



AS-0053CSL

3

3rd BATTALION
7th RAJPUT REGIMENT
(DUKE OF CONNAUGHT'S OWN)



[Photo by W. & D. Downey, Ltd.]

FIELD-MARSHAL HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS ARTHUR WILLIAM PATRICK, DUKE OF CONNAUGHT AND STRATHEARN, K.G., K.T., K.P., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., G.B.E., A.-D.-C.
Honorary Colonel, 7th D.C.O. Rajputs, 1883-1923. Colonel-in-Chief, 7th Rajput Regiment.



CSL

The History of the
3rd BATTALION
7th RAJPUT REGIMENT
(DUKE OF CONNAUGHT'S OWN)

BY
H. G. RAWLINSON, C.I.E.
*Author of The History of Napier's Rifles, The History of Outram's Rifles,
The History of the 2/6th Rajputana Rifles*



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS

1941

319/90



CSL

THE BATTALION OWES THE PRODUCTION OF THIS
HISTORY TO THE LABOURS OF ITS COLONEL,
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR ALFRED H. BINGLEY,
K.C.I.E., C.B., AND TO THE DEVOTED WORK IN THE
COLLECTION OF MATERIAL, OF THE LATE MAJOR
J. W. B. TINDALL WHO WAS KILLED IN ACTION
WHILE COMMANDING THE BATTALION IN WAZIRISTAN
IN 1936

355.09

R 21 H

4620



CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	ix
CHAPTER	
I. EARLY HISTORY, 1778-1824	1
II. FROM THE BARRACKPORE MUTINY TO THE FIRST SIKH WAR, 1824-45	17
III. THE FIRST SIKH WAR, 1845-7	31
IV. BURMA, THE MUTINY AND CHINA, 1847-60	48
V. FROM THE CHINA WAR TO THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN, 1860-82	61
VI. REGIMENTAL LIFE, 1882-1900	75
VII. CHINA : THE BOXER CAMPAIGN, 1900-1	85
VIII. SERVICE ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER AND IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1901-14	111
IX. EARLY OPERATIONS IN MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-15	118
X. THE ADVANCE ON BAGHDAD. CAPTURE OF AMARA ; BATTLE OF ES-SINN OR KUT-AL-AMARA, BATTLE OF CTESIPHON, 1915	134
XI. RETREAT FROM CTESIPHON AND SIEGE OF KUT-AL- AMARA, 1915-17	152
XII. OPERATIONS OF THE ADEN FIELD FORCE, 1917-21	173
XIII. REORGANIZATION FOLLOWING THE GREAT WAR. OPERATIONS IN WAZIRISTAN, KHAISORA VALLEY, 1921-39	185



CSL

CONTENTS

APPENDIXES :

	PAGE
I. ROLL OF HONOUR—GREAT WAR, 1914-18	201
II. LIST OF COLONELS, COMMANDANTS, ADJUTANTS AND STATIONS	202
III. INDIAN OFFICERS WHO HAVE HELD THE RANK OF SUBADAR MAJOR	209
IV. MAINLY ABOUT UNIFORMS	210
V. INDEX	215



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIELD-MARSHAL H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT	<i>frontispiece</i>	
		PAGE
BATTLE OF MOODKEE		35
BATTLE OF FEROZESHAH		39
BATTLE OF ALI WAL		43
BATTLE OF SOBRAON		45
PORTRAIT OF GENERAL D. POTT, C.B.	<i>facing</i>	62
MAP OF LOWER EGYPT		67
BATTLE OF TEL-EL-KEBIR	<i>facing</i>	71
PORTRAIT OF COLONEL H. R. B. WORSLEY, C.B.	<i>facing</i>	75
GROUP OF OFFICERS, LUCKNOW, 1883	<i>facing</i>	76
GROUP OF OFFICERS, SAUGOR, 1890	<i>facing</i>	81
MAP SHOWING ADVANCE, TIENTSIN TO PEKIN		91
ACTION NEAR PEITSANG		93
ACTION NEAR YANGTSUN		97
ENTRY INTO PEKIN		101
THE HATA-MEN AND WATER GATE, PEKIN	<i>facing</i>	102
PORTRAIT OF GENERAL SIR EDMUND G. BARROW, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.	<i>facing</i>	112
PORTRAIT OF COLONEL H. B. VAUGHAN	<i>facing</i>	114
GROUP OF OFFICERS, AHMEDABAD, 1911	<i>facing</i>	115
MAP OF MESOPOTAMIA	<i>facing</i>	120
ACTION NEAR QURNA		123
BATTLE OF ES-SINN OR KUT-AL-AMARA		137



CSL

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
BATTLE OF CTESIPHON	145
SIEGE OF KUT-AL-AMARA	157
PORTRAIT OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HARINGTON O. PARR, K.C.B., C.M.G. <i>facing</i>	167
SKETCH MAP TO ILLUSTRATE ADEN OPERATIONS	175
PORTRAIT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR ALFRED H. BINGLEY, K.C.I.E., C.B. <i>facing</i>	191
MAP TO ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONS IN WAZIRISTAN	194
PORTRAIT OF MAJOR J. W. B. TINDALL <i>facing</i>	196
GROUP SHOWING UNIFORMS, 24TH BENGAL INFANTRY <i>facing</i>	210
GROUPS SHOWING UNIFORMS, 7TH (D.C.O.) RAJPUTS <i>facing</i>	212



PREFACE

FOR the materials used in the compilation of this history I have drawn upon the usual official sources and histories, as well as the records of the battalion. But the narrative would not have been as complete as it is had I not had the advantage of consulting the diaries, letters, and personal narratives of many of the officers who took part in the operations described.

I have to acknowledge the help given me by Lieutenant-General Sir Alfred Bingley, K.C.I.E., C.B., the Colonel of the 3rd Battalion 7th Rajput Regiment (D.C.O.), and the oldest living officer of the battalion, whose knowledge of its history and traditions is unique. Besides contributing to various chapters, he has been helpful in revising the text and in making suggestions which have added greatly to its interest. I am no less indebted to the late Major J. W. B. Tindall, who was killed in action when in command of the battalion, and whose aptitude for research and unflagging zeal in collecting historical data have proved of inestimable value. Besides securing the correspondence of Major Kilpatrick, Ensign Jenkins and Colonel Gimlette, together with the memoirs of Major-General Pughe, he compiled a nominal roll of officers who have served in the battalion and its predecessors from 1782 to the present day, complete with biographical details of the greatest interest. In addition to this, he prepared an illustrated catalogue of the mess trophies and plate, and an account of the more distinguished of the Indian officers.

My acknowledgements would not be complete if I did not refer to the help derived from Colonel H. B. Vaughan's book, *St. George and the Chinese Dragon* and the narratives of Lieut.-Colonel A. R. Thomson, M.C., and Major J. W. B. Tindall, the former relating to the Mesopotamia campaign and the latter to the Aden operations.

Considerations of economy have put a limit on the number of maps and illustrations that could be provided to amplify the text.



PREFACE

It is hoped, however, that those produced will satisfy essential requirements. The portraits of Commanding Officers are those of officers who commanded the battalion in the major campaigns in which it has taken part. The choice of maps and plans has been determined on the same principle. Most of the illustrations have been contributed by Lieutenant-General Sir Alfred Bingley ; among other helpers in this respect have been Colonel Vaughan, Major Tindall and Major Dixon-Smith, to all of whom my thanks and acknowledgements are due. I may add that two of the maps illustrating the advance on Pekin are reproduced by kind permission of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, Bart., G.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.M.G., D.S.O., and his publishers, Messrs. George G. Harrap & Co., from his work *Adventures Ashore and Afloat* ; that the map illustrating the battle of Tel-el-Kebir is reproduced by kind permission of Messrs. W. Heine-mann Ltd., from Sir F. Maurice's *Life of Lord Wolseley* ; and also that, through the kindness of the Commandant and officers of the 2/6th Rajputana Rifles (Prince of Wales's Own), I have been allowed to utilize some of the maps and plans contained in my history of their battalion. In conclusion, I have to thank the Committee of the Royal Artillery Institution for permitting me to make use of a sketch map of the operations round Aden, published in Vol. LIV of their Journal.

H. G. RAWLINSON



CHAPTER I

EARLY HISTORY, 1778-1824

attalion of the 7th Rajput Regiment was not
1824, as stated in the Army List, it bears the title
much earlier formation, and its history would be
which preceded

a Company
ny by nine
ngal Native
ain Charles
Kilpatrick,
ion in the
ef, who on
y. As this
ed to as the
among the
e unit after
command,

har in the
da s. The
re strongly
osed of the



CSL

PREFACE

It is hoped, however, that those produced will satisfy essential requirements. The portraits of Commanding Officers are those of officers who commanded the battalion in the major campaigns in which it has taken part. The choice of maps and plans has been determined on the same principle. Most of the illustrations have been contributed by Lieutenant-General Sir Alfred Bingley ; among other helpers in this respect have been Colonel Vaughan, Major Tindall and Major Dixon-Smith, to all of whom my thanks and acknowledgements are due.

advance of
the Fleet
and his p
Adventures
Tel-el-K
mann-L
through
Rajputan
utilize so
battalion
Royal Ar
map of
Journal.

8

ERRATA

- Page 31 line 3 ; for 'Ranjur' read 'Ranjit'.
- „ 47 „ 10 ; for 'Commander' read 'Companion'.
- „ 51 „ 37 ; for '24' read '47'.
- „ 55 „ 1 ; for '24' read '47'.
- „ 186 „ 12 ; for 'Poona' read 'Poonch'.
- „ 209 „ 9 ; for 'Bhawani Din' read 'Bhawani Lal'.
- „ 220 „ 46 ; for 'Maréchal' read 'Colonel'.
- „ 222 „ 11 ; below 'Rangoon' enter 'Ranjit Singh, 31'.
- „ 222 „ 12 ; after 'Ranjur Singh', delete '31'.



CHAPTER I

EARLY HISTORY, 1778-1824

ALTHOUGH the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Rajput Regiment was not actually raised until 1824, as stated in the Army List, it bears the title (*Craum-ki-paltan*) of a much earlier formation, and no history would be complete without a brief account of the various corps which preceded it, and from which it is lineally descended.

In 1778, owing to the many wars in which the East India Company was involved, it was decided to augment the Bengal Army by nine battalions. The first of these to be formed was the 31st Bengal Native Infantry, which was raised at Cawnpore in 1778 by Captain Charles Marsack. He was succeeded almost at once by Captain S. Kilpatrick, who had served with distinction under Colonel Champion in the campaign against Hafiz Rahmat Khan, the Rohilla chief, who on April 23rd, 1774, was crushingly defeated near Bareilly. As this victory was won on St. George's Day, it is generally referred to as the battle of St. George. Thenceforth the battalion was known among the sepoys as *Kilpatrick-ki-paltan*, the fashion being to name the unit after its first Commandant. Soon after Kilpatrick had assumed command, the 31st was renumbered and became the 24th.

The men were chiefly recruited from Oudh and Bihar in the proportion of two-thirds Hindus to one-third Muhammada s. The majority of the Hindus were Rajputs ; but Brahmans were strongly represented, especially in the grenadier companies composed of the tallest and finest sepoys. Owing to their dislike of foreign service and tendency to desert when employed at a distance from their homes, the presence of so many Brahmans in the ranks proved a grave source of weakness. The influence they exercised by virtue of their priestly status was often prejudicial to discipline, as it encouraged other Hindus to follow their unsoldierly example.

On October 30th, 1780, orders were issued for a force to assemble at Midnapore, and proceed overland to Madras as part of the army under Sir Eyre Coote which was to take the field against Haidar Ali of Mysore. It was composed of the 12th, 13th, 24th, 25th and 26th



Bengal Native Infantry, and the command was given to Colonel T. Pearse of the Bengal Artillery. The force started its march to the south early in 1781, but was beset with difficulties from the outset. On entering Orissa, the baggage was continually plundered by Mahratta horsemen, and numerous desertions took place, as the Bengal sepoy were filled with dread on entering a strange country. Colonel Pearse checked this for the time by blowing a deserter from a gun, but on February 25th, 1781, when the force reached Cuttack, the sepoys, taking advantage of a dense fog, again absconded in large numbers.

A worse disaster befell them at Ganjam on the Chilka Lake, for here an epidemic of cholera, left behind, no doubt, by pilgrims on their way to the great temple of Jaganath at Puri, broke out among the troops. As the sepoys were without tents or blankets, and very inadequately supplied with medical comforts, the mortality was terrible. 'No less than 1,800 were at one time in the hospital, and many of my fine, stout grenadiers', writes Major Kilpatrick, 'died in a few hours, also many of our servants.' As this appears to be the first time the disease occurred in the army in an epidemic form, it caused great terror. A further batch of desertions occurred, fifty or sixty men going off in a night from each regiment, and in the 24th matters were not made any better by friction between Major Kilpatrick and Captains Scott and Sandford, his battalion commanders. After an enquiry into the grievances of the sepoys, conditions improved, and when at length the Kistna river was reached on June 11th, the force, which had been reinforced by two Madras battalions, was still 3,820 strong, 4,500 being the number that had started from Bengal. On July 25th it joined the Grand Army under Sir Eyre Coote at Pulicat, having marched twelve hundred miles in about six months.

During the ensuing campaign, the Bengal regiments showed that, whatever their conduct may have been on the march, they were first-rate fighting soldiers. The 24th now formed part of the 4th Brigade under Colonel Arthur Owen of the Bengal Army, and on August 24th they had their first encounter with the enemy at Pollilore, a place of evil reputation, for here Haidar Ali had in the preceding year cut to pieces a detachment under Colonel W. Baillie, and the ground was still littered with unburied corpses. The enemy had taken up a strong position, their flanks resting on fortified villages, and their



front protected by deep nullahs and thick jungle. The battle raged for eight hours before Pollilore was taken at the point of the bayonet and the Mysoreans were forced to fall back on Arcot.

On September 27th, Coote attacked Haidar Ali, who had entrenched himself at Sholinghur, blocking the way to Vellore. In this battle, the 24th was commanded by Major William Vanas, Major Kilpatrick having died on September 7th of a wound received in a duel with his former subordinate, Captain Sandford. It repeatedly repelled charges by the Mysore cavalry, led by Tipu Sahib in person, and fought with conspicuous gallantry. Colonel Pearse, writing to Warren Hastings about this battle, said that it amply refuted all charges of unsteadiness on the part of the Bengal sepoys, and showed that 'with proper discipline and strict justice they might be made equal to Prussian troops in all points, and superior in many, from their simple mode of life'.

On October 23rd, the 24th, still part of Colonel Owen's brigade, helped to cover the retreat of the force at the pass of Virakundalur. Owen had been detached by Coote to intercept Haidar Ali's grain supplies, but was himself cut off by his opponent and forced to retire after abandoning his baggage. During the passage of the troops through a narrow defile, the 24th behaved with great steadiness, and assisted in the recovery of a gun which had been captured by the enemy. In this affair, Captain Scott of the 24th handled his men so capably that he was shortly afterwards promoted by Coote to command the 26th Bengal N.I. Lieutenant David Ochterlony of the 24th, afterwards a famous personage, who was in charge of a convoy of supplies, also acted with conspicuous coolness, and adroitly saved his valuable charge from falling into the enemy's hands.

In 1782, Sir Eyre Coote, who died soon after, was forced to take leave owing to ill-health, and was succeeded by Major-General James Stuart. In June 1783, Stuart determined to take the fortress of Cuddalore, which was held by the French allies of Haidar Ali, and preparations were made to lay siege to it. The French, under the Marquis de Bussy, had taken up a position covering the town. It consisted of well-armed redoubts connected by trenches and was strongly held. The British attacked these lines on the 13th and were repulsed at several points. They renewed their attacks, however, and at the end of an exhausting day, in which both sides suffered heavy casualties, the French abandoned their positions and retired into Cuddalore,



CSL

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

4 taking their guns with them. The British then occupied the abandoned redoubts and trenches, and started converting them into siege works.

On June 25th the French Regiment d'Aquitaine, led by the Chevalier de Damas, made a sudden sortie before dawn, and caught the 24th hard at work digging trenches. The sepoys at once dropped their shovels and took up their muskets, and a terrific *mêlée* ensued, in which bayonets and butt-ends were the only weapons used. The French took the colours of the 24th; the sepoys not only recaptured them, but in their turn carried off both the French colours. The Commanding Officer of the 24th, Captain James Williamson, was severely wounded; Lieutenant Nicholas Grueber was killed, and Lieutenant David Ochterlony was wounded and captured. On the other hand, the French lost their Colonel, the Chevalier de Damas, and many officers and men killed or taken prisoner, among the latter being, according to some authorities, a young soldier named Bernadotte, who afterwards became a Marshal of France and King of Sweden. His Majesty the King of Sweden presented a portrait of his famous ancestor to the Mess of the 7th Rajputs as a souvenir of this interesting but unconfirmed tradition.¹

The conduct of the 24th on this occasion was all the more praiseworthy as the regiment was completely taken by surprise, and was not only attacked in front by the French, but in the darkness and confusion was fired into from the rear by the European Grenadiers and the 16th Carnatic Battalion. Colonel Pearse in a letter says, 'The 24th Bengal Regiment defeated the enemy's attack on our trenches; killed many with the bayonet only; took two colours; recovered the pair which had been lost; sustained the fire of the enemy in front and that of our own troops in the rear; and took prisoner the Colonel who commanded the attack.'² The French acknowledge 350 Europeans lost that day, and only the 24th was engaged. . . . The next morning, the French and the sepoys were found lying dead with their bayonets in one another's bodies, a proof of the gallantry of both.' The Chevalier de Damas, who was taken as an honoured guest to General Stuart's camp, expressed his astonishment

¹ Though repeated in many books, the story rests on rather slender evidence, and Bernadotte's latest biographer, Sir Plunkett Barton, denies that he was ever in India. This view is supported by the Swedish writer P. Samzilius of Upsala.

² The Chevalier de Damas, according to another account, surrendered to Lieutenant Wahab, 16th Carnatic Battalion.



and shame at being captured unwounded by sepoys, who, he had been taught to believe, would never dare to contest the point of the bayonet with Europeans. The memory of this combat was cherished with just pride by the officers of the Bengal Army. To commemorate their gallantry on this occasion, the men of the 24th were permitted to wear crossed bayonets as a badge of honour on their accoutrements—a distinction which the regiment retained as long as it existed as a separate corps.

The Second Mysore War having come to an end, orders were received in April 1784 for the Bengal detachment to march back by the route by which it had come. There was great discontent among the sepoys, as they had not been paid for nearly a year, and thinking that Colonel Pearse was about to slip away by sea, they surrounded his *palki* in a threatening manner, clamouring for their arrears. At length half a month's pay was sent by the Madras Government, and Captain Williamson, who had the 24th well in hand, persuaded his men to accept it, though the 13th threatened to fire on them if they did so. The British officers were in even worse case, as they had to provide their own transport and messing, and in some cases had not enough ready cash to pay for their food. Some of the juniors were reduced to selling their wearing apparel and other necessities to meet their daily wants. The Bengal troops were in the end given three months' arrears of pay and marched to Vizagapatam, where they went into cantonments for the rainy season. It was not until the middle of January 1785 that they reached Ghiretti, near Calcutta, where they encamped.

On the 24th of that month they were reviewed by Warren Hastings. As the Governor-General, dressed in a plain blue coat, rode down the lines, he greeted each regiment personally, to the great delight of all ranks. A General Order was issued, thanking the men for their gallant behaviour and faithful service in a long and unequal war. Swords of honour were presented to Colonel Pearse and Lieut.-Colonels Edmonstone and Blane, and officers were confirmed in their regimental appointments. Medals were ordered to be struck, of gold for subadars, and of silver for jemadars and lower ranks. New colours of China taffeta were ordered to be issued to the 24th to replace those made of 'buntin' taken and retaken at Cuddalore. The first colour was the Union, with the regimental number in the centre, and the second or regimental colour was yellow, the same as



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

the facings, with the arms of the Honourable East India Company in the centre, surrounded by a wreath, and a scroll below on which was the number and description of the regiment. This colour bore the badge of crossed bayonets granted in honour of Cuddalore. In 1829, surviving units which had taken part in the Mysore expedition were granted the battle honour 'Carnatic', to be worn on their colours and appointments.

The subsequent history of the battalion was uneventful. In 1786, it was put on a peace establishment, the Staff consisting of a Commandant (Major or Captain), an Adjutant (Captain or Lieutenant), an Assistant Surgeon, a Hospital Assistant, a Sergeant-Major, a Quartermaster-Sergeant, a Drill Havildar, a Drill Naik, and a Drum and Fife Major. There were two grenadier and six battalion companies, each commanded by a subaltern. The establishment of a company was 1 Lieutenant or Ensign, 1 Sergeant, 1 Subadar, 1 Jemadar, 4 Havildars, 4 Naiks, 1 Drummer, 1 Fifer and 68 sepoys. This gave a total strength of 10 British officers, 10 Sergeants, and 640 natives of all ranks. Captain James Williamson remained in command until 1787, when he was transferred to the 7th Bengal Battalion. Later he volunteered for service in Mysore where he commanded the 1st Bengal Volunteers. He died in 1792 while holding the appointment of Commandant Bangalore Fort. The names of the officers who commanded the 24th from 1787 to 1796 cannot be traced.

In 1796, partly to equalize promotion and facilitate transfers, and partly to cut down military expenditure, the Native Infantry of the Bengal Army was reorganized and reduced, its establishment being fixed at twelve regiments each composed of two battalions. As the result of this drastic measure, the number '24' disappeared from the Bengal Army List for the next eight years, the famous '*Kilpatrick-ki-paltan*' being absorbed by half-battalions into the 1/7th and 2/7th Bengal N.I., respectively. In 1804, however, the Government of India found it necessary to augment the army. Lord Lake's successful campaign against the Mahrattas had entailed heavy losses, and the defeat and retreat of Monson in 1804 had encouraged Holkar of Indore and his ally the Raja of Bhurtpore to renew hostilities. This, and the demand for troops to garrison the newly conquered districts, necessitated the immediate formation of four additional two-battalion regiments, numbered from 24 to 27.

The new 24th consisted of two battalions raised by Captain



EARLY HISTORY

7 **CSL**

P. Crump and Lieutenant W. H. Matthews of the 2/9th and 1/9th N.I. respectively, and popularly known as *Craum-ki-paltan* and *Muttees-ki-paltan*. This augmentation was carried out at Cawnpore in September 1804. The new battalions absorbed as transfers some of the personnel of the original 24th N.I., including Majors John Duff and William Alston, both of whom had served under Coote and Stuart in the Carnatic.

The cadre of the new 1/24th was as follows :—

<i>Colonel</i>	John Gardiner.
<i>Lieut.-Colonel</i>	James Powell (Commandant).
<i>Major</i>	John Duff.
<i>Captains</i>	Robert Broughton. C. W. Lambourne. Richard Lambert. J. J. Aldin.
<i>Lieutenants</i>	Frederick Carr. Henry Tanner. T. G. Alder. William Macpherson. W. H. Jackson. Richard James. G. D. Heathcote (Adjutant). D. Le Hardy.
<i>Ensigns</i>	Philip Brewer. W. R. Pogson.

TURKIPURA

The 1/24th remained at Cawnpore until April 1805, when it became part of a field detachment under Lieut.-Colonel D. R. Richardson, which was sent against the stronghold of Turkipura in the Doab, held by the robber chief Nahar Ali of Imlani, who not long before had sacked the cantonment of Khasganj. The battalion guns, two light six-pounders, proved quite insufficient to batter in the gates, and an attempt to blow them in proved unsuccessful. The troops then gallantly tried to take the walls by escalade, but this too failed, as the scaling ladders were found to be too short, and the 24th suffered badly from the fire of the matchlockmen lining the walls. The next day, heavier guns were brought up, and the gates were breached. The garrison then fled, and about 800 were cut down by Skinner's Horse, who pursued them for several miles.



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

MINOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MAHRATTAS

Shortly after this, the 1/24th was ordered to Panipat, where it joined a field force under Colonel William Burn, a distinguished officer who had served with the old 24th in the Carnatic. The object of this force was to intercept the flight of the Mahratta chief Jaswant Rao Holkar of Indore, who, after the defeat of his ally at Deeg by General Fraser in November 1804, was trying to break back across the Sutlej into the Punjab. The brigade marched through Karnal, Thanesar, Patiala and Nabha to Raisina, and there was inspected by the Commander-in-Chief, who expressed his satisfaction at its appearance. Meanwhile, the 2/24th was in a column under Captain H. W. Royle, which intercepted the remnants of Holkar's regular infantry at Adalatnagar, south-east of Agra, as they were trying to make their way back to Indore in Central India. In the battle of Adalatnagar, July 7th, 1805, the Mahratta general, Khushial Rao, was utterly defeated, and lost all his guns. Captain Royle, in his report to Colonel Blair, commanding at Agra, said, 'The conduct of the troops in this action was highly exemplary, and especially that of the 24th and 25th Regiments of Native Infantry, which had not been embodied for a period of more than five months. I am greatly obliged to Lieutenant and Adjutant Craigie for his exertions and good conduct in bringing six companies of the 2/24th into action.' After this, the 2/24th was engaged in minor operations against the Raja of Gohad in 1809, and in the following year in the pacification of Haryana, which brought the campaign to a close.

NEPAL

In February 1816, the two grenadier companies of the 1/24th, with four British officers, formed part of the 8th Grenadier Battalion in the army under Major-General Ochterlony, sent to punish the Gurkhas of Nepal, who had been making inroads on British territory. Each native battalion then had two grenadier or flank companies, composed of picked men, and in the case of the Bengal regiments, it is stated that their average height was 6 feet, while that of the sepoys of the battalion companies was not less than 5 feet 6 inches. The original function of the grenadier companies was to lead the attack on a position by throwing hand-grenades. This practice had fallen



into disuse, but they were the *élite* of the force, and filled much the same role as the 'storm troops' of modern armies.

In a letter to his brother, written in that year, Ensign F. Jenkins, who had joined the 24th at Lucknow in 1812, tells us how he came to belong to this grenadier corps.

'I little expected to be so soon on the march, but the General Commanding at the Presidency, to show his zeal, has embodied a Grenadier Battalion from the troops at Barrackpore, making altogether a complement of 800 as fine men as perhaps were ever brought together, not excepting His Majesty's Foot Guards. Not badly officered either, whether you regard quantity or quality. Each corps has furnished four officers, so including a surgeon, there are seventeen of us, and we shall have another added on our way, for we are to pick up an Artillery officer and two field pieces, with the usual complement of European gunners.

'You may perhaps ask how I became a grenadier. Why, for want of a better man! We had few officers present, so Major N. White (our Commanding Officer) wrote to the General that I, with most laudable zeal, had volunteered for service. I am thus what is known among native soldiers as a "*zubberdasti volunteer*." ' In another letter written later in the same year, Jenkins wrote, 'of the four officers who have come from the 1/24th, I am second junior; but as my Captain is Quartermaster, I have the honour of commanding our Left Grenadiers, the finest company in the battalion, the finest perhaps in the Service—rather an anxious charge for a young unseasoned officer.'

The campaign of 1814-15 against the Gurkhas had not so far been successful. Indeed, it had only been redeemed from failure by the successes of Major-General Sir David Ochterlony,¹ which brought about a temporary cessation of hostilities and the commencement of peace negotiations. These were abandoned when it became evident that the Nepal Darbar had no intention of ratifying the treaty or carrying out its promises. A new force was accordingly assembled early in 1816 at Dinapore under Ochterlony, whose vigour and enterprise in the first operations had been in marked contrast to the dilatoriness and incapacity shown by Generals Woods and Marley, the other divisional commanders. Marley, in particular, who had abandoned his command without waiting to be relieved, was held in

¹ He had been created a Baronet and a K.C.B. in 1815, in recognition of his services.



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

CSL

universal contempt ; and in stating that ' there is only one general in whom confidence can be placed and that is Ochterlony, who was in this corps (24th N.I.) in 1780 ', Ensign Jenkins merely repeated what was the general opinion of the Army at that time.

The force under Sir David Ochterlony was composed of four brigades which were formed into three columns, as follows :—

The Centre Column, under the personal command of Sir David, consisted of the 3rd Brigade, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel F. Miller, 87th Foot, and the 4th Brigade commanded by Lieut.-Colonel J. Burnet, 8th N.I.

The Right Column consisted of the 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel W. Kelly, 24th Foot.

The Left Column consisted of the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel C. Nicol, 66th Foot. Included in the brigade was the 8th Grenadier Battalion in which were two companies of the 1/24th and four officers, one of whom was Ensign Jenkins.

The Centre Column (Ochterlony), at Segowli,¹ was to advance via Bichiakoh ; the Right Column (Kelly), at Bhagwanpur, was to advance via Hariharpur ; and the Left Column (Nicol), at Ramnagar, was to advance up the valley of the Rapti, a tributary of the Gandak, to Etounda, where all three columns were to concentrate, preparatory to a general advance on Khatmandu which was only about twenty miles distant.

On reaching Bichiakoh, the Centre Column found that the direct road into the hills from this place was occupied by the enemy. This necessitated a careful reconnaissance. After four days' search, Lieutenant J. Pickersgill, 1/24th N.I., Ochterlony's able and enterprising Intelligence Officer and Guide, discovered a difficult path by which the pass might be turned. The 3rd Brigade accordingly started at 5 in the evening of March 14th, leaving its tents standing. These, to conceal the movement, were at once occupied by the 4th Brigade. The 3rd Brigade had a most arduous march, through ravines and up watercourses, ending with a climb of 300 feet up a steep ascent, and did not reach their objective until 9 o'clock in the evening of the 15th. A couple of days were spent in making the path practicable for baggage elephants, and for the guns which were drawn up by hand. Sir David was now at Etounda, in rear of the Gurkha position in the Churia Ghat. The column met with but trifling opposition,

¹ Also spelt Sagauli.



but the ascent of the Ghat itself proved a matter of great difficulty. The pioneers, with infinite labour, constructed a long flight of steps, formed of tree trunks laid transversely up the steep slope of the hill, which was climbed successfully by the elephants.

On February 27th, the 3rd Brigade moved from Etounda to a position on open level ground immediately south of the hills covering the fortified heights of Makwanpur and was joined there, next day, by the 4th Brigade in time to assist in repulsing an attack made by the enemy in force. Our losses in this action were considerable.

The Right Column under Colonel Kelly attacked the Gurkha position at Hariharpur on March 1st. This involved hard fighting, which was decided in our favour by the opportune arrival of the guns whose fire proved most effective.

The Left Column, meanwhile, had experienced no opposition worth mentioning. After crossing the Churia Ghat range on February 14th, and after taking possession of a strong stockade at Jogiyah which was abandoned on its approach, the column halted five days at Ekor. A little beyond, the enemy had two posts farther north at Kadrang and Upadrang. So two battalions and the guns were left there to deal with them, while Colonel Nicol, following the course of the Rapti, proceeded up the valley with the rest of his brigade, arriving at Makwanpur the day after the action. A few days after this, a Gurkha envoy presented to Sir David Ochterlony, on bended knee, the treaty which the Nepal Government had up to then refused to ratify.

The officers and men of the 2nd Brigade were very sore at having missed the fight at Makwanpur. This was attributed to the long halt made at Ekor and to a lack of energy on the part of Colonel Nicol. This criticism was, however, undeserved. The delay was unavoidable, being due to a shortage of supplies. Until fresh stocks arrived, the column could not resume its advance. The difficulties experienced by transport moving through a mountainous and roadless country were not fully realized.

As was often the case at that time, however, many commanding officers like Colonel Nicol were too old for their work, particularly in mountain warfare which demands a high standard of physical fitness. It was the first occasion on which Bengal troops had fought in the hills and at first the difficulties of the ground and the hardihood of their Gurkha enemy so wrought upon the inexperience of some and



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

CSL

the fears of others, that failure and disaster resulted. It was Sir David Ochterlony who showed how the positions occupied by the Gurkhas could be won, with comparatively small loss, by skilful turning movements. His caution and judgement were admirably displayed in both campaigns and he brought a troublesome war to an honourable conclusion, turning a gallant enemy into a faithful and helpful ally.

PINDARI CAMPAIGN

In October 1817, after spending a short time at Benares and Barrackpore, the 1/24th was sent to Cawnpore to join the Centre Division of the Grand Army for the Pindari Campaign. The Pindaris were bands of mounted marauders, chiefly disbanded soldiery from the armies of Native States, whose depredations and brutality had caused widespread misery and ruin over Central India. The Marquis of Hastings was determined to exterminate these pests, whose raids had extended into British India, and the operation was to be carried out by two armies—the Grand Army drawn from the Bengal Presidency which was under his personal command, and the Deccan Army, drawn chiefly from the Madras Presidency, commanded by Sir Thomas Hislop. The task assigned to the four Divisions of the Grand Army was to prevent the Pindaris from breaking through to the north and at the same time to isolate Sindia of Gwalior so as to stop him from aiding them or joining forces with the other Mahratta States, all of which were secretly abetting the enemy. The six Divisions of the Deccan Army were assigned a more active role. Three of them were to attack the Pindaris, and confine them to their haunts in the Nerbudda Valley by driving them inwards towards Hindia, south-east of Ujjain. The other three were to be employed as circumstances demanded against Holkar of Indore, the Bhonsle Raja of Nagpur, and the Peshwa of Poona. Thus the Grand Army Divisions were to act as ‘stops’, while the Deccan Divisions acted as ‘beaters’, the object being to encircle the Pindaris and crush them out of existence.

The 1st or Centre Division of the Grand Army, which assembled at Sikandra, was commanded by Major-General S. Brown and consisted of four regiments of cavalry, nine battalions of infantry and fifty-four guns. The 3rd Infantry Brigade of this Division was composed of the 2/11th, 2/13th and 1/24th N.I., and the latter was



commanded by Lieut.-Colonel J. Dewar. The Brigadier was Colonel L. Burrell, and his Brigade Major was Captain G. D. Heathcote of the 1/24th. The Centre Division moved first to Mahewa and then to Sonari on the river Sind, but field operations were retarded by a terrible cholera outbreak in November. It only lasted ten days, but in that time 767 fighting men and 8,000 followers died and there were further losses from desertion. After this, the net closed remorselessly on the Pindaris. The part played by the infantry was of secondary importance ; it consisted of blocking every pass, ford, or other bolt-hole by which the enemy might escape while they were being hunted down by the cavalry and dromedary corps. It entailed little fighting, but a vast amount of marching, often under exhausting conditions. The Pindaris were continually doubling back in their attempts to join hands with the Mahratta chiefs who secretly supported them, or their sympathizers in Central India. The work was trying and monotonous, and much of the country was difficult of access and unmapped. Gradually the bands were dispersed and the leaders surrendered or were captured. Chitu, the most daring and successful of them, remained as an outlaw till 1819, when he was killed in the jungle by a tiger. The operations against the Pindaris developed later into the Third Mahratta War, in which there were several battles and sieges. With these, however, we are not concerned, as the 1/24th took no part in them. By February 1819, the country was so far pacified that most of the Bengal troops were ordered back to their cantonments.

It is interesting to learn, from the letters of a young officer of the 1/24th to his family, what regimental life in India was like in the early part of the nineteenth century. In the correspondence of Ensign Francis Jenkins, from which we have already quoted, we get a lively and often humorous account of his doings. In a letter to his mother, dated Lucknow, May 30th, 1812, he writes : ' Without saying more, allow me to introduce you to my regiment. Major Broughton commands. I like him very much. In consequence of promotion, which he expects immediately, we suppose he will be removed. As to the other officers, I can safely boast that there are none more gentlemanly or better educated, and they are the most studious set of men I have ever met with. There are among them no less than six or seven Oriental scholars, professed students, well versed in Arabic, Persian and Hindoostanee. With such examples I cannot but study in my own defence.'

Ensign Jenkins goes on to say, 'all the officers here mess together, that is they all dine together at 8 o'clock, which I think is very desirable on many accounts. First, for a subaltern officer it is the cheapest way of living. Then a Mess may be said to unite the officers more strictly than they would otherwise be, as in the hot winds people are seldom disposed to go out, so the only way of visiting is to go to dinner. Otherwise, though next door, you may not see your friend for a month. Also it in great measure prevents party divisions and party spirit in a corps. The only thing that can be said against a Mess, in my opinion, is that it sometimes leads to hard drinking. But this can never be alleged against our corps, for when there is no stranger present, wine is never drunk.' The officers of the 1/24th were evidently in advance of their times, for though Officers' Messes came into general use about 1832, they were not established officially until 1856.

As may be gathered from this young officer's remarks, the Bengal Army, during the hot weather months, was usually in a state of suspended animation. Discipline grew lax and parades were few and far between. Then, as now, however, regiments were occasionally subject to bouts of 'inspection fever'; and the prospect of a visit from the Commander-in-Chief would stir the most lethargic commanding officer into temporary activity. Under the stimulus of this prospective ordeal, there would be a general furbishing up, covering the whole field of regimental activity and consequently many additional parades. This is amusingly referred to in one of Ensign Jenkins's letters, from which a few more extracts may be quoted.

'Sir George Nugent, our Commander-in-Chief, intends paying a visit, in the cold weather, to the Upper Provinces; and so that we may cut a respectable figure when he arrives here, we have begun a course of exercise and parade. That I may be perfect in my own share of the lesson, I have just been drawing up and manœuvring ten cards on my table, as if they had been so many companies. And with "Dundas" at my elbow I have continued to put my battalion through the principal movements and never were men more steady!'

'Dundas' was the author of the drill book of that day, which summarized the whole art of handling a battalion in the instructions given for carrying out the 'Eighteen Movements' that were supposed to provide for every contingency. Our ingenuous young friend goes



on to give a lively account of the first battalion parade in which he took part. 'One morning,' he writes, 'on going round the square, when I had ordered my men to open ranks, I placed myself in front of my company, opposite the third file from the right and I should have marched on steadily till within six paces of the Colonel, when I should have saluted. Unfortunately, I was in a brown study and did not perceive my near approach to him till within five paces. I saluted—I had taken a pace too much and I was perhaps flurried on account of my mistake. Said the Colonel (he is a very mild man but has a very gruff voice) in a hollow tone which thrilled through me, "Very bad, Mr. Jenkins."

'Well, the same morning, when I had brought my men into line and dressed them, I dropped back into my place. Up comes the Colonel and glancing along the line saw, or thought he saw, a man too far forward. He accosted me directly—as I have said before, he is not given to wiggling—but using the gruff tone before described, he said, "Damned bad, Mr. Jenkins." Again, that same morning, we were firing by companies from centre to flanks. You must know that in firing from centre to flanks, the right company begins and then the left fires, and then the right and so on, alternately. Mine was the 7th and consequently a left company and the 2nd company corresponds with the 7th in respect to their place in the wings. There is always a great noise whilst firing, and sometimes the powder from the pan flashes against your cheek. It so happened that on the second round, instead of lending attention to my duty, I was rubbing my face with my hand because it smarted; and instead of letting the 2nd company fire before me, I as mishap would have it, took the lead. The Colonel, whom nothing ever escapes, cried out—I repeat he is a very mild-tempered man—but, as he had before spoken to me in the positive and comparative degrees, he was now obliged to give force to the superlative and to raise his voice to the highest key. Accordingly, raising himself gently from his saddle, holding the bridle firmly with one hand and with the other holding tight to the mane to keep himself steady, thus making with his leg and body an angle of 136 degrees, he cleared his throat as a woman does when she is going to sing, and shrieked out, "Infernal bad, Mr. Jenkins". After parade, on going up to the Colonel, as is customary, to pay our respects, he said, putting on a smiling countenance, "Mr. Jenkins, will you breakfast with me?"' This amusing anecdote shows how



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

CSL

happy were the relations existing between the Commandant of the 1/24th and his officers.

Before concluding this chapter, a few remarks may be added in regard to the organization of a Native Infantry battalion. The establishment of a battalion as given on page 6 varied from time to time, according to the military or financial requirements of the moment. As the number of British officers increased, the number of British non-commissioned officers diminished. By the beginning of the nineteenth century it was reduced to two per battalion, viz. a Sergeant-Major and a Quartermaster-Sergeant, and this establishment survived until after the Mutiny, when both appointments were abolished. The number of companies in a battalion varied from eight to ten, but the flank companies, composed of the finest sepoys, were called grenadiers. During the Mahratta War, one of the battalion companies was trained in light infantry duties ; but later this was changed, and by the time of the First Sikh War the two flank companies became the Grenadier and the Light Company respectively. Colonel Worsley tells us that ' they were the only two companies that were taught skirmishing. Officers were selected to serve in these two companies as a reward for extra smartness. A " light bob " had to be a good runner '.



CHAPTER II

FROM THE BARRACKPORE MUTINY TO THE FIRST
SIKH WAR, 1824-45

IN 1824, the double-battalion organization introduced in 1796 was abolished and the Bengal Native Infantry renumbered as single-battalion regiments. The 1st Battalion 24th N.I., then became the 47th, and the 2nd Battalion the 48th. The change was unpopular with the native ranks, for they were loth to lose a designation of which they were proud. Moreover, it entailed the transfer of British officers whom they knew and trusted and their replacement in many cases by strangers from other corps.

The reason given for the change was that the double-battalion organization had been found unsatisfactory. It had been created on the assumption that the two battalions of a regiment would generally serve together and that the Colonel, assisted by the Regimental Adjutant, would be able to exercise effective control over the whole corps, especially in such matters as promotions, leave and recruiting. In practice, however, this was rarely possible. The exigencies of the Service made it difficult to keep battalions together. They had to serve where they were wanted, and as the East India Company's dominions expanded, the tendency to separation increased, so that by 1824 battalions had little in common except the number which they shared.

If the Colonel, though nominally on the Active List, had permission to live in Europe, he could not exercise command and consequently became a mere figurehead. If on the other hand he remained in India, he tended to lessen the authority and responsibility of his battalion commanders by interfering in matters of detail which should have been left to their own discretion and initiative. As there were no railways, no telegraphs, and a slow and unreliable postal service, these references to superior authority caused unnecessary correspondence and irritating delays. A tardy recognition of the fact that this circumlocution was prejudicial to efficiency led to the issue of G.G.O. 141 of May 24th, 1824, by which each battalion became a



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

CSL

separate unit. Under the new organization the cadre of a regiment included a Colonel as before ; but as he was no longer permitted to interfere with the Lieut.-Colonel or Major in actual command, his office, except as regards pay, became to all intents and purposes an honorary one.

The cadre of the 47th was as follows :—

Colonel	J. Price.
Lieut.-Colonel	E. Cartwright.
Major	W. C. Baddeley.
Captains	E. B. Craigie.
	T. Dundas.
	W. R. Pogson.
	F. W. Friith.
	B. Blake.
Lieutenants	T. Bolton.
	A. Goldie.
	F. Jenkins.
	J. S. Winfield (Adjutant).
	H. T. Raban.
	H. C. Williams.
	N. J. Cumberlege (Interpreter and Q.M.).
	C. Troup.
	J. Macdonald.
Ensigns	T. J. Rocke.
	G. C. Armstrong.
	E. C. Macpherson.
Assistant Surgeon ..	J. E. Dempster.

In a well-known work entitled *Oriental Field Sports* by Captain Thomas Williamson, published in 1808, the author remarks : ' It is perhaps worthy of note that a very large portion of the Bengal Army, perhaps no less than a fifth or sixth part, is composed of Brahmans. It has been observed that where corps have been detached on foreign service, the Brahmans have been remarkable for desertion and indeed they have always been found to be the main though secret springs of every mutiny. Their ascendancy in regard to religious matters gives them great power over the minds of the superstitious Hindus of other castes, who would think it the worst of crimes to betray their reverend advisers. In such circumstances the reader will not be surprised at the intrigues of this crafty set.' There had been evidence of such intrigues in the case of the original 24th, during the march from



Bengal to Madras in 1781. They were now to be repeated in an aggravated form in the 1/24th of the second creation, which, under the reorganization of 1824, had recently been renumbered as the 47th.

In 1824 war broke out with Burma. The Burmese rulers of Ava had extended their conquests into Assam, Cachar, and Manipur, and they now threatened the frontier districts of Sylhet and Chittagong. In that year an incursion into British territory, the occupation of the island of Ramu on the coast of Arakan, and the destruction of the detachment of Native Infantry that formed its garrison, made it necessary to carry the war into the enemy's country. Orders were issued to the 26th, 47th and 62nd N.I., all stationed at Barrackpore, to prepare for active service in Burma. It was rumoured that Rangoon would be the main objective of the expedition, and there was no way of getting there except by sea. This report, for it was no more, was received with consternation by the sepoys of these regiments, as nothing was more dreaded by Brahmans and other high-caste Hindus than a voyage across the *Kala pani*. For apart from the hardships of sea travel on small ill-found sailing ships, the lack of space on board and the shortage of fresh water made it difficult for them to observe the rules of caste in regard to washing, cooking and eating.

Nothing spreads quicker than bazaar rumour, and in this case the suspicion and discontent which it aroused was secretly encouraged by the Subadar Major and his Brahman confederates. Protest meetings were held at night in the lines, at which a number of the men bound themselves, by the most sacred of Hindu oaths, that in no circumstances would they risk the loss of caste by going on board ship. The Subadar Major must have been well aware of these acts of indiscipline, but neither he nor any of the other Indian officers reported them to their Commanding Officer, who, having been long absent from the regiment, had little personal influence.

The Indian officers and other ranks of the 47th held that under the terms of their enlistment they were under no obligation to serve outside India. They therefore regarded the order to prepare for service in Burma as a breach of faith and an infringement of their acknowledged rights. Lord Cornwallis in 1790 had overcome the caste prejudices of Bengal sepoys in regard to service overseas by calling regiments to volunteer, either as whole corps or as individuals.



CSL

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

By offering a bonus of a month's pay, paid in advance, with free rations, the prospect of rapid promotion and the right to revert to their former corps on return to India, he had experienced no difficulty in getting as many volunteers as he wanted, and Bengal volunteer battalions served with distinction at Macao, and in Ceylon, Egypt, Mauritius and Java.

When the sepoy of the Barrackpore garrison, secretly encouraged by many of the Indian officers, had worked themselves up into a frenzy of suspicion and discontent over this grievance, it was tardily explained by the authorities that there had never been any intention of sending them anywhere by sea, and that their destination was not Rangoon but Arakan, which could be reached by land via Chittagong. This entailed a long and difficult march through a malaria-infested country covered with marsh and jungle and devoid of roads, in which the food to which the men of Oudh and Bihar were accustomed, viz. *atta*, *dhal* and *ghi*, was unprocurable, as the local inhabitants were mostly rice-eaters. There had been operations in Assam in the previous year in which the casualties from sickness had been appalling. Moreover, the superstitious sepoys credited the Burmans with magical powers and it was said that they tortured their prisoners. These considerations made the forthcoming campaign extremely unpopular and there is no doubt that the three regiments concerned were on the look-out for any pretext that would relieve them of a duty which they regarded with apprehension and dislike. This excuse was provided by the Government of India itself, through blundering and mismanagement at Army Headquarters.

The pay of a sepoy in cantonments was in those days only seven rupees a month, to which one rupee eight annas *batta* was added when on the march or on active service. Out of this scanty allowance he had to provide his own transport—no light matter when every man was allowed to take with him on service his own set of brass cooking utensils. The Indian officers represented that it was impossible for the regiment to hire or purchase transport, even at prohibitive rates, as the Government had already commandeered all the carts and bullocks available. An appeal for financial assistance was made to the Quartermaster-General, but the men were told that they were under engagement to provide their own transport and that they could not be relieved of this obligation. A further grievance arose from the fact that in order to induce them to serve, followers of the menial



class, such as bullock drivers, dooli bearers, *bhistis* and sweepers, were being paid at a higher rate than the sepoys.

Colonel Cartwright dealt with the situation rather weakly, but to overcome the transport difficulty he offered to advance the money required for the purchase of baggage animals. Hearing of this, the Government gave orders for the issue of the required funds. Unfortunately, owing to the dilatoriness of the authorities in dealing with the matter, the remedy was applied too late. When the 47th, which was to be the first to march, was ordered to parade in full marching order, the men fell in without their knapsacks, alleging that they were worn out. When informed that new ones, for which they were already under stoppages, were on their way, the sepoys shouted that they would not go to Rangoon or anywhere else by sea, and that they would not go to Arakan by land unless they received double marching *batta*. This mutinous declaration made the situation intolerable, for no Government can maintain its authority if it allows itself to be dictated to by the troops in its service.

At this stage, Major-General Dalzell, commanding the Presidency Brigade, intervened. He ordered the 47th to parade at daybreak on October 30th, the day the regiment was due to march. On this parade all semblance of order was lost, except in one company commanded by an officer who had been long with the regiment and was popular with his men. The trouble was spreading to the 62nd and 26th, and unless it was promptly checked it seemed probable that all three regiments would openly defy the authorities. Realizing how serious was the situation, Major-General Dalzell reported it to Sir Edward Paget, the Commander-in-Chief, then in Calcutta.

Paget acted promptly. He at once marched to Barrackpore with the Governor-General's Bodyguard, a field battery of the Bengal Artillery, the 1st Royal Scots and the 47th Foot. The troops took up a position ready to act against the mutineers. The 47th N.I., which had been joined by about 200 of the 62nd and twenty of the 26th, was ordered to fall in. The Adjutant-General then read out the Commander-in-Chief's reply to a petition which the men had submitted in which they asked to be discharged and allowed to return to their homes. This request was refused and they were warned of the consequences that would follow if they failed to obey the command that was about to be given.



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

CSL

The regiment was ordered to 'ground arms', but with the exception of one man, all remained at the 'order', in a state of stupid desperation, resolved not to yield, but making no preparations to resist. Thereupon, at a preconcerted signal, the artillery opened fire on them with grape. Many were killed and the rest were instantly dispersed and pursued by the Bodyguard. A General Court Martial was immediately assembled, and a dozen of the ringleaders were sentenced to death and hanged. Hundreds of others were rounded up, tried and condemned, but the death-sentence in their case was commuted to imprisonment with hard labour for life. Four months later the survivors received a free pardon, the Government of India having apparently recognized that, through the bungling of its officials, it was, in truth, partly responsible for this deplorable affair, which was not very erroneously described as 'an ebullition of despair on the part of the sepoys at being ordered to march without the means of doing so'.

Though they had taken no open part in the mutiny, the Indian officers and non-commissioned officers of the 47th N.I. were clearly aware of the mischief that was afoot, and there is no doubt that they secretly aided and abetted it. This was realized by the military authorities, and as a punishment for their gross neglect of duty, which had brought about the disgrace and destruction of their regiment and the removal of its number from the Army List, all were summarily dismissed, forfeiting any pension they might have earned. The General Order directing this may be quoted, as it asserts a principle which should hold good for all time.

'To the Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Bengal Army the Governor-General in Council now more particularly desires to address himself. He is perfectly satisfied that no instance of insubordination can take place in a corps without such coming to their early knowledge. He hereby demands from them a rigid execution of their duty, and observes that even on the rumour of any discontent in a corps, it is their particular duty to communicate it instantly to their European Officers, and to exert their utmost endeavours to put down in the first instance any appearance of combination. His Lordship in Council further desires it to be distinctly understood that in failure of that line of conduct which is expected from the Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Army, they will be held personally and collectively



responsible for any behaviour of the men, who are more immediately under their eye and command in the lines than they can be under that of the European Officers, and that the most prompt dismissal from the Service will be the inevitable consequence of any want of exertion and zeal. In short, he warns them to profit by the example of the 47th, who have drawn down upon themselves a punishment they most justly merited. The Governor-General in Council, in order to make known the sentiments of Government to the Native Army as fully and correctly as possible, is pleased to direct that this Order shall be translated into the Hindustani language and printed in the Nagari character for the purpose of transmission to the corps respectively, through the Adjutant-General of the Army, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, who will be pleased to issue such subsidiary orders as may be necessary, drafting the privates of the late 47th, whose fidelity may be unshaken, into such regiments as may be expedient.'

The incident created a considerable stir in England as well as in India, and Sir Edward Paget was severely criticized for his alleged severity. The matter was raised in Parliament, but the Commander-in-Chief was stoutly upheld by the Duke of Wellington, who maintained that his prompt and resolute action alone averted a serious catastrophe, and this opinion was shared by most officers with Indian experience. The blame, if any, lay primarily with Army Headquarters, which failed to take steps to remedy a genuine grievance until matters had gone too far. The Indian officers were, of course, gravely at fault, and it was said at the time that the trouble was partly due to the undue influence exercised by the Subadar Major over his Commanding Officer. Both Colonel Cartwright and his Adjutant were new to the regiment, about half of the other officers were recent transfers, and none took any action to nip the rising in the bud, presumably owing to their ignorance of what was going on. It is significant that the men who remained faithful to their salt belonged to a company commanded by one of the few officers who had been with the battalion for a considerable period.

On November 10th, 1824, orders for the raising of a battalion to replace the 47th were issued as follows :—' The 69th Regiment of Native Infantry is to be raised and disciplined at Benares, to which station the officers of the late 47th Regiment, now posted to the 69th Regiment, are, with the exception of Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright,



who is posted to the 2nd European Regiment, to proceed without delay. Lieut.-Colonel J. W. Blackney of the 35th Regiment of Native Infantry is removed to the 69th Regiment and directed to proceed to Benares with all practicable expedition and commence the formation of the Regiment, and in order to give it the advantage of a portion of old soldiers, twenty-five men per company will be drafted from the undermentioned Corps, in addition to a complete complement of Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers. . . . The facings of the regiment to be yellow, and the lace silver.'

In order to remove all doubt as to the terms of enlistment and avoid catastrophes such as that which had occurred at Barrackpore, the 69th was expressly raised for General Service. In G.O. No. 69 of March 25th, 1825, a list of 'General Service' corps, which included the 69th, was published, and it was laid down that these regiments should be 'designated as such, or Volunteers'. During the next three years the regiment suffered from an epidemic of changes in its Commandants. Lieut.-Colonel R. Hampton succeeded Lieut.-Colonel Blackney in 1826, and was in turn succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel C. Bowyer, C.B., in 1827, Lieut.-Colonel W. H. Wood in 1829, and Lieut.-Colonel E. F. Waters, C.B., in 1831.¹

In 1825, the regiment learnt with regret of the death of Sir David Ochterlony, the most distinguished officer in the early history of the 24th N.I. Sir David served as a subaltern with the old 24th in the Mysore Campaign of 1781-5, and was taken prisoner by the French in the action at Cuddalore on June 25th, 1783. He fought under Lake in the Doab and at Aligarh, and was appointed British Resident at the Court of Delhi. In 1804, together with Colonel Burn, another old officer of the 24th, in face of overwhelming odds, he defended Delhi against Holkar. He was made a G.C.B. and a Baronet for his services in the Nepal Campaign of 1814-16, where, after a series of disasters to other columns, he defeated the Gurkhas and forced them to sign the treaty of Segowli. After this he became Resident in Malwa and Rajputana, and it is commonly said that his death was hastened by mortification at the Government's vacillating conduct in dealing with the refractory state of Bhurtpore. After his

¹ The *Digest of Services* states that in the year 1828 Lieut.-Colonels Heathcote, Boyd, Swinton and Major Hay commanded the regiment successively. This does not agree with the published Army Lists, so they can only have officiated for very short periods.



decease, his countrymen erected an imposing obelisk in his honour on the Calcutta Maidan.

In 1828, in recognition of the exemplary conduct of the 69th ever since it was raised, the last memories of the unhappy incident at Barrackpore were expunged in a General Order, dated June 13th and running as follows :—

‘ At the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, to whom opportunities have been afforded of addressing the Government in terms of marked approbation regarding the discipline and good conduct of the 69th Regiment, Native Infantry, the Honorable the Governor-General in Council has much satisfaction in restoring to the Army List the number “ 47 ”, which is henceforth to be borne by the above Corps. This new designation will place the 47th Regiment, Native Infantry, in that portion in the numerical order of the Regiments which its change of number entitles it to assume.’

In September 1828, the 47th Volunteers, as the regiment was now designated, was ordered from Barrackpore to Arakan for garrison duty as soon as tonnage could be provided, and on January 27th, 1829, it landed at Kyouk Phyoo, where it remained until it was transferred to Cuttack on the Madras coast on March 15th, 1831. Here it was engaged in some minor operations ; a rising at Bahman Ghati was put down with the loss of one havildar and one follower, and the regiment formed part of a detachment sent against the refractory Raja of Dhenkanal. No opposition was offered and the regiment returned with the Rani, her three children and much booty.

The next ten years were uneventful, being spent in cantonments at Sikrora and Pertabgarh in Oudh, Agra, Lucknow, Barrackpore and other stations. The officers who commanded the regiment during this period were Lieut.-Colonels C. W. Brooke, G. Hunter, C.B., and C. R. Skardon. The latter was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Pogson. Much interesting information about regimental life at this period may be gathered from the memoirs of Lieutenant (afterwards Major-General) J. R. Pughe, who joined the 47th at Barrackpore in January 1840. The Commanding Officer from 1841 to 1843 was Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Pogson. He joined the regiment in 1806, and weighed twenty stone. He was of enormous girth, and according to one story, his orderly and two men once buckled themselves into his belt and, being unable to extricate

themselves, were caught in this predicament. His charger was the size of a dray-horse. His unwieldy size militated against his efficiency as a commanding officer ; but in his younger days he had been a fine soldier, and as D.A.A.G. of the 1st Division had been present at the siege of Bhurtpore in 1825. He was a good Oriental scholar and a member of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. He travelled extensively in Bundelkhand, and published a *History of the Bundelas*.

Military discipline, which had rapidly deteriorated since 1805, continued to be slack, and this was attributed to the restriction of the authority of commanding officers by encouraging appeals to Army Headquarters, and to the fact that in 1833 flogging had been abolished in the Indian Army by the Governor-General, Lord Bentinck, while it was retained as a punishment for their European comrades. *Fauj be dar hogya*, 'The Army has ceased to fear', remarked an old subadar who had served under Lake and Ochterlony. The British officers usually led idle lives, the more industrious devoting their time to the study of Oriental languages, as herein lay the key to lucrative political and civil posts in the Company's recently-acquired possessions. Officers in civil employ, who were all unseconded, were recalled to the colours when the regiment went on active service, and it was usually found that they had forgotten their drill and lost touch with the men, often with disastrous results. Brigade manœuvres were unheard of.

The training was left entirely to the Adjutant and the European Sergeant-Major ; there was very little musketry, as the troops were armed with the smooth-bore flintlock, which was quite unreliable at ranges of over fifty yards. Ten rounds per annum were fired at canvas targets at ranges up to one hundred yards, but this was generally regarded as a farce. Promotion was entirely by seniority, and many of the officers, British and Indian, were far too old for their work. The social life of the regiment centred in the Mess which had been started in 1812. The Band was formed in 1836. Many of its members were Eurasians who, on account of their European descent, drew good-conduct pay at the same rates as British soldiers.

The uniform of the men consisted of a red cloth coatee with yellow facings, black cloth pantaloons which replaced the *jangias* or short drawers of an earlier period, white crossbelts and a single pouch. Up to 1839 havildars carried swords and pikes, but after that date they were replaced by fusils. The most unserviceable part of the



uniform was the head-dress. It consisted of a shako made of cane, in shape not unlike a flower-pot, about a foot high, covered with blue cloth edged with white tape and bearing in the middle a brass star on which was the number '47'. Men of the Grenadier Company bore in addition a grenade, and those of Light Company a bugle. As chin-straps were not allowed, the shako was liable to blow off in a high wind or to fall off when moving at the double. It afforded no protection from the sun, and, together with the abominable tight leather stock, was responsible for numerous casualties from sunstroke on parade. On the march or in wet weather it was encased in a black oilskin cover. About the period of the Sikh War, it was replaced by the unsightly Kilmarnock cap, with its white wadded linen cover supplemented on occasions by a curtain at the back. The sepoys liked it, but it was very unpopular with the British ranks, and an old Peninsula officer was heard to exclaim, 'Dammit, sir, I would as soon go on parade with a washing basin on my head!' Officers, however, continued to wear the shako in full dress for about twenty-five years after it had been abandoned by the men, together with white overalls, a red cloth coatee which in the 47th had specially long tails, yellow facings, silver epaulets and lace, and a black stock two inches deep. For undress they had a neat blue forage cap with a black mohair band of oak-leaf design, and the regimental number in the centre, and a single-breasted blue frock coat with silver wings. Officers never appeared in public out of uniform, and always wore swords. Shell jackets of red cloth were just coming into use. These became the mess-jackets of a later period.

One of the duties of the regiments at Barrackpore was to furnish the guards for Fort William. This entitled the officer on duty to a special allowance, and there was little to do except visiting the sentries and turning out the guard. Lord Auckland, who was Governor-General when Pughe arrived, was very popular, mainly on account of his two charming sisters, the Misses Eden, both writers and artists of great talent, who kept open house for the young officers. His predecessor, Lord William Bentinck, on the other hand, had been greatly disliked, mainly because, under orders from the India House, he had curtailed the *half batta* or cantonment allowance of military officers serving at places in the Lower Provinces such as Barrackpore, Berhampore and Dinapore. In consequence of this, an Ensign had only 180 and a Lieutenant 230 rupees a month on which to house,



CSL

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

clothe and feed himself. As a result, the Governor-General was boycotted by the Army ; officers refused all hospitality at Government House, and cut him dead when they met him.

In November 1840, the regiment was again ordered to Kyouk Phyoo, the port of Arakan, to reinforce the 68th, which was stationed there. The voyage took three weeks. It was a dreary and desolate spot, and hated by the sepoys on account of its unhealthiness. The bungalows were built on piles and looked like haystacks ; in the monsoon, the water could be heard swirling under the floors. Supplies were brought once a month from Calcutta, and if the ship were long delayed, matters became serious, though there was an abundance of fish. The mail, on the other hand, was brought daily from Chittagong by Arakanese boatmen. Once it was five days late, and it was discovered that the boatmen had stopped *en route* to feed on a dead elephant ! There was splendid shooting, fishing, boating and surf-bathing, but the latter pastime came to an abrupt end when an officer of the 68th was killed by a shark in the presence of his comrades.

One result of the monotony of life at Kyouk Phyoo was incessant quarrels, which sometimes ended in a duel. Duelling, Lieutenant Pughe tells us, was very common until an order was received that officers giving or accepting challenges would be court-martialled and cashiered. Pughe gives an account of a moonlight duel between two officers of the 47th, and the General's comments on the incident are interesting. He raises no objection to the duel itself, but merely points out that action in such cases should never be precipitate ; the seconds should see that time was given for an explanation or apology before the meeting took place. In this particular instance, probably both the principals were the worse for liquor.

The regiment returned to Barrackpore at the end of May 1842, and had an unpleasant voyage owing to the bursting of the monsoon. Lieutenant Pughe notes that during the rainy season parades were held only once a week, and the officers spent most of their time in the swimming bath. Soon after this the regiment was transferred to Benares, and before leaving, the occasion was celebrated by a grand ball, to which everyone in Barrackpore and Dum Dum was invited. At Benares, on August 6th, 1843, Colonel Pogson died. He was buried under a group of trees on the parade ground, in a spot chosen by himself, within sound of the regimental bugles. As this was unconsecrated ground, the burial service was taken by the Adjutant,



FROM BARRACKPORE MUTINY TO FIRST SIKH WAR

Lieutenant Renny. A handsome marble tomb, in the shape of a Greek temple,¹ was erected over his grave by his brother officers, bearing the following inscription :—

SACRED TO THE MEMORY OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL
WREDENHALL ROBERT POGSON OF THE 47TH N.I.
BORN ON THE 1ST JULY, 1787, DIED ON THE 6TH AUGUST,
1843, AGED 56 YEARS, ONE MONTH AND SIX DAYS. THIS
MEMORIAL IS ERECTED BY THE OFFICERS OF THE 47TH
AND HIS FRIENDS AND FAMILY, AS A TOKEN OF RESPECT
TO HIS MEMORY.

For many years it was the custom of the pensioners of the regiment to light *chiraghs* or fairy lamps at his tomb on the anniversary of his death. His son, J. F. Pogson, had joined the 47th three years previously and was afterwards severely wounded in the arm at Moodkee. In 1851 he retired to Simla, where he was put on the Invalid Establishment, and took a great interest in Indian agriculture till his death at Kotgarh in 1890.

Colonel Pogson was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel Richard Home, C.B., who commanded until 1844, when he was replaced by Lieut.-Colonel John Graham. Colonel Graham² after a few months was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel George Hicks. In 1844 the regiment proceeded by road to join the Army of the Sutlej at Ambala, a distance of 600 miles. Lieutenant Pughe gives an interesting account of a march in the days before the opening of the railways. Officers' families travelled in a contrivance known as a *palki gharry*, a palanquin on wheels, drawn by ponies, which moved at the average rate of three and a half miles an hour. When the road became too rough for wheeled traffic, or a river was reached, the *palki* was taken off its wheels and carried on the bearers' shoulders. In hot weather the stages between one dak bungalow and the other were covered by night : the children slept on a shelf on the side of the *palki*, and when a bump came, they would come bounding down on top of their parents !

Ambala was a new cantonment, and the ground allotted to the regiment was little more than a ploughed field. However, most of the officers, except the Commandant and the Adjutant, managed to get leave to Simla, the hill station recently acquired from the Gurkhas,

¹ It still exists and is in very good order.

² There is some doubt as to whether he joined.



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

and there they stayed until things in cantonments had settled down. In the absence of accommodation which they could purchase or rent, officers in those days had to build their own bungalows. The Indian ranks had also to provide their own accommodation ; so unless there were Lines for them to occupy, they had to build new ones. Government provided the guard room, magazine, quartermaster's stores and the bells of arms or armouries, but all other buildings had to be constructed by the sepoys themselves.



CHAPTER III

THE FIRST SIKH WAR, 1845-7

IN 1845, the Bengal Army was called upon to face a severe ordeal. The Sikhs, once an obscure religious sect, had gradually become the dominating power in the Punjab, and the Maharaja Ranjur Singh had called in a number of distinguished European soldiers of fortune¹ to drill them, until he had the finest Native Army in the country. He had, moreover, a passion for artillery, and his guns, both in range and weight of metal, outclassed those of the British. The Army of the Khalsa, as it was called, consisted of 200,000 men and 200 guns, and in addition there were the undisciplined but still formidable irregular cavalry forces of the feudal chiefs. But Ranjit Singh was a shrewd judge of men. He had no wish to try conclusions with the Government which had overthrown Tipu Sultan and crushed the Mahrattas, and he agreed that the Sutlej should be the boundary between his own State and the dominions of the East India Company.

After the death of the Maharaja in 1839, however, relations began to deteriorate. Anarchy reigned in the Punjab, and the Sikhs became more and more aggressive. The British Government, in its desire for peace, had withdrawn from the frontier, leaving two isolated posts at Ferozepore and Ludhiana, on the banks of the Sutlej, with weak garrisons. The main army under Sir Hugh Gough was at Ambala, 150 miles from Ferozepore, and numbered about 10,000 men, while another 9,000 were at Meerut, 120 miles south-east of Ambala. Communications were bad and transport deficient; the troops had not been brigaded and knew little of their comrades and commanders. On the other hand, Lahore, the Sikh base, was only fifty miles from Ferozepore, and Major G. Broadfoot, our Resident there, estimated the strength of the Army of the Khalsa mustered there at 40,000 and 200 guns.

In January 1845, Gough thought matters so serious that he persuaded the Governor-General, Sir Henry Hardinge, to take some

¹ Among the best known of these were Generals Ventura and Allard who had served under Napoleon, and the ferocious Neapolitan Avitabile. The excellence of the Sikh artillery was due to them and to the Irish artillery officer, Gardner.



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

precautions. Major-General Sir John Littler was sent to take charge at Ferozepore, and the garrison of that place was brought up to 7,000 men, including a European regiment. The 'Army of the Sutlej', assembled at Ambala, consisted of four Divisions as follows :—

Cavalry Division : Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K.C.B.
1st Infantry Division : Major-General Sir Harry Smith, K.C.B.
2nd Infantry Division : Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, K.C.B.
3rd Infantry Division : Major-General Sir John McCaskill, K.C.B.

The 47th, which had arrived at Ambala in the previous April, had the following cadre of officers :—

<i>Colonel</i>	W. H. Perkins (on furlough).
<i>Lieut.-Colonel</i>	George Hicks (Commandant).
<i>Major</i>	A. Goldie (in civil employ).
<i>Captains</i>	F. Jenkins (in civil employ).
	G. C. Armstrong (attached Ramgarh L.I.).
	C. Boulton (on furlough).
	C. Corfield.
	D. Pott.
	J. T. Daniell (in civil employ).
	W. C. Hollings (attached 63rd L.I.).
<i>Lieutenants</i>	A. G. Reid (Interpreter and Quartermaster ; on leave).
	R. Renny ¹ (Adjutant).
	A. H. C. Sewell (in civil employ).
	J. Dick-Lauder (on furlough).
	R. Campbell (attached 2nd Assam L.I.).
	W. C. Watson (on leave).
	J. F. Pogson.
	J. R. Pughe (Interpreter—Acting).
<i>Ensigns</i>	G. McAndrew (on leave).
	J. P. W. Campbell.
	C. P. Lucas.
	W. H. Walcot (on leave).
	<i>Staff</i>
<i>Adjutant</i>	R. Renny.
<i>Quartermaster</i>	A. G. Reid (on leave).
	J. F. Pogson (Acting).
<i>Surgeon</i>	C. B. Francis.

The Commanding Officer, Colonel George Hicks, who had recently taken over command, is described by Lieutenant Pughe as

¹ Lieutenant Renny left the 47th after the Sikh War, and subsequently joined the 3rd Sikhs (Renny-ki-paltan) which he commanded with distinction.



a rollicking, good-natured man, with very little knowledge of his profession. On one occasion, when he took a parade, he shouted out an order, whereupon the Adjutant, Lieutenant Renny, saluting, said in a low voice : ' Sir, that cannot be done.' ' Oh yes, it can,' said the Colonel, ' it's in my drill book.' ' Then, sir,' replied the Adjutant, ' yours must be a different edition to mine.' Having got the battalion into a state of wild confusion, he would call out, ' Lieutenant Renny, be good enough to march the regiment to the lines,' as though all had been carried out perfectly. It would take Renny a long time to sort out the companies before doing so. Colonel Hicks passed on all correspondence to Lieutenant Pughe, who was the acting Interpreter, to answer as best he could. When he saw the draft reply, he would say, ' Lieutenant Pughe, you have carried out my orders exactly as I wished,' which was strange, as he never gave any orders ! However, he never worried his officers and was immensely popular, and he proved to be a gallant and capable leader in the field.

The 47th belonged to the First Brigade of the 1st (Smith's) Division, which was composed as follows :—

First Brigade (Bolton) : H.M. 3rd,¹ 24th N.I. and 47th N.I.

Second Brigade (Wheeler) : H.M. 50th,² 42nd N.I. and 48th N.I.

On December 11th arrived the long-expected news that the Sikhs had begun to cross the Sutlej. They were in two groups. The first, under Tej Singh, was to contain Littler ; the second, under Lal Singh, was to mop up the Ludhiana garrison, and then delay the advance of the force from Ambala until Littler had been disposed of and the two Sikh armies could join hands. Gough saw that his best chance of success lay in advancing with such rapidity as to forestall this plan of action. He ordered the cavalry forward at once, while he followed with the infantry by forced marches. The task was no light one. The country was dry and dusty, with wells and villages at rare intervals. The roads were mere tracks, unfit for wheeled traffic and only suitable for camels. The dust was blinding, and patches of sand made marching slow and difficult. The troops were often a whole day without food or water, and as often as not, when rations were issued, they could not be cooked, as the utensils had not turned up.

Yet they pushed on, undeterred by hunger, thirst, heat and cold,

¹ Now 1st Battalion, The East Surrey Regiment.

² Now 1st Battalion, The Royal West Kent Regiment.


HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

camping by night in the open without blankets. They covered 150 miles in seven days, including two forced marches of thirty miles each. On December 17th, they joined hands with the Ludhiana garrison at a place called Badhni, and this brought Gough's total strength up to 12,000 men. The cavalry was now in contact with the enemy's patrols, and the next day they came in sight of the little mud-walled village of Moodkee, standing in a jungle-clad plain, and only twenty miles from Ferozepore. When the head of the column reached Moodkee at midday, there were only about fifty men with the colours, and the stragglers stretched for miles to the rear. Gradually they closed up, and the troops, footsore and weary, staggered into Moodkee and stripped off their accoutrements and began to cook their food. Scarcely had they settled down, when Prince Waldemar of Prussia, A.D.C. to the Governor-General, galloped up to the 47th, shouting, 'Stand to your arms, gentlemen! The enemy is close upon you!' This was about 4 p.m., and there was a scuffle as the men got into their accoutrements, seized their arms and fell in.¹

A dense cloud of dust on the horizon announced the approach of the Sikhs, and the army was drawn up for action, the cavalry and guns forming the first line and the infantry the second. Sir Harry Smith's Division was on the right, Gilbert's in the centre and McCaskill's on the left. The order of battle of Smith's Division was Wheeler's Brigade (H.M. 50th, 42nd, 48th) on the right, and Bolton's Brigade (H.M. 31st and 47th) on the left; the 24th, which belonged to this brigade, was detached and acting as baggage guard. Thus the 47th was on the left flank of the 1st Division.

The Sikhs, estimated at 10,000 horse, 3,000 foot and 22 guns, were about three miles away when the alarm was given, and when they came into sight of the British, they took post in a deep belt of jungle and stunted trees. Between the opposing forces was about a mile of ploughed fields. Gough, whose Irish blood always rose to boiling point as soon as he sighted the enemy, at once ordered his horse batteries to gallop up to the edge of the jungle and open fire. An artillery duel ensued, which went on for about an hour, after which the enemy's guns were temporarily silenced. Meanwhile, a fierce cavalry engagement was in progress on both flanks, which resulted in the retreat of the masses of Sikh horsemen, who were hovering about there, ready to charge.

¹ It is said that many went into action clad in their *dhotis*.



By courtesy of Darbishire & Stanford, Ltd.

The Oxford Geographical Institute.

BATTLE OF MOODKEE, DECEMBER 18th, 1845

References

- | | |
|-------------------------------|---|
| A Brigadier M. White. | E Major-General W. R. Gilbert. |
| B Brigadier J. B. Gough. | F Major-General Sir John McCaskill. |
| C Brigadier W. Mactier. | G The British Cavalry turning the enemy's flanks. |
| D Major-General Sir H. Smith. | H The Sikh Army in full flight. |



CSL

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

It was now the infantry's turn, and they advanced in echelon of brigades from the right. It was the end of a brief winter's day, and with fixed bayonets the men pushed on, seeing nothing of their objective in the dense smoke and dust and the deepening twilight. In front was a mass of jungle, from which appeared from time to time a burst of white smoke and a flash as a gun opened fire. As the 47th came up to a battery of the B.H.A. unhorsed by the Sikh fire, an officer of the 47th shouted, 'Where are the enemy, Sergeant?' 'You'll soon find out, sir,' replied the sergeant. Just at that moment a gun opened on them from the jungle, sending a shower of grapeshot whistling through the ranks. 'I think you've got them all right, sir,' the sergeant called after them. The troops now entered the line of trees, and soon all semblance of order was lost in the growing darkness. Regiments even fired into one another. Brigadier Bolton, leading the 47th and 31st, adjured his men to fire low and be steady, until he fell mortally wounded. The Colonel of the 31st died at the head of his men. Sir Harry Smith himself decided the combat by riding into the midst of the enemy holding aloft the colours of the 50th. Then the Sikhs gave way. 'The whole force', says the official dispatch, 'was driven from position after position with great slaughter and the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery,' some of heavy calibre. Our infantry used that never-failing weapon, the bayonet, whenever the enemy stood. Night only saved him from worse disaster, for this stout conflict was maintained during an hour and a half of dim starlight amid a cloud of dust from a sandy plain which yet more obscured every object.'

It was 2 a.m. before the victorious troops, utterly exhausted, were withdrawn from the wood to their encampment at Moodkee. The casualties were greatly increased by prowling Sikh marauders who barbarously cut up the wounded during the night. The total losses were 215 killed and 657 wounded. Of these, the casualties of the 47th were six killed, and Lieutenant J. F. Pogson and eight men wounded. Brigadier Bolton being killed, Colonel Hicks took command of the Brigade, and the command of the 47th devolved on Captain Pott. The next day, the troops stood to arms, expecting a fresh attack, while the dead were buried and the wounded brought in. The sufferings of the latter were terrible, as the field hospital

¹ One of these guns was captured by Jemadar Chand Khan of the 47th, who was awarded the Indian Order of Merit for gallant conduct.



arrangements were not complete and they were without proper shelter or food. It is said that the only 'hospital comforts' available were rice-water and coarse wheaten cakes prepared for the elephants !

So ended the first battle of the war. Gough has been criticized for attacking late in the day with tired and hungry troops. But he was probably right. 'When you see an Asiatic Army, go for it', was the motto of the Great Duke. He knew that the Bengal Army, to use a vulgar phrase, had 'got its tail down' ever since the Afghan disaster of 1842, and the Hindustani sepoys dreaded an encounter with the Sikhs. It was necessary at the very outset of the campaign to restore their self-confidence and dispel the myth about the enemy's superiority. In war, the ratio of the moral to the physical is three to one, and nowhere was this better exemplified than at Moodkee.

From December 19th to 21st the troops were resting, and Sir Hugh Gough received welcome reinforcements. But the position was still precarious. Littler's force, invested by Tej Singh, lay at Ferozepore, twenty miles away, while the Sikh Army under Lal Singh, beaten at Moodkee, had retreated to the village of Ferozeshah, about half way between the two and commanding the main road. Gough sent a message to Littler, telling him to slip away and join him ; meanwhile, he would attack the Sikhs at Ferozeshah.


Gough's army moved out of Moodkee in the greatest secrecy at 4 a.m. on December 21st. Heavy baggage and greatcoats were left in camp, and the men marched in their white covered Kilmarnock caps, red coats and black trousers, with two days' cooked rations in their haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ball ammunition in their pouches. Their weapons were the triangular bayonet and the converted 'Brown Bess' which since 1842 was fired by percussion caps instead of flint-locks. The army was within deploying distance at 10.30 a.m., and it was found that the Sikhs occupied a position shaped like a horseshoe, with the village of Ferozeshah in the middle. It was of great strength, owing to deep nullahs and dense jungle, and had been further strengthened with abattis of cut branches and entrenchments, and heavy guns mounted at regular intervals. December 21st is the shortest day in the year, and Gough wisely decided to strike at once, without waiting for Littler. Unfortunately, a hitch occurred at this moment. Sir Henry Hardinge, in his capacity as Governor-General, suddenly imposed an absolute veto on the attack,

and insisted that Gough should first join hands with the army from Ferozepore. This junction was eventually effected at a little place called Misreewalla, about 3,000 yards from the enemy's position, at about 3 p.m. But by this time, the troops had been manœuvring for fourteen hours in the hot sun, with no water and only the food in their haversacks, and there were only two hours of daylight left. The sepoys, who had less stamina than their European comrades, were utterly exhausted and had little spirit for the fight.

The four Divisions, commanded by Littler, Wallace and Gilbert, with Smith in close support, were deployed at 4 p.m., and the troops lay down while the artillery opened a fierce duel. But the Sikh guns were heavier and outranged our own, and finally Littler, who was in charge of the left attack, ordered his troops to press forward. They were repulsed with loss, and there were loud shouts of triumph as the news spread along the enemy's line. The other two Divisions were heavily engaged, and at about 5 p.m. Sir Harry Smith was ordered to advance. His left Brigade was commanded by Brigadier Ryan, and his right (H.M. 31st, 24th and 47th N.I.) by Brigadier Hicks of the 47th. The troops struggled through a gap in the line, led by Sir Harry in person, who called to his men, 'Into them, my lads! The day is your own!'

Soon they were right among the jungle and broken branches which barred their path, and the smoke of the guns made it as dark as night. 'I continued to advance', Smith says in his dispatch, 'in line in perfect order until impeded by the enemy's tents, when the whole broke, and in a mass of undaunted British soldiers rushed forward pell mell, bearing everything before them, until we reached the mud-walled village of Ferozeshah, where the enemy attempted to rally and compelled me to collect my troops. I speedily seized this village, filled with infantry, cavalry and horses richly caparisoned. Many of the enemy were slain and many surrendered themselves prisoners. . . .

'It was now dark, and I ordered everyone to halt and to form, but such was the excitement and exultation of the moment, that it was totally impossible to establish anything bordering on regularity. As this excitement subsided, I endeavoured with some success to collect the troops and form in line in a semi-circle around the front of the village. I could hear nothing but the shouts of the enemy and his drums, especially of his cavalry, and it became evident that the



By courtesy of Darbishire & Stanford, Ltd.

The Oxford Geographical Institute.

BATTLE OF FI ROZESH AH, DECEMBER 21ST AND 22ND, 1845

British

AA British Army formed for Attack, Dec. 21st.

BB Bivouac of 2nd Division with Details on morning of 22nd.

C Sir H. Smith with 2nd Brigade of Reserve, up to 3 a.m. on morning of 22nd.

DD British position after capture of enemy's camp on 22nd.

EE Final position of British troops on 22nd.

FF Cavalry movement against enemy's final movement.

Sikhs

XX Enemy's position on Dec. 21st.

YY First attack of enemy, Mid-day 22nd.

ZZ Final movement of enemy on 22nd.



success I anticipated on my right and left had not been pushed forward so as to afford any support. The scattered troops with me amounted to 2,000 or 3,000 men of different regiments besides the 2nd Brigade. I occupied an isolated position in the very centre of the Sikh Army. . . .

‘ Scarcely had I succeeded in a formation in front of Ferozeshah, when rather a sharp attack was made on my right, and that part of my position shamefully abandoned—the enemy fortunately was prevented in the darkness from pushing the advantage gained, or all would have been lost. I contracted my position, and re-occupied my right. The enemy continued to approach on all sides, and kept up a continuous fire of cannon, camel-pieces and musketry, most destructive in its effect. My position was critical, my communications cut off. I had no intimation of the position of the army whatever, and only vague hope of reinforcements. The enemy brought up a gun to bear on my immediate rear, from which he kept up a continual fire of grape—he was firing and shouting and beating the French *Pas de Charge* all round us. . . .

‘ Having therefore maintained this isolated post until between 2 and 3 o’clock in the morning, and having occupied the attention of the enemy all night . . . in perfect silence I commenced my march, which the enemy from the noise of his own fire did not discover . . . and I continued in the same direction until large bivouac fires guided me to a brigade of cavalry, re-established my communication with Headquarters, and received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to move up rapidly in support of the attack about to commence on that part of the enemy’s position from which he had been dislodged on the previous evening.’

That night of anxiety lived long in the memories of all who experienced it. No one knew what would happen on the following day, should Tej Singh come from Ferozepore to the help of his comrades. The fate of India hung in the balance, and the Governor-General sent back his confidential papers to Delhi. Yet it was not without its humours. Lieutenant Pughe tells us that an old captain of the 47th created much amusement by observing loudly that ‘ If any young man stated that he liked this kind of thing, he didn’t believe him ’, whereupon the European soldiers of the 31st, cold and hungry though they were, burst into roars of laughter. At dawn, as the men were falling in, young Hardinge, the Governor-General’s



A.D.C.,¹ rode up to an Irishman named Lucas, who was commanding the leading company of the 47th, and asked, 'Will your men fight?' 'You damned young fool,' replied Lucas, 'what else do you suppose they are here for?' Shortly after dawn, after a concentrated fire from the whole of the British batteries, the troops charged the position with the bayonet, dislodging the Sikhs and driving them completely out of the village. The troops then halted and re-formed, and as Sir Hugh Gough, with the Governor-General at his side, rode down the line, they were received with a tremendous burst of cheering. All danger now seemed over, when suddenly a cloud of dust heralded the approach of Tej Singh from Ferozepore. Discovering that Littler had outwitted him, Tej Singh, fortunately too late to be of any assistance, arrived on the scene. The weary troops lined the defences and prepared to be attacked; but for some reason, never satisfactorily explained, the Sikhs withdrew after a heavy cannonade. The losses of the 47th at Ferozeshah were nine killed, twenty-six wounded and thirty-five missing. The total British casualties were 103 officers and 694 other ranks, and of the Sikhs about 8,000 men and seventy-three guns. Christmas Day was spent quietly in camp, and Lieutenant Pughe notes that, thanks to a clever *Khansama*, the Officers' Mess managed to get a turkey, a ham and a Christmas pudding from Ambala.

The victors, paralysed after their prodigious exertions and excitement, were unable to move until reinforcements arrived from Delhi. Sir Harry Smith's Division remained in camp until the middle of February, when it was sent to deal with a Sikh force under Ranjur Singh, which had crossed the Sutlej near Ludhiana and was threatening our communications. The Division set out on January 14th, starting at 1 o'clock in the morning. 'It was bitterly cold and very dark,' says Lieutenant Pughe, 'and the road very vile, being nothing but a track. It was not unusual to come across a gun upset in a small nullah. It would, of course, take several men to get it out, and the task was only accomplished after much hard work and delay. About dawn on January 18th the General was informed by the civil authorities that the Sikhs had already crossed the river and had entrenched themselves across our path, and that if we wanted to reach Ludhiana in safety we must make a detour, as the enemy was strongly posted.

¹ He was the Governor-General's second son, later General Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.B., who commanded the Meerut Division 1873-8. He was Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army 1881-5 and died in 1892.

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT


‘Sir Harry Smith, who had been all through the Peninsular War with the Duke of Wellington, was a somewhat obstinate old gentleman, and thought it would be undignified for him to avoid the enemy, so we marched straight on in open column of companies. We had not gone a couple of miles when bang came a round of shot right into our centre, for the enemy had got the range beautifully. This excited the General, and he ordered us to wheel into line, with a view of attacking them in their entrenchment. Only a few yards farther on, a shower of grape was poured in upon us. The first round killed a young subaltern of my regiment, Lieutenant Rideout. The General, seeing that he had made a mistake as to the strength of the Sikhs, wisely wheeled us back into column, and we marched on towards Ludhiana. Their cavalry, however, came close behind us, and cut off all our baggage which was in the rear on camels. It was very lucky that they captured no guns.’¹

The regiment found that the cantonment at Ludhiana had been sacked by the Sikhs, but they managed to get some fresh kit in the bazaar to replace that looted by the enemy during their raid on the rearguard, and Lieutenant Pughe, who had saved his belongings by placing his camels on the reverse flank of the column, describes in an amusing fashion how he shared a *pal*² with six other subalterns, one of whom wore spurs ! The Sergeant-Major, who had been a butcher by trade, managed to get a calf for the Mess, and an old Jew was found who had a large supply of bottled beer secreted in his shop. It was noted that the enemy had left untouched the billiard table in the Mess of the 50th, probably mistaking it for a Muslim tomb !

On January 25th the force moved out to attack the enemy who had taken up a strong position on the Sutlej near the village of Aliwal. ‘It was a lovely morning,’ says Lieutenant Pughe, ‘and a beautiful plain with a slight dip in the centre stretched out before us. The Sikhs moved out and posted themselves right in our way. We marched in open column of companies till we got within their range, when they immediately started firing. The infantry formed line and we advanced steadily. It was very clear, and we could see the enemy plainly on a rise in front of us. I remember a sepoy saw a round shot come lobbing along, and put out his foot to stop it. It twisted his

¹ This was the skirmish at Badiwal on January 21st, when the British sustained a reverse.

² A *pal* is a small single-fly tent.



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF ALI WAL, JANUARY 27th, 1846

Cavalry

- | | |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Brigadier Cureton | Commanding Cavalry Division. |
| Brigadier Stedman | { 1st and 5th Light Cavalry. |
| | { Body Guard and Shekawattee Cavalry. |
| Brigadier McDowell | { 16th Lancers. |
| | { 3rd Light Cavalry. |


Infantry

- | | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| Brigadier Godby | { Shekawattee Battalion. | Brigadier Wheeler | { H.M.'s 50th Foot. |
| | { Nusseree Battalion. | and Brigadier Penny | { 48th Native Infantry. |
| | { 36th Native Infantry. | | { Sirmoor Battalion. |
| Brigadier Hicks | { H.M.'s 31st Foot. | Brigadier Wilson | { H.M.'s 53rd Foot. |
| | { 47th Native Infantry. | | { 30th Native Infantry. |
| | { 24th Native Infantry. | | { 56th Native Infantry. |

foot almost off. The Sikhs had most of their guns posted in front of their infantry, and as we came near, the greater portion of their infantry bolted. One of their leaders charged fiercely upon the 31st Foot on our right, but before he had ridden half the distance, he fell riddled with bullets. The Sikh gunners also bolted and we took possession of their guns. Having secured them, we swept through the village of Aliwal which gave its name to this fight. On the left, the 16th Lancers would not wait to allow the artillery to fire into a *ghool* of Sikhs, and themselves charged them. As they came near, the Sikhs threw themselves on the ground, firing a volley at the Lancers and emptying many saddles. The cavalry actually rode over them without doing much damage, when the enemy sprang up and frightfully wounded the men lying on the ground. The next morning, several dead bodies were to be seen horribly cut about. After this, as it was just getting dark, the enemy retired across the Sutlej. That night, I was on picquet duty on the banks of the river. It was bitterly cold, so I rolled myself in a *rezai*, having first partaken of sandwiches and cold tea I had in my holsters, and there, I am sorry to say, I went fast asleep and thus remained all night. I knew my havildars would wake me up if any senior officer came round ! Next morning, we returned to Ludhiana with upwards of fifty Sikh guns which we had captured.' Sir Harry Smith in his despatch says that at Aliwal the 1st Brigade made 'a rapid and noble charge, H.M. 31st and the Native Regiments (24th and 47th) contending for the front'. 'I am unwonted', said the gallant General, 'to praise where praise is not merited, but I must avowedly express my firm opinion and conviction that no troops in any battle on record behaved more nobly.'

The final battle was fought near Sobraon, but on the left bank of the Sutlej, where the Sikhs had taken up a strongly entrenched position.¹ Sir Hugh Gough, who had now been further reinforced, decided to attack them on February 10th, and at 2 a.m. the troops moved silently to their positions. No sound reached the Sikhs, and a dense fog enabled each unit to take up its proper alignment without hindrance. In the words of an eye-witness, 'the rising sun rapidly dispelled the fog, when a magnificent picture presented itself. The batteries of artillery were seen in position ready to open fire, and the plain was covered with our troops, the fortified village of Rodawalla

¹ It was designed by a Spanish engineer named Hobron.



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF SOBRAON, FEBRUARY 10th, 1846

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

on our left being strongly held by our infantry. Immediately the guns opened a heavy fire. The enemy appeared suddenly to realize their danger, their drums beat the alarm, their bugles sounded to arms, and in a few minutes their batteries were manned, and pouring shot and shell upon our troops.'

The 47th as usual formed part of Brigadier Hicks's Brigade, and were on the extreme right of the attack, forming the support to Brigadier N. Penny. After a heavy artillery duel, the men, who had hitherto been lying down, sprang up and advanced. The ground in front was intersected by watercourses, and the earthworks were so high that it was almost impossible to scale them in face of the enemy's fire. After a desperate struggle, the first line was compelled to fall back, but they were well supported by Brigadier Hicks, who, after opening his ranks to let the fugitives through, led his men to the assault in person. They were now joined by Penny's Brigade, which had been rallied by its officers and were maddened at seeing the Sikhs running out and cutting up the wounded. This time the formidable earthworks were carried, and the Sikhs then began to fall back over the bridge which formed their sole line of retreat. The guns came up and opened fire on the bridge, which gave way, precipitating the retreating army into the river.

'The Sikhs', it was said at the time, 'fought with the valour of heroes, the enthusiasm of crusaders, and the desperation of zealots sworn to conquer the enemy or die sword in hand.' The severity of the fighting is shown by the fact that they lost in killed and wounded fully 10,000 men with sixty-seven guns. The river was crimson with blood, and quarter was neither given nor taken. 'Their awful slaughter', wrote Lord Gough, 'was such as would have excited compassion in the hearts of their generous conquerors, if the Khalsa troops had not in the early part of the action sullied their gallantry by barbarously mangling every wounded soldier whom in the vicissitudes of the attack the fortunes of war left at their mercy.'

During the engagement, the regiment was commanded by Captain Corfield, as Captain Pott was acting as Interpreter to Sir Harry Smith and had his horse shot under him. The 47th was mentioned in dispatches as having greatly distinguished itself, and further evidence of its gallantry is given by the casualty list, which was as follows :—



THE FIRST SIKH WAR

CSL
47

Killed : Jemadar Jorawar Khan and seven other ranks.

Wounded : Lieutenant and Adjutant R. Renny ; Lieutenant H. C. James (attached) ; Ensign W. H. Walcot ; Ensign J. D. Ogstone ; Subadar Major Bhawani Lal Dube ; Subadar Dhariyal Singh ; Subadar Meerut Singh ; Jemadar Sardar Khan, and sixty-four other ranks.

By G.O.C.C., December 12th, 1846, the regiment was granted the Battle Honours 'MOODKEE', 'FEROZESHAH', 'ALIWAL' and 'SOBRAON', and the following distinctions were conferred :—

Commander of the Bath : Lieut.-Colonel George Hicks.

Brevet Majority : Captain Charles Corfield ; Captain David Pott.

Order of Merit : Subadar Chand Khan (for gallantry at Moodkee).

Colonel Hicks received the following special mention in the Commander-in-Chief's dispatch of February 2nd, 1846 :—

'Great praise is due to Brigadiers Godby and Hicks, who, with the 36th Native Infantry and the Nusseree Battalion, Her Majesty's 31st, and the 24th and 47th Native Infantry, stormed the village of Aliwal, drove the enemy from it, and seized the guns by which it was defended.'

The victory at Sobraon was decisive ; it was won against 'the bravest and steadiest enemy ever encountered in India by a British Army'. On February 13th the British crossed the Sutlej and occupied Lahore on the 20th. On March 9th the Sikhs signed a treaty ceding to the Company large territories between the Sutlej and the Beas and promised to pay a large indemnity. Kashmir was made into an independent State, and the minor Dalip Singh was placed on the throne under the supervision of Sir Henry Lawrence. A force was left in Lahore to keep order, and of this the 47th formed a part. The regiment was stationed in a large square palace belonging to a Sikh Sardar, near one of the city gateways. Round three sides of the square were the officers' quarters and on the fourth was a spacious Darbar Hall, used as a Mess. After seven months at Lahore, the regiment moved to Ferozepore, where it stayed until the end of 1847.

A medal was granted for each of the four great battles of the campaign, those entitled to be decorated for more than one battle receiving the medal struck for the first of the four in which he was present, and clasps for subsequent engagements.



CHAPTER IV

BURMA, THE MUTINY AND CHINA, 1847-60

AFTER about nine months at Ferozepore, the regiment was ordered, in November 1847, to Etawah in the North-West Provinces,¹ with a wing at Mainpuri. The former is on the banks of the Jumna, and the latter on the Grand Trunk road, which had just been completed as far as Delhi. It was bridged and metalled throughout, and this made troop movements much easier. Captain Pughe speaks with delight of the pleasure of this march through the flat, fertile country of the Doab, in the exhilarating cold weather of Northern India. A start would be made about 4 a.m., and he as Quartermaster would go ahead to arrange about a camping ground. He would be preceded by the Indian officer next for duty, in charge of the *rasad* or ration guard escorting the *chowdry* and the *bunniahs*, together with the tindal and the tent lascars. The latter formed the *line dori* or camp colour party, whose duty it was to lay out the camp under the Quartermaster's directions. The other officers marched or rode with the regiment, except those granted leave who would ride across country in quest of sport. On reaching the half-way halting place, the regiment would fall out for a quarter of an hour, while the British officers collected round the Mess dooly, which had been sent ahead overnight. There they found tea, coffee and milk, with bread, butter and hard-boiled eggs. When the tents had been pitched and the men had settled down, most of the officers would go out shooting or pig-sticking, for the country then swarmed with game.

At Agra, the Left Wing went off to Mainpuri. Etawah was reached by Christmas. It was a small cantonment with little accommodation, and this led to a good deal of friction between the civil and military officers. As the District Magistrate refused to vacate his bungalow, Colonel Hicks marched in with a guard of sepoy, and told them to pile arms on the verandah. Trouble was also caused by encounters in the bazaar between the sepoy and local *badmashes*, and this was difficult to stop, as the men naturally refused to give

¹ Now called the United Provinces.



their comrades away. At last a wounded sepoy was brought in and sentenced to transportation to the Andamans ; but on the way down the Ganges he jumped overboard and was drowned. The upshot was that in April 1849, the 47th was moved to Cawnpore, a week's march in grilling weather.

Cawnpore was a gay station. The great event of 1849 was the presentation by Lady Gomm, wife of the Commander-in-Chief, of colours inscribed with the battles of the Sikh War, and this was celebrated by a grand ball, which was attended by the whole station in spite of the heat. In 1850, combined brigade manœuvres were held on an unprecedented scale. This innovation may have been due to the arrival as Commander-in-Chief of Sir Charles Napier, an eccentric man of volcanic energy. In September 1852, Lieut.-Colonel G. A. Smith of the 9th N.I., familiarly known as 'Tiger' Smith on account of his prowess as a shikari took over command from Lieut.-Colonel G. Hicks, C.B.¹ He was preceded by Lieut.-Colonel G. Huish, C.B., according to the Army List, but the latter never actually took over.

BURMA

In 1851 war broke out with Burma, owing to various acts of oppression inflicted on British merchants by the Court of Ava. A force was sent under General Godwin, which stormed the Great Pagoda at Rangoon on April 14th, 1852, and, advancing up the Irrawaddy, occupied Prome in the following October. In December 1853, the 47th, then stationed at Jhelum, was ordered to proceed to Rangoon at ten days' notice. This was due to the fact that the corps was one of the nine Bengal regiments bearing the proud title of 'Volunteers', which were bound, under the terms of their enlistment, to go anywhere, even overseas, whenever called upon to do so. Burma was notorious for its unhealthiness, and the sepoys were not enthusiastic about the move. As one of them remarked, when reminded of his obligation, '*Han, Huzur, Bullanteers to hain, lekin ham log nahin jane mankte hain*', 'It's quite true we're Volunteers, but all the same, we are not keen to go'. The regiment had to march 400 miles to Meerut, where the Commissariat had provided a fleet of boats to transport

¹ Colonel Hicks afterwards rose to the rank of Lieutenant-General, and was Colonel of the 70th N.I., now the 5th Battalion, 7th Rajputs. He died in 1873. He was grandfather of Sir Edward Seymour Hicks, the actor.



CSL

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

them down the Ganges to Calcutta. On the way, cholera broke out in the flotilla, and the sepoy died like flies. The virulence of the epidemic is shown by the fact that, when the boats were stopped in order that the regimental Pandit might offer prayers to avert the evil, the Pandit, in the midst of the ceremony, himself collapsed and died.

On arriving at Calcutta, the regiment was embarked on three transports, and reached Rangoon in about a week. Rangoon was then a dirty, insignificant place; its thatched houses looked like haystacks, and the only building of interest was the Shwe Dagon Pagoda. The troops were now transferred to flats, and towed to Prome, 300 miles up the Irrawaddy. Prome was reached on March 15th, 1854, and the 47th was cantoned at a place called Mumyan about four miles down the river. The officers were quartered in *Phoongye Kyoungs* (Buddhist monasteries) until better arrangements could be made. Detachments were sent out to hunt dacoits, and two companies were stationed about fifty miles away. Lieutenant Walcot, the Adjutant, described Mumyan as an 'open sepulchre'. Hardly a man escaped fever, and it was difficult to find enough fit men to mount the guards. Most of the officers went sick. Colonel Smith was so ill that he had to apply for a transfer to India, and Major Pott, his successor, was forced to go for a sea voyage. There was no proper parade ground, and Lieutenant Walcot found it very difficult to prevent the men from forgetting their drill altogether.

However, things were a little better when the regiment moved up stream to Thayetmyo in September 1855. About this time, a change in equipment was made by the introduction of waist belts and a second ammunition pouch, and the abolition of the bayonet shoulder-strap. The regiment remained at Thayetmyo until March 1857, when the remnants were ordered back to India. Headquarters embarked at Rangoon on April 11th, and arrived at Calcutta on the 20th. Of the 1,200 men who set out three years earlier, less than 500 returned. The regiment lost over 700 from sickness, discharges, and transfers to the pension establishment. In Burma, Bengal regiments were at times rather difficult to deal with, owing to their caste prejudices. But of the 47th the General Officer Commanding reported that 'they gave no trouble whatever'. Major Pott received the special thanks of Government for important services when commanding a force of eighteen hundred men against insurgents in Pegu.



BURMA, THE MUTINY AND CHINA

CSL
51

The following was the cadre of the regiment on its return from Burma :—

<i>Colonel</i>	S. D. Riley (on furlough).
<i>Lieut.-Colonel</i>	Brevet-Colonel J. Nash, C.B. (Brigadier commanding at Delhi).
<i>Major</i>	Brevet Lieut.-Colonel D. Pott (Acting Commandant).
<i>Captains</i>	Brevet-Major J. T. Daniell (Interpreter and Quartermaster). R. Renny (O.C. 3rd Sikh Infantry). R. Campbell (O.C. 2nd Assam L.I.). W. C. Watson. J. R. Pughe (on furlough). G. McAndrew (in civil employ). J. P. W. Campbell (attached 2nd Sikh Infantry).
<i>Lieutenants</i>	C. P. Lucas (on furlough). W. H. Walcot (Adjutant). E. Leeds (on furlough). C. V. Jenkins (attached 2nd Oudh Infantry). W. Gordon. T. W. Evans. W. Phaire. H. R. Buttanshaw. H. R. B. Worsley. E. S. Fox.
<i>Ensigns</i>	M. C. Perreau (on furlough). H. L. Ramsbotham. A. J. Scott.
<i>Assistant Surgeons</i>	T. M. Lee, M.D. W. H. Hayes.
<i>Subadar Major</i>	Oomar Khan Bahadur, O.B.I.

Thus, out of twenty-two officers, nearly half were serving outside the regiment or were on furlough at the time of the outbreak of the Mutiny.

THE MUTINY

The unsatisfactory state of discipline in the Bengal Army has already been commented on when we were referring to the mutiny of the 24th N.I., in 1824. Since then, no less than four other Bengal regiments had behaved in a similar fashion. One of the contributory causes



CSL

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

was the practice of promoting both British and Indian officers by seniority, and retaining them long after they were useless : subadars of fifty years' service were not uncommon.¹ A third of the men came from Oudh, and they were deeply affronted by the annexation of that State by Dalhousie in 1856. But the chief difficulty was that of caste. In spite of warnings, the authorities continued to enlist Brahmans in excessive numbers ; moreover, all regiments contained numbers of men related to each other by family ties, and this made them particularly homogeneous and liable to be swayed by the same motives. Matters reached a climax in 1857, when an ill-advised attempt was made to arm the Indian regiments with the muzzle-loading Enfield rifle. The new cartridge was made up with grease, in order to facilitate the ramming of the bullet into the bore, and moreover it was necessary to tear open the paper covering with the teeth, in order to pour the powder into the barrel. A rumour went round like wildfire that animal fat was the lubricant used, and that this would defile all those who touched it.

On March 29th, 1857, at Barrackpore, the Adjutant of the 34th N.I. was cut down on the parade ground by a Brahman sepoy, while his comrades looked on. On May 3rd, the 7th Oudh Infantry mutinied at Lucknow. At Meerut, on Saturday, May 9th, the 3rd Cavalry were compelled to witness on parade the public degradation of eighty-five of their comrades, who had refused the cartridge. The next day, while the European troops were at church, the three native regiments rose, murdered their officers, burnt their houses, broke open the jail and released their comrades. They then made off at full speed to Delhi, where they put all the English people to the sword and placed titular Emperor, Bahadur Shah, on the throne. Very soon Hindustan, from Ambala to Benares, was a sea of anarchy, from which all trace of order had vanished. Murder, burning and plundering raged uncontrolled in every district.

The 47th was at Calcutta when the Mutiny broke out. The regiment was then slowly recovering from its experiences in Burma, and was much under strength, as, owing to the disturbed state of the country, it was impossible to raise any recruits. On account of the mutiny of the greater part of the Bengal Army, the authorities in Calcutta had some difficulty in deciding where to station and how to utilize

¹ At the battle of Rannagar in 1846, Subadar Major Sher Ali was killed at the age of 78, after sixty years' service.



the 47th. It was eventually decided to send the regiment by steamer to Mirzapore, as escort to 10 lakhs of treasure consigned to the Magistrate of that district. The intention was that the Headquarters and Left Wing should remain there, and that the Right Wing should be dropped *en route* at Dinapore. The latter proposal was, however, abandoned, for the strength of the regiment being less than that of a wing, it was not feasible to spare so large a detachment without withholding the accumulated furlough to which the native ranks were entitled after nearly four years' foreign service. The 47th left Calcutta on May 30th and reached their destination on June 7th.

The advent of a Bengal regiment of which they knew nothing caused a panic among the civil population of Mirzapore, especially as the half battalion of the Regiment of Ferozepore,¹ which had previously been garrisoning the place, had been ordered to Allahabad. Rumours were rife of the advance of a large body of insurgents from the Allahabad border, and the Rajputs from the turbulent village of Akhori were said to be meditating a descent on the town. On the 9th, these rumours gained such strength that all the inhabitants of the Civil Station, except Mr. Tucker, the Magistrate, fled to Chunar.

Several officers who were on leave or extra-regimentally employed, had narrow escapes. On June 5th, Lieutenant C. V. Jenkins, attached to the 2nd Oudh Infantry at Sultanpore, with his wife and family and thirty-five other ladies, gentlemen and children, arrived at Mulloopore, about 26 miles from Allahabad, where they were attacked by a mob of hostile villagers. They were recognized by Sepoys Shiunath and Janki Upadhya of the 47th, who were returning from furlough. They at once came to their help, and brought them food and supplies. When the approach of a swarm of insurgents made it necessary for the refugees to split up into small parties, these faithful Brahman sepoy offered to procure Hindustani clothing for Lieutenant Jenkins and his family, and to smuggle them in disguise into Mirzapore. This was rendered unnecessary by the action of a loyal zemindar named Munshi Ajit Singh, who provided the fugitives with doolies, camels and elephants, and an escort of 150 men as far as Allahabad. But until they reached their destination, these two loyal men were

¹ Later the 14th K.G.O. Ferozepore Sikhs, and now 1st Battalion, 11th Sikh Regiment (King George's Own).



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

untiring in their efforts to get them supplies, especially of milk for the ladies and children.

Lieutenant Walcot managed to rejoin the regiment after a perilous journey from Fatehgarh to Allahabad, and Allahabad to Mirzapore, with his little son. When the Mutiny broke out, he was staying with his friends, Colonel and Mrs. Smith, at Fatehgarh, where Colonel Smith, late of the 47th, was now commanding the 10th N.I. For a few days he served with a body of matchlockmen raised by a local zemindar, but as matters grew worse, he decided to leave while the road was still open. He little realized that he was saying good-bye to his host and hostess for the last time. Colonel Smith, says Sir G. O. Trevelyan, was 'distinguished by courage so closely allied with rashness, and firmness so nearly akin to obstinacy, that the European residents could not have fared worse had they been under the charge of a waverer and a coward. He was a zealous adherent of that sect of the officers which worshipped the sepoy.' He paid for his confidence with his life. When the 10th mutinied, the Smith family escaped to Cawnpore by boat, only to perish in the massacre of July 15th.

Both Pott and Walcot were men of strong personalities, and having put in most of their service with the 47th, they knew their men intimately. Moreover, Walcot was an excellent Hindustani scholar, and by reading intercepted letters inciting the men to mutiny, he knew exactly what was going on. They were loyally supported by Subadar Major Oomar Khan *Bahadur*, and in particular by Drill Havildar Fakira Ram, a soldier of outstanding intelligence and loyalty, and an Ahir or cowherd by caste. In order to avoid trouble, Colonel Pott decided to send away in batches, on furlough, all the men except those whom he could thoroughly trust, a fresh party being dispatched when the previous one returned. It is a noteworthy fact that not one of these parties failed to come back.

One reason for their loyalty was that Colonel Pott had in his possession a fund of about a lakh of rupees representing the savings of the men while in Burma. In defiance of strict orders from General J. G. S. Neill, who was commanding at Allahabad, he arranged for this to be paid out to the men in fortnightly instalments. This was a very popular measure, as the men found means to farm the money out locally until they could take it home with them. Had he withheld the money lawfully due to them, he would have precipitated an outbreak by creating a grievance similar to the transport complaint which drove



the 24th into mutiny in 1824. When the Ferozepore Sikhs left, they were unable to take away with them their spare arms and ammunition. Colonel Pott at once ordered his men to occupy the magazine, and threw into the river 50,000 cartridges and the nipples of all the surplus muskets, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the rebels. An entrenched position was then dug, enclosing the post office and bungalow on the river bank, and guns mounted to protect it. Lieutenant E. S. Fox of the 47th was appointed artillery officer in charge. All tents and spare clothing were shipped on to boats and sent up-country for the use of the troops in the field. Ensign A. J. Scott, who proceeded to Allahabad with this convoy, was killed there by the mutineers.

On June 13th, a detachment of the 1st Madras Fusiliers¹ arrived at Mirzapore, and at once an outcry to disarm the 47th was raised. Colonel Pott, who had now got his men well in hand, refused to yield to the clamour, and the wisdom of his decision was proved by the valuable part which the regiment played in operations to clear the surrounding country. The first operation, carried out in conjunction with the Madras Fusiliers, was the destruction of the village of Gaura, about sixteen miles west of Mirzapore, on the south bank of the Ganges. This was a regular nest of turbulent Rajputs, who had committed a number of river dacoities and terrorized the surrounding country. Finding themselves attacked in front and rear, the inhabitants fled and the ringleaders were captured. The country was then cleared of rebels as far as the foot-hills. Soon after this, a party of the 47th went out under Mr. Tucker, the District Magistrate, to rescue Mr. Moore, the agent of the Raja of Benares, who had been captured by some rebels while defending the factory of Pali. After these expeditions which he led in person, Colonel Pott received the following letter of thanks from Mr. Tucker, dated June 24th :—

‘ I am anxious to express my thanks to you and to the officers of the 47th present with the regiment, for the security of life and property which have been uninterruptedly preserved in the city by the presence of your regiment, and for the assistance you have afforded me in putting down dacoity and violence on both the northern and southern sides of the river.

‘ Should you think proper, I hope you will express to the sepoy of your regiment the pleasure which I feel in bringing to the notice

¹ Afterwards the 1st Battalion, The Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

At the same time, the following awards were announced 'for loyal, faithful and valuable services' :—

Subadar Major Oomar Khan, O.B.I. : To be Sardar Bahadur and promoted from 2nd to 1st Class, Order of British India.

Havildar Fakira Ram : To be Subadar Major and Sardar Bahadur, and awarded the Order of British India, 1st Class. (G.G.O. 842/61 of 1858.)

Havildars Ramjiawan Singh and Bhinik Singh : To be Subadar and Sardar Bahadur, and awarded the Order of British India, 1st Class.

Sepoys Shiunath Upadhya and Janki Upadhya : To be Havildars and to receive the Order of Merit 'in consideration of their conspicuous loyalty in aiding, saving and protecting a party of European fugitives from Sultanpore'. (G.G.O. 486 of 1858.)

Lieutenant Walcot was made a Brevet-Captain, but Colonel Pott, perhaps owing to his difference with General Neill, did not receive his C.B. until some years later. Other awards were made by the civil authorities, but no mention is made of the regiments to which the recipients belonged. In 1864, after the regiment had become the 7th B.N.I., the Indian Mutiny medal roll was prepared for eighty men still serving.

CHINA

The war with China was brought about by the seizure in 1856 of a ship flying British colours, but not much could be done at the time, as the troops detailed for the China Expedition had been diverted to quell the Mutiny in India. At the end of 1857, however, Canton was taken by storm with the help of the French, and this brought active operations in South China to a close.

Early in March 1858, the regiment was ordered back to Calcutta from Mirzapore, and here it was rearmed. On the 30th, still much depleted in strength, it embarked, together with the two other loyal Bengal regiments, the 65th¹ and 70th,² for Hong Kong, where it landed on May 5th. The harbour, which was capable of holding the fleets of the whole of Europe, presented a beautiful sight, but the

¹ Later 10th Jats and now the 3rd Battalion, 9th Jat Regiment.

² Later 11th Rajputs and now the 5th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment.



town was very unhealthy. Owing to defective drainage, dysentery and fever raged, and it was stated that of those who originally came out in the 58th Foot, only the Major and a woman survived ! Among those of the 47th N.I. who succumbed was Captain Walcot, and in him the regiment lost a distinguished and beloved officer, who would have risen high in his career had he been spared. His life was a short and tragic one. He married in 1852, and the next year his wife died, leaving an infant son who was taken care of by his friend Mrs. Smith at Fatehgarh while the regiment was in Burma.

After the Burma campaign, Walcot went to Fatehgarh, and brought away his little boy just in time to escape the mutineers. The child, in charge of his *ayah*, was taken home to his grandparents in November 1857. He never saw his father again. Captain Walcot, shortly before his death, had been offered the post of Brigade Major to the troops in China, and in a battalion order, Colonel Pott spoke of him as follows :—

‘As an officer, a more zealous, painstaking, hard-working, just man never lived—one who was always ready, not only to do his duty, but to help others in theirs, and both by practice and example to show officers younger and less experienced than himself how to do their duty.’

In July, Captain Pughe rejoined his regiment. It is interesting to note that he had to serve fourteen years before obtaining his first furlough. He was then granted three years’ leave, six months on £500 a year and the remainder on £190 a year. On the outbreak of the Mutiny, he was recalled from the Hythe School of Musketry, where he was learning the use of the Enfield rifle, and on arrival in India was sent to Purneah to organize a battalion of Gurkha Military Police.

In September 1858, the 47th went to Canton, and here it was quartered in one of the gateways of the city. There were spacious mess rooms and quarters for the officers, while the men were housed in tents or huts. British and French Headquarters were on a hill, where there was a battery commanding the town. The General, Sir Charles van Straubenzee, was an eccentric man, who would often sound the bugle for parade at 3 or 4 o’clock in the morning. During its stay in China, the regiment was issued with red tunics instead of coatees, and the Kilmarnock cap was replaced by a blue turban. The end of the turban had a red stripe and a fringe. This was gold for the Indian officers and red for the other ranks.



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

While in China, Captain Pughe did valuable work in setting in order the regimental accounts, which had fallen into confusion in the Mutiny, and incidentally he gives some interesting details about the curious practice of 'purchasing out'. Promotion in the Indian Army was regimental up to the rank of Major, and after that it was on a General List. A pension was earned after twenty-four years' service, but it was so small that most officers preferred to stay on. This meant an indefinite block in promotion, so Pughe and other juniors raised £7,000 by joint guarantees, in order to buy out a Major and two Captains. In spite of the losses caused by the Mutiny, the loan was paid back in due course, and Pughe tells us that he 'danced a war dance' as the bonds were destroyed.

In April 1860, orders were received for the three Bengal regiments to return to India, and the 47th was posted at Jaunpore, which it reached on June 13th. On their return to India the following General Order (No. 557 of 1860) was issued :—

'These regiments volunteered for service in that country at a time when the body of the Bengal Native Army severed from its allegiance and rose in arms against the State. They were again entrusted with their arms, and the Governor-General in Council allowed them to proceed to China, in full reliance on their loyalty. That reliance has been fully justified by the exemplary conduct of those regiments in China, and the Governor-General in Council, while publicly recording circumstances so creditable to these corps, tenders to Brigadier-General W. R. Corfield and to the officers of the 47th, 65th and 70th Regiments the cordial acknowledgements of the Government of India for having maintained these corps in the state of order and discipline described by Major-General van Straubenzee.'

For its part in these operations, the regiment was given permission by G.G.O. 188 of 1882, to bear the words 'CHINA 1858-9' on its colours and appointments. Officers and men were granted the China Medal.



CHAPTER V

FROM THE CHINA WAR TO THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN,
1860-82

AFTER its return from China, the regiment passed some years in cantonments at Jaunpore, Banda and Allahabad. During this period, far-reaching changes took place in the Bengal Army. The East India Company ceased to exist, and the Indian Armies came directly under the Crown. In 1861, orders were issued, reorganizing the confused crowd of regiments, regular and irregular, left behind after the storm of the Mutiny. Out of these, twenty-two infantry battalions were found, and in the renumbering, the 47th became the 7th Bengal Native Infantry. Each regiment consisted of eight companies, with a Commandant, two Wing Officers and two Wing Subalterns, a Doing Duty Officer¹, Adjutant, Quartermaster, and a certain number of British officers attached. In order to put an end to the practice of allowing a large number of officers to be absent in civil employment, a Staff Corps was created. Its object was 'to supply a body of officers for service in India, by whom various offices and appointments, hitherto held by officers borne on the strength of the several corps of the Indian forces, shall be held; it having been resolved that the practice of withdrawing officers for such employments while remaining on the strength of their regiments be discontinued, and that ultimately all officers selected for such employment be transferred to the Staff Corps'.

Each company now had the following Indian personnel :—

1 Subadar.	5 Naiks.
1 Jemadar.	2 Drummers.
5 Havildars.	75 Privates.

giving a total strength of 16 Indian Officers, 40 Havildars, 40 Naiks, 16 Drummers and 600 Sepoys, or 712 of all ranks.

The Subadar Major was included among the eight Subadars and the Indian Adjutant among the Jemadars.

¹ These designations were altered soon after. The two 'Wing Officers' became 'Wing Commanders', and the 'Wing Subalterns and Doing Duty Officer' became 'Wing Officers'. The Adjutant and the Quartermaster were included among the latter.

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

Certain changes were made in uniform and equipment. A tunic of the Zouave pattern was introduced, and that relic of barbarism, the stock, was abolished. Turbans were dark blue in colour, with a red stripe above the fringed end, which fell on the right side. They were tied round a wicker framework. In 1878 these were replaced by hand-tied *pagris*. Owing to the disastrous results of the attempt to force the Enfield rifle on the Bengal Army, the troops were still armed with a smooth-bore percussion musket, and the rifle was not again introduced until 1872. In preceding chapters, the fact that caste was at the bottom of most of the troubles in the old Bengal Army has been mentioned. This was partially remedied in 1864 by orders for the gradual admission of lower-caste men. The 7th was to be composed of Hindustani Musalmans, Brahmans, Rajputs, Cis-Sutlej Sikhs and lower-caste Hindus. The Sikhs and lower-caste Hindus, chiefly Ahirs, formed separate companies. Important concessions were made in the shape of good conduct pay and allowance for the purchase and upkeep of kit, and in 1870 the Thursday holiday was introduced.

In 1864, the regiment had to part with its Commanding Officer, Brevet-Colonel D. Pott, who went to command the Dinapore Brigade. He was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel F. J. Nelson. Colonel Pott came of a distinguished Border family, which had furnished many members to the Army. After serving for four years as a Midshipman in the Royal Navy, he entered the Bengal Army in 1829, and joined the 47th as an Ensign in 1833. Four years later, he became Adjutant. He served with distinction throughout the First Sikh War, and received the thanks of Lord Gough. At Sobraon he was orderly officer to Sir Harry Smith and had his horse shot under him. He was made a Brevet-Major in 1846. In 1853, while in charge of three companies escorting 5 lakhs of treasure, he made a remarkable forced march from Jhelum to Rawalpindi. He commanded his regiment in Burma in 1854-7, and his able handling of it in the Mutiny has already been described. He became a Major-General in 1866, a Lieutenant-General in 1874, and a General in 1877. He died four years later at his estate near Hawick.

In 1868, the regiment was moved, by road, rail and steamer, to the Eastern Frontier district, Headquarters and Left Wing being at Dacca, and the Right Wing at Cachar. Here it received new colours. Early in 1869, trouble broke out in the wild and mountainous Lushai



GENERAL DAVID POTT, C.B.

Born 1812. Died 1881.

1st Sikh War, 1845 ; Burma, 1854-57 ; Mutiny, 1857-58 ; China, 1858-59
Commandant, 1854-64.



country, where the turbulent tribesmen had burnt the bungalows of two tea gardens and looted several villages. On January 25th the left wing was ordered to Sylhet, making the journey by river. They reached Sylhet on February 1st, preceded by the Sikh Company¹ under Captain H. R. B. Worsley, which had pushed ahead by forced overland marches, as danger was apprehended by the civil authorities.

LUSHAI

Brigadier-General W. F. Nuthall, commanding the district, took charge of operations on February 6th, and the Headquarter Wing, under Major F. J. Stephenson, officiating Commandant, was ordered to co-operate with a police force under Mr. E. Baker, Inspector-General of Police, at Kambughat. At Kambughat, B Company, commanded by Lieutenant Logan, was left to reinforce Mr. Baker and provide detachments for the protection of outlying tea estates, while Major Stephenson, with 300 men and a half battery of Eurasian Artillery under Lieutenant Brough, R.A., accompanied Mr. Edgar, the Deputy Commissioner, in an expedition up the Sonai river. This column pushed on with great difficulty to a place called Rambukan Tila, the guns being carried on elephants up the river bed. At Rambukan Tila, the main body halted while Captain Worsley and his Sikhs escorted Mr. Edgar to a Lushai village far up-stream, and here delegates came in and proffered their submission. The mission had now accomplished its object and withdrew, some of the troops going by raft and canoe, and the remainder marching overland as escort to the guns. The whole detachment reached Cachar on March 30th after a most adventurous march through unexplored territory. The men had to hack a path with native *daos* and *kukris*, the English bill-hooks supplied for the purpose from Calcutta having proved quite unsuitable.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Logan had undergone some remarkable adventures. Brigadier-General Nuthall had penetrated into the Lushai country with a wing of the 44th N.I. (Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion²), and a half-battery of Eurasian Artillery, and Lieutenant Logan was told to push on from Kambughat with 60 men of B Company

¹ This company was raised at Banda in 1864 by Subadar Jaimal Singh, one of the faithful garrison of the Lucknow Residency. The men nearly all came from the village named Puttoke, in the Mogah *tahsil* of the Ferozepore district.

² Now the 1st Battalion, 8th Gurkha Rifles.

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

and 150 police and effect a junction with him at the Gootoor river. General Nuthall, however, was forced to fall back by heavy rain and sickness among his men. In the meantime, Lieutenant Logan, who had left Kambughat on February 14th, struck the Gootoor river on March 16th, after a terribly difficult march through dense jungle and over very hilly country. He crossed the stream after exchanging shots with the enemy, and advanced for about six miles on the farther side. Seeing nothing of the main body, he decided to fall back to his last camping ground. As soon as he started to do so, the Lushais attacked his party on all sides from the jungle, but were repeatedly charged with the bayonet and put to flight. The detachment then camped for the night, and was heavily sniped, one policeman being killed. Huge bonfires were kindled on the surrounding peaks, and by their light, masses of tribesmen could be discerned descending the hillsides for several hours in a continuous stream. It was evident that the main body of the Lushais was concentrating for the purpose of cutting him off, and Lieutenant Logan therefore decided to retreat. He withdrew his men with great skill, and reached Kambughat on March 29th without further loss.

The Lushais now sued for peace, and the expedition being over, Headquarters left on April 22nd and arrived at Dacca on May 8th. The men had suffered severely from fever and dysentery, as by some oversight on the part of the staff they had been supplied with blankets but not with tents, though the rainfall in the Assam hills is the heaviest in the world. The Right Wing remained in Cachar until the end of 1870, when the regiment was relieved by the 4th N.I. The 7th then moved by easy stages to Lucknow, which was reached on February 1st, 1871. The thanks of the Government of Bengal were conveyed to Major Stephenson, Captain Worsley, Lieutenant Logan and Lieutenant Abercrombie, for 'cheerful endurance of exposure and hardship'. Jemadar Shiudas Singh, who commanded the pioneer party which accompanied Mr. R. Nuthall, Superintendent of Government Kheddass, for the purpose of cutting a path through the jungle in advance of the Sonai column, was favourably noticed by Lieutenant Abercrombie, and Subadar Indar Singh, commanding B Company, was mentioned for his good work by Lieutenant Logan.

On March 2nd, 1872, the regiment was ordered to Jullundur,



to relieve the 14th Sikhs,¹ and arrived there on the 17th of the month. Soon after, news was received of the death while on leave of Lieut.-Colonel F. J. Nelson, the Commandant. Colonel Nelson had been in ill-health for some time, and Lieut.-Colonel Stephenson, who had been officiating, was given command. In 1874, the regiment was rearmed with Snider rifles, and in 1876 it was inspected by H.R.H. the Prince of Wales² at Lahore.

In 1878, war with Afghanistan being anticipated, three companies under Lieut.-Colonel Worsley went into camp with the Peshawar Field Force at Hari Singh Ka Burj in order to watch the movements of the Afghan troops at Ali Masjid, and during this time the strength of the battalion was raised from 600 to 800 sepoys. Lieut.-Colonel Worsley succeeded to the command of the regiment in December 1878, vice Stephenson retired. The years 1878-81 were passed without incident at Cawnpore and Lucknow, and in 1882 F Company was broken up, and a company of lower caste Hindus, mostly Ahirs, was transferred to the 7th from the 36th N.I. An additional Wing Officer was added to the establishment at the same time.

EGYPT

In 1882, trouble broke out in Egypt, where a body of discontented army officers, headed by Arabi Pasha, started a military revolt against the Khedive and his English and French advisers. The cry of 'Egypt for the Egyptians' was raised, and in June there was a rising in which about one hundred and fifty Europeans in Alexandria were brutally massacred. On July 4th, the forts protecting Alexandria were bombarded by the British fleet. At the end of the month, a force under Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent to suppress the rising and restore order in the country.

The outbreak of hostilities was soon followed by a call for a contingent from India, and this event aroused great interest locally, as it was eighty years since Sir David Baird had been sent with an Indian force to Egypt on a similar occasion. The brigades selected for the purpose were made up of the 2nd and 6th Bengal Cavalry and the 13th Bengal Lancers, and the 7th and 20th Bengal N.I. and the 29th Bombay N.I., the whole under the command of Major-General Sir H. T. Macpherson. The 7th N.I. left Lucknow on July 31st for

¹ Now the 1st Battalion 11th Sikh Regiment (King George's Own).

² Afterwards King Edward VII.

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT


Bombay, with eight British officers, sixteen Indian officers, eighty-four N.C.O.s and 697 other ranks. The British officers were as follows :—

<i>Commandant</i> ..	Lieut.-Colonel H. R. B. Worsley.
<i>Wing Commanders</i>	Major G. Logan (Second in Command). Major B. G. Vyvyan.
<i>Wing Officers</i> ..	Lieutenant E. G. Barrow (Adjutant, officiating D.A.Q.M.G.). Lieutenant J. F. Worlledge (officiating Adjutant). Lieutenant A. Elderton (Quartermaster). Lieutenant A. E. Whistler. Lieutenant E. B. Burton (on probation). Lieutenant H. B. Vaughan (on probation).
<i>Medical Officer</i> ..	Surgeon G. H. D. Gimlette, M.D.

The journey down to Bombay took five days, as owing to the heat troop trains could only move by night. At Bombay, on August 5th, Headquarters and the Right Wing under Colonel Worsley were embarked on s.s. *Merton Hall*, and the Left Wing under Major Vyvyan on s.s. *Sicily* on the following day. The voyage was very uncomfortable as the monsoon was at its height, and both ships rolled incessantly. The sepoys were very sick, and Surgeon Gimlette, to whose letters we are indebted for many details, says that the atmosphere between decks, where the mules were tethered, was simply indescribable. Owing to bad weather, progress was slow; the *Merton Hall* reached Suez on August 20th, and the *Sicily* two days later. The men were disembarked and went into camp near the British Hospital. On August 28th, a detachment of 100 men under Lieutenant Whistler was left to garrison Suez, and 100 men under Major Vyvyan were detailed to guard the Serapeum lock on the Sweet Water Canal. On August 30th, the remainder marched to Nefiche, where the rest of the contingent was assembled, and was there brigaded with the Seaforth Highlanders, the 20th Punjabis and the 29th Baluchis under Brigadier-General C. V. Tanner. Lieutenant Vaughan was despatched, with the recruits, colours and treasure-chest, to Ismailia¹, and a party under an Indian officer was left behind to form a post at Tel-el-Mahuta.

Meanwhile, Sir Garnet Wolseley had arrived at Alexandria on August 17th. After an elaborate feint of landing at Aboukir under the cover of the guns of the fleet, he slipped away in the darkness, entered the Suez Canal at dawn, and disembarked his troops at

¹ Also spelt Ismailia.



BATTLE OF TEL-EL-KEBIR.

From Maurice's "Life of Lord Wolseley"



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

Ismailia on the 19th. His plan of campaign was brilliantly simple. From Ismailia the Sweet Water Canal and railway line run side by side to the important junction of Zagazig, about fifty miles distant, and thence, branching southwards, to Cairo, the Egyptian capital. If Cairo could be occupied, the back of the rebellion would be broken. On August 26th his advanced guard occupied the lock on the Sweet Water Canal at Kassasin, about twenty miles from his base. This was of vital importance, as the canal was the only source from which water for the troops could be obtained during the advance, and the enemy were attempting to dam or destroy it. For some days, however, further progress was retarded by a breakdown in the railway transport, and the troops had to subsist on biscuits, muddy water flavoured with dead mule, and such food as they could forage from the surrounding villages—melons, pigeons, and a few goats and head of cattle. On August 28th, the Egyptians made a violent attack with the object of dislodging the advanced guard holding the canal at Kassasin. The fighting went on all day, and was decided late in the evening by the famous 'moonlight charge' of the Household Cavalry under Sir Baker Russell. It was now ascertained that at the railway station of Tel-el-Kebir, ten miles beyond Kassasin, Arabi had taken up a very strong position astride the railway. His lines ran northwards for four miles, following the contour of a low range of hills. They consisted of a broad and deep dry ditch, with a breastwork six feet high and shelter trenches in the rear. The line of trenches was broken at intervals by redoubts armed with field-pieces, excellently sited so as to sweep the ground in front with a cross-fire. Information from spies and prisoners enabled our Intelligence Department to estimate the Egyptian army at twenty-four battalions of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, seventy guns and a vast horde of irregulars. Wolseley's striking force, after allowing for troops on lines of communication, consisted of 11,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and sixty guns.

By September 2nd, the whole of the Indian contingent, except the 6th Bengal Cavalry, had reached Suez, and units had started to go forward. Owing, however, to the necessity for guarding the long and vulnerable line of communications, the majority of the Indian Infantry were detained on detachment work at Ismailia, Nefiche, Tel-el-Mahuta and Mahsameh¹, only 250 of each regiment being sent to the front at Kassasin. The Rev. Arthur Male, an Army Chaplain,

¹ Also spelt Masama.



met a party of the 7th at Mahsameh railway station, and graphically describes their disappointment at not being allowed to go up the line. 'En route we had to stop at Mahsameh, where our cavalry fight had taken place a fortnight or so before. Here a part of a native regiment which I had known at Lucknow, the 7th Bengal Infantry, were encamped. The men gathered round me with sad words. They had heard that the *burra larai* (big fight) was coming off in a day or two at Tel-el-Kebir, and here they were, ten miles down the line, and not likely to be in it. Great stalwart fellows they were, and as they stood around me in their ordinary native dress, with brown, muscular legs and arms, it seemed to me that any one of them could tackle half a dozen of the pusillanimous Egyptians. They almost had tears in their eyes as they asked me to entreat Colonel Worsley, their Commanding Officer, to let them come forward. They appeared to be one of the detachments of the 7th N.I., left on the line of communications. Whether these particular men did get forward or not I do not know, but certainly this gallant regiment, than which there is no better set-up body of men in the Indian Army, was in the fight and took its part right worthily.'¹

The two armies were now only ten miles apart, and on September 9th, Arabi Pasha, realizing that Sir Garnet Wolseley's force was growing in strength every day, made another determined attempt to dislodge him from Kassasin. The camp might well have been surprised, but the 13th Bengal Lancers under Colonel Pennington, while making a reconnaissance, ran into the enemy's main body as it advanced, and gallantly held it at bay until the troops had time to fall in. After a brisk fight, the Egyptians were driven back and pursued to within 6,000 yards of their lines.

Wolseley was now confronted with a difficult problem. Before him lay the enemy's position, well constructed and strongly held. If he made a frontal attack by daylight, his men would have to advance for the last five miles over an open glacis, absolutely devoid of cover, under heavy fire, while his opponents would be protected by their entrenchments from the effects of any bombardment which his small body of artillery could inflict. A turning movement would involve a long détour in the heat over a waterless desert, and the enemy, even if expelled from their lines, would be able to fall back on an expanse of densely irrigated country intersected by canals, where pursuit

¹ *Scenes through the Battle Smoke*, by the Rev. Arthur Male. London, 1882.


would be almost impossible. Above all, Wolseley was determined to use this golden opportunity not merely for the defeat but the destruction of the Egyptian army, and so bring the campaign to a decisive conclusion. The only possible alternative, therefore, was a night march and an attack at dawn. Wolseley was afterwards much criticized for his decision, but events proved that he was right. The Egyptians, as he had ascertained, did not send out picquets far in advance and kept a poor look-out by night, and he knew that their general lack of morale and physical stamina would render it impossible for them to stand up to an attack with the bayonet by British and Indian troops if he could get close enough to deliver it before being detected.

On September 11th, the Indian contingent under Sir Herbert Macpherson arrived at Kassasin; the infantry was then attached to the 2nd Division under Lieut.-General Sir Edward Hamley, and the cavalry became the 2nd Brigade of the Cavalry Division under Major-General Sir Drury Lowe. The officers present with the 7th Bengal Infantry were Lieut.-Colonel Worsley, Major Logan, Lieutenants Worledge, Elderton and Burton, and Surgeon Gimlette. The remainder were on detachment duty with the exception of Lieutenant Barrow, who was with the Quartermaster-General's Department.

On the 12th, orders were issued for an attack on the fortified position of Tel-el-Kebir at dawn on the following day. The order of battle was as follows:—On the extreme right were the Cavalry Division and two batteries R.H.A. Then came the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions, with the Artillery Brigade between them, and on the railway line was an armoured train manned by bluejackets. South of the canal were the 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, and 250 men from each¹ of the 7th Bengal Infantry, the 20th Punjab Infantry and the 29th Baluchis, and the Naval Brigade with Gatling guns, the whole under Major-General Macpherson.

As soon as it was dark, tents were struck and all the baggage piled up on the two sides of the railway line. Camp fires were left burning, and the troops moved quietly into their positions, where they bivouacked. No fires were allowed, and all were ordered to maintain complete silence. At 1.30 a.m., the two Divisions north of the railway

¹ The actual strength of the 7th was 6 British Officers and 271 Indian ranks. It was the strongest Indian battalion in the contingent.



BATTLE OF TEL-EL-KEBIR, SEPTEMBER 13TH, 1882

Photograph of the original painted by Colonel H. B. Vaughan, 7th Rajputs, which was destroyed by white ants while the regiment was in Burma. The regiment is shown on the left. The officer leading is Lieutenant J. F. Worledge. The Seaforth Highlanders are on the right. In the foreground are a dead Egyptian soldier and a wounded Highlander.



FROM THE CHINA WAR TO THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN

moved off, guided by Lieutenant Rawson, R.N. Macpherson's contingent started an hour later, as they were to advance through the cultivated land irrigated from the Sweet Water Canal, and it was feared that the inhabitants might raise the alarm. Their role was to prevent an enfilade fire on the British left, and Wolseley had in mind two separate attacks, so that if one were held up, the other would support it. The troops went noiselessly forward, halting frequently to dress and correct intervals; communication between the force north of the railway line and the Indian contingent was maintained by telegraph. At 4.50 a.m. the leading brigade on the north of the railway was detected by the enemy, who opened fire at a range of 300 yards. The troops were then ordered to fix bayonets, and carried the enemy's position by assault. The Egyptian rank and file, especially the Soudanese, put up a plucky fight; but being deserted by their officers, they broke and fled, pursued by the cavalry and fired on both by our artillery and their own captured guns. By 6 a.m. the enemy's army ceased to exist, and the Cavalry Division, dashing on ahead, entered Cairo at 4.45 p.m. on September 14th, having covered sixty-five miles in two days, just in time to prevent a repetition of the massacre at Alexandria. Arabi and his chief officers surrendered at discretion.

Meanwhile, what was happening on the south bank of the canal is graphically described in a letter of Surgeon Gimlette :—

'On the evening of the 12th, with a good deal of mystery, we got orders to strike tents at dusk, and pack and pile our baggage, as we might get further orders to march during the night. Of course, everyone knew that this meant the attack on Tel-el-Kebir at daybreak. All preparations made, we rolled ourselves up in great-coats and tried to get some sleep, but excitement, and occasional mysterious messages from Staff Officers, rather disturbed our rest. At last, the final order came to fall in at 2 o'clock, which was done in perfect silence. There was a good deal of delay for some reason or other; we stood waiting for the regiments who were to precede us to take their places, and it was nearly 4 o'clock before we moved off. Our line of advance was along the south bank of the canal, which the Indian contingent had all to themselves. Arabi had one battery in position on this side of the canal bank, but his strength lay on our right, and it was on that side that the important part of the battle came off. Our brigade had rather an uncomfortable road; we went along in a long column on

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

the top of a causeway, the canal on one side and marshy ground on the other. Just before daybreak, the enemy saw us, and began firing, at first away on our right ; but very soon one particular battery, right in front, found us out, and blazed away like fits. Our escape was most marvellous. The shells came screaming down, just overhead and on each side of our narrow column, falling and bursting so close as to scatter mud and dust over the men. The noise of the cannonade by this time was hideous. Yet with it all scarcely anybody was touched.

‘ We were now within about two miles of the enemy, and soon got an order to double, which we did, as hard as we could lay legs to the ground. This, I think, really saved us, as we soon got far enough in front to escape danger from the shells, which fell well to the rear. After a bit we came under their musketry fire, and had the pleasant sensation of bullets whistling about our ears in addition to the shells overhead. Soon the final rush came ; the Seaforths, who were in front, with the 7th in close support, drove the Egyptians out of their battery with their bayonets, capturing twelve guns. Our share of the fight was then over, the only thing left being to keep the flying enemy on the run. They bolted into fields of high maize, and were shot down literally in hundreds. About the same time, all the big redoubts and entrenchments on the right were taken, and our troops marched into Arabi’s camp. The whole affair lasted just two hours. Although the fire we were under seemed very hot, we only lost one killed and seven or eight wounded among the Seaforth Highlanders and the six or seven hundred sepoy of the three Indian regiments.

‘ Now came our great disappointment. We marched along our bank right past the deserted Egyptian camp—an immensely large one—from which we were divided by the canal, until we came to a bridge. Here we hoped to cross, so as to be able to investigate the captured camp and position, when an order came from Sir Garnet Wolseley for the Indian contingent to march to Zagazig, eighteen miles farther on. We had already come eight, a good part of it at the double, and felt much more inclined to sit down than to march on ! However, there was no help for it. On we had to go, and our first halt after leaving Kassasin was two miles beyond Tel-el-Kebir. The sun was by this time burning hot ; we struggled on all day, and at last got in at seven in the evening, after having been seventeen hours under arms, marched twenty-six miles, and fought an engagement—a very fair day’s work ! The only troops who did the whole march



CSL

FROM THE CHINA WAR TO THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN 73

were the sepoys, as the cavalry had galloped ahead and seized a train, which came back and picked up the Seaforths, who had dropped a long way behind us.'

The capture of Zagazig, the junction between Ismailia, Cairo and Alexandria, was of vital importance, and was carried out in a dashing manner. A squadron of the 6th Bengal Cavalry under Major Jennings rode on ahead of the Indian contingent, and when within five miles of the town they broke into a gallop. The horses were tired out by a long ride through loose sand, and three officers and about half a dozen sowars arrived at the railway station long before the rest. Here they found five trains with steam up and packed with troops. They rode up to the locomotives and the engine-drivers surrendered or were shot. Thereupon the soldiers jumped out, threw down their arms and bolted. By 9 p.m. the main body under Major-General Macpherson arrived on the scene, not a single sepoy having fallen out on the march.

Zagazig is a prosperous town, with fine houses and bazaars and broad streets, and the troops received a warm welcome from the inhabitants. It is surrounded by green fields, and these afforded a welcome change after the desert; the only drawback was a plague of mosquitoes and sandflies. The Indian troops had their tents, and rations were plentiful. Meanwhile, Cairo was occupied, and the citadel and fort at Mokattam, which were of great strength, surrendered without a blow, the troops laying down their arms and marching out. On September 18th, Wolseley took up his abode at the Abdin Palace, where, just a year before, Arabi had forced his terms upon the Khedive.

On September 22nd, the Indian contingent at Zagazig was ordered to march to Cairo in order to take part in a grand parade in honour of the Khedive. It covered forty-six miles in thirty-six hours, and was housed in the Abassiyeh barracks outside the city. All the detachments on the line of communication came in, and the troops marched past amid the ovations of the populace. On October 2nd, the Indian contingent was inspected by H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, and on the 10th by Sir Garnet Wolseley. Both expressed themselves in the highest terms on the turn-out and bearing of the men. The festivities came to a close with a magnificent ball at the Ghezireh palace. It was attended by all the officers who had taken part in the campaign, and the river was illuminated with thousands of fairy lamps, an unforgettable sight to all who witnessed it. Amongst other events,



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

the Musalman company was particularly gratified at being able to take part in the ceremonies connected with the dispatch of the Holy Carpet from Cairo to Mecca, and the Egyptians were greatly impressed by the sight of the victorious army paying its respect to this emblem of their faith. On October 10th the regiment left for Suez and embarked on the transport *India*. After an uneventful voyage it arrived at Bombay on the 25th and Lucknow on November 4th.

The following decorations were awarded to officers for their share in the campaign :—

Colonel H. R. B. Worsley : C.B. and 3rd Class Order of Medjedieh.

Major G. Logan : 3rd Class Order of Osmanieh.

Lieutenant E. G. Barrow : 5th Class Order of Medjedieh.

Subadar Dyal Singh : 5th Class Order of Medjedieh.

Two Indian officers, Subadars Gurdatt Singh (Rajput) and Chattar Singh (Sikh), with Sepoy Gajraj Singh (Rajput), were invited to visit England, and were received in audience by Queen Victoria at Windsor Castle. Her Majesty was graciously pleased to order the grant of a medal inscribed ' EGYPT 1882 ', with a clasp for Tel-el-Kebir, to the 7th N.I. and other regiments of the Indian contingent (G.G.O. 665, December 8th, 1882). Permission was also granted for the wearing by all ranks of the Khedive's bronze star, and for the inscription of the battle honours ' EGYPT 1882 ' and ' TEL-EL-KEBIR ' on the colours of the 7th Bengal Infantry (G.G.O. 341, June 15th, 1883).



COLONEL HENRY ROBERT BROWN WORSLEY, C.B.

Born 1833. Died 1902.

Mutiny, 1857; China, 1858-59; Lushai, 1869-70; Egypt, 1882.

Commandant, 1878-85.



CHAPTER VI

REGIMENTAL LIFE, 1882-1900

THE next few years in the history of the regiment are chiefly noteworthy for the changes which took place in its internal economy. In September 1883, H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught and Strathearn was appointed Honorary Colonel, and its title was altered to that of the 7th Duke of Connaught's Own Bengal Native Infantry (G.G.O. No. 542 of 1882). In the same year, the regiment was made a 'class company regiment',¹ and its composition was fixed as follows :—

- 2 Companies Hindustani Musalmans.
- 3 " Rajputs.
- 2 " Hindus of other castes, chiefly Jats and Ahirs.
- 1 Company Brahmans.

In October 1885, Lieut.-Colonel H. R. B. Worsley, C.B., having completed his seven years as Commanding Officer, was placed on the retired list, and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel G. A. Way. Colonel Worsley came of a well-known military family, and his father had commanded the 74th N.I. He joined the regiment in 1852, and served with it in Burma, the Mutiny and China, and received the thanks of the Bengal Government for his services against the Lushais. He commanded the regiment in the Egyptian Campaign, for which he received the C.B. One of the officers who served under him describes him as a genial and popular Commandant, who saw to it that the 7th in its drill and turn-out was one of the smartest battalions in the Indian Army. The Mess and Band were his special care. His rule was strict and entirely personal; he had little respect for regulations, and used to invent highly original punishments for the erring. One of his favourite sayings was that two things were *never* right, the Second in Command and the Quarter Guard clock!

On October 13th, 1886, an Army Circular was issued, which

¹ A 'class' regiment was one composed exclusively of one class. A 'class company' regiment was one in which there might be several classes, but each company would be composed of one class only.




HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

CSL

materially affected the organization of the Bengal Army. It ordered that all Native Infantry battalions should be linked together in groups of three battalions each. Enlistment would be for any one of the linked battalions, the numbers of the corps remaining unaltered. Liability to transfer from one battalion to another would only come into force in the case of one or more battalions being ordered on active service. A system of reserves, active and garrison, was introduced; the former was to consist of men transferred after not less than five or more than ten years' service with the colours, and the latter of men pensioned after twenty-one years' service, or who had completed a total of colour and reserve service of twenty-one years. The active reserve was limited to 100 men per battalion; the garrison reserve was unlimited.

The same circular granted pay to recruits, wherever enlisted, from date of enlistment, as well as 'marching batta', or free carriage for their baggage. Rates of good-conduct pay were sanctioned after three, six and ten years' service, and the annual allowance for 'half mounting' was raised from four to five rupees. Pension rules were altered by the abolition of invalid pensions after fifteen years' service, the grant of ordinary pensions to all soldiers after twenty-one years' service, and a gratuity of twelve months' pay of rank to all men discharged as unfit between fifteen and twenty-one years' service. Fixed regimental centres for the groups of linked battalions were authorized. Under this re-arrangement, the 7th was linked with 8th and 9th (subsequently the 11th) Regiments Bengal N.I., and the headquarters of the group was fixed at Lucknow.

In 1886, the regiment was stationed at Morar in the Gwalior State, and here it took part in the rendition to the Maharaja Sindia of the famous stronghold of Gwalior, 'the pearl in the necklace of the castles of Hind'. As the British garrison marched out of the fortress, the Maharaja's band, with unconscious humour, played the then popular tune, 'Tommy, make room for your uncle'. Morar was given up at the same time, the town of Jhansi being taken in exchange. After this, it moved to Calcutta, and the years 1886-91 were spent in Calcutta and Saugor. In 1889, it took the first place in musketry among corps armed with the Snider rifle. In 1890, it was inspected by the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Frederick Roberts, V.C., who expressed his approval of the smart appearance and high efficiency of officers and men.



7TH DUKE OF CONNAUGHT'S OWN BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY, LUCKNOW, 1883

Standing (from left to right) : Subadar Lalla Ram (M), ———, Subadar Gurdatt Singh *Bahadur*, O.B.I., Subadar Chatter Singh.
(The remaining nine standing are not known.)

Sitting (from left to right) : Lieutenant J. F. Worlledge, Lieutenant A. Elderton, Surgeon-Captain G. H. D. Gimlette, I.M.S., Major B. G. Vyvyan, Lieutenant A. E. Whistler, Colonel H. R. B. Worsley, C.B., Lieutenant E. G. Barrow, Lieutenant E. B. Burton, Lieutenant H. B. Vaughan, ———.



BURMA

For some time, operations had been in progress against the wild tribes on the frontiers of the newly-acquired province of Upper Burma. These tribes, unsettled by the change of government, had begun to raid their more peaceful neighbours, the most aggressive in their depredations being the Lushais and Chins, as some of their clans had added slave-catching and head-hunting to their other evil deeds. In 1890-1, expeditions had been sent into their country, and rebellious villages had been attacked and destroyed ; but after the columns had withdrawn, raiding went on much as before, and it became necessary thoroughly to explore and open up the whole strip of territory. In 1891, matters were complicated by an outbreak in the frontier State of Manipur, in the course of which the Chief Commissioner of Assam and certain members of his staff were brutally murdered.

In 1891, the regiment was under orders for service in Upper Burma, and the cadre of officers borne on the strength at the time was as follows :—

<i>Commandant</i> ..	Colonel G. A. Way (on furlough).
<i>Wing Commanders</i>	Major A. W. Jamieson (officiating Commandant). Brevet-Major E. G. Barrow (on furlough).
<i>Wing Officers</i> ..	Captain A. Elderton (on furlough). Captain H. B. Vaughan (officiating Second in Command). Lieutenant H. G. B. Raitt (on furlough). Lieutenant A. H. Bingley (officiating Wing Commander). Lieutenant N. E. Robin.
<i>Adjutant</i> ..	Lieutenant M. R. E. Ray (Quartermaster). Lieutenant A. H. Bingley. Lieutenant M. R. E. Ray (officiating Adjutant).
<i>Medical Officer</i> ..	Surgeon P. Mullane, M.D.
<i>Attached</i> ..	Lieutenant H. O. Parr (East Surrey Regiment—on probation). Lieutenant J. K. Condon (Manchester Regiment—on probation). Lieutenant E. F. Hood (South Wales Borderers—on probation).

It left Saugor on April 3rd, under the command of Major Jamieson and embarked at Calcutta on the R.I.M.S. *Dalhousie* and the B.I.S.N. steamer *Camorta*. Rangoon was reached on the 12th, and the next day it entrained for Thayetmyo and proceeded thence by steamer



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

to Myingyan, dropping a number of detachments *en route*. In August, instructions were received to take over the posts in the Kubo and Kale valleys from the 5th M.I., which had suffered heavy casualties from sickness. The detachment started from Pagan at the end of August under Lieutenant E. F. Hood, and proceeded up the Chindwin river in two Government steamers. Two companies were landed at Kalewa, at the junction of the Chindwin and Manipur rivers, and marched up the Kale valley; the remaining company went on up-stream to Sittaung, close to the Manipur border, where it was detained for several days owing to lack of transport and provisions. Eventually it reached the Manipur frontier in small detachments after a very trying march, as the track over the hills was washed away in several places, and the streams were much swollen by the rains. As soon as the company was collected, the march down the Kubo valley was resumed, and the various posts taken over from their former garrisons.

In September, orders were received to prepare a detachment of 300 men to take over the posts on the Pakoko-Haka road and the Yaw valley, in relief of the 28th M.I., which had suffered severely from sickness. The detachment, under the command of Lieutenant M. R. E. Ray, left Myingyan in October by steamer for Pakoko, and marched from there to Pauk. The march was a very trying one, owing to the flooded rivers which were encountered. In the same month, two Mounted Infantry sections of twenty-five men each were formed, one under Jemadar Jagdatt Singh at Pauk, and another under Lieutenant Ray at Yawdwin.

In January 1892, it was decided to send five separate columns to march through the Chin Hills and reduce the tribes to order. Two of these, the Baungshe Column commanded by Major R. H. Gunning of the 4th King's Royal Rifles, and the Yawdwin Column, commanded by Lieutenant M. R. E. Ray of the 7th Bengal Infantry, were to co-operate. Leaving Subadar Major Gurdatt Singh in charge of the garrison of Yawdwin, Lieutenant Ray, with Lieutenant Tighe, D.S.O., as Political Officer, two Indian officers and 120 rank and file, marched out on January 4th. After visiting villages in the Chinbok area and collecting tribute, the column advanced up the Mon river into the unexplored Chinme country. All went well until they came to the village of Khreum, which was found to be full of armed men, evidently bent on offering a determined resistance. A few shots were fired, and Lieutenant Ray deployed his men for attack. The sight of the



advancing troops was too much for the Chinme villagers, who came out and tendered their submission. From Khreum the column moved to the Southern Baungshe country, where it was of indirect assistance to Major Gunning, as the Baungshes, finding themselves threatened from two sides at once, offered little resistance. It also prevented their neighbours, the Chinmes and Chinboks, from coming to their help, or offering them a place of refuge. The column then returned to Yawdwin to refit, visiting *en route* the villages in the Southern Chinme country and collecting tribute. When a treaty of amity was agreed on, the officers concerned had, as a token of friendship, to suck spruce beer through a cane syphon after it had been used by a very dirty Chin chief, rather a trying experience !

Yawdwin was reached on February 24th, and four days later the column again set off, this time under Captain A. Elderton, who had just returned from furlough. It was out until April 10th, marching along the Mon valley and reducing the tribesmen to order. Thus it was in the field for three and a half months, a longer time than any other column, and in spite of the hardships endured, the health of the troops was excellent ; only one man died and only eight went sick. For his services on this expedition, Lieutenant Ray and his detachment received the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief for 'their energy and hard work'. This praise was well merited, for Lieutenant Ray, in addition to commanding the column, made a survey of the country in which it was operating, supplemented by an excellent military report. Those who took part in these operations never forgot the beauty of the country through which they passed—the jungle-clad mountains capped with mist, the deep valleys with their masses of scarlet rhododendrons, and the curious box-shaped stone burial places of the Chinbok chiefs, each containing miniature bows and arrows and little pots filled with water or rice for the dead man's sustenance in the world of shades. The sepoys were fond of sticking red rhododendron flowers in their *pagris*, and the effect was so smart that fringes and falls of that colour were afterwards adopted as part of the uniform.

A novel feature of the operations was the use of signalling, by means of flags, helio and lamps, in order to keep up communications between outlying posts. The jungle was so dense that it was often necessary to climb a lofty tree for the purpose. The first batch of regimental signallers were trained by Lieutenant A. H. Bingley in



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

1887-9, when, in spite of official discouragement, he taught them to write Hindustani messages in Roman characters. This idea proved to be invaluable, and the use of Roman Urdu, as it was called, was afterwards officially adopted. The scattered temporary posts of the Yawdwin Column were afterwards abandoned and a permanent one established at Mindat Sakan (Mount Victoria), in the Chinbok hills, situated at a height of 4,800 feet. After unaccountable delay, the India Medal of 1854, with the clasp 'BURMA 1889-92', was issued in 1907 to such members of the column as had shared in the operations against the Baungshes.

In 1892, the Bengal Army was re-armed with the Martini-Henry rifle, Mark II, and short triangular bayonets. In the same year, it was decided to raise an Indian regiment, to be known as the Hong Kong Regiment, for service in China. Major E. G. Barrow, Second in Command of the 7th, was appointed Commandant, and Lieutenant M. R. E. Ray Quartermaster. Five Havildars, two Naiks and fifty-seven rank and file, all Musalmans, volunteered for the new regiment, and in consequence the class composition of the 7th was again altered. The number of Rajput companies was increased from four to five, and the Musalman companies reduced from two to one. A recruiting depot was opened at Lucknow in order to bring the regiment up to strength. At the same time, the active reserve was called up for discipline and training, and ninety-seven reservists attended.

In July of the same year, cholera broke out at Myingyan and other stations on the Irrawaddy, and Captain A. Elderton and four sepoy succumbed. In October, a rising took place among the Northern Chins, and Lieutenant J. K. Condon was sent with a detachment to reinforce the posts on the Kalemmyo—Fort White road. In January 1893, the various detachments were relieved by the 28th M.I. and assembled at Myingyan for return to India. They embarked on the R.I.M.S. *Irrawaddy* for Rangoon, where they were transferred to the *Clive*. They reached Calcutta on January 31st, and Lucknow on February 9th. On the 13th, they were inspected by Lord Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief, and Major Jamieson received a copy of the following letter from the Military Secretary :—

'I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to request that you will convey to the Officer Commanding the 7th Bengal Infantry His Excellency's entire satisfaction with the turn-out



7TH DUKE OF CONNAUGHT'S OWN BENGAL INFANTRY, SAUGOR, 1890

Standing (from left to right) : Jemadar Lachman Upadhya, Jemadar Badri Narayan Singh, Jemadar Gajraj Singh, Jemadar Asghar Ali Khan, Lieutenant J. K. Condon, Surgeon-Major P. Mullane, I.M.S., Subadar Ram Ratan Singh, Jemadar Anwar Khan.

Sitting (from left to right) : Jemadar Afsir Ali Khan, Subadar Lalla Ram (M), Lieutenant N. E. Robin, Colonel G. A. Way, C.B., Subadar Major Gurdatt Singh Bahadur, O.B.I., Major A. W. Jamieson, Subadar Mahomed Yar Khan, Subadar Bhawanibaksh Singh.

(In front) : Lieutenant H. G. B. Raitt, Jemadar Paltu Ram.



and general appearance of the regiment at his inspection after its recent return from Burma.'

An idea of the improved conditions in the Indian Army may be obtained by comparing the health of the regiment in Burma in 1855-7 to that enjoyed in 1891-3. In the former campaign, it lost about 700 men, chiefly from sickness; in the latter, its total casualties from sickness were one British, one Indian officer, and forty-three rank and file. This was mainly due to Lieut.-Colonel Jamieson, and his work was acknowledged in the following letter from the Secretary to Government to the Adjutant-General in India, dated March 20th, 1893 :—

'In acknowledging the receipt of your letter dated March 7th, 1893, submitting a report on the sanitary condition of the 7th Bengal Infantry while in Burma, I am directed to express the satisfaction of the Government of India at the excellent results obtained by Lieut.-Colonel Jamieson's good regimental system for the care of his men.'

Colonel G. A. Way, C.B., vacated command on March 6th, 1892, and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Jamieson, who had officiated as Commandant during his absence on leave. Colonel Way joined the 58th N.I. in 1855 and was with that regiment when it mutinied in 1857. He then joined the Punjab Frontier Force and took part in the Mahsud-Waziri Expedition of 1860. He held various appointments on the Staff, and as D.A.A.G. Eastern Frontier District was mentioned in despatches for his services in the Akha Expedition of 1883. He was a practical soldier and did much to improve the field training and equipment of the regiment. The latter, in those days, was for the most part provided regimentally, through the Half-Mounting Fund. Somewhat stern of aspect and a strict disciplinarian, Colonel Way commanded the respect of those serving under him by his justice, impartiality, and the confidence he placed in those whom he trusted. He was a keen shikari and made a fine collection of Indian birds. His love of the classics, acquired as a boy at Eton, continued throughout his service, and he would read Horace and Virgil with pleasure up to the time of his death.

In 1893, a far-reaching change was introduced, when it was decided to reorganize the sixteen Hindustani infantry regiments of the Bengal Army as 'class regiments'. Experience has shown that not only were recruits of a better stamp attracted to class regiments, but

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

that all ranks were more contented when serving with men of their own race and caste ; the regimental system was found to work more harmoniously in such corps, while *esprit de corps* was fostered and a healthy spirit of rivalry engendered. Excluding the 9th Bengal Infantry, which became a Gurkha regiment, the other fifteen regiments were reorganized in four classes, viz. Brahmans, Rajputs, Musalmans, and Jats, the 2nd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 11th, 13th and 16th Bengal Infantry becoming Rajput regiments. Under this scheme, the 7th became a regiment of Rajputs recruited from the United Provinces ; the Brahmans in the regiment were transferred to the 1st, the Jats to the 10th, and the Musalmans to the 18th, while the Rajputs from the 6th were transferred to the 7th. At the same time, a large number of men who had been in Burma were granted furlough. After this, the regiment was brought up to strength by recruiting parties. In 1894, a Regimental Rifle Meeting, organized on the same lines as the Bengal Presidency Rifle Association, was held. Medals were given for the highest individual scores, and there were revolver matches for British and Indian officers.

At the end of 1896, the regiment was transferred to Baksa Duar, on the Bhutan frontier, with a wing at Dorunda in the Ranchi District. Shortly after, it received the following farewell letter from Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., commanding the Oudh District :—

‘ The Major-General Commanding the Oudh District desires to express to Lieut.-Colonel Jamieson, commanding the 7th Bengal Infantry, his very high estimation of the battalion under his command.

‘ During the time they have been stationed at Lucknow, from February 9th, 1893, the regiment has attained to a very high state of perfection. Their smartness at drill was all that could be desired, and the conduct of the men has been exemplary.

‘ Great credit is due to Lieut.-Colonel Jamieson and his officers, both British and Native, and amongst the latter the Major-General noticed the very efficient way in which the Subadar Major carried out his duties and supervised all the work connected with them.

‘ The Major-General regrets exceedingly losing the regiment from his command, and wishes them every happiness in their new stations. He is sorry that owing to his absence from Lucknow a Station Order was not issued at the time of their departure, but he hopes that Lieut.-Colonel Jamieson will publish his remarks in Battalion Orders, and record them in the History of the Regiment.’



In 1897, Lieut.-Colonel Jamieson was promoted Brevet-Colonel and went on leave. He did not rejoin the regiment, for he was selected for the officiating command of the Presidency Brigade. He did not hold this appointment long, however, as he decided to retire. He belonged to a family of long-standing military traditions, his father being Major-General J. W. H. Jamieson of the East India Company's Service. Colonel Jamieson joined the 7th Rajputs in 1876 and was for some years Adjutant of an Indian Volunteer Corps. He was a man of many talents—an agreeable companion, an actor, an artist, a linguist, and a writer of some distinction, being a regular contributor to the *Pioneer* and other Indian newspapers. He was succeeded in the command of the regiment by Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Mansel.

On June 20th, 1897, the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria was celebrated by special parades and Thanksgiving Services all over India, and special concessions to the Indian Army were announced in commemoration of the occasion. The Order of British India was increased by ten First Class and forty Second Class appointments; an extra Meritorious Medal with 25 rupees gratuity was given to one Havildar in each regiment; and two extra Long Service and Good Conduct Medals were given to each unit. On January 1st, 1898, it was announced that the designation of the regiment was to be altered to the 7th (The Duke of Connaught's Own) Rajput Regiment of Bengal Infantry. A detachment consisting of Subadar Adhar Singh, one Jemadar and fifty-nine rank and file was sent on March 31st to the Tochi valley on the North-West Frontier, to reinforce the 8th Bengal Infantry. During the year, the regiment was mainly occupied in building new lines, but in spite of this handicap, it managed to obtain an excellent Inspection Report. 'The cheerful, clean, contented appearance of the men, proved to the G.O.C. that the 7th Rajputs are animated by an excellent *esprit de corps*, which reflects great credit on all ranks.'

In 1899, the colours presented at Dacca in 1868 having become worn out, they were replaced by a new set. These were formally presented to the regiment by Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Mansel, who gave a brief history of the corps since its formation. The following Battle Honours were borne on the new colours:—Moodkee, Ferozeshah, Aliwal, Sobraon, China 1858-9, Egypt 1882, Tel-el-Kebir.

On December 21st, the regiment entrained for Calcutta, where it



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

CSL

replaced the 4th (P.V.O.) Rajputs at Fort William, and while it was stationed there an important change in regimental organization was brought about by the introduction of the double company system.

By this important reform the organization of an Indian Infantry battalion, which since 1867 had consisted of eight companies grouped in two wings, each under a Wing Commander, was altered to four double companies, each under a Double Company Commander. This arrangement left the eight subadars in charge of companies as before, but gave commands suitable to their rank and length of service to two senior British officers who would otherwise have remained in subordinate positions. It ensured the closer supervision in training demanded by modern tactics and armament, and it provided for the more suitable employment of a cadre which had been increased from a total of eight to twelve officers. It is interesting to note that the double company organization was devised by Major E. G. Barrow of the 7th Rajputs, and introduced by him, with complete success, in the Hong Kong Regiment, which he raised and commanded. It was the forerunner of the four company organization adopted in the British Army just before the Great War.



CHAPTER VII

CHINA : THE BOXER CAMPAIGN, 1900-1

IN June 1900, the trouble which had long been brewing in China came to a head. Ever since 1856, when the Chinese were forced to throw open their ports to the Indian opium trade, feeling against the economic and cultural penetration of the country had been growing. One European nation after another had been demanding treaty ports, railway and mining concessions, and other exclusive privileges. The Russians occupied Port Arthur, the British Wei-hai-wei, and the Germans Kiauchao.¹ A succession of floods and famines had added to the general discontent, and ardent nationalists declared that the Christian missionaries were undermining the ancient culture laid down in the Confucian classics.

China has always swarmed with secret societies, and one of the most popular was that known as the 'Righteous Harmony Fists', whose members adopted as their sign a pair of clenched fists and were generally known among the Europeans as 'the Boxers'.² The Boxers were pledged to the extermination of the 'foreign devils', and were responsible for a number of outrages upon Europeans. Missionaries, both men and women, together with their Christian converts, were brutally murdered. The Chinese Government professed itself to be unable to interfere. There were two parties, the Manchu faction led by Prince Tuan, which was openly in favour of the Boxers, and the Court Party under the Dowager Empress, which counselled moderation. But the Empress, who was in fear that her adopted son would lose his throne, allowed herself to be carried away by the wave of popular feeling, and consented to the summoning to Peking of General Tung-fu-shan and his hordes of savage soldiery from Kansu. General Tung-fu-shan openly boasted that he would drive the foreigners into the sea.

At Peking, the Chinese capital, were the European Legations, with the Ministers and their staffs, wives and families, besides a number of

¹ They called it Tsingtao.

² The Chinese name of this society was the Ih-Hwo-chuan.

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

missionaries, business men, engineers and railway officials. Monseigneur Favier, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Peking, who was in intimate touch with the Chinese, issued repeated warnings about the seriousness of the situation. These were at first disregarded, but during May matters assumed an increasingly alarming complexion. Troops were pouring into the capital, and assaults upon Europeans became more and more frequent. Finally, Baron von Kettler, the German Minister, was murdered. A call for assistance was sent to Tientsin, and in reply, 450 seamen and marines of various nationalities were despatched by rail to Peking early in June.

The Legation Quarter, which was in the south-east corner of the Tartar city, was put into a state of defence, and Sir Claude Macdonald, the British Minister, was asked to take command. By the middle of June, road and railway communications were severed, and the Legations were completely isolated from the outside world. The distance between Tientsin, at the mouth of the Peiho river, and Peking, is about eighty miles, and a relieving force of 2,000 seamen and marines of various nationalities under Admiral Sir E. H. Seymour, which on June 10th went to the rescue of the Legations in armoured trains, found the line cut and was obliged to retire with heavy casualties. It fell back on Tientsin, where it was itself closely besieged in the Foreign Settlement.

It was now evident that the Legations could only be relieved by an international army of considerable strength. The time factor made it impossible to send troops from England, and in any case this was rendered difficult by the fact that the British Government was already in the throes of the South African War, which was making heavy demands on its military resources. It was therefore decided to call upon India, and the authorities rose nobly to the occasion. In record time a cavalry brigade and an infantry division, together with divisional troops, were got ready for active service. They were placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir A. Gaselee, K.C.B., with Brigadier-General E. G. Barrow, C.B. (late 7th Rajputs) as Chief of the Staff. The force, with the exception of the artillery, consisted entirely of Indian units, Rajputs, Mahrattas, Sikhs, Punjabis, Baluchis and Gurkhas, and was thus thoroughly representative of the martial races of the country. The 1st Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Sir Norman Stewart, Bart., consisted of the 7th Rajputs, the 1st Sikhs, the 24th Punjabis, and the 26th Baluchistan



Regiment.¹ General Gaselee, in taking over command, issued the following proclamation to the troops :—

‘ In assuming command of the Force, Lieutenant-General Sir Alfred Gaselee, K.C.B., A.D.C., desires to remind the corps composing it that they represent all classes of the Indian Army, and that as the honour and good repute of that army is in their hands, he expects from them a high standard of discipline and soldierly smartness, as well as valour and endurance.

‘ The occasion is unique in the annals of the Indian Army. Ten thousand men, composed almost entirely of Indian soldiers, cross the sea to protect the lives of the Queen’s subjects in a far distant land. The duty thus entrusted to them shows the confidence which Her Gracious Majesty the Queen-Empress puts in her Indian soldiers. Sir Alfred Gaselee feels assured that this duty will be cheerfully and bravely performed, whatever the hardships, difficulties and dangers may be.

‘ Further, they go to meet as allies the troops of other armies—the Russians, the French, the Germans, the Americans and the Japanese—and in the presence of these it behoves the Indian soldiers of the Queen to show that they are second to none in soldierly conduct, and that Her Majesty has in her Indian troops men as good as those of any nation in the world.’

On June 19th, the regiment received orders to form a depot at Fort William and hold itself in readiness for field service. Two hundred men were away on leave, and had to be recalled by telegram. The 7th Rajputs were still armed with the Martini-Henry rifle, and as this would be quite inadequate against an enemy equipped with modern weapons, Lee-Metford rifles taken from the 34th Sikh Pioneers were sent by passenger train from Rawalpindi and issued two or three days before sailing. A Maxim gun was also received from Attock. In eleven days, the battalion was mobilized at full service strength (720 men), with stores, mules, sea and foreign service kits, and six months’ land and two months’ sea rations. The latter included a flock of goats, the only meat which caste Hindus will eat. Two hired transports were requisitioned, the *Nerbudda* and the *Palamcottah*, and by the 24th the former was loaded up. The work was most exhausting, as during the monsoon the climate of Calcutta is moist and steamy to a

¹ The 26th Baluchistan Regiment did not arrive in time to take part in the relief of the Peking Legations. Its place was filled by the Royal Welch Fusiliers, from Hong Kong.



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

degree. The officers who accompanied the regiment on active service were as follows :—

<i>Officiating Commandant</i>	Major H. B. Vaughan.
<i>Double Company Commanders</i>	Captain A. H. Bingley (officiating Second in Command). Captain N. E. Robin. Captain H. O. Parr. Captain J. A. Stewart.
<i>Double Company Officers</i>	Lieutenant H. C. Cutler, 8th Rajputs (attached). 2nd Lieutenant C. A. G. P. Meadows. 2nd Lieutenant A. G. Shea. 2nd Lieutenant H. N. F. Macdonnell, 8th Rajputs (attached). 2nd Lieutenant G. T. Vander Gucht, 11th Rajputs (attached).
<i>Adjutant</i>	Captain E. F. Hood.
<i>Quartermaster</i>	Lieutenant J. C. Loch.
<i>Medical Officer</i>	Captain H. J. Walton, I.M.S.
<i>Subadar Major</i>	Gurdatt Singh, <i>Bahadur</i> , O.B.I.

2nd Lieutenant G. C. Ross, 1/3rd Gurkhas (attached) and 2nd Lieutenant C. R. C. Sandys, 16th Rajputs (attached) joined in Pekin in November 1900, after the relief of the Legations.

On June 25th, the Left Wing, under Captain A. H. Bingley, marched down to the Kidderpore docks and embarked on the *Nerbudda* in pouring rain. Captain Bingley was at the time officiating D.A.A.G. at Army Headquarters, but fortunately he had obtained permission to return to his regiment for active service. Five days later, Headquarters and the Right Wing under Major Vaughan followed on the *Palamcottah*. Before leaving, the regiment was inspected by Brigadier-General Leach, C.B., commanding the Presidency Brigade, who congratulated it on being selected and said that he was confident that the 7th Rajputs would live up to their reputation, in the field. Telegrams wishing the regiment good luck were received from Sir John Woodburn, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and the Maharaja Sindia of Gwalior.

The first part of the voyage was thoroughly uncomfortable. Few of the men, except some Indian officers and a handful of old soldiers who had been in Burma, had seen the sea before. The



monsoon was at its height, and the sepoys were prostrated with seasickness. After passing the Nicobar Islands, however, conditions improved. Subadar Major Gurdatt Singh, by the ingenious device of smearing the galleys with a layer of Ganges mud, managed to overcome the caste scruples of many of the men in regard to cooking on board ship, and Subadar Ram Ratan Singh invented an excellent emergency ration. All ranks were kept busy with parades and instruction in the use of their new weapons. The Indian officers and N.C.O.s were first instructed, and soon the decks were studded with groups of men working their bolts and charging magazines. Firing practice at towed targets was carried out. A number of partially-trained recruits were issued with khaki uniforms and equipment, and put through their drill. A halt was made at Singapore, and then at Hong Kong, where the sepoys were entertained with sweetmeats and fruit by the Hong Kong Regiment. The men of this corps were mostly Punjabi Musalmans, and had originally been raised by Major Barrow of the 7th. Everyone was greatly impressed by the fine buildings and magnificent harbour of Hong Kong. After they left Hong Kong, the weather became very bad again, and Taku Roads, at the mouth of the Peiho river, were not reached till the 17th. As the transports steamed past the forts recently captured by the allies, the marines and bluejackets turned out and cheered them.

Taku Roads presented an extraordinary appearance. Thirty-six warships, besides transports, lay at anchor, and the scene reminded the onlooker of a naval review at Spithead. Captain Bingley reported his arrival to Admiral Seymour, and learnt from him details of his gallant but unsuccessful attempt to relieve Peking. The admiral said that the rails had been torn up by the Boxers behind as well as in front of his armoured train, making it impossible to advance or retreat. He had been opposed by regular troops as well as the Boxer rabble, and his ammunition had run out. He had only been saved from disaster by the discovery of a Chinese magazine from which he was able to replenish his stock. The fighting at Tientsin had been of a desperate character. The Chinese were armed with modern artillery, and fired as many as 500 shells a day into the European Settlement. Men from the *Terrible*, fresh from South Africa, said that the bombardment of Ladysmith had been child's play compared with this. Four days before the arrival of the Indian troops, the native city of Tientsin had been taken after a desperate struggle, and the Chinese had fallen




HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

CSL

back to Peitsang on the Pekin road where they were reported to be digging themselves in.

By working all night, the troops were disembarked before day-break, and next day they were taken by train up to Tientsin, thirty miles distant, while the stores and kit followed on lighters drawn by tugs. Everywhere along the line were signs of the recent fighting. The Peiho was full of floating corpses, and the stench was appalling. Many of the buildings were shattered by shellfire, and here and there groups of native houses were still burning fiercely. Officers and men were comfortably housed in some large and airy godowns belonging to Messrs. Butterfield & Swire on the left bank of the river. The city was crowded with soldiers of all nationalities, and presented a curious spectacle, Indian sepoy's rubbing shoulders with French Zouaves, Italian Bersaglieri, Japanese, Russians and Americans. A curious multitude assembled every day to watch the drums and pipes of the 1st Sikhs playing outside their quarters. General Gaselee and his staff landed on July 28th and on August 1st the Brigadier, Sir Norman Stewart, paid the Rajputs a visit. General Barrow also came over to call on his old regiment.

There were endless delays in starting for the relief of Pekin. The foreign generals were of opinion that it would be impossible to arrive in time to save the Legations and that no advance could be made until at least 60,000 troops had been landed. On July 29th, a cipher message was received from Sir Claude Macdonald, written nine days earlier, in which he said, 'We have provisions for about two weeks, but are eating our ponies. If the Chinese do not press their attacks, we can hold out for some days, say ten; but if they show determination, it is a question of four to five, so no time should be lost if a terrible massacre is to be avoided.' To those at Tientsin who had friends in Pekin, the situation was agonizing, and General Gaselee and General Chaffee, the American Commander-in-Chief, stated that the attempt must be made at all hazards, and if no one else would go, the British and Americans would advance alone, cost what it might. It was impossible to sit with folded hands, waiting for reinforcements, while eighty miles away European women and children were in hourly danger of being slaughtered. Immediately this decision was known, there was an immense activity in Tientsin; Pekin carts, ponies and their saddles, donkeys and rickshaws were commandeered, and means of transport of any kind fetched fancy prices.



ADVANCE FROM TIENTSIN TO PEKIN



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

CSL

On July 28th orders for the advance on Pekin were received from Headquarters :—

‘The following troops will be held in readiness for active operations, with eight days’ supplies for men, two days’ grain and forage for horses, 1st and 2nd reserves of small arm ammunition, and light scale baggage without tents :—

1st Bengal Lancers	400 sabres.
7th Rajputs	500 rifles.
1st Sikhs	500 rifles.
24th Punjab Infantry	250 rifles.
12th Field Battery R.A.	6 guns.
Hong Kong Artillery	1 12-pounder.
			4 Maxims.
Royal Navy	3 12-pounders.
Royal Welch Fusiliers	300 rifles.
Hong Kong Regiment	100 rifles.
Chinese Regiment	100 rifles.
Hong Kong and Singapore Battalion R.A.	Gun Detachment.


Boats will be allotted to units, who will be responsible for loading and guarding them. Four armed men will be allotted to each boat by the units concerned, who will assist in working the boats as well as guarding them.

‘All arrangements to begin at once ; a forward movement may take place in a few days, as it is believed that the Legations are still holding out in Pekin. Obligatory mules and land transport will accompany the force by land. Troops not included in the above order will remain under the orders of General Dorward at Tientsin.’

On August 3rd, a conference of allied generals was held, and it was decided to start at daybreak on the following morning. The international force detailed for the purpose was about 20,000 strong with seventy guns, and it was arranged that British, Japanese and Americans were to work jointly along the right bank of the Peiho, while the Russians (East Siberian Regiments and Cossacks) and French advanced along the left bank. It was not actually until the afternoon of the 4th that the troops started, the guns rattling noisily over the cobblestones and rickety bridges, and the infantry raising thick clouds of dust. It was hot and clammy, with an occasional

drizzle ; fortunately, however, the rain that year was not as heavy as usual, or most of the country between Tientsin and Peking would have been an impassable morass.

The first brush with the enemy was at Hsi-Ku, about four miles from Tientsin, where there was an arsenal. Here the Chinese had taken up a position, but they were dislodged by the Japanese at about 2 a.m. and retired on their main body at Peitsang, about four miles farther on. The troops bivouacked at Hsi-Ku, while the approaches to Peitsang were being reconnoitred. The Chinese were found strongly posted. Their left rested on the railway embankment, and they had flooded the surrounding country, rendering it impassable. Their centre was located round the village of Peitsang, through the middle of which ran the Peiho river, and here was an important bridge. Their right flank stretched from the river to the embankment along which ran the Peking road, and was covered by tall crops. The only possible line



ACTION NEAR PEITSANG, AUGUST 5th, 1900

of attack, over the open ground between the river and the road, was covered by several lines of skilfully constructed entrenchments and earth-works, and sown with land-mines. The enemy was reported to have twenty-six guns in position. The assault was planned to take place at daylight, preceded by a bombardment by the Japanese artillery; under cover of this, the British force was to deploy for attack behind the road, the 1st Sikhs and 24th Punjabis in the firing line, and the 7th Rajputs and Royal Welch Fusiliers in close support.

'After a scratch dinner', says Major Vaughan, 'we lay down, the regiment in column of companies in front, officers and hospital next, and mules in rear. Rain fell during the night, and it wasn't at all pleasant. Saddles were used as pillows, and with our great-coats spread over us, we lay on the bare ground. Our doctor, however, was in clover, as he slept in his hospital dooly with a waterproof roof and curtains. We stood to arms at 1.30 a.m. and finally marched at 4 a.m., along a track on the south side of the embankment. Firing was heard ahead of us to our right front; with the rattle of musketry and booming of big guns, which as we advanced grew louder. . . .

'After going some distance, we were ordered to halt, and lay down on the south slope of the embankment and charged magazines. Our field battery now came up, and we closed to the right to make room for it. Two gunners began taking the range. At that moment, a shell whizzed past me, and burying itself in the ground about ten yards behind, burst with a dull report in the high crops. "A narrow shave that, sir," remarked one of the range-takers, who was close alongside. I went and lay down on the left of our line. A few minutes after, an officer of the Hong Kong Regiment came up and said, "Three of your men are lying wounded just behind you." I went and looked, and saw three of our signallers lying on the ground, groaning, and saying, *Goli laga, doctor Sahib bhejdo*, "We are wounded, send a doctor." . . .

'At 6 a.m. the Chief of the Staff, General Barrow, ordered us to advance to the attack on the left of the 1st Sikhs. Captain Bingley started with his double company, and ten minutes later we followed with the next one. I told Captain Robin to take his double company still farther to the left and advance, covering our left outer flank. The Royal Welch Fusiliers advanced in support of us; the crops were very high, but we could see our shrapnel bursting over the villages in



front, one of which was in flames. We could not hear the enemy's bullets owing to the rustling made by our progress through the crops, but in the patches of open ground we heard them pattering, and saw the soil jumping. So many struck in one place that, though I had a sprained ankle, I thought it advisable to dismount.'

Captain Bingley thus describes the adventures of his double company as it advanced :—

'The 1st Sikhs and 7th Rajputs were about 400 strong, and the Royal Welch Fusiliers and 24th Punjabis only about 250 each. The ground we had to advance over was covered with *kaolian*, a sort of giant millet six to eight feet high, which made it not only impossible to see, but also offered considerable physical obstruction, making movements in any sort of formation very difficult. After advancing for about half an hour, we all got hopelessly mixed up. Firing lines lost their supports, which in some cases got in front of them ; control, except over the men near one, was out of the question. The heat was intense and, though we were being shelled the whole time, we were unable to reply, as we could see nothing in front of us. We simply shoved along to the sound of the Japanese fire on our left. At one or two places we had to cross clearings, and there the enemy's fire became heavy and fairly accurate. We suddenly came upon some advanced trenches in front of which the Chinese had prepared a land-mine. They got nervous, however, as we drew near, and bolted before they had time to set fire to the quick match, which we found already fixed. The majority scattered into the crops, where, later, they were hunted down by the 1st Bengal Lancers. Still pressing forward, we could hear heavy firing on our left, followed by much cheering. This was the Japanese infantry capturing the bridgehead and village of Peitsang.

About ten minutes later we emerged from the crops and found ourselves on the river-bank. About 1,000 yards off, on the other side, we could see a large body of Chinese regulars in line, with field artillery on their flanks, retiring in excellent order. We put a few volleys into them and our guns galloped up and shelled them, but they soon disappeared in the crops and our fire became masked by the advance of the Japanese. There was no real pursuit, for the 1st Bengal Lancers and most of the Japanese cavalry were on the wrong side of the river. We then crossed the pontoon bridge and occupied the village. There were not more than eighty or ninety




HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

CSL

dead in the Chinese trenches, but they usually carry off their dead as well as their wounded. Most of the dead we found were in a wood to the south of the village, which had been shelled by our naval 12-pounders at 8,000 yards range. The Russians and French advancing along the railway did not come up until after the fight was over. Their support was practically limited to distant artillery fire. Our total casualties were, I think, about thirty. Our regiment suffered most, I believe, but our own casualties were only about five wounded.

‘On the 6th, we left Peitsang, leaving a garrison there of a company of the 7th under Lieutenant Meadows, one company of Americans, and one of Japanese. We advanced on Yangtsun, where the Chinese had prepared a second and more formidable position. On this occasion the Japanese advanced along the right bank of the Peiho, and the British and Americans along the left bank. The 7th was on rearguard that day, and owing to the fact that our Brigadier, Sir Norman Stewart, had with mistaken courtesy allowed a Russian regiment to cut in between us and our main body, we found ourselves hopelessly in rear ; for the Russians only march about two miles an hour and make long and frequent halts. Meanwhile we could hear our guns in action in front, so we started to head the Russians, moving by by-paths and across country. By great efforts we got in front of them and came up towards the end of the fight, the men greatly exhausted by the heat and the pace at which we had moved, for the last two miles were at the double. We were rushed along into action without a halt to support the attacking infantry, which consisted of the Americans on the right and the British on the left.

‘We had to move in places through high crops of *kaolian*, and the heat was terrific. The men were so tired that it was with some difficulty that we got them to go on. In the middle of the field of action there was a well where British, American and Indian soldiers struggled and quarrelled to get water. By the time the 7th got up, the 1st Sikhs and 11th U.S. Infantry were charging up the railway embankment, and the 24th Punjabis were clearing the village. The Chinese held their rifle-pits till the sepoys were within a hundred yards of them. Then they bolted, and our men were too done up to follow them ; they simply flung themselves on the ground, and called for *pani* and *pakhals*. The 1st Sikhs had a few casualties and the Americans considerably more, owing to the formation of the ground which made them bunch together and keep supports too close to the



ACTION NEAR YANGTSUN, AUGUST 6th, 1900



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

firing-line. The American medical resources seemed limited, for many of their wounded were picked up by our stretcher-parties and attended to in our field hospitals, which were excellent. Everyone was full of praise for the *Kahars*, who carry their doolies most pluckily under fire, and never seem to go sick or get tired.¹

‘After taking the village of Yangtsun and the railway embankment, we found that we had only captured the Chinese advanced position ; their main line of defence was about a mile ahead. Against this the British, American and Russian artillery opened fire, and the Russian infantry deployed for attack. But the fire was not returned, and on getting up to the position, the Russians found it deserted. The Chinese cleared out so fast that pursuit by men done up by a trying march of fourteen miles, in fearful heat, was impossible. As it was, there were many cases of apoplexy among the Indian as well as among the British, Russian and American troops.’

All the next day (August 7th) the force remained at Yangtsun, quite prostrated by its exertions, and on the 8th the advance was resumed. Owing to the fact that the Japanese insisted on starting first, the rest of the Allies had to march in the heat of the day, and the troops suffered greatly. Men fell out by the score, but fortunately the river was only a few hundred yards distant, and they were quickly put on board the junks. One of the chief sources of trouble was the blinding, choking dust, particularly in the neighbourhood of the guns, which made breathing difficult. The road had no trees, but the crops on either side shut out the air and made it seem as though the troops were marching through an endless tunnel. The scene at the wells was extraordinary, British and American soldiers burnt brick-red with exposure struggling for water with bearded Sikhs and white-coated Japanese. The tents, baggage and supplies were carried on junks, towed along the Peiho by long lines of coolies under Captain Parr’s command, but owing to the shallowness of the river and its frequent bends, progress was very slow, and the whole march from Tientsin to Peking was performed in the clothes that the men stood up in. At night they slept in open bivouacs, without even waterproof sheets, in fields drenched with rain, and more trying conditions could not easily be imagined. The country was absolutely

¹ The casualties were : British 45, Americans 72, Russians 118. Many of them were due to mistakes on our side. Our guns shelled our own troops and the Americans, and the 1st Bengal Lancers fired on the Russians !



deserted, as the villagers fled in terror before the advance. The Commissariat was, however, efficient, and there were no complaints about the rations. Considering the shortness of the notice which they had received, this spoke well for the Indian Commissariat Department.

After an arduous march of ten miles, the troops reached a large village of the name of Tsaitsun, and the cavalry, going forward to reconnoitre, reported that the Chinese were in force at Ho-hsi-wu, about a mile farther on. The Japanese moved out to attack them, and after a fusillade lasting for about fifteen minutes, the enemy fled, abandoning an elaborately prepared position, including an enormous cutting, thirty feet broad and twenty feet deep, by means of which they hoped to divert the river and surround the whole position by an impassable moat. During these operations, two squadrons of the 1st Bengal Lancers under Major Hayes came upon a body of 500 Tartar cavalry and charged them, killing fifty and capturing two standards. On the 10th and 11th, Ma-tau and Chung-chia-wan were occupied after some skirmishing, and the troops prepared to attack Tung-chau. Tung-chau is a great depot for the rice trade, and there the junks had to disembark their heavy guns and stores for the last thirteen miles of the advance, as the river beyond this point is not navigable. To everyone's surprise, the town was evacuated without a blow, and the allies occupied it on the morning of the 12th.

In *Adventures Ashore and Afloat*, by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, it is stated that in a cipher message received at Ho-hsi-wu, Sir Claude Macdonald advised General Gaselee 'to force the South Gate (Yung-ting-men) of the Chinese city, advance up the main strete towards the Middle Gate (Chien Men),¹ then work to the right towards the Water Gate in the Tartar City wall (abreast of the Legation), which they would be able to open to us. He also suggested that it would be advisable to occupy the Temples of Heaven and Agriculture, the great parks of which would be the best camping-grounds near the Legations.

'Fortunately the Chief of Staff, General Barrow, consulted a Wesleyan missionary (the Rev. F. Brown), who had lived in Pekin, and accompanied the expedition as an Intelligence officer. Mr. Brown pointed out that if we entered by the South Gate we would have an army of Boxers—who were known to be in the Emperor's Hunting Park to

¹ Spelt Tsien-men on map.

the southward of Pekin—threatening our rear. It would also mean a three-mile longer march for our men, and separation from the other columns. He advised the General to force the Middle East Gate (Shawo-men) which he declared was a weaker gate and much nearer the Legations.’ A reference to the map will show how sound was this advice and how wise we were in acting on it. Sir Claude Macdonald had evidently thought that our advance would be along the railway.

On the 12th, the troops rested and prepared for the final advance on their goal, now only thirteen miles distant. At a meeting of the Allied Generals, it was decided that they should attack Pekin in the following order :—The Japanese on the extreme right, the Russians in the centre on the north bank of the canal, and the Americans and British on the south bank of the canal. Each force was to push forward its own reconnoitring parties. British Headquarters thereupon issued orders as follows :—

‘ A reconnoitring force, consisting of—


2 guns, 12th Battery R.F.A.,
3 squadrons, 1st Bengal Lancers,
7th Rajputs,

under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Gartside-Tipping, will move forward at 4.30 a.m. to-morrow morning, in accordance with the orders which have been personally communicated. Three days’ supplies, including emergency rations, will be carried.’

The force moved out as directed, and pushed on to within six miles of Pekin. Here it bivouacked in the enclosure round a Manchu nobleman’s tomb, and spent the day in throwing up entrenchments, as word came that a heavy attack might be expected. The afternoon and night of the 13th were times of intense anxiety. The city walls, with their massive gateways, were visible and the sound of a tremendous fusillade, the booming of guns and the rattle of Maxims, could be plainly heard. The firing went on continuously, and it was evident that the Chinese were making a last desperate effort to storm the Legations before the relief force arrived. No one knew what ghastly tragedy might be even then in progress behind those forbidding portals. A message was received from General Gaselee, in which he called upon all for a final effort. ‘ Their object, the relief of the Legations, is almost accomplished, and the General has no doubt

that the Queen's soldiers will display the same courage and endurance in the final struggle that has marked their march.'

At 7 a.m. on the 14th, the G.O.C. and his staff, with the main body, arrived on the scene, and the stage was set for the last act of the great drama. A general advance was ordered, and now an incident occurred which proved highly advantageous to the British. The attack had developed into a race between the different nationalities for the honour of arriving first, and on the night of the 13th, the Russians, stealing a march on the rest, had effected a lodgement on the wall to the far north, but had been forced to retire. The Japanese followed suit with a violent artillery bombardment of the gate of the Tartar city by which the Tung-chau road enters. This had the effect of drawing off almost the whole of the Chinese forces to the threatened point, and when the British advanced against the Middle East Gate of the Chinese city, they found themselves practically



ENTRY INTO PEKIN, AUGUST 14TH, 1900

A, B, C and D indicate positions of British, Russian, United States and French Legations.

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

unopposed. For the account of what followed, we are again indebted to Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes' memoirs and to Captain Bingley's letters and diary :—


'We found the village outside the gate of the Chinese quarter of Peking lightly held, and shelled it a little before advancing to the attack. The place was rushed in five minutes, and on the far side we found ourselves face to face with the outer gate, which was battered in after some delay. Some sepoy of the 7th Rajputs¹ and the 24th Punjabis had meanwhile climbed up the wall and opened the inner gate from within. We then rushed in, and after a short halt in a garden, where we ate grapes and halted for a quarter of an hour to close up the column, the advance of our force through the Chinese city, towards the Legations, commenced.' Captain Bingley's narrative of what followed has an interesting supplement in Sir Roger Keyes' account of this incident. 'The General', Sir Roger writes, 'was very anxious that a British flag should be hoisted on the Shawo-men directly we had captured it, in order to avoid any risk of its being fired upon by the American and French artillery. I had my white ensign and Union Jack secured to the dees of my saddle, and undertook to see to this. I galloped forward and joined a troop of [the 1st] Bengal Lancers . . . and we rode right up to the gate, without a shot being fired at us. . . . I took my Union Jack in my teeth, gave my pony to a trooper [sowar] to hold, and, standing on its back in the angle of the wall to the right of the gate, I managed to get a foothold in several places where stones had come out, and after some anxious moments succeeded in climbing to the top. . . . I tied my Union Jack to a Chinese pike and waved it. . . . A few moments later the inner gate burst open and the troops streamed through. A young officer of the 7th Rajputs [Lieutenant J. C. Loch] ran up a path which sloped up the inside of the wall and joined me on the top, carrying my white ensign, which he had taken from my saddle. I thought I would keep my white ensign for another occasion, so gave him the Union Jack, which was then hoisted on the tower above the gate.'

'Our advance to the relief of the Legations was made in three columns. The left column consisted of the 1st Bengal Lancers, 24th Punjabis and four guns R.F.A.; the centre column of the 1st Sikhs, Royal Welch Fusiliers and two guns R.F.A.; and the right of the 7th Rajputs. We moved in rather a straggling fashion, for the

¹ The first to enter was Subadar Adhar Singh of the 7th.



7TH RAJPUTS AT HATA-MEN GATE, PEKIN, AUGUST 14TH, 1900



RELIEF OF THE LEGATIONS

Water Gate in Tartar City wall, through which the 7th Rajputs entered the Legation Area, August 14th, 1900



men were greatly exhausted by the heat and thirst. It took us all we knew to keep them together. As we advanced through the streets, we were sniped by the Boxers from the houses, and by Imperial soldiers from the wall of the Tartar city, which ran parallel to our line of advance. Fortunately for us, the Chinese fired very high, and their bullets passed harmlessly overhead, so there was much noise but few casualties. We had to run the gauntlet in one rather nasty place, near E on plan (page 101). From the Hata-men Gate the enemy kept up a heavy fire on us as we crossed the street. We posted a section there to cover the passage of the regiment and transport, and its well-directed fire on the loopholes of the gate tower, 300 yards off, practically silenced the enemy. We suffered no casualties except a graze on one of the mules, and I got a slug in my coat-sleeve which I did not notice until the following day. We had been skirting along the Tartar city wall for some distance, when suddenly three flags came into view—British, American, and Russian. We realized that we had reached our goal, and this was confirmed by the cheering of the American Marines, who crowded on to the wall to greet us, and pointed to the sluice gate in the moat below, as the best way in.¹ We scrambled down into the moat, which was nearly dry, and forced an opening and rushed in, the first corps to enter the Legations !

‘ We made our way to the British Legation, and on the lawn found the ladies assembled to greet us. A few appeared rather dishevelled, but the large majority were delightfully smart and clean, presenting an almost festive appearance. This was notably so as regards the English and American women, and especially in the case of Lady Macdonald, who received us like the hostess at a garden party. We were filled with admiration at her coolness and courage. In their desire to welcome us, the defenders cast prudence to the winds, and came out of their shelters in spite of the firing which was still going on. The result was that a lady standing on the lawn was hit, as well as one of our sepoys. Many of us were embraced by excited females, and a missionary lady, no doubt with the kindest intentions, pressed tea and biscuits on the wounded sepoy. As the man had been hit in the mouth and had lost a lot of his teeth, her solicitude was somewhat

¹ Sir Claude Macdonald had sent a cipher message to General Gaselee, advising him to enter by the Water Gate, a sluice by which the superfluous water of the Tartar City was carried off. This message was in a cipher of which the Staff had not the key. It had therefore to be taken to Tientsin, to be decoded by the Consul-General. This risky undertaking was gallantly carried out by Lieutenant Griffin of the 1st Bengal Lancers, who rode through the night in a country swarming with enemies.

ill-timed. As I passed he called out, *Huzur, memsahib ham ko barra dik karta*, "Sir, this lady is worrying me a lot". I explained matters to her and him, and saw that he got the water which was what he most urgently needed.

'Meanwhile, the centre column with the 1st Sikhs had forced the Chien Men Gate after a brisk skirmish in which our Maxim guns did great execution. They came into the Legation at least fifteen minutes after us. They certainly had more fighting than we had, but we without doubt got in first, and it created some disappointment in the regiment that the G.O.C. stated, and I believe repeated, that we got in simultaneously. The men and women of the garrison were rather pale and worn, but were generally in pretty good health. They were living on mule and horse flesh. We dined on mule steaks on the day of our arrival, and with the addition of Worcester sauce found the dish not unpalatable.'

It is interesting to compare this with Sir Claude Macdonald's graphic account of the relief in a letter which he wrote to Lord Salisbury :—

'Three times during the night it was necessary to call up the reserves in support of the firing line, the attacks being more frequent than on any previous night. But at two in the morning there mingled other sounds with those of the Chinese rifles. From the East we heard Maxim fire and heavy guns, and no one doubted that they were those of our relief. We listened to their music all the forenoon, until, at half past two, the 7th Rajputs found their way into the Legation, the first of the allied forces to arrive, and our eight weeks of siege were over.' Sir Claude Macdonald's report was confirmed by the following message of an American newspaper correspondent :—'At about half past two', he wrote, 'Mr. Moore, an Englishman, saw the first troops—the Indians—entering through the Water Gate under Major Vaughan, of the 7th Rajputs, General Gaselee following. On their reaching the British Legation, there was a scene of bewildering joy. On the tennis lawn all nations celebrated the relief, and we then telegraphed home Psalm cxxiv, verse 7—

"Our soul is escaped as a bird out of the snare of the fowls : the snare is broken and we are escaped."

General Gaselee issued a Complimentary Order in which he congratulated the Indian troops on being the first to enter the Legation entrenchments, and assured them that their cheerful endurance of no



ordinary hardships would be brought to the notice of Her Majesty's Government. A considerable amount of shellfire was still being directed on the Legations from the Imperial City, but a few rounds from the 12th Battery, R.F.A., soon silenced the guns which the Chinese had mounted on the wall. Rifle fire went on all that night, but gradually subsided. On the 15th, the 7th moved to quarters in the Imperial Carriage Park and secured as a trophy the trappings of the Imperial elephants, which now adorn the Mess.

On the following day, Captain Bingley was appointed liaison officer to the French General Frey, who commanded a mixed French, Russian and British force, including a double company of the 7th, which went to the relief of the Catholic Mission besieged in the Peh-tang Cathedral in the Forbidden City. Here the Archbishop, Monseigneur Favier, with forty French and Italian marines and thirteen Lazarist Fathers, had most gallantly defended the Sisters of Charity and a host of Chinese converts. For two months, they had been entirely cut off from the Legations, and shelled night and day. Their handsome Gothic Cathedral was riddled with bullet-holes, and the Chinese had exploded a number of mines under their defences, one mine alone killing eighty people. The defenders had even made their own gunpowder, and when relieved their food was almost exhausted and they were at their last gasp.

The sepoys settled down very contentedly to life in Pekin after the strenuous exertions of the march. Indian regiments took charge of the Chinese flour mills, and fresh *atta* was issued daily, though there was an occasional shortage of *ghi*. A generous ration of tea and sugar induced the troops to boil their water, and this accounts for a low rate of dysentery and enteric. Throughout the campaign, the health of the 7th Rajputs was exceptionally good, and on the long marches, fewer fell out than in any other regiment, Indian or British. During the remainder of the year, the regiment was constantly at work in minor enterprises, convoys, roadmaking, the repair of the railway and the construction of winter quarters, and clearing the surrounding country of Boxers and marauding bands.

During these operations the Indian and American troops came into close contact, and on August 17th, in a cavalry reconnaissance near Tientsin, Lieutenant Gaussen of the 1st Bengal Lancers picked up a wounded American trooper under very heavy fire, placed him on his horse and galloped back to safety. On another occasion,

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

Captain Browne of the same regiment and about twenty sowars rescued an American patrol which had been cut off and was sheltering in some high crops.

The 6th U.S. Cavalry and 9th U.S. Infantry were quartered close to the Rajputs, and the officers saw a great deal of one another. In 1927, the contact was renewed by Colonel Ovens, who sent Christmas greetings from 'Old Timers' of the 7th Rajputs to the Colonel and officers of the 9th U.S. Infantry at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. This elicited a most cordial response, in which many amusing incidents of Pekin days were recalled. Colonel Nicklin, who had been an officer of the 9th U.S. Infantry when in Pekin, replied that 'the cementing of friendships of those days had its undoubted effect in making us appreciate them as brothers-in-arms in France to a degree that would have been far less complete but for our affiliations in China'. Major-General Rhodes, who was then a Lieutenant in the 6th U.S. Cavalry, wrote in 1929, in reply to Christmas greetings, 'Wherever we may be, we one and all appreciate the 7th Rajputs' thought of us. We remember continually, with pride and real affection, our service with British officers and soldiers, to whom we are bound by indissoluble ties of ancestry, language, and Anglo-Saxon standards of right living.'

On August 18th, a force consisting of the 1st Bengal Lancers, one and a half companies of the 7th Rajputs, two companies of the 24th Punjabis and two guns of the 12th Field Battery, R.A., under the command of Colonel Gartside-Tipping, went out on a reconnaissance. In the Imperial Hunting Park they encountered a large body of Boxers, who appeared from behind a fold in the ground. The cavalry cleared away from the front, while the guns came into action and the Rajputs fired several volleys into them. The 1st Bengal Lancers then advanced and burnt a village which harboured the enemy.

On August 28th, the Allied Forces took part in a triumphal march through the Forbidden City. This is the innermost of the three cities of Pekin, and, except by members of the Diplomatic Corps, had never before been entered by foreigners. Each regiment of the British force was represented by two British and two Indian officers and twenty-five other ranks, headed by the pipers of the 1st Sikhs. General Linievitch, the senior officer present, inspected the contingent, and said to General Gaselee, 'How can I find words to express my



admiration of these superb Orientals ? ' The Palace, with its succession of pavilions, linked by terraces and flights of steps, its lacquered pillars and coloured tiles and its stately throne room, was a deeply impressive sight.

On August 30th, Captain Bingley and his double company was sent to occupy Fengtai and Liukochao.¹ At Fengtai is an important railway junction and workshop, and at Liukochao are two bridges, the Marco Polo road bridge and a fine iron railway viaduct, over the Peiho. Captain Bingley's command was an independent one, directly under Headquarters, and he had under him a half squadron of the 1st Bengal Lancers, 100 rifles 7th Rajputs, 100 rifles 24th Punjabis, one company Madras Sappers and Miners, and two Maxim guns. His headquarters were at Liukochao, a small provincial town, which he put into a state of defence, with the Union Jack flying over the gateway. Patrols were sent out, which cleared the surrounding villages of Boxers, and the people were gradually induced to return to their deserted homes. Captain Bingley's position was in some respects not unlike that of a Frontier Deputy Commissioner in India, and he was greatly helped by Mr. Ling, a courteous and obliging Chinese magistrate. Many Christians came in, bringing pitiful tales of heroic priests who had stood by their missions to the last, and had been martyred in a ghastly fashion. Captain Griffin and his Lancers, with the machine-gun detachment, co-operated with the Germans in an attack on the Boxer stronghold at Liang-hsiang. They also took part in a combined operation under Brigadier-General Wilson, U.S. Army, against an important Boxer stronghold at Patachu. In this, Captain Bingley, with his detachment of the 7th, acted as rearguard to the column. The position was successfully surprised and cleared of its occupants, and an arsenal used by the Boxers was destroyed. On another occasion, in conjunction with the French, Captain Bingley searched the hills for coal and later organized a small post, consisting of Lieutenant Shea, a Jemadar and twenty-five men, to occupy the Manthukoo coal-mine. This was very important, in order to ensure our supply of fuel for the approaching winter. There were many visitors to Liukochao during the autumn, including Pierre Loti, the French writer, Marchand, the hero of Fashoda, Colonel Erich von Falkenheim who in the Great War was for a time

¹ This command was later divided. Captain Bingley retained command at Liukochao and Manthukoo. Fengtai became an independent post.

Chief of the German General Staff, and Dr. Morrison, the famous correspondent of *The Times*.

So far, the health of the troops had been excellent, but during the autumn the 7th suffered two grievous losses. On September 24th, Subadar Ram Ratan Singh died of malaria at Pekin. He was a gallant soldier and a strict disciplinarian. He had two sons serving in the regiment. The elder, Jemadar Shiuambar Singh, after seeing service in China, Mesopotamia and on the North-West Frontier, and winning the Indian Order of Merit, retired as Subadar Major after thirty-two years' service with the title of *Sardar Bahadur* and the rank of Honorary Captain. The younger, Rambaran Singh, who distinguished himself at Kut-al-Amara, was one of the first Indian officers to be granted the King's commission as a Second Lieutenant.

Subadar Ram Ratan Singh's death was followed soon after by that of his clansman, Subadar Major Gurdatt Singh, *Sardar Bahadur*.¹ Both were Indian officers of the finest type, and had been in the regiment from their youth. Being rather advanced in years, they had never fully recovered from the hardships of the advance on Pekin. Gurdatt Singh was an exceptionally enlightened man, and he, loyally supported by Ram Ratan Singh, had done much to break down the caste prejudices which at one time hampered the Rajput sepoy on active service. During the Mutiny, his father, Subadar Hanuman Singh, was awarded the Indian Order of Merit for conspicuous gallantry in the defence of the Bailey Gate of the Residency at Lucknow. Gurdatt Singh served in the Egyptian Campaign and in Burma, and when he visited England in 1882, Queen Victoria personally decorated him with the Order of British India. He was the first, and for a long time the only, Indian officer to hold the 'extra' musketry certificate. He died of dysentery at Wei-hai-wei, on his way to India, and as a special mark of respect the officers of the garrison attended his funeral. The body, wrapped in a white sheet and carried on the shoulders of sepoys, was borne to the funeral pyre surrounded by his comrades, and the British officers stood at the salute as the procession passed.

North China is a country of extremes, and in November arctic cold descended on the land. Many of the sepoys had never seen snow or ice before, and their reactions were highly diverting. A man came to his officer and said, '*Huzur, hamara lota ka pani pattar hogya*', 'Sahib, the water in my pot has turned to stone!' Thanks, however,

¹ Both belonged to the great and influential Oudh Rajput clan, the Tilokchandi Bais.



to good hutting, an abundance of food including meat and tea, and plenty of clothing, the troops stood it excellently, though the thermometer ranged from 8 degrees below zero at night to 18 degrees Fahrenheit by day. The men had stoves in their quarters and were issued with poshteens, Canadian coats and moccasins. The 7th Rajputs had the best record for health in the whole force during the winter. The officers had made themselves a very snug and comfortable Mess, which was, unfortunately, burnt to the ground on Christmas Eve, as owing to the fact that all the water was frozen, the fire could not be extinguished. Early during the New Year, a mounted infantry company was organized and placed under the command of Captain Parr. It was mounted on shaggy but hardy Chinese ponies, which had comfortable paces but very hard mouths. The railway line was repaired by the troops under the direction of Royal Engineer officers and the Sappers and Miners, and very soon the regular train service between Peking and Tientsin was restored. Missionaries and business men began to return to their work, and the country gradually resumed its normal appearance. A favourite amusement was skating on the lake of the Summer Palace.

The remaining portion of the time spent in China passed uneventfully. On January 24th, 1901, came news of the death of Queen Victoria two days previously, and a most impressive funeral parade was held on the 29th, at which all the allied troops were present. Many officers now went on furlough. Colonel W. G. Mansel, the Commandant, who had been on sick leave when the regiment went to China, took over from Major Vaughan, and Captain Bingley returned to India to take up his post as D.A.A.G. at Army Headquarters.

Negotiations about an indemnity had been going on for some time with the Chinese Government, and on August 19th the regiment left their quarters in the Temple of Heaven, and embarked at Taku on the hired transport *Nurani*. On their departure, they received a farewell message from Major-General Sir Norman Stewart, in which he spoke of 'the pleasure it had given him to have such a splendid regiment under his command', and 'the high praise which the 7th Rajputs had received from all sides for their conduct under fire, their marching under most trying conditions, and their discipline in camp'. After an uneventful voyage, the regiment disembarked at Calcutta on September 9th, and reached Lucknow three days later. The following



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

is an extract from China Dispatches by General Gaselee, published in the *London Gazette* of May 14th :—

‘The 7th Rajputs afforded me the most lively satisfaction. In marching powers they were second to none, while their spirit, discipline, appearance and steadiness have been a credit to the Indian Army. I especially mention these two corps (1st Bengal Lancers and 7th Rajputs), because the experience of this campaign shows that good Bengal regiments may be thoroughly relied on. . . . Major Vaughan deserves credit for the good work done by his fine regiment, which on all occasions rendered excellent service. He was well supported by Captain A. H. Bingley, Captain E. F. Hood and Subadar Major Gurdatt Singh (since deceased).’

APPENDIX

The following rewards were granted for the campaign (*London Gazette* of May 14th, 1901) :—

Major H. B. Vaughan to be Brevet Lieut.-Colonel.

Captain A. H. Bingley to be Brevet-Major.

Subadar Major Gurdatt Singh *Bahadur* would have been promoted from the 2nd to the 1st Class of the Order of British India, with the title of *Sardar Bahadur*, had he survived.

Captain E. F. Hood was awarded the Order of the Sacred Treasure by His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan.

All ranks received the China Medal with the clasp ‘Relief of Peking’, and many British officers were made Honorary Members of the American Order of the Yellow Dragon. They were, however, refused permission to wear the artistic ribbon and badge of this Order, for though recognized by the United States Government, it was not issued officially by the latter, members being required to buy their own insignia.



CHAPTER VIII

SERVICE ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER AND IN THE
PERSIAN GULF, 1901-14

By the end of 1901, the regiment had recovered from the dislocation caused by the China campaign, and had settled down to garrison duty at Lucknow. The following years witnessed further momentous changes in the organization of the Indian Army, chiefly due to the reforming zeal and initiative of Lord Kitchener, which resulted in much greater uniformity of training and administrative efficiency. The four Commands were reduced to two, the Northern and Southern, each in charge of a Lieutenant-General, the supreme command being vested in the Commander-in-Chief. The troops were equipped with modern weapons and transport, and the scattered detachments were concentrated as far as possible at large military stations, where combined training could be satisfactorily carried out. Thanks to the class regiment system, the morale of the rank and file was very high. Greatly improved conditions as regards pay and allowances had enabled the Recruiting Staff to secure men of a very good class and physique, and the Indian officers and N.C.O.s were of the best type of professional soldiers. There was a spirit of traditional loyalty to the *paltan* among both the officers and the rank and file which induced members of certain families to serve for successive generations in the same regiment.

In 1902, a contingent was assembled at Deolali to represent the Indian Army at the Coronation of His Imperial Majesty Edward VII, and Captain H. O. Parr was made Adjutant and Quartermaster. The detachment from the 7th Rajputs consisted of Subadar Adhar Singh, three havildars and twenty-three rank and file. Leaving Bombay on May 24th in the R.I.M.S. *Hardinge*, they arrived at Southampton on June 14th, and went into camp at Hampton Court. They were shown round the principal sights of London, and visited Liverpool and Manchester during their stay. On July 16th, H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught presented them with medals for the China Campaign, and they were reviewed by Queen Alexandra on the



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

CSL

Horse Guards Parade on the 22nd. Lord Kitchener published an order congratulating them on their turn-out and steadiness on parade, and expressing his pleasure at seeing such a fine body of men. On August 9th, they lined the street at Whitehall for the Coronation, and on the 13th His Majesty decorated them at Buckingham Palace with the Coronation Medal. The contingent landed at Gibraltar and Malta on its return voyage, and reached Bombay on September 16th. Soon after their arrival, Subadar Adhar Singh was decorated with the Order of British India, Second Class, by Lieutenant-General Sir Alfred Gaselee. In October, owing to the renumbering of the Indian units, the title of the regiment was changed to that of the 7th Duke of Connaught's Own Rajputs.

On June 3rd, 1904, Major-General Sir Edmund Barrow, K.C.B., was appointed Colonel of the regiment. Sir Edmund Barrow was one of the most distinguished of the many notable officers who served in the 7th Rajputs. He joined the regiment in 1878, and was present at the capture of Ali Masjid and at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. He was Adjutant from 1878 to 1884, and afterwards went on the Headquarters Staff. He served on the Lockhart Boundary Commission in the Chitral and Hunza districts and the Anglo-Siamese Boundary Commission. He raised and commanded the Hong Kong Regiment, and was Chief of Staff to Sir Alfred Gaselee during the China campaign, for which he received the K.C.B. In 1901, he became Secretary to Government, and was afterwards General Officer Commanding, Southern Army. It was confidently hoped that he would succeed Lord Kitchener, but the repercussions of the Kitchener-Curzon controversy resulted in the selection of Sir O'Moore Creagh. In 1909 he was made a G.C.B. and full General, and in 1914 he became Military Secretary at the India Office. In 1916, he became a G.C.S.I. and a Member of the Council of India. Among his publications was the *Sepoy Officer's Manual*, published in 1880 and always brought up to date by an officer of the regiment. Early in 1914 he wrote the famous Barrow Memorandum entitled *The Role of India in a Turkish War*. He continued to take a keen interest in the fortunes of the regiment until his death in 1934, at the age of 81. It is noteworthy that Sir Edmund Barrow, like his successor, Sir Alfred Bingley, won the Gold Medal of the United Service Institution of India, and both officers held office as Secretaries to Government.

On September 21st, 1904, Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Vaughan succeeded



GENERAL SIR EDMUND GEORGE BARROW, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

Born 1852. Died 1934.

Colonel, 7th (D.C.O.) Rajputs, 1904-34.



Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Mansel in command, and in the following January the Mess was destroyed by fire. Many valuable paintings and trophies, including two standards captured from the Boxers, were destroyed, but the old colours were rescued. In the cold weather of 1905, the 7th left Lucknow for a tour of service on the North-West Frontier and was stationed at the Malakand.¹ The regiment reached Nowshera on November 13th and found itself a unit of the 1st Peshawar Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir E. Barrow. There was a very bad outbreak of malaria during this year, due to the flooding of the Swat river, and the Malakand movable column, composed of troops from Nowshera and Mardan, suffered severely. During the cold weather of 1907, the regiment accompanied the Chitral reliefs as far as Darora, and escorted the relieved regiment, the 2/39th Garhwal Rifles, through Dir territory to Chakdara. On the return march, there was heavy snow and it was realized that there would be difficulty in getting the baggage animals over the Lowari Pass. Captain A. C. Ogg volunteered to assist the Transport Officer in this duty, and near the top of the Pass an avalanche fell and carried away thirty mules, blocking the road completely and cutting the column into two portions. The rear portion, consisting of a company of the 39th Garhwalis and most of the transport, had to return to Drosh, and it was a week before the road could be cleared. In the meantime the main portion of the relieved column, being short of rations, had to continue its journey to India, leaving a rearguard behind under the command of Captain Ogg to bring in the Garhwalis and the transport that had returned to Drosh. For his services on the Lowari Pass and on the return march to India, Captain Ogg received the commendations of the G.O.C. 1st (Peshawar) Division, which were endorsed by the Commander-in-Chief. In March 1908, the regiment left the Malakand, marching to Lahore and proceeding from there to Dinapore by rail.

In 1909, Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Bingley, C.I.E., who had returned to the regiment as Second in Command in the previous year, on vacating the appointment of Deputy Secretary Army Department, succeeded Brevet-Colonel H. B. Vaughan in command. Colonel Vaughan, who died in 1934, was a talented artist. The illustration facing page 71, showing the 7th in action at Tel-el-Kebir, is a reproduction of one of his pictures. He was also an author and his book,

¹ At first at Chakdara and Dargai and later at the Malakand.

St. George and the Chinese Dragon, gives a lively account of the operations which culminated in the relief of the Peking Legations. He was employed on several occasions in the Intelligence Branch of the Quartermaster-General's Department and carried out two venture-some reconnaissances across the Kavir or Great Salt Desert of Persia. The excellence of his survey work was recognized in 1892 by the award of the MacGregor Memorial Medal for the best reconnaissance of the year. He served with the regiment in Egypt, 1882, and commanded it in China, 1900. For his services in the latter operations he was mentioned in dispatches and promoted Brevet Lieut.-Colonel. Colonel Vaughan was a keen soldier and paid great attention to the war training of the 7th. He was much interested in the history of the regiment and looked forward to the publication of this book. Though shy and reserved in manner, he had great independence of character and was much liked by those serving under him.

In the following year the G.O.C. Presidency Brigade, in his inspection report, remarked :—‘ This is the best and smartest Indian battalion in the brigade, and its condition reflects the greatest credit on its officers and especially on its C.O., who is untiring in his endeavours to promote efficiency in every possible manner.’ In May 1910, Brevet-Colonel A. H. Bingley, C.I.E., who was at home on leave, was one of the representatives of the Indian Army at the funeral of H.M. King Edward VII. Service in the Uganda contingent having been thrown open to Rajputs, twenty-seven men of the regiment volunteered for it and were accepted. An interesting event of this year was the presentation to the Mess, by H.M. Gustav V, King of Sweden, of a portrait of his famous ancestor, Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, who, it will be remembered, was captured, according to some accounts, by the 24th Bengal N.I. at Cuddalore in 1783, when serving as a volunteer under the Chevalier de Damas. The Crown Prince of Sweden married H.R.H. Princess Margaret of Connaught, which gave the presentation an additional interest. The regiment was transferred in November to Ahmedabad in the Bombay Presidency, leaving the Northern Command for the first time.

In 1911, it provided a Guard of Honour to General Sir E. Barrow at the Coronation Darbar at Delhi, and Subadar Major Adhar Singh *Bahadur* attended the Veterans' Camp for the occasion. General Barrow afterwards wrote warmly praising their turn-out, and especially mentioned Subadar Mahesh Singh and Assistant Surgeon Abdul



COLONEL HENRY BATHURST VAUGHAN

Born 1858. Died 1934.

Egypt, 1882 ; China, 1900.

Commandant, 1904-09.



7TH (D.C.O.) RAJPUTS, AHMEDABAD, 1911

Top Row : Jemadar Rampal Singh, Subadar Ramdayal Singh, Subadar Ramlal Singh, Subadar Meghraj Singh, Jemadar Ahibaran Singh.

Second Row : Lieutenant R. Barrow, A.D.C., Jemadar Sardar Singh, Lieutenant G. St. J. Richardson, Captain W. G. Ayscough, Lieutenant A. R. Thomson, Jemadar Bhawani Pershad Singh, Subadar Shiuambar Singh, Lieutenant G. R. Rae.

Third Row (sitting) : Major J. Stewart, Lieut.-Colonel Ozzard, I.M.S., Brevet-Colonel A. H. Bingley, C.I.E., General Sir Edmund Barrow, G.C.B., Major H. O. Parr, Military Secretary, Captain C. A. G. P. Meadows.

Bottom Row (sitting) : Jemadar Chandrapal Singh, Jemadar Jaikaran Singh, Subadar Major Adhar Singh *Bahadur*, O.B.I., Jemadar Brijmohan Singh.



Aziz Khan. Among other boons proclaimed at the Darbar were half a month's pay for Indian officers and men, and the announcement by the King-Emperor that 'the loyal Indian officers, men and reservists of his Indian Army should be eligible for the decoration of the Victoria Cross for Valour'. Brevet-Colonel A. H. Bingley, C.I.E., having been promoted Colonel and appointed a G.S.O.I. at Army Headquarters, the command of the regiment devolved upon Lieut.-Colonel N. E. Robin, with effect from November 6th, 1911.

In September, severe tribal outbreaks, involving the maltreatment of British subjects, took place in various parts of Persia. These had to be suppressed, and at the same time the Indian Government was determined to put down the gun-running in the Persian Gulf, thanks to which large quantities of arms and ammunition found their way to the tribesmen on the North-West Frontier. The great distributing centre was Muscat, and in spite of the vigilance of the British cruisers, dhows constantly ran the blockade and landed the arms on the Makran coast, where Pathan and Baluch caravans were ready to pick them up and carry them inland.

The 7th Rajputs were accordingly ordered to furnish a number of detachments at Jask, Bandar Abbas, Muscat, Lingah and Bushire, as well as inland at Shiraz and Baghdad, to prevent traffic in arms, protect consulates and telegraph lines, and furnish guards for Residencies. The first detachment under Lieutenant Richardson left Bombay for Bushire on October 3rd, followed by a second under Subadar Shiuambar Singh on the 11th. As the situation continued grave, the rest of the regiment, under Lieut.-Colonel Robin, embarked in two portions on December 12th and 13th. On arrival at their various posts, the men were kept busy in road-making and constructing quarters, and breakwaters for landing stores. At Jask, the regimental headquarters, the battalion carpenters built an Officers' Mess. There was practically no fighting, though detachments were constantly being called upon to co-operate with the Royal Navy in repelling attacks which never actually materialized. Only once was a detachment in action; on October 22nd, news reached Jask that gun-runners were landing arms some distance away down the coast, and Captain Ayscough with fifty men set out to intercept them. After an exhausting forced march of seventeen miles, he came upon the enemy just as they were getting their pack-animals loaded up. He at once opened fire with such good effect that two of the marauders were killed and

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

several of their animals wounded. The gun-runners returned the fire so hotly that further advance was impossible until Naik Bhawani Pershad Singh with a few sepoys and a number of villagers appeared upon the enemy's flank ; whereupon, thinking that their line of retreat was threatened, they retired precipitately, leaving behind them a number of wounded animals, with sixty-two rifles and 700 rounds of ammunition. The detachment then returned ; they had been out all day, and marched thirty-four miles and fought an action without food or water, as there had been no time to make the necessary arrangements. For this they were thanked by H.E. the Naval Commander-in-Chief.

A letter from the Adjutant-General in India to the G.O.C. Southern Command also stated that ' Sir O'Moore Creagh is very glad to note that the operations were conducted with marked energy and skill, reflecting great credit on the detachment, and His Excellency desires that an expression of his appreciation of their good work be conveyed to Captain Ayscough and to all concerned '. Orders were received promoting Naik Bhawani Pershad Singh to the rank of Havildar, ' in recognition of the enterprise and initiative displayed by him ', and he was awarded the Indian Distinguished Service Medal. This medal was afterwards presented at a parade, after the regiment's return to India.

In November 1912, the regiment, with the exception of the detachment at Shiraz, was relieved by the 2nd Q.V.O. Rajput L.I., and returned to Ahmedabad. The conduct of the troops throughout had been excellent, and their health, except for an outbreak of dysentery at Jask, was good. The practical experience gained by the men was destined to prove an invaluable preparation for the greater ordeal which lay ahead of them. The high praise earned by the regiment for its discipline and good behaviour in a foreign country is attested by a letter received from Colonel J. A. Douglas, O.C. troops at Shiraz, on the withdrawal of the Shiraz detachment in April 1913 :—

' On the departure of the troops from Shiraz, Major O'Connor, H.M.'s Acting Consul there, expressed to me verbally his appreciation of the general conduct of the detachment of the 7th Rajputs under Lieutenant G. St. J. Richardson, which, he informed me, he would bring to the notice of the Foreign Department of the Government of India.

' I have now much pleasure in adding my own testimony to their excellent behaviour. During the eighteen months that this



CSL

detachment served under me, no complaints against them of any kind were made to me, nor, in any single instance, was a man of the detachment reported to me for misbehaviour. Their duties were invariably smartly performed, and their drill, turn-out, and general bearing left nothing to be desired.'

In August 1913, Subadar Major Adhar Singh, *Sardar Bahadur*, O.B.I., retired. He had joined from the 13th Rajputs as a Jemadar in 1893, and had greatly distinguished himself in China. In a farewell order, Lieut.-Colonel Robin spoke of him as 'a valued and confidential officer in all matters, great and small, regarding the welfare of the men, as well as a personal friend'. He was granted the rank of Honorary Captain on retirement, and founded a musketry prize to commemorate his connexion with the regiment. He was succeeded by Subadar Shiuambar Singh.

On November 12th, on a requisition received from the Political Agent, Mahi Kantha, a machine-gun detachment of the 7th Rajputs under Captain Ayscough, together with a company of the 104th Wellesley's Rifles, a company of the Mewar Bhil Corps and a detachment of police, were assembled at Sunth Road Station on the B.B. and C.I. Railway to put down a rising among the Bhils. A Guru or holy man had incited the Bhils to defy the British authorities, and about 5,000 Bhils had obeyed his commands and were looting the countryside. Peaceful measures had no effect, and the rebels had taken up a position in a *sangar* on the top of a hill near a place named Santharampur.

The force marched forty-seven miles in twenty-four hours, and arrived on the scene of operations at about midnight. The attack was delivered at dawn, and resistance collapsed after a few shots had been fired. The Guru and his headmen were captured and made to do penance in the presence of the Commissioner, Southern Division, after which they were lodged in the Ahmedabad Central Gaol.

Training during 1912-13 was complicated, first by the fact that the regiment was split up into a number of detachments in Persia, and secondly by the departure on leave of a large number of men on their return from field service. In spite of this, it continued to earn high praise from inspecting officers. The G.O.C. Southern Command spoke of it as 'a clean, handsome, mature body of men, animated by a good spirit. . . . Officers and men appear to be in touch, and the state of the regiment is a credit to Lieut.-Colonel Robin'.



CHAPTER IX

EARLY OPERATIONS IN MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-15

THE regiment was stationed at Ahmedabad when the momentous news of the declaration of war against Germany was announced in 1914. Its position was an anomalous one, as it was under the Mhow Division for administrative purposes, but was part of the 6th Poona Division for war. Mobilization orders arrived on September 7th, and it was hoped that this meant that it was to be a unit in Force 'A', the Indian Army Corps destined for France. A good deal of money was accordingly spent on warm clothing, which afterwards proved superfluous. Lieutenant W. L. Harvey was sent to Lucknow to take charge of the reservists, but the majority of these proved to be in poor physical condition and quite unfit for active service. The two regimental machine-guns were worn-out weapons, but all endeavours to induce the ordnance authorities at Kirkee to replace them proved to be in vain, probably because none was available.

By October 30th, mobilization was complete, and it was learnt that the regiment was to form part of the 18th (Belgaum) Brigade of the 6th (Poona) Division under Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Barrett, K.C.B. The Brigadier was Major-General C. I. Fry, C.B., and the Brigade consisted of the following units :—

2nd Battalion, The Norfolk Regiment.

7th D.C.O. Rajputs.

120th Rajputana Infantry.

110th Mahratta Light Infantry.

The following British and Indian officers accompanied the regiment on active service :—

Lieut.-Colonel N. E. Robin (Commanding Officer).

Lieut.-Colonel H. O. Parr (Second in Command).

Captain A. C. Ogg

Captain W. A. Gover

Lieutenant A. N. I. Lilly

} (Double Company Commanders).



EARLY OPERATIONS IN MESOPOTAMIA

CSL
119

Captain F. O. McKenzie (Adjutant).

Lieutenant A. R. Thomson (Quartermaster).

Lieutenant W. L. Harvey.

Lieutenant R. J. N. Norris.

Lieutenant J. W. B. Tindall.

Lieutenant D. B. Burgoyne-Wallace.

Major T. G. F. Paterson, I.M.S. (Medical Officer).

Subadar Major Shiuambar Singh.

Subadar Ramdayal Singh.

Subadar Mahesh Singh.

Subadar Rambaran Singh.

Subadar Bhawani Pershad Singh.

Subadar Sardar Singh.

Subadar Ahibaran Singh.

Subadar Brijmohan Singh.

Subadar Agar Singh.

Jemadar Mukat Singh.

Jemadar Jaikaran Singh.

Jemadar Bhabhuti Singh.

Jemadar Mahadeo Singh.

Jemadar Shiudayal Singh.

Jemadar Sitlabaksh Singh.

Jemadar Bhagwanbaksh Singh.

Jemadar Rambadan Singh.

Major S. G. W. Hume, Lieutenant G. St. J. Richardson, Jemadar Baijnath Singh, Jemadar Chandrapal Singh and Jemadar Hazari Singh were left behind in charge of the Depot, and Captain W. G. Ayscough was seconded to the Bharatpur Imperial Service Infantry.

The total strength of the battalion on mobilization was twelve British officers, seventeen Indian officers, 809 rank and file and twenty-four followers. On November 5th, the regiment entrained at Ahmedabad, and reached Alexandra Docks on the following day, when it was at once embarked on the B.I.S.N. *Erinpura*. Up to the last moment, it was expected that France was their destination, and it was with great disappointment, on opening sealed orders, that all ranks learned that the Brigade was to be landed at the mouth of the Tigris, with the object of occupying the Basra *vilayet*. Ever since the outbreak of war with Germany, the attitude of Turkey had been more and more uncertain, and on October 4th Brigadier-General Delamain, C.B., D.S.O., had been sent with the 16th Brigade to protect British interests at the head of the Persian Gulf. On November 1st, Turkey declared war on the Allies, and General Delamain landed five days later at the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab, and occupied the fort of Fao.

The *Erinpura*, carrying the 7th D.C.O. Rajputs, the 120th Rajputana Infantry,¹ and details of the 3rd Sappers and Miners and 48th Pioneers, sailed on the 7th, as part of a convoy of seven troopships with the 6th (Poona) Division on board. Their sole escort was the


¹ Now 2nd Battalion, 6th Rajputana Rifles (Prince of Wales's Own).

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

R.I.M.S. *Lawrence*, a paddle steamer armed with a 4-inch gun and only capable of steaming at 8 knots. As the redoubtable *Emden* was thought to be in the vicinity, some anxiety was felt until the news of her sinking on November 10th was received. The *Erinpura* and her consorts arrived at the bar of the Shatt-al-Arab on November 14th, and as she sailed up the river, the sides of the ship were lined with bales of *bhoosa* and manned by sepoy, with two machine-guns in the bows. However, the convoy proceeded up-stream without being fired upon, and after steaming for about four hours, cast anchor off Sanniya.

At dawn on November 15th the task of disembarkation commenced, and was completed by mid-day, by means of *mahailas* or country boats, the horses and mules being left to the naval authorities to deal with subsequently. The disembarkation was carried out to the sound of rifle fire, as in the meantime the 16th Brigade was having a lively argument with the enemy in occupation of a village called Saihan, from which they were eventually driven.

Shortly after the landing, the 16th and 18th Brigades received orders to attack the Turks at Sahil, some four or five miles up-stream, where they were said to have taken up a position under the command of Subhi Bey, the Vali of Basra. Valises and cooking pots and blankets were stacked to follow by river. At dawn the force moved off, preceded by the cavalry and a screen of regimental scouts, and supported by the launches and gunboats of the Royal Navy. The going was very bad, as it had rained during the night, and the horses of the 63rd Battery R.F.A. had the greatest difficulty in pulling the guns through the mud. At about noon the cavalry made contact with the Turks, who were reported to be about 8,000 strong, and to be entrenched with their left flank on the river at Sahil, and their right resting on a white mosque. The 18th Brigade deployed with the Norfolk Regiment on the right, the 7th Rajputs on the left, and the 110th Mahratta L.I. and 17th Company 3rd Sappers and Miners in support. The plan of action was that the 18th Brigade was to deliver a frontal attack, while the 16th was to advance up the river bank and turn the enemy's flank. As the troops advanced, the Turkish Commander was seen galloping along the line on a white horse, and soon a heavy fusillade was opened. In spite of the fact that this was their baptism of fire, the sepoy behaved with great steadiness; Havildar Baijnath Singh was wounded, and the Medical Officer, Major T. G. F. Paterson,





was hit in the stomach by a shrapnel bullet while attending to him. There were twenty-two other casualties. About 4.30 p.m. the enemy evacuated his position, and the Dorset Regiment and the 7th pushed on in pursuit. The latter captured two Krupp mountain guns. The two brigades thereupon encamped on the field. The news now arrived that, owing to a violent *shamal* or sandstorm, the *mahaila* containing the sepoy's kits had foundered, and five men left in charge together with the Master Armourer had been drowned. Another man was rescued by one of the ship's officers, who dived off the bridge of the *Erinpura* into the Tigris—a tidal river with a swift current. November 17th was spent in great discomfort on the bank of a creek. There was very heavy rain, and much sniping by the Arabs who were prowling round ready to rob and murder any wounded man they could find. A sepoy of the 7th was hit in the head by a stray bullet and died instantly, and this was the first death in action suffered by the regiment.

Next day, November 18th, the regiment was relieved by the Norfolk Regiment and returned to its former camp. The wounded were evacuated on board the *Erinpura*, and a fresh supply of blankets and cooking pots was drawn. The men now had their first square meal since the 15th; on the two previous nights they had been forced to cook their *chapatis* on entrenching tools as best they could. Lieut.-Colonel Robin went sick, and was succeeded in command by Lieut.-Colonel H. O. Parr, while Lieutenant Hari Chand, I.M.S., temporarily replaced Major Paterson as M.O.

On November 20th, General Barrett heard that the Turks had evacuated Basra, and that there was a danger that the Arabs would start to loot the town. Basra was twenty-five miles distant, and the 18th Brigade was ordered to occupy the place at once, after a night march. The regiment came straight off twenty-four hours outpost duty and fell in at 8 p.m. Two hundred rounds of ammunition per man were issued, and the services of an Arab guide were impressed. The guide was tied on to a mule with two privates of the Dorsets in charge of him, but as no one knew any Arabic, he deliberately led the column by devious and difficult ways, with the result that it marched many more miles than it need have done. The column floundered along, crossing a number of muddy creeks and continually losing its way until daybreak. Then matters were a little easier, but it was 11.30 a.m. before the column, thoroughly exhausted, reached

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

the Zobeir Gate of Basra, having marched a distance of something more like thirty-five miles than twenty-five.¹


The official entry into Basra took place on the 23rd, when General Barrett, accompanied by Sir Percy Cox, the chief Political Officer, marched into the town with an escort of cavalry and infantry. The Union Jack was hoisted, and a proclamation was read to the inhabitants, telling them that Great Britain had no quarrel with the Arab population, and as long as they did not attack us their rights would be respected. The troops had arrived only just in time, as looting had already begun, and the Bank and Customs House had been set on fire. The regiment was encamped for two days in a palm-grove ; there were no tents, and it rained incessantly. On the 26th, however, orders were received to take up billets in Admiralty House, and by a great piece of good luck, it was found possible to purchase copper cooking vessels in the bazaar. This made the men much more contented, as it had hitherto been impossible wholly to make up for those lost at the time of disembarkation.

Captain Gover, with his double company, went down-stream to protect the loyal Shaikh of a place called Abu Kasib. Another double company under Captain Ogg was detailed to occupy the Arab quarter, of which Captain Ogg was made Military Governor. This was not an enviable post, as the Arab town was indescribably filthy, with narrow, winding lanes and innumerable creeks, and appeared to be occupied by the dregs of humanity.

The Turks had now retired to a position at Qurna,² at the junction of the Tigris with the old bed of the Euphrates, about fifty miles up-stream. In order to dislodge them, a force consisting of the 110th Mahratta L.I., the 104th Wellesley's Rifles, one company of the Norfolk Regiment and a Mountain Battery, the whole under Lieut.-Colonel Frazer, was dispatched by river in H.M.S. *Lawrence*. Colonel Frazer succeeded in driving the enemy out of the village of Mazera, on the opposite bank to Qurna, but finding himself not strong enough to hold the position, he retired to Suwaiyib Creek, about four miles down-stream, to await reinforcements. When information to this effect was received, it was decided to despatch the remainder of the

¹ The only casualty on this night march was Drummer Aziz Khan, later killed at Ctesiphon. He was a mere boy, but carried a rifle, 200 rounds and the rest of his kit for thirty-five miles. He collapsed in a dead faint just as the column reached Basra.

² There is much variety in the spelling of these place-names. Qurna is spelt Kurna, Suwaiyib is spelt Shwaib, and Mazera is spelt Muzaira. The spelling adopted is that shown on maps and plans.



Qurna, Mazera and Suwaiyib are also spelt Kurna, Muzaira and Shwaib, respectively.

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

18th Brigade to the scene of operations. The troops were embarked in the river steamer *Mejidieh*, commanded by Captain Cowley. Cowley was a well-known local character. The son of an English father and an Arab mother, he had a perfect command of both languages, and an intimate knowledge of the peculiarities of the navigation of the river Tigris and of Arab politics. He had access to information of the enemy's movements far in advance of the Intelligence Department, and on this and all other occasions during the advance up the river, his services were simply invaluable. He was much respected by the Arabs, and most of their chiefs were his personal friends, but he was greatly hated and feared by the Turks, who put a price on his head.

The force left Basra on the *Mejidieh* at 4 p.m. on December 5th, and landed at Suwaiyib Creek on the following morning. General Fry decided to attack Mazera village on the 7th, covered by the fire of the river flotilla. At dawn, the flotilla went into action with great gallantry; H.M.S. *Shaitan*, an armed tug, received a direct hit from a shell, which killed her commander and temporarily put her out of action. The infantry, meanwhile, was deploying for action, with the 110th Mahratta L.I. and 104th Wellesley's Rifles in the firing line, the Norfolk Regiment and 120th Rajputana Infantry in support, and the 7th in reserve. The ground was as smooth as a billiard table, and the enemy's trenches were so well sited as to be completely invisible. The going was very heavy, and the guns had to be man-handled from time to time, in order to extricate them from the mud. About 11.30 a.m., the 7th was ordered up to the support line, and in coming up they found themselves enfiladed from a belt of palm trees on their left. The enfilade fire was coming from a series of cuts about four feet deep, and Lieut.-Colonel Parr's double company was ordered to take them. The sepoys advanced with alacrity, and captured the position at the point of the bayonet. Subadar Brijmohan Singh greatly distinguished himself, and shot several of the enemy at point-blank range with his revolver. Lieutenant Harvey, in charge of the machine-guns, was hit in the shoulder whilst attending to a stoppage.

The village of Mazera was now burning fiercely, and most of the enemy had escaped over the river in *mahailas*, and had ensconced themselves in Qurna. Captain Ogg was told to clear Mazera, which he did. The troops now found themselves on the bank of the Tigris, which was here 200 yards wide, and came under an intense fire from



the enemy occupying Qurna on the opposite side. The advantage lay with the Turks, who had excellent cover among the houses, whereas our men were in the open and had the sun in their eyes. Colonel Parr, who was sheltering behind a palm tree, had two bullets which passed clean through the trunk a foot above his head, and Lieutenant Bullock of the Norfolk Regiment was shot in the hand while giving him a message. The musketry duel was continued until dusk, when General Fry withdrew his men to bivouac, leaving a strong picquet under Captain Ogg at Mazera to prevent the Turks from recrossing at that point. The losses of the regiment, Lieutenant Harvey and six men wounded, were very light. The enemy suffered heavily, over fifty dead being found in one trench alone. The night which ensued was cold and uncomfortable, as during most of the time the men had been wading chest deep through creeks and marshes and were wet through. They had come light from Basra with only a great coat and blanket apiece, and huddled round their camp-fires, trying to dry themselves as best they could.

The next morning revealed an unusual position of affairs. The Turks had removed all the boats and *mahailas*, and the Tigris was here from 200 to 500 yards wide, running at three miles an hour, and the water was icy cold. It seemed, therefore, impossible to attack Qurna until the problem was solved by Lieutenant Gunning Campbell and three men of the 17th Company of the 3rd Sappers and Miners, who most gallantly swam the river under fire, taking a rope with them. By this means, a flying bridge was established, and the 110th Mahratta L.I. and 104th Wellesley's Rifles established themselves on the opposite bank, right across the enemy's line of retreat. At midnight on December 8th, with much blowing of whistles and every available light burning, a launch put off from Qurna and proceeded downstream to H.M.S. *Lawrence*, where a deputation of Turks waited on General Fry. The deputation proposed to hand over Qurna, on condition that they should be allowed to march out. They were informed that this was impossible, and they thereupon surrendered unconditionally. The prisoners included the Vali of Basra and 1,100 men with twelve guns. Had the cavalry been available, it is probable that the number would have been a great deal larger. Immediately after the surrender, the brigade moved in and took possession, and both officers and men were glad of a chance of a wash and shave and change into clean and dry clothing.



Qurna is popularly supposed to be on the site of the Garden of Eden, and this was the subject of many jokes, as it proved to be a squalid and filthy little town of the usual Arab type. No one was sorry when orders came on December 4th to move to a perimeter camp known as Fort Snipe, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles up-stream, leaving Qurna to be garrisoned by the 110th Mahratta L.I. The troops were ferried across to their new quarters by Captain Cowley in the *Mejidieh*, and Colonel Parr went down to Basra to bring up the regimental baggage. When this was done, things became far more comfortable for all concerned. Fort Snipe was only a temporary camp, for with the approach of warm weather, snow-water flowed down from the hills, and converted the whole of the surrounding country into a vast lake. It would then be necessary to shift quarters back to Qurna, and Qurna was, in consequence, converted into a very strong position, with ample provision against possible flooding.

The life was a pleasant one ; the weather was cold and bracing, and there were plenty of wildfowl to shoot, with an occasional pig to ride, and fishing for those who liked it. There was, however, a certain amount of dysentery among the Indian troops, due chiefly to the poor quality of the *atta*, and the difficulty in procuring proper fuel. Wood is scarce in Mesopotamia, and the date-palm is too valuable to cut down. Firewood had to be brought all the way from India. The regiments took it in turn to man the perimeter, and this led to a certain amount of excitement, as it was the practice of the Arabs to prowl round on every moonlight night, trying to snipe the camp or steal in through the wire. Jemadar Shiudayal Singh was hit in the head by a bullet from one of these snipers as he left his tent, and died immediately. One of the more unpopular posts was an isolated hillock known as Mount Norfolk, which in case of serious attack would be under fire from both sides. It was the custom of the Arabs to assemble of an evening at some distance from the camp, yelling and waving green flags, preparatory to these raids. Arrangements were made to turn the guns on one of these concentrations, with marked deterrent effect. Christmas Day was celebrated with a pudding sent by Lady Willingdon, and a party on board H.M.S. *Lawrence*. A greeting from H.M. the King was read to all ranks and greatly appreciated. At the end of the year, two fresh regiments, the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire L.I. and the 103rd Mahratta L.I. of the 17th Brigade, arrived on the scene.



On January 7th, 1915, Lieut.-Colonel Robin retired on medical certificate, and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel Parr; Captain Arthur took over duty as Medical Officer. The ruined village of Mazera had long been a happy hunting ground for snipers, and on January 7th the regiment was ordered to go and occupy it. For some time, owing to the *shamal*, it was impossible to cross the river, and when at last this was done, and the men had worked all day in the rain unloading their barges, a message was received from divisional headquarters to the effect that Mazera was to be taken over by the 17th Brigade. There was no help for it, and the barges had to be once more loaded up and returned to Fort Snipe. By the middle of January the floods began to come down in earnest, and the brigade was withdrawn to Qurna. On January 19th, two companies of the 7th under Captain W. A. Gover took part in a reconnaissance in force against a Turkish detachment entrenched on the Rota canal, which led to some sharp fighting. The Turks retaliated by attacking our perimeter on January 23rd, but were beaten off with ease. On January 30th, Captain Ralston from the 4th Rajputs arrived with drafts, and on the following day, the regiment received orders to strike camp, and embark, with first line transport only, on the s.s. *Mejidieh* for Basra, there to await orders.

The reason was soon apparent. At Maidan-i-Naftun, in South Arabistan, are the important oil-fields owned by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In these the British Government had secured a predominant interest in order to control the supply needed for the Royal Navy. The pipe-line runs for nearly one hundred and fifty miles to the refinery at Abadan on the Shatt-al-Arab, most of its length being through the territory of the Shaikh of Mohammerah. The protection of these oil-fields was one of the duties of the Expeditionary Force. One of the most important points on the line was the town of Ahwaz about midway, on the bank of the Karun river, where there were in peace time a number of European officials of the Company. In February, news reached General Barrett that 2,500 Turks and about a thousand Arabs were massing for an attack on Ahwaz. If this materialized, the loyal Shaikh of Mohammerah would probably be powerless to prevent a rising of the local tribes, which would in all likelihood spread to the whole of the Arabs east of the Tigris. It was therefore decided to dispatch to Ahwaz a force composed of one squadron 33rd Cavalry, a detachment of the Dorset Regiment, one

section 23rd Mountain Battery R.A., and one section 82nd Battery R.F.A., one section 22nd Company Sappers and Miners, and the 4th and 7th Rajputs, under the command of Brigadier-General C. T. Robinson, C.R.A. of the Division.

The regiment embarked once more on the *Mejidieh* and arrived at Basra on February 1st, and here Colonel Parr had a long talk with General Barrett and Captain (afterwards Sir) Arnold Wilson, the Political Officer. The *Mejidieh* made a short halt at Mohammerah, and then steamed up the Karun river. Thanks to Captain Cowley's extraordinary knowledge of the intricacies of the stream, Ahwaz was reached without mishap on the afternoon of the 2nd. Colonel Parr hastened the disembarkation of his men, who at once set to work to make a perimeter camp. This was finished in three days, with a perimeter of unbaked bricks and a wide, deep ditch lined with broken glass as a deterrent to marauders. The German agent named Hemlich, who had been active in spreading anti-British propaganda, was arrested and sent to Basra ; the unrest among the Arabs was demonstrated by the fact that the pipe-line had been already punctured in many places, and at night the sky was lit up by jets of burning oil.

On February 14th, the rest of the force, together with General Robinson, R.A., and his staff, arrived at Ahwaz, and for the next two weeks the cavalry was busy reconnoitring. Colonel Parr accompanied them from time to time, and on March 1st he reported that a Turkish camp with guns, and two large Arab encampments, had been located in the plain below some high ground about nine miles west of Ahwaz. General Robinson, as a gunner, had an implicit confidence in the efficacy of his own arm, and he appears to have been convinced that if he could get his guns within range of the enemy's camp unobserved, and open rapid fire, the enemy would be panic-stricken and disperse. On March 2nd, a conference of commanding officers was held, and the scheme was explained. A force consisting of two troops of the 33rd Cavalry, one section of the 82nd Battery R.F.A., one section of the 23rd Mountain Battery R.A., twenty rifles of the Dorsets, and three double companies each of the 4th and 7th Rajputs, was detailed to march at 2 a.m. on the 3rd.

From the first, everything went wrong. It was a bright moonlight night, and surprise, essential to success, was out of the question. Fires lit on the high ground showed that the foe was on the alert.



The maps issued were misleading, and gave a wrong idea of the distances. Moreover, no plans had been worked out for the ultimate withdrawal. Repeated requests had been made at the conference on March 2nd by Colonel Parr and others for information about the arrangements to be made in case the force had to retire. General Robinson's reply was that the infantry was not going to be engaged and that therefore no plans for a withdrawal were necessary; the infantry were in fact to act rather as an escort to the guns, which were to provide a demonstration of the destructive power of artillery when shelling a camp. The force, guided by Lieutenant Sheepshanks, moved along two parallel ridges separated by a narrow valley, and arrived at the spot overlooking the enemy's camp a little before dawn. As soon as it was light enough, the guns opened fire. The range was 6,000 yards, and the only apparent effect was to disturb a veritable hornet's nest: a host of Arabs and Turks poured out, and began to envelope both our flanks. In a short time, a large body, waving flags, appeared on the crest of a hill, and attacked the right flank guard, consisting of two double companies of the 7th under Captain Ogg. Captain Ogg became so heavily engaged that it was found necessary to send the third double company of the 7th to their aid. At 7.15 a.m. the order to retire was given, and at first it was carried out in good order. Suddenly, however, fire was opened on the left from high ground which should have been occupied by the 4th Rajputs, but which, owing to bad staff-work, had been vacated. To add to the confusion, the horses of one field gun and the mules of one mountain gun were shot, and the mule drivers of some wagons lent by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company bolted, abandoning valuable stores and ammunition. Lieutenant Peebles, who went back to put his gun out of action, was severely wounded, and only escaped with great good luck. Matters now reached a serious pitch. The enemy were closing in to fifty yards, and officers had to do their best to collect their men round them in little groups and fight their way back. Colonel Parr was conspicuous in rallying his sepoys. He was severely wounded in the forearm early in the action, but, supported by his orderly, Gokaran Singh, he continued to use his revolver with great effect. He was again wounded in the stomach and hip, and only escaped with his life thanks to his orderly's devotion.

The loss of their Commanding Officer shook the men considerably, and shortly afterwards Lieutenant Burgoyne-Wallace was shot through



CSL

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

the thigh and was left behind. Seeing him lying alone in a nullah, Captain Gover, Lieutenant Harvey and Subadar Mahesh Singh went to his assistance, but as they were carrying him along, they were cut off by the enemy and all four were killed. Lieutenant Harvey, the machine-gun officer, had ordered his Havildar (afterwards Subadar Major) Rambali Singh, to get his guns into position some 300 yards away to cover the retreat of the little party ; but so dense was the *melée* that it was impossible to open fire without hitting friend as well as foe. Sepoys Ramsabad Singh, Captain Arthur's batman, and Dwarka Singh behaved with exceptional gallantry and devotion to duty in going back under heavy fire and bringing in wounded comrades only a few yards from the leading groups of the enemy. The former was mortally wounded and died soon after. The force was now five miles from camp, and the enemy was massing on a ridge cutting it off from its destination. The only thing to do was to attack. This operation was carried out in a brilliant manner by Captain Ogg and his double company, assisted by the men of the Dorsets under Lieutenant Bailey, whose conduct throughout had been beyond all praise.¹ No less gallant was the behaviour of the section of the 23rd Mountain Battery under Captain Hunt, R.A. Its shooting was most accurate and effective. The ridge was taken at the point of the bayonet, while the cavalry dashed round the enemy's flank. While this rearguard action was being fought the rest of the force was gradually withdrawn. The severity of the fighting is illustrated by the fact that a party of thirty of the enemy horsemen charged home with such valour that they were killed to a man. The troops from camp now came out to cover the retirement, and the enemy withdrew. To crown the other mishaps of this unlucky day, Captain McKenzie, the Adjutant, was killed by one of the last shells fired by the enemy. Throughout the action, Captain Arthur, the M.O., had been indefatigable in his attention to the wounded under heavy fire, and he continued to work unremittingly far into the night. He was awarded the Military Cross.

The total casualties of the force were sixty-two killed, including five British officers and one Indian officer, and 227 wounded, including three British and four Indian officers. Out of these, the 7th lost four British and one Indian officer killed, one British and one Indian

¹ Eight out of the twenty of these were awarded the Military Medal, and their officer was given the M.C.



officer wounded, thirty-six other ranks killed, and fifty-eight wounded. It must be remembered that we were outnumbered by ten to one, and the enemy greatly surpassed us in mobility. It is said that an Arab on foot can outrun an Indian sowar at full gallop. Only the steadiness of the 7th and the Dorsets averted a major disaster. The bodies of the dead were recovered on the following day. Lieutenant Thomson, 7th Rajputs, who was acting as brigade signalling officer, received the Military Cross for rallying a party of men and leading three bayonet charges. Captain Gover and Lieutenant Harvey were recommended for the V.C. but without result, and much disappointment was felt that no reward fell to the lot of Captain Ogg, whose work through this trying day had been conspicuous. He undoubtedly saved the situation. Sepoys Gokaran Singh, Ramsabad Singh and Dwarka Singh received the Indian Order of Merit, which was also posthumously awarded to Subadar Mahesh Singh. Havildars Ramadard Singh and Gurdatt Singh, Naik Sukhlal Singh and Sepoy Matan Singh received the I.D.S.M.

General Robinson was to blame for his conduct of this affair. His orders were vague and he made no plan for the withdrawal of his force after the attack. When the retirement was followed up by the enemy, confusion and loss ensued, and the safety of the force as a whole was jeopardized by the premature retreat of the 4th Rajputs, ordered by the General himself. General Barrett's instructions had been that the force was to stay at Ahwaz; but he considered that General Robinson was faced with a difficult situation and was on the whole justified in attacking the enemy before the latter could concentrate his forces. It is certainly true that the enemy, numbering about 2,000 Turks and perhaps 8,000 Arabs, never ventured again to approach Ahwaz, but remained in camp at Ghadir.¹ The Arabs themselves admitted that they lost from 200 to 300 killed and about 600 wounded in the action.

Colonel Parr left on the 6th for India. Captain Colan, 67th Punjabis, and Captain G. R. Rae, S. and T. Corps, were attached to the regiment to fill vacancies. Lieutenant A. R. Thomson was appointed Adjutant, and Lieutenant A. N. I. Lilly Quartermaster. The rest of the stay of the 7th at Ahwaz was uneventful, and on March 25th they were relieved by the 44th Merwara Infantry and returned to Basra.

¹ About ten miles north-west of Ahwaz.

APPENDIX

AWARDS FOR GALLANTRY ON MARCH 3RD, 1915, NEAR
AHWAZ

In the *Gazette of India* dated July 2nd, 1915, the names of the following Indian ranks appear as having been awarded the Indian Order of Merit and the Indian Distinguished Service Medal as follows :—

INDIAN ORDER OF MERIT

For admission to the 2nd Class of the Order :—

SUBADAR MAHESH SINGH (believed to have been killed), 7th Duke of Connaught's Own Rajputs, for great gallantry at Ahwaz on March 3rd, 1915. During the retirement, his Double Company Commander, Lieutenant D. B. Burgoyne-Wallace, was wounded in the thigh and could only walk with assistance. Subadar Mahesh Singh, with great gallantry, stayed behind with Captain Gover and Lieutenant Harvey in an endeavour to save Lieutenant Burgoyne-Wallace's life. The Subadar is believed to have been killed.

SEPOY RAMSABAD SINGH (died of wounds), 7th Duke of Connaught's Own Rajputs, for exceptional bravery and devotion to duty near Ahwaz on March 3rd, 1915, in assisting to carry in a wounded sepoy who had been left behind. He did this under heavy fire from the enemy, about 100 yards away, and was mortally wounded.

SEPOY DWARKA SINGH, 7th Duke of Connaught's Own Rajputs, for gallantry near Ahwaz on March 3rd, 1915. During the retirement, Dwarka Singh went back under a heavy fire and rescued a wounded comrade, who had been left behind at a spot only some thirty yards distant from the leading group of hostile tribesmen.

SEPOY GOKARAN SINGH, 7th Duke of Connaught's Own Rajputs, for conspicuous bravery near Ahwaz on March 3rd, 1915, in remaining with Lieut.-Colonel Parr, who was severely wounded,



and assisting him back to camp. To do this, he had frequently to drive off hostile tribesmen who were closing round them, and at times had to carry Lieut.-Colonel Parr, who, but for Gokaran Singh's devotion, would probably never have reached camp.

INDIAN DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

HAVILDAR RAMADHAR SINGH, 7th Duke of Connaught's Own Rajputs.

SEPOY MATAN SINGH, 7th Duke of Connaught's Own Rajputs.

HAVILDAR GURDATT SINGH, 7th Duke of Connaught's Own Rajputs.

NAIK SUKHLAL SINGH (killed in action), 7th Duke of Connaught's Own Rajputs.

(Extract from Force Routine Order No. 1256, July 20th, 1915.)

Posthumous mentions in dispatches were awarded later to Captain Gover and Lieutenant Harvey.



CHAPTER X

THE ADVANCE ON BAGHDAD. CAPTURE OF AMARA,
BATTLE OF ES-SINN OR KUT-AL-AMARA, BATTLE OF
CTESIPHON, 1915.

AT 2 a.m. on March 27th, the *Mejidieh* cast anchor off the quayside of the General Hospital, Basra, and disembarked her sick and wounded. She then dropped down-stream to the Customs Pier, and here the regiment was put ashore, and told to settle down in the Customs House Barracks. The officers pitched their tents in the compound, using the main building as a Mess, while the men were accommodated in the go-downs on the banks of the Ashar creek. These go-downs had glass roofs, and were unbearably hot until the Sappers and Miners covered them with matting. Major F. C. Tregear, 16th Rajputs, who had been posted to the 7th as Second in Command, came to take over temporary command, and the gaps in the ranks were filled by Captain J. Martin, 94th Russell's Infantry, Captain W. G. Palmer, 113th Infantry,¹ and three I.A.R.O. officers, Lieutenant W. S. Halliley, 2nd Lieutenant J. C. Stewart, and 2nd Lieutenant E. C. St. J. Ronaldson. A draft of two Indian officers and sixty-six men also arrived. Lieut.-Colonel Parr sailed for India on the s.s. *Purnea* on April 1st, to the unfeigned regret of all ranks, who little expected to see him back.

On April 5th, the regiment was told to occupy a post outside Basra named Khora Fort, and in consequence, with the exception of the machine-gun section under Lieutenant Thomson, it missed the great battle of Shaiba on the 13th, but after the engagement it took charge of 700 Turkish prisoners until a passage to India could be arranged for them. From Khora the regiment moved to Dhiramiyeh, a most uncomfortable spot. The *shamal* or hot wind had begun to blow regularly, and a fine dust settled thickly on everything, spoiling the food and getting into the Rajputs' beards. Still worse was the plague of flies, which rendered life almost unendurable from sunrise to sunset. The hot weather was now setting in; the thermometer registered 120 degrees F. in the shade at mid-day and there were no

¹ Captain Palmer was seconded to the Royal Flying Corps in June, as an observer.



comforts such as punkahs or fans. Rifle-barrels or entrenching tools left in the open rapidly became too hot to touch. The only consolation was a plentiful supply of water-melons and grapes. At the end of May a transfer was made to Fort George, on the ruins of Old Basra.

Meanwhile, Force D¹ was assuming the proportions of an Army Corps of two Divisions, and General Sir J. S. Nixon came out to command it. Sir Arthur Barrett went home sick, and the 6th Division was taken over by Major-General C. V. F. Townshend, while the newly arrived 12th Division was commanded by Major-General G. F. Gorringe. During June, an amphibious force under General Townshend, popularly known as 'Townshend's Regatta', captured Amara, ninety miles up-stream from Qurna, and on July 25th, Major-General Gorringe's force, after some extremely difficult operations in an exhausting climate, occupied the key position of Nasiriya,² at the junction of the Euphrates with the Shatt-al-Hai.

No one was sorry when an order was received on July 15th to leave Fort George for Basra. The regiment's stay in Basra was brief, as on the 24th orders came to embark on the R.I.M. sternwheeler P.1, which had a lighter lashed on either side, to join the 18th Brigade, acting as the reserve of General Gorringe's force. The 7th, in common with the other units of the brigade, took no part in the operations, as it spent most of the time aground in the Hammar Lake. After the capture of Nasiriya the 18th Brigade returned to Qurna, where the troops were transferred to the *Blosse Lynch*. Qurna and Mazera had changed greatly since the 7th were there in January. The country was now one vast, shallow lake, about two or three feet deep, with here and there a grove of date-palms, or a mosque standing out of the water. The climate was most unpleasant, and the slightest exertion bathed one in perspiration. This was due to a moist wind known as the 'date ripener', which persists in lower Mesopotamia during June and July.

Amara was reached on July 29th and afforded a welcome change. It is about ninety miles up-stream from Qurna, and has a much drier climate. There was a large stone bazaar, and substantial residences along the river front, where there was always a breeze of an evening. The regiment took over the billets vacated by the 104th Wellesley's Rifles, and the Officers' Mess was a large private house known as

¹ This was the official designation of the Expeditionary Force in Mesopotamia.


² Also spelt Nasiriyeh.

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

Clery House, named after the C.O. of the vacating regiment. The opportunity was taken to put the men through a thorough course of drill and musketry, which had been sadly neglected owing to the incessant digging at Fort George. Lieutenant Halliley was now machine-gun officer, and no less than six gun teams were trained.

It was ascertained that the Turks, after their defeat by 'Townshend's Regatta', had retired to Kut-al-Amara, about 150 miles up-stream from Amara. Here they had been engaged in the construction of a strong defensive position, about seven miles outside the town, along a ridge of low sandhills known as the Es-Sinn banks, running on both sides of the river for about five miles. Their right rested on two formidable works, the Dujailah and Sinn Abtar redoubts, and the river was blocked by a *mahaila* with a steel lighter filled with sand on either side, lashed together by strong steel hawsers. On the left were three separate defence systems divided by marshes, known respectively as the Horseshoe, Suwada and Ataba marshes. In the flood season, these marshes become a single sheet of water extending right up to the Pusht-i-Kuh hills. As the floods recede, however, gaps are left, that between the Suwada and Ataba marshes being about one and a half miles wide and practicable to all arms. The Turks had filled the gaps with a maze of trenches and redoubts, protected with barbed-wire entanglements, land-mines, and pits filled with stakes. The ground in front was devoid of cover, and provided a perfect field of fire. To hold this, the enemy had massed two divisions, comprising twelve battalions, with thirty-eight guns, under Nur-ud-din, one of their best commanders. The Turks had been working continuously at the position for over three months, and Nur-ud-din is said to have reported to Constantinople that he could hold it indefinitely.

In order to complete the occupation of the Basra *vilayet*, it was decided to turn the Turks out of the Es-Sinn position and capture Kut-al-Amara. The task was entrusted to General Townshend's Division, which consisted of the 16th, 17th and 18th Brigades. General Townshend's plan of campaign was an ingenious one. The Division was to be divided into two columns; Column B, the 'minimum force', under Major-General Fry, consisting of the 18th Brigade, was to deliver a holding attack against the Turkish trenches opposite the Horseshoe marsh, so as to attract the attention of the enemy and make him think that we intended to break through there. Meanwhile,



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

the 'maximum force', Column A, consisting of the 16th and 17th Brigades under Brigadier-General Delamain, after making an elaborate demonstration on the right bank the day before, was to cross the river under cover of darkness, and to attack the enemy's left between the Suwada and Ataba marshes. If this manœuvre proved successful, Column A would turn the whole of the Turkish position, and drive its opponents into the river, while Column B pressed home its attack from the front in combination.

On September 9th, the 7th, on being relieved by the 76th Punjabis, loaded up at Amara on the s.s. *Julnar*, its strength being at the time eight British officers, fourteen Indian officers, and 660 rank and file. The *Julnar* was a twin-screw vessel belonging to Messrs. Lynch Bros., and very difficult to manage. Her screws were continually giving trouble, and she quickly ran aground. Here she stuck for some hours, until a tug from Amara arrived to pull her off. The flotilla of which the *Julnar* was a unit then slowly made its way to Sannaiyat, where it halted until the rest of the force arrived. On September 25th, tents and kits were again loaded up on the *Julnar*, and at 8 a.m. next day the battalion embarked on the gun-barges attached to the *T.2* and the *Shihab*. They disembarked at Nakhailat, about four miles from the Turkish position, on the left bank of the river.

Column B, of which the battalion formed part, consisted of the 2nd Battalion Norfolk Regiment, the 7th, the 110th Mahratta L.I., the 120th Rajputana Infantry, the 48th Pioneers, the 17th Company, Sappers and Miners, the 82nd Field Battery, R.A., and one section 1/5th Hants Howitzer Battery. They had first-line transport only, the remainder being left on board the steamers. General Townshend was at Nakhailat, where an observation tower had been built for him, and General Nixon was present as a spectator. On the night of the 26th, General Fry moved his brigade into a position about 3,000 yards from the enemy's front line and about 1,500 yards from the river, in readiness to attack the next morning. Meanwhile, Column A under Brigadier-General Delamain had disembarked on the right bank, at Chahela Mounds, and made a great display of pitching tents, constructing entrenchments, and sending out reconnoitring patrols. This was done so successfully that Nur-ud-din actually moved his reserve to the right bank of the river.

At 5.15 a.m. on the 27th, the 18th Brigade marched from its bivouacs, and deployed, with the 7th, 120th Rajputana Infantry and



110th Mahratta L.I. in the firing line, and the Norfolk Regiment in reserve. The 7th took up a position with their left flank resting on the Tigris, on a frontage of 400 yards. Nos. 2 and 3 Double Companies, under Captain Ogg and Lieutenant Lilly, in lines of sections and half-company columns, formed the firing line and supports, while Nos. 1 and 4 Double Companies, under Lieutenant Norris and Captain Martin, were in local reserve about 400 yards back. No. 1 Double Company, which had been on outpost duty on the previous night, was covering the left flank of the advance.

As the brigade moved forward, the 7th came under fire from a party in position north-west of the deserted village of Sufa,¹ but the leading companies, advancing at a great pace in conjunction with the 120th on their right, drove them back and seized a good defensive line. The enemy then brought enfilade fire to bear on the reserves from a mound on the left, but this too was quickly got under control by No. 1 Double Company and the machine-guns. After consultation with the 120th, Major Tregear selected a line and dug in on it. The dispositions made for the night were Nos. 2 and 3 Double Companies and two machine-guns in the firing line, No. 4 in close support, and No. 1 in local reserve; a position was entrenched on the left facing the Sufa mound, to deal with fire from that quarter. The night was quiet except for an attack from a small raiding party which was easily driven off. Meanwhile, under cover of darkness, Column A, consisting of the 16th and 17th Brigades under General Delamain, after a great demonstration on the right bank, had slipped silently across the river, and, guided by an R.E. officer, had taken up their positions for their turning movement on the following morning.

On the morning of the 28th, at 5.30 a.m., the 18th Brigade again advanced, the 7th having Nos. 1 and 4 Double Companies in the firing line, No. 2 Double Company in local reserve, and No. 3 Double Company covering the left flank. At about 6 a.m. when the brigade was about 1,500 yards from the enemy's main position, it encountered a very heavy barrage from the Turkish land batteries and steamers, which went on until about 7.30 a.m., after which our artillery gradually got the upper hand.

At 10.40 a.m. an aeroplane flew over General Townshend's headquarters and fired a Very light, which was the preconcerted signal that Delamain's movement had been launched; and about

¹ Not indicated on map.



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

CSL

an hour later General Fry was asked to co-operate by pressing his attack home, as Column A was meeting with opposition. General Fry replied that he would do what he could, but the enemy's resistance was still considerable. The 18th Brigade gradually pushed on in short rushes, and by 4.30 p.m. the right of the firing line was about 900 yards from the Turks between the Horseshoe and Suwada marshes. On the left, however, the 7th were still being held up by enfilade fire from a mound south of the Horseshoe marsh, and their left flank had to be echeloned back. The Turkish trenches were flush with the ground, and quite invisible owing to the dust and mirage. During this period, the 7th suffered most of its casualties, Jemadar Rambadan Singh, in charge of the regimental scouts, being killed, and Captain Martin and Lieutenant Halliley wounded. During this trying day under the hot sun, the regimental *Kahars* were conspicuous, carrying water for the sepoys imperturbably into the firing line, although the kerosene tins on their heads shone like helios and attracted marked attention from the Turks.

At 5.30 p.m., General Fry received an aeroplane message from General Delamain, saying that Column A was behind the Horseshoe position. At that point, however, it was held up by a strong counter-attack delivered by fresh Turkish reserves from the other side of the river. This was beaten off at the point of the bayonet, but flesh and blood could do no more. The men, who had been fighting since 8 a.m., were exhausted by fatigue, hunger and thirst, and remained where they were till dawn, suffering severely from the bitter cold. Meanwhile, the 18th Brigade had advanced to within 500 yards of the Turkish main line, but in the absence of co-operation from Column A could go no farther. By 6.40 p.m. it was completely dark, and the sound of Delamain's guns could no longer be heard. General Fry therefore ordered his men to dig in and make dispositions for the night. At daybreak on the 29th the advance was continued. There was an ominous silence, and then the patrols came in with the news that the Turkish trenches had been evacuated. The pincers had just failed to close, owing to the failure of our cavalry to bar the enemy's retreat, and Nur-ud-din, by a great stroke of luck, had withdrawn the major part of his force.

The troops were in no condition to pursue immediately. Delamain's force in particular was described as stupefied by their exertions, and the cavalry were back at Nakhailat. The most



promising prospect seemed to be offered by the river, provided the boom could be broken, and a most gallant attempt was made by Lieut.-Commander E. C. Cookson of the *Comet* to remove this obstacle sunk by the Turks in the Tigris. Finding that he could not send a man over the ship's side to cut the hawser, 'because it meant certain death', he took an axe and went himself. He was killed instantly, and was awarded a posthumous V.C. The passage was got fairly clear by the morning of the 29th, and the 18th Brigade was told to carry on the pursuit, moving by steamer behind the flotilla, while the cavalry co-operated on the left bank. The 16th and 17th Brigades were to occupy Kut and clear up the battlefield. Much unnecessary suffering was caused by the faulty arrangements for evacuating the wounded, many of whom had to lie unattended for hours before they were picked up, and then had to endure long journeys on springless carts to the river.

The battle of Es-Sinn or Kut-al-Amara¹ was a notable victory. The Turks had been ejected from a carefully prepared position, with a loss of 4,000 killed and wounded, fourteen guns and 1,153 prisoners. Our own casualties were ninety-four killed and 1,234 wounded, and of these, the 7th Rajputs lost Jemadar Rambadan Singh and two sepoy killed, and Captain Martin, Lieutenant Halliley, Subadar Sardar Singh and twelve sepoy wounded.

General Nixon concluded his report on the operations with the words : 'The troops under the command of Major-General Townshend displayed the highest soldierly qualities, and worthily upheld the reputation they have earned during this arduous campaign. The conduct of the infantry in the attack was particularly noteworthy. They were set a task involving prolonged exertion and endurance, and performed it with an alacrity and resolution which must have been most disconcerting to the enemy. The dash with which the Indian troops attacked a well-entrenched and stubborn foe I attribute largely to the confidence with which they have been inspired by the British battalions of the force.'

With the defeat of the Turkish Army and the occupation of Kut-al-Amara, the task of Force D was completed. As General Townshend wrote to General Nixon :—'If I may be allowed to express an opinion, I should say that our object up to the battle of Kut

¹ This action, known as the battle of Kut-al-Amara, is sometimes described as the battle of Es-Sinn because the principal line of defence of the Turks was the Es-Sinn banks, on both sides of the Tigris, but mainly on the right bank.



CSL

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

has been the occupation of the Basra *vilayet* and the occupation of the strategic position of Kut. If Government does not consider that the occupation of Baghdad is yet politically advisable, owing to doubt of the Dardanelles situation and the consequent possibility of any small force we might put into Baghdad being driven out by superior forces from Anatolia, and so obliged to retreat along an extremely long line of communication, infested by hostile or semi-hostile Arabs, then we should on all military grounds occupy ourselves with consolidating our position at Kut.'

It is now only too evident that General Townshend's appreciation of the situation was correct; the occupation of Baghdad was only justifiable from the military point of view had we completely routed the enemy at Es-Sinn, and been able to enter the city at his heels. Nor did anyone at the time appear to realize the necessity of co-ordination. As long as we kept the main Turkish Army immobilized in Gallipoli, operations in Mesopotamia were comparatively safe; if, on the other hand, the Cabinet proposed to evacuate the Dardanelles, ordinary prudence demanded that we should stand on the defensive in the East. Baghdad is a great city, which could never have been held except by a far larger force than that at General Nixon's disposal, and no one appears to have appreciated that the sole means of communication was the river Tigris, notoriously difficult to navigate and running for 500 miles through hostile country.

But the lure of Baghdad was irresistible, both to the Cabinet and the Indian authorities. Mr. Austen Chamberlain, then Secretary of State for India, wired to the Viceroy:—'At the present moment it seems that the German attempt to break through to Constantinople will succeed, and our position and prospects in Gallipoli are most uncertain. Persia seems to be drifting into war on the German side, while Arabs are wavering, and, unless we can offer them a great inducement, will probably join the Turks. We are, therefore, in need of a striking success in the East, both to check the Persian movement and win over the Arabs. Unless you consider that the possibility of a future withdrawal is decisive against the advance, all other considerations seem to us to render it desirable, and we are prepared to order it.' Sir John Nixon was not the man to refuse so plain a lead, and the fatal decision was taken.

On September 29th, the 18th Brigade was embarked to follow up the retreating Turks. The 7th were in the *Mejidieh*, which, contrary



to Captain Cowley's advice, was overloaded with baggage and stores belonging to the Staff. The river was very low at the time, and the vessel continually ran aground on sandbanks. In consequence, the pursuit went on at a snail's pace, and allowed the enemy ample time to fall back unmolested. It took five days to reach Aziziya,¹ fifty miles up-stream from Kut, and here the troops disembarked.

Aziziya was a desolate spot, being merely a collection of huts on the river-bank, and the sandflies were a great nuisance. The men were tired out; many were suffering from beriberi, due to lack of fresh vegetables, and there was much hard work to be done in the way of unloading the ships and making a perimeter camp. Our prestige, however, was high, and villagers brought in eggs, fowls and dates. Much needed reinforcements arrived from India, and though these were not up to the former regimental standard, they were given as much drill and musketry as was possible in the circumstances.

On the night of October 11th/12th, the monotony was relieved by a raid on an outlying post known as Frazer's Post, which was only driven off after the Arabs had penetrated the defences. On the 27th, General Townshend determined to give these marauders a sharp lesson. It was known that they were encamped at El Kutunie, about eight miles away, and a column was sent out to disperse them. It started at 1.15 a.m., and after a rough and tiring desert march, arrived in rear of the enemy, quite unobserved, at dawn. Unfortunately, a long halt was now made, in order to bring up stragglers and close ranks, and the enemy managed to break through. The Arab encampment was, however, destroyed, and a fortified *serai* was blown up. On the return journey, the 7th provided the rearguard. The force reached camp at 2 p.m. without mishap, having covered about twenty miles in the twelve hours, and the behaviour of the recruits proved to be highly satisfactory. The weather was intensely cold, and the men, who had hitherto had only their shorts and shirts and a single blanket apiece, felt it keenly. Fortunately the heavy kit now began to arrive, and gradually things became a little more comfortable. Subadar Agar Singh joined from the base with a draft of 100 men, and Subadar Brijmohan Singh turned up from hospital. On November 9th, Colonel Parr arrived. Few had expected him to return after his severe wounds at Ahwaz, and it was touching to see the effect on the men of his presence among them once again. He was looking

¹ Aziziya is also spelt Aziziyeh.

very fit, but was rather lame, and walked with the aid of a stick. Accompanying him, needless to say, was his faithful orderly, Gokaran Singh, I.O.M. General W. G. Hamilton replaced General Fry in charge of the 18th Brigade.

The army destined for the advance on Baghdad was now concentrated at Aziziya. It consisted of the following units :—

6th Cavalry Brigade and ' S ' Battery R.H.A.

16th and 17th, 18th and 30th Infantry Brigades.

10th Brigade R.F.A., 86th and 104th Heavy Batteries R.G.A.,

and 1/5th Hants Howitzer Battery.


Divisional Troops.

Seven aeroplanes R.F.C.

Four river gunboats, with barges mounting 4·7 naval guns, and five river steamers.

The total was about 11,300 troops of all arms and thirty guns.

The Turkish army was calculated by General Townshend's Intelligence Department at 13,000 infantry and thirty-eight guns, but owing to an unfortunate mischance which will be described later, this proved to be an underestimate ; actually the enemy had in the firing lines at least 18,000 infantry, including the famous 51st Division of Ottoman Turks, and fifty-two guns, besides a swarm of Arab irregulars. Aeroplane reconnaissances showed that Nur-ud-din, profiting by the delay in following him up, had constructed a strong position astride the Tigris, about 6,000 yards from the great arch of Ctesiphon, that curious relic of the Sassanian Empire which here dominates the landscape for miles around, and some twenty miles below Baghdad. The work had been carried out under German supervision. It extended from the river for about 3,500 yards to an ancient L-shaped earthwork known as High Wall, which was about 40 feet high, with two arms each about 500 yards in length. From High Wall the trench-line ran about 2,000 yards to an earthwork known as Water Redoubt, and from here to another strong redoubt known as V.P. or Vital Point, as Townshend looked upon it as the key of the whole position. Thus the enemy's line was altogether about six miles long, its right resting on the Tigris, and its centre and left on a chain of strong redoubts. The trenches were low-sided and almost invisible, and well wired. In front was an excellent field of fire, the ground being flat and covered with low scrub. About 4,000





yards to the rear was a second line, covering Qusaiba village and less carefully prepared than the first. In the rear of that again lay the unfordable Diyala river.

General Townshend's plan of attack was similar to that which had proved successful at Es-Sinn. It was based on the principle laid down in *Field Service Regulations*, 'Success may be sought by means of a converging movement of separated forces so timed as to strike the enemy's front and flank simultaneously.' He divided his force into four columns. Column C, consisting of the 17th Brigade under General Hoghton, was to deliver a holding attack on the Water Redoubt, pin the enemy to his ground and induce him to think that this was the main attack. As soon as the attack by Column C was under weigh, Column B, consisting of the 18th Brigade under General Hamilton, together with the Flying Column under General Melliss, was to turn the enemy's left and rear, and threaten his line of communications. When this attack was launched, General Delamain would strike the decisive blow against V.P. General Townshend afterwards explained that he reckoned on paralyzing a great part of the Turkish army by General Hoghton's attack, while the main attack under General Delamain turned the enemy's flank. If this came off, the Turks would either be driven into the Tigris or be thrown back against the Diyala river. But Townshend had no general reserve, and it was admittedly a desperate expedient. It is doubtful whether it would have been undertaken at all, but for an unfortunate accident to Major Riley, commanding Townshend's small air force. On November 21st, while on a reconnaissance flight, Major Riley detected the presence of the 51st Turkish Division on the field. This information was of vital importance to Townshend, but Riley was brought down by machine-gun fire and captured, and the news never reached British Headquarters.

On the evening of November 21st, the columns moved out to their allotted stations, ready to move forward at sunrise. They spent a miserable night in the bitter cold, and when the sun rose the dense mist from the Tigris made it impossible to see more than a few yards. As soon as conditions made it possible to observe, the din of battle arose as the river flotilla opened with every gun that could be brought to bear.

Column B, under General Hamilton, consisting as usual of the Norfolk Regiment, 7th, 110th and 120th, moved out from Lajj soon



after dark on the 21st. The strength of the 7th was ten British officers, sixteen Indian officers, and 663 rank and file. As water supply was likely to be the chief problem of the day, every water-bottle and *pakhal* was filled, and an extra supply was carried in *mashaks* made from machine-gun tarpaulins. About midnight the force broke off from Delamain's column and moved to its allotted post about three miles to the right, while Melliss's cavalry column took position on its right flank. Owing to the mist, the brigade could not move forward until 8.30 a.m. on the following morning. No. 3 Double Company, together with the 22nd Company Sappers and Miners, were left under Major Tregear to guard the field ambulances and reserve ammunition. The remainder were deployed with the Norfolk Regiment and 110th in the firing line, and the 7th and 120th in support.

At first the advance went according to plan, and at about 9.15 a.m. some advanced groups of the enemy were encountered and driven in. The brigade then pushed rapidly on to within 800 yards, when intense machine-gun, rifle and artillery fire brought it to a standstill. Soon all four units were absorbed in the firing line. Many brave deeds were done on that day. Major Cramer-Roberts, commanding the Norfolk Regiment, finding the men uncomfortably crowded and unable to use their rifles, asked Major Ogg to move his sepoys to a flank. 'As soon as I saw Ogg', he said, 'I knew he was the man to do it, if it could be done at all.' Major Ogg went backwards and forwards under a perfect hail of bullets, leading each section to its right place, until he fell with a bullet through the thigh which completely paralysed his leg. He lay until 6 p.m. before he was picked up. He was awarded a D.S.O., which those who saw his work at Ahwaz thought should have come long before.

Ammunition was now running short, and Captain Thomson, the Adjutant, went back to get some. Lieutenant Lilly, the Quartermaster, was struck by a bullet at about the same time. Shortly after, Captain Thomson returned wounded; he wished to carry on, but was sent to the ambulance. However, Subadar Rambaran Singh soon appeared with twenty-two boxes of ammunition, which he proceeded to distribute with the utmost coolness to the 7th and other regiments. Colonel Parr, who was now in charge of the firing line, was looking anxiously for Delamain's brigade on his left, but no one appeared, so he told his men to entrench themselves as best they could in the hard ground with the small entrenching tool. At 3 p.m. he

received a message saying that 'the General' had ordered the line to advance. On going up to investigate, he came across General Delamain and his staff. Just at that moment, a company of the 7th came up with tremendous *élan*, led by Lieutenant Richardson and Subadar Brijmohan Singh. Lieutenant Richardson, who had joined from the base only a few days earlier, shouted as he passed, 'This is better than the Depot, Colonel!' General Delamain turned to Colonel Parr and remarked, 'Parr, your fellows are splendid, and I shall mention them in my report.' Just about this time, casualties began to mount up. Lieutenant Richardson fell with a bullet through the lung, but Subadar Brijmohan Singh, though wounded, carried on in his place. Signalling-Havildar Dirjodhan Singh and Havildar Mahadeo Singh, two of the best, were killed. Lieutenant Halliley and Lance-Naik Ramautar Singh fought their machine-guns with great gallantry. By the end of the afternoon the casualties amounted to five British officers out of ten, nine Indian officers out of sixteen, and 320 rank and file, or 45 per cent. of the total strength. Soon after, the advance was again checked by a strong Turkish counter-attack, and the force was ordered to hang on till dark, and then fall back on V.P. This was done by about 2 a.m. on the 23rd, but not until all the wounded had been brought in. So great was their number that sepoy had to improvise stretchers out of rifles and greatcoats.

Those who were present remember with gratitude the Mess Havildar, Harakhbahadur Singh, who, having located the battalion in some miraculous manner, turned up at V.P. with his Mess mule in the nick of time. This was an inestimable boon to officers who had been marching and fighting since 6 a.m. without food. Conditions at V.P. were almost indescribable. Hand-to-hand fighting of a desperate character had taken place in the redoubt, which was choked with Turkish dead. Here also the wounded were collected. Unfortunately the authorities had not profited by their experiences at Es-Sinn, and the number of casualties far exceeded the provisions made for their removal. Transport carts had to be commandeered, and the jolting of these springless vehicles over the rough ground caused indescribable suffering to those who suffered from fractured limbs. There was no food or water, and to crown all, the Turkish artillery opened fire early next morning, the shells falling right among those who still waited to be evacuated. It is difficult to imagine how men in these



circumstances retained their sanity. The work of the medical officers of the 6th Division was beyond praise ; they laboured until they collapsed from fatigue, but it was impossible to do much with the inadequate means at their disposal.

The 23rd was a day of exhaustion for both sides, and General Townshend's staff spent the time in reorganizing the force. Column C was to hold V.P. till the wounded had been evacuated ; Column B was to reorganize at V.P. and then move to High Wall, while the 16th Brigade was to hold Water Redoubt. V.P. was garrisoned by the 7th and 110th, the Norfolk Regiment and 120th having been sent to reinforce Water Redoubt. Late in the afternoon, the Turks made a counter-attack, which was not pressed home. The night of the 23rd/24th was one of great anxiety. The cold was intense ; the men were hungry and exhausted, and ammunition was running short. At Water Redoubt, the Turkish 51st Division launched no less than six furious assaults, and groups of the enemy came right up to the trenches ; away on the left, heavy firing and much shouting came from an isolated mound held by the 2/7th Gurkhas, where another fierce encounter was in progress. The portion of the line held by the Norfolk Regiment, 120th, 110th and 7th was attacked by the 38th Turkish Division in a less determined manner, and the enemy were repulsed.

At dawn on the 24th, the 7th were sent to Lajj to act as escort to an ammunition convoy. *En route*, they came up with the long, seemingly endless procession of wounded in A.T. carts, making its way over the four weary miles which lay between them and their base. It included several of their own officers. Captain Ogg, in spite of his leg wound, was mounted on a pony. Lieutenant Lilly, wounded in the stomach, was obliged to walk. Captain Norris, wounded in six places, had found a seat in an A.T. cart on top of two soldiers with broken limbs. Presently the 7th were stopped by two gunners, who enquired whether they had a doctor with them. Captain Arthur stepped forward, and was shown a form lying on the roadside, covered by a sheet. It proved to be Lieutenant Richardson. He had apparently been left for dead, but he was still breathing, and a lift was commandeered for him in the Army Commander's car, which happened to be passing by. He was eventually placed on board a steamer. Thanks to his splendid constitution, he lingered on till December 7th and died at Amara, though the doctor who attended



him on the battlefield had then pronounced his wound as mortal. At Lajj, the men were allowed to fall out and get a drink from the river. This was the first they had enjoyed since the evening of the 21st, except for the water they carried with them.

The night of the 24th/25th was a quiet one, and the Turks had apparently retired to the Diyala river. On the afternoon of the 25th, however, the air service reported that the enemy had been strongly reinforced from Baghdad, and was preparing to attack in great force. General Townshend felt, to use his own words, that from a military point of view it would be madness and nothing else to remain at Ctesiphon. His men were exhausted, and short of food, water and ammunition. His casualties, 4,511, or nearly half his force, were very severe, and what was worse, the Indian regiments had lost a very large proportion of their British officers. He therefore determined to fall back on Lajj, and the retirement, which was begun at 7 p.m. on the 25th, was carried out in perfect order by 1 a.m. the following morning. All the wounded were evacuated, and stores sorted out and loaded on barges. Ammunition and equipment were reissued to those who had lost theirs, and stragglers returned to their units.

So ended the battle of Ctesiphon, one of the severest and most heroic in the history of the Indian Army. The 6th Poona Division had covered itself with glory. It had defeated a brave and determined enemy considerably outnumbering it, and turned him out of a carefully prepared position with a loss of 9,500 men, including 1,650 prisoners. General Townshend in a communiqué said :—

‘I cannot express my admiration and gratitude for the heroism displayed by all ranks. To show with what stern valour you fought, you drove four divisions out of a very strong position and forced them to retire beyond the Diyala river. But our numbers were too few to put them to rout ; we have had 4,000 men killed and wounded, the Turks losing many more than this figure. You have added a brilliant page to the glorious battle-roll of the Army in India, and you will be proud to tell them at home that you fought at the battle of Ctesiphon.’



THE BATTLE OF CTESIPHON

CSL
151

APPENDIX

CASUALTIES AT THE BATTLE OF CTESIPHON

Killed

Lieutenant G. St. J. Richardson
Havildar Dirjodhan Singh
Havildar Mahadeo Singh
and thirty-five other ranks.

Wounded

Captain A. C. Ogg
Captain and Adjutant A. R. Thomson, M.C.
Lieutenant A. N. I. Lilly
Lieutenant R. J. N. Norris
Subadar Major Shiuambar Singh
Subadar Sardar Singh
Subadar Agar Singh
Subadar Ram Singh (attached)
Jemadar Bhagwanbaksh Singh
Jemadar Gopal Singh
Jemadar Bhabhuti Singh
Jemadar Sitlabaksh Singh
Jemadar Mahadeo Singh
and 242 other ranks.

Total casualties 293, or 42·5 of total strength.



CHAPTER XI

THE RETREAT FROM CTESIPHON AND SIEGE OF KUT-AL-AMARA, 1915-17

DURING the night of November 26th, the force prepared a defensive position for itself at Lajj. Tents were available, and the men made themselves fairly comfortable, but not for long. Aeroplane reconnaissance showed that the Turks were advancing in force, and on the 27th General Townshend issued orders for a further retirement to Aziziya, twenty-two miles down-stream. A quantity of stores had to be destroyed, and tents were left standing in order to deceive the enemy. The retreat to Aziziya was carried out without molestation, as the Arabs were too busy looting the camp to interfere. The troops started at 4 p.m. with the 18th Brigade as rearguard, and arrived at Aziziya at 8 a.m. on the 28th, after a night march.

The force halted for two days at Aziziya, while stores and wounded were evacuated, and welcome reinforcements in the shape of the 14th Hussars and the 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment came up. The Hussars made short work of a party of Arab snipers who had been giving much trouble. General Townshend now came to the conclusion that he must get right back to Kut-al-Amara before the Turks caught him up, and at 9 a.m. on November 30th the retirement was continued as far as the village of Umm-al-Tubul, about nine miles away. At 9 a.m., the troops moved off, the 18th Brigade again acting as rearguard. Umm-al-Tubul was reached at mid-day, and a camp was laid out. It was rectangular in shape, with one side parallel with the river. During the night it was fired into, and the sound of the jingling of accoutrements and the tramp of men, and the appearance of numerous lights, showed clearly that the main Turkish force had caught us up. General Townshend issued orders that the army was to attack the enemy at dawn, and then to break off the action and continue the retreat. Meanwhile the transport and wounded and the Turkish prisoners were got away, and an urgent message was sent recalling General Melliss and the 30th Brigade, which had been sent down-stream to open the way to Kut.



Daylight on December 1st disclosed an extraordinary sight. About 3,000 yards away lay the whole Turkish force under canvas. The 63rd Battery R.F.A. at once opened rapid fire, and soon the whole of the artillery and the ships joined in. The enemy was completely taken by surprise. A Turkish field battery was engaged by the 63rd Battery R.F.A. and knocked out, gun by gun. Tents were seen to collapse, and riderless horses and camels were observed galloping wildly in every direction. General Townshend, seeing the effect of his artillery fire on the Turks, decided that this was the psychological moment to continue the retreat. The Division was ordered to retire in echelon of brigades, commencing with the 16th, which was nearest the river. This difficult movement was executed with clockwork precision, which elicited the admiration of their Commander. The Norfolk Regiment and the 7th Rajputs, who formed the rearguard of the 18th Brigade, had a very hot time from Turkish gunfire. A retirement in the face of the enemy is always a difficult operation, and the behaviour of the 7th in these circumstances was admirable. Nothing could have surpassed their coolness ; when the turn of the battalion came to fall back, each double company in its turn got up and walked deliberately off as if they were on the parade-ground, with no sign of hurrying. During this action, the regiment lost seven killed and twenty-seven wounded. The latter included Lieutenant E. C. St. J. Ronaldson, I.A.R.O., and Jemadar Adjutant Bhabhuti Singh. Lieutenant Ronaldson was wounded in the arm whilst covering the retirement of the 63rd Battery. About 9 a.m. General Melliss turned up with the 30th Brigade, and this considerably relieved the pressure. Unfortunately, two gunboats, the *Firefly* and *Comet*, were disabled by enemy shellfire and had to be abandoned, both badly on fire.

In order to throw off the enemy General Townshend marched for the whole of December 1st, and did not halt until he reached Shadi (Monkey Village), twenty-six miles from Umm-al-Tubul. The men staggered along, many of them literally walking in their sleep, with the Arab horsemen hovering on their flanks. Fortunately the main body of the Turks had been too disorganized by the severe handling that they had received at Umm-al-Tubul to pursue. Darkness came on, but still the force pushed on over the rough track ; it needed all the efforts of the British and Indian officers to prevent the men from falling out, though they knew what they must expect at

the hands of the Arabs if they did. The head of the column reached Shadi at 9 p.m., but it was dawn before the rearguard arrived and, even then, cold and want of food prevented anyone from getting proper rest. But in an almost miraculous fashion, the indefatigable Harakhbahadur Singh once again turned up in the nick of time with his mess mule. Thanks to their resourceful and untiring Mess Havildar, the 7th not only had something to eat and drink themselves, but were even able to entertain a number of famished guests. Among the latter was the Brigade Commander, who always swore that Harakhbahadur Singh had saved his life on this occasion.

Early next day the march was resumed, and after covering eighteen miles the men bivouacked at sunset three miles out of Kut. The garrison sent out coffee and hot food and did what they could. The 17th Brigade did not arrive until much later, owing to the difficulty of bringing in stragglers ; the men had now been marching and fighting for twelve days on end with hardly any time for food or sleep, and many of them were young recruits. From Umm-al-Tubul they had covered fifty miles in thirty-six hours, after fighting a fierce rearguard action against an enemy superior in numbers. A special word of praise is due to the transport under Major Forbes, S. and T. Corps, who got away safely and without delay not only the bulk of the baggage, but the 1,650 prisoners taken at Ctesiphon. On the morning of December 3rd, the 6th Division staggered into Kut and the men lay down where they were. Many went to sleep without even taking off their accoutrements, so utterly were they worn out. It speaks well for the march discipline maintained that during the retreat there were only 218 missing out of 6,500, of whom many were sick and wounded taken prisoners on the abandoned barges. General Townshend, in his account, says :—‘ Never, I consider, has a British force done longer and more exhausting marches than those of 1st and 2nd December. Never in any war in modern military history have British troops been more highly tried than in the Ctesiphon operations. Yet never was there a murmur—never the slightest sign of demoralization or insubordination. I hope history will call this also an honourable retreat.’

Townshend’s decision to make a stand at Kut was prompted by many reasons. Kut was the only real halting place before Basra was reached ; it blocked the Turkish advance, and enabled us to maintain the Basra *vilayet*, which had been the original object of the



expedition. Kut was also a place of considerable strategic importance. It was at the junction of the Tigris with the Shatt-al-Hai,¹ by which the enemy could make a diversion, via Nasiriya, against Basra, and it was the meeting-place of many caravan roads. It had been the base for the advance against Baghdad, and if it were abandoned, valuable supplies of stores and ammunition would fall into the enemy's hands. Besides, the men were tired out, and it was doubtful whether a further retreat would not have a bad effect on morale. Kut was, moreover, easy to defend. It was situated in a U-shaped bend in the river which was here 250 to 400 yards wide, and the mouth of the U was only about one mile across. On the right bank of the river, at its junction with the Shatt-al-Hai, lay the little hamlet of Yakasub, known to the troops as Woolpress Village. Kut is a typical Mesopotamian town, with a fringe of palm trees, and a few shops, cafés and bazaars along the river front. Its tall minaret was a prominent feature for miles around. Like all Arab places, it was indescribably filthy, its narrow, winding lanes being littered with refuse. It had about 6,000 inhabitants, and it would have been infinitely more advisable had these been expelled on the arrival of the troops. General Townshend was, however, persuaded, against his better judgement, by Sir Percy Cox, the chief political officer, to allow them to remain on humanitarian and political grounds. General Townshend subsequently had good grounds to repent of his leniency. Not only was the number of mouths to be fed nearly doubled, but the Arabs acted with characteristic treachery, and constantly betrayed his movements to the enemy.

Prior to his arrival, General Townshend was informed by General Rimington, who had been in charge of the lines of communication, that Kut had been put into a state of defence ; but this information proved to be misleading. The mouth of the U had been partly closed by a fort and a series of redoubts connecting the two banks of the river, with a single apron of barbed wire. No trenches, however, had been dug, and the fort, which simply consisted of mud walls and had been originally built as a warehouse, offered no protection against artillery fire. A bitterly cold rain was falling, and the sepoys were in no condition to start work. Fortunately the enemy was still some distance away, and perfect peace reigned. Every effort was made to get wounded and non-combatants safely down-stream to Ali Gharbi. The boats full of wounded presented a terrible sight. The wretched

¹ This was dry except in the flood season.


HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

men were lying on the dirty boards, still wearing their field-dressings and covered with sores and blisters, unattended and scarcely fed. Major M. Carter, I.M.S., who was present when the *Mejidieh* arrived at Basra, said, 'The patients were crowded and huddled together and only a few could stand. With no protection from sun or rain for seventeen days, with fractured limbs, many with their skins perforated in five or six places by broken bones, they had been left writhing in the cramped space allowed them on the deck of the ship, which was covered with dysentery and swarming with flies and vermin.' The scandal created by these disclosures led to the appointment of a Commission, of which Major-General A. H. Bingley was a member, to enquire into the causes of this appalling breakdown of the Medical Services. Their report brought about an immediate improvement, but the real culprits were never brought to book. In justice, however, to the medical officers of the 6th Division, whose work was heroic, it should be realized that the collecting and embarking of the wounded under fire in a retreat, with the enemy in close pursuit, was a remarkable feat worthy of all praise. The real cause of the collapse was not so much the paucity of medical personnel as the acute shortage of river transport and the consequent impossibility of reserving any steamers exclusively for hospital work. The wounded and sick had to be embarked in haste on the first steamer available, and in some cases the urgency for a quick turn round was such that there was not time to so much as clean the decks and barges from the dirt of the last voyage.

As soon as the troops had recovered from their exertions, they were set to work at digging trenches, making the fort and redoubts bomb-proof, and wiring. Improvised cover was provided by using sacks of *atta* in the place of sandbags. Ultimately three trench-systems, connected by communication trenches, were erected, and divided into the north-east, the north-west and southern sectors. These were held by the 17th, 16th and 18th Brigades respectively. The 18th Brigade was responsible for the second line and the river line south of it; Woolpress Village, across the river, was held by the 120th Rajputana Infantry under Major P. F. Pocock, and was practically speaking an independent command. The 30th Brigade was in reserve. The town of Kut itself was taken over and cleaned up as far as possible, and covered *serais* were utilized for hospitals. The strength of the force holding Kut was 301 British officers, 2,851 British troops,

THE SIEGE OF KUT AL AMARA

Dec., 1915 to April, 1916.





HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

225 Indian officers, and 8,230 Indian troops, with forty-three guns. General Townshend could reckon on putting 7,000 rifles into the firing-line, with 800 rounds per rifle and 600 rounds per gun. There were provisions for two months. The strength of the 7th Rajputs at the beginning of the siege was six British officers, six Indian officers and 350 rank and file.

On December 7th the Turks began to appear on the scene. Had they rushed the town while the defences were yet unfinished, the results might have been disastrous, but their experiences at Ctesiphon and Umm-al-Tubul had taught them a wholesome respect for the 6th Division, and during the next few days they contented themselves with a converging movement on both banks, north and south of the peninsula. At the same time, a force pressed forward in extended order against the mouth of the U. The Turk is an adept at digging, and very soon the neck of the peninsula was completely closed by a network of trenches. Fearing that his bridge of boats might be rushed by the enemy, General Townshend had it blown up. This task was most gallantly carried out by two officers,¹ and Kut was then, save for its wireless, completely severed from the outer world. The 7th now had No. 4 Double Company in Woolpress Village to reinforce the 120th, Nos. 1 and 3 in the palm gardens east of the town, and No. 2 in billets on the eastern side of Kut. The billets were in an Arab house of the usual type, with a central court and a number of rooms opening inwards on to it. There was a great deal of shelling, which set fire to some stacks of *bhoosa* and caused a serious conflagration.

There was no serious fighting until the 12th, when a determined attack was delivered on the 16th Brigade's trenches and Woolpress Village. It was beaten off, the Indian troops showing that they had fully recovered from their fatigues and behaving admirably. The garrison of Woolpress Village made a successful sortie, and considerably enlarged their perimeter. After this, there was comparative quiet for some days, punctuated only by sniping. The enemy investing Kut were now computed at 12,000 men and thirty-three guns. Fortunately the weather was fine, with frosty nights. There was no lack of food, as Townshend confidently reckoned on being relieved within a month at the latest. The only serious diversion was on the night of the 17th to 18th, when a successful raid on the Turkish

¹ Lieutenant A. Matthews, R.E., and Lieutenant R. Sweet, 2nd Battalion, 7th Gurkha Rifles. Both officers were awarded the Military Cross.



trenches was carried out. Some forty Turks were killed and a number of prisoners taken, without loss on our side.

On Christmas Eve the enemy began a very heavy bombardment, shells pouring into Kut at the rate of eighty a minute. Telephonic communications were cut, and a number of guns were put out of action. The walls of the fort crumbled under the fire, and the wire was cut in many places. This was followed by a general assault, the heaviest weight of which fell on the first line, and especially on the fort, held by the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, the 103rd, 119th, and the Volunteer Battery. Here the fighting was hand-to-hand, with bayonet and bomb, and continued far into the night. The scene was lit up by the faint rays of the moon, and by the star shells fired by the batteries. When the sun rose on Christmas Day, nearly 2,000 dead, mostly of the 52nd Turkish Division, which had just arrived from the Caucasus, lay piled in front of our wire. A few days later, the Turks asked for an armistice, and fatigue parties were busily engaged for a long time in the gruesome task of removing the decaying corpses and burying them. The British casualties were 315, including seventeen officers. This brought our total casualties up to 1,625 since the beginning of the siege. For the rest of the month there was little fighting; the defences were improved, and fresh communication trenches dug. The health of the troops was good, save for a few cases of beriberi, dysentery and pneumonia, and all looked forward to being relieved early in the coming year.

Here perhaps something may be said of the hospitals. These had to be located in the town, and were dismal spots. The officers' hospital was an ordinary Arab house. The beds were crowded together as casualties began to come in, and privacy there was none. Many of the inmates turned envious eyes on the spacious and roomy building occupied by the Military Governor, which would have been far more suitable for the purpose. Still more depressing was the British and Indian troops' hospital, a dingy place which had once been a covered-in bazaar, the roof black with smoke and thick with cobwebs. Both hospitals were directly in the line of fire of the Turkish guns shelling our batteries north-west of Kut, and 'overs' had an unpleasant habit of pitching in the vicinity. Snipers on the river bank had an almost uninterrupted view of the ambulances bringing in the sick. The climax was reached when a Turkish aeroplane landed a bomb on the roof, killing or wounding thirty-two

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

of the patients. Every effort was made to collect eggs for the use of sick and convalescents, and about 300 were brought in daily. A certain amount of medical comforts, such as fresh and preserved milk, tinned meat and fruit, tea, coffee, rice and sugar, could be purchased at famine prices in the bazaar during the early stages of the siege, but these soon ran out. Dates were always plentiful.

On January 19th, 1916, Sir John Nixon was relieved of his command, and replaced by Sir Percy Lake. This is not the place to discuss General Nixon's share in the responsibility for the unfortunate decision to try and capture Baghdad with quite insufficient means. When the advance on Baghdad failed, the public was only too prone to remember this fact, and to forget the greatness of his other achievements. He was the life and soul of the advance, and it was chiefly owing to his inspiring example that the army, starved of almost every elementary requisite for a successful campaign, progressed as far as it did.

On January 21st, hopes rose high as the besieged heard the thunder of the guns when the relieving force assaulted the Turkish entrenchments at Hanna. The attack failed, chiefly owing to the atrocious weather, though it was pressed home with the utmost gallantry, the Black Watch and 6th Jats getting into the enemy's trenches, only to be driven out with heavy loss. General Townshend thereupon issued the following on January 26th :—

'The Relief Force under General Aylmer has been unsuccessful in its efforts to dislodge the Turks entrenched on the left bank of the river, some fourteen miles below the position at Es-Sinn, where we defeated the Turks in September last, when their strength was greater than it is now. Our relieving force suffered severe loss and had very bad weather to contend against. They are entrenched close to the Turkish position. More reinforcements are on their way up river, and I confidently expect to be relieved some day during the first half of the month of February.

'I desire all ranks to know why I decided to make a stand at Kut during our retirement from Ctesiphon. It was because so long as we hold Kut the Turks cannot get their ships, barges, stores and munitions past this place, and so cannot move down to attack Amara. Thus we are holding up the whole of the Turkish advance. It also gives time for our reinforcements to come up river from Basra and so restore success to our arms. . . . By standing at Kut, I maintain the territory we have



won in the past year at the expense of much blood . . . and thus we maintain the campaign as a glorious one, instead of letting disaster pursue its course down to Amara and perhaps beyond.

‘I have ample food for eighty-four days, and that is not counting the 3,000 animals which can be eaten. When I defended Chitral some twenty years ago, we lived well on *atta* and horseflesh, but, I repeat, I expect confidently to be relieved in the first half of the month of February.

‘Our duty stands out plain and simple. It is our duty to our Empire, to our beloved King and Country, to stand here and hold up the Turkish advance as we are doing now, and with the help of all, heart and soul with me together, we will make this defence to be remembered in history as a glorious one. All in England and India are watching us now, and are proud of the splendid courage and devotion you have shown. . . .

‘I am absolutely calm and confident as to the result. The Turk, though good behind a trench, is of little value in the attack. They have tried it once and their losses in one night in their attempt on the Fort were 2,000 alone. They have also had very heavy losses from General Ayimer’s musketry and guns, and I have no doubt they have had enough.

‘I want to tell you now that, when I was ordered to advance on Ctesiphon, I officially demanded an Army Corps, or at least two Divisions, to do the task successfully. Having pointed out the grave danger of attempting to do this with one Division only, I had done my duty. You know the result, and whether I was right or not ; and your name will go down to history as the heroes of Ctesiphon, for heroes you proved yourselves in that battle. Perhaps by right I should not have told you of the above, but I feel I owe it to all of you to speak straight and openly, and to take you into my confidence. God knows I felt our heavy losses and the sufferings of my poor brave wounded, and I shall remember it as long as I live. I may truly say that no General I know of has been more loyally obeyed and served than I have been in command of the 6th Division. These words are long, I am afraid, but I speak straight from the heart, and you see I have thrown all officialdom overboard. We will succeed ; mark my words. *Save your ammunition as if it were gold.*’

In his book, *My Campaign in Mesopotamia*, General Townshend states that ‘this communiqué had a most excellent effect on the

garrison. The Brigadier-Generals told me of the fine spirit it had aroused in the troops. I received messages from Indian officers indicating their absolute devotion, notably in the case of the 7th Rajputs, the Indian officers of which battalion went to their Commanding Officer, Colonel Parr, in a body, and asked him to write to me as follows :—They would like me to know how well pleased all the regiment was at receiving my communiqué. They say that “we never had any anxiety about the situation and . . . are with him to the last breath.”

On receipt of the news of the reverse at Hanna, the garrison was put on half rations. At the same time, a house-to-house search was instituted, and very large stores of grain, dates, *ghi*, and other eatables were brought to light and commandeered. This, of course, should have been done at the commencement of the siege, but so confident were General Townshend and his staff that they would be relieved that this obvious precaution was overlooked. Had it been known that Kut could hold out for five months, the relieving force, instead of frittering away its strength in premature attacks, would have carried out its preparations methodically and not struck until it was fully ready. Firewood began to present great difficulties, as the sepoy requires a large quantity for cooking purposes. Old houses were demolished for the sake of their timber, and when this ran out, oil had to be used. There was a large stock of crude oil fuel for the river steamers, and Colonel Parr invented an ingenious patent cooker, similar to that employed in Indian jails, for utilizing it. It was rather crude, and covered the user with soot, but it was gradually adopted by all the Indian units. Colonel Parr also invented a species of fuel which had been tried with success in China, consisting of balls of mud, oil, and coal-dust, which were burnt in the mess-room grate with highly satisfactory results. Lack of vegetables was responsible for an outbreak of scurvy, and attempts to meet this were made by gathering grass and other herbs and stewing them down into a kind of spinach. Some of these herbs proved to be poisonous, and those who ate them died.

A more serious question was that of eating horseflesh. Mutton had already run out, and some kind of meat diet was essential if the men were to keep up their strength. General Townshend did not handle the matter very tactfully. He had had comparatively little experience of the peculiar mentality of Indian troops, and instead of



issuing an order on the subject, he contented himself with merely advising the men that it was their duty to their King and Country. At the same time his optimistic communiqués made the men put off the evil day, under the impression that relief was at hand. Rulings on the subject were subsequently obtained on behalf of the Muhammadans from the Imam of the Jama Masjid at Delhi, and for the Hindus from *panchayats* of the various castes and leading Maharajas and Pandits. But the Hindu is an intensely conservative creature. The sepoys pointed out to their officers that, despite all that Rajas and Pandits might say to the contrary, they would, if they ate horseflesh, be ostracized on their return to their villages, and nobody would marry their daughters! In these circumstances, the other Hindus naturally looked to see what line the Rajputs would take, and to their great credit, Subadars Rambaran Singh and Daulat Singh and Naik Ramadhar Singh volunteered to eat a meal of horseflesh in public. Even then, few followed their example, and in one regiment a Jemadar actually blew out his brains rather than obey. The officers found mule-steak not unappetizing, and supplemented this diet with pies made from the starlings and sparrows which came to roost at night in the palm-groves. On one red-letter day, three black partridges were bagged with a rifle. Mud fish were caught in the Tigris, but the Turkish snipers made fishing a dangerous pastime.

On February 16th, all ranks were cheered by a message from H.M. the King-Emperor to General Townshend, which said:—‘I together with all your fellow-countrymen continue to follow with admiration the gallant fighting of the troops under your command against great odds. Every possible effort is being made to support your splendid resistance. GEORGE R.I.’

On the following day, the Mess Havildar Harakhbahadur Singh died of pneumonia. He was a gallant Rajput of the old type, and very popular with the officers of the regiment. He never seemed to be tired and, no matter how long the distance or how hot the action, Harakhbahadur Singh was always there, cool and unperturbed, his Mess mule loaded with food and drink. On February 20th, news came of the great Russian victory at Erzeroum in the Caucasus, but this, alas, had little influence on local operations.

March was ushered in with intensive air operations. Our ancient machines had little chance against the Fokker planes, which literally

made rings round them, and Captain W. G. Palmer, lately attached to the regiment, was killed in an air fight over the Es-Sinn ridge in full view of the troops. Several heavy bombs were dropped on Kut. One of them exploded with disastrous effect on the sepoy's hospital, and another wiped out an Arab house with fifteen men, women and children. A third dropped through the roof of a shelter under which four sepoy's of A Company were sitting, but failed to explode. Captain Lilly's orderly, Sepoy Chandika Singh, carried it into the orderly room, but was told to deposit it in the Tigris with all speed and care !

On March 8th, there was intense excitement when news leaked out that General Aylmer was about to make a further effort to relieve Kut. The attempt came within an ace of success. A force under Major-General Kemball made a night march across the desert with the object of capturing the Dujaila redoubt. The Dujaila redoubt was the key to the Turkish lines round Kut, and at dawn the relieving column was within a few miles of it. The Turks were taken completely unawares, as the position was held only by a few sleepy Arab sentries. Unfortunately, an order had been given that the redoubt was not to be assaulted without a preliminary bombardment, and this aroused the enemy to the danger to their right flank. Reinforcements were rushed to the spot, and the all-important element of surprise was lost. Our attack, in spite of the fact that it was pressed home with the utmost gallantry, was bloodily repulsed.

The garrison of Kut was asked to co-operate, and General Townshend had ready to pass across the Tigris a force consisting of the 30th Brigade, a second brigade consisting of his three British battalions, and two batteries R.F.A. This force, starting from the palm grove where the 7th were encamped, was to commence to cross the river as soon as the troops attacking the Dujaila redoubt were seen to be coming round the south of it. In conjunction with this scheme, the 7th took over part of the north-east sector, while Lieutenant Halliley remained with his machine-gun section to cover the crossing. About 7 a.m. heavy gun and rifle fire were heard, which died down about 11 a.m. At 5 p.m. the sounds were renewed, as the relieving force made a second attempt. This also failed, and the troops, suffering terribly from want of water, were compelled to withdraw to the Tigris. General Townshend has been severely criticized for his



failure to co-operate more actively with the attempt to break through at the Dujaila redoubt. Soon after the reverse, he issued another characteristic communiqué, in which he exhorted all ranks to hold on to the last. He promised that a fresh attempt, in overwhelming numbers, would be made to relieve them at the end of the month, and he again exhorted the troops to co-operate with him by eating horseflesh, in order to economize supplies. Sir Percy Lake sent a wire deeply sympathizing with the disappointment felt at the failure, and assuring the besieged troops that efforts would not be abandoned, and at the next attempt all available forces would be employed.

A new complication now arose. With the approach of the hot weather, the flood-season was coming on and the snow-water coming down from the hills was fast converting the low-lying lands on the banks of the Tigris into a lake. The Turks could to some extent control the floods by cutting the bunds and allowing the water to overflow the country over which our men had to advance, and this made the prospects of relief increasingly remote. On March 11th and 12th rain began to fall heavily, and the sepoys were kept very busy, watching the various bunds and patching weak spots. This, however, inconvenienced the Turks as much as ourselves, as their trenches were flooded out and they were compelled to evacuate them, suffering a good many casualties as they did so. The consequence was that there was a great decrease in sniping, and it was possible to walk about in comparative safety. On March 15th, rations were reduced to 10 oz. barley bread and $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb. horseflesh for British troops, and 8 oz. barley meal and 4 oz. parched barley for Indian troops. A further difficulty arose as grindstones were becoming worn out and could not be replaced.

On March 22nd, the Turks subjected Kut to an intense bombardment from land and air, in the course of which 1,000 shells and fifty bombs were dropped on the town. Special efforts were made by the enemy to sink the *Sumana*, which maintained communication between Kut and Woolpress Village, but without success. A 40 lb. shell passed without bursting through one of our machine-gun posts installed in a house; but it mortally wounded Naik Ramadhin Singh. The Naik was rushed to hospital, where he passed away on the following day. He was perfectly conscious, and made no complaints. Shortly before the end, he asked to see the Adjutant, and told him

that he died happily, and hoped that he had done his duty to the *Sarkar*. And so the regiment lost another faithful and gallant soldier, at a time when such men could ill be spared. The floods reached their peak on March 25th, when the river burst its banks and drove out the Turks opposite our Nos. 6, 7 and 8 picquets. The enemy who were repairing the *bund* were subjected to intense machine-gun fire and heavily shelled.

On April 1st, rations were further reduced, and the sepoy only got 5 oz. of barley meal and a minute quantity of *ghi*. In estimating what this meant to them, it should be remembered that the normal issue in peace time is 1½ lb. of *atta*. Officers had an abundance of meat, but only a tiny loaf a day and enough coarse flour to make four *chapatis*. Sugar and milk were practically unobtainable, and smokers were driven to use 'Kut mixture', a horrible compound of ginger and dried tea-leaves. At auctions of the possessions of deceased officers, cigarettes, tobacco, sweets and butter fetched fabulous prices, as the craving for these luxuries was almost intolerable. On April 5th, hopes were again revived by the thunder of the guns, as General Gorringe, who had succeeded General Aylmer, again started pounding the Turkish defences. Our howitzers opened fire on the ferry at Magasis, where much activity was observed, but the mirage greatly interfered with accuracy of aim.

General Townshend subsequently heard that General Gorringe had been held up by the flooded ground. He thereupon issued a communiqué in which he said, 'I am very sorry I can no longer favour the Indian soldiers in the matter of meal, but there is no possibility of doing so now. It must be remembered that there is plenty of horseflesh which they have been authorized by their religious leaders to eat, and I have to recall with sorrow that by not having taken advantage of this wise and just dispensation, they have weakened my power of resistance by one month.' He concluded: 'The whole British Empire, let me tell you, is ringing now with our defence of Kut.'

'You will all be proud to say one day, "I was one of the garrison at Kut!"' As for Plevna and Ladysmith, we have outlasted them also. Whatever happens now, we have all done our duty. As I said in my report of the defence of this place, which has now been telegraphed to Head Quarters . . . it was not possible in despatches to mention everyone, but I could safely say



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HARINGTON OWEN PARR, K.C.B., C.M.G.

Born 1867. Died 1928.

Burma, 1889-92 ; Tirah, 1897 ; Tibet, 1904 ; Mesopotamia, 1914-17.

Commandant, 1915-16.



that every individual in this force had done his duty to his King and Country.'

Two days later General Townshend received a report from Colonel Hehir, the A.D.M.S., to the effect that the Indian troops were greatly debilitated and in a state of semi-starvation; he said that the universal use of horseflesh would materially reduce the death and sickness rates, and maintain a large proportion of the men in a physical state which would enable them to carry on their garrison duties. General Townshend then issued a belated appeal, in which he threatened to replace all non-meat-eaters, who, he considered, failed in their duty to the State, and to send a list of their names to the Government of India. In consequence, 9,239 sepoy offered to eat meat, but it was now too late, and their enfeebled stomachs refused to digest it.

On April 15th, attempts were made to provision the garrison by dropping flour and other necessities from the air. Six aeroplanes were utilized, but they were old machines and not adapted for the purpose. In consequence, many loads missed their mark and fell into the Turkish camps on the river bank. The maximum amount dropped in a day was 2,540 lb. of flour, but this only meant 8 oz. per man. In the end, they were entirely stopped by the German planes. About the same time, General Hoghton died of dysentery brought on by eating poisonous herbs. Colonel W. U. Evans, Chief Staff Officer, was given command of the 17th Brigade, and Colonel Parr was made G.S.O.I. in his place. The command of the 7th Rajputs thus fell to the lot of Major Tregear.

On April 15th, General Gorringe made a final attempt to break through, and desperate fighting went on for three days, during which we obtained some initial successes. But on the 19th, the enemy launched no less than twelve counter-attacks, and the advance was once again definitely held up. Matters were now becoming desperate. The garrison was literally starving to death. Men on fatigue or trench-digging had to rest every ten minutes, and those carrying loads were compelled to rest after going one hundred yards. Men on sentry-go would drop down from no apparent cause, and there were instances of sepoy who returned from the trenches, seemingly with nothing the matter, and were found dead in the morning. There was a vast amount of suffering uncomplainingly borne, and those who were in daily contact with the men spoke with admiration of their

pluck and grit as little less than heroic. They were, however, in no condition to take the offensive, and this ruled out the feasibility of any attempt to break through on their part.

The part played by the 7th throughout was particularly arduous. They were responsible for a long sector of the river front, and this was held by nine picquets, each of two N.C.O.s and twelve men, with thirty men under an Indian officer as a reserve. Guards and patrols had to be found and, owing to casualties and sickness, men often only got one night out of four in bed. All through the siege, the behaviour of the men (except in regard to eating horseflesh) was exemplary. They were quite callous about exposing themselves to fire, and as in the palm gardens, where they were quartered, there was no cover, they suffered several casualties in consequence. One typical incident may be cited. Some fifty *mahailas* massed opposite the picquets of the 7th were set ablaze by enemy shells, and Lance-Naik Shiunath Singh with three sepoy went out and extinguished the conflagration under very heavy fire. Luckily, none of them was hit. Among the Indian officers Subadar Rambaran Singh, the acting Quartermaster, greatly distinguished himself by his hard work, his unfailing cheerfulness, and his tact in distributing supplies. After the war he received a King's Commission as 2nd Lieutenant. Subadar Daulat Singh of the 8th Rajputs (attached), acting as Jemadar Adjutant, and Havildar Mathura Singh received the I.D.S.M. Among the N.C.O.s and men, mention must specially be made of Havildars Rambahadur Singh, Mathura Singh, and Ramadhar Singh. The whole battalion was loyal to the last, and the men continually asked, 'Why can't we be led out to fight them?'—oblivious of the fact that though the spirit was willing, the flesh was weak, and none of them could march a mile.

General Gorringe's failure at Sannaiyat on April 22nd, 1916, was the beginning of the end. The food was all gone, except the emergency ration and anything which might be dropped by aeroplane. But one forlorn hope remained to be tried. The Royal Navy volunteered to run the blockade and, although it was known to be almost certain death to make the attempt, every man volunteered for it. The *Julnar* was loaded up with 270 tons of provisions, and put in command of Lieutenant H. O. B. Firman, R.N., with Lieut.-Commander C. H. Cowley¹ as second in command. The *Julnar* started on her journey at 7 p.m. on the 24th, but unfortunately the secret had been betrayed

¹ He had been given a commission in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.



by the Arabs, and a hawser had been stretched across the river at Magasis ferry. She fouled the hawser, and at once came under heavy artillery fire at point-blank range. Firman was killed and Cowley was wounded, and the boat drifted ashore, an utter wreck, and was captured. Nothing is known of Cowley's fate, but he was bitterly hated by the Turks for the great assistance he had given to the English in navigating the river, of which his knowledge was unique, and it was reliably asserted that he was murdered in cold blood by Khalil Pasha himself.¹ Both officers were awarded posthumous V.C.s.

There was nothing now left save to open negotiations, and General Lake authorized General Townshend to start without delay. On the 27th an unearthly stillness reigned in Kut, and the men sat about in the bright sunlight in little groups, gazing listlessly in front of them. General Townshend and Khalil Pasha met in their launches, and an attempt was made to secure the release of the garrison on parole in return for the surrender of all the guns, the return of the Turkish prisoners, and the sum of one million pounds. Khalil Pasha referred the matter to Enver Bey, and Enver refused to accept anything save unconditional surrender. General Townshend might go where he liked on parole, and the sick and wounded would be exchanged for an equivalent number of unwounded Turks. Accordingly, the Sappers were ordered to blow up guns and all that might be of use, burn papers and saddlery, and throw the ammunition into the river. This was duly done ; at 1 p.m. the wireless signalled its last 'good-bye' before being dismantled.

So ended the memorable siege of Kut, the greatest disaster to British arms in the East since the destruction of the Bengal army in the retreat from Kabul nearly a century earlier. During the siege, 1,025 had died of wounds and 725 of disease, and close on 11,000 passed into captivity. The Turks entered Kut on the 29th, and General Townshend being sick, General Melliss took charge. The troops were marched out to a camp at Shumran, despite their exhausted condition, and here they found neither tents nor blankets. The only ration issued was Turkish army biscuits, not unlike dog biscuits, which were so hard and indigestible that they brought on terrible attacks of enteritis. About 300 men died in a few days, though matters became a little better when a shipload of provisions was sent up-stream by General Lake.

¹ See Cowley of the 'Julnar', by 'Shalimar', published by Blackwood.

On May 6th, in spite of protests, the men were separated from their officers, and told they must march on foot to Baghdad. The Turkish commander promised that they should not march more than eight miles a day, but this promise was broken at once. The prisoners, sick and footsore, were forced to cover the 100 miles in eight days, with only a short halt at Aziziya. The stragglers were flogged by their Arab guards until they could go no farther, and then they were left to die by the way. At Baghdad they were publicly paraded through the streets. General Melliss and General Delamain insisted that the sick should be properly tended, and the French nuns and the American Consul, Mr. Brissel, worked nobly to alleviate their sufferings ; the latter died of cholera contracted while visiting a prisoners' camp.

About 500 sick were left in Baghdad, and the remainder were packed into cattle-trucks and sent to railhead at Samarra, where they were to begin their desert march of 500 miles to their destinations in Asia Minor. Of this march, it has been said, 'The truth of what happened has only gradually become known, and in all its details it will never be known, for those who could tell the worst are long ago dead. But it is certain that this desert journey rests upon those responsible for it as a crime of the kind which we call historic, so long and terrible was the torture it meant for thousands of helpless men.' At Ras-el-Ain, 370 miles from Samarra, the prisoners were put on to railway construction work, but as they were too feeble for this, they were sent off to camps in the interior. As they marched across the mountains, those who fell out were mercilessly kicked and beaten. An Austrian officer who met this ghastly procession toiling along in the fierce summer heat, described it as 'a scene from Dante's *Inferno* set in the loveliest scenery of Anatolia'.

Here again, heroic efforts were made by the American Consuls at Mersina, Aleppo and Mosul to alleviate the sufferings of these unfortunates. In 1917, conditions gradually improved. When the Armistice came, the surviving sepoys were gradually collected at Aleppo and shipped to a camp at Alexandria. Most of them were repatriated in January 1919, though many who had been given up for dead arrived from remote parts of Asia Minor weeks and even months later. Of them it may be truly said, 'These are they who came out of great tribulation.'

APPENDIX

CASUALTIES AT KUT

The following was the strength of the battalion when Kut fell :—

Lieut.-Colonel H. O. Parr (Acting G.S.O.I.)
 Major F. C. Tregear (Acting Commandant)
 Captain A. R. Thomson, M.C. (Adjutant)
 Lieutenant W. S. Halliley
 2nd Lieutenant M. L. Corley Smith, I.A.R.O.
 Captain D. Arthur, M.C., I.M.S. (died in captivity)
 Subadar Ramdayal Singh
 Subadar Rambaran Singh
 Subadar Bhawani Pershad Singh
 Subadar Daulat Singh
 Jemadar Kalka Singh
 Sub-Assistant Surgeon Badruddin
 and 301 other ranks (seventy-eight remained in hospital).

The following were the casualties :—

Killed or died of wounds	26
Suicide	2
Died of disease	47
Wounded	38
Total	113

Out of the 301 rank and file who went into captivity, only 120 returned to India after the Armistice. The balance was never heard of. It just disappeared.

HONOURS AND REWARDS

The following honours and rewards were granted for services rendered in the Great War, 1914-18, excluding those awarded for services in the Aden Operations which are stated on page 184 :—

Brevet-Colonelcy, C.M.G. and Croix de Guerre : Lieut.-Colonel H. O. Parr.

Brevet-Majority : Captain A. N. I. Lilly.

King's Commission as 2nd Lieutenant : Subadar Rambaran Singh.

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

D.S.O. : Major A. C. Ogg ; Major F. Etheridge ; Major T. G. F. Paterson, I.M.S.

M.C. : Captain W. G. Ayscough ; Captain A. R. Thomson ; Captain A. N. I. Lilly ; Captain W. S. Halliley ; Captain J. Martin.

O.B.I. : Subadar Major Shiuambar Singh ; Subadar Rambaran Singh ; Subadar Major Ramdayal Singh ; Subadar Sardar Singh ; Subadar Brijmohan Singh.

I.O.M. : Subadar Major Shiuambar Singh ; Subadar Mahesh Singh ; Subadar Daulat Singh (also Croix de Guerre) ; Sepoy Ramsabad Singh ; Sepoy Dwarka Singh ; Sepoy Gokaran Singh.

I.D.S.M. : Subadar Brijmohan Singh ; Subadar Sardar Singh ; Subadar Daulat Singh ; Subadar Rambali Singh ; Havildar Gurdatt Singh ; Havildar Umrao Singh ; Havildar Pancham Singh ; Naik Ramadhar Singh ; Naik Sukhlal Singh ; Lance-Naik Charan Singh ; Sepoy Matan Singh ; Sepoy Bhola Singh ; Sepoy Mahipal Singh.

Also 22 Meritorious Service Medals and 54 Mentions in Dispatches.



CHAPTER XII

OPERATIONS OF THE ADEN FIELD FORCE, 1917-21

ADEN was a minor field of operations during the Great War, and has not received the attention which it deserves. One of the duties of the Government of India was the protection of Aden, which is a great coaling-station and oil depot and the doorway of the Red Sea. The Turks had in Arabia the VIIth Army Corps, a fine force commanded by Tewfik Pasha, and owing to the constant menace of a detachment of this command, it had been necessary to increase the Aden garrison so as to ensure the safety of the fortress. The troops employed for the purpose formed the Aden Field Force.

Prior to receiving orders to join the Aden Field Force, the 7th Rajputs had been reconstituted at Baroda in October 1916. There were several existing detachments in Mesopotamia, which had been employed on other duties at the time when the battalion was invested at Kut-al-Amara. Some of these, amounting to about one and a half companies, had been serving in the composite Indian battalion at Shaikh Saad, and later in the 9th Bhopal Infantry. Others had been attached at the time to the 2nd (Q.V.O.) Rajputs, acting as personal guard to the G.O.C., or as ground troops to the R.A.F. ; and besides these, there were a number of recruits at the depot. All these had been assembled at Baroda to form a nucleus, and here the battalion was reconstituted under the command of Lieut.-Colonel A. Le F. Smith (2nd Q.V.O. Rajputs). The other officers were :—


Captain F. J. O. Hume-Wright, 16th Rajputs
Lieutenant J. C. T. Cleave, 7th Rajputs
Lieutenant E. C. St. J. Ronaldson, I.A.R.O.
Lieutenant F. M. Wardle, I.A.R.O.
Lieutenant D. L. Campbell, I.A.R.O., Signalling Officer
Lieutenant R. C. Alderson, I.A.R.O., Scout Officer
Lieutenant J. W. B. Tindall, 7th Rajputs, Adjutant
Lieutenant K. W. Bridges, 7th Rajputs, Quartermaster
Subadar Major Chandrapal Singh
Indian officers, 15
Other ranks, 712.



The battalion left Baroda on April 6th, 1917, after a hearty send-off from H.H. the Maharaja and the residents. It embarked on the B.I. ship *Purnea*, and reached Aden on the 15th, escorted by H.M.S. *Dufferin*. After disembarkation, it entrained for Shaikh Othman, where it became part of the 5th Brigade of the Aden Field Force under Brigadier-General Walton. The other units in the Brigade were the 69th Punjabis and the 75th Carnatic Infantry, two camel batteries, one mountain battery, a howitzer battery, and the Aden Field Troop. The latter was supplemented by three squadrons of the 26th Light Cavalry, certain sections of the Sappers and Miners, a mule corps and a camel corps. No. 5 sector of the defences, for which the brigade was responsible, consisted of a line of outposts resembling an arc of a circle ten miles in length, and stretching from Imad on the right to the town of Shaikh Othman on the left. It thus effectively controlled all the approaches to the isthmus of Aden, and allowed the force behind it plenty of room for manoeuvre. The usual disposition adopted was a chain of picquets supported by artillery and a flying column, with the remainder of the brigade in local reserve at Shaikh Othman. There were also detached posts at Imad and Robat. The latter turned out to be an exceptionally good observation post, and from the top of the tower of the central block-house many artillery duels were directed.

The terrain was rolling country, consisting mostly of sand dunes, with patches of dense camel-thorn and scrub, and here and there a solitary tree or a group of ruined buildings. At frequent intervals, sandstorms would get up without the slightest warning, completely blotting out the landscape and reducing visibility to a few yards. The Turkish line was about six miles distant, and reconnoitring parties constantly met in the no-man's-land between the opposing forces. The rising sun usually favoured the Turks, but our dawn patrols suffered few casualties on their outward journey. On their return, however, they were invariably attacked, and seldom succeeded in withdrawing without loss. At Asela, about 6,000 yards from Robat, was a ruined building, and the area between, known as the Darb Scrub, was the scene of almost constant skirmishing.

When the 7th Rajputs arrived, it was realized that both officers and men would require a great deal of instruction and practice if they were to be of any value under the peculiar local conditions. Ordinary kit was almost useless, and the men paraded in socks and



ADEN OPERATIONS

ankle-puttees. The scouts were furnished with gym shoes and rifles with telescopic sights, and Brigadier-General Walton put them through two months' intensive training before using them in the field. It was not until June 4th that the battalion was under fire. On this occasion, D Company was out with the Flying Column. Captain Hume-Wright, who was in charge, was sent out to reconnoitre the country in the direction of Mansur ridge and Hatum. The enemy had received information about this, and laid an ambush. As the force retired, it was attacked in flank and rear by a party of Turks which suddenly appeared out of the scrub and captured a machine-gun. The attack was driven off, and the gun recaptured with the loss of two sepoys, one follower and three mules killed. Two days later the Turks made a night attack in force on the Robat post. After considerable shelling, it became evident that the main assault would be directed against a picquet held by the 7th Rajputs, consisting of the machine-gun detachment under Lieutenant Peckover, and a platoon commanded by Jemadar Sitlabaksh Singh. The attack was pressed home with the greatest determination, and the next morning nineteen Turkish dead were found in front of our lines, two of them actually inside our wire. Unfortunately, Lieutenant Peckover was killed by a bullet through the head while he was running along the top of the communication trench to the machine-gun emplacement in order to attend to a gun which had jammed. He had joined the battalion as machine-gun officer from the 33rd Punjabis in the previous April, and had won the affection and respect of all ranks by his enthusiasm and efficiency. He was buried with full military honours in the cemetery behind our lines at Shaikh Othman.

On July 8th the battalion took part in an operation intended to disclose the positions of the enemy on the Hatum ridge. The troops deployed on a compass-bearing in the dark, and at dawn advanced in extended order against the Turkish trenches, with A and B Companies in the firing-line and C and D Companies in support. At fifty yards from the enemy the force was ordered to retire, much to the chagrin of the Indian officers, with a loss of two killed and seven wounded, as the task allotted to them had been accomplished. Thanks to the effective co-operation of the 15-pounder battery the retirement was successfully carried out, and the mounted Arab camel levies sent to harass our retreat never got within striking distance. A letter was sent to Major H. L. Holmes, R.G.A., thanking him for his assistance,



and later on in the day Brigadier-General Walton visited battalion headquarters and congratulated the 7th Rajputs on the steady way they had carried out a very difficult operation.

During August and September there was almost continual patrol work and small local actions, most of which were over by mid-day. The evenings were employed in hockey tournaments and wrestling competitions. On October 8th there was again a skirmish, this time of considerable proportions, on the Hatum ridge. Three companies advanced in open order, finding their own supports, and it was hoped that the psychological moment had at last come for closing on the enemy with the bayonet, when peremptory orders were received to fall back. The General's comments on the operation were as follows :—

‘A great improvement was noticed in the steadiness and control of fire in the firing-line. The enemy's infantry were numerous. Two extra picquets on the Hatum ridge were located and the enemy's trenches contained an unusual number of men, whose fire was intense whenever artillery fire stopped. The advance was well carried out, the retirement was very slow, and only contested for a few yards.’

Our losses were two killed and twelve wounded. On November 10th Colonel M. Ff. Harding of the 69th Punjabis took over command of No. 5 Sector.

On November 22nd a column consisting of the 69th Punjabis, the 7th Rajputs and the 1/6th East Surreys moved out to attack a place called Jabir, which was held in force by the enemy. The attack was carried out by the 69th Punjabis, with the 7th Rajputs covering the right flank. The 7th started with C Company widely extended on a front of 1,500 yards, and A and B Companies in support. They advanced rapidly through the scrub, while the Punjabis took their objective at the point of the bayonet. Jabir tower and the houses about it were then blown up, and the battalion retired with a loss of fourteen wounded, two of whom died on their way to hospital. On December 3rd an unfortunate accident occurred at Robat post. Bombing Lance-Naik Bhagwandin Singh was cleaning a box of hand-grenades when they exploded, killing three men and wounding seven.

On December 22nd the 7th were detailed for a particularly arduous undertaking, a reconnaissance in force of the Darb position. This was a very difficult matter, owing to the thick scrub, and many

plans for carrying it out had been previously made but had been subsequently abandoned. Brigadier-General L. N. Beatty, who had recently taken over command, decided that it must be attempted. The Turkish position was well wired, and they had an excellent field of fire for 1,500 yards ; the approach was over very rough country, with scrub-covered sand-hills and ravines, which made co-operation between units a matter of some anxiety. Moreover, the attack was carried out in broad daylight, and the element of surprise was lost. The battalion was deployed with B and D Companies in the firing-line and A and C Companies in close support, but owing to the nature of the ground, Major S. G. W. Hume, who was in command, could exercise very little effective control. The advance was commenced at 7.45 a.m. and almost at once the men came under point-blank fire from a battery of 10-pounders and from the Turkish skirmishers who were thrown out far in front of the main position. Very soon A and C Companies were absorbed in the firing-line ; but no progress could be made, and our gunners were unable to fire for fear of hitting our own men. An aeroplane went up and reported that the enemy was being heavily reinforced, so a retirement was ordered.

But this was more easily said than done, as the battalion was being enfiladed from both flanks. Captain F. J. O. Hume-Wright withdrew B Company with great skill, skirting the jungle and passing through C Company, and for this he was rewarded with a Brevet-Majority. D Company was unable to break off until it had delivered a counter-attack which resulted in heavy fighting. Lieutenant F. L. Barry Roberts, a young officer of great promise, who had joined up in the previous November, was wounded and died almost immediately. Jemadar Sitlabaksh Singh was mortally wounded, and Lieutenant A. H. B. Joyce and Sepoy Jhandu Singh went to his help. Despite the Jemadar's entreaties that they should leave him, Jhandu Singh, who was a well-known wrestler, picked him up and put him on his back. In this way he struggled along through the heavy sand, until both rescuer and rescued fell dead amid a hail of bullets. Lieutenant Joyce returned to his platoon a sorry sight. His clothes were torn to rags by the camel thorn, and he had been wounded in the right arm by a splinter of rock. Lieutenant Joyce was awarded the M.C. and Sepoy Jhandu Singh received posthumously the I.O.M. and Médaille Militaire. Subadar Major Chandrapal Singh was awarded the I.D.S.M. for the gallant manner in which he led a counter-attack,



and Sepoy Mahipal Singh received the I.D.S.M. for coolly delivering messages under fire.

Lieutenant Apte, the young Indian M.O., earned a M.C. for the gallant manner in which he tended the wounded under fire and refused to withdraw until all had been removed to a place of safety. Altogether in this affair we lost one British officer, one Indian officer and nine other ranks killed, and one British officer, one Indian officer and twenty-four other ranks wounded.

Brigadier-General Beatty wrote to Colonel Smith, 'I hope you will express my sincere regret to both British and Indian officers at the loss of your two gallant officers. The battalion did all that was expected of them, and kept us well informed of the situation. Please tell Major Hume that I shall have much pleasure in reporting the manner in which he carried out this very difficult operation.'

On January 5th, 1918, a force was sent to attack Hatum, and this time the 7th Rajputs were in reserve. This meant a march of seven and a half miles through scrub and loose sand. On this occasion the two battalions in the attack got badly mixed up, and large Turkish reinforcements appeared on the left flank. The situation was saved by the prompt action of the 7th Rajputs. Six platoons under Captain Tindall went to the rescue of the outmanœuvred and heavily pressed left, while the remaining two platoons under Colonel Smith formed a line behind which the two disorganized battalions withdrew and re-formed. A special order was issued, congratulating the 7th Rajputs on 'their almost perfect withdrawal'. The Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir C. C. Munro, in his summary of these operations, remarked, 'During the period under review, the role assigned to the Aden Field Force has continued as previously defined, viz. to keep up an active defence and to harass the Turks. This latter purpose has been consistently carried out. Constant reconnaissances and minor operations, on occasions leading to sharp fighting, have taken place.'

Considering that the fighting had been of the nature of skirmishing rather than pitched battles, the casualties during the year—two British and one Indian officers and twenty-one rank and file killed, and one British and one Indian officer and seventy-five rank and file wounded—were severe, and testify to the arduous nature of the work. The majority of the officers and men were quite inexperienced, many of the former being members of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers who had joined up for the period of the war, and most of the latter



being recruits from the depot ; but thanks to the leavening of old soldiers, they performed their duties with commendable alacrity. Their chief defect was their over-enthusiasm, which made control of fire difficult, and it was never an easy matter to induce the men to break off an action when a withdrawal was ordered. At first many of the lately-joined officers suffered from a lack of familiarity with the language and customs of the men ; but towards the end of 1917, thanks to unremitting training, the battalion steadily shook down, and all ranks became worthy successors to their brothers-in-arms who had passed into captivity at Kut-al-Amara.

In 1918, conditions for the Aden Field Force greatly improved. Aeroplane reconnaissance made it unnecessary to use ground troops for the purpose to the same extent as before, and the artillery was considerably reinforced. On January 14th the battalion was split up ; one company was sent to garrison the Crater and another to Khormaksar, and the remaining two took over the Imad post from the 69th Punjabis. Imad was a detached post about half way between Shaikh Othman and Hatum. It was not a pleasant spot ; it was entirely isolated, and consisted of an ancient mosque and a few tumbledown huts surrounded by sand-dunes and scrub. Dust storms, common all over the Aden hinterland, here appeared to be continuous, and sand got into the food and drink and even the bedding, making life very trying. The troops were quartered in grass huts or *chappas*, which were very hot and, to crown everything, the water was brackish and undrinkable. About 4,000 yards away to the south-east was the long line of the Indian Ocean, with its fringe of white breakers. A road built of brushwood fascines connected Imad with Khormaksar, about 11,000 yards to the southward.

The Imad detachment, in addition to the two double companies of the 7th Rajputs, consisted of twenty-five sowars of the 26th K.G.O. Light Cavalry under a Risaldar and a detachment of the Imad Levy under a local chief. Captain L. M. Handley, M.C., of the Aden Troop, was Commandant. The chief excitement was the daily arrival of the *Khafila* or caravan, consisting of hundreds of camels carrying firewood, goats, fowls, eggs, honey and other commodities to Aden, where they were exchanged for piecegoods, soap and, quite often, various contraband articles. In consequence of this smuggling, the *Khafilas* required a great deal of supervision, more especially as valuable political intelligence could often be gleaned from the camel-



drivers in return for a handful of cigarettes. There was plenty of work to do at Imad. Trenches had to be dug and wired, and field training carried out. In addition to this, there was almost daily scrapping around Jabir, about three and a half miles away, which consisted of two towers and some storehouses with walled compounds. This was from time to time occupied by parties of the enemy, who had to be driven out. On May 26th the detachments at Imad and Khormaksar were relieved by the Malay States Guides and the 1st Brahmans, and went into camp at Shaikh Othman. The camp was pleasantly situated in a grove of palm-trees, and it was possible to lay out a hockey ground for the troops. The battalion was only once in action while at Shaikh Othman. This was at an eminence known as Handley Hill, where it was acting as a covering party to the troops engaged in constructing the Robat-Shaikh Othman railway.

In July, the 7th Rajputs were informed that it would do a tour of duty on the islands in relief of the 69th Punjabis. The troops were railed from Shaikh Othman to Maala and embarked on the s.s. *Centriana*, and disembarked by means of dhows. The distribution of the battalion was now as follows :—

At Kamaran Island : Battalion headquarters under Lieut.-Colonel S. G. W. Hume, Headquarter Wing, and D Company.

At Perim : B Company and signalling detachment.

At Steamer Point : C Company and signalling detachment.

At the Crater : A Company and signalling detachment.

Kamaran was an interesting post. It was originally occupied by a British detachment in April 1915, the Turks having withdrawn. Its chief importance in peace time was as a quarantine camp for the use of pilgrims on their way to Mecca, and it contained a residence for the Turkish Governor and a number of other public buildings, including an up-to-date hospital. There were also an ice factory, a water condenser, and an engineering workshop. There was always a sea breeze and plenty of opportunities for bathing and fishing, and it was altogether a delectable spot after a long spell in the desert. The value of the place, too, was considerable ; it was the chief political centre for the affairs of the Yemen, and was the base of the Red Sea Naval Patrol which was blockading the coast. This patrol consisted of our old friends of Mesopotamian fame, H.M.S. *Espiègle*, *Odin* and



CSL

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

Clio, and the visits of these vessels were red-letter days. Supplies came every three weeks from Aden.

Life at Perim, Steamer Point and the Crater was uneventful, with the usual round of musketry, combined training and route marches to keep the men fit. In July, the Steamer Point detachment had to go to the rescue of a portion of the Aden Troop which had been cut off during a reconnaissance. The work at the Crater was particularly hard and monotonous, as guards had to be found for the various Red Sea lighthouses, and the men on this duty invariably underwent great privations. All these detachments suffered severely during the great influenza epidemic of 1918. At Kamaran, 185 out of 225 were ill at one time; at Steamer Point practically the whole detachment was prostrated. Sentries had to sit on chairs and be relieved every hour, and thirteen sepoy died. The news of the Armistice, which was picked up on the wireless, was the occasion of great rejoicing, and after this the chief remaining duty was to round up the Turks at various posts and repatriate them. Many of the enemy had not even heard of the cessation of hostilities, and refused to surrender. At Hodeida, in particular, a considerable force had to be despatched in order to force them to yield.

Early in January 1919, the battalion was relieved by the 1st Brahmans, and gradually assembled at Aden. Its ration strength at the time was ten British and twenty-one Indian officers and 970 other ranks. Later, the 7th took charge of the Turkish Prisoners of War Camp. Visits were paid to the former Turkish lines at Lahej, and many officers went home on leave. Subadar Major Chandrapal Singh and Sepoy Bikrama Singh visited England in August for the peace celebrations. In the same month the battalion was again ordered to Hodeida, where the unruly Ouhra tribe had possessed themselves of the arms and ammunition left behind by the Turks and were giving much trouble. On August 20th they seized and imprisoned a political mission consisting of Colonel A. L. Jacob with two other political officers and a small escort. On August 30th a body of tribesmen secretly entered the city in two parties. One of these wiped out the guard at the gate, while the other entered the Supply and Transport Depot and killed seven men of the Army Bearer Corps.

Three platoons of the 7th Rajputs, under Lieutenant Alderson, Lieutenant Joyce and Lieutenant Ropner, arrived on the scene in the nick of time, and drove out the intruders after very severe street



OPERATIONS OF THE ADEN FIELD FORCE

CSL
183

fighting, in which we lost eight killed and eleven wounded. On September 2nd the Arabs made another attack on the picquets outside the Officers' Mess. They came on with great boldness, and were only driven back at the point of the bayonet by Lieutenant Alderson's platoon after we had lost four men killed and four wounded. Colonel Jacob was eventually located by aeroplane, and after many strange adventures was released on December 13th. In October, Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Tregear, who had been taken prisoner at Kut, assumed command, relieving Lieut.-Colonel Smith, who rejoined his old regiment, the 2nd Rajputs, then in the Black Sea Command. The Hodeida detachment returned to Aden in February 1920.

In May 1920, the regiment was ordered to take over from the 75th Carnatic Infantry at Lahej and Shaikh Othman. A force of all arms, consisting of the 7th Rajputs less detachments, the 69th Company R.G.A., a half squadron of the 26th K.G.O. Light Cavalry, under the command of Colonel Tregear, was encamped at the little hamlet of Nobat Dakim, a collection of grass huts about nineteen miles north of Lahej, and forty miles from Aden. The duties of the force were to protect the territory of the Sultan of Lahej from the molestations of marauding Arabs, and to keep open the Aden road. Here, to the great grief of all ranks, 2nd Lieutenant Rambaran Singh died of enteric fever. After his safe return from captivity in Asia Minor he had taken a short holiday in India and then rejoined the battalion at Hodeida. His brother, Subadar Major Shiuambar Singh, arrived just in time for the funeral. The bier was escorted to Halkot Bay by a guard of honour of one British officer and forty rank and file of the 75th Carnatic Infantry, who fired the customary salute, after which the buglers sounded the 'Last Post'. The body was then cremated with full Hindu rites. Fever was very prevalent in the battalion during the whole of this period.

On May 3rd, 1921, H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, Colonel-in-Chief of the regiment, arrived in H.M.S. *Malaya*, in order to unveil the War Memorial to officers and men of the Aden Field Force who had been killed or wounded or had died of disease during the years 1914-19. He was received by a guard of honour consisting of Captain Rimell, Lieutenant Cleave, Lieutenant Joyce and 100 rank and file. Another distinguished visitor was the Viceroy, Lord Reading, who arrived in the *Kaisar-i-Hind* on March 28th. The battalion was relieved by the 2/19th Punjabis on April 1st, and in due course

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

reached Bombay in H.M.S. *Dufferin* on the 19th. Men enlisted for the period of the war were discharged, and the battalion once more settled down to peacetime duties in cantonments at Santa Cruz.

The following rewards were granted for service at Aden :—

Brevet-Majority : Captain F. J. O. Hume-Wright.

Military Cross : Lieutenant A. H. B. Joyce ; Lieutenant V. K. Apte, I.M.S.

Croix de Guerre : Captain J. W. B. Tindall.

Indian Order of Merit : Sepoy Jhandu Singh, who was also awarded the Médaille Militaire.

Indian Distinguished Service Medal : Subadar Major Chandrapal Singh, who was also awarded the Médaille d'Honneur avec Glaives.

The following were mentioned in dispatches :—Lieut.-Colonel A. Le F. Smith, Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Tregear, Captain F. J. O. Hume-Wright, Captain J. W. B. Tindall, and Subadar Major Chandrapal Singh.



CHAPTER XIII

REORGANIZATION FOLLOWING THE GREAT WAR
OPERATIONS IN WAZIRISTAN, KHAISORA VALLEY,

1921-39

AFTER the war, a complete reorganization of the Indian Army was undertaken. The general idea of the scheme was that regiments should be organized in groups, and that one regiment should act as a training battalion and depot for the whole group. Under this scheme, the various Rajput regiments became units of the 7th Infantry Group. Shortly after, this term was abolished, and the Group was renamed the 7th Rajput Regiment. The battalions were then renumbered as follows :—

2nd Q.V.O. Rajput Light Infantry became the 1st Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment (Q.V.O.).

4th P.A.V. Rajputs became the 2nd Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment (P.A.V.).

7th D.C.O. Rajputs became the 3rd Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment (D.C.O.).

8th Rajputs became the 4th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment.

11th Rajputs became the 5th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment.

16th Rajputs (The Lucknow Regiment) became the 10th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment (The Lucknow Regiment).

The last of these was the Training Battalion, with its headquarters at Fatehgarh. The Training Battalion was responsible for the enlistment and training of all recruits and the keeping of regimental records. Each active battalion provided a company commander for its own particular company in the Training Battalion. At the same time, class regiments were abolished, except in the case of Sikhs, Gurkhas and Garhwalis, and class companies instituted. It was thought that this would promote a spirit of competition within the

HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

battalion, and would make it easier to replace casualties in time of war. The class composition of each battalion was now to be :—

- 1 Company Rajputs from the Eastern U.P.
- 1 Company Rajputs from the Western U.P.
- 1 Company Hindustani Musalmans from the U.P.
- 1 Company Punjabi Musalmans from the Ambala and Jullundur Districts and the Phulkian States.

At a later stage, the impossibility of recruiting Hindustani Musalmans of good physique led to a further change. The Hindustani Musalmans were allowed to die out and were gradually replaced by Punjabi Musalmans from the Gujrat, Shahpur, Mianwali, Attock, Sialkot, Poona, Jummo, Mirpur and Gurdaspur Districts. The intention of Army Headquarters was to carry out the change by means of exchange between units rather than by recruiting, but this, in the case of the 7th Rajputs (or 3/7th as we must now call them), presented considerable difficulties. There were not only 850 Rajputs who had returned from Aden with the 1st Battalion, but 500 belonging to the 2nd Battalion which had been raised and sent to Irak but was under orders for disbandment, and 450 in the depot. Eventually 400 of these were selected to form the two Rajput companies. A full company of so-called Punjabi Musalmans, complete with Indian officers and N.C.O.s, was taken over when the 5th L.I. was disbanded, and the company of Hindustani Musalmans was made up by drafts from the 99th, 119th, and 120th. There remained the question of British officers. The battalion was greatly over strength, but the surplus was carefully weeded out, and those who were 'axed' received generous gratuities.

While the battalion was stationed at Santa Cruz, India was in a disturbed state, owing to the activities of Mr. M. K. Gandhi and the Indian National Congress. On November 17th, 1921, H.R.H. the Prince of Wales landed in India, and the battalion lined the streets of Bombay from the bottom of Malabar Hill to the gates of Government House. It also provided a guard at Government House of one Indian officer and 50 rank and file. The occasion of the Prince's visit was marred by a series of disgraceful riots, organized by supporters of Congress, and the situation was so serious that the 3/7th Rajputs were called in to aid the civil authorities. They were encamped on the Maidan, and furnished patrols and pickets in the disturbed areas.



REORGANIZATION FOLLOWING THE GREAT WAR

187
CSL

On November 20th, His Royal Highness presented the battalion with new colours at a parade held on the Oval. The British officers present were :—

Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Tregear.

Major F. Etheridge, D.S.O.

Brevet-Major F. J. O. Hume-Wright.

Captain and Adjutant A. F. G. Raikes, M.C.

Captain M. L. Corley Smith, M.C.

Captain F. J. Rimell.

Captain H. A. Porteous.

Captain J. C. T. Cleave.

Lieutenant R. L. B. Maiden.

The Prince was received with the Royal Salute, and then inspected the battalion, shaking hands and chatting with those who had distinguished themselves in the war. The new colours, placed on a pile of drums in front of the line, were taken up by Major Etheridge and Major Hume-Wright, with Jemadar Matabaksh Singh and Jemadar Jemadar Khan, who received them from His Royal Highness. In December, owing to continual disturbances in Gujarat, B Company was sent to Surat, and did not return to Bombay until the following March, when the battalion was again called out to patrol the city at the time of Mr. Gandhi's arrest.

Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Tregear was invalided in February 1923 and the command of the battalion then devolved on Major C. A. G. P. Meadows who was appointed Commandant and promoted Lieut.-Colonel with effect from May 1st, 1923.

In February 1924, the 3/7th Rajputs on relief by the 1/11th Sikhs, moved to Landi Kotal. Everyone was glad to exchange the malarious and enervating atmosphere of snake-infested Santa Cruz for the keen, invigorating climate of the North-West Frontier, and the change in the men was soon apparent. After some time, a move was made to Ali Masjid, and here the battalion was split up into detachments and employed in picqueting. To the great regret of all, news was received of the death at Kabul on December 15th of Brevet-Major A. N. I. Lilly, M.C., who was at the time Military Attaché at the British Legation. Major Lilly had only just received a nomination to the Staff College, Quetta, and in him the battalion lost an exceptionally talented and gallant officer. The body was brought



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

to Peshawar and buried with full military honours. The 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade furnished the escort and the 3/7th Rajputs the firing party.

On February 4th, 1925, the battalion had the honour of entertaining Prince and Princess Arthur of Connaught. Their Royal Highnesses won the hearts of everyone, and proved to be delightful guests. After lunch, the Indian officers were presented to them, and on their departure they were played through a lane of sepoy by the drums and fifes. As they drove away, they received a tremendous ovation, which touched them greatly. Two other distinguished visitors arrived shortly after, in the persons of the King and Queen of the Belgians. King Albert, who was in khaki shorts and stockings, insisted on his visit being purely informal. Turning to Colonel Meadows, he said at the end of a tour round the lines, 'I am a soldier, and I only want to see a guard and a barrack room. I have seen both of yours, and I congratulate you on your fine regiment.'

On October 29th the battalion, in full marching order with kits and first line transport, was inspected by Field-Marshal Sir William Birdwood, G.C.B. At the conclusion of the inspection, His Excellency told Colonel Meadows that he was delighted, not only with what he had seen, but what he had heard from Major-General Cassels, the District Commander, and Colonel Loch, the Brigade Commander.

In 1926, it was announced that His Majesty the King had approved of the grant to the 7th Rajput Regiment of the following battle honours in recognition of their services in campaigns during the Great War of 1914-18 :—

MACEDONIA 1918, SUEZ CANAL, EGYPT 1915, ADEN, BASRA, KUT-AL-AMARA 1915, CTESIPHON, DEFENCE OF KUT-AL-AMARA, TIGRIS 1916, MESOPOTAMIA 1914-18, PERSIA 1915-18, N.-W. FRONTIER 1915-17.

The total number of battle honours now borne on the colours of the 7th Rajput Regiment is 37, which exceeds that of any other regiment of the Indian Army. It was also notified that the 3rd Battalion was authorized to bear the crest and cipher of H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught as the centre badge of its regimental colour.

Everyone was delighted to hear that Major-General Parr, C.B., C.M.G., late Military Secretary at Army Headquarters, had been made a K.C.B. Unfortunately he did not live long to enjoy the



REORGANIZATION FOLLOWING THE GREAT WAR

189
SL

honour ; he died on October 3rd, 1928, never having recovered from the effects of his wounds and the privations he endured in Mesopotamia. He joined the regiment in 1887, and saw fighting in the Chin Hills in 1892-3, the North-West Frontier in 1897-8, in the Tirah and Boxer campaigns, the expedition to Lhasa, and in Mesopotamia. He was a typical fighting soldier and a most able Commanding Officer, beloved and admired by all ranks.

The battalion left the Khyber in October 1926 for Fyzabad. Before departing, it was inspected by General Sir A. S. Cobbe, V.C., K.C.B., and received the following farewell message from the Brigade Commander :—

‘ The Brigade Commander, on behalf of all ranks of the 1st Indian Infantry Brigade, wishes to congratulate the 3rd Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment (D.C.O.), on the extremely complimentary remarks made by the Army Commander on his recent inspection of the battalion. He would like further to record his appreciation of their excellent behaviour and work during their stay in the Khyber. He wishes them God-speed and the best of luck in their new station.

Lieut.-Colonel C. A. G. P. Meadows completed his tenure of command on August 1st, 1927, and was succeeded by Major T. L. Ovens, Second in Command, who was promoted Lieut.-Colonel. Colonel Meadows served in China 1900, in the Great War of 1914-18 and in Irak. He raised and commanded the 2nd Battalion of the 7th and, on its being disbanded after the war, took over command of the 3/7th from Lieut.-Colonel Tregear. On Colonel Meadows fell the difficult task of reorganizing the battalion after its conversion into a class company unit. Mainly through his representations, the quality of the Punjabi Musalmans enlisted was improved by the extension of the regimental recruiting area to districts which produced the best soldiers. Under his able direction, the battalion was brought to a high state of efficiency and its institutions and funds restored to their pre-war standard. In 1925, he allowed the Punjabi Musalman companies to start a band of *dhols* and *sarnais* which developed later into the pipe band. Few commanding officers have been more popular or done so much to promote the well-being of their men.

The battalion now came under the 6th (Lucknow) Infantry Brigade, and continued to earn golden opinions from its Brigadiers. The annual report for 1931 describes it as ‘ A good, efficient battalion, and very smart. The British officers are keen and know their work

thoroughly. Drill and steadiness above the average. Their turn-out beyond all praise.' This from a Guardsman was high commendation. To these comments, the G.O.C. Eastern Command, General Sir John Shea, K.C.B., added, 'I shall be very sorry to lose this fine battalion; it has maintained a high standard of efficiency.' On August 2nd, 1931, Major A. R. Thomson, M.C., assumed command of the battalion, with the rank of Lieut.-Colonel, vice Lieut.-Colonel Ovens, who retired.

On November 11th, 1931, the battalion left for a tour on the Frontier, and was posted to Razmak. It was seen off by a large gathering at the station and arrived at Bannu on the 15th. From Bannu it marched to Razmak. The last stage of the route involved a climb of 2,500 feet, but the men stood it splendidly, in spite of the intense cold. The sepoy had their time fully occupied in clearing away snow and keeping the paths open, as A Company was posted about six and a half miles away at the Alexandra Ridge Post, overlooking Razmak Narai, 8,000 feet above sea level.

At the end of January 1932 the first Regimental Reunion was held at the headquarters of the Training Battalion at Fatehgarh. Representatives from all the battalions attended, and the occasion was celebrated by inter-regimental sports and hockey matches. The chief feature was the unveiling by H.E. Sir Philip Chetwode, the Commander-in-Chief, of the War Memorial erected to the 27 British officers, 31 Indian officers, 166 N.C.O.s, 1,442 sepoy and 89 followers, 1,755 in all, who gave their lives for King and Country in the Great War. The Memorial was in the form of a six-pillared *Chhatra*, each pillar bearing the crest of one battalion, and had been subscribed for by the whole regiment. His Excellency, in an impressive speech, recalled the stirring part which the Rajputs had played in the history of the Indian Army, in the Mahratta and Sikh Wars, in the Mutiny of 1857, in the Burma, China, and Frontier campaigns, and lastly in the Great War, during which 60,000 men, belonging to thirteen battalions in all, had served, in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, Salonika and West Africa. He concluded:—

'The officers and men whose names are commemorated on this Memorial have bequeathed undying fame to your Regiment, and have laid upon you the sacred and solemn duty of continuing the traditions they so nobly upheld. The Rajput soldiers fought far from their homes, amid unfamiliar surroundings and peoples, for an ideal of



[Photo by Lafayette]

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR ALFRED HORSFORD BINGLEY, K.C.I.E., C.B.

Born 1865.

Colonel 3rd Battalion 7th Rajput Regiment (Duke of Connaught's Own), 1934.

Commandant 1909-11.



which their understanding was necessarily less complete than that of their British comrades, and in these circumstances their valour and steady devotion to duty throughout a long and terrible war are beyond all praise. In their simple loyalty, they accepted an arduous task and honourably discharged it. This monument will keep their valiant deeds alive in the hearts of those who follow them in the regiment they loved so well. More need not be said. To the glory of God, and in memory of the officers and men whose names are recorded on this Roll of Honour, I unveil this Memorial.'

During its tour of duty in Waziristan, the battalion was almost continually out on column, and this involved a number of long and arduous marches over very rough and mountainous country. On one occasion, Havildar Hazari Singh went to the rescue of a picquet which had been cut off by a sudden spate of the Takki Zam, wading up to his middle in the icy water. For this brave act he was awarded the Indian Meritorious Medal. In November the 3/7th Rajputs were, on relief by the 5/6th Rajputana Rifles, transferred to Ahmednagar, the headquarters of the 11th Infantry Brigade. The change was not popular. The men disliked the enervating climate of the Deccan after the bracing cold of Razmak, and the officers were by no means pleased at the miserable, tumbledown bungalows in which they were accommodated.

On January 3rd, 1934, General Sir Edmund Barrow, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., Colonel of the battalion, died in Ireland at the age of 81, and was succeeded by Lieut.-General Sir Alfred Bingley, K.C.I.E., C.B. General Bingley joined the 7th in 1887, and served in the Chin Hills, in the Boxer campaign and in the Great War of 1914-18. He held the Adjutancy for six years and commanded the battalion from 1909 to 1911. Much of his service on the Staff was at Army Headquarters. He was D.A.A.G. from 1901 to 1906, and Deputy Secretary to Government in the Army Department from 1906 to 1909. From 1911 to 1914 he was a G.S.O.I. at Army Headquarters and later D.A.G. with the rank of Brigadier-General. He served in Egypt as Brigadier-General for Administration 1914-16, and was Chief Staff Officer to the G.O.C. Canal Defences at the time of the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal. Later he was employed on special duty in Mesopotamia. He was mentioned in dispatches, promoted Major-General, and awarded the C.B. in 1916, and the K.C.I.E. in 1918 for services in the Great War. Among other distinctions he was

awarded the Gold Kaisar-i-Hind Medal in 1901 in recognition of his work on plague duty in Bombay. Like his predecessor, General Sir Edmund Barrow, Sir Alfred Bingley was a Gold Medallist of the United Service Institution of India. He was Secretary to the Army Department until his retirement with the rank of Lieutenant-General in 1921.

On January 12th, a letter was received from the Brigadier at Razmak, saying, 'I hope the battalion will be very happy in the Ahmednagar Brigade, and that it will add fresh laurels to the very fine reputation it made for itself on the Frontier.' In April, Colonel Thomson brought back with him on his return from leave, the Remembrance Book 'To the honoured memory of our fallen comrades, 1914-1918', which had been produced at the suggestion of Sir Alfred Bingley. It is a beautiful volume, bound in morocco, and contains the names of the 492 officers and men who gave their lives in the Great War. It is installed in the Quarter Guard, and every day at 11 a.m. the Indian officer of the day turns over a page, while the guard turns out and the regimental flag is lowered. The medal ribbon marker was presented by Mrs. Vere-Hodge, daughter of Sir Alfred Bingley and granddaughter of Colonel G. A. Way, C.B., both former Commandants.

On January 21st, 1936, came the sad news of the death of King George V, and soon after his accession H.M. Edward VIII sent the battalion a gracious message, in the course of which he said, 'I desire on my accession to the Throne to express to the Army my thanks for its devoted services to my beloved father. I recall with gratitude the noble response which the Army made during the Great War to his proud confidence in its loyalty, valour and steadfastness. Its welfare was ever in his thoughts.'

Lieut.-Colonel A. R. Thomson, M.C., vacated command of the battalion on August 2nd, 1935, and was succeeded by Major B. T. Phillips, Second-in-Command, who was promoted Lieut.-Colonel. Colonel Thomson served with the battalion throughout the Mesopotamia campaign and was present at every action in which the battalion took part. At Ahwaz, he led three bayonet charges during the retirement and was awarded the M.C. for his gallant conduct. After the surrender of Kut he was taken into captivity and remained a prisoner of war until peace was declared. During his period of command the training of the battalion reached a very high standard



of efficiency, more especially in the practice of mountain warfare. The value of this careful training was demonstrated in the operations in the Khaisora Valley, 1936-7, in which the battalion took a distinguished part.

In October 1936, the 3/7th Rajputs were once more under orders to return to the North-West Frontier. Major-General F. L. Nicholson, the District Commander, in a farewell message, described the battalion as a 'happy' one, and ascribed to this quality its efficiency and keenness. The long trek to the north began on the 26th, and Bannu was not reached until November 2nd. There the kits were placed on A.T. carts, and the battalion started on its march along the Tochi road to its quarters at Mir Ali, at which they arrived on the 4th. Here it took over from the 2/19th Hyderabad Regiment. The first three weeks were spent in company training on the hills, repairing the perimeter and the wire, and preparing for column duties.


Armistice Day was celebrated in what had now become the traditional manner. The battalion was formed into hollow square, with the Remembrance Book in the centre. Over it colour-bearers held the regimental colours, while the senior Indian officer read out the following :—

'Those whom this Remembrance Book commemorates were numbered among them who at the call of King-Emperor and Country left all that was dear to them, endured hardness, faced danger, and finally passed out of the sight of men by the path of duty and self-sacrifice, giving up their own lives that others might live in freedom. Let those who come after see to it that their names are not forgotten.'

At 11 a.m., the Quarter Guard gave the General Salute, the regimental flag was dipped during the two minutes' silence, and at its conclusion the battalion marched past in single file, each man saluting the book as he passed it.

OPERATIONS IN THE KHAISORA VALLEY

During the cold weather of 1936, there was much unrest among the Mahsuds and the Wazirs, owing to the subversive activities of that inveterate disturber of the peace, the Fakir of Ipi. Telegraph wires were cut, road and culverts damaged, and posts sniped. In order to overawe the tribesmen, the Government decided to carry out a flag-march through the Khaisora valley, and for this purpose two



WAZIRISTAN OPERATIONS



columns, the Razmak column (Razcol) and the Tochi column (Tocol), were concentrated at Damdil and Mir Ali respectively on November 24th. Razcol consisted of four battalions and three mountain batteries, and Tocol of the 3/7th Rajputs,¹ the 1/17th Dogras and one squadron of Probyn's Horse. The first was to move via Asad Khel and thence eastward into the Khaisora valley, and the other south-west along the track from Mir Ali; both columns were to rendezvous at Biche Kashkai. Just as the march commenced, news was brought that tribal *lashkars* were forming, and at 10 a.m. Razcol was fired on in the neighbourhood of Zerpezai. The route here follows a valley, both the sides of which are covered with thick scrub and dotted with caves, affording excellent cover. The enemy fought with great determination, lying in concealment until the troops were right on them, and then slipping away. The resistance stiffened as the advance progressed, and the column did not reach the rendezvous until 8.15 p.m., having lost 14 killed and 43 wounded. The enemy's casualties were estimated at 300.

Meanwhile, Tocol left Mir Ali for Biche Kashkai, a distance of 13 miles, at 7 a.m. The Tochi was crossed without opposition, and all went well until 10 a.m., when the cavalry ran into the enemy and were held up. The Dogras were all employed in finding picquets, and the 3/7th were told to clear the enemy away at all costs, as it was essential that the column should reach its destination before nightfall. The Rajputs went forward at a rapid pace, and as they advanced over a crest, they came under a heavy fire. Major Tindall told his men to hold on while he went back to bring up a machine-gun. He was directing this gun on the enemy when he was mortally wounded. At the same time Captain Boyd was hit, together with about a dozen men from C Company, who were in the front line. Captain L. G. Phillips with A Company, supported by covering fire from the Vickers guns, tried to capture two small hills about a mile ahead from which the main attack appeared to be coming. Captain Phillips was wounded in the leg, and after advancing about half a mile, A Company was brought to a standstill. They were reinforced by B Company, but the tribesmen continued to fight with great determination until their flank was threatened by the cavalry. They then retired, and the column made its way to Jaler Algad. During the

¹ Major J. W. B. Tindall was in command owing to Lieut.-Colonel B. T. Phillips being on the sick list. Major F. J. Rimell took over after Major Tindall's death.



encounter, the Vickers gun detachment behaved with great gallantry, and both the section commander and No. 1 of the section received the I.D.S.M.

It was now 4 o'clock, and the men were much exhausted. The Brigadier therefore decided to halt until the moon rose, and at 7 p.m. the march was continued, the Tochi Scouts acting as guides. Almost immediately afterwards, while crossing a nullah, the vanguard came under fire, with the result that a number of mules stampeded, causing great confusion in the darkness. Order was at last restored, and the column started once more, but before it had gone very far it ran right into a party of Tochi Khel tribesmen coming from the opposite direction. It was hard to say which party was the more taken aback by the encounter, and in the mêlée which ensued the transport mules again bolted, taking with them the mess kit and stores. Being tied up in threes, they went through the battalion like chain-shot, scattering the men left and right. Subadar Major Jemadar Khan was wounded during the encounter. After this, the Brigadier decided to encamp for the remainder of the night, and an improvised perimeter was built up of *bhoosa* bales, great-coats, blankets and boxes. About 4 a.m. the 1/17th Dogras beat off an attack, and as soon as it was light the cavalry went back to retrieve the loads which had been scattered over the countryside. At the same time, C Company of the 3/7th was ordered to seize and picquet a range of hills along the line of advance. At 11 a.m. the march was once more resumed, and the column reached its destination one and a half hours later, very weary and in much need of water and food.

On the following day, the combined force proceeded to retrace its steps, Tocol forming the advance guard and Razcol the rearguard. In the centre was the transport, consisting of 1,600 mules and the Political Officer's numerous retinue of camels. The Tochi Scouts formed a screen in front, while the 3/7th and the 1/17th Dogras threw out flanking parties. At 2 p.m., when only five miles from home, the Brigade Major rode up with the news that the rearguard was being attacked, and the 3/7th Rajputs had to take up a defensive line. This had to be improvised by withdrawing the picquets as opportunity offered, and in consequence the men were very mixed up, hardly a single company being intact or under its own company commander. Nevertheless all ranks behaved with great steadiness, and covered the withdrawal of Razcol and the cavalry.



[From a Miniature]

MAJOR JOHN WILLIAM BROOKE TINDALL

Born 1893. Died 1936.

Killed in action, Khaisora Valley, N.-W. Frontier of India, while in command of the battalion.



Through these operations, the battalion greatly distinguished itself, and various platoons were thanked by no less than five regiments for the help they had given in extricating them from tight corners. Their casualties amounted to one British officer killed, two British and one Indian officer wounded, six men killed and twenty wounded, and the men were awarded four out of a total of nine Indian Distinguished Service Medals given on the occasion. Their behaviour was all the more notable when it is remembered that the column had been assured by the Political Department that it was on a peace march, and that it was without artillery. It was surprised by a force consisting of 2,700 tribesmen, well armed and well led, and had to give battle under very unfavourable conditions.

It was essential that the tribesmen should be punished for their unprovoked attack on British troops, and for this purpose a considerable body of men, with light tanks, guns and aeroplanes, and known as Wazirforce, was concentrated. A column, consisting of Razcol reinforced by two battalions, acted as a striking force. This time the advance into the Khaisora valley was practically unopposed, but heavy rain made the roads impassable for mechanical transport. Much assistance was rendered by the R.A.F., and over four tons of supplies were dropped from the air for the use of the men. These planes also performed useful work in reconnaissance, breaking up hostile concentrations, and bombing fortified buildings occupied by the enemy. On December 22nd, Razcol was heavily engaged while carrying out operations for the destruction of towers occupied by the tribesmen, and covering the parties engaged in road construction. During these operations it lost sixteen killed and wounded. On December 28th, the Resident and the Army Commander, General Sir J. Coleridge, held a *Jirga* for the tribal *maliks* at Mir Ali, and the General presented Indian Distinguished Service Medals to the following members of the battalion for gallantry in action :—

Lance-Naik Jahan Dad,
Lance-Naik Abdul Haq,
Sepoy Sahib Din,

and medals for Long Service and Good Conduct to Sepoys Mahadeo Singh, Suraj Singh and Sahdeo Singh. The tribesmen agreed to hand in 100 rifles and 100 hostages, and expel malcontents and

disturbers of the peace. Further operations, however, were necessary before the intruders were finally driven out of tribal territory, and it was not until January 16th, 1937, that the column was broken up. The total casualties were 34 killed, including three British and one Indian officers, and 132 wounded, including five British and four Indian officers. The tribesmen's losses were estimated at 300.

On April 9th, 1937, a tragic occurrence took place at Shahur Tangi, in which a convoy was ambushed and Lieutenant E. S. R. France and Subadar Major Jemadar Khan, who were going to Wana for a Pashtu examination, were involved. Lieutenant France was killed, and the Subadar Major's orderly, Fazal Din, was severely wounded. The Subadar Major himself was awarded the I.D.S.M. for his gallant conduct in getting seventeen lorries through to Sarwekai. During 1937 and 1938, the tribal unrest fomented by the Fakir of Ipi continued, and the battalion was almost continuously engaged in minor operations often of a very exacting character; Brigadier-General Maynard, commanding Tocol, in his annual report, said, 'the regiment has had a very rough time since it came under my command, having lost no less than four British officers. It has, however, not lost its spirit.'

On August 2nd, 1938, Lieut.-Colonel B. T. Phillips vacated command and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel C. M. P. Durnford of the 4/6th Rajputana Rifles. On November 13th, the 3/7th Rajputs, having finished their time in Waziristan, left the North-West Frontier for Hyderabad, Sind. They did not stay there long, however, for in April 1940 the battalion moved to Quetta after a short spell of employment at Sukkur in aid of the civil power. Meanwhile Lieut.-Colonel C. M. P. Durnford, having been appointed a G.S.O.I. at Army Headquarters, vacated command and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel W. F. Charter, M.C., of the 5/14th Punjabis, who, as commander of the Legation Guard at Addis Ababa, had rendered distinguished service when the Italians occupied Abyssinia.

This forms a convenient place to conclude the history of the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Rajput Regiment. While these words are being written, the shadow of war is once again darkening the atmosphere, but we may be confident that whatever lies in store, the spirit of loyalty to the King-Emperor and devotion to duty which has animated the 3rd Battalion 7th Rajputs during its long career, will be equally conspicuous in the future.



HONOURS AND AWARDS EARNED DURING THE OPERATIONS ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1936-7

O.B.E.

Major F. J. Rimell. For services rendered during the operations in the Khaisora valley in Waziristan, N.-W. F.P.

Authority G. of I., Extraordinary, dated 10.12.37.

INDIAN DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL (I.D.S.M.)

No.	Rank.	Name, etc.	Authority.
11721	L/Naik	Jahan Dad	For services rendered during the Khaisora operations on the North-West Frontier in November 1936. Authority G. of I., Part 'B', No. 857 of 19.12.36.
11348	L/Naik	Abdul Haq	
12157	Sepoy	Sahib Din	
	Jemadar	Abdul Latif, I.M.D.	
	Subadar	Raza Muhammad	Authority G. of I., Extraordinary, dated 10.12.38.
	Jemadar	Ran Singh	G. of I., Extraordinary, dated 21.12.37.
	Subadar Major	Jemadar Khan	G. of I., No. 416 of 29.5.37.

MENTIONED IN DISPATCHES

Rank.	Name, etc.	Authority.
Major	F. J. Rimell, O.B.E.	G. of I., Extraordinary, No. 196-H., dated December 10th, 1937.
Jemadar	Birad Singh	G. of I., Extraordinary, No. 215-H., dated 21.12.37.
Lieutenant	F. W. Collard	G. of I., No. 112-H., dated August 16th, 1938.
Lieutenant	L. H. Rush	
Subadar	Shiunarain Singh	
Major	R. H. Culley	



HISTORY OF THE 3/7th RAJPUT REGIMENT

DEVOTION TO DUTY CERTIFICATES AWARDED BY G.O.C.-IN-CHIEF.
NORTHERN COMMAND

No. of Certi- ficate.	Regtl. No.	Rank.	Name.
112	12936	L/Naik	Ramsagar Singh
113		Jemadar	Alif Din, I.D.S.M.
114	9137	Sepoy	Chhote Singh
115	8648	Sepoy	Harakhraj Singh
116		Subadar Major	Matabaksh Singh
117		Subadar	Shiunarain Singh
118		Jemadar	Ram Sundar Singh
119	10417	L/Naik	Abdul Aziz
120	11921	L/Naik	Mohamed Latif
121	8946	Havildar	Dal Singh

Authority, Headquarters, Bannu Brigade, No. 86/A, dated
January 14th, 1938. B.O., Part I, No. 132, dated 16.2.38.

70	12976	L/Naik	Angad Singh
71		Subadar	Hemraj Singh
72	6856	L/Naik	Balram Singh
73		Subadar	Bhagwat Singh

Authority, Headquarters, Northern Command, No. 20478/IV/A,
dated 14.2.38, B.O., Part I, No. 140, dated 19.2.38.

85		Subadar Major	Matabaksh Singh
86		Jemadar	Ram Sundar Singh
87	8109	Sepoy	Samarbahadur Singh

Authority, Headquarters, Northern Command, No. 20478/VII/A,
dated 24th August, 1938.

66		Subadar	Mohammad Saddik Khan
67		Subadar	Maharaj Singh
68		Jemadar	Khan Mohammad Khan.
69	10573	Naik	Shiuratan Singh
70		Subadar Major	Matabaksh Singh Bahadur O.B.I.
71		Subadar	Shiunarain Singh Bahadur O.B.I.
72		Jemadar	Jan Mohammad



APPENDIX I

ROLL OF HONOUR—GREAT WAR, 1914-18

The following gave their lives for King and Country in the Great War :—

BRITISH OFFICERS

- Major W. G. Ayscough, M.C. Killed in action in East Africa, September 25th, 1917.
- | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|
| Captain W. A. Gover | } | Killed in action at Ahwaz, March 3rd, 1915. |
| Captain F. O. McKenzie | | |
| Lieutenant W. L. Harvey | | |
| Lieutenant D. B. Burgoyne-Wallace | | |
- Captain W. G. Palmer. 113th Infantry and 7th D.C.O. Rajputs. Killed in air combat over Es-Sinn, February 1916.
- Captain R. K. Peckover, 33rd Punjabis, attached 1/7th D.C.O. Rajputs, killed in action near Aden, June 7th, 1917.
- Captain D. Arthur, M.C., I.M.S., died of disease contracted in the course of his duty, as a prisoner of war at Entelli, Turkey, July 30th, 1917.
- Lieutenant G. St. John Richardson, died at Amara, December 7th, 1915, of wounds received in the battle of Ctesiphon.
- Lieutenant F. L. Barry Roberts, 2/2nd Q.V.O. Rajput L.I., attached 1/7th D.C.O. Rajputs, killed in action near Aden, December 22nd, 1917.
- 2nd Lieutenant Rambaran Singh, died of enteric fever at Aden.

INDIAN OFFICERS

- Subadar Mahesh Singh, killed in action at Ahwaz, March 3rd, 1915.
- Subadar Baijnath Singh, died of disease at Aden.
- Jemadar Shiudayal Singh, killed in action at Qurna, December 1914.
- Jemadar Rambadan Singh, killed in action at Es-Sinn, September 3rd, 1915.
- Jemadar Kalka Singh, died as a prisoner of war in Turkey.
- Jemadar Sitlabaksh Singh, killed in action near Aden, December 22nd, 1917.

Also twenty Havildars, thirty-three Naiks, three hundred and eighty-nine Sepoys and thirty-three followers, whose names are recorded in the Book of Remembrance.

THEIR NAME LIVETH FOR EVERMORE

APPENDIX II

LIST OF COLONELS, COMMANDANTS, ADJUTANTS AND STATIONS

(1) 31ST BATTALION, AND 24TH REGIMENT (BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY)

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Designation.</i>	<i>Commandant.</i>	<i>Station.</i>
1778-80	31st Battalion (Bengal Native Infantry)	Captain C. Marsack	Cawnpore
1780-1	24th Regiment (Bengal Native Infantry)	Major S. Kilpatrick	Midnapore and Carnatic Campaign
1781-2	" "	Major W. Vanas	Carnatic Campaign
1783-7	" "	Captain J. William-son	" "
1787-96	*24th Battalion (Bengal Native Infantry)	Names not recorded	Various stations in Bengal

(2) 1ST BATTALION, 24TH N.I.

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Colonel.</i>	<i>Lieut.-Colonel.</i>	<i>Adjutant.</i>	<i>Station.</i>
1805	J. Gardiner	J. Powell	G. D. Heathcote	Cawnpore. Attack on Turkipura
1806	" "	" "	" "	Panipat. Operations against Holkar
1807	" "	C. Gladwin	" "	Rewari
1808	" "	J. H. Forster	J. Craigie	Agra
1809	" "	" "	" "	"
1810	" "	J. Haynes	" "	Moradabad
1811	" "	" "	" "	Lucknow
1812	" "	J. De Courcy R. Broughton	" "	"
1813	" "	" "	" "	Benares
1814	Major-General H. de Castro	C. Crawford	" "	Barrackpore
1815	" "	R. Broughton	" "	"
1816	" "	N. White	F. W. Frith	" Grenadier companies in Nepal campaign

* The 24th Battalion (B.N.I.) was absorbed into the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 7th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry in 1796 and the number '24' disappeared from the Army List until 1804, when a new 24th Regiment was raised.



APPENDIXES

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Colonel.</i>	<i>Lieut.-Colonel.</i>	<i>Adjutant.</i>	<i>Station.</i>
1817	Major-General H. de Castro, C.B.	J. Dewar	A. McMahon	Cawnpore
1818	" "	" "	" "	Pindari campaign in Central India
1819	" "	J. Tetley	F. W. Frith	Agra
1820	" "	J. Garner	A. McMahon	Mhow
1821	" "	T. Penson	F. W. Frith	"
1822	" "	C. Fagan	S. Delap	Muttra
1823	" "	" "	" "	"
1824	Colonel J. Price	E. Cartwright	F. C. Smith	Barrackpore

(3) 69TH, LATER 47TH NATIVE INFANTRY

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Colonel.</i>	<i>Lieut.-Colonel.</i>	<i>Adjutant.</i>	<i>Station.</i>
1825	J. Price	J. W. Blackney	J. S. Winfield	Benares
1826	" "	R. Hampton	" "	Pertabgarh
1827	" "	C. Bowyer, C.B.	P. Deare	Barrackpore
1828	" "	" "	" "	"
1829	" "	W. H. Wood	" "	Kyook Phyoo, Arakan
1830	" "	" "	" "	" "
1831	" " (Major-General)	E. F. Waters, C.B.	H. T. Raban	" "
1832	" "	" "	" "	Cuttack
1833	" "	" "	" "	"
1834	" "	C. W. Brooke	J. G. B. Paton	"
1835	" "	" "	C. Corfield	Sikrora
1836	" "	G. Hunter, C.B.	" "	Lucknow
1837	" "	" "	" "	Agra
1838	" "	" "	" "	"
1839	" "	C. R. Skardon	" "	"
1840	" "	" "	R. Renny	Barrackpore
1841	" "	W. R. Pogson	" "	"
1842	" " (Lieut.-General)	" "	" "	Kyook Phyoo, Arakan
1843	Major-General W. H. Perkins	" "	" "	Sikrol, Benares
1844	" "	R. Home, C.B.	" "	"
"	" "	J. Graham	" "	Amballa
1845	" "	G. Hicks	" "	With the Army of the Sutlej
1846	" "	" "	" "	"

APPENDIXES

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Colonel.</i>	<i>Lieut.-Colonel.</i>	<i>Adjutant.</i>	<i>Station.</i>
1847	Major-General W. H. Perkins	G. Hicks, C.B.	G. McAndrew	Lahore and Ferozepore
1848	" "	" "	" "	H.Q. and Right Wing at Etawah Left Wing at Mainpuri
1849	" "	" "	" "	"
1850	S. D. Riley	" "	" "	Cawnpore
1851	" "	" "	" "	"
1852	" "	G. Huish, C.B. G. A. Smith	" "	Jhelum
1853	" "	" "	" "	"
1854	" "	" "	W. H. Walcot	En route from Jhelum to Rangoon
1855	" "	J. Nash, C.B. (Brevet-Colonel) D. Pott (Brevet Lieut.-Colonel)	" "	Prome
1856	" " (Major- General)	J. Nash, C.B. ¹ (Brevet-Colonel) D. Pott (Brevet Lieut.-Colonel)	" "	Thayetmyo Pegu
1857	" "	H. Troup ¹ (Brevet- Colonel) D. Pott (Brevet Lieut.-Colonel)	" "	Pegu
1858	" "	" "	C. V. Jenkins (officiating)	Mirzapore
1859	" "	D. Pott	W. H. Walcot	Hong Kong
1860	" "	" "	F. C. Brewster	Canton
1861	" "	" "	" "	Jaunpore
1862	" "	" "	" "	Banda and Nowgong
1863	" "	" "	" "	"

(4) 7TH NATIVE INFANTRY

(A change was made in 1864 in the mode of officering regiments)

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Commandant.</i>	<i>Adjutant.</i>	<i>Station.</i>
1864	Brevet-Colonel D. Pott	F. M. Armstrong	Banda and Nowgong

¹ As in Army List. Did not join.

APPENDIXES

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Commandant.</i>	<i>Adjutant.</i>	<i>Station.</i>
1865	Major F. J. Nelson	F. C. W. Drummond	Banda and Nowgong
1866	" "	" "	Allahabad
1867	" "	" "	"
1868	Lieut.-Colonel F. J. Nelson	" "	Dacca
1869	" "	F. C. W. Drummond	H.Q. at Dacca. Right Wing at Cachar
1870	" "	G. Logan	" "
1871	" "	" "	" "
1872	" "	E. C. Hamilton	Lucknow
1873	Lieut.-Colonel F. J. Stephenson	" "	Jullundur
1874	" "	G. Logan (Acting)	"
1875	" "	E. C. Hamilton	"
1876	" "	" "	"
1877	Major H. R. B. Worsley (officiating)	A. W. Jamieson	Peshawar
1878	Lieut.-Colonel H. R. B. Worsley	E. G. Barrow	"
1879	" "	" "	"
1880	" "	J. F. Worlledge (officiating)	Lucknow
1881	" "	" "	"
1882	" "	" "	Egyptian campaign
1883	Lieut.-Colonel H. R. B. Worsley, C.B.	E. G. Barrow	Lucknow

(5) 7TH (THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT'S OWN) REGIMENT OF BENGAL INFANTRY

HONORARY COLONEL : Major-General H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught and Strathearn, K.G., K.T., K.P., K.C.S.I., C.M.G., C.B.

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Commandant.</i>	<i>Adjutant.</i>	<i>Station.</i>
1884	Brevet-Colonel H. R. B. Worsley, C.B.	E. G. Barrow	Morar
1885	" "	J. F. Worlledge	"
1886	Colonel G. A. Way,	A. Elderton	"
1887	" "	" "	Fort William
1888	" "	" "	" "
1889	" "	A. H. Bingley	Saugor
1890	" "	" "	"
1891-2	Colonel G. A. Way, C.B.	N. E. Robin (officiating)	"

APPENDIXES

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Commandant.</i>	<i>Adjutant.</i>	<i>Station.</i>
1892	Major A. W. Jamieson (officiating)	M. R. E. Ray (officiating)	Myingyan, Upper Burma. Operations in Chin Hills
1893	Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Jamieson	A. H. Bingley	Lucknow
1894	" "	" "	"
1895	" "	" "	"
1896	Brevet-Colonel A. W. Jamieson	N. E. Robin	"
1897	" "	H. O. Parr (officiating)	H.Q. <i>en route</i> from Luck- now to Doranda Right Wing at Buxa Duars
1898	Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Mansel (officiating)	E. F. Hood (officiating)	" "
1899	Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Mansel	E. F. Hood	Ranchi, Buxa Duars and Fort William. Calcutta.
1900	Major H. B. Vaughan (officiating)	" "	Boxer campaign. Relief of Pekin.
1901	Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Mansel	" "	Pekin
1902	" "	" "	Lucknow
1903	" "	A. C. Ogg (officiating)	"
1904	Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Vaughan	E. F. Hood	"

(6) 7TH (DUKE OF CONNAUGHT'S OWN) RAJPUTS

COLONEL-IN-CHIEF : Field Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught and Strathearn,
K.G., K.T., K.P., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O.

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Colonel.</i>	<i>Commandant.</i>	<i>Adjutant.</i>	<i>Station.</i>
1905	Major-General Sir E. G. Barrow, K.C.B.	Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Vaughan	C. A. G. P. Meadows	Lucknow
1906	Lieut.-General Sir E. G. Barrow, K.C.B.	" "	" "	H.Q. at Chakdara. Wing at Dargai
1907	" "	Major N. E. Robin (officiating)	" "	Malakand
1908	" "	" "	W. G. Ayscough	"
1908-9	" "	Colonel H. B. Vaughan	" "	Dinapore



APPENDIXES

207

CSL

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Colonel.</i>	<i>Commandant.</i>	<i>Adjutant.</i>	<i>Station.</i>
1909	General Sir Edmund Barrow, G.C.B.	Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Bingley, C.I.E.	W. G. Ayscough	Dinapore
1910-11	" "	Brevet-Colonel A. H. Bingley, C.I.E.	" "	Ahmedabad
1912	" "	Lieut.-Colonel N. E. Robin	F. O. McKenzie	Jask, Persian Gulf
1913	" "	" "	" "	Ahmedabad
1914	" "	" "	" "	Ahmedabad and Indian Expeditionary Force, Mesopotamia
1915-16	" "	Lieut.-Colonel H. O. Parr,	A.R. Thomson, M.C.	" "
1916	" "	Major F. C. Tregear	" "	(Prisoner of war)
1916	" "	Lieut.-Colonel A. Le F. Smith	J. W. B. Tindall	Baroda
1917	" "	" "	" "	Aden Field Force
1918	General Sir Edmund Barrow, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.	" "	" "	" "
1919				
1st Bn.	" "	Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Tregear.	" "	" "
2nd Bn.	" "	Acting Lieut.-Colonel C. A. G. P. Meadows	—	Fort William
1920				
1st Bn.	" "	Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Tregear	J. W. B. Tindall	Aden Field Force
2nd Bn.	" "	Acting Lieut.-Colonel C. A. G. P. Meadows	—	On field service, Irak
1921	" "	Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Tregear	A. F. G. Raikes, M.C.	Santa Cruz

APPENDIXES

(7) 3RD BATTALION (D.C.O.) 7TH RAJPUT REGIMENT

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Colonel.</i>	<i>Commandant.</i>	<i>Adjutant.</i>	<i>Station.</i>
1922	General Sir Edmund Barrow, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.	Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Tregear	A. F. Raikes, M.C.	Santa Cruz
1923	" "	Lieut.-Colonel C. A. G. P. Meadows	" "	"
1924	" "	" "	" "	"
1925	" "	" "	J. C. T. Cleave	Landi Kotal
1926	" "	" "	" "	"
1927	" "	" "	" "	Ali Masjid
1928	" "	Lieut.-Colonel T. L. Ovens	" "	Fyzabad
1929	" "	" "	" "	"
1930	" "	" "	W. E. Norrish	"
1931	" "	Lieut.-Colonel A. R. Thomson, M.C.	" "	Razmak
1932	" "	" "	" "	"
1933	" "	" "	" "	"
1934	Lieut.-General Sir A. H. Bingley, K.C.I.E., C.B.	" "	" "	Ahmednagar
1935	" "	Lieut.-Colonel B. T. Phillips	H. S. Q. Stewart	"
1936	" "	" "	" "	Mir Ali. Khaisora Valley operations
1937	" "	" "	" "	Waziristan operations
1938	" "	Lieut.-Colonel C. M. P. Durnford	" "	" "
1939	" "	" "	" "	Hyderabad, Sind
1939	" "	Lieut.-Colonel W. F. Charter, M.C.	" "	Quetta

APPENDIX III

INDIAN OFFICERS WHO HAVE HELD THE RANK OF SUBADAR MAJOR

N.B.—The names of Indian officers were not recorded in the Army Lists until the latter half of the nineteenth century unless they were Members of the Order of British India. Subadar Major Ramgholam Agnihotri *Bahadur* was probably the third Subadar Major of the 47th Volunteers (later 7th B.N.I.) after its being re-formed in 1825 as the 69th N.I.

- 1838 Ramgholam Agnihotri *Bahadur*, O.B.I.
- 1845 Bhawani Din Dube
- 1847 Chand Khan *Sardar Bahadur*, O.B.I., I.O.M.
- 1858 Oomar Khan *Sardar Bahadur*, O.B.I.
- 1863 Fakira Ram *Sardar Bahadur*, O.B.I.
- 1869 Ramjiawan Singh *Sardar Bahadur*, O.B.I.
- 1872 Bhinik Singh *Sardar Bahadur*, O.B.I.
- 1874 Jaimal Singh *Bahadur*, O.B.I.
- 1878 Shiudas Singh, I.O.M.
- 1884 Dewah Singh
- 1885 Gurdatt Singh *Sardar Bahadur*, O.B.I.
- 1900 Gajraj Singh, *Bahadur*, O.B.I.
- 1903 Adhar Singh, Hon. Captain, *Sardar Bahadur*, O.B.I.
- 1913 Shiuambar Singh, Hon. Captain, *Sardar Bahadur*, O.B.I., I.O.M.
- 1917 Chandrapal Singh, Hon. Lieutenant, *Bahadur*, O.B.I. and Médaille Militaire
- 1917 *Rambali Singh*, I.D.S.M. (2nd Battalion, 7th Rajputs)¹
- 1919 Ramdayal Singh, Hon. Captain, *Sardar Bahadur*, O.B.I.
- 1921 Bhawani Pershad Singh, Hon. Captain, *Sardar Bahadur*, O.B.I.
- 1927 Azizuddin Khan, *Bahadur* (Civil), Hon. Lieutenant, *Bahadur*, O.B.I.
- 1932 Beni Singh
- 1932 Jemadar Khan, Hon. Lieutenant, I.D.S.M.
- 1937 Matabaksh Singh *Bahadur*, O.B.I.

¹ The 2nd Battalion, 7th Rajputs was raised at Alipore, Calcutta, in 1918 and was disbanded in the reduction of the Army after the war.

APPENDIX IV

MAINLY ABOUT UNIFORMS


By Lieutenant-General Sir ALFRED H. BINGLEY

Although there are occasional references in the foregoing pages to the uniforms of the battalion, the subject is, I think, of sufficient interest to justify an appendix, particularly as we can supplement its text by interesting illustrations. I will not attempt to record the changes that have taken place in the uniforms of British officers, as they conformed generally to those made from time to time in the British Service. Two only need to be mentioned. Up to 1893 a blue *pagri* was worn with the white helmet. After the return of the battalion from Burma, a white *pagri* was substituted, with a patch of blue cloth under the badge. The other change was the substitution of brown leather for white buff sword belts and sword knots. This was in 1885, and was due to the introduction of brown leather accoutrements for the Indian ranks and the greater use of khaki.

Facing this page is a drawing by Major Dixon Smith, reproducing a contemporary engraving, which shows in detail the uniforms of a Subadar, a Havildar and a Sepoy of the 24th Bengal Infantry. As these uniforms were those worn from about 1775 to about 1816, they cover, except as regards the head-dress, the period dealt with in Chapter I which tells us about the early history of the battalion.

Up to the end of the eighteenth century the Sepoys' head-dress was a flat blue turban, in shape like a lifebuoy, ornamented in front with a triangular piece of wood, painted blue and called a 'coxcomb' on which was displayed the number and badge of the regiment. At a distance of two or three hundred yards, this turban was in outline hardly distinguishable from the three-cornered cocked hat of the British soldier. When the latter discarded his cocked hat in favour of a round one which developed later into the shako, the Bengal Army followed the British Army's lead and the coxcomb turban was replaced about 1795 by the cylindrical head-dress, still called by courtesy a turban, of which a description is given on page 27 and which is depicted in Major Dixon Smith's sketch.

After 1815 utility was sacrificed to show, and it became the fashion to increase the size and height of all military head-dresses. In the Bengal Army, following the example of the British Service, the so-called 'turban' of the Sepoy grew bigger and bigger, its top-heaviness being exaggerated by the fact that it had no chin-strap to steady it. In 1838, the 47th, as our battalion was then called, made good this defect by adding to this cumbrous head-dress a chin-strap composed of brass scales. This was a notable improvement; but its unsuitability for active service was generally acknowledged, with the result that the shako was discarded about 1844 in favour of the Kilmarnock cap, a change that proved very popular with the Sepoy. In the 47th, which after the Mutiny became the 7th B.N.I., the Kilmarnock cap was discarded in 1859, when a blue turban, with a red-striped end and fringe, as described on page 59, was adopted in its place. A few regiments, however, retained their Kilmarnock caps for many years, and a draft of the 11th Rajputs, now the 5th Battalion of our regiment, was wearing them when it joined us in Peking in 1901.



24TH BENGAL INFANTRY, ABOUT 1910

Some details of the uniforms shown in the plate call for remark. The facings are yellow and the lace silver. It is noteworthy that the facings of our battalion have been yellow throughout its history, but the lace was changed from silver to gold in 1831. The grenades on the head-dresses of the Subadar and Havildar and the bugle on that of the Sepoy, show that the wearers belonged to the Grenadier and Light Infantry Companies respectively. In 1805 the Havildars, whose position had been up to then in the ranks, were placed in the supernumerary rank like Sergeants, and were armed like the latter with pikes and swords instead of with muskets and bayonets. They were also given pantaloons instead of *jangias* or shorts. In 1831, a short musket called a fusil replaced the Havildar's pike and a bayonet his sword.

The most striking item of the Sepoys' uniform at this time was the *Kummerbund*. From the days of David and Goliath it has been the custom of Eastern warriors to gird up their loins for the fray, using for this purpose their *Kummerbunds* or waistbands. The *Kummerbund* was thus a traditional detail of the Sepoys' equipment, and it no doubt served its original purpose as long as it was allowed to retain its original form. But from the time that it was standardized and made ornamental, it became a useless encumbrance. The following description of how it originated and what it became, is taken from Williamson's *Oriental Field Sports*. 'The *Kummerbund*', he says, 'is made of leather covered with blue cloth, with a cross of white lines in front. This part of the dress, which is purely Oriental and was formerly made of a long piece of cloth similar to the turban, is intended as a support to the loins and certainly may be useful in that respect. I doubt, however, whether the manner in which *Kummerbunds* are laced up, added to their being in general too substantial and broad, be not productive of bad effects. The casting off of so warm a vesture as many are apt to do in a state of fatigue and impatience, has in my opinion often induced bowel complaints which have perhaps been attributed to less probable causes.'

Another detail of this illustration which is worthy of notice, is the spat gaiters which finish off the Havildar's pantaloons. Spat gaiters were for many years a distinguishing feature of the uniform of our battalion. They were made of drill, white for Review Order, blue for Drill Order and khaki for Marching Order and summer wear. I may mention that up to about 1890 all parades during the cold weather months were in red cloth uniform. Khaki was reserved for field training, musketry and manœuvres.

The spat gaiters have had a chequered career. In 1888 our white and khaki gaiters were abolished, but in response to an urgent appeal, the Commander-in-Chief rescinded the order as regards the white gaiters, and in 1894 our battalion was permitted to go on wearing khaki gaiters in lieu of the khaki puttees which most regiments had by then adopted. Meanwhile, blue puttees had replaced the blue drill gaiters worn in Drill Order—Red. These blue puttees were then made to serve a double purpose, for they were worn also in Marching Order—Khaki, as may be seen from the upper of the two groups of the plate facing page 212.

During and after the Great War, all articles of clothing and equipment, including boots and puttees, were standardized and made articles of Government issue. Before that they were provided regimentally, through the Half-Mounting Fund, with the exception of the triennial issues of cloth uniforms which were made through the Clothing Department. The term 'half mounting' is a corrupt rendering of the

APPENDIXES

French 'demi-montant'—the word 'montant' meaning 'total'. Half the total cost of a soldier's kit, represented by his cloth uniform, was the liability of the Colonel, who received an annual grant for this purpose; the other half or 'demi-montant' was the liability of the soldier himself, and was met by deductions from his pay. Thus the fund through which these issues were accounted for was called the 'Half-Mounting Fund'—a term the origin of which has puzzled generations of Quartermasters.

When the battalion was re-formed in 1824, first as the 69th and later as the 47th N.I., the red uniform jacket made of a material called 'Aurora', as shown in Major Dixon Smith's sketch, had been replaced by a red cloth coatee, and the cotton *jangias* or shorts by black or dark blue serge trousers with white cotton ones for wear in hot weather. I have not been able to produce a drawing of this uniform and of the Kilmarnock cap worn with it, which is referred to on page 27; but I am able to describe it from personal knowledge. When serving as Adjutant and while on the march from Calcutta to Saugor in 1889, the battalion encamped near a village in the Benares district in which there were many military pensioners. Among them was Naik Shiudayal Singh, late of the 47th N.I. He paid me a visit clad in his old regimental coatee. It was in shape and cut like a modern dress coat with tails, except that it was buttoned up to the neck and ended in a high yellow collar beneath which was a stiff leather stock. It had square yellow cuffs and the front of the garment was decorated with broad bands of braid, rather like those on a drummer's tunic except that the braid was plain white. The old man had the Sutlej medal with clasps for 'Ferozeshah', 'Aliwal' and 'Sobraon', and on his head was the shabby remnant of a Kilmarnock cap with the number 47 in front. His trousers had long since been worn out, so below the waist he was clad in the ordinary Hindustani *dhotti*; 'like the one', he told me, 'in which I fought at Mood-kee'. He called my attention to his coat tails which were, he said, two inches longer than those of other *pultuns*. He was as proud of this distinction as later generations were of their white spat gaiters.

The coatee uniform remained the standard issue until 1860 when it was replaced first by a long-skirted red tunic, and then in 1867 by a new garment, inspired by the association of the British with the French in the Crimea. This was officially described as a 'Zouave Jacket'. It had little resemblance to the latter, however, being really a red tunic with a yellow front and slashed yellow cuffs. It had no collar or stock and was consequently more comfortable than previous uniforms. The details of this garment, which was worn with baggy serge breeches, can be seen in the group facing page 76. A point to notice is that the badges of rank of Indian officers at this time were two crossed *tulwars* for a Subadar and a single *tulwar* for a Jemadar. These badges were worn on the front of the jacket, near the neck. Sashes were worn over the left shoulder by officers, and over the right by Havildars. Indian officers and other ranks then wore white buff belts and accoutrements not only in red, but also in khaki uniform which had not long been in use.

In 1887 red cloth tunics with yellow collars, cuffs and shoulder straps, were introduced in place of Zouave jackets, and an ill-drawn picture of a Sepoy of our battalion wearing this uniform in Review Order, forms the frontispiece of Cardew's *History of the Bengal Army*. The badges of rank of Indian officers were changed about this time, metal stars fixed on the shoulder straps, viz. two for a Subadar and




7TH (D.C.O.) RAJPUTS, LUCKNOW, 1892

Havildar,
 Marching Order,
 Khaki.

Sepoy and Havildar, "
 Drill Order,
 Khaki.

Subadar Major
 Gurdatt Singh
 Bahadar, O.B.I.,
 Review Order,
 Red.

Sepoy,
 Drill Order,
 Red.



7TH (D.C.O.) RAJPUTS, SIMLA, 1905

A Guard. Review Order, Red.



one for a Jemadar, taking the place of the *tulwars*. The Subadar Major's rank was indicated by a crown. These changes are shown in the group facing page 81. At the same time brown leather belts, sword knots and accoutrements, replaced the buff ones previously issued.

In 1895 the Zouave jacket was reintroduced in place of the tunic. It was similar to the original, but of an improved pattern, and had a low collar to hide the under-garments that in its absence used to project untidily above the neck line. It is well exemplified in the upper group of the plate facing page 212. This uniform continued in use until about 1903 when it was replaced by one of an entirely new design. This was a loose scarlet serge *Kurta*, similar to those worn by the Indian Cavalry. It was girt about with a yellow *Kummerbund* with striped ends, over which was the brown leather waistbelt. It formed a very handsome uniform, as may be judged from the lower group in the plate facing page 212, which is from a photograph taken in Simla in 1905, when a picked detachment of the battalion, under Captain Gover and Subadar Major Adhar Singh, furnished the Viceroy's Guard and earned great praise for its faultless turn-out and the smartness with which it performed its duties. It will be noticed that the men are all wearing shoulder pads to protect their *Kurtas* from the rubbing of the magazine rifle when carried at the slope. As this dress was not considered suitable for Indian officers, the latter reverted in 1909 to the tunics shown in the group facing page 81, except that the sash, hitherto worn over the left shoulder, was now worn round the waist.

Before giving a brief account of the khaki uniform, some remarks may be added in regard to *pagris*. In 1865 there was a partial reversion to a former practice when, to ensure uniformity, a straw skull cap was introduced round which the *pagri* was tied. This contrivance was discarded in 1878, when *pagris* were tied as before in the normal fashion, as they have been ever since. In 1884 the appearance of the *pagri* was improved by the addition of a brooch badge,¹ designed by Captain Vaughan, which was sanctioned by Government after the battalion had been made the Duke of Connaught's Own. In 1893, on the return of the battalion from Burma, the red stripe and fringe at the end of the *pagri* was changed to one of the red rhododendron colour, as mentioned on page 79; and instead of the end of the *pagri* falling on the right side, it was brought straight over the top. This is clearly shown in the group facing page 115, and also in both groups of the plate facing page 212.

The Band, which was started in 1836, retains the full dress scarlet uniform, for wear when playing out and on occasions of ceremony. In former days the bands of Indian regiments were dressed in all sorts of fancy uniforms. When our battalion was the 47th, the band is said to have been dressed, when playing out, in red shell jackets, white drill trousers and forage caps of Lancer pattern. It would be difficult to conceive a more unsuitable uniform. There were at one time several Eurasians in the Band—I remember one named Letts and another named Steers.

The training of musicians was always a difficulty and indeed still is. Most of them were the sons of bandsmen and they grew up with their instruments, so to speak. The Band was usually conducted by the Bandmaster of one of the British regiments quartered in the same station, but the battalion produced several excellent Band Havildars, who proved capable conductors and efficient trainers. Among

¹ As shown on cover.

the more notable were Mir Safar Ali and Abdul Basit. Both retired as Honorary Jemadars.

Khaki uniform made its first appearance during the Mutiny Campaign of 1857-9 when it was worn by the Guides and other corps raised in the Punjab. Its adoption became general about 1878, and its use in our battalion dates from that time. At first it required constant re-dyeing, as it would fade to all sorts of shades after every washing ; but later a fast dye was discovered by a Manchester firm which for many years enjoyed a monopoly. A khaki jumper was approved in 1880, and this, with baggy breeches to match, was the uniform worn by the battalion in the Egyptian Campaign of 1882 as may be seen from the picture facing page 71 and from the figures at the back of the group facing page 76. This jumper had cartridge holders for ten rounds on each breast, but these were removed and pockets substituted about 1892, when the battalion was equipped with Martini-Henry rifles which had cartridges different in size and shape to those of the discarded Snider. The khaki jumper of this period is well exemplified in the upper group of the plate facing page 212. It had white metal sugar-loaf buttons and on the shoulder strap were the numerals 7 B.I. in brass. The latter were changed to 7 Rajputs in 1898. A few years later, the khaki jumper was replaced by a khaki blouse, as shown in the group facing page 115, which, in all essential respects, was the same as the one now in use.

There is nothing new under the sun, and the 'shorts' now worn by British and Indian troops in hot climates, can clearly be traced to the *jangias* of the Sepoys who fought under Clive, Coote, Wellesley, and Lake. The revival of their use came about at the time of the Tirah Expedition of 1897. They were used first by the Scouts of Gurkha battalions serving on the frontier. Their use spread gradually to the whole Army—to begin with by the Scouts, who themselves represented a revival of the Light Companies, and later to the Infantry as a whole.

There is one more detail which calls for remark. Three officers of the battalion have been awarded the D.S.O. Two, viz. Majors Ogg and Etheridge, won it for services in the Great War of 1914-18. But before this, a D.S.O. was awarded to Major McC. R. E. Ray. As mentioned on page 79, Ray rendered good service in the Chinbok Hills in 1892. Like General Barrow and Colonel Vaughan, he had an aptitude for intelligence work and like the latter held the McGregor Memorial Medal for the best reconnaissance of the year. Besides his work in the Chinbok Hills and in the Far East, he rendered valuable service in Tibet. In the China Expedition of 1900 he served as D.A.Q.M.G. Line of Communications. He was a Staff Captain at Army Headquarters in 1902 and a D.A.Q.M.G. in 1904. He earned his D.S.O. and a Mention in Despatches for the Tibet Expedition of 1903-4, but died soon after, while on sick leave in England.

I will conclude this Appendix by explaining that owing to the loss of the records of the 47th N.I. through the capsizing of a junk or sampan in Hong Kong harbour in 1859, some errors and omissions have been discovered in the Digest of Services which was compiled from scanty data some years after. This has made the compilation and checking of Appendix II rather laborious, for it entailed much research. If any errors are discovered later, it will not be for lack of care in revision, for every effort has been made to ensure accuracy.

INDEX

(Throughout this Index the latest rank has been given where known)

- Abadan, 127
Abdul Aziz Khan, Assistant Surgeon, 115
Abdul Aziz, L/Naik, 200
Abdul Haq, 197, 199
Abdul Latif, Jemadar, 199
Abercrombie, Lieutenant, 64
Abyssinia, 198
Adalatnagar, battle of, 8
Adhar Singh, Subadar Major, 83, 111-14, 117, 209
Addis Ababa, 198
Aden, 173-88, 207
Aeroplanes, 139, 152, 159, 163, 167-8, 183
Afghanistan, 37, 194
Africa, East, 201; West, 190
Afsir Ali Khan, Jemadar, 81 (*illus.*)
Agar Singh, Subadar, 119, 143, 151
Agra, 8, 25, 48, 202-3
Ahibaran Singh, Subadar, 119
Ahmedabad, 114-19, 207
Ahmednagar, 192, 208
Ahwaz, 127-8, 131-2, 143, 147, 192, 201
Ajit Singh, Munshi, 53
Akha, 81
Alderson, Lieutenant R. C., 173, 182-3
Aldin, Captain J. J., 7
Aleppo, 170
Alexandra, Queen, 111
Alexandria, 65-7, 71-3
Ali Masjid, 112, 187, 208
Alif Din, Jemadar, 200
Aligarh, 24
Aliwal, 42-4, 47, 83
Allahabad, 53-7, 61, 205
Alston, Major W., 7
Amara, 120 (*map*), 135-8, 149, 160-1, 201
Ambala, 29-33, 39, 41, 52, 186, 203
American troops in China, 87, 90-2, 96-107, 110
Angad Singh, L/Naik, 200
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 127, 129
Anwar Khan, Jemadar, 81 (*illus.*)
Apte, Lieutenant V. K. (I.M.S.), 179, 184
Arabi Pasha, 65, 68-73
Arabistan, 120 (*map*), 127
Arabs, 121-2, 126-31, 142-4, 152-4, 164, 169, 175, 183
Arakan, 19, 21, 25, 28, 203
Arms traffic, 115-16
Armstrong, Lieutenant F. M., 204
Armstrong, Captain G. C., 18, 32
Arthur, Captain D. (I.M.S.), 127, 130, 149, 171, 201
Asghar Ali Khan, Jemadar, 81 (*illus.*)
Assam, 19, 20, 77
Auckland, Lord, 27
Ava, 19, 49
Aylmer, General, 160-1, 164, 166
Ayscough, Major W. G., 115-16, 119, 172, 201, 206
Aziziya, 143-4, 152, 170
Aziz Khan, Drummer, 122
Azizuddin Khan, Subadar Major, 209
Baddeley, Major W. C., 18
Badri Narayan Singh, Jemadar, 81 (*illus.*)
Badraddin, Sub-Assistant Surgeon, 171
Baghdad, 115, 120 (*map*), 142-4, 150, 155, 160, 170
Bahman Ghati, 25
Bajinath Singh, Subadar, 119-20, 201
Bailey, Lieutenant, 130
Baillie, Colonel W., 2
Baird, Sir David, 65
Balram Singh, L/Naik, 200
Baluch caravans, 115
Baluchis, 86; 26th, 87; 29th, 66, 70
Baluchistan, 193
Band, the, 26, 75, 188
Banda, 63, 204
Bandar Abbas, 115
Bareilly, 1
Baroda, 173-4, 207
Baroda, H.H. the Maharaja of, 174
Barrackpore, 9, 12, 19-21, 24-8, 52, 202-3
Barrett, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur A., 118, 121, 127, 131, 135
Barrow, Lieutenant-General Sir E. G., 66, 74, 76 (*illus.*)-7, 80, 84-6, 89, 90, 94, 99, 112 (*illus.*)-14, 191-2, 205-8
Basra, 119-28, 131, 134-6, 142, 154-6, 188
Battle Honours, 6, 47, 74, 83, 188
Beatty, Brigadier-General L. N., 178-9
Belgians, King and Queen of the, 188

Benares, 12, 23-4, 28, 52, 55-7, 202-3
 Bentinck, Lord William, 27
 Bengal Army, 31, 37
 Bengal Cavalry, 65, 73
 Bengal Lancers, 1st, 95-107, 110; 13th, 65
 Bengal Native Infantry, 3, 5-7, 63, 65, 76,
 81-3; for the 7th and 24th *see* Rajputs,
 3/7th
 Beni Singh, Subadar Major, 209
 Beriberi, 143, 159
 Bernadotte, 4, 114
 Bhabhuti Singh, Jemadar, 119, 151, 153
 Bhagwanbakh Singh, Jemadar, 119, 151
 Bhagwandin Singh, L/Naik, 177
 Bhagwat Singh, 200
 Bharatpur Imperial Service Infantry, 119
 Bhawani Lal or Din Dube, Subadar Major,
 47, 209
 Bhawani Pershad Singh, Subadar Major,
 116, 119, 171
 Bhils, 117
 Bhinik, Subadar Major, 58, 209
 Bhola Singh, Sepoy, 172
 Bhopal Infantry, 173
 Bhurtpore, 24
 Bhutan frontier, 82
 Biche Kashkai, 194-5
 Bihar, 20
 Bikrama Singh, Sepoy, 182
 Bingley, Lieutenant-General Sir A. H., ix,
 x, 77, 79, 88-9, 94-5, 102, 105-15, 156,
 191-2, 205-8
 Birad Singh, Jemadar, 199
 Bird, Major-General G. Corrie, 82
 Birdwood, Lord, 188
 Black Watch, the, 160
 Blackney, Lieut.-Colonel J. W., 24, 203
 Blair, Colonel, 8
 Blake, Captain B., 18
 Blane, Lieut.-Colonel, 5
 Bolton, Brigadier-General, 34
 Bolton, Lieutenant T., 18
 Bombay, 66, 184, 186
 Book of Remembrance, 192-4, 201
 Boulton, Captain C., 32
 Bowyer, Lieut.-Colonel C., 24, 203
 Boxer Campaign, 85-111
 Boyd, Captain, 195
 Boyd, Lieut.-Colonel, 24
 Brahmans, 1, 18, 19, 52, 62, 75, 82; 1st,
 181-2
 Brewer, Ensign Philip, 7
 Brewster, Lieutenant F. C., 204
 Bridges, Lieutenant K. W., 173
 Brijmohan Singh, Subadar, 119, 124, 143,
 148, 172
 Brissel, Consul, 170

Broadfoot, Major G., 31
 Brooke, Lieut.-Colonel C. W., 25, 203
 Broughton, Lieut.-Colonel R., 7, 13, 202
 Brown, Rev. F., 99
 Brown, Major-General S., 12
 Browne, Captain, 106
 Bullock, Lieutenant, 125
 Burgoyne-Wallace, Lieutenant D. B., 119,
 129, 132, 201
 Burma, 19, 49, 52-6, 62, 75-82, 88, 108,
 190, 206
 Burn, Colonel W., 8, 24
 Burnet, Lieut.-Colonel J., 10
 Burrell, Colonel L., 13
 Burton, Lieutenant E. B., 66, 70, 76 (*illus.*)
 Bushire, 115
 Bussy, Marquis de, 3
 Buttanshaw, Lieutenant H. R., 51

 Cachar, 19, 62-4, 205
 Cadres, 7, 32, 51, 66, 77, 88
 Cairo, 67-8, 71, 73
 Calcutta, 25, 52, 58, 76, 83, 206
 Campbell, Lieutenant D. R., 173
 Campbell, Lieutenant G., 125
 Campbell, Captain J. P. W., 32, 51
 Campbell, Captain R., 32, 51
 Canning, Lord, 57
 Canton, 59, 204
 Carnatic, the, 4, 6-8, 202
 Carnatic Infantry, 75th, 174, 183
 Carr, Lieutenant F., 7
 Carter, Major M. (I.M.S.), 156
 Cartwright, Lieut.-Colonel E., 18, 21, 223,
 202
 Cassels, General Sir R. A., 188
 Caste, 19, 52
 Castro, Major-General H. de, 202-3
 Cawnpore, 1, 7, 49, 54, 57, 65, 204
 Chaffee, General, 90
 Chamberlain, Sir Austen, 142
 Champion, Colonel, 1
 Chand Khan, Subadar Major, 36, 47, 209
 Chandika Singh, Sepoy, 164
 Chandrapal Singh, Subadar Major, 119,
 173, 178, 182, 184, 209
 Charan Singh, L/Naik, 172
 Charter, Lieut.-Colonel W. F., 198, 208
 Chattar Singh, Subadar, 74, 76 (*illus.*)
 Chetwode, Field-Marshal Sir P. W., 190
 Chhote Singh, Sepoy, 200
 Chin Hills, 189, 191, 206
 Chins, the, 77-80
 Chitral, 112-13, 161
 Chittagong, 19, 20, 28
 Cholera, 50, 80



- 'Class' company, 'class' regiment, 75, 81, 110
Cleave, Captain J. C. T., 173, 183, 187, 208
Clio, the, 182
Cobbe, General Sir A. S., 189
Colan, Captain, 131
Coleridge, General Sir J., 197
Collard, Lieutenant F. W., 199
Colours, 5, 49, 62, 74, 83
Comet, the, 153
Condon, Lieutenant J. K., 77, 80-1 (*illus.*)
Connaught, H.R.H. the Duke of, 73-5, 83, 111, 183, 188, 205
Connaught, Prince and Princess Arthur of, 188
Connaught, Princess Margaret of, 114
Cookson, Lieut.-Commander E. C., 141
Coote, Sir Eyre, 1-3
Corfield, Captain C., 32, 46-7, 203
Corfield, Brigadier-General W. R., 60
Cornwallis, Lord, 19
Coronation Darbar (1911), 114
Cowley, Lieut.-Commander C. H., 124-8, 143, 168
Cox, Sir Percy, 122, 155
Craigie, Captain E. B., 18
Craigmie, Lieutenant J., 8, 202
Cramer-Roberts, Major, 147
Crawford, Lieut.-Colonel C., 202
Creagh, Sir G. O'Moore, 112, 116
Crump, Captain P., 7
Ctesiphon, 120 (*map*), 144-51, 154, 158-61, 188, 201
Cuddalore, 3-6, 24, 114
Culley, Major R. H., 199
Cumberlege, Captain N. J., 18
Cureton, Brigadier-General C. R., 43
Curzon, Lord, 112
Cutler, Lieutenant H. C., 88
Cuttack, 25, 203

Dacca, 62-4, 205
Dal Singh, Havildar, 200
Dalip Singh, 47
Dalzell, Major-General, 21
Damas, Chevalier de, 4, 114
Damdil, 195
Daniell, Brevet-Major J. T., 32, 51
Darb, 174-7
Daulat Singh, Subadar, 163, 168, 171
Deare, Lieutenant P., 203
Deccan, the, 12, 191
De Courcy, Lieut.-Colonel J., 202
Delamain, Lieutenant-General Sir W. S., 119, 138-40, 146-8, 170
Delap, Lieutenant S., 203
Delhi, 24, 40-1, 52, 114, 163

Dempster, Assistant Surgeon J. E., 18
Dewah Singh, Subadar Major, 209
Dewar, Lieut.-Colonel J., 13, 203
Dharial Singh, Subadar, 47
Dhenkanal, 25
Dick, Major-General Sir R. H., 45
Dick-Lauder, Lieutenant J., 32
Dinapore, 53, 113, 206
Dirjodhan Singh, Havildar, 148, 151
Dixon-Smith, Major, x
Diyala river, 146-50
Doab, the, 7, 24, 48
Dogras, 1/17th, 195-6
Dorset Regiment, 121, 127-31, 137
Dorward, General, 92
Double battalions, 17
Double companies, 84
Drummond, Lieutenant F. C. W., 205
Drury-Lowe, Lieutenant-General Sir D. C., 70
Duelling, 28
Duff, Major J., 7
Dum Dum, 28
Dundas, Sir David (1735-1820), 14
Dundas, Captain T., 18
Dwarka Singh, Sepoy, 130-2, 172
Dyal Singh, Subadar, 74

East Surrey Regiment, 33, 177
Eden, the Misses, 27
Edmondstone, Lieut.-Colonel, 5
Edward VII, King, 65, 111, 114
Edward VIII, 186-7, 192
Egypt, 65-75, 83, 108, 114, 188-90, 205
Elderton, Captain A., 66, 70, 76 (*illus.*) 80, 205
Emden, the, 120
Enfield rifle, 59, 62
Enver Bey, 169
Espiggle, the, 181
Es-Sinn, 136, 141-2, 146, 160, 164, 201
Establishment, 6, 16, 61
Etawah, 48, 203
Etheridge, Major F., 172, 187, 214
Euphrates, 120 (*map*)-123, 135
Eurasians, 26
Evans, Lieutenant T. W., 51
Evans, Colonel W. U., 167

Fagan, Lieut.-Colonel C., 203
Fakira Ram, Subadar Major, 54, 58, 209
Falkenheim, Colonel E. von, 107
Fatehgarh, 54, 59, 185, 190
Favier, Monseigneur, 86, 105
Fazal Din, orderly, 198
Ferozepore, 31-4, 38-41, 47-8, 53-5, 63, 204

Ferozeshah, 37-41, 47, 83
Firefly, the, 153
 Firman, Lieutenant H. O. B., 168
 Forbes, Major, 154
 Force D, 135-41
 Forster, Lieut.-Colonel J. H., 202
 Fort George, 135-6
 Fort William, 27, 84, 87, 205-7
 Fox, Lieutenant E. S., 51
 France, Lieutenant E. S. R., 198
 Francis, Surgeon C. B., 32
 Frazer, Lieut.-Colonel G. S., 122
 French troops in China, 86-7, 90-3, 96-7,
 101-2, 105-7
 Frith, Captain F. W., 18, 202-3
 Fry, Major-General C. I., 118, 124-5,
 136-40, 144
 Fyzabad, 189, 208

 Gajraj Singh, Subadar Major, 74, 81 (*illus.*),
 209
 Gandhi, Mr. M. K., 186-7
 Garhwal Rifles, 113
 Garhwalis, 113, 185
 Gardiner, Colonel J., 7, 202
 Garner, Lieut.-Colonel J., 203
 Gartside-Tipping, Lieut.-Colonel, 100, 106
 Gaselee, Lieutenant-General Sir A., 86-7,
 90, 99, 100, 103-6, 110-12
 Gaussen, Lieutenant, 105
 George V, King, 126, 163, 192
 German troops in China, 85-7, 107
 Gilbert, Major-General Sir W. R., 32-5,
 38-9, 45
 Gimlette, Colonel G. H. D., ix, 66, 70-3,
 76 (*illus.*)
 Gladwin, Lieut.-Colonel C., 202
 Godby, Brigadier-General, 43, 47
 Gohad, Raja of, 8
 Gokaran Singh, Sepoy, 129-32, 144, 172
 Goldie, Major A., 18, 32
 Gomm, Lady, 49
 Gopal Singh, Jemadar, 151
 Gordon, Lieutenant W., 51
 Gorringe, Lieutenant-General Sir G. F.,
 135, 166-8
 Gough, Brigadier-General J. B., 35, 39
 Gough, Lord, 31-3, 37, 41, 44, 46, 62
 Gover, Captain W. A., 118, 122, 127,
 130-3, 200
 Graham, Lieut.-Colonel J., 29, 203
 Grenadier Battalion, 8-10, 16, 202
 Griffin, Captain, 103, 107
 Grueber, Lieutenant N., 4
 Gujarat, 187
 Gunning, Major R. H., 78-9
 Gun-running in Persian Gulf, 115-16

Gurdatt Singh, Subadar Major, 74-8, 81
 (*illus.*), 88-9, 108-10, 131-3, 172, 209
 Gurkhas, 8-12, 24, 29, 56, 59, 82, 86, 184;
 2/7th, 149, 158; 1/8th, 63
 Gwalior, 12, 76
 Gwalior, Maharaja Sindia of, 88

 Haidar Ali, 1-3
 Halliley, Lieutenant W. S., 134-6, 140-1,
 148, 164, 171-2
 Hamilton, Lieutenant E. C., 205
 Hamilton, Brigadier-General W. G., 144-6
 Hamley, Lieutenant-General Sir E., 70
 Hampshire Howitzer Battery, 138, 144
 Hampton, Lieut.-Colonel R., 24, 203
 Handley, Captain L. M., 180
 Hanna, 162
 Hanuman Singh, Subadar, 108
 Harakhhahadur Singh, Mess Havildar, 148,
 154, 163
 Harakhray Singh, Sepoy, 200
 Harding, Lieut.-Colonel M. Ff., 177
 Hardinge, General Sir A. E., 40-1
 Hardinge, Sir H., 31, 37-40
 Hari Chand, Lieutenant (I.M.S.), 121
 Hariana, 8
 Hariharpur, 10, 11
 Harriot, Brigadier-General, 39
 Harvey, Lieutenant W. L., 118-19, 124-5,
 130-3, 201
 Hastings, Marquis of, 12
 Hastings, Warren, 3, 5
 Hatum, 176-80
 Hay, Major, 24
 Hayes, Major, 99
 Hayes, Assistant Surgeon W. H., 51
 Haynes, Lieut.-Colonel J., 202
 Hazari Singh, Havildar, 119, 191
 Health, 81
 Heathcote, Lieut.-Colonel G. D., 7, 13, 24,
 202
 Hehir, Colonel, 167
 Hemraj Singh, Subadar, 200
 Hicks, Lieutenant-General G., 29, 32-3,
 36-8, 43, 46-9, 203-4
 Hindus, 1, 18, 19, 62, 65, 75, 87, 163, 183
 Hindustani regiments, 81, 186
 Hislop, General Sir T., 12
 Hoghton, General, 137, 146, 167
 Holkar, 6, 8, 12, 24, 202
 Hollings, Captain W. C., 32
 Holmes, Major H. L. (R.G.A.), 176
 Home, Lieut.-Colonel R., 29, 203
 Hong Kong, 58, 87, 204; Regiment, 84,
 89, 92, 94, 112
 Hood, Captain E. F., 77-8, 88, 110, 206
 Horseflesh, use of, 161-7



Huish, Lieut.-Colonel G., 49, 204
Hume, Lieut.-Colonel S. G. W., 119, 178-81
Hume-Wright, Major F. J. O., 173-6, 178, 184, 187
Hunt, Captain (R.A.), 130
Hunter, Lieut.-Colonel G., 25, 203
Hussars, 14th, 152
Hyderabad Regiment, 2/19th, 194
Hyderabad, Sind, 198, 208

Imad, 180-1
Indar Singh, Subadar, 64
India, Government of, 167, 173
Indian Mutiny, 51-63, 75, 108, 190
Indian National Congress, 186
Indore, 6, 8, 12
Infantry, 113th, 134
Ipi, Fakir of, 194, 198
Irak, 186, 189, 207
Ismailia, 66-8, 73
Italian troops in China, 90

Jackson, Lieutenant W. H., 7
Jacob, Lieut.-Colonel A. L., 182-3
Jagdatt Singh, Jemadar, 78
Jahan Dad, L/Naik, 197-9
Jaikaran Singh, Jemadar, 119
Jaimal Singh, Subadar Major, 63, 209
Jaler Algad, 195
James, Lieutenant H. C., 47
James, Lieutenant R., 7
Jamieson, Lieut.-Colonel A. W., 77, 80-3, 205-6
Jamieson, Major-General J. W. H., 83
Jan Mohammad, Jemadar, 200
Janki Upadhyaya, Havildar, 53, 58
Japanese troops in China, 90-101
Jask, 115-16, 207
Jaswant Rao Holkar, 6, 8
Jats, 82; 6th, 160; 3/9th, 58
Jaunpore, 60-1, 204
Jemadar Khan, Subadar Major, 187, 196, 198-9, 209
Jenkins, Lieutenant C. V., 51-3, 204
Jenkins, Captain F., ix, 9, 10, 13-15, 32
Jennings, Major, 73
Jhandu Singh, Sepoy, 178, 184
Jhansi, 76
Jorawar Khan, Jemadar, 47
Joyce, Lieutenant A. H. B., 178, 182-4
Jullundur, 64, 186, 205
Jular, the, 138, 168

Kabul, 187
Kalka Singh, Jemadar, 171, 201
Kamaram, 181-2
Kambughat, 63-4

Karun river, 127-8
Kashmir, 47
Kassasin, 67-72
Kelly, Colonel W., 10, 11
Kemball, Major-General, 164
Keyes, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger, x, 99, 102
Khaisora Valley, 194-9, 208
Khalil Pasha, 169
Khalsa, 31, 46
Khan Mohammad Khan, 200
Khormaksar, 180-1
Khusial Rao, 8
Khyber, 189
K.G.O. Light Infantry, 26th, 180, 183
Kilpatrick, Major S., ix, 1, 2, 6, 202
Kirkee, 118
Kitchener, Lord, 111-12
Krupp mountain guns, 121
Kut-al-Amara, 120 (*map*), 136-43, 152-73, 180, 183, 188, 192

Lachman Upadhyaya, Jemadar, 81 (*illus.*)
Lahej, 175, 182-3
Lahore, 31, 47, 65, 113, 204
Lajj, 146, 149-52
Lake, Lord, 6
Lake, Lieutenant-General Sir Percy, 160, 165, 169
Lal Singh, 33
Lalla Ram, Subadar, 76 (*illus.*), 81 (*illus.*)
Lambert, Captain R., 7
Lambourne, Captain C. W., 7
Landi Kotal, 187, 208
Lawrence, Sir H., 47
Lawrence, H.M.S., 122, 125-6
Leach, Brigadier-General, 88
Lee-Metford rifle, 87
Lee, Assistant Surgeon T. M., 51
Leeds, Lieutenant E., 51
Le Hardy, Lieutenant D., 7
Lhasa, 189
Lilly, Major A. N. I., 118, 131, 139, 147-51, 164, 172, 187
Lingah, 115
Linievitch, General, 106
Littler, Lieutenant-General Sir J. H., 32-3, 38-41
Loch, Colonel G. G., 188
Loch, Lieutenant J. C., 88, 102
Logan, Major G., 63-6, 70, 74, 205
Loti, Pierre, 107
Lowe, Lieutenant-General Sir D. C. Drury-, 70
Lucas, Lieutenant C. P., 32, 41, 51
Lucknow, 9, 13, 25, 52, 63-5, 69, 74-6, 80-2, 108-13, 118, 203-6

- Lucknow Infantry Brigade, 6th, 189
 Lucknow Regiment, 185
 Ludhiana, 31-4, 41-4
 Lushai, 63-5, 75-7
- McAndrew, Captain G., 32, 51, 204
 McCaskill, Major-General Sir J., 32, 34-5
 Macdonald, Sir Claude, 86, 90, 99, 100,
 103-4
 Macdonald, Lieutenant J., 18
 McDowell, Brigadier-General, 43
 Macedonia, 188
 MacGregor Memorial Medal, 114
 Machine-guns, 118, 124, 134-6, 139, 148,
 164-5, 176
 McKenzie, Captain F. O., 119, 130, 201,
 207
 McMahan, Lieutenant A., 203
 Macpherson, Ensign E. C., 18
 Macpherson, Major-General Sir H. T., 65,
 70, 73
 Macpherson, Lieutenant W., 7
 Mactier, Brigadier-General W., 35
 Madras Fusiliers, 55
 Mahadeo Singh, Havildar, 148, 151
 Mahadeo Singh, Jemadar, 119, 151
 Mahadeo Singh, Sepoy, 197
 Maharaj Singh, Subadar, 200
 Mahesh Singh, Subadar, 114, 119, 130-2,
 172, 201
 Mahi Kantha, 117
 Mahipal Singh, Sepoy, 172, 179
 Mahomed Yar Khan, Subadar, 81 (*illus.*)
 Mahratta Light Infantry, 110th, 118-26,
 138-9
 Mahrattas, 2, 6, 8, 12, 13, 16, 31, 86, 190
 Mahsamah, 68-9
 Mahsuds, 194
 Maiden, Lieutenant R. L. B., 187
 Mainpuri, 48, 204
 Malakand, 113, 206
 Malay States Guides, 181
 Male, Rev. A., 68-9
 Manipur, 19, 77-8
 Mansel, Lieut.-Colonel W. G., 83, 109,
 113, 206
 Marchand, Maréchal, 107
 Marines, 93
 Marley, General, 9
 Marsack, Captain C., 1, 202
 Martin, Lieut.-Colonel J., 134, 139-41, 172
 Martini-Henry rifle, 80, 87
 Matabaksh Singh, Subadar Major, 187,
 200, 209
 Matan Singh, Sepoy, 131-3, 172
 Mathura Singh, Havildar, 168
 Matthews, Captain A. B. (R.E.), 158
 Matthews, Lieutenant W. H., 7
 Maynard, Brigadier-General F. H., 198
 Maxim gun, 87
 Mazera, 122-7, 135
 Meadows, Lieut.-Colonel C. A. G. P., 88,
 96, 187-9, 206-8
 Medals, 5, 47, 74, 80-3, 110-12, 172, 178,
 184
 Meerut, 31, 41, 49, 52
 Meerut Singh, Subadar, 47
 Mejidieh, the, 126-8, 134, 142, 156
 Melliss, General, 146-7, 152-3, 169
 Mersina, 170
 Merwara Infantry, 44th, 131
 Mesopotamia, 118-74, 181, 188-90, 207
 Mess, Officers', 4, 14, 41-2, 47-8, 75, 109,
 113-15, 134-5, 148, 183
 Mewar Bhil Corps, 117
 M.I., 5th, 28th, 78
 Miller, Lieut.-Colonel F., 10
 Mir Ali, 194-7, 208
 Mirzapore, 53-8, 204
 Mohamed Latif, L/Naik, 200
 Mohammad Saddik Khan, Subadar, 200
 Mohammerah, 120 (*map*), 128
 Mohammerah, Shaikh of, 127
 Mohun Singh, Sepoy, 56
 Monson, 6
 Moodkee, 29, 34-6, 39, 47, 83
 Morar, 205
 Morrison, Dr., 108
 Mosul, 170
 Muhammadans, 1, 163
 Mukat Singh, Jemadar, 119
 Mullane, Surgeon-Major P., 77, 81 (*illus.*)
 Munro, Sir C. C., 179
 Musalman Companies, 74-5, 80-2
 Musalmans, 1, 62, 89, 186, 189
 Muscat, 115
 Mysore war, second, 1-6, 24
- Nagpur, 12
 Napier, Sir C., 49
 Nash, Brevet-Colonel J., 51, 204
 Nasiriya, 135, 155
 Navy, Royal, 115-16, 120, 127, 168
 Neill, Brigadier-General J. G. S., 54, 58
 Nelson, Lieut.-Colonel F. J., 62, 65, 205
 Nepal, 8-12, 24, 202
 Nerbudda valley, 12
 Nicholson, Major-General F. L., 194
 Nicklin, Colonel, 106
 Nicol, Lieut.-Colonel C., 10, 11
 Nixon, General Sir J. S., 135, 138, 141-2,
 160
 Norfolk Regiment, 118-26, 137-9, 146-9,
 153

Norris, Captain R. J. N., 119, 139, 149-51
Norrish, Lieutenant W. E., 208
North-West Frontier, 83, 113-15, 187-9,
193-9
Nugent, Sir G., 14
Nur-ud-din, 136-40, 144
Nuthall, Mr. R., 64
Nuthall, Brigadier-General W. F., 63-4

Ochterlony, Major-General Sir David, 3,
4, 8-12, 24-6
Odin, the, 181
Ogg, Lieut.-Colonel A. C., 113, 118, 122-5,
129-31, 139, 147-51, 172, 206, 214
Ogstone, Ensign J. D., 47
Oomar Khan, Subadar Major, 51, 54, 58,
209
Oudh, 20, 25, 52, 83, 108
Ovens, Lieut.-Colonel T. L., 189-90, 208
Owen, Colonel A., 2, 3
Oxford and Bucks L.I., 126, 159

Paget, Sir E., 21, 23
Palmer, Captain W. G., 134, 164
Paltu Ram, Jemadar, 81 (*illus.*)
Pancham Singh, Havildar, 172
Panipat, 8
Parr, Major-General H. O., 77, 88, 98,
109, 111, 118, 121, 124-34, 143, 147-8,
162, 167, 172, 188-9, 206-7
Paterson, Major T. G. F., 119-21, 172
Pathans, 115
Patiala, 8
Paton, Lieutenant J. G. B., 203
Pearse, Colonel T. D., 2-5
Peckover, Lieutenant R. K., 176
Peebles, Lieutenant, 129
Pegu, 204
Pekin, 85, 89-93, 114, 206
Pennington, Colonel, 69
Penny, Brigadier-General N., 43, 46
Penson, Lieut.-Colonel T., 203
Perkins, Major-General W. H., 32, 203-4
Perreau, Ensign M. C., 51
Persia, 115-17, 142, 188-90
Persian Gulf, 119-20 (*map*), 207
Peshawar, 65, 113, 188, 205
Phaire, Lieutenant W., 51
Phillips, Captain L. G., 195
Phillips, Lieut.-Colonel B. T., 192, 198, 208
Phulkian State, 186
Pickersgill, Lieutenant J., 10
Pindari campaign, 12-13, 203
Pioneers, 48th, 119, 138
Pocock, Brigadier-General P. F., 156
Pogson, Lieutenant J. F., 29, 32, 36

Pogson, Lieut.-Colonel W. R., 7, 18, 25-9,
203
Political Department, Government of India,
197
Poona, 12, 118, 186
Poona Division, 6th, 150
Porteous, Captain H. A., 187
Pott, General D., 32, 36, 46-7, 50-1, 54-9,
62, 204
Powell, Lieut.-Colonel J., 7, 202
Price, Colonel J., 18
Promotion, 60
Pughe, Major-General J. R., ix, 25-9, 32-3,
40-2, 48, 51, 59, 60
Punjab, the, 8, 31, 81
Punjabi Musalmans, 89, 186
Punjabi regiments: 5/14th, 198; 2/19th,
183; 20th, 66, 70; 24th, 86, 92-8, 102,
106-7; 33rd, 176; 69th, 174, 177, 180-1
Pusht-i-Kuh, 120 (*map*), 136

Quetta, 198, 208
Qurna, 120 (*map*), 122-7, 135, 201

Rae, Captain G. R., 131
Raban, Lieutenant H. T., 18, 203
Raikes, Captain A. F. G., 187, 207
Raitt, Lieutenant H. G. B., 77, 81 (*illus.*)
Rajput regiments: 1/7th (formerly 2nd
Q.V.O. Rajput L.I.), 116, 173, 183, 185;
2/7th (formerly 4th P.A.V. Rajputs),
185
Rajput regiments: 3/7th. *Descent*: 31st
(and then 24th) Bengal Native Infantry,
1-16; 69th (later 47th) B.N.I., 17-61;
7th B.N.I., 58, 61-74; 7th (D.C.O.)
B.N.I., 75-83; 7th (D.C.O.) Rajput
Regiment of Bengal Infantry, 83ff.
Rajput regiments: 4th, 84, 127-9, 131;
13th, 117; 16th, 134, 173
Rajputana, 24
Rajputana Infantry, 120th (P.O.W.'s Own),
118-19, 124, 138, 156, 191
Rajputana Rifles, 4/6th, 198
Ralston, Captain, 127
Ram Ratan Singh, Subadar, 81 (*illus.*), 89,
108
Ram Singh, Jemadar, 200
Ram Singh, Subadar, 151
Ramadar Singh, Havildar, 131, 133, 168
Ramadhar Singh, Naik, 163, 172
Ramadhin Singh, Naik, 165
Ramautar Singh, L/Naik, 148
Rambahadur Singh, Havildar, 168
Rambadan Singh, Jemadar, 119, 140-1, 201
Rambali Singh, Subadar Major, 130, 172,
209

Rambaran Singh, 2nd Lieutenant, 119,
147, 163, 168, 171-2, 183, 201
Ramdayal Singh, Subadar Major, 119, 172,
209
Ramgholam Agnihotri, Subadar Major,
209
Ramjiawan Singh, Subadar, 58, 209
Ramsabad Singh, Sepoy, 130-2, 172
Ramsagar Singh, L/Naik, 200
Ram Sundar Singh, Jemadar, 200
Rangoon, 19, 49, 77, 80
Ranjur Singh, 31, 41
Rawson, Lieutenant, 71
Ray, Lieutenant M. R. E., 77-80, 205, 214
Raza Muhammad, Subadar, 199
Razmak, 190-96, 208
Reading, Lord, 183
Regimental Life, 13, 28, 75-84
Reid, Lieutenant A. G., 32
Remembrance, Book of, 192, 194, 201
Renny, Lieutenant R., 29, 32-3, 47, 203
Rhodes, Major-General (U.S. Army), 106
Richardson, Lieut.-Colonel D. R., 7
Richardson, Lieutenant G. St. J., 115-16,
119, 148-51, 201
Rideout, Lieutenant, 42
Rifle Brigade, 188
Riley, Colonel S. D., 51, 146, 204
Rimell, Major F. J., 183, 187
Roberts, Lieutenant F. L. Barry, 178, 201
Roberts, Lord, 76, 80
Robin, Lieut.-Colonel N. E., 77, 81 (*illus.*),
88, 94, 115-18, 121, 127, 205-7
Robinson, Brigadier-General C. T., 128-31
Rocke, Ensign T. J., 18
Ronaldson, Lieutenant E. C. St. J., 134,
153, 173
Ropner, Lieutenant, 182
Ross, Lieutenant G. C., 88
Royle, Captain H. W., 8
Royal Air Force, 173, 197
Royal Artillery, 106, 128, 130, 138
Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 55
Royal Engineers, 109; *see* Sappers and
Miners
Royal Field Artillery, 102, 164; 12th
Battery, 105-6; 63rd, 120, 153; 82nd,
128
Royal Flying Corps, 144
Royal Garrison Artillery, 69th, 183
Royal Welch Fusiliers, 87, 92-7, 102
Royal West Kent Regiment, 33
Rush, Lieutenant L. H., 199
Russell, Sir B., 68
Russell's Infantry, 94th, 134
Russian troops in China, 85-7, 90-3, 96-103
Ryan, Brigadier-General, 38

Sahdeo Singh, Sepoy, 197
Sahib Din, Sepoy, 197, 199
Salonika, 190
Samarbahadur Singh, Sepoy, 200
Samarra, 170
Sandford, Captain, 2
Sandys, Lieutenant C. R. C., 88
Sannaiyat, 120 (*map*), 168
Santa Cruz, 184-7, 207-8
Sappers and Miners, 107-9, 119-20, 125,
128, 134, 138, 147, 169, 174
Sardar Khan, Jemadar, 47
Sardar Singh, Subadar, 119, 141, 151, 172
Saugor, 77, 205
Scott, Captain, 2, 3
Scott, Ensign A. J., 51
Seaforth Highlanders, 66, 70-3
Segowli, 10, 24
Sewell, Lieutenant A. H. C., 32
Seymour, Admiral Sir E. H., 86, 89
Shadi, 153-4
Shaiba, 134
Shaikh Othman, 174-6, 180-3
Shaikh Saad, 173
Shaitan, H.M.S., 124
Shamal, the, 127
Shatt-al-Arab, 119-20, 127
Shatt-al-Hai, 155
Shea, Lieutenant A. G., 88, 107
Shea, General Sir J. S. M., 190
Sheepshanks, Major R. H., 129
Shiraz, 115-17
Shiuambar Singh, Subadar Major, 115,
119, 151, 172, 183, 209
Shiudas Singh, Subadar Major, 64, 209
Shiudayal Singh, Jemadar, 119, 126, 201
Shiunarain Singh, Subadar, 199-200
Shiunath Singh, L/Naik, 168
Shiunath Upadhyaya, Havildar, 53, 58
Shiuratan Singh, Naik, 200
Siam, 112
Sikhs, 53-5, 62-3, 185
Sikh regiments: 1st, 86, 90-8, 102-6;
11th, 53-5, 65, 187; 34th Pioneers, 87
Sikh War, first, 16, 27, 31-49, 62, 190
Simla, 29
Sindia of Gwalior, 12
Sitlabaksh Singh, Jemadar, 119, 151, 176,
178, 201
Skardon, Lieut.-Colonel C. R., 25, 203
Skinner's Horse, 7
Smith, Lieut.-Colonel A. Le F., 179, 183-4,
207
Smith, Lieutenant F. C., 203
Smith, Lieut.-Colonel G. A. ('Tiger'), 49,
50, 54, 204

Smith, Major-General Sir Harry, 32-42, 44-5, 62
 Smith, Captain M. L. Corley, 171, 187
 Snider rifle, 76
 Sobraon, 44-7, 62, 83
 Stedman, Brigadier-General, 43
 Stephenson, Lieut.-Colonel F. J., 63-5, 205
 Stewart, 2nd Lieutenant H. S. Q., 208
 Stewart, Captain J. A., 88
 Stewart, Lieutenant J. C., 134
 Stewart, Major-General Sir Norman, 86, 90, 96, 109
 Straubenzee, Major-General Sir C. van, 59, 60
 Stuart, Major-General James, 3, 4
 Suez, 66-8; Canal, 188
 Sumana, the, 165
 Sukhlal Singh, Naik, 131, 133, 172
 Sukkur, 198
 Suraj Singh, Sepoy, 197
 Surat, 187
 Sutlej, 29, 31-3, 41-7, 203
 Suwaiyib, 122-4
 Sweden, King Gustav V of, 4, 114
 Sweet, Lieutenant R., 158
 Swinton, Lieut.-Colonel, 24
 Sylhet L.I. Battalion, 63
 Tanner, Brigadier-General C. V., 66
 Tanner, Lieutenant H., 7
 Tej Singh, 33, 40-1
 Tel-el-Kebir, 67-74, 83, 112-13
 Tetley, Lieut.-Colonel J., 203
 Tewfik Pasha, 173
 Thackwell, Major-General Sir J., 32
 Thayetmyo, 50, 77, 204
 Thomson, Lieut.-Colonel A. R., ix, 119, 131, 134, 147, 151, 171-2, 190, 192, 207-8
 Tientsin, 86, 89-93, 103-5, 109
 Tighe, Lieutenant, 78
 Tigris, 119-27, 137-9, 141-6, 155-7, 163-5, 188
 Tindall, Major J. W. B., ix, x, 119, 173, 179, 184, 195 (and *illus.*), 207
 Tipu Sahib, 3, 31
 Tirah Campaign, 189
 Tochi, 194-8
 Townshend, Lord, 135-46, 149-69
 Tregear, Lieut.-Colonel F. C., 134, 139, 147, 167, 171, 183-4, 187-9, 207
 Troup, Lieutenant C., 18
 Troup, Lieut.-Colonel H., 204
 Tucker, Mr., a Magistrate, 53, 55
 Turkipura, 7, 202
 Turks, 119-31, 136-82
 Uganda, 114
 Umm-al-Tubul, 152-4, 158

Umrao Singh, Havildar, 172
 Uniform, 26, 37, 50, 59, 62 and Appendix IV
 U.S. troops in China, 87, 90-2, 96-107, 110
 Vanas, Major W., 202
 Vander Gucht, Lieutenant G. T., 88
 Vaughan, Colonel H. B., ix, x, 66, 71 (*illus.*), 76 (*illus.*)-77, 88, 94, 104, 109-14 (and *illus.*), 206
 Vickers guns, 195
 Victoria, Queen, 74, 83, 87, 108-9
 'Volunteers', 49, 60, 83
 Vyvyan, Major B. G., 66, 76 (*illus.*)
 Walcot, Captain W. H., 32, 47, 50-1, 54-9, 204
 Waldemar of Prussia, Prince, 34
 Wallace, Brigadier-General, 38-9
 Walton, Brigadier-General, 174-6
 Walton, Captain H. J., 88
 War of 1914-18, *see* Chapters IX to XII and Appendix I
 Wardle, Lieutenant F. M., 173
 Way, Colonel G. A., 75-7, 81 (and *illus.*), 192, 205
 Waziristan, 191-9, 208
 Wellesley's Rifles, 104th, 117, 122-5, 135
 Wellington, Duke of, 23, 37, 42
 Wheeler, Brigadier-General, 33-4, 43
 Whistler, Lieutenant A. E., 66, 76 (*illus.*)
 White, Brigadier-General M., 35, 39
 White, Lieut.-Colonel N., 9, 202
 Williams, Lieutenant H. C., 18
 Williamson, Captain J., 4, 5, 6, 202
 Williamson, Captain T., 18
 Willingdon, Lady, 126
 Wilson, Sir Arnold, 128
 Wilson, Brigadier-General, 43
 Wilson, Brigadier-General (U.S. Army), 107
 Winfield, Lieutenant J. S., 18, 203
 Wolseley, Lord, 65-73
 Wood, Lieut.-Colonel W. H., 24, 203
 Woodburn, Sir J., 88
 Woodhouse, Captain, 56
 Woods, General, 9
 'Woolpress Village', 137, 155-8, 165
 Worlledge, Lieutenant J. F., 66, 70-1 (*illus.*), 205
 Worsley, Colonel H. R. B., 16, 51, 63-6, 69-70, 74-6 (*illus.*), 205
 Wright, Major F. J. O. Hume-, 173, 176, 178, 184, 187
 Yangtsun, 96-8
 Zagazig, 67-8, 72-3