the inroads of the wilder tribes, and soon after the tract held by Tularam's sons was annexed in consequence of their fighting with the Nagas, Lord Dalhousie remarking that he would rather have nothing to do with these jungles, but to occupy the country was in this instance better than to let it alone.

In 1854 a Manipuri force invaded the Angami Hills, and twenty-two villages sent deputies to beg our interference and protection. But the Government now hold that it was not justified in calling upon Manipur to abstain from working its will among these tribes, as they were not under our protection.

The repeated efforts of the local Officers to induce Government to take once more a direct part in hill management were sternly repressed. The line of out-posts which it had been proposed to occupy was contracted. Punitive expeditions for recent outrages were discouraged unless the punishment could be inflicted with certainty and at once. Nothing that occurred beyond the outskirts of our inhabited villages was to receive any attention. Demapore was abandoned. Borpathar became our most advanced guard. The Officer stationed in North Cachar was strictly charged to look upon the Angamis "as persons living beyond the jurisdiction of the British Government." For years raids went on, which our frontier posts proved quite unable to check. North Cachar suffered most from the effects of this policy. Here the frontier line was always matter of doubt, and the presumption under the current policy was, that any village attacked lay beyond the boundary. At one time it was proposed by the local Officers, almost despairingly, to abandon North Cachar itself, as there seemed to be no hope of effectually protecting it without the employment of means which the Government would not sanction.

The Supreme Government was not, however, to be moved from its resolve, even though the Court of Directors expressed a strong opinion that the policy of absolute withdrawal would only encourage the tribes to advance, and become more positively aggressive. The Directors would have preferred the plan of settling between our villages and the Nagas colonies of Kookies and other self-reliant races as buffers—a plan of which some trial had already been made. They suggested

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 12th January 1854, Nos. 74-98.  
Judicial Proceedings, 23rd March 1854, Nos. 166-72.  
Judicial Proceedings, 18th November 1852, No. 125.



also the enlistment of Angamis in the military police. This last idea had also been tried without much success. The hillmen could not be induced to remain long under discipline; of 37 Angami recruits the average service proved to be only eight months.

The non-interference policy was maintained, and the raids went on, until at length<sup>(1)</sup> in 1862 the Commissioner was constrained to report:—

It is not creditable to our Government that such atrocities should recur annually with unvarying certainty, and that we should be powerless alike to protect our subjects or to punish the aggressors. It is quite certain that our relations with the Nagas could not possibly be on a worse footing than they are now. The non-interference policy is excellent in theory, but Government will probably be inclined to think that it must be abandoned.

A new Lieutenant-Governor (Sir Cecil Beadon) had then succeeded to office, and he reviewed afresh the whole question of the treatment of these tribes. He dissented from the policy of interdicting them from trade, which had of late years been usual. It was, he thought, not only unsound in itself, but it was a policy which, in regard to a country situated as is that of the Angami Nagas, it was impossible to carry out. He directed that an Officer subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner of Nowgong should be placed in immediate communication with the Nagas. The Chiefs on the border were to be informed that Government looked to them to be responsible for the good behaviour of their villages, and annual stipends for this Police duty would be paid to them so long as they performed it well. Written agreements were to be taken to this effect and annual presents interchanged. The

(1) The following are the references to the official correspondence between 1854 and 1861:—

- Judicial Proceedings, 29th April 1854, Nos. 743-749.
- Judicial Proceedings, 11th May 1854, No. 149.
- Judicial Proceedings, 15th June 1854, Nos. 210-212.
- Revenue Proceedings, 26th January 1854, Nos. 4-5.
- Judicial Proceedings, 12th April 1855, No. 155.
- Judicial Proceedings, 17th May 1855, No. 215.
- Judicial Proceedings, 26th July 1855, Nos. 56-61.
- Judicial Proceedings, 20th September 1855, No. 193.
- Judicial Proceedings, 27th September 1855, Nos. 399-400.
- Judicial Proceedings, 7th January 1856, Nos. 186-189.
- Judicial Proceedings, 6th March 1856, Nos. 239-240.
- Judicial Proceedings, 15th May 1856, Nos. 165-168.
- Judicial Proceedings, 26th June 1856, Nos. 158-159.
- Judicial Proceedings, 15th May 1856, Nos. 188-189.
- Judicial Proceedings, 5th July 1856, Nos. 185-187.
- Judicial Proceedings, 18th September 1856, No. 266.
- Judicial Proceedings, 26th December 1856, Nos. 120-121.
- Judicial Proceedings, 9th April 1857, Nos. 100-101.
- Judicial Proceedings, 27th August 1857, Nos. 171-173.
- Judicial Proceedings, 31st December 1857, Nos. 180-181.
- Judicial Proceedings, 15th July 1858, Nos. 450-452.
- Judicial Proceedings, 27th January 1859, No. 86.
- Judicial Proceedings, 14th April 1859, No. 45.
- Political Proceedings, 14th April 1859, Nos. 13-14.
- Revenue Proceedings, 17th November 1859, No. 3.
- Revenue Proceedings, 3rd May 1860, Nos. 9-10.
- Political Proceedings, April 1861, Nos. 4-5.



Officer to be appointed to this duty was further ordered to decide any disputes voluntarily referred to him, but not to interfere in internal affairs, at any rate for the present. Some delay occurred in bringing this policy into actual operation, owing to official changes among the local officers and the successive representations of conflicting views. It came, however, in the course of the next year or two to be recognised that there were the following three distinct lines of policy open, and each had its defenders :—<sup>(1)</sup>

- (1.) We might abandon North Cachar and all the hill tracts inhabited by Nagas, and strictly enforce the non-interference policy of 1851.
  - (2.) We might advance into the hills, place special officers in charge, and maintain them there by force of arms.
  - (3.) We might, while confining ourselves to the plains, cultivate political relations with the neighbouring clans and bring their Chiefs into stipendiary police relations to ourselves.
- (This was Sir Cecil Beadon's original scheme of 1862.)

Nothing decisive was done for over two years or until further raids in March and April 1866 forced upon Government a definite settlement of the question. Lieutenant Gregory, an officer of much tact and energy, was at that time in charge of North Cachar, and he reported that, unless he were allowed to adopt more vigorous measures than were permitted to his predecessors, he could not guarantee the safety of his Sub-Division. Still the Commissioner, possibly because he saw no alternative between absolute conquest and absolute non-interference, proposed to abandon the whole hill tract to its fate; or at least to close the Dwaïs to all Naga trade; and it became necessary for the Lieutenant-Governor to give decisive orders. Sir Cecil Beadon insisted accordingly on a fair trial being given to the policy sketched out by him in 1862, remarking that if the policy indicated in 1862 had been carried out in the spirit in which it was conceived, there was every reason to suppose these outrages would not have occurred. Two years and a half had been allowed to elapse, and nothing had yet been done to give effect to the orders of Government, and though these orders were peremptorily repeated in a subsequent letter, dated 30th July 1863, they had apparently received no attention whatever. The proposal to recede before these wild tribes and fall back from their neighbourhood whenever they chose to annoy us, was one which the Lieutenant-Governor could not for a moment entertain. The practical effect of such a measure would be that in the course of a few years Assam would be divided amongst the Bhutias, Abors, Nagas, Garos, Mishmis, and other wild tribes; for exposed as Assam is on every side, if petty outrages were to be followed by withdrawal of our frontier, we should very speedily find ourselves driven out of the province.

<sup>(1)</sup> Judicial Proceedings, June 1865, Nos. 9-11.



In reply to this the Commissioner entered into an elaborate review of our position in regard to North Cachar and the Nagas, denying that Colonel Hopkinson's proposal to post an officer in the Hills.

he was himself decidedly averse to taking a more direct control of the country. He, however, pointed out that the democratic nature of the tribal arrangements among the Angamis, the infinite divisions and disputes existing even in a single village, rendered it impossible to hope for success from the policy of conciliation *ab extra* proposed by the Government. He admitted that no system of frontier military defence that could be devised would secure perfect immunity from raids. A country void of roads, void of supplies,—a country of interminable hills, of vast swamps covered with dense forest, save where here and there a speck in the ocean of wilderness reveals a miserable Mikir or Cachari clearance, could not possibly be defended at every point against a foe for whom hill and swamp and forest are resources rather than obstacles. From 1854 to 1865 there had been nineteen Angami raids, in which 232 British subjects had been killed, wounded, or carried off. Ninety-two of these unfortunates had been so lost during three years (1854-56), when a chain of outposts was in existence from Borpathar to Assaloo connected by roads which were regularly patrolled. "At most we should be able to keep the raids of such savages below a certain maximum, and prevent their extension to settled districts." The settlement of a trade blockade, the Commissioner maintained, was advantageous when it could be made practically complete, and so far as it was complete; but none of these schemes would secure the peace of the frontier. They had all been tried and found wanting. If Government were prepared to consider a more advanced policy he was ready to show how it could best be carried out. He would depute a specially qualified Officer to proceed with a force of not less than 200 men, and effect a permanent lodgment in the country at a point most convenient for keeping open communication and procuring supplies. This Officer would then invite the Chiefs to submit themselves to us. Those who agreed would, as a token of submission, pay an annual tribute, and in return receive our aid and protection; while those who refused would be told that we would leave them to themselves so long as they kept the peace towards us and those who submitted themselves to us.

The Commissioner now suggested that Lieutenant Gregory should occupy Samoogooding, the post formerly held by Bhogchand Darogha, in the way above described. The following was Lieutenant Gregory's own idea of how his operations should be conducted:—

He was totally averse to any attempt to subdue the country. It could only be done at great expense, and would require a strong force to hold it. It would be further embarking on an unknown sea, for we knew nothing of the tribes beyond the Angamis, except that they are fierce and warlike; so that it would be well our acquaintance with them should be made gradually and peacefully, which it is most certain would not be the case if we began by annexing them the Angami country *vi et armis*.

He would advance step by step, yearly opening out a good road as he went, never getting in advance of the road, and never in advance of ground he was not sure of, until he reached the very centre of the most thickly-populated part of the country. There,



clear of any village but that of his own hewers of wood and drawers of water, on the slopes of what is described as a most beautiful country, fertile to a degree, finely wooded with oak and beech and fir, and well watered, he would build the permanent station.

The way in which the Lieutenant-Governor received these proposals will be best seen by the following extract from his letter to the Government of India in regard<sup>(1)</sup> to them :—

In regard to the policy to be pursued towards the Angami Nagas, the Lieutenant-Governor is clearly of opinion that the abandonment of the position we held previously to 1854, and the withdrawal of our line of frontier posts to the left bank of the Dhunsiri is proved, by the events which have since occurred, to have been a grave mistake, and that the only course left us consistently with the duty we owe to the inhabitants of the adjoining frontier districts as well as to the Angami Nagas themselves, who are torn by intestine feuds for want of a government, and unable to exercise any general self-control, or to restrain independent action on the part of any village or even of a section of any of the numerous villages inhabited by the tribe, is to re-assert our authority over them, and bring them under a system of administration suited to their circumstances, and gradually to reclaim them from habits of lawlessness to those of order and civilization.

These Angami Nagas are frequently mentioned in the correspondence of late years as independent Nagas, and a distinction is made between the tract they inhabit and British territory, as if the former were not included in the latter. But for this distinction there is no real ground. The treaties with Burmah and Manipur recognize the Patkoi and Barail ranges of hills running in a continuous line from the sources of the Dehing in the extreme east of Assam to those of the Dhunsiri in North Cachar as the boundary between those countries and British India. There is no intermediate independent territory, and while the wild tribes who inhabit the southern slopes of those ranges are subject to Burmah and Manipur, those who inhabit the northern slopes are subject to the British Government. These latter, including the Angami Nagas, are independent only in the sense that the British Government has refrained from reducing them to practical subjection, and has left them, except at occasional intervals, entirely to themselves; but they have never enjoyed or acquired political or territorial independence; and it is clearly open to the British Government in point of right, as it is incumbent on it in good policy, to exercise its sovereign power by giving them the benefit of a settled administration.

This is the course advocated by all the local authorities, and it is the one which the Lieutenant-Governor strongly recommends as the only means of establishing peace in this part of the frontier, and of putting an end to the atrocities which have prevailed more or less for the last thirty years, and which a policy of non-interference and purely defensive action is now found to be wholly inadequate to prevent. Even if the right of the British Government were less clear than it is, the existence on its border of a savage and turbulent tribe, unable to restrain its members from the commission of outrages, given up to anarchy, and existing only as a pest and nuisance to its neighbours, would justify the Government in the adoption of any measures for bringing it under subjection and control.

The Lieutenant-Governor therefore proposes to direct Lieutenant Gregory to remove his head-quarters from Assaloo\* to Samoo-goodting, to abolish Assaloo as a sub-division, apportioning a part among the districts of South Cachar, the Cossyn and Jynteah Hills, and Nowgong, and constituting the remainder lying on the right bank of the Dhunsiri, together with the Angami Naga Hills and the country on both banks of the River Doyeng (a tributary of the Dhunsiri) a separate district, to be administered by Lieutenant Gregory as Deputy Commissioner, under the direct orders of the Commissioner, and no longer dependent on the District of Nowgong.

The orders of the Government of India thereon were as follows :—

With reference to various passages of your letter under reply, indicating a desire to bring the whole country of the Angami Nagas at once under the subjection of the British Government, I am desired to observe that such a policy is more than the local

(1) Judicial Proceedings, June 1866, Nos. 133-34.



officers recommend, or the Government of India is prepared to sanction. Colonel Hopkinson appears to agree entirely in Lieutenant Gregory's proposals, and the only instance in which the latter officer contemplates any assertion of actual authority over the Nagas is that of the villagers of Samoogoodting who are said to have been always friendly to us, and to be really anxious for our re-occupation of their territory. Lieutenant Gregory's object is, from his position at Samoogoodting and by the exhibition to the other Nagas of the kindly relations subsisting between the Samoogoodting people and himself, gradually to win the confidence and friendship of the neighbouring villages, and so, village by village, to bring the whole Naga country under control, but he deprecates strongly any attempt to do this by force, he is 'totally averse to any attempt to subdue the country.' This, I am to intimate, is the policy which commends itself to the approval of the Governor General in Council.

Lieutenant Gregory may take up the proposed position at Samoogoodting, and do his best by tact and good management, supported by a moderate display of physical force, to bring that portion of the hill tract adjacent to the plains into order. He will remember that our main object in having any dealings with the hill people is to protect the low lands from their incursions. Instead, therefore, of exerting himself to extend our rule into the interior, he will rather refrain from such a course. Subject to this general principle, his line of action may advantageously be left in great measure to his own good judgment. A conciliatory demeanour will of course be indispensable, and perhaps the expenditure of a little money to leading men will be useful. When conciliation fails, punitive measures will not be shrunk from. In some instances a blockade of the passes, so as to exclude the offending tribe or village from our bazaars, may be attended with good results. But in all cases the great point will be to select a penalty suitable to the circumstances of the particular affair. Where roads are necessary, they must be constructed in a simple and inexpensive manner, just sufficient for the opening of the country to the extent actually required.

Should the plan thus sketched succeed, and the hillmen be gradually reclaimed to our rule and civilised, without much cost to the British Treasury in the process, it will be a good work well accomplished. But His Excellency in Council cannot admit that we are bound to attempt more in their behalf than the resources of the empire can reasonably afford.

The Secretary of State cordially approved of all that had been done.

It will be seen that the Supreme Government gave no sanction to a gradual occupation of the Naga Hills, such as the Commissioner certainly contemplated, and the Bengal Government desired, but merely allowed the establishment of a strong central station, the officer in charge of which was to endeavour to maintain conciliatory intercourse with the Nagas.<sup>(1)</sup>

It is not necessary to enter into a detailed statement of the mode in which the arrangements thus approved were carried out. Lieutenant Gregory was ordered to establish himself at Samoogoodting. Assaloo, in North Cachar, was abandoned, save by a small Police guard. A road was opened from Demapore to the new station. A compact force of 150 Police, all hillmen and well armed, was placed at Lieutenant Gregory's disposal. Large discretionary powers were entrusted to him of proceeding summarily against villages concerned in any gross outrage, and a rough

(1) Judicial Proceedings, June 1866, Nos. 113-14.  
 Judicial Proceedings, April 1867, Nos. 109-12.  
 Judicial Proceedings, October 1866, Nos. 56-57.  
 Judicial Proceedings, April 1866, Nos. 69-140.  
 Judicial Proceedings, May 1866, Nos. 8-11 & 127.  
 Judicial Proceedings, July 1866, Nos. 97-98.  
 Judicial Proceedings, June 1867, Nos. 143-145.  
 Judicial Proceedings, October 1867, Nos. 139-41.  
 Judicial Proceedings, February 1868, Nos. 185-187.



system of judicial procedure was laid down. The Manipuris were not to be allowed any longer to make retaliatory expeditions into the Naga Hills. Measures to redress any outrages committed by Angamis in Manipur were to be taken in concert with Lieutenant Gregory. This was not, of course, to prevent Manipuri troops from following up and punishing any marauding party they fell in with in their own territory. All Angami Nagas visiting the plains of Assam were to be furnished with passes, by Lieutenant Gregory, as they passed through Samoogoodting, where they were also to leave their spears.\*

At the very time of the change of policy thus inaugurated, in January 1866, the Nagas of the village of Razepeamah cut up a Mikir village in North Cachar. In March Lieutenant Gregory made a dash with a little force of Police and burnt Razepeamah to the ground. In June the Razepeamah men, to retrieve their honour, made a raid and butchered twenty-six Mikirs in the village of Sergameha. The rains prevented any immediate steps being taken to avenge this outrage. But it was determined that, as soon as Lieutenant Gregory had fairly established himself in the hills, a salutary lesson should be given to the Razepeamah community, while an amnesty for the past was extended to all others. This was accordingly done. Razepeamah was levelled to the ground; its lands declared barren and desolate for ever; and its people, on their making complete submission, were distributed throughout other communities.

The occupation of Samoogoodting was followed by the opening of a school and dispensary, the extension of trade and construction of roads to the plains. A plan was also sanctioned of receiving at Samoogoodting residuary delegates from the various communities,

\* The boundaries of the District of the "Naga Hills" were thus fixed in 1867:—

*Eastern Boundary.*—The "Doyeng" or "Rengmah" river.

*Northern Boundary.*—A line from the confluence of the "Doyeng" and "Dhunseery" river along the "Dhunseery" for a distance of six miles, thence up the "Nambar" Nulla to its source and across country to a point on the "Doeegoorong" Nulla, thence along it northwards for a distance of 7½ miles, from which point it takes a due westerly course across to a point on the "Kollecane" river along which it runs for a distance of 28 miles.

*Southern Boundary.*—A line along the crest of the Burrail range from the source of the "Rengmah" or "Doyeng" river to the small western feeder at the source of the "Dhunseery" river.

*Western Boundary.*—A line from the crest of the "Burrail" range down the "Dhunseery" river for a distance of 26 miles, thence across the Hills to a point on the "Loongteng" river and along it to its confluence with the "Doyeng" river; across the Hills to "Gungah Ghat" on the "Kopile" rivers; and along it to the junction of the "Kopile" and "Doyeng" rivers; along the Kopile for three miles, from whence in an east by south direction it extends for eight miles to a point three miles east of "Deeklam," thence in a N. N. E. direction crossing the "Longboomlong," "Ranga Jan," "Long-koí Noi," and "Dikreng-kong" Nullah, to a point on the "Kakee-Noi" which form the boundary till its confluence with the "Tereh Langsoh Jan," from which point with a semicircular line it touches the "Jumoona" Nuddoe about a mile above the confluence of the "Booreegunga" with the "Jumoona," which forms the boundary to the "Sessah Jan" Nullah, from whence it crosses the "Meekir" and "Rengmah" Naga Hills in a northerly direction till strikes the "Kollecane" river.



to whom small stipends were allowed for acting as interpreters and messengers to their respective clans.

The permanent establishment of a British Officer in the Angami

Interneine feuds of the tribes.

Naga country had the effect for a time of stopping the annual raids upon British territory, and the tours of Gregory and his successor Captain Butler greatly extended our knowledge of the tribes and convinced them of the peaceable character of our intentions towards them. The Naga question was not however yet by any means finally settled. More intimate relations with the hillmen revealed more clearly than ever the wretched state of inter-tribal warfare which prevailed.

Fresh complications also speedily arose with reference to the Manipur boundary and the interference of that State in certain parts of the hills. The boundary laid down in 1842 had been in 1867 re-asserted by the Government, but was little regarded by Manipur. Moreover, as our officers were prohibited from directly controlling the independent Nagas within the limits of the Hills District, the assertion of such a boundary line merely prevented Manipur from retaliatory raids on what was nominally British territory, while the Nagas had no scruples in violating that of Manipur. This furnished a standing excuse for Manipuri reprisals. Manipur also objected to the line as robbing it of villages that had for years paid willing tribute. The Administration Report for the Hills District for 1868-69 noted the progress of survey operations in the Naga country, the difficulty of procuring supplies and carriage, and the pressing importance of finally demarcating the boundary between

The Manipur boundary question.

Manipur and the Naga Hills. The Lieutenant-Governor (Sir W. Grey)

was doubtful as to the advisability of pushing on regular survey operations at the present stage, but agreed in the necessity of settling the boundary question. The leading Naga villages of Konemah and Mozemah had complained of attempts made by Manipur to levy contributions, and it was clear that, if raids were to be avoided, such interference with the Nagas within the Hills District must cease. The Government of India concurred in this view, holding that as we had resolved on avoiding encroachment from our side upon the Naga communities, Manipur also must be restricted to the limits laid down by Gordon and Biggs in 1841-42. Captain Butler, the Deputy Commissioner of the Hills District, and Dr. Brown, Political Agent at Manipur, accordingly met in the cold weather of 1869-70 and endeavoured to trace out the boundary line. They differed, however, in opinion as to the position of part of it, and it was decided to appoint a Boundary Commissioner to go over the ground again and settle all disputed points. Into the details of his enquiry it is not necessary to enter. The boundary was, after much correspondence, eventually settled in July 1872. The line of 1842 was maintained in all essential points so far as it was clearly identified. A few villages on the dividing ridge of the water-pent, over which Manipur had acquired supremacy, were demarcated as belonging to that State; and from the termination of the line



of 1842, at a point called the Telizo Peak, eastward the watershed of the main line of hills which divide the affluents of the Brahmaputra from those of the Irrawaddy as far as the Patkoi Pass was declared to be the limit of Manipur on its northern frontier. The Naga Hills District was advanced to march with the boundary of Manipur as thus determined. The Kookie colonies on the Langting (of which we shall hear more in connection with North Cachar) were brought within<sup>(1)</sup> the limits of the Naga Hills District—a measure rendered necessary by their having commenced a course of active hostilities against certain Naga villages. Manipur afterwards objected to the boundary, but its objections were overruled.

Captain Butler, the Deputy Commissioner,\* whose title was in 1872 changed to that of Political Agent, had for some time past been urging upon Government the adoption of a bolder policy with reference to these tribes.<sup>(2)</sup> He begged to be allowed to step in as authoritative arbiter between the clans, believing that he could with a moderate show of force support his position and reduce the refractory to order.

Captain Butler presses for a bolder policy. The Bengal Government was not unwilling to allow Butler to try the effect of mediation in stopping feuds between hostile villages, but neither the Local nor the Supreme Government was as yet prepared to undertake the complete administration of the Naga Hills. In March 1871, when reporting on raids said to have been committed by Nagas in Manipur, Captain Butler had offered to assume the direct management of the tribes, if a moderate increase were made in his armed Police. In forwarding this report Colonel Hopkinson, the Commissioner, wrote :—

Before embarking on such an enterprize, I must say I would prefer to push non-interference to the utmost verge of forbearance, though it may be that I hardly hope for any other advantage from it than may result from the conviction it is likely sooner or later to bring, that interference is unavoidable, and being unavoidable, that a thorough business should be made of it when once it is taken in hand.

It is certain that our actual position with respect to the Naga tribes is most unsatisfactory, and that the complications arising from it are increasing in seriousness and magnitude. The prevention of their raids into North Cachar is no longer our chief concern. There is first the much greater difficulty, as this letter shows, that has arisen in keeping the peace between the Angamis and the Manipuris. I am satisfied that the Manipuris will spare no intrigue that may serve to foment disturbances along the boundary, to the recent settlement of which they have shown themselves so much averse, and, apart from their possible intrigues, they seem to have a right to attach responsibility for the conduct of those tribes over whom we refuse to allow them control. \* \* \*

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\* A son, I believe, of the Butler mentioned above.

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(1) The correspondence regarding the Naga-Manipur boundary is as follows :—

Judicial Proceedings, November 1869, Nos. 96 to 99 and 136 to 141.

Judicial Proceedings, September 1870, Nos. 141 to 159.

Judicial Proceedings, November 1870, Nos. 192 to 198.

Judicial Proceedings, September 1871, Nos. 12 to 26.

Judicial Proceedings, February 1872, Nos. 76 and 77.

Judicial Proceedings, July 1872, Nos. 237 to 242.

Judicial Proceedings, January 1873, Nos. 159 to 161 and 223 and 224.

Judicial Proceedings, February 1873, Nos. 31 to 34.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, February 1871, Nos. 278 to 282.

Judicial Proceedings, March 1871, Nos. 225 and 256.



I very much fear that affairs cannot remain as they now are, and that we shall be obliged to decide shortly whether we are to advance to the occupation of Naga Hills, or retire, letting the Manipuris complete the conquest of the Angamis on their side, and on ours withdrawing our frontier to a safe distance from the incursions of the tribes. As to the adoption of this latter course, I would only say that it seems like an abandonment of our duty, and that it is uncertain whether, even in a remote province like Assam, we could afford to make so great an exhibition of our weakness. Neither, may I add, would such a measure of retreat be very easy of execution, nor the cost of executing it inconsiderable so long as a line of frontier would have to be guarded.

On the other hand, I see no reason to doubt the feasibility of the occupation and thorough reduction to our control of the whole of the country by the same means as were successfully employed under the same circumstances in the Khasi Hills some forty years ago. With a fine body of infantry properly posted in it, strong supports below, and a good military road traversing the entire country, there would probably be very soon an end of the Naga, as there has been an end of Khasi difficulty, and I am much mistaken if it will ever be perfectly solved in any other way.<sup>(1)</sup>

In a subsequent letter Colonel Hopkinson asserted that the Government of India, by directing Lieutenant Gregory, on establishing himself at Samoogoodting, to refrain from any attempt to extend our direct rule, had entirely changed the character of the advance then contemplated by the local authorities. True, raiding upon the plains had for the time been stopped, but lawless violence was as rife as ever in the hills, and might at any moment spread over into the plains.

The Lieutenant-Governor Sir George Campbell, after much deliberation, came to the conclusion that the only satisfactory plan of dealing with the Naga tribes was to bring about gradually the establishment of political control and influence over them without any assertion

of actual government. He proposed that this control should extend to the introduction of a sort of political police over the tribes. We were no longer to refuse to arbitrate between hostile clans, but to accept the position and, if need be, to enforce our awards. The Political Agent was to be removed to a more central site and authorised to keep the peace of the hills by the exercise of his influence, and if need be by the display of force. To enable him to give effect to this policy, extensive explorations were proposed, and the clear definition of boundary lines and local limits was postulated as essential to any proper working of the scheme. These views were in their broad outlines eventually accepted by the Supreme Government.<sup>(2)</sup> The weaker villages very soon began to show a desire to place themselves under our protection, and, although raids by one clan upon another continued to be reported, no hostility to the British officers was anywhere manifested.

In February 1874 the Naga Hills were made over to the charge of the newly-appointed Chief Commissioner of Assam.

It has been stated above that from the Telizo Peak eastward the watershed between the affluents of the Brahmaputra and Irrawaddy was to be the boundary of Manipur on the north. In December 1872 Major Godwin-Austen was deputed to explore this boundary up to the Patkoi Pass.

(1) Judicial Proceedings, September 1871, Nos. 12-16.  
Judicial Proceedings, October 1871, Nos. 205-207.

(2) Letter to Bengal, No. 1661, dated 1872, No. 73.



The result of the expedition was not altogether satisfactory. The actual demarcation of the line was carried up to the Telizo Peak, and a considerable area of unknown country was surveyed. But beyond Telizo Peak it was found impossible to proceed with the demarcation. The Manipuris threw every obstruction in the way of the party, and the want of labour made further advance hopeless. It was not even decided in what direction the boundary would lie. Two distinct ranges, a considerable distance apart, inclosed between them the broad valley of the Lanier. These ranges were traced for some distance in a north-easterly direction, and named, respectively, the Kopamedza and Saramethi mountains. The latter and more southerly range was apparently the more considerable, and the presumption was that the boundary line would lie along its watershed. Major Godwin-Austen was of opinion that the Lanier river maintained a northerly source, and emerged from the Naga country as the Dikkoo which flows past Sebsaugor into the Brahmaputra. But it was possible, on the other hand, that the Lanier and Dikkoo might be separate rivers, and that the Lanier might be, in fact, an affluent of the Irrawaddy. The question involved was one of considerable importance. If it turned out that the northern range was, in fact, the watershed dividing the affluents of the Brahmaputra from those of the Irrawaddy, and if we determined to adhere to that watershed as the boundary, Manipur would be at liberty to annex the whole tract of Naga country lying between the two ranges, and to confine us to a narrow strip running up the eastern bank of the Doyeng and along the southern frontier of the Sebsaugor District.<sup>(1)</sup>

For the settlement of this question it was accordingly arranged that a survey party under Captain Badgley should, in the cold weather of 1873-74, follow up the work begun by Major Godwin-Austen. The main object of the expedition was to trace the Lanier either to some point in the Saramethi range or northwards into the Dikkoo. No boundary was to be demarcated. In view of the great concession to Manipur which would be involved in the acceptance of the Kopamedza range, Government was anxious to obtain accurate information without pledging itself by any demarcation. Captain Butler and Captain Badgley were ordered to collect all the information they could, and meanwhile to avoid any reference to the British boundary. The boundary when laid down would be between Manipur and the Nagas, not between Manipur and British territory. How far we might choose to extend our frontier southwards was a matter for further consideration and had nothing to do with Manipur.

With these instructions the party started from Kohimah on the 1st of January 1874, and a successful exploration was made. The Lanier was followed up to the village of Thetchuma (latitude  $25^{\circ} 50'$  longitude  $94^{\circ} 49'$ ), where it was met by an equally large river flowing from the north north-east, bent round in its course, and made for a point in the Saramethi range some 12 miles south-west of the Saramethi Peak. The Lanier therefore was an affluent of the Irrawaddy, and the Kopamedza range was the actual watershed.

(<sup>1</sup>) Assam Proceedings, February, March, July and August 1875.



It remained to be seen where the Dikkoo rose. As the Chief Commissioner of Assam pointed out there seemed to be no area left for that river to drain.\* But this question could not be solved during the season. The party succeeded in surveying 2,000 miles of new country, and returned to Samoogoodting on the 23rd March, after two brushes with the Nagas, who turned out in some force to attack, and were driven off with some loss. These small affairs however caused little anxiety. The Chief Commissioner expressed regret that the necessity for hostilities should have arisen. But he seemed to think the village feuds of the Nagas made such encounters inevitable, and he was rather disposed to attach fresh value to the expedition on account of its having been "strong enough to defy opposition." The result he believed would be to lessen the chance of such affairs in future. The military force attached to the expedition consisted of 70 men of the 43rd Native Infantry.

Meanwhile a survey party under Major Lance had been demarcating the southern boundary of the Seesaugor District. The line to be laid down was to be the limit of our civil jurisdiction; and the broad principle on which Major Lance was working was the distinction of the lowlands from the hills. He had met with considerable difficulties from the nature of the ground, and had only succeeded in determining ten miles of the boundary out of a total length of 120 miles. In the summer of 1874, the Chief Commissioner suggested that this boundary survey should be discontinued. There was, he thought, no necessity for an immediate demarcation, and there were many reasons against it. He proposed therefore the merging of the boundary survey in the general survey of the country lying south and east of Seesaugor and Luckimpore. It would be time enough to fix the boundary of our civil jurisdiction where we knew something of the country. Meanwhile the unexplored tract might be opened up by two parties starting—the one from Samoogoodting, and other from Jeypur, and working to meet one another. Such an exploration could not fail to discover the source of the Dikkoo and fill in the gap between the Seesaugor frontier and the lately surveyed portion of the Naga Hills.

The suggestion was approved. It was decided that Captain Badgley should accompany Lieutenant Holcombe, Assistant Commissioner of Luckimpore, and work in a south-westerly direction from Jeypur, while Captain Butler and Lieutenant Woodthorpe of the survey struck out to the north-east from Samoogoodting. Both the District Officers were instructed to proceed with the utmost caution. They were to avoid all chance of hostility with the savage tribes, and to retire if it became evident that they could not proceed without imminent danger of a hostile reception. Captain Butler was provided with a military guard of 70 men. Lieutenant Holcombe's guard was at first fixed at 30 men, besides police. It was afterwards raised to 40 men.

From the very beginning of operations the Nagas showed a hostile spirit. The eastern survey party under Captain Butler marched from Samoogoodting on the 23rd December 1874. On the 3rd January 1875

\* This mystery was afterwards cleared up. See Butler's Report of 29th May 1875 in Assam Proceedings for August 1875.



they reached Wokha, a large village on the western slope of the Wokha Peak. The following day a coolie was murdered. Some useless negotiation followed, and it was clear that mischief was meant. About 7 P. M., when it was quite dark, the party was startled by the Naga cry and some shots. It soon appeared that the camp was entirely surrounded, and some confusion took place among the non-combatants. As soon as they were in order, Captain Butler with a detachment of about 40 men went straight at the village, drove the Nagas through it, killing some twenty men, and returned without loss, after posting a police guard within the village with orders to patrol all night. The village was in great measure destroyed. The upshot of the whole affair was that the murderers of the coolie were surrendered by the Wokha men, and on the 20th January Captain Butler marched out of the place.

In reporting the matter the Chief Commissioner wrote that Captain Butler had again been warned to proceed with caution. He had no fears for the safety of the party, and the Chief Commissioner himself was inclined to hope that the lesson given at Wokha would be enough to deter the Nagas from any further opposition. Captain Butler accordingly went on with the survey, and a large tract of country was mapped out before he received orders to close operations and join the expedition which was about to start to revenge Lieutenant Holcombe's murder.

An account of that unfortunate event has been given in the preceding chapter.

The northern boundary of Manipur eastward of Telizo was not settled until 1875 when a line was finally laid down and accepted by that State.<sup>(1)</sup>

In the spring of 1874, Captain Johnstone, who was then officiating for Captain Butler at Samoogoodting, informed the Chief Commissioner that he had formally taken under our protection on payment of revenue two Naga villages which were in imminent danger of attack, and had ordered other hostile villages to leave them alone. He justified this action as the only one "consistent with honor, justice, and sound policy." In this view the Chief Commissioner agreed. He thought Captain Johnstone could not have allowed women and children who claimed his protection to be massacred almost within sight of his own bungalow. Colonel Keatinge was fully aware of the importance of the precedent and of the responsibility we were incurring by assuming any such protectorate. But he thought that considerations of duty, of prestige, and of personal interest combined to force it upon us. The orders of Government upon his letter conveyed a very guarded approval of Captain Johnstone's action. The Supreme Government was not even yet prepared to assume the direct administration of the hills. But it

Extension of British protectorate to Naga villages.

(1) Assam Proceedings, March and June 1878.



clearly laid down the principle that absolute non-interference was not in all cases necessary, and that the acceptance of a protectorate might in some cases be justified by circumstances. This principle is one bearing so closely on our future dealings with the Nagas that I think it may be as well to quote the actual words. They were as follows :—

His Excellency in Council considers that Captain Johnstone ought not to have taken this step without consulting superior authority, unless, indeed, the necessity of protecting the villages was very urgent. And so far as the step, if approved, may involve us in the reduction of the country by degrees to a regular system of government regardless of expense, to that extent it certainly expresses a policy to which His Excellency in Council does not assent. Moreover, you have described the complication into which the government might be led by such proceedings and the inconvenient responsibilities that might arise out of it. If such complications ensue, the Political Agent, whose action may have brought them to pass, will of course be liable to be called to account for his want of judgment and caution; and you will no doubt take some opportunity of intimating to the Political Agents in your province how far you intend them in future to use their discretion in such contingencies without first taking your orders.

In regard, however, to the affair now reported, His Excellency in Council would, as it stands at present, desire to leave the management in your hands, to be conducted according to circumstances. His Excellency in Council does not understand that the affair must necessarily involve any question of large policy or definite acknowledgment of a principle so that it might be best to avoid the use of such formal terms as that of accepting from these Nagas 'their fealty as subjects of the Queen.' Our relations with these barbarous tribes will bear treating much more roughly and indefinitely. The Government of India have not hitherto objected to the establishment over the tracts bordering on British territory of so much influence as will enable our Political Officers to keep order on the frontier and to prevent raids on the British territory; and inasmuch as such raids always grow out of turbulence and disorganisation across the border, for that reason it is very essential to maintain peace within the scope of the Political Agent's influence on both sides of the frontier. Now the Government are aware that this influence cannot well be established without some kind of action or exercise of material authority. Captain Johnstone's act was an exercise of such authority, and the question for you to decide is, whether it was necessary for the maintenance of good order on the frontier, and also whether it was exercised with prudence and without greater risk than the object was worth. If you are of opinion that these villages are worth protecting in the interests of our own territory, that they can be conveniently and substantially protected, and that they are within easy range of your power to control, then Captain Johnstone's proceedings need not be disallowed. But if you think, after taking account of the localities and state of affairs, that the cost and consequence of this extension of our protectorate has been miscalculated, and that no adequate advantage is to be gained, in that case you will possibly be obliged to take steps to withdraw from an embarrassing and perhaps untenable position. And I am to say distinctly that the Government of India desire neither to accept fealty nor to take revenue from the independent villages, and would rather not extend their protecting obligations unless you are satisfied and can report that it is now necessary to uphold what has been already done.<sup>(1)</sup>

A few weeks after the despatch of this letter news arrived that Captain Johnstone had taken a third village under his protection, and in submitting the administration report for the year that officer intimated that in his opinion the action taken by these villages was the beginning of a general voluntary submission on the part of the Nagas.

The Chief Commissioner Colonel Keatinge, in March 1875,<sup>(2)</sup> re-opened the question of policy, advocating the gradual and systematic prosecution of the survey of the hills, not for mere purposes of exploration but

(1) Political Proceedings, India, July 1874, No. 146.

(2) Assam Proceedings, March and July 1875.



as a continuation of our political occupation of the hills. In July 1875 he followed this up by recommending the transfer of the head-quarters from Samoogoodting to Wokha. Colonel Keatinge pointed out that Samoogoodting was originally chosen as lying between the Naga villages of Mozemah, Konemah, and Jotsomah, and the plains of Nowgong, and it had effectually protected Nowgong from raids. He showed that in 1873 the Bengal Government was in favour of moving the officer in charge of the hills to a site more healthy and nearer to the chief Naga communities. What was now especially required was a screen for Seeb-sangor, and a move to Wokha would bring influence to bear on the Lhotas, Hathigorias, and neighbouring tribes who threaten that district. Though Wokha was further from the Angami Naga centres than Samoogoodting the road thence was easier. Samoogoodting would be kept up as an outpost, but was in any case too unhealthy for the permanent head-quarters. The Government of India decided to await the result of the next season's survey operations before moving the head-quarters of the district.

In November 1875 the Chief Commissioner reported that the number of Naga villages tendering revenue to our Political Officers was increasing. From villages within reach of Samoogoodting he had ordered this to be accepted. From the more powerful and turbulent villages to the east such as Sepemah and Mozemah he had declined to receive revenue. The Government of India approved of his action, with a caution to the local officers about going too far. The policy laid down in 1874 was still to be maintained.<sup>(1)</sup> During the cold weather of 1875-76 the survey went steadily on in the Hathigoria country, though encountered much opposition from the tribes.

In December 1875 Captain Butler, the Deputy Commissioner, who

#### Death of Butler.

was singularly qualified to acquire influence over these tribes, and was a most able and enthusiastic officer, was killed in an ambuscade at the village of Pangti, a Lhota Naga village not far from Wokha, while leading the survey party through the hills. Lieutenant Woodthorpe, who was in charge of the Survey, promptly burnt Pangti, and the neighbouring villages remaining friendly, the work of the survey was carried on to completion. Although the weaker villages continued after this to seek our protection, the leading villages of Mozemah and Konemah persistently held aloof.<sup>(2)</sup>

In August 1876 the Chief Commissioner again drew attention to

#### Forward policy finally resolved upon.

the continued aggressions of the Angamis, and specially of the villages of Konemah and Mozemah, upon Naga communities living under Manipur, and to the state of perpetual warfare in which they lived among themselves. No actual raids upon our villages in North Cachar had taken place of late, partly because the Kutcha Nagas usually submitted to Angami exactions, partly because they were able to shelter themselves

(1) Political Proceedings (India), December 1875, No. 70.

(2) Assam Proceedings, June and August 1876.



behind the Kookies, whom the Angamis dared not touch; but from 1874 up to date six villages had been plundered, nine wholly or partially destroyed, and 334 persons killed, chiefly by Konemah and Mozemah. Colonel Keatinge accordingly proposed to send the Political Officer, Mr. Carnegie, with a strong escort in the cold season to meet the Manipur Political Agent on the frontier and enquire into the state of matters and endeavour to pacify the tribes. The Government of India, while holding that measures to repress these outrages were certainly called for, decided in October 1876 to postpone any expedition<sup>(1)</sup> until Lieutenant Colonel (lately Captain) Johnstone, an experienced frontier officer, who had just been appointed Agent in Manipur, had time to master recent local politics and confer with Mr. Carnegie. Meantime Mr. Carnegie was to use his influence to prevent outrage and push on road-making. The Secretary of State, however, when the facts were reported home, deprecated any avoidable delay, remarking that no time should be lost in taking vigorous steps to prevent a repetition of these Naga outrages. Upon this authority was given to the Chief Commissioner to adopt any measures he might consider necessary "for preventing future raids and exacting reparation for past outrages."

Meantime, the Assam reports were full of accounts of raids by one Naga village on another, and at last in February 1877 the Mozemah people attacked the Cachari village of Gnumaigaju within a short distance of Assaloo, formerly the head-quarters of North Cachar.<sup>(2)</sup> In this six men were killed, two wounded, and two guns carried off. Mozemah refused all reparation, and an expedition in force was arranged for the next cold season to settle the Angami question once for all.

In June 1877 the Government of India addressed the Secretary of State on the subject of the policy to be followed in future in the Naga Hills. Definite orders as to policy issued. It was admitted that up to date the objects kept in view had merely been the peace of our own border. No attempt had been made to civilize the Nagas, or maintain order among them, save so far as our own immediate interests were concerned. The local officers had all been anxious for authority to act as arbiters in inter-tribal feuds with power to enforce their awards, and the Governor General in Council was now of opinion that the British Government was bound to acquire effective control and influence over a larger section of the hills. It was proposed, therefore, to move the head-quarters station to some locality in the interior of the hills, and to strengthen the administrative staff, so as to provide for the management, on the new and more active principles, of both the Eastern and Western tribes. The Secretary of State entirely agreed that the attitude of indifference to the internecine feuds and the raids of the Nagas on Manipur could no longer be maintained without discredit to British Administration.<sup>(3)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> Assam Proceedings, December 1876.

<sup>(2)</sup> Assam Proceedings, March and April 1877.

<sup>(3)</sup> Political Proceedings (India), August 1877, Nos. 120 to 132.  
Political Proceedings, October 1877, No. 468.



On the 6th December 1877 the Political Officer, Mr. Carnegie, left Samoogoodting with the expedition.<sup>(1)</sup> The force was commanded by Captain Brydon, and consisted of 196 rank and file of the 42nd Assam Light Infantry and 50 Police. The troops advanced on Mozemah on the morning of the 8th December. On the approach of the troops, the inha-

*Expedition of 1877-78.*

bitants of the village at once opened fire on them. The village was accordingly attacked and carried by assault, and the whole of it, with the exception of three or four houses, was burnt to the ground. This burning of the village was not intended. The Mozemah men, after having been driven out, dispersed themselves among the neighbouring jungles and hill crests, and did all they could to harass the troops by intermittent firing and frequent night attacks. They also adopted the tactics of operating in rear of the force and interrupting communication between it and Demapore, in the plains, on the road to Golaghat, at the same time frequently threatening Samoogoodting. An addition to the force employed was consequently deemed necessary to bring the expedition to a successful termination, and a reinforcement of 100 men from the 43rd Assam Light Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Macgregor, who was accompanied by Captain Williamson, the Inspector General of Police, was despatched to the Naga Hills. In the meantime, desultory fighting had been going on there, and, finally, the Mozemah Nagas, being without food and shelter, and their village and all their stores of grain having been destroyed, made overtures for peace. These negotiations were, however, interrupted by the death of Mr. Carnegie, the Political Officer, who was accidentally shot by one of his own sentries. On hearing of the accident to Mr. Carnegie, Captain Williamson hastened up from Samoogoodting, assumed charge of the Political Officer's duties, and commenced to settle the conditions to be imposed upon the Mozemah people. The following were the principal conditions:—

- (1.) That they should pay a fine of Rs. 50.
- (2.) That they should restore the arms and accoutrements of three constables who had been waylaid and also the contents of a plundered mail bag.
- (3.) That they should surrender four of their own firearms.

Pardon was extended to Konemah and Jotsomah, on their Chiefs formally tendering their submission.

These conditions were certainly lenient, but it was taken into consideration that an ample punishment had already been inflicted on the Mozemah people by the destruction of their houses and food-supply, and in the privations they had undergone, and it would have been futile, as well as inexpedient, to impose on them a heavy fine, which, all their property having been destroyed, they would not have been able to pay. It had not, however, been intended that Konemah and

<sup>(1)</sup> Assam Proceedings, October 1878.



Jotsomah should have escaped comparatively scot-free. The omission to impose a fine upon these villages was due to the fact of Captain Williamson having no knowledge of the correspondence which had passed in connection with the expedition. The requisite papers were not at hand in camp for reference, and Mr. Carnegy was too ill to be consulted.

On the 18th January, the terms imposed upon Mozemah were fully complied with, and, peace being thus formally concluded, the expeditionary force fell back upon Samoogoodting on the 28th January.<sup>(1)</sup>

In March 1878<sup>(2)</sup> the Chief Commissioner reported that after personal exploration, he considered Kohimah the best site for the head-quarters of the Political Officer, commanding, as it did, the principal Angami villages and the Manipur frontier line. Wokha was also to be occupied to control the Lhota country. Sixteen Naga villages had by this time accepted the British protectorate, thirteen of which paid a revenue of Rs. 1,032. To protect them and maintain order generally, a force of 450 armed police was considered requisite. It was anticipated that eventually we should, at Rs. 2 per house, draw a revenue of Rs. 26,000 from the Naga villages—Angamis (7,367 houses), Kutchas Nagas (1,286 houses), Rengma and Lhotas (number doubtful). But meantime a very heavy expenditure was unavoidable. Kohimah was occupied, without opposition, on the 14th November 1878.

In July 1878<sup>(3)</sup> the Government of India communicated to the new Chief Commissioner, Sir S. C. Bayley, its general views of the more forward policy advocated by Colonel Keatinge, and so far approved.\* It

\* The following extracts from the orders may be given:—

"After careful consideration of Colonel Keatinge's views, and of the general course of affairs in the Naga Hills during past years, His Excellency the Governor General in Council agrees that a more definite policy ought to be adopted in our dealings with these tribes. Such a policy would necessarily look beyond our immediate needs and interests, and could not be confined to questions of the best system for protecting our own settled districts, and the villages in the Naga Hills which have submitted to our authority. Colonel Keatinge's proposals for advancing our protectorate would no doubt bear upon these questions; for it is plain that our frontier, as at present established, will gain greatly in security if our dominion is advanced well beyond it, and that our interior administration will be benefited proportionately. But the scheme for largely extending our dominion could not be supported entirely upon such arguments; because our settled territory is understood to be already sufficiently safe from molestation. At any rate, there is no need of any such comprehensive project as that which is now before the Government, for the sole object of ensuring the security of our present line. The plan advocated by Colonel Keatinge contemplates the extension of our authority, village by village, over the whole tract between our present border and the longitude specified, not only for the purpose of placing beyond reach of danger the villages which we already protect, but upon the principle that we should undertake gradually to subdue and settle down all the wild tribes which inhabit these hills.

(1) Assam Proceedings, October 1878.

(2) Assam Proceedings, March 1878.

(3) Assam Proceedings, May 1879.



held that it was justifiable and should be systematically pursued, but at the same time enjoined caution in procedure, and the keeping in mind the object of securing a definite limit of administration and a fixed political boundary. Roads to open out the country were put in hand; and the Nagas began to come in from all sides tendering submission and promising to obey orders.

The diaries of Mr. Damant, the Officer now in charge, were during the early part of 1879-80 full of encouragement; recording generally the arrival of deputations from distant villages with offers of submission, his efforts to prevent inter-tribal massacres, and his successful enforcement of fines and penalties on those villages which had been guilty of raiding in disobedience to his orders.<sup>(1)</sup>

These tribes now live in a state of constant internal disorder, their raids and feuds among themselves and with Manipur cause incessant bloodshed, and they have no elementary form of Government for which improvement might be hoped. In a tract of country adjoining British possessions, and separated from our protected villages by an indistinct and arbitrary arrangement, this is a state of things which cannot be expected to last. Whether we should leave the changes that must eventually come to be accomplished piecemeal, according to the exigencies of the moment; or whether we are now to shape out and proceed to forecast and steadily follow up a plan for reducing all these tribes under our control, is the question which is now before the Government for decision.

"His Excellency observes that our actual system of administration in the Naga Hills District is at present indefinite. We administer only those villages which have placed themselves under us, to the extent of protecting them from raids, and receiving some taxes, and we keep out the Manipuris from the whole district. These are, of course, no more than rudimentary functions of Government. And the consequence is that the present boundary has no special or intelligible meaning in an administrative sense; while neither for defensive purposes, nor for the protection of our settled borders, has it an advantage over the further boundary up to which Colonel Keatinge desires to extend our influence.

"This being the present situation, His Excellency in Council is inclined, upon a full review of it, to determine that the policy of the scheme proposed by Colonel Keatinge is justifiable and expedient; and that some such measures are becoming practically unavoidable. The experience already gained in our dealings with the tribes leads to the belief that no serious difficulties may be anticipated to hinder the execution of the scheme. If it can be carried, by degrees, into effect without unreasonable risk or any very disproportionate expense, His Excellency will be disposed to accord a general sanction to the policy, and to decide that in future it shall be systematically pursued. His Excellency would, however, desire you to proceed cautiously, and to avail yourself fully of local knowledge and experience before adopting your practical conclusions. You will probably see fit to examine and test Colonel Keatinge's views upon the ultimate line of boundary which will be most convenient for general administration of all these hills, and as a fixed political frontier. And you will satisfy yourself that the force he asks for is adequate for the ends proposed, having regard to the nature of the country and to the resistance likely to be offered. In short, His Excellency in Council believes that you will find it necessary to obtain a more distinct conception of the scheme which Colonel Keatinge has laid before the Government in outline, than can be readily gathered from these papers. Meanwhile, the details of Colonel Keatinge's plan have to be arranged. You are requested to submit a report giving some estimate of the total expense that is likely to be incurred, and specifying particularly the cost of the Kohima station and of the Wokha Sub-division. The cost of the additional police, and of the military officer who is to command them, should also be stated exactly. And you will have to explain how you propose that this expenditure shall be provided."

(1) Assam Proceedings, June 1880.



The first interruption to this peaceable state of affairs was in April 1879, when a policeman, who was (contrary to orders) singly escorting the mail-runner, was shot. It turned out that only one Naga was concerned in this murder, which was committed with a view of obtaining the policeman's rifle, but the mail-runner seized it, and pointed it at the Naga, who fled, while the runner proceeded with the mail to Piphimah. As the murderer failed to obtain the rifle, it was impossible to ascertain from what village he came, but representatives of all the principal villages in the neighbourhood came in and swore to their own being unconcerned in the matter.

It may be mentioned incidentally, as disclosing the relative value attached in these hills to arms and women respectively, that the same diary mentions Mr. Damant's recovery from the people of one village of the sum of Rs. 80, which they had received as the price of an old musket stolen from Samoogoodting, and from another village of Rs. 40, which they had received as the price of a Hathigoria woman whom they had captured and sold into slavery.

In May Mr. Damant reported that the village of Konemah was acquiring arms and ammunition, and it subsequently appeared that the same information was given about the same time to the Political Agent at Manipur.

In June the attitude of Konemah was so decidedly threatening, that Mr. Damant proposed to organise a hostile expedition against it after the rains; but even at this time Konemah was apparently divided against itself, for in his diary of the 11th June he reported that the Semmama Khel had sent their representative to declare that they would not assist the other Khels if they proved hostile to Government. In July the attitude of the village had so far changed that it quietly paid a fine which Mr. Damant had inflicted on it, and in that month he reported it to be peaceably disposed, and that no hostile action would, he thought, be necessary.

From time to time Mr. Damant reported that he had difficulty in procuring supplies, or rather in procuring carriage to bring in supplies, and this difficulty became so serious that in August the military authorities found it necessary to send up a special officer to arrange for the storing of adequate supplies for the military in the stockade.

There were not wanting at this time indications of an unfriendly  
indications of pending trouble. if not absolutely of a hostile spirit  
on the part of the Nagas, but  
though it is easy to put this interpretation on them in the light of subsequent events, Mr. Damant did not so interpret them at the time. Such petty insults as throwing stones at the stockade were attributed to the natural insolence of savages, which it was not necessary to notice. Late in September there was, it is said, an abortive demonstration made against the stockade at Piphimah. But this could not have been very serious, as it was not reported by Mr. Damant, and no details were ever communicated to the Chief Commissioner.



It is quite evident that Mr. Damant had no suspicion of there being anything to fear from the attitude of the Nagas at this time. In the beginning of October he went down with an escort of only ten policemen to visit Piphimah, Samoogoodting, and Demapore, and to bring up Captain Reid and the detachment of the 43rd; he also planned a lengthened expedition into the Hathigoria country to the eastward; but before carrying out this expedition, which involved taking with him as escort a considerable proportion of the Kohima garrison, he determined to ascertain the real intentions of those villages the attitude of which he had most reason to doubt. On the 11th October he wrote—"I intend starting on Monday for Jotsomah, Konemah, and Mozemah, as I want to find out what disposition they are in before starting for the Hathigorias."

On Monday, the 13th October, Mr. Damant<sup>(1)</sup> set out on his expedition accompanied by an escort of 21 military and 65 police. He

Mr. Damant's murder.

halted for the night at Jotsomah, and thence obtained coolies to carry on the baggage of the party to Konemah. Before starting the next morning he was warned by a Jotsomah interpreter that the Konemah men meant mischief. One of the escort afterwards narrates that "the interpreter begged Mr. Damant not to go on, and on several occasions fell in front of the Political Officer and caught him by the hand, beseeching him not to proceed, but Mr. Damant replied that there was no danger." On arriving at the foot of the hill, on the summit of which stood the strongly fortified village of Konemah, Mr. Damant left his baggage and half his escort, and with the other half of the party advanced up the steep pathway leading to the place. This pathway is described as having a precipice on one side, and a high wall, which was lined by the young men of the village, on the other. The gate was found to be closed, and while Mr. Damant stood before it, with no advanced guard and all his escort clubbed together, a single shot was first fired at him, striking him in the head, and then a volley was fired into the escort, who endeavoured as best they could to escape and join the baggage-guard below. The Nagas swarmed out and succeeded in dispersing the troops, who broke up and attempted to return to Kohimah in twos and threes. The Jotsomah men joined in the attack, and the Chetonoma khel of Kohimah came out to cut off their retreat. Ultimately, of the 65 police who accompanied Mr. Damant 25 were found to be killed or missing, and 14 more were wounded, and of the 20 military

Siege of Kohimah.

10 were killed and 5 wounded. Three domestic servants who accompanied the party were also killed. The news of the disaster reached Kohimah the same afternoon, and preparations were at once commenced in expectation of an immediate attack. The force there consisted of about 100 police, 32 of whom were recruits, and 80 military; and the civil charge of the garrison devolved on Mr. Cawley, District Superintendent of Police. A message was at once sent to Wokha, a distance of 57 miles,

(<sup>1</sup>) Assam Proceedings, December 1879.



and Mr. Hinde, the Extra Assistant Commissioner in charge, taking 40 sepoy, his whole available force, and 22 police, reached Kohimah on the 19th. Mr. Hinde's action in himself going to the rescue was, under the circumstances, eminently courageous, and his march was exceedingly well executed. He managed, by marching through hostile villages at night, and by coming through the village of Kohimah instead of by the regular road, to bring in his small but welcome reinforcement without the loss of a man. Messengers were also sent to Samoogoodting, but these never arrived. The Nagas made hostile demonstrations against Kohimah on the 16th and 17th, but did not commence any serious attack till the 21st. Thereupon a sortie was made under Native officers, in which the garrison lost two men killed and four wounded. On the 23rd the Nagas succeeded in establishing themselves close to the stockade, and attacked it with some persistence, but without doing serious damage; and on the 24th, having apparently heard that help was coming from Manipur, they commenced to treat. They offered the garrison a safe conduct to Samoogoodting, and the defenders, who were very sorely pressed for want of food and water, were glad of the respite which the negotiations gave them, but it became clear that their enemies were not acting in good faith, and, had they accepted the terms, they would all undoubtedly have been massacred. Before active hostilities could recommence, they were cheered by the news that Colonel Johnstone, with a force of Manipuris, was on his way to relieve them, and on the 27th Colonel Johnstone marched in unopposed, and the siege was at an end.

Colonel Johnstone had, as soon as the news of Mr. Damant's death reached him, asked the Maharaja of Manipur to put 2,000 men at his disposal, and these men, under the command of the Minister and the Maharaja's two sons, started the next day. Colonel Johnstone had also with him his own escort of 30 men of the 34th N. L., and a small body of Cachar Frontier Police. The whole force accomplished the distance of nearly 100 miles, over a roadless and most difficult country, in five days, and the service thus rendered by Colonel Johnstone and the Maharaja to the Government was one which was not forgotten later on.

The news of Mr. Damant's murder reached Shillong on the 18th October. The 44th S. L. I. were at this time at Goalundo, having been ordered to Cabul; but these orders had already been countermanded, and they were directed to return. In the meantime, a party of the 43rd A. L. I., under Major Evans, was despatched from Dibrugarh on the 23rd, and marched from Golaghat to Samoogoodting, where they were joined by Lieutenant Maxwell, the Assistant Commissioner, who had pushed on with a few Frontier Police. This party, making forced marches, arrived at Kohimah on the 30th, when they found that the garrison had already been relieved.

To punish Konemah and re-assert the supremacy of the British Government in these hills, Brigadier-Punitive expedition, 1879-80. General Nation determined to take the field in person with a force consisting of the 44th S. L. I.,



under Colonel Nuttall, C. B., a detachment of the 43rd A. L. I., under Major Evans, and two mountain guns under Lieutenant Mansel, R.A.

Thanks in a great measure to the exertions of Colonel Campbell, the Deputy Commissioner of Sebsaugor, carriage was collected, the troops were enabled to reach Sachimah by the 21st November, and Konemah was attacked on the following day. The place, which was by nature very strong, had been fortified with immense labour and skill, and was deemed by the Nagas impregnable. The assault lasted all day, and at nightfall only the lower portion of the village had been captured, after the severest fighting ever known in these hills. In the night, the Nagas evacuated the upper works, and on the following day the British force occupied the position, having lost in the assault two British Officers and the Subadar-Major of the 44th S. L. I. killed, two British and two Native Officers wounded, and 44 of the rank and file killed and wounded. The Nagas retreated to a strongly-fortified position on a crest of the Burrail range, where, as their access to their fields and houses was cut off, the General with his small force deemed it inexpedient to follow them preferring to reduce them to terms by the slower process of blockade.

Of the 13 villages hostile to us, Piphimah, Merramah, Sachimah, Sephamah, and Puchamah were attacked and destroyed before the

Subsequent operations.

attack on Konemah took place. Some fighting occurred at Sephamah, which was destroyed by a party of the 43rd Assam Light Infantry, with a loss of Lieutenant Maxwell severely wounded, two sepoy killed and two wounded. Subsequently, the village of Konemah was destroyed and the site occupied by our troops, and Jotsomah, which is close by, was captured on the 27th November, and a portion of it was burned. On the arrival of reinforcements from Shillong, a detachment was sent out to punish a group of villages to the eastward, that had taken part in the siege of Kobimah, and this work was effectually accomplished; another party under Mr. Savi was afterwards detached to the westward into the North Cachar country to cover the routes by which the Augamis generally visit the plains, either of Nowgong or Cachar.

During February and March 1880 there was a series of skirmishes, connected with our endeavours to prevent supplies being brought in by the enemy to their stronghold, known as the Chakka Forts, and to capture and occupy Popolongmai, while the Nagas maintained a guerilla warfare, constantly firing at sentries, convoys, and water parties, but making no sustained attack, save on the Nichi guard outpost, on which in one week they made three night attacks, without causing serious damage. Altogether in these petty onslaughts they inflicted throughout the expedition a loss of nearly 50 in killed and wounded.

One party of Nagas, however, executed a most daring raid, which, as it disclosed our weakness in an unexpected quarter, requires to be noticed.<sup>(1)</sup> Late in January a party of 55 men of Konemah, with only

Raid on Bahadhan.

(1) Assam Proceedings, February 1881.



seven firearms among them, started from Popolongmai, marched down the bed of the Barak through Manipur territory, requisitioning food from some of the Kutcha Naga villages on the way, crossed by a disused road from the Barak into British territory, and, hiding in the jungles during the day, surprised the Baladhan tea-garden at nightfall, slew the manager, Mr. Blyth, and 16 coolies, plundered what they could, and burned everything on the place. They then marched back unmolested by the same route. The distance in a straight line cannot be less than 80 miles, and, even for Nagas, it was a good four days' march each way. The country through which they came is one of hill and dense jungle, so scantily populated that they might scarcely meet a single village in a day's march, and these villages, though in Manipur territory, are so profoundly dominated by terror of the Angamis, that no resistance was to be expected from them. The Baladhan garden was well known to the Angamis, being the furthest and most exposed on the line of road which they usually take in trading at the Lakhipur Bazar. On that line, however, there are police posts and Kookie villages, and they could not have adopted it without the danger of an alarm being given, so they took the remoter line down the Barak. It is obvious, that through such a country, small parties of Nagas travelling unhampered can vary their route indefinitely, can evade a police post, and can escape from a pursuing party.

The Chief Commissioner himself visited Cachar shortly after this occurrence, and made such arrangements as he could for the protection of the frontier from a repetition of such attacks, and no further attempts took place; but it was some time before confidence was restored, and the success of the raiders on this occasion must necessarily cause serious anxiety lest it should lead to a repetition of the attempt in future years. From Cachar the Chief Commissioner went on through Manipur to the Naga Hills, and remained at Kohimah from the 1st to the 11th March.

At this time further reinforcements were on their way, and Popolongmai having been occupied successfully by Captain Abbott's detachment, it was possible to enforce a stricter blockade of the enemy's position in the Chakka Forts, and to make demonstrations against it with a view, if necessary, to taking it by assault; happily, this was not necessary, the Nagas having already shown a disposition to treat. On the 27th March they finally submitted, and on the 28th the Chakka Forts were surrendered.

Generally, those villages which took part against us were punished by fines in grain and cash and a certain amount of unpaid labour. The Nagas had to surrender without compensation the firearms they were known to possess, and those that stood out against us and had to be attacked were in most instances punished by the demolition of their village, and in some instances by a removal of the site from a fortified and inaccessible crest to a position more easily accessible. The village



of Konemah suffered, in addition, the confiscation of its terraced cultivation and the dispersion of its clans among other villages. Two men were excepted from the amnesty by name. From all villages an agreement was taken to pay revenue in the shape of one maund of rice and one rupee per house, to provide a certain amount of labour annually for State purposes, and to appoint a headman who should be responsible for good order and for carrying out the wishes of Government.

Subsequently the Chief Commissioner found it necessary to sanction some modifications in these terms. The changes were all in the direction of greater leniency. The two main points in which the conditions laid down were relaxed were these—(1) permission was given to the dispossessed villages or *khels* to re-occupy their old cultivation; and (2) the terms of the revenue assessment were modified.

After the operations were closed the Political Officer reported that the punishment inflicted by our troops had been far more severe in its results than was at first supposed. The dispossessed villagers of Konemah and other communities had not only been deprived of their homes, but, by the confiscation of their settled cultivation, they had, during the whole of the past year, been reduced to the condition of houseless wanderers, dependent to a great extent on the charity of their neighbours, and living in temporary huts in the jungles. The result had been great sickness and mortality among them, and a severe strain upon the resources of those who had had to supply them with food. The object aimed at in the policy of Government was to induce the dispossessed clans to settle elsewhere, either bodily in Manipur, where land and an asylum had been offered them, or on fresh land in the Naga Hills, which was pointed out to them by the Political Officer. But in this we were disappointed. They could not be persuaded willingly to settle elsewhere, and from the nature of the case wholesale coercion was impossible. No other Nagas were willing to take up the confiscated lands, fearing probably future retribution; and the dispossessed clans, except in occasional instances, had, for the most part, been receiving such shelter and livelihood as they could obtain from the villages in the neighbourhood of their old homes.

Under these circumstances, finding the prosecution of the policy of dispersion impossible, Sir Stuart Bayley considered that the question was narrowed to one of the sufficiency of the punishment already inflicted. After learning where the dispossessed clans were, how they were living, and what was their condition and attitude, he came to the conclusion that their punishment had been terribly severe; that the risk of their supposing that we were actuated by weakness in restoring their lands was not great; and that the first step towards enforcing on them permanently peaceful habits must be to let them have not only the means of livelihood, but lands, the loss of which they would not again lightly care to risk. He therefore agreed to let the dispossessed *khels* return to their confiscated lands, on condition that they were not to be



re-occupied till February 1881, when the cultivating season commenced, and, with the further condition, in the case of Konemah, that the village site would on no account whatever be restored to them, and that the three *khels* must build their houses on separate sites in the valley, aloof from their former strong position on the heights, to be marked off for them by the Political Officer. These conditions were accepted, the new sites occupied, and when Mr. Elliott, who had then succeeded Sir S. C. Bayley as Chief Commissioner, visited Konemah in March 1881, he found houses already built, and the *khels* engaged in preparing for their cultivation.

In regard to the rates of revenue to be assessed, the Chief Commissioner were of opinion that, in the first instance, the measure was important rather from a political than from a fiscal point of view; and he insisted on it as a public and well-understood symbol of obedience rather than as a valuable contribution to the revenue. Major Michell, the Political Officer, pointed out that, in his opinion, the assessment of one rupee, plus one maund of rice, per house was far too high, and that in the first year at all events it could not possibly be collected. The Nagas had not, he said, the rice to give, as much grain was destroyed in the operations of the troops. There were many more mouths than usual to be fed, and much land, especially in the neighbourhood of Kohimah, was uncultivated. Cash they had in greater plenty than usual, as our payments for labour and for rice had made money circulate largely in the hills; but they had not more rice than was necessary to feed themselves. Sir Steuart Bayley, therefore, consented to the Political Officer changing the general rate of assessment from one rupee and one maund of rice per house to two rupees a house, which is the usual rate at which house-tax is levied from other wild tribes in Assam, and from the villages which have hitherto paid revenue in the Naga Hills; and he allowed him large latitude in dealing with the assessment of any particular village. These rates were readily accepted, and were paid punctually and spontaneously.

In the matter of forced labour, the conditions of the agreements were not formally abrogated, and labour was demanded and given in accordance with our requirements from time to time. But it was not found possible to regulate its incidence so that the burthen should fall equally on all villages bound to bear it: those far from Kohimah and the road down to the plains escaped, while those nearer were unduly pressed. In all cases, however, wages were paid at the full rate of four annas a day, instead of the subsistence rate of two annas. In the matter of fines, also, the Political Officer was lenient, not demanding the full payment when he had reason to think that it could not be paid without some hardship.

In a note<sup>(1)</sup> of the 10th March 1880, Sir S. Bayley pointed out the necessity of bringing the Kookie and Kuteha Naga villages of North Cachar under better control. It was found that they had been carrying

(<sup>1</sup>) Assam Proceedings, March 1880.



on a trade in arms with the Angamis and indeed the Kookies, who had originally been settled as a screen to protect the North Cachar villages, had latterly been getting out of hand altogether. The Chief Commissioner proposed therefore to reconstitute the Assaloo Sub-

Division moving its head-quarters to the north-east and placing the whole country from the Burrail on the south to Nowgong on the north under the Naga Hills District. The limits of the Political Officer's jurisdiction, so far as taking revenue and direct interference went, he proposed to fix to the eastward by a line drawn from the Manipur frontier through the Kopamedza Hill along the Munnoo ridge, and thence northward by the Doyeng, from the junction of the Sijjoo and Zuloo Rivers to the Wokha and Golaghat road. This included the country of the Lhota, but excluded the Sema and Hathigoria Nagas. Sir S. Bayley had no doubt that in time we should have to go beyond this line, but meantime the Officer in charge of the hills should consolidate his authority within these limits. These proposals were carried out, and the Secretary of State again confirmed the policy of effectively administering the tract thus brought within the Naga Hills District.

The attitude of the tribes during the year 1880-81 was one partly of exhaustion and partly of expectancy. The indirect results of

the war were far more grievous to them than the actual hostilities; and those on whom the blow had fallen hoped, by quiet and peaceable demeanour, to earn some relaxation in the stringency of the conditions to which they were bound. Accordingly, throughout the year there was little or no crime, no outbreak, and no necessity to employ force. There were many disquieting rumours, it is true, most of which originated in Manipur; but these gradually passed away, and no evil followed. Kohimah was again declared to be the most suitable head-quarters station.<sup>(1)</sup>

The difficulties with which the force occupying the hills had to contend were terrible: there was cholera on the line of communications and scurvy in the hills; great mortality and desertion in the transport train; bridges and roads washed away, with no local labour to fall back upon for repairs. But, so far, the policy pursued was apparently successful. The revenue was paid up, and the peace kept. Major Michell at the close of 1880 reported that officers could safely go about the hills unattended, and that sepoy visits the villages as freely as in the Khasi Hills; while he had had on more than one occasion to refuse revenue from distant villages, situated beyond the boundary fixed by Sir Stewart Bayley.

Of deeds of violence, the Political Officer reported only (1) an affray at Kigwemah in December 1880, where two clans contended with two others with sticks and stones, and two persons were killed: the

(1) Assam Proceedings, March 1881.



village was fined Rs. 200, which amount was paid; (2) a murder near the village of Kekrimah of a Naga of Viswemah, the perpetrators of which had not up to the close of the year been detected; and (3) the murder of a man of Kohimah at Chajubama, a village outside our frontier, whither he had gone to trade. This last event resulted, in April 1881, in an expedition being led by the Political Officer against Chajubama, which was burnt.

The revenue, as already mentioned, was got in from the Angami Nagas without any necessity for using force. The Lhota and Rengma Nagas (except those of the latter tribe living across the Dhansiri in the Mikir Hills) have not yet been assessed to revenue. Their attitude during the year was one of complete tranquillity.

The boundaries of the district were definitely settled, and a notification defining them appeared in the *Gazette of India and Assam*.<sup>(1)</sup> On the south and north these are identical with those laid down in 1875, with the exception of the portion between the Doyeng and the north-east corner of the district, which had then been left unsettled; on the west they are also the same as were determined seven years ago, with a slight modification whereby a triangle inhabited by Kookies and Cacharis, and bounded on the south by the Langting and Langreng rivers, on the north-east by the Lunding, and on the north-west by the Doyeng, has been transferred from the Naga Hills to North Cachar; on the east the frontier is that proposed by Sir Stuart Bayley in March 1880, and follows generally the course of the Doyeng to where that river abandons its northward direction and flows south-west; thence the line is drawn to the Sebsaugor border in such wise as to include all the villages of Lhota Nagas, and exclude all those of Hathi-gorias, who are here the neighbours of the former.

On the 2nd May 1881, the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Elliott, submitted a comprehensive memorandum on the administration of the district, in which he took a hopeful view of the future, and insisted on the advantages accruing from free intercourse between our officers and the Naga tribes.

Of "political cases" the record of the year 1881-82 is fortunately brief. An attack by certain Lhotas of Lakhuti on the Hathi-goria village of Nungatung, where they killed two persons, was punished by sentencing the guilty parties to two years' rigorous imprisonment. An inter-tribal dispute at Kigwemah, in which one man was killed, was settled by demolishing the defensive works raised by the *khels* and the house of the murderer, compelling the guilty *khel* to work off a fine of Rs. 200 in labour contributed to the Public Works Department, and posting a police guard at the village till the murderer was hunted down. A man of Mozemah, who was accused of having sold a girl of Kerumah to the Kookies, was compelled to procure her restoration, and did so. There was an undiscovered murder

(1) Assam Proceedings, November 1882.



on the North Cachar frontier at Langtingbra, where a shop was plundered and six men killed. The place was solitary, and the crime remained undetected till it was too late to track the murderers, regarding whom nothing is as yet known. But the most successful and satisfactory exploit performed in this branch of the administration was the reparation exacted from a Sema village named Philimi, which had raided on the Lhota village of Chingaki, killing two persons.<sup>(1)</sup> An expedition, consisting of about 50 men of the 42nd Regiment under Captain Abbott and some Frontier Police, was skilfully and suddenly led against the aggressors by Mr. McCabe, the Political Officer, the resistance of the village anticipated, and the site occupied. The inhabitants were kept out of their houses for two days, and finally Mr. McCabe threatened to burn the village unless the principal culprit, a headman named Kenilhi, was surrendered. This demand was complied with, and the man brought into Kohimah and sentenced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment. This result seems to prove that prompt and ready action, backed by sufficient force, is now adequate to procure respect to law and authority, and that the barbarous expedient of village-burning which confounds the innocent and the guilty, is not essential to the enforcement of order in these hills.

Much has been done within the last few years to open up the country, and the Naga communities are now apparently settled down as revenue-paying subjects of the British Government. They may no doubt at times break out into savagery, and they must be firmly held and closely watched for many years to come; but on the whole the Angami Naga problem is, it may be hoped, at last in a fair way to final solution.

The Officer in charge of the hills is now taking steps to have the fortifications of villages gradually destroyed,<sup>(2)</sup> and is empowered to punish by military force all incursions into our territory by the tribes outside the line, being at the same time responsible for preventing raids by our subjects upon the tribes beyond.

The Angami Nagas have figured so prominently in the frontier history of Assam that a brief description of them and of their villages, furnished for the Assam Gazetteer, may appropriately close this Chapter:—

They are an athletic and by no means bad-looking race; brown complexion; flat noses, and high cheek bones; brave and warlike, but also treacherous and vindictive. The men dwelling in the higher ranges of the hills are fine, stalwart, hardy-looking fellows. Their dress consists of a dark blue or black kilt, ornamented with rows of cowrie shells, and a thick cloth of home manufacture thrown loosely over the shoulders. Strings of various-coloured beads ornament their necks in front, a conch shell being suspended behind. The warrior wears a collar round his neck made of goats' hair dyed red, intermixed with long flowing locks of hair of the persons he has killed, and ornamented with cowrie shells. No one is allowed to wear these insignia of honour unless he has killed many of his enemies and brought home their heads. As ear-ornaments they use the tusks of the wild bear, with tufts of goats' hair dyed red. They also wear earrings of

(<sup>1</sup>) Assam Proceedings, May 1882.

(<sup>2</sup>) Assam Proceedings, July 1882.



brass wire. Above the elbow they wear armlets, either of ivory or plaited cane, prettily worked in red and yellow. Between the calf and knee they bind strips of finely-cut cane dyed black, the calves being encased in leggings made of fine cane, similar to that of the armlets. These are generally worked on the leg, and allowed to remain until they wear out. Some of the men cut their hair square in front, and wear it pushed up above their foreheads, the hair at the top and back of the head being tied into a knot behind, and ornamented with eagle and toucan feathers. Others, again, cut their hair all round, leaving it about three or four inches long in front, and from six to eight inches long behind, and allow it to remain loose and dishevelled. The women are short in stature, stout, and extremely plain featured. They have to perform all the drudgery of the house, to work in the fields, hew wood, and draw water, besides weaving the clothing required for the family.

The Angami villages are invariably built on the very summits of the hills, and vary much in size, some containing as many as a thousand houses, while others consist of no more than twenty. The villages are all strongly fortified with stockades, deep ditches, and massive stone walls, and the hill sides thickly studded with *pánjis*, *à chevauz de frise* of sharp-pointed bamboo sticks planted in the ground. In some cases, also, the sloping side of the hill is cut away so as to form a perpendicular wall. The approaches to the villages are tortuous, narrow, covered ways, only wide enough to admit the passage of one man at a time; these lead to gates closed by strong, heavy wooden doors, with look-outs on which a sentry is posted day and night when the clans are at feud. Very often these approaches are steeply scarped, and the only means of entry into the village is by means of a ladder consisting of a single pole, some fifteen or twenty feet high, cut into steps. The sites of the villages, however, are sometimes ill chosen, being commanded by adjoining heights from which the internal economy of the hamlet can be viewed, and well-judged attack with firearms would render opposition useless.



## CHAPTER XV.

## NORTH CACHAR.

West of the Angami territories and lying between the Districts of Nowgong (on the North), the Khasi and Jaintia Hills (on the East), and Cachar Proper (on the South) is a tract of hilly country which for years had distinct administrative recognition as the District of North Cachar. The greater portion of this tract belonged to Tularam Senaputty of whom an account has been given in the Chapter on the Angami Nagas. The history of North Cachar is indeed, as has been shown, intimately connected with that of the Angami Hills. The tribes of Cacharis and Kutcha Nagas living in the eastern part of North Cachar were for many years harried by the Angamis, and the principal administrative question connected with the tract was the protection of the villages of these our subjects against their turbulent neighbours of the inner hills.

In 1839 North Cachar was annexed to Nowgong, and in 1852 it was placed in charge of a separate officer whose principal duty it was to keep order among certain Kookie Settlements established near Assaloo, the head quarters station, and to protect them and the other peaceable hillmen under our rule as far as possible from the Angamis. In 1844 Tularam made over his territory to his son; but as it was found that the Senaputty family were quite unable to keep out the Nagas, in 1854 the tract was finally taken over, the five surviving members of the family being pensioned. In 1867, when the Naga Hills District was formed, North Cachar was parcelled out between the Districts of Nowgong, Cachar, and the Naga Hills, the principal portion together with the chief Station, Assaloo, falling to Cachar.

There are six distinct tribes of hillmen in North Cachar. Their

Hill tribes in North Cachar. names and numbers, as given in Mills' Report (1854) and Allen's Report (1859), are—

	Mills.	Allen.
Hill Cacharis ...	3,940	6,735
Hozai Cacharis ...	1,170	3,260
Mikirs ...	1,820	5,076
Old Kookies ...	3,335	3,709
New Kookies ...	7,575	4,763
Aroong Nagas ...	3,505	5,885

These all pay to Government either a house tax or hoe tax through their elected headmen or mouzahdars. There is reason to suppose that