



## THE SERVICES OF THE

# CSL

local and irregular corps had been raised, amongst them especially the four Gurkha battalions already noticed: also in 1817 (G. O. G. G., 16th May), in consequence of the disturbances in Cuttack, an irregular force was raised in that province, called the "Cuttack Legion"; this consisted originally of two troops of cavalry, with two small guns, and three companies of infantry. The cavalry was afterwards disbanded, but the infantry still survives as the 42nd Bengal Infantry (Gurkha Rifles). A similar force was raised in Gorakhpur (9th February, 1818) consisting of a battalion of light infantry, with two troops of irregular cavalry attached, and to provide for contingencies throughout the Mahratta war, various levies were raised at Cawnpore, Fatehgarh, Muttra, and Dinapore, all of which were (9th and 13th March, 1818) ordered to be completed to a strength of 1,000 men.

These four battalions were, in 1823, brought into the regular army, and Major Fagan's Fatehgarh levy, which then became the 1st Battalion of the 32nd, is now the 9th Bengal Infantry. On the 19th of February, 1819, orders were issued for the raising of a corps of "Sappers or Miners" to be formed at Allahabad, and to be completed to a total of 816 (native ranks): they were commanded by Major Anburey, and two companies of the existing Pioneers were incorporated in the corps.

During the preparations for, and the course of, the Mahratta war, several bodies of cavalry previously in the services of various native chiefs were received into the Company's army: thus, besides the Rohilla Horse, raised during the Gurkha war, a corps modelled on the same lines was formed of horsemen formerly in the service of Dyaram, the Taluqdar of Hathras, and of some of the chiefs of Bundelkhand (25th May, 1817), and in the following year three corps of local horse were formed with men received from Amir Khan, whose troops also supplied the British with two battalions of local infantry, called the "Rampura Local Battalions" (G. O. C. C., 4th May, 1818). In 1819 (G. O. C. C., 4th February) the strength of the regular cavalry was increased, each regiment being formed into eight troops of 92 men each. A month later, the great war being now practically over, all infantry regiments were augmented by 10 men per company, to enable a larger proportion of the old soldiers to visit their homes.

In the autumn of 1818 (G. O. C. C., 14th July), a detachment of volunteers was called for and despatched to Ceylon to assist the local Government there; it consisted of three battalions of infan-

The 42nd  
Gurkha  
Rifles.

The 9th  
Bengal  
Infantry.

The Sappers  
and Miners.

Troops for  
Ceylon.





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and some native artillery; these troops remained in Ceylon nine months, but do not appear to have taken part in any active operations; they returned to Calcutta late in 1819, when they were complimented in General Orders for their alacrity in volunteering, and for their good conduct while on service; a gratuity of one month's pay and full batta was granted them, and they were allowed to elect the corps of the line which they might wish to join.

The period of peace which followed the Mahratta war enabled the Government to dispense with some of its more expensive auxiliary forces. Thus, in 1819 (G. O. C. C., 28th August), one regiment of Rohilla Horse, two of Rampura Local Cavalry, and one of Skinner's Horse were disbanded, and the 3rd Rohilla Horse was transferred to the service of Oudh. No other changes occurred, however, until two years later, when (20th August, 1821) the Dromedary Corps was disbanded, and the transport which had been kept up to war strength on the frontier was greatly reduced.

After a further period of two years, the Government determined to bring to some uniform level the various and nondescript irregular regiments in the service of the Company: orders were issued for all local and provincial battalions of infantry and local horse to be placed on a fixed scale in the numbers of their officers, non-commissioned officers, and men; while at the same time a detailed list was given of all these corps, showing their composition, numbers, and duties (G. O. C. C., 6th May, 1823).

Organisation  
of irregular  
corps, 1823.

The local battalions of infantry, with the present names of those which now exist, are as follow:—

The Ramgarh Local Battalion.

Bhagalpur Hill Rangers.

Dinajpur Local Battalion.

Champaran Light Infantry.

1st Nasserri (Gurkha) Battalion, now the 1st Gurkha Rifles.

2nd Nasserri (Gurkha) Battalion.

Sirmoor Battalion, now the 2nd Gurkha Rifles.

Rangpur Light Infantry, formerly the "Cutlack Legion," now the 42nd Bengal Infantry.

Gorakhpur Light Infantry.

Rampura Local Battalion.

In Civil Department. { Calcutta Native Militia, now the 18th Bengal Infantry.  
Kumaon Battalion, now the 3rd Gurkha Rifles.  
Bencoolen Local Battalion.  
Mharwara Local Battalion.



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The local horse, which, as the G. O. C. C. explains, being neither clothed nor armed by the State, take rank after the infantry, were:—

- 1st (Skinner's) Local Horse, now the 1st Bengal Cavalry.
- 2nd (Gardner's) " " 2nd Bengal Cavalry.
- 3rd (Blair's) " " formerly the 1st Rohilla Cavalry.
- 4th (Baddeley's) Local Horse, formerly Skinner's 2nd Regiment, now the 3rd Bengal Cavalry.
- 5th (Gough's) " (raised by G.O.C.C. of this date for service in Malwa).

Besides the above, there were thirteen corps of provincial infantry which were practically police levies.

Four new  
Regiments  
raised, 1823.

In June, 1823 (G. G. O. No. 65) orders were issued for the formation of four new regiments of regular infantry, to be numbered from the 31st to the 34th. Of these the first two were formed from the infantry levies raised in 1817; the remainder were newly raised. The following detail of orders were issued on the subject:—

- 31st Regiment { 1st Battalion, to be formed from Major Wood's Benares Levy.  
2nd Battalion, from Captain Watson's Cawnpore Levy.
- 32nd Regiment { 1st Battalion, from the Mainpuri (originally the Fatehgarh Levy, Major Smith.  
2nd Battalion, from the Muttra Levy, Captain Gilman.
- 33rd Regiment { 1st Battalion, to be raised at Dinapore.  
2nd " " at Cawnpore.
- 34th Regiment, both battalions to be raised at Benares.

Of these, the 1st of the 32nd is now the 9th Bengal Infantry; and the 1st of the 33rd still survives as the 10th Bengal Infantry.\*

Interior  
economy, etc.

Cavalry.

Before proceeding to the extensive changes in the army which were executed in the following year, it will be well to notice the interior economy and equipment of the Bengal troops as they existed down to this date. In the cavalry the ever-recurring and difficult question of remounts is one which we find constantly noticed in the orders of the period. According to the earliest rules on the subject (Minutes of Council, 8th April, 1793), horses for cavalry remounts were bought by a commissariat agent, and passed into the ranks after approval by a committee of cavalry officers; the standards at that time were, of age not under three years or over eight in times of peace, and in times of war not under four or over nine years; of height not under fourteen hands and-a-half. This latter rule, however, was soon modified; for in 1801 (2nd October) orders were issued that three years old of 14—16

\* The 2nd of the 32nd bore the native name of *Harriat-ki-paltan*, derived from the officer who first commanded it,—Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Harriott,—1.





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might be received, and even horses of 14—1 and above three years old, if the Committee were satisfied that they were otherwise unexceptionable. As early as 1794 a board was appointed for promoting the improvement of country-breeds; but there is little record of the improvements effected, beyond the appointment of a secretary on Rs250 a month, with a further Rs250 for rent of an office for the board and a house for himself. Early in the century the Government Stud establishments were started, notwithstanding which the supply of good-sized horses seems to have been much exceeded by the demand, so that in 1816 (18th September) we find the standard height of stud-breeds and zemindars' horses presented to the committee by officers of the stud reduced to fourteen hands. The purchase of remounts was now effected directly by a commissariat officer, who despatched the horses to regiments, where they were passed by a regimental committee. From the Government Stud horses were assigned to regiments by lot. In September, 1816, an experiment was made in the use of geldings as troop horses in Bengal; orders were issued for the formation of one troop of such in each regiment, remounts for which were to be obtained from the Pusa stud. But after trial for three years and-a-half (G. O. C. C., 11th March, 1820) "it having been proved to the satisfaction of the Commander-in-Chief that the general employment of geldings would tend to the great deterioration of the efficiency of the cavalry in India," these troops were ordered to be broken up.

Definite orders were issued in September, 1818, regarding the standards of the regular Bengal Cavalry: one standard was allowed per squadron, the first being dark-blue, with the Royal Arms in the centre and the Union in the upper corner; the second of crimson, with the Company's arms; the third of the colour of the regimental facings, with the number of the regiment in the centre.

In 1820 (23rd September) the system of *bargirs* in the irregular cavalry was abolished, but this order, which no doubt occasioned much dissatisfaction, was modified two months later, and native officers of the first class were allowed to keep not more than three *bargirs*, those of the second class two, and inferior ranks one: a few years later the original system of numerous *bargirs* was reverted to.

In the artillery branch an important addition was made to the Bengal Army by the institution, in 1817, of Native horse artillery: this was formed in the first place by the withdrawal from Native

Artillery.





cavalry regiments of their galloper guns, which, with the men of the various regiments whence they were detached, were formed into three troops of horse artillery; the arrangement thus made as a tentative measure was confirmed two years later, when (G. O. C. C., 1st May, 1819) the cavalry soldiers doing duty with these guns were ordered to return to their regiments, unless they might wish to remain permanently in their present service, in which case they were to take rank from their first employment with the horse-artillery troops in 1817.

Some few changes are noticeable in the organisation of Bengal infantry during these years: of these the most important, in which too the cavalry was equally concerned, was the institution (28th October, 1817) of the rank of Subadar-Major: definite rules for the selection and the payment of these officers were published in March, 1818, and on the same date the appointment of Colour-Havildar was instituted in the non-commissioned ranks. On the re-organisation of the local corps, in 1823, regulations were published as to the rates of pay in those regiments, and also with regard to the nature of their equipment. From this we find that the local regiments were dressed like those of the line, except that they retained the old black leather belts and accoutrements in the place of buff. In 1818 the facings and lace of regiments were regulated, the colour of which seems to have previously varied a good deal in accordance with the taste and fancy of commanding officers.

The date is now reached of the second great re-organisation of the Bengal Army: the system which had obtained for the last thirty years was swept away, and a new order brought into force which lasted unchanged until, after a further period of thirty years, destroyed by the events of the Indian Mutiny, it in turn gave place to the present organisation.

On the 6th of May, 1824, a G.G.O. was issued, in accordance with instructions received from the Court of Directors, ordering promotions to be made to bring the strength of officers in all infantry regiments to the following scale:—

2 Colonels.	2 Majors.	20 Lieutenants.
2 Lieutenant-Colonels.	10 Captains.	10 Ensigns.

[N.B.—The rank of Captain-Lieutenant had been abolished by G. O. C. C., dated 9th January, 1819].

In cavalry regiments the strength of officers was to be half the above.

Infantry.

Re-organisa-  
tion of the  
Army.

1824.





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This order further directed that "as soon as the above promotions are carried out, the infantry, European and Native, are to be divided into two regiments each, by the final separation of battalions," and that officers were to be posted alternately to the two regiments. The regiments so formed were then to be numbered in the order in which they were first raised. The following table shows the changes which were thus effected in the numbering of corps :—

Old number.		New number.	Old number.		New number.
1st	1st Battalion	2nd	18th	1st Battalion	36th
	2nd "	4th		2nd "	37th
2nd	1st "	5th	19th	1st "	38th
	2nd "	22nd		2nd "	39th
3rd	1st "	6th	20th	1st "	25th
	2nd "	19th		2nd "	40th
4th	1st "	7th	21st	1st "	41st
	2nd "	23rd		2nd "	42nd
5th	1st "	11th	22nd	1st "	43rd
	2nd "	20th		2nd "	44th
6th	1st "	3rd	23rd	1st "	45th
	2nd "	18th		2nd "	46th
7th	1st "	13th	24th	1st "	47th
	2nd "	10th		2nd "	48th
8th	1st "	9th	25th	1st "	49th
	2nd "	24th		2nd "	50th
9th	1st "	8th	26th	1st "	51st
	2nd "	21st		2nd "	52nd
10th	1st "	14th	27th	1st "	53rd
	2nd "	16th		2nd "	54th
11th	1st "	15th	28th	1st "	55th
	2nd "	17th		2nd "	56th
12th	1st "	12th	29th	1st "	57th
	2nd "	1st		2nd "	58th
13th	1st "	26th	30th	1st "	59th
	2nd "	27th		2nd "	60th
14th	1st "	28th	31st	1st "	61st
	2nd "	29th		2nd "	62nd
15th	1st "	30th	32nd	1st "	63rd
	2nd "	31st		2nd "	64th
16th	1st "	32nd	33rd	1st "	65th
	2nd "	33rd		2nd "	66th
17th	1st "	34th	34th	1st "	67th
	2nd "	35th		2nd "	68th

The re-introduction of single battalions and general re-organisation of 1824 closes another chapter in the history of the Bengal Army. Whether the past thirty years had seen as great an improvement in the quality as they had in the quantity of the Bengal troops, seems in the opinion of contemporary critics to have been doubtful. The





double battalion system and with it regimental promotion of officers up to the rank of Major had been introduced in the hope of strengthening the ties between British and Native ranks; but this object was defeated by the defects in the position of officers of Native corps: the command of one of these regiments was of less value from any point of view than staff appointments of a second class; it was attended with great anxiety and much drudgery, and carried but little influence or consideration; under these circumstances it was not a post much sought after. A second point adverse to the efficiency of the Bengal Army was the small consideration paid to the Native commissioned ranks at this period; until the institution of the rank of Subadar-Major, a Native officer could not rise above the insignificant pay of R 174 a month; when, in addition to this, it is remembered that the lower ranks were liable for most trivial offences to suffer corporal punishment, that even when a commission was gained a Native officer was exposed to the harshness of his British superiors, whose habits of self-restraint, as the court-martial records of the times prove, were but too little cultivated; and that consideration for the position of Native officers as such was not much insisted on from British ranks, commissioned, or non-commissioned; when all these points are considered, it is only to be wondered at that the Native army displayed as much devotion and zeal in times of emergency as it undoubtedly did.

That the fact of the Native army being in an unsatisfactory condition was just beginning to dawn on Anglo-Indians is proved by the commencement of that stream of newspaper and serial controversy on the subject, which twenty years later swelled into such a torrent as to almost flood all the public journals of the time. Among numerous letters and essays, some of whose arguments are proved by after-events to have been prejudiced and short-sighted, a carefully written article in the *Asiatic Journal* for May, 1821, contains much useful criticism of the sepoy army of that time. "The defects of that army," says the writer (a Madras officer), "are the paucity of British officers, the ignorance of the Native officers, and the worthlessness of the material." The latter he ascribes in Madras and Bombay to poor physique, in Bengal to the encumbrance of caste prejudices, which he declares are fostered by the British officers, who set a bad example of luxuriousness and often of inefficiency. The expression of such opinions as these was received with a torrent of abuse and sarcasm; yet who will now be found to question their truth?





## Chapter V.—(1824—1838.)

British India (*Wilson*)—History of India (*Marshall*)—Madras Army (*Wilson*)—History of British India (*Thornton*)—Burmese War (*Snodgrass*)—E. I. United Service Journal—Bengal Army Regulations, 1839.—G. G. O. and G. O. C. C.—Political and Military Events (*Hough*)—Burmese War (*H. H. Wilson*)—Political History of India—(*Malcolm*).

During a period of nearly thirty years, since 1794, the Eastern frontier of the British possessions in Bengal had been again and again disturbed by the incursions and aggressions of the Burmese. Several representations on this subject were made to Ava, but attempts to open negotiations served only to imbue that arrogant court with the idea that the unwillingness of the Indian Government to declare war was the result of fear; the insolence of the Burmese increased year by year, until at the close of 1823 it became evident that a recourse to hostilities was the only remedy. The immediate cause of rupture was a claim laid by the Burmese to the small island of Shahpuri at the mouth of the Naf river, which was occupied by a detachment of Bengal troops. Two Burmese armies invaded British territory with the avowed object of possessing themselves of Chittagong and the adjoining districts; one of these advanced from Assam, the other from Manipur; the former was attacked at Bikrampur on the 17th of January, 1824, by a small force under Major Newton, consisting of detachments of the 1-10th and 2-23d Bengal Native Infantry, and four companies of the Rangpur Light Infantry.\* the enemy were driven from their stockade and routed, but the British force was too small to allow of a protracted pursuit, and the Burmese soon rallied and effected a junction with the second army from Manipur. They now advanced along the right bank of the Surma river and stockaded themselves close to Bhadrapur, a small post held by Captain Johnston with a wing of the 1-10th, one company of the 2-23rd and a few of the Rangpur Light Infantry: from this position they were driven by Captain Johnston on the 13th February, and being followed by Lieutenant-Colonel Bowen, who commanded on the Sylhet frontier, one division retired into Assam and the other entrenched themselves at Dudhpatli. Here they were attacked by the Bengal troops on the 21st February, but repulsed the latter with a loss of 21 killed and 135 wounded, including one officer (Lieutenant A. B. Armstrong, 1-10th Bengal Native Infantry) killed, and four others wounded, amongst whom were Lieutenant-Colonel Bowen and Captain Johnston. On the

The first Burmese War, 1824.

Operations in Assam.

\* Now the 42nd Bengal Infantry (Gurkha Rifles).





27th of February, Lieutenant-Colonel Innes arrived at Jatrapur with the 2-19th Bengal Native Infantry, and four guns, upon which the Burmese abandoned Dudhpatli and retired into Manipur. In June, however, they again advanced into Cachar, and Colonel Innes attacked them at Talain; but he was unsuccessful, and was obliged to retire to Jatrapur, and the setting in of the rains put a period to further operations for the time. Hostilities having thus commenced, the Indian Government turned their attention to the readiest method of bringing the war to a speedy and successful conclusion. The difficulties presented by a march through the swamps and jungles of Manipur and Arakan were too great to allow an attack on that side to promise favourably: it was therefore determined to send an expedition to Rangoon, whence it was believed that the Irrawaddy could be navigated in sailing vessels, and the capital reached speedily and without loss.

Expedition to  
Rangoon.

The aversion of the Bengal sepoys to serve across the seas prevented any but a small detachment of them taking part in this expedition; the force from Bengal consisted of His Majesty's 13th and 38th, two companies of artillery, and the 40th Bengal Native Infantry (late the 2nd Battalion of the 20th, or Marine Regiment). The remainder of the force was drawn from the Madras Presidency. Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, K.C.B., of the 38th Foot, was appointed to the command of the expedition, the troops composing which rendezvoused at Port Cornwallis in the Andamans in the early part of May 1824.

Rangoon was reached on the morning of the 11th of May, to the astonishment of the inhabitants, who never expected to be attacked in their own country; a broadside from the frigate accompanying the expedition silenced the feeble attempts of the few Burmese guns on shore, and the force, landing without opposition, found the town entirely deserted. This was the first blow to the hopes of the British, who were thus unable to procure boats in which to continue their advance up the Irrawaddy. Indeed, Sir Archibald Campbell found it sufficiently difficult to obtain supplies for his force where he was, and from this cause, and from the unfavourable season of the year in which these operations had been begun, the troops were subjected to great privations, and suffered greatly in health, large number perishing from fever, dysentery, and other diseases incidental to the climate and locality. The Burmese to some extent confined





their hostilities to cutting off all supplies and to endeavouring to fire the British ships in the river, in which latter attempt, however, they were not successful; but large bodies of them not infrequently came and stockaded themselves within striking distance of our troops, and finding it impossible to advance up the river to attack the capital, Sir Archibald Campbell lost no opportunity of attacking these bands, and many sharp engagements followed at Joazoung, Kemmendine, Kamarut, Dalla, Kyklu, and other places, in which our troops sustained considerable losses; it is calculated that up to the end of November our casualties in the various engagements at Rangoon and in the vicinity amounted to not less than 100 killed and 560 wounded, of whom a large proportion were officers. Small expeditions to more distant points were also sent, and Mergui, Martaban, and other places were captured.

At length, in December, the enemy massed his troops for a vigorous attack on the invaders, and the British positions round the Shwe-Dagon Pagoda at Rangoon and at Kemmendine were completely hemmed in by stockades and entrenchments, held by 60,000 men, under Maha Bandula, the most celebrated of the Burmese generals. From the 1st to the 4th the skirmishing was incessant. On the 5th Sir Archibald Campbell delivered a vigorous attack on the enemy's left, forced their entrenchments, and drove them from the field, capturing the whole of their guns and military stores. But though thus defeated on his left, Bandula still continued the attack from his right, until the 7th, when Sir Archibald again attacked him and drove him finally from his works, and dispersed the remains of his vast army. In these operations the British loss amounted to 26 killed (including two officers) and 240 wounded (including eleven officers). On the 8th and 9th the enemy were driven from Dalla with a loss on our side of 2 killed and 46 wounded, and on the 15th a large body, whom Bandula had rallied, and who had strongly entrenched themselves at Kokein, about five miles to the north of Rangoon, were vigorously attacked and driven from their position with heavy loss, our own being 18 killed (including three officers) and 115 wounded (including 14 officers). Among the troops engaged at Rangoon and Kokein was a detachment of the Governor-General's Body-Guard, which had arrived from India a few days before.

During this period but partial success attended the British arms on the Eastern frontier. A force, commanded by Lieutenant-

Operations on  
the Eastern  
Frontier.





Colonel Macmorine, and consisting of seven companies of the 2-23rd Native Infantry, six companies of the Rangpur Light Infantry, the Dinajpur Local Infantry, a wing of the Champaran Light Infantry, six 6-pounder guns, and a small body of irregular horse, had been assembled at Goalpara, and moved forward from that place in March, 1824, with the object of expelling the Burmese from Assam, but after defeating the enemy in several encounters, the want of supplies and the commencement of the rains compelled Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Richards, who had succeeded to the command on Colonel Macmorine dying of cholera, to retire to Gauhati and defer further operations for a time.

Disaster at  
Ramu.

On the south-eastern frontier positive disaster was experienced. We had at Chittagong a force under Colonel Shapland, consisting of the left wing of the 2-13th (now become the 27th), five companies of the 2-20th (now become the 40th), and the whole of the 1-23rd (now become the 45th), Bengal Native Infantry, the Chittagong Provincial Battalion, a newly raised Magh Levy, and some artillery, in all about 3,000 men; of these a detachment (three companies of the 40th, 100 men, and five of the 45th, 250 men, with portions of the Provincial Battalion and the Magh Levy, and two guns) was in the exposed outpost of Ramu, under the command of Captain Noton of the 45th. A very large Burmese force advanced from Arakan early in May and attacked Ramu, where the detachment was reduced, by the flight of the irregulars, to only 350 sepoy. Captain Noton held his ground until the morning of the 17th of May, when, his flank being turned, he was compelled to retreat. The result was one of those terrible disasters which have, from time to time, overtaken the British forces, and the cause of which has generally been, as in this case, too great confidence in being able to oppose large armies of uncivilised peoples with a mere handful of disciplined troops. Captains Noton, 45th, Trueman, 40th, and Pringle, 18th (commanding the Magh Levy), Lieutenant Grigg, 45th, Ensign Bennett, 45th, Assistant-Surgeon Maysmor, Subadar Harak Singh, and Jemadar Shaik Manulla, 40th, and Subadar Bachu Ram, 45th Bengal Native Infantry, were killed; two more officers were wounded and 250 sepoy were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners.

Conquest of  
Assam.

In Assam the retirement of the British to Gauhati during the rains had been the signal for a renewed advance on the part of the Burmans. At the end of the year, however, a force (the 46th and 57th





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Native Infantry and the Rangpur Light Infantry) moved against them under Lieutenant-Colonel Richards, which drove the Burmese before them and finally occupied Rangpur, the capital of Upper Assam, after a sharp encounter (29th January, 1825) in which we sustained a loss of two men killed and two officers and 49 men wounded. Of the officers wounded one was Lieutenant-Colonel Richards himself; the other was Lieutenant James Brooke of the 18th Bengal Native Infantry, then an officer in the Bengal Commissariat Department, but more widely known in after years as the Rajah of Sarawak.

The last months of 1824 witnessed the massing at Sylhet of a large force, of which the object was an invasion of Burma through Manipur, while a still larger army was prepared to march from Chittagong into Arakan and over the Arakan Yomas to the Burmese capital. These expeditions, so contrary to the original plan of the campaign, were arranged with the concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief, when the difficulties of the army at Rangoon made the success of the British force in that quarter a matter of grave doubt. In order to supply troops for all these expeditions, four flank battalions were formed in Bengal (G.G.O. No. 195 of 1824 and G.O.C. C., 12th July, 1824), for which twenty regiments contributed each a grenadier and a light company, and two light infantry and two grenadier battalions were thus formed of ten companies each: included in them were detachments from the 33rd and 43rd Bengal Native Infantry (now the 4th and 5th), which sent companies to the 1st Grenadier Battalion and the 1st Light Battalion; while in the 2nd Battalions of each were companies from the 59th and 63rd (the present 8th and 9th).

The Cachar force under Brigadier-General Shuldhham was formed of the 7th, 14th, 39th, 44th, 45th, and 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, with two companies of artillery, four of pioneers, the Sylhet Local Battalion, the 3rd (Blair's) Local Horse, and some native auxiliaries. No opposition was encountered from the enemy, but the difficulties of the route and the incessant rains proved more formidable than any human foe; after struggling on with extraordinary difficulty and by dint of the greatest exertions through February and March, 1825, it became evident that to reach Manipur through such a country, and with a fully equipped army, was an impossibility, and Brigadier-General Shuldhham accordingly relinquished the attempt and retraced his steps.

Operations on  
the Cachar-  
Sylhet  
Frontier.





Mutiny of the  
47th Bengal  
Native  
Infantry.

The preparations for the expedition into Arakan occasioned one of the most painful instances of mutiny in the records of the Bengal Army. Three regiments, the 26th, 47th, and 62nd, stationed at Barrackpore, received orders to march on active service; several causes were at work to make the men discontented and uneasy; the recent changes in the army had sent a number of officers to regiments in which they were strangers to their men,\* and this no doubt was an indirect cause of the attitude of the sepoys on this occasion; moreover, the service was a very unpopular one; native superstition, ever too readily aroused, had endowed the Burmese with supernatural powers; while the nature of the country necessitated the use of bullock transport, which the sepoys had been ordered to procure at their own expense, at a time when the drain on Bengal for the supply of the Rangoon expedition had made those animals almost unprocurable; finally, despite assurances to the contrary, an impression prevailed amongst the men that they would be forced, against their will, to embark on shipboard. Unfortunately, there seems little doubt that no consideration was paid to the peculiarities of the native temperament; the first sign of discontent was met with harshness instead of attempts at re-assurance. The 47th Regiment was the first that was to march, and was ordered to parade on the 1st of November; on this they broke into open mutiny and refused to fall in. On the following day the Commander-in-Chief proceeded to the spot, and at daybreak two British regiments, a detachment of horse artillery and a troop of the Body-Guard were paraded at right angles to the sepoy lines; the 47th formed in front of their lines, and were joined by about 100 of the 62nd and 20 of the 26th; they were ordered to ground their arms but refused compliance. On this they were fired on by the artillery, and immediately broke and fled; many were killed on the spot, a number more were taken prisoners, of whom eleven were hanged and the rest sentenced to hard labour in chains: the number of the regiment was effaced from the Army List and the Native officers dismissed

\* This has generally been assigned as a prominent cause of the Barrackpore mutiny, and there was possibly something in it. But at the same time it is to be remembered that changes of officers such as those referred to were by no means unknown prior to the reorganisation of 1824. On the contrary, in the days of the double battalion regiments, the transfers of officers from one battalion to another in which they were strangers to the men were matters of every day occurrence. The reorganisation of 1824 practically put a stop to such transfers.—P.





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the service, although none of these openly took part with the mutineers (G. G. O. No. 335 of 1824). It is probable that these sentences were considered more severe than the occasion warranted both in India and at home; and the mutineers who remained in custody were pardoned four months later (G.O.C.C., 22nd April, 1825).

When finally formed, the expedition to Arakan was commanded by Brigadier-General Morrison,\* and consisted of His Majesty's 44th and 54th, the 26th, 42nd, 49th and 62nd Bengal Native Infantry, the 1st and 2nd Bengal Light Infantry Battalions, the 10th and 16th Madras Native Infantry, a detachment of the 2nd Local Horse (Gardner's), with details of artillery and pioneers. The two Grenadier battalions joined the force towards the close of the service, and suffered terribly from sickness. The force commenced its march from Chittagong on the 1st of January, 1825, and at the end of March arrived before the town of Arakan. Actions took place on the 26th and 27th on the Padha hills and at Mahati, and Arakan was attacked on the 29th, but although the troops behaved with perfect steadiness, they were unable to obtain a footing on the steep ascent on which the place stands, exposed as they were to a continuous fire from the enemy. On the evening of the 31st the flank of the Burmese position was turned by the circuitous march of a detachment under Brigadier W. Richards, and on the 1st of April the place was taken. Our losses in these operations amounted to 30 killed and 213 wounded. It was now found to be too late in the season to make any further progress, especially as the passes over the Arakan mountains were quite unknown to the British. The whole of the monsoon season was passed at Arakan; fever of a most destructive type spread to a terrible extent; nothing but a mere skeleton of the army remained fit for work; and all thoughts of an advance against Amarapura had to be abandoned. It was not until the end of 1825 that the remains of the army were withdrawn to Bengal.

Conquest of  
Arakan, 1825.

After remaining nine months at Rangoon, Sir Archibald Campbell commenced his march towards the capital of Burma on the 13th of February, 1825. The army was divided into three columns, of which the first was detached against Bassein, where it met with no resistance; the second under the Commander-in-Chief advanced by land to-

Advance from  
Rangoon, 1825.

\* Brigadier-General J. W. Morrison was the officer who commanded in the brilliant action of Chrystler's Point, in Canada, in November, 1813. He died on the 15th February, 1826, a victim to the climate of Arakan.—P.





wards Amarapura; the third under Brigadier-General Willoughby Cotton proceeded by water up the Irrawaddy, and reached Donabyu, the stronghold of the main Burmese army, on the 28th of February. This place had been fortified with all the science of which the Burmese were masters, and was of very considerable strength and extent: its garrison was a large one, though the common account, which reckons it at 12,000, is probably much exaggerated. The whole force with Brigadier-General Cotton did not exceed 600 men; with this he attempted an assault on the 7th of March, but, though successful against the outworks, he was repulsed with heavy loss (19 killed and 110 wounded) in attacking the main position. On receiving news of this reverse the Commander-in-Chief returned with his column and joined Brigadier-General Cotton. Donabyu was again attacked on the 1st of April, and was shelled throughout the day; on the following morning the place was found to be evacuated, and it proved that this result had been brought about by the panic caused by the death of Maha Bandula, the Burmese General, who had been killed by a rocket.

Immediately after the fall of Donabyu, Sir Archibald Campbell pushed forward to Prome, which place he occupied, without resistance, on the 25th April, but both sides were now desirous of peace; the rains were approaching and the Indian Government saw a further period of costly inaction before their army, while the Burmese were alarmed at the defeats which had been sustained by their troops. Negotiations were commenced, but terms could not be arranged, and hostilities were renewed as soon as the rainy season had terminated. In the first engagement that took place (at Wah-tee-gaon on the 16th November) a brigade of Madras sepoys sustained a severe defeat, losing more than 200 officers and men. Encouraged by this success, the Burmese army advanced on Prome, but here they were defeated, with great loss, by Sir Archibald Campbell, on the 1st, 2nd, and 5th of December. Sir Archibald afterwards continued his movement towards the Burmese capital, and several engagements took place, until finally the whole Burmese army was totally defeated at Paghamyu,\* on the 9th of February 1826, and fled in confusion to Amarapura. Sir Archibald advanced rapidly towards the capital, and the king, finding the invaders at his gates, was forced to sue for peace, and a treaty was finally concluded at Yandabu

\* Now known as Pagan.





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on the 24th of February. The army broke up immediately and returned to the coast, whence the Bengal division sailed to its own presidency. The flank battalions from Arakan had by this time returned to Dinapore, where they were broken up, and the men, after being allowed from six to eight months' leave to their homes, rejoined their regiments (G.O.C.C., 11th November, 1825).

Permission was given for the words "AVA," "ARRACAN," and "ASSAM" to be borne on the colours of corps engaged, and a medal and six months' batta were afterwards granted to the troops by G.G.O.No. 84 of 1826.

The protracted operations and tardy success of the British forces in Burma were the cause of much disturbance in the newly subjugated territories of India, where a strong belief prevailed that the rule of the English was approaching its fall. The first serious outbreak was in the Saharanpur District, where a freebooter, named Kowar Singh, collected a considerable force of Gujars and established himself in the mud fort of Kunjawa: here he was attacked by a detachment of 350 of the Sirmoor Battalion and a small body of horse under Captain Young. The Gurkhas stormed the fort and killed 153 of the enemy, the loss on our side being five men killed, and Captain Young (slightly) and the Hon'ble F. J. Shore of the Civil Service, who served as a volunteer, 4 Native officers, and 29 men wounded, of whom six died. In the Rohtak district several disturbances occurred, the most serious being headed by a marauder, named Suraj Mal. For the better protection of this part of the country, two new regiments of local horse were raised at Delhi and Bareilly, and a third at Hansi by Colonel James Skinner (G. O. Nos. 338 and 345 of 1824). An unimportant attempt was made in Bundelkhand against the town and fort of Kalpi, but was frustrated by the garrison. In Central India serious disturbances occurred, especially in the Nerbadda valley, near Burhanpur; these were successfully quelled by a detachment of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force and some of the Mandlesar Local Corps (raised in August, 1823) under Lieutenant A. Lermite (12th Native Infantry).

But the most marked defiance of British authority was at Bhurtpore, where Durjan Sal, a nephew of the late Rajah, usurped the throne and seized the person of the rightful prince, a boy about five years old. Sir David Ochterlony, the Resident at Delhi, prepared to take prompt measures to punish this outrage, but he was checked by the

Termination of  
the War.

Disturbances  
in India,  
1824.

Siege and  
capture of  
Bhurtpore,  
1825-26.





Supreme Government (1825), and the disappointment and mortification occasioned, not long after, the death of this distinguished veteran.\* However, the ferment in Bhurtpore continued to increase, and at length (December 5th, 1825) the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Combermere, advanced against the place with an army of 21,000 men. This force was composed and arranged as follows:—

ENGINEER DIVISION,—under Brigadier T. Anburey, C.B.,—

15 Engineer officers.

6 Companies of Sappers.

2 Companies of Pioneers.

ARTILLERY DIVISION,—under Brigadier A. Macleod, C.B.,—

6 Troops of Horse Artillery.

2 Light field batteries.

8 Companies of Foot Artillery.

(The siege ordnance consisted of 110 pieces.)

CAVALRY DIVISION,—under Brigadier-General J. W. Sleigh, C.B.,—

*1st Brigade*,—under Brigadier G. H. Murray, C.B.,—

H. M.'s 16th Light Dragoons (Lancers).

6th Light Cavalry.

8th „

9th „

*2nd Brigade*,—under Brigadier M. Childers,—

H. M.'s 11th Light Dragoons.

3rd Light Cavalry.

4th „

10th „

FIRST INFANTRY DIVISION,—under Major-General T. Reynell, C.B.,—

*1st Infantry Brigade*, under Brigadier-General J. M'Combe,—

H. M.'s 14th foot.

23rd and 63rd Native Infantry.

*4th Infantry Brigade*, under Brigadier T. Whitehead,—

32nd, 41st and 58th Native Infantry.

*5th Infantry Brigade*, under Brigadier R. Patton, C.B.,—

6th, 18th, and 60th Native Infantry.

SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION,—under Major-General J. Nicolls, C.B.,—

*2nd Infantry Brigade*, under Brigadier G. M'Gregor,—afterwards under

Brigadier-General W. T. Edwards,—

H. M.'s 59th Foot.

11th and 31st Native Infantry.

*3rd Infantry Brigade*, under Brigadier-General J. W. Adams, C.B.,—

33rd, 36th, and 37th Native Infantry.

*6th Infantry Brigade*, under Brigadier-General W. T. Edwards,—after-

wards under Brigadier C. S. Fagan,—

15th, 21st, and 35th Native Infantry.

In addition to the above troops, there were with the force Skinner's Irregular Horse, (about a thousand strong) and two detach-

\* Sir David Ochterlony died at Meerut on the 14th July, 1825.—P.





ments of 200 men each from the 1st Nasserri Battalion and the Sirmoor Battalion. The 1st Bengal European Regiment joined in January 1826, and was placed in the 2nd Division.

Operations were commenced by the despatch of a detachment to seize a *jhil* lying north-west of the town, whence in time of war water was carried by a canal into the ditches of the fortress. This duty was successfully accomplished (10th December), and the ditch continued dry throughout the siege. The army now encamped before the northern and eastern faces of the town, and batteries were constructed and opened fire on the 24th of December. The fire of the guns, however, did not produce sufficient effect on the fortifications to make a practicable breach and recourse was had to mining, with such success, that by the 18th of January two practicable breaches had been made. On that day the assault was arranged to take place, and the attacking force was divided into four columns, with a reserve. The main right column was composed of eight companies of His Majesty's 14th Foot, five companies of the 41st Native Infantry, and the 6th, 23rd, and 60th Native Infantry, with two companies of the 14th Foot, and the 18th and 32nd Native Infantry in reserve; in the left main column were His Majesty's 59th Foot, and the 15th, 21st, and 31st Native Infantry. On the right of the first column was a division of two companies of the Bengal European Regiment, the 58th Native Infantry, and 100 Gurkhas of the 1st Nasserri Battalion; an intermediate column was formed of two more companies of the Bengal European Regiment, the grenadier company of the 35th Native Infantry, the light company of the 37th, and 100 Gurkhas of the Sirmoor Battalion. The 36th and remaining companies of the 37th formed the reserve. The signal for the assault was the springing of a mine under the north-east cavalier, and as soon as the explosion took place the several storming parties advanced with the greatest steadiness. The assailants were encountered by a desperate resistance on the part of the garrison, but the latter were gradually forced to give way from point to point, until only the citadel held out, and that also surrendered in the afternoon. The loss of the garrison is said to have been 8,000. No complete return of the British loss during the operations appears to have been prepared, but it is roughly estimated to have been about 180 killed, 780 wounded, and 20 missing. The casualties in the assault amounted to 103 killed, 466 wounded, and 11 missing; three officers were killed, including Captain Brown of





the 31st Native Infantry, and 36 were wounded, including Brigadier-Generals M'Combe and Edwards (mortally) and Brigadier Patton. Lieutenant Tindall, of the Engineers, attached to the Sappers, was killed during the siege, and Lieutenant Candy, of the Bengal European Regiment, died of the wounds he received in the assault.

During the siege the cavalry several times distinguished themselves in attacks on parties of the enemy's horse; one affair in particular is mentioned in G.O.C.C., 24th December, 1825, when Jemadar Sheik Ramzan Ali, of the 4th Light Cavalry, with only twenty men defended and saved a party of foragers from a large body of the enemy: for his conduct on this occasion he was promoted to the rank of Subadar on the spot. Here too, for the first time, the Gurkhas of the Nasserri and Sirmoor Battalions took a prominent part in the operations of a British army, and won enthusiastic praise on all sides for their courage, discipline, and good temper.

The fall of Bhurtpore, so long considered impregnable, effectually restored tranquillity throughout the surrounding countries, and stilled the ferment which for some time past had disquieted India; while the relief which was experienced by the Government at the speedy and successful termination of what could not but be regarded as a hazardous enterprise, was plainly evinced in the highly complimentary order issued to the army by the Governor-General. In this, besides five other corps and detachments which have ceased to exist, special praise is bestowed on the 31st Native Infantry, the 1st Local Horse (Skinner's), and the Sirmoor Battalion: the Commander-in-Chief's order, the day after the assault, refers also to the local horse, artillery, sappers and miners, and pioneers. All the cavalry and regular infantry present at the siege were authorised (G. O. 85 of 1826) to bear the name "BHURTPORE" on their colours and appointments; but it was not until thirty-three years later that this honor was extended to the Sirmoor Battalion, and it was not sanctioned for the Nasserri Battalion (the 1st Gurkha Rifle Regiment) until 1874.

Lord Combermere's short and brilliant campaign was the last in which the Bengal Army was destined to engage for many years. Freed from the anxieties of hostility on their frontier or disaffection in their dependencies, the Indian Government turned their attention to lightening the drains on their impoverished exchequer, and the military operations of the next eleven years may be dismissed in a few words. These were, indeed, only necessitated by occasional





demonstrations of turbulence and disaffection, none of which on this side of India reached an extent of any importance. The first of these was a religious tumult in Lower Bengal in 1831, where a colony of fanatical Mahomedans of the Wahabi sect fell foul both of their Shia co-religionists and of the Hindu population, and having proclaimed a religious war marched through the country, plundering and devastating on every side. They were pursued by the 11th and 48th Bengal Infantry, with a party of horse and two guns, and having been overtaken at Hooghly, were forced to betake themselves to the shelter of a stockade; thence, after an hour's fighting, they were dislodged and finally dispersed, but not without the loss of seventeen or eighteen sepoy. In the newly acquired provinces of the Eastern Frontier disturbances were, for several years, of frequent occurrence, but were for the most part easily suppressed. In Upper Assam an incursion was made in 1830 by the Singphos from Hukong, who were quickly driven back over the frontier by the Political Agent with a detachment of the Assam Light Infantry (the 42nd Bengal Infantry). A more serious affair took place at Nanklao in the Khasiah Hills in the preceding year. Thither two British officers, Lieutenants Bedingfield and Burlton, had gone for the benefit of their health, with a small guard of Assam Light Infantry. The place was suddenly attacked, on the 4th April, 1829, by some 500 Khasiahs: Bedingfield was murdered on the spot; Burlton, with nearly all the detachment, was killed on the following day retreating towards Assam. The Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion was sent up, under Captain F. G. Lister, who defeated the Khasiahs at Mamlu on the 14th April, re-took Nanklao, and stormed the strong position of Mogandi on the 21st May, losing there one sepoy killed and Assistant Surgeon Hugh Beadon (mortally) and five sepoy wounded. A desultory conflict was maintained for two years in the difficult jungles of the frontier, until at length tranquillity was restored in 1832.

At the further extremity of Bengal, disturbances in Chota Nagpur necessitated more extensive military operations: the insurrections of the Kols, a wild, aboriginal race of Central India, reached such a pitch that at length, in 1832, a force of considerable strength had to be sent into the country. This force consisted of a squadron of the 3rd Light Cavalry, the 34th and 50th Native Infantry, the Ramgarh Battalion, and detachments of the 2nd and 54th Native Infantry, together with some artillery and irregulars. Little opposition was





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met with, and that was more from ambushes than in open action, which indeed is hardly to be wondered at, seeing that the Kols were armed only with bows and arrows and battle-axes: quiet was not established for some months, the British loss during the campaign having been 16 killed and 44 wounded; amongst these was Ensign T. H. S. Macleod, of the 34th, who died of an arrow wound.

Simultaneous with the Kol rising, and, like it, of an agrarian nature, was the insurrection of the Chuars, a lawless race in the Jungle Mehals, headed by one Ganga Narayan. A still larger force had to be assembled (under the command of Colonel J. W. Fast) to put down this outbreak; it consisted of the 24th, 34th, and 50th Native Infantry, with detachments of the 25th, 31st, and 33rd, and some irregulars, and was styled "the Jungle Mehal Field Force." There was much harassing service in the jungles, but after overcoming the difficulties of a trying march in an impracticable country, Bandi, the head-quarters of Ganga Narayan, was captured and his following dispersed. Lieutenant R. H. Turnbull, of the 24th, was mortally wounded with an arrow during these operations. A similar outbreak occurred at the same time on the borders of Cuttack, in consequence of which the 38th Native Infantry was despatched from Midnapore; but the submission of the malcontents obviated the necessity for active measures.

In 1836, a rising in Cuttack occasioned the employment of the 10th, 19th and 24th Native Infantry.

In 1837-38, further disturbances occurred in the Kol country, in which the 31st Native Infantry, the Ramgarh Light Infantry, the 5th Local Horse, and a detachment of artillery, with four 6-pounders, were employed. The field force assembled at Seraikela on November 30th, 1837: on the 4th December a detachment of the 31st, under Captain Corfield, surprised and routed a party of the enemy; and on the 18th a large body of them was attacked and dispersed near Siringsia, with a loss on our side of one man killed and 15 wounded. Several villages were destroyed as a punitive measure, and the troops remained in the district throughout the following spring.

In the autumn of 1834, a very considerable force (three troops of horse and seven companies of foot artillery, with a siege train; two squadrons of the 11th Light Dragoons; the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 7th Light Cavalry; the 3rd Local Horse; the 26th Foot; and the 3rd, 8th, 22nd, 23rd, 28th, 32nd, 36th, 44th, 51st, 61st and 68th Native Infan-

Demonstration  
against  
Jodhpur, 1834.





try, with Brigadier-General Stevenson in command) was assembled at Ajmir with the object of marching against Jodhpur, the Rajah of which place had for several years been giving much trouble; its movements in that direction, however, were arrested by the timely submission of Man Singh, the Jodhpur Rajah, and several corps returned to cantonments. A force of one cavalry and two infantry brigades was detained in the field under Brigadier-General Stevenson, C.B., to proceed against the Shekhawats, a predatory tribe inhabiting a tract lying to the north-east of Jodhpur. This force was composed as follows:—

*Cavalry Brigade*,—4th and 7th Light Cavalry and 3rd Local Horse.  
*1st Infantry Brigade*,—3rd, 22nd, and 61st Native Infantry.  
*2nd Infantry Brigade*,—32nd, 36th, and 51st Native Infantry.

The force marched on the 20th of November, 1834, and proceeded by short stages into the heart of the Shekhawat country, without encountering any opposition: the strongholds of the plundering chiefs were either occupied or destroyed, and at the end of December the force broke up and returned to cantonments. A detachment, consisting of the 61st Native Infantry, the 3rd Local Horse, and some artillery, remained under Colonel Wyatt at Patan, while a corps of irregulars, horse and foot, was organised for local work by Lieutenant Forster from among the feudatory tribes of the district; this force, known as the Shekhawati Contingent, was subsequently re-organised as a regiment of irregular infantry, and is now the 13th Bengal Infantry.

Contending claims to the succession and resulting misgovernment rendered it necessary, in 1838, for the Government of India to assume the administration of the territories of the deceased Rajah of Jhansi. This was opposed by the mother of the late Rajah's predecessor, who shut herself up in the fort of Jhansi, with several thousand armed followers, determined to resist the orders of the paramount power. It became necessary to despatch a force to reduce the fort, and in December, 1838, Major-General Sir Thomas Amberey appeared before the place with the 6th Light Cavalry, the 3rd Local Horse, the 25th, 33rd, 63rd, and 72nd Native Infantry, and Sindbia's Reformed Contingent (horse, foot, and artillery), together with a powerful battering train. While preparations were making for opening fire on the fort, preparatory to an assault, the contumacious Rani and her followers lost heart and, evacuating the place secretly during the night (5th January, 1839), made off without being discovered.

The Shekhawat Expedition, 1834.

The 13th Shekhawati Regiment, 1835.

Reduction of Jhansi, 1839.



The period between the general re-modelling of the Bengal Army in 1824 and the augmentations in consequence of the Afghan War in 1838, although after the conclusion of the Burma and Bhurtpore campaigns it was devoid of stirring incident in the field, was nevertheless a memorable one for its numerous internal changes. The campaigns of 1825 and 1826 necessitated further additions to the Native army, already larger than the resources of the Company could easily support. The mutiny of the 47th in 1824 was followed immediately by orders for the raising of a corps to take its place (G.O.C.C., 10th November, 1824), which was numbered the 69th and to which were sent all the British officers of the old 47th: in 1828 the latter number was given to the new corps, which now exists as the 7th (the Duke of Connaught's Own) Bengal Infantry. In 1824 also (G.G.O. No. 64) was raised the Sylhet Local Battalion, now the 44th Bengal Infantry (Gurkha Rifles). A general augmentation took place in the January following when all Native infantry corps were ordered to recruit an additional twenty sepoys. Early in 1825 a still more extensive measure was resorted to; this was the raising of twelve additional regiments of regular infantry of 1,000 men each, which were called "Extra Regiments" (G.G.O. No. 149 of 1825). Of these the first six were fully officered immediately, but the six remaining were regarded rather as depôt battalions and only received three officers each, who were borrowed from other corps: of the twelve extra regiments one only exists at the present day, namely, the 2nd, which afterwards became the 70th of the line regiments, and is now the 11th Bengal Infantry. This was the last augmentation of the Bengal Army which took place for many years, and from the close of 1825 until 1836 reductions on all sides were the order of the day; the first of these was the breaking up of the light infantry and grenadier flank battalions on their return from Chittagong and Arakan (G. O. C. C., 11th November, 1825 and 29th April, 1826); the companies composing these, however, were not discharged, but returned to their various regiments, where they were absorbed. In 1826 (G. G. O. No. 43) the six unofficered extra regiments were reduced after an existence of less than a year; while a month later (G. G. O. No. 79) the whole of the army was reduced to peace establishment, or a full strength of 10 non-commissioned officers and 82 privates per company. At the end of the year a complete and drastic reform of the local forces was commenced by Lord William Bentinck; the Dinajpur,





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Champaran, Gorakhpur, and Rampurah local battalions were reduced (G. G. O. No. 231 of 1826); three years later the same course was pursued with regard to the whole (fifteen) of the provincial and three more local corps, the latter including the 2nd Nasserri Battalion, of which all sepoys, natives of Nipal, of over six years' service were drafted into the 1st Nasserri and Sirmoor Battalions. It does not appear that these provincial battalions, which were merely an expensive and very worthless form of police, were much regretted in the army, and a contemporary writer praises Lord William Bentinck for "having set to and cleared away the whole of the provincial corps, root and branch, so effectually that, with the past experience of their utter uselessness, we have no prospect of ever being so bothered again."

Similar changes had been taking place in the cavalry branch. In 1825 the irregular regiments were increased to ten troops of 100 officers and men each, while, at the same time, their Native officers were so equalised that there should always be one risaldar with each squadron and a ressaidar under him in the other troop. In May of the same year two "Extra Regiments" of light cavalry of eight troops each were formed, and by G. G. O. No. 348 of 1825 were permanently added to the Native cavalry as the 9th and 10th Regiments. In 1826 reductions were commenced; regular regiments were brought down to a peace establishment of 60 privates per troop, while at the end of the year similar orders were published about the first five irregular corps: no definite directions were given about the remaining three regiments of local horse until 1829, when they were paid up and discharged in accordance with G. G. O. No. 124.

Cavalry.

The Bengal artillery was re-organised by G. G. O. No. 192 of 1825, when the horse artillery was formed into three brigades of four troops each, the fourth troop in each brigade being composed of natives; the foot artillery was formed in five battalions of four companies each. By this order four companies of foot artillery were reduced, and four new European troops of horse artillery raised. Two years later (G. O. C. C., 20th June 1827) the field artillery was reduced to twelve batteries—eight British and four Native—all of which were to be drawn by horses: such field ordnance as was in excess of this strength was used for independent post work and manned by *golan-das*, or native gunners.

Artillery.





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The total strength of the Bengal Army at this period was as follows :—

Horse artillery—Three brigades of four troops each—			
	British	1,086	
	Native	330	
		<hr/>	1,416
Foot artillery—British, five battalions of four companies each—			
		2,250	
	Native, two battalions of eight companies	2,062	
	Gun lascars, twenty companies	1,224	
		<hr/>	5,536
Engineers, six companies		...	916
Native Cavalry (regular), ten regiments of six troops—			
	British	260	
	Native	4,980	
		<hr/>	5,240
Native infantry (regular), 74 regiments of 8 companies—			
	British	1,776	
	Native	55,648	
		<hr/>	57,424
European Regiment, of eight companies		...	781
Governor-General's Body-Guard		...	183
Local cavalry,—five corps of eight <i>rissalahs</i>		...	4,234
„ infantry,—13 corps, comprising 100 companies		...	9,961
Miscellaneous departments		...	691
		<hr/>	
GRAND TOTAL		...	<hr/> 86,382 <hr/>

As regards the strength of the military forces nothing remains to be noticed here except three small additions which were made towards the end of the period under review. The first of these was the "Assam Sebundy Corps," which was formed (G. G. O. No. 98 of 1835) from four companies of *sibandis* and other irregular troops maintained in Assam, with the addition of two companies transferred from the Assam Light Infantry (the strength of which was reduced from twelve to ten companies), and of two newly raised companies, —the whole making a corps of eight companies, of a strength of 756 men, with a captain in command :—this corps still survives as the 43rd Bengal Infantry (Gurkha Rifles). The second was the "Oudh Auxiliary Force," formed in 1837, and composed of a company of artillery, a regiment of cavalry and two regiments of infantry; of these, the two infantry regiments, afterwards designated the 1st and 2nd Oudh Local Battalions, were swept away in the mutiny of 1857; the mounted corps subsequently became the 6th Irregular Horse, and still survives as the 4th Bengal Cavalry. The third addition was a





corps consisting of both cavalry and infantry which was raised in 1838-39 specially for service in Bundelkhand, and received the designation of the "Bundelkhand Legion." This corps will again come under notice further on.

The changes in the interior economy of the army during these years are of more immediate interest than the fluctuations in its strength. Foremost among these was the famous "half batta" measure, which it was one of the first duties of Lord William Bentinck as Governor-General to enforce, and which created almost as much discontent and indignation in the Bengal Army as the equally celebrated order of a similar nature in 1766, although on this occasion the malcontents did not proceed to such extreme measures as their predecessors in the service. Disturbed at the perilous state of their finances, the Company sought every means of economising, and with this object one of their first measures was to reduce the large military cantonments of Dinapore, Barrackpore, and Berhampore from full to half batta stations (G. G. O. No. 224 of 1828). The proceeding may have been reasonable enough, but the saving effected was comparatively very small, while the hardship inflicted by it, especially on junior officers, was great.

Early in 1825, shortly after the raising of the 69th, and when the question of foreign service was one of present importance to the Bengal troops, the 39th and 60th Regiments of Native Infantry volunteered to be placed on the list of general service corps; this produced an order of Government complimenting these regiments for their zeal, and, after stating the advantages accruing to general service corps, giving a list of the same amounting to nine regiments, among which were the present 7th and 10th Bengal Infantry.

On the 19th of March 1827, a G.O.C.C. was issued of most vital interest to the Native forces in India; it was to the following effect:—"The Commander-in-Chief is satisfied, from the quiet and orderly habits of the Native soldiers, that it can very seldom be necessary to inflict on them the punishment of flogging, while it may be almost entirely abolished with great advantage to their character and feelings;" no Native soldier, therefore, was in future to be sentenced to corporal punishment, unless for the crimes of stealing, marauding, or gross insubordination, where the individuals were deemed unworthy to continue in the Native Army. As may be imagined, criticism adverse to the foregoing order was not wanting,

Interior  
economy,  
1824-40.

Half Batta,  
1828.

Abolition of  
corporal  
punishment,  
1827-35.



but this opposition was nothing as compared with that which greeted a G. G. O. eight years later (No. 50 of 1835) which directed "the practice of punishing soldiers of the Native army by the cat-o'-nine-tails, or rattan, to be discontinued in all the presidencies; soldiers to be sentenced to dismissal from the service for any offence which might now be punished by flogging." Considering the question in the light of modern ideas and experience, it is difficult to realise the consternation created by this order, and which found expression in a flood of letters and articles addressed to every journal in the country; the arguments used were of course the same as those which were urged in more recent years with regard to a similar measure in the British Army, but while the violence engendered apparently by many years of rather uncivilized life in a trying climate caused these arguments to be expressed in more immoderate terms, the circumstances of the case deprived them of much of the cogency which they possess when applied in the later instance.\*

In G. G. O. No. 43 of 1829 it was notified that the names of various campaigns and actions, from Plassey to Java, were to be borne by corps engaged therein on their regimental colours and appointments; of the honours then granted the following alone now remain in the Army List:—

"DELHI"	• •	2nd Bengal Infantry.
"LASWARI"	• •	1st, 2nd, and 4th Bengal Infantry.
"DEIG"	• •	2nd Bengal Infantry.
"JAVA"	• •	The Body-Guard.

To these were subsequently added "SEETABULDEE," "ARAKAN," "ASSAM," "AVA," and "BHURTPORE," of which the second still survives on the colours and appointments of the 5th Bengal Infantry, and the last on those of the 1st Bengal Cavalry, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 9th Bengal Infantry, and the 1st and 2nd Gurkha Regiments.

Only one noticeable change occurred about this time in the equipment of the army, namely, the substitution of fuzils for the old pikes of infantry havildars (15th August 1831). In the same year

\* At the same time the fact must not be lost sight of that the abolition of flogging did undoubtedly lead to a distinct increase in the crime of insubordination in the Native Army. There was much force in the remark of an old subadar, who had known the Bengal Army as it was in Lord Lake's time and saw the condition at which it had arrived only four years after the abolition of flogging—"Fauj be dar hogya,"—"The Army has ceased to fear." Apart from the abstract question whether flogging, for the maintenance of discipline, was necessary or the reverse, the abolition of this degrading punishment, so far as the native soldier was concerned, while it was maintained in full force for his European comrade, was an act of which the wisdom was widely questioned at the time, both in the service and out of it.—P.





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silver lace for infantry uniforms was abolished, and it was directed that the lace of every regiment should be gold (G. G.O. No. 464 of 1831).

In 1837 (G. G. O. No. 83, April 17th) another important innovation was introduced; this was the grant of good-conduct pay and the institution of the Orders of British India and of Merit. The former indulgence was granted at the rate of one rupee a month after sixteen years', and two rupees after twenty years' service, and to obtain it a sepoy should not, within the previous two years, have been convicted by a court-martial for any serious offence, nor have been twice entered in the regimental defaulter's book. The Order of British India was to be given to Native officers for long and honourable service; it was divided into two classes, each having one hundred members, of whom one-half were to belong to the Bengal Army: the first class, carrying with it an extra pay or pension of two rupees a day, was granted to subadars and the corresponding grade of the irregular cavalry; the second class, with one rupee a day, was for all Native officers indiscriminately. The Order of Merit, granted for conspicuous bravery in action, was divided into three classes; the third or lowest class carried with it an extra allowance to the extent of one-third of the holder's full pay or pension; the second class gave two-thirds, and the first class entitled the holder to double his full pay. These grants were followed shortly by other measures calculated to improve the position of the Native soldier. By G. O. C. C. 21st June 1837, commissions were for the first time granted to Native officers of irregular cavalry. In 1838 (G. G. O. No. 120, August 13th) the more important grant was made to the Native commissioned ranks of pensions for wounds received in action: these, in the case of persons permanently disabled or maimed, were on the following scale:—

	₹
Subadar, Risaldar, or Woordi-Major . . . . .	= 25
Ressaidar . . . . .	= 18
Naib Risaldar or Jemadar . . . . .	= 12
Jemadar of Local Horse . . . . .	= 7

Little remains to be mentioned, except an order limiting the number of *bargirs* in the irregular horse (No. 236 of 1840); having been at one time entirely forbidden, and then restricted to a very small number, the custom of keeping *bargirs* had gradually crept again into the irregular regiments, where the orders restricting it were

Good-conduct  
Pay, Order  
of British  
India, and  
Order of  
Merit,  
1837.

Wound  
Pensions,  
1838.





unpopular, and if possible, evaded. The numbers now fixed were, for risaldars and ressaidars five, for naib-risaldars and jemadars two, and for dafadars one. These corps, hitherto officially known as "Local Horse," were, by G. G. O. No. 276 of 1840, ordered to be called in future "Irregular Cavalry"; of which the cavalry regiment of the Oudh Auxiliary Force (formed in 1838 for the service of the King of Oudh) was named the 6th Regiment.

That the measures mentioned above for the improvement of the Native soldier's prospects were in the right direction, and urgently needed is amply proved by the magazine literature of the period, which teems with articles on the Bengal Army, its deficiencies, and requirements. One writer, among many others in the *United Service Magazine*, 1835, thus summarises the "points in which the condition of the Native army has deteriorated: (1) Decrease of pay (as compared with the increase of expenses), (2) increase of duty, (3) decrease of consideration, (4) want in general of kindness, favor, and notice from the governing power." Probably the two last points were of far more importance than the former two; want of kindness and consideration, not only from the governing power but from regimental officers also, seems to have been but too common at the period now under notice; it was the gradual growth of years, and had become so deep-seated in a great proportion of Anglo-Indian military society that nothing short of the violent convulsion of 1857 could serve effectually to uproot it.





## Chapter VI.—(1838—1845.)

Political and Military Events (*Hough*)—History of India (*Marshman*)—British Empire in India (*Thornton*)—Afghan War (*Kaye*)—First Afghan War (*Durand*)—Afghan Campaigns (*Major H. H. Jones*)—Journal of General Abbott (*Low*)—Narrative of the Army of the Indus (*Hough*)—Official papers relating to the War in Afghanistan—Career of George Broadfoot (*W. Broadfoot*)—Expedition to China (*Lieutenant Bingham*)—Conquest of Sindh (*Sir W. Napier*)—G. G. O. and G. O. C. C.

After a period of twelve years of comparative tranquillity, the invasion of Afghanistan involved the Government of India in a war of four years' duration, in which the success which was at first attained was afterwards overshadowed by one great and appalling disaster, resulting in a loss of prestige and influence in Central Asia which not even the most brilliant subsequent successes served completely to repair. The proclamation which announced the determination of the Government to despatch an expedition to Afghanistan declared that it had been resolved to restore to the throne of that country the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, and that he would "enter Afghanistan surrounded by his own troops." Meanwhile, in anticipation of this course, a force had, about five months before, been raised for Shah Shuja, consisting of two regiments of cavalry and six of infantry, officered by British and Native officers drawn from the Company's regiments: of this force the 3rd Infantry Regiment still survives as the 12th (Kalat-i-Ghilzai) Bengal Infantry.

The "Army of the Indus," as the expeditionary force was styled, was assembled at Ferozepore in November 1838, and consisted at first of between fifteen and sixteen thousand men. News, however, having been received of the withdrawal of the Persian army which had been besieging Herat, it was determined to reduce the force, and the detailed strength of the Bengal detachment of the army was eventually as follows:—

IN COMMAND,—Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, K.C.B.

Cavalry Brigade, under Colonel Arnold, H.M.'s 6th Lancers—

H.M.'s 16th Light Dragoons (Lancers), the 2nd and 3rd Light Cavalry, the 4th Local Horse, and part of the 1st Local Horse (Skinner's).

Artillery, under Major P. L. Pew—

2nd Troop 2nd Brigade 4th Company 2nd Battalion, and 2nd Company 6th Battalion.

Sappers and Miners, under Captain E. Sanders, Bengal Engineers—

The 2nd and 3rd Companies.

The First  
Afghan War,  
1838.





*1st Infantry Brigade*, under Colonel R. H. Sale, c.b., 13th Light Infantry--

H.M.'s 13th Foot (Light Infantry), and the 16th and 48th Native Infantry.

*2nd Infantry Brigade*, under Major-General W. Nott--

The 31st, 42nd, and 43rd Native Infantry.

*4th Infantry Brigade*, under Lieutenant-Colonel A. Roberts, European Regiment--

The Bengal European Regiment, and the 35th and 37th Native Infantry.

The Bombay column consisted of two and a half regiments of cavalry, three batteries of artillery, three regiments of infantry, and a company of sappers. The contingent with Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk amounted to about 6,000 men. A force, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wade, which included a Sikh contingent of 6,000 men and 4,000 under the Shahzada Timur, eldest son of Shah Shuja, was also detailed to assemble at Peshawar and act through the Khaibar Pass: with this force were two companies each of the 20th and 21st Native Infantry, forming an escort to Colonel Wade. The total strength of the British forces employed, including reserves, amounted to about 39,000. The command of the whole was conferred upon Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane, k.c.b., of H. M.'s Service, then Commander-in-Chief in the Bombay Presidency.

The Bengal column marched from Ferozepore on the 10th December 1838, Sir Willoughby Cotton being in command until the force should be joined by Sir John Keane, and arrived at Rohri in Sindh on the 24th January 1839. Thence part of the force was detached to meet Sir John Keane and the Bombay troops marching from Karachi, and to hasten the Sindh chiefs in their settlement of terms of friendship with the British. This object having been attained, it was important to advance through the Bolan Pass with as little delay as possible; the Indus was crossed by a bridge of boats, and Shikarpur reached on the 20th February. Sir John Keane was now in command of the army, while Sir Willoughby Cotton had that of the 1st (Bengal) Division of Infantry; the cavalry division was under Major-General Thackwell, and the artillery under Brigadier Stevenson of the Bombay army. Advancing through the Bolan, Quetta was reached on the 26th March, and after a fortnight's delay the army proceeded through the Kojak Pass to Kandahar, where it arrived on the 26th April.

Up to this point no enemy had been encountered, except parties of marauding Afghans, who confined themselves to cutting off follow-





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ers and stragglers, but the privations endured through want of water and scarcity of provisions were far more trying and just as destructive as would have been the most determined opposition of the Afghan army.

At Kandahar, on May the 8th, Shah Shuja was formally installed on the *masnad*, and the army enjoyed a brief interval of comparative rest, but the difficulty in obtaining provisions still continued, as did also the annoyance of incessant robberies by the Afghans. From this place a detachment was despatched to the fort of Ghrishk under Brigadier Sale, consisting of detachments from the 2nd and 3rd Light Cavalry, the 13th Light Infantry, and the 16th Native Infantry, with some of the Shah's infantry and 300 of his cavalry: the chief, Kohan-dil Khan, did not, however, await the arrival of the detachment; he abandoned the fort, and fled across the Persian frontier, and Sale returned to Kandahar. At the same time unsuccessful overtures were made to the Ghilzai chiefs, who, however, showed no readiness to espouse the cause of Shah Shuja.

Leaving at Kandahar the 37th Bengal Native Infantry with some detachments and (in belief of the current reports regarding the weakness of Ghazni) the whole of the battering train, Sir John Keane resumed his march on the 27th June, and arriving before Ghazni on the 21st July, reconnoitred the place under fire the same afternoon. The fortress, which was now found to be of considerable strength, was held by Haidar Khan, son of Dost Muhammad Khan, the reigning Amir of Afghanistan. To effect a breach in its walls would have required a much more powerful battering train than had been brought from India, and as that, such as it was, had been left behind at Kandahar, no resource remained but to blow open one of the gates and endeavour to carry the place by a *coup-de-main*. After a further reconnaissance on the 22nd, the Kabul gate was selected for this purpose. The 22nd was passed in completing the necessary preparations, and was moreover enlivened by an attack on Shah Shuja's camp, which was repulsed by some of the Contingent under Captain Outram and Lieutenant Nicolson. The dispositions for the storming of Ghazni were made during the evening, and before day-light on July the 23rd the various parties were all in position. These were (1) the explosion party of engineers, under Captain Thomson of the Bengal Engineers; (2) the advance, under Colonel Dennie of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, consisting of one

Storm of  
Ghazni, 23rd  
July 1839.





company of that regiment and the light companies of Her Majesty's 2nd and 17th, and of the Bengal European Regiment; (3) the main storming party under Brigadier Sale, formed of the remaining companies of the 2nd Queen's, the 13th Light Infantry, and the Bengal European Regiment; (4) a false attack by three companies of the 35th Bengal Native Infantry, under Captain John Hay; and (5) the reserve under Sir Willoughby Cotton, consisting of the 16th and the 48th, and remainder of the 35th Bengal Native Infantry. The operation of blowing up the gateway was completely successful, and the advance under Colonel Dennie pushed on, though met by a desperate resistance on the part of the defenders. This gave the main body of the attack time to close up with the advance, while these were closely followed by Sir Willoughby Cotton with the reserve. Within a very short time the centre square was reached, and the enemy, finding that all was lost, abandoned the citadel and fled in all directions; many of them, however, continued to fire on the troops from the houses and behind walls, until, refusing all chance of quarter, they were themselves shot down. The loss of the Afghans was very great, but the British force did not suffer as much as might have been expected, and their casualties (including the loss sustained in the reconnaissance of the 21st) amounted to no more than 18 men killed, 20 officers and 153 men wounded, and 2 men missing.

Arrival at  
Kabul.

On the 30th of July the army moved on towards Kabul. On its approach Dost Muhammad fled from the capital and evaded all pursuit, though a lightly equipped detachment under Captain Outram was despatched in chase of him. Shah Shuja made his public entry into Kabul on the 7th August. Three weeks later Colonel Wade, with the force of the Shahzada Timur, arrived from Peshawar, having forced the Khaibar and taken Ali Masjid with a loss of about 150 killed and wounded.

Withdrawal  
of the army.

The arrival of the British force at Kabul and the installation of the Shah in his capital concluded the first phase of the Afghan war, and arrangements were soon after entered upon to withdraw a great part of the army to India. The Bombay Division left Kabul on the 18th September, and marching *via* Ghazni and Kandahar reached Quetta on the 31st October. The troops which remained in Afghanistan to strengthen the hands of the Shah were the whole of the Bengal Division of infantry, the 2nd Light Cavalry, detachments of the 1st and 4th Local Horse, and No. 6 Light Field Battery, the whole





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under the command of Sir Willoughby Cotton. The remainder of the Bengal troops returned to India with Sir John Keane through the Khaibar Pass, where they experienced hardships from want of water and supplies, and from the attacks of marauders, no less than in their march into Afghanistan in the earlier part of the year. They arrived at Peshawar in November, and on the 1st of January 1840 at Ferozepore, at which place, on the day following, the Army of the Indus was broken up.

In November 1839 a part of the troops which had remained in Afghanistan and Baluchistan, together with two of the British regiments which had just marched back from Kabul, were engaged under Major-General Willshire against Mehrab Khan, the Baluch Khan of Kalat, who, during the advance through the Bolan Pass in March 1839, had evinced a hostile feeling towards the British, and whom it was found necessary to chastise and render incapable of future mischief. The troops employed in this undertaking were Her Majesty's 2nd and 17th Foot, a squadron of the 4th Local Horse, and the 31st Bengal Native Infantry, with two guns of the Bombay Horse Artillery and four of the Artillery of Shah Shuja's Contingent. The force was attacked by the enemy's horse as it approached Kalat on the 13th of November, and skirmishing continued to within a short distance of the town. There it was discovered that the fort was protected from attack by three heights before its north-western face, and which were strongly held by the enemy; these it was determined to storm immediately, and one each was assigned to the three regiments of infantry, of which half advanced to the attack, while the remaining four companies formed a reserve. The enemy were driven from their position by artillery fire before the storming parties reached them, and made good their retreat into the city, but were closely followed by the British troops; one of the gates was blown open by the fire of the Shah's artillery under Lieutenant Creed, and the town carried by storm. After some delay an entrance was also made into the citadel, where, after a brave struggle, the Khan and several Baluch *sardars* were themselves slain and the capture of the place completed. Our loss was one British and one Native officer (Subadar Ramsahai Singh, 31st Native Infantry) and 29 men killed, and 8 British and 2 Native officers and 97 men wounded; among the latter being Captain Saurin and Ensign Hopper, of the 31st Bengal Native Infantry.

Capture of  
Kalat, 13th  
November,  
1839.





The objects of the expedition into Afghanistan having now been accomplished, it remained to reward the army which had been employed in the operations. All corps which advanced beyond the Bolan Pass were granted permission to bear the word "AFGHANISTAN" on their colours and appointments, and those which were present at the capture of GHAZNI and KALAT were permitted to inscribe the names of those places also; while to the whole force beyond the Bolan was issued a gratuity of six months' batta—(G.O.C.C., 22nd November, 1839, and 14th January, 1840). A medal was afterwards given for the capture of Ghazni.

The fall of Kalat and the commencement of the severe Afghan winter now produced a lull in the country, which gave reason to hope that quiet was permanently established. The troops retained in the country were divided into two commands,—the Northern under Sir Willoughby Cotton, including Kabul, Ghazni, Bamian, Jalalabad and the Khaibar, and the Southern, under Major-General Nott, comprising Kandahar, Girishk, Quetta, and Kalat. The distribution of the troops was as follows :—

*Kabul*—H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, the 35th Bengal Native Infantry, and three guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery.

*Ghazni*—16th Bengal Native Infantry and one *rissalah* of the 1st (Skinner's) Local Horse.

*Bamian*—4th (Gurkha) Infantry, Shah Shuja's Contingent, and one troop of horse artillery.

*Jalalabad*—2nd Light Cavalry, one *rissalah* of Skinner's Horse, three guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery, a detachment of Sappers and Miners, the 1st Bengal European Regiment and the 37th and 48th Bengal Native Infantry.

*Kandahar*—one *rissalah* of the 4th Local Horse, one company of foot artillery, two troops of horse artillery of Shah Shuja's Contingent, 4 eighteen-pounders, the 42nd and 43rd Bengal Native Infantry, and one battalion of infantry, Shah Shuja's Contingent.

*Girishk*—one battalion infantry, Shah Shuja's Contingent.

*Kalat*—31st Bengal Native Infantry, and a detachment of artillery, Shah Shuja's Contingent.

*Quetta*—one battalion of infantry, Shah Shuja's Contingent, and two guns.

It was not long before the distrust of Shah Shuja and the hatred of the English which was smouldering in Afghanistan betrayed itself in small and apparently unimportant outbursts, which served to portend the storm which was eventually to overwhelm the ill-fated army of occupation at Kabul. The first of these occurred early in 1840 when it became necessary to send a force against a refractory Khan named Sayyid Husain, Padshah of Kunar, who was holding





out in the fort of Pashut, some fifty miles from Jalalabad. The force employed was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Orchard, and consisted of a wing of the 37th Bengal Native Infantry, eighty of the 1st Bengal European Regiment, a troop of the 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry, 20 sappers, the 3rd Regiment of the Shah's Infantry (now the 12th Bengal Infantry), and the 1st Regiment of the Shah's Cavalry, with three guns. On the morning of the 18th January, in pouring rain, through which the troops had been marching for several preceding days, an attack was made on Pashut. The outer gate was battered down by the fire of the guns, and Lieutenant Pigou, of the Engineers, then endeavoured to blow down the inner gate, but the only powder available was not only drenched by the rain, but also so bad as to be useless even if dry; and the storming party, who, through a mistaken bugle-call, rushed forward too soon, found themselves exposed to a heavy fire from the fort, and were obliged to retire. Another attempt was made, but with equal ill-success, and at length the troops had to be withdrawn with the loss of Jemadar Ganesh Tiwari (3rd Infantry) and 18 men killed and two officers and 48 men wounded, many of them mortally, amongst whom was Lieutenant Collinson, 37th, who died soon after of his wounds. The attack was not, however, without result, for the fort was evacuated immediately after.

In the following August Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Wheeler had to move out from Jalalabad, with detachments of the 1st Bengal European Regiment and the 48th Native Infantry, to punish some refractory chiefs in the Waziri Valley, and took the fort of Kajja by storm on the 19th, with a loss of one man killed and one officer (Lieutenant Parker) and 18 men wounded.

Another affair of less importance was the attack of a small fort near Bamian by a party under Captain Garbett, where the assailants met with obstinate resistance, and did not gain possession of the place until they had recourse to burning out the garrison.

In April the wild clan of Ghilzais was in open revolt against the British and Shah Shuja, and it became necessary to take vigorous measures for their suppression. Major-General Nott, who commanded at Kandahar, contented himself at first with sending 200 cavalry to clear the road between that place and Kabul; but a stronger force being found necessary, a regiment of the Shah's infantry, 300 cavalry, and four guns of the Shah's horse artillery were

Storming and capture of Kajja Fort, August 19th, 1840.

Rising of Ghilzais.





despatched from Kandahar on the 7th May, under Captain William Anderson, Bengal Artillery. This detachment joined the first one on the 14th, and on the 16th, near Tazi, on the Turnak River, the enemy was encountered, some 2,000 strong, when, after an action remarkable for the gallantry displayed on both sides, the Ghilzais were driven in confusion to the refuge of their mountain fastnesses, and a British detachment occupied Kalat-i-Ghilzai.

A month later Lieutenant W. H. Clarke, 2nd Bombay Native Infantry, who, with a party of the Sindh Irregular Horse, had escorted a convoy to Kahun in the Marri hills, was, on his return, reinforced by two companies of the 5th Bombay Infantry, cut off by the Marris in the Sartof Pass (16th May, 1840) and the whole detachment destroyed. A more serious misfortune was the re-capture of Kalat by Nasir Khan, a son of the late Khan. There was no garrison in the place, beyond a small party of sepoy under Lieutenant Loveday, the Political Agent, and when it was attacked, the assailants were aided by treachery within the walls. An attempt at escalade was however repulsed, but after the defence had been protracted for some days, Lieutenant Loveday, finding resistance hopeless, capitulated (August, 1840), and was afterwards murdered by his captors. Following closely on this, another calamity overtook the troops in Sindh, when a large party of Bombay troops escorting a convoy for the relief of Kahun was driven back from the Nafusk Pass (31st August, 1840) with the loss of 179 killed (including four officers) and 92 wounded, together with its baggage, artillery and transport, and the whole of the convoy. A month later, on September 28th, Captain Brown, who commanded at Kahun, evacuated that place on honorable terms, and marched unmolested to the British post of Pulaji.

While these events were proceeding in Sindh and Baluchistan, the Northern force of the army of occupation was threatened by the re-appearance on the borders of Afghanistan of the ex-Amir Dost Muhammad. This prince, after fleeing from Kabul in the preceding year, had sought an asylum with the Amir of Bokhara, but driven thence by the unscrupulous cruelty of his host, he finally found an ally in the Wali of Khulum. He succeeded in raising a force, formed for the most part of Usbegs, and in August 1840 attacked a small fort, 150 miles north of Bamian which was held by a chief friendly

Disasters in  
Baluchistan  
and Sindh.

Operations on  
the Northern  
Frontier and  
in Kohistan.  
Sep.—Nov.  
1840.





to the British. The outposts of Bajgah, Kamurd, and Saighan had to be recalled; Brigadier Dennie advanced by forced marches to Bamian, and with four companies of the 35th Bengal Native Infantry, four of the 4th (Gurkha) Infantry of Shah Shuja's Force, 100 of the Shah's 2nd Cavalry, 200 "Jan-baz" horse, and two guns, making a total of 880 of all ranks, attacked the enemy near Bamian on the 18th September, dispersed the Usbeg force, and compelled Dost Muhammad to fly to Nijrao. In the same month disturbances in Kohistan led to the despatch of Brigadier Sir Robert Sale into that country, with a force consisting of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, two companies of the 27th\* and two of the 37th Bengal Native Infantry, the 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry, the 2nd Cavalry, Shah Shuja's Force, and details of artillery. A successful action took place at the fortified village of Tutam-dara, near Charikar, on the 29th September, but an attempt, on the 3rd of October, to storm the fort of Julgah was repulsed with a loss of 16 killed and 31 wounded. The enemy evacuated the fort the same evening. Sir Robert Sale remained in Kohistan throughout October, at the end of which month he was reinforced by the remaining companies of the 37th Native Infantry. Meanwhile every effort was made to obtain accurate information of the whereabouts of Dost Muhammad, and it at length appeared that the chief was moving towards the Ghorband Pass and was in the neighborhood of Parwandara. Thither he was followed by the British force, which arrived at the place on the 2nd of November in time to see the enemy retreating to the hills. The two squadrons of the 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry were sent on from the advance guard to endeavour to cut off the fugitives. Seeing this, the enemy's cavalry, which amounted only to about 80 ill-mounted men, turned and advanced at a slow pace towards their pursuers. Captain Fraser, commanding the squadrons, gave the order to charge, and himself, with the other officers, rode on into the midst of the enemy, but for some inexplicable reason, which has never been discovered, the troopers turned about and galloped back towards the advancing column, leaving their officers to their fate. Lieutenant and Adjutant Crispin, Lieutenant Broadfoot of the Engineers, and Assistant-Surgeon Lord, the Political Officer, were killed,

\* These two companies of the 27th Native Infantry had gone up to Kabul on escort duty with stores.—P.





Surrender of  
Dost  
Muhammad,  
November 3rd.

Affairs in  
Baluchistan.

## THE SERVICES OF THE

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and Captains Fraser and Ponsonby severely wounded.\* Deplorable as was this affair to us, it was nevertheless Dost Muhammad's last stand; he rode into Kabul next day and gave himself up to Sir William Macnaghten, the British envoy to the Court of Shah Shuja. After remaining for a short time with the British envoy, where he charmed all who met him by his chivalrous and straightforward bearing, the ex-Amir was escorted to India by Sir Willoughby Cotton and the 1st Bengal European Regiment, who were relieved, respectively, by Major-General W. G. K. Elphinstone, C.B., and the 44th Foot. The 48th Native Infantry also returned to India at this time, as part of the escort with Dost Muhammad. With the 44th Foot there arrived from India the 5th Light Cavalry and the 27th and 54th Native Infantry. The 2nd Native Infantry had already arrived at Kabul and gone southwards to Kandahar, which place was also reinforced later on with the 38th Native Infantry. The 5th Native Infantry likewise arrived in Kabul a few months later, escorting a convoy.

While these events were happening in the north, in Baluchistan and Sindh Nasir Khan remained for some time master of the situation. Forced to move from his quarters at Mastung, he emerged from the Bolan Pass on the 28th of October, and made a vigorous attack on the post of Dadur, the repulse of which was due mainly to a splendid charge of 120 of Skinner's Horse, led by Lieutenant A. F. Macpherson, 43rd N. I., who penetrated right through the masses of the enemy and returned victorious with the loss of one risaldar (Mir Bahadar Ali) and two troopers killed, and Macpherson, two Native officers, and 25 men wounded. The Baluchis made desultory attacks on the place on the two subsequent days, but finally withdrew on the arrival of reinforcements from Sukkur. On the 3rd November, Major-General Nott, with the 42nd and 43rd Bengal Native Infantry, four 18-pounders, and some cavalry and infantry of Shah Shuja's Force, arrived at Kalat from Kandahar, and re-occupied the place without opposition. Leaving the 42nd at Kalat, and garrisons at Quetta and Mastung, the General, with the 43rd, returned immediately to Kandahar. Nasir Khan still remained in arms, but his camp was attacked at Kotra, on the 1st December, by a force of Bombay troops under Lieutenant-

\* The two offending squadrons were immediately sent back to India, and by G. C. O. No. 38 of 1841 the regiment was disbanded; the squadrons which had so disgraced themselves were dismissed the service, and the remainder were drafted into other regiments of cavalry.





Colonel Marshall, and he was compelled to seek safety in flight, while his army was completely dispersed with considerable loss.

The surrender of Dost Muhammad Khan and the re-establishment of British influence in Baluchistan brought the year to a satisfactory termination; but it was not long before further outbreaks disturbed the general tranquillity. The first of these was a disturbance in the Durani country, where a chief named Akhtar Khan took up arms in the Zamin-dawar, and was successful until attacked and dispersed by Captain Farrington, 2nd Bengal Native Infantry, with a detachment of Native troops, at Landi-nawa, on the 3rd January 1841. This was followed by an unsuccessful attack on the fort of Kajjak, near Sibi, by a detachment of Bombay troops in which two officers (one of them being Lieutenant Creed, who had so distinguished himself at the capture of Kalat) and 9 men were killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, who commanded the force, another officer, and 40 men wounded; Colonel Wilson's wound proved fatal. In February it was found necessary to undertake operations against the Sangu Khel Shinwaris, inhabiting the Nazian valley, one of the eastern valleys of the Safed Koh lying to the south of Peshbolak. On this service a column was employed under Colonel Shelton of the 44th Foot, composed of his own regiment, the 27th Bengal Native Infantry, four horse artillery guns, and some details from Shah Shuja's Force, including the 3rd Infantry, and within a few days the valley was reduced to order, though not without the loss of two officers,—Captain Douglas, Assistant-Quartermaster-General, and Lieutenant Pigou, of the Engineers.

About this time General Nott, foreseeing the need of a large force at Kandahar, ordered up most of the troops from the neighbourhood of Quetta, and thus increased the force at his disposal to one regiment of cavalry, seven of infantry, two troops of horse artillery, and one company of foot artillery. This was not accomplished a day too soon, for early in April trouble again broke out with the Ghilzais, who, always disaffected towards Shah Shuja and foremost among the Afghans in their hatred of the English, were now particularly incensed by the re-building by the latter of the fort of Kalat-i-Ghilzai. They surrounded the place and attempted to obstruct the works, and threatened the force which, under Captain Macan, was located in the fort,—two regiments of infantry and part of one of cavalry (Christie's

1841.

The Duranis,  
January.The Sangu  
Khel  
Shinwaris  
February.The Ghilzais,  
April.





Horse) of Shah Shuja's contingent. Reinforcements were sent from Kandahar under Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer, consisting of 400 of the 38th Native Infantry, two squadrons of Christie's Horse, two horse artillery guns, and a few sappers. Wymer's force was attacked on the 29th of May, at Ilmi, about twenty miles from Kalat-i-Ghilzai, by a very large body of Ghilzais. The enemy advanced against the detachment in a solid mass, but, being received by a steady fire from the guns, they separated into three columns, which still advanced with the object of making a simultaneous attack. They were met, however, by a steady and destructive musketry fire, which their repeated rushes were not able to break through, and after an action of five hours' duration they were beaten off and dispersed. The British force, of which the 38th Bengal Native Infantry behaved with especial steadiness and courage, lost only four men killed and fifteen wounded. Scarcely was this affair brought to a successful termination than it became necessary to despatch another detachment to the Zamin-dawar, where Akhtar Khan was again in rebellion; the force employed was composed of the 5th Infantry\* of Shah Shuja's Force, some artillery of the same force, and two corps of Afghan Horse (called "Jan-baz"), the whole under Captain Woodburn of the 44th Bengal Native Infantry, who was also commandant of the 5th Infantry. The enemy were met with and defeated on the left bank of the Helmand, near Girishk, on the 3rd of July, but Woodburn could not follow up his success, as the "Jan-baz" would not fight. He pushed on to Girishk, where he was reinforced by Captain Griffin (24th Bengal Native Infantry) with the 1st Infantry, Shah Shuja's Force, two guns, and some cavalry. On the 17th of August, a more severe engagement took place at Sikandarabad, when Captain Griffin, with a detachment which included part of the 2nd Bengal Native Infantry, a wing of Christie's Horse, and the 1st and 5th Infantry Shah Shua's Force, totally defeated Akhtar Khan and dispersed his forces, his own loss being 12 killed, 102 wounded and 2 missing. The enemy retreated to their own valleys; to attack them there a large force was necessary, and preparations were accordingly made by Major-General Nott. Early in September he took the field in person with a considerable force, but, contrary to expectation, no resistance was met with, and Nott returned to Kandahar before the end of October.

The Duranis,  
July.





## BENGAL NATIVE ARMY.

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Meanwhile, events of some importance had been occurring elsewhere. Nasir Khan of Kalat surrendered to Lieutenant-Colonel Stacy, 43rd Native Infantry, in July. In the same month a trifling outbreak occurred in Kohistan, but was easily quelled. On the 5th August Lieutenant-Colonel Chambers, with detachments of the 5th Light Cavalry, the 4th Irregular Cavalry, and the 16th and 43rd Native Infantry, gained the temporary submission of the Ghilzais by a decided success over that tribe at Karutu, near the Saighan Pass.

General Nott's short expedition against the Duranis was not concluded before the news arrived of another serious outbreak of the Ghilzais, of which the immediate cause was the reduction by the Government of the allowances paid to the tribes who held the defiles between Peshawar and Kabul. The tribesmen visited Kabul and, receiving unsatisfactory replies to their requests from the envoy and the Amir, quitted the capital, occupied the passes, and cut off all communication between Kabul and the east. Sir Robert Sale, who was about to march to India with his brigade, on relief, was ordered to clear the road. His force consisted of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, a squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry, a troop of the 2nd Cavalry, Shah Shuja's Force, the 35th Native Infantry, two guns, and some sappers. The 35th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, marched in advance, on the 9th October, and encamped at Butkhak; here on the same night the camp was attacked, but the assailants were repulsed. Sale, having joined the advance, attacked and forced the Khurd Kabul Pass, on the 12th, with a loss of six killed and 33 wounded, he himself being among the latter. From this point the 13th Light Infantry with Sale returned to Butkhak; the remainder of the force, under Monteath, was again subject to a night attack on the 17th, which, however, was unsuccessful, though it inflicted on us the loss of one officer (Lieutenant Jenkins, 35th Native Infantry) and several sepoys. Sale now decided to push on to Tezin, which was reached on the 22nd, with the loss of one officer (Lieutenant E. King, 13th) and four men killed, two officers and 17 men wounded. Marching thence on the 26th and evading the Ghilzais, who had prepared to attack his force at the Pari Dara, he forced the Jagdalak Pass, on the 28th, and reached Gandamak on the 29th, but not without the heavy loss of 29 killed and 91 wounded. Among the former were Captain Wyndham of the 35th, who lost his life in a

Sale's Brigade  
on the march  
to Gandamak,  
October, 1841.





gallant endeavour to save that of a wounded soldier, and Subadars Ranjit Singh and Hardyal Singh and Jemadar Bhawani Singh, of the same regiment. On November 10th news reached Sale at Gandamak of the outbreak at Kabul. Unable from the weakness of his force and the want of camp equipage or supplies to return to the relief of the garrison there, he determined to occupy Jalalabad and marched into that place on November 13th.

About the same time, towards the end of October, a fresh outbreak occurred in Kohistan, which eventually resulted in one of the most painful incidents of the war. Charikar, the chief town of the district, was garrisoned by the 4th (Gurkha) Infantry of Shah Shuja's Force. On the 1st November, a strong insurgent force took up a position in the neighbourhood, cutting off the communication with Kabul. On the 3rd, Lieutenant Rattray, Assistant Political Agent, was treacherously killed at the termination of a conference with some of the insurgent chiefs, and from that date the fighting at and around Charikar was incessant. After heavy loss had been sustained (both Captain Codrington and Ensign Salusbury of the Gurkha battalion being among the slain), the utter failure of the water supply necessitated the evacuation of the place, and accordingly, on the 13th, the garrison, now reduced to 200 men, including Major Pottinger and Ensign Haughton, both wounded, Ensign Rose and Assistant-Surgeon Grant, retreated under cover of night. Dispersed, however, in the darkness, many fell by the hands of the insurgents, and many were taken prisoners and carried into slavery: Pottinger and Haughton, with one Gurkha, alone reached Kabul, though in the following year the latter officer collected 165 Gurkhas in the country round, who had escaped with their lives. All the wounded, as well as the wives and children of the sepoys, were massacred. At the same time the Kohistan Regiment mutinied and deserted, after killing their officers, Lieutenant Maule and Local-Lieutenant Wheeler.

It now remains to give a short account of the insurrection at Kabul and of the events which succeeded it, a story of defeat and disaster which make this one of the darkest pages in all the annals of the British arms in India.

On the 2nd November a tumult broke out in the city: the house of Sir Alexander Burnes (who had been nominated to succeed Sir William Macnaghten as Envoy) was attacked, and he, his brother

Charikar,  
November.

The Kabul out-  
break.





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(Lieutenant Charles Burnes, 17th Bombay Native Infantry), and Lieutenant W. Broadfoot of the 1st Bengal European Regiment, were, after a desperate defence, overpowered and slain by the insurgents. At this time the troops in Kabul were ---

The 1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Bengal Horse Artillery.

A battery of Artillery, Shah Shuja's Force.

A detachment of the Bengal Sappers and Miners.

A detachment of Sappers, Shah Shuja's Force (3 companies).

Two squadrons of the 5th Bengal Light Cavalry.

One *risalah* of the 1st Irregular Cavalry.

One *risalah* of the 4th Irregular Cavalry.

The 2nd Regiment of Cavalry, Shah Shuja's Force.

Her Majesty's 44th Foot.

The 5th Bengal Native Infantry.

The 54th ditto ditto.

The Envoy's Body-Guard.

The 6th Regiment of Infantry, Shah Shuja's Force.

The whole of these troops were under the command of Major-General W. G. K. Elphinstone, C.B., an officer of good repute, who had seen much service in various parts of the world (he had commanded the 33rd Foot at Waterloo), but he was at this time in an extremely bad state of health, and this interfered to a great extent with the proper performance of the onerous duties of his command: to this circumstance is to be attributed in a great measure the whole of the misfortunes which followed.

On the 3rd of November, the force was increased by the arrival of the 37th Bengal Native Infantry from Khurd Kabul.

On the following day the first misfortune occurred in the loss of the commissariat fort, with the whole of the supplies which it contained, which had to be abandoned in consequence of the delay which took place in reinforcing the small party which held it. On the 6th, Kila-i-Muhammad Sharif, which had been occupied by the enemy, was taken by storm by a detachment of three companies (one each from the 44th Foot and the 5th and 37th Native Infantry) commanded by Major Griffiths of the 37th. On the 10th the Rikabashi fort, of which the insurgents had taken possession, was retaken with the severe loss of 200 killed and wounded, amongst whom was numbered Colonel Mackrell of the 44th, an old Waterloo officer, who died the same day of his wounds. On the 13th an action was fought on the Bemaru heights, which, after a check which very nearly proved a disaster, ended in the





defeat of the enemy and the capture of their guns. Some days were now spent in fruitless discussions as to the best course to be pursued, for supplies were beginning to run low, while the enemy were increasing in numbers and boldness; but no action of any kind was taken. At length, on the 22nd November, Muhammad Akbar Khan, son of Dost Muhammad, arrived at Kabul, and on the following day the enemy again occupied the heights of Bemaru. Brigadier Shelton was sent out to dislodge them with seventeen companies of infantry (five of the 44th Foot, and six each of the 5th and 37th Native Infantry), 100 sappers, three squadrons of cavalry and *one* gun. The detachment was, however, mishandled, for Shelton, like Monson, though as brave a man as ever lived, was no general. The result was a disastrous defeat of the British force, which was only saved from annihilation by a charge of the cavalry and by the fall of one of the principal Afghan chiefs.

Little was now thought of but a retreat to India; supplies had failed, and cold and defeat had demoralised the remnant of the troops that still remained; while the whole country was up in arms against us. To this end, therefore, on the 11th December, negotiations were opened with Muhammad Akbar; in the midst of which, twelve days later, December the 23rd, the British Envoy, Sir William Macnaghten, was inveigled out of cantonments to a conference and treacherously murdered. Notwithstanding the evidence this act afforded that little reliance could be placed in the good faith of the enemy negotiations were still continued, and on the 6th of January 1842, after having sustained the humiliation of giving up to the enemy all the guns but six, and although the terms, both as regarded transport and escort, had not been fulfilled by the Afghans, the Kabul garrison, amounting to 4,500 fighting men, evacuated the positions they had held, and commenced their retreat to Jalalabad. Then ensued what might have been anticipated from a knowledge of the Afghan character. Scarcely had the troops left their cantonments when the Afghans began to attack them; day after day, through the defiles of Khurd Kabul, of the Tangi Tariki, of Jagdalak, their numbers grew less and less before the bullets of the Afghan *jazels* and the cold steel of the Afghan knives, aided by the bitter cold and the deep-lying snow. The widows, married people, and children were saved by being made over to the care of Muhammad Akbar at Khurd Kabul; General Elphinstone,

Murder of Sir  
William  
Macnaghten.

1842.

The retreat.





Brigadier Shelton, and Captain Johnson, who had gone to meet Muhammad Akbar at a conference at Jagdalak, were there taken prisoners by the Afghan chief, who detained them as hostages for the surrender of Jalalabad.\* Reduced at Jagdalak to about 150 men, the devoted remnants of the force struggled on into that last fatal pass, where a terrible fate awaited them. Hemmed in on every side by the murderous hordes of their enemies, only some twenty officers and forty-five men survived to see another day at Gandamak: here within a few miles of Jalalabad their merciless foes fell on them again: the remnant which escaped fell one by one by the way or were cut down by the enemy, until at length one only survived,† grievously wounded and almost overcome with exhaustion, to reach a haven of safety and tell the fate of Elphinstone's brigade to the garrison of Jalalabad.

Sir Robert Sale, as we have seen, occupied Jalalabad on the 13th November, 1841. Aided by that excellent officer, Captain George Broadfoot, of the Madras Army, Commandant of the Corps of Sappers of Shah Shuja's Force, he immediately set about restoring the fortifications of the place, which were in a most dilapidated condition, superintending the work with unceasing vigilance, although, in consequence of the severe wound he had received in forcing the Khurd Kabul Pass, he was unable to get about without assistance, and had to be carried from point to point in a litter. By the unremitting labours of the garrison, Jalalabad was soon in a respectable state of defence, but the severity of the season and the fury of the enemy were not all that these gallant men had to contend against. Even Nature herself seemed to be arrayed against them, for the walls had not long been restored when a violent shock of earthquake once more reduced them to ruins, and in some places even levelled them with the ground. But the calamity was met with becoming fortitude; the weary work was promptly recommenced, and soon once more the walls were raised, and the place made secure against all the efforts of the enemy, who, under Muhammad Akbar Khan, were in great force in the neighbourhood.

Defence of  
Jalalabad.

Early in the siege the question of surrendering the place, in

\* Major-General Elphinstone died in captivity, at Badiabad, on the 23rd April 1842.—P.

† Assistant-Surgeon W. Brydon.



obedience to orders received from Major-General Elphinstone, when he capitulated at Kabul, came under the consideration of Sale and a Council of War. It has been said proverbially that "a Council, of War never fights," and in this instance there was no exception to the rule. Considering themselves abandoned, and hopeless of relief, Sale and the majority of the Council were for yielding, and notwithstanding the sterner counsels of Broadfoot, Oldfield, and Backhouse, who strongly urged the more worthy course of holding on to the place to the last, proposals for the evacuation of Jalalabad, on the condition of a safe conduct to Peshawar, were actually addressed to the enemy. An implied doubt of the sincerity with which these proposals were made afforded an opportunity of reconsidering and withdrawing them; manlier counsels prevailed and Jalalabad remained in our hands, to be defended with a tenacity which has extorted universal admiration.

From November, 1841, to April, 1842, Sale's Brigade continued straitly shut up within the walls of Jalalabad, except only when the occasional nearer approach of the Afghans afforded opportunity for a sortie. In one of these sallies (24th March, 1842) the gallant Broadfoot received a severe wound which deprived the garrison of his valuable services for the remainder of the siege.

This was now rapidly approaching its termination. A relieving force, under the command of Major-General Pollock, was on its way, but on the 7th April, a week before it reached Jalalabad, the garrison sallied forth and inflicted a crushing defeat upon the enemy and practically relieved themselves. The available force on that day was something under 1,500 men, including the 13th Light Infantry, the 35th Native Infantry, Broadfoot's Sappers, and a squadron and a half of native cavalry; while that of Muhammad Akbar is described as not less than 6,000. The enemy were drawn up in a strong position to receive the attack, but they were speedily driven from it with severe loss and their army entirely dispersed. Sale's loss was 11 killed and 71 wounded; among the former being the gallant Colonel Dennie, of the 13th Light Infantry, a distinguished officer who had served under Lord Lake in the early years of the century, had witnessed the conquest of the Isle of France, and gone through three arduous campaigns in Burma with much credit, and who had led the storming





party at the capture of Ghazni three years before. The whole of the Afghan camp was captured and several British guns re-taken, together with a quantity of provisions. Of these latter it is related that when the Brigadier divided amongst his troops the sheep taken from the enemy, the 35th Native Infantry desired that their share might be given to the 13th Light Infantry, who, they said, were in more need of animal food than themselves,—a striking instance of the good fellowship which has so often existed between British and Native corps, especially in times of hardship and trial.

In India, in the meantime, as soon as intelligence was received of the outbreak at Kabul, strenuous efforts were made to push up reinforcements, and before the middle of January 1842 a brigade,—consisting of a squadron of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, and the 30th, 53rd, 60th, and 64th Native Infantry, in all about 4,300 men, with five guns (which had been borrowed from the Sikhs),—was at Peshawar under the command of Brigadier Wild. As a preparatory step to advancing to the relief of Jalalabad, Wild, on the 15th January, sent forward the 53rd and 64th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, to take possession of Ali Masjid. This was easily accomplished, and on the 19th the Brigadier himself moved forward with the remaining two regiments and four guns; but the Afridis had now risen and closed the pass, and were prepared to resist the advance of any more troops into the Khaibar; Wild encountered them at the mouth of the pass and a severe engagement ensued, but owing to the worthlessness of the Sikh guns, which broke down at the first discharge, and to the inadequacy of the force, the attempt to get through to Ali Masjid proved a complete failure; the troops were beaten back and obliged to retire to Jamrud with considerable loss, Brigadier Wild himself and three other officers being amongst the wounded. In the meantime, Moseley, exposed to incessant attacks, had found it impossible to maintain himself at Ali Masjid, and on the 24th he was compelled to evacuate the place and retreat to Jamrud, exposed the whole way to an incessant fire from the Afridis. The loss of Moseley's detachment was heavy, as was that of another detachment sent to the entrance of the Khaibar Pass to cover his retirement. Altogether the loss amounted to 37 killed (including Captain Lock, 5th Native Infantry—attached to the 60th,—Captain Wilson, 64th

Repulse in the  
Khaibar.



General  
 Pollock's  
 advance.

Native Infantry, and Subadars Ram Singh and Sukhlal Upadhia, 53rd Native Infantry) and 232 wounded (including six British and eight Native officers). This check had a fatal effect on the force and it was not until Major-General Pollock, who had been appointed to command the forces moving into Afghanistan, arrived and assumed the command that any real progress was made in preparing for an advance. But, with all his energy, it was the 5th of April before Pollock was able to march from Peshawar. The force under his command was organised as follows:—

**ARTILLERY:** Under Captain A. Abbott—One troop of horse artillery, two light field batteries, and Backhouse's Mountain Train.

**CAVALRY:** Under Brigadier M. White—3rd Light Dragoons, 1st Light Cavalry, a detachment of the 5th Light Cavalry, 10th Light Cavalry, 3rd Irregular Cavalry, and a detachment of Anderson's Horse (late 2nd Cavalry, Shah Shuja's Force.)

**INFANTRY:** Under Major-General J. M'Caskill, K.H.

**1ST BRIGADE:** Major-General Sir R. H. Sale, K.C.B.—13th Foot, 35th Native Infantry, Broadfoot's Sappers, and the Khaibar Rangers.

**2ND BRIGADE:** Brigadier W. H. Dennie, C.B.:—9th Foot, 26th and 60th Native Infantry, and the 5th Company of Sappers and Miners.

**3RD BRIGADE:** Brigadier C. F. Wild—30th, 53rd and 64th Native Infantry.

**4TH BRIGADE:** Brigadier T. Monteath—31st Foot, 6th and 33rd Native Infantry.

Of these troops, however, Backhouse's Mountain Train, Broadfoot's Sappers, the detachments of the 5th Light Cavalry and of Anderson's Horse, the 13th Foot and the 35th Native Infantry were then at Jalalabad; the 31st Foot and the 6th Native Infantry had not yet arrived at Peshawar, and thus Pollock made his forward movement with only the following corps and detachments:—

The 3rd Light Dragoons, the 1st and 10th Light Cavalry, and a detachment of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

A troop of horse artillery, two light field batteries, and some siege guns.

A company of Bengal Sappers and Miners.

The 9th Foot, the 26th, 30th, 33rd, 53rd, 60th, and 64th Native Infantry, and a corps of Afghan riflemen styled "Ferris's Jazelchis."

General Pollock's advance was planned and conducted with the greatest care and circumspection. On the date abovenamed, his force advanced in three columns, the right and left preceding the centre and crowning the heights on either side of the Khaibar





Pass. The enemy (Afridis and other Khaibaris) made a determined and obstinate resistance, but after a succession of severe combats they were driven from every position they had taken up, and the pass was forced with a loss on our side of 14 killed, 104 wounded, and 17 missing. Pollock, pushing forward, reached Jalalabad on the 16th of April, only to find that the garrison had already, unaided, broken up the siege of the place and effected its own relief. Here in the following month he was joined by the 31st Foot and the 6th Native Infantry.

It is now necessary to describe the doings in southern Afghanistan during the preceding six months. In November 1841, the force at Major-General Nott's disposal consisted of Her Majesty's 40th Foot, the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd, and 43rd Native Infantry, the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Infantry of Shah Shuja's Force (or portions of these corps), a detachment of the 1st Irregular Cavalry, the 1st Cavalry of Shah Shuja's Force (Christie's Horse), and some details of artillery. Summoned by Sir William Macnaghten, one brigade, under the command of Colonel McLaren, marched in November for the relief of our forces at Kabul, but, being unable (so, at least, it was alleged) to overcome the difficulties of bad weather and want of food, it returned to Kandahar on the 8th December, having reinforced the garrison of Kalat-i-Ghilzai with 300 of the 43rd Native Infantry.

Events at  
Kandahar.

Ghazni was at this time held by the 27th Native Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer. The insurgents appeared before the place on the 20th November, and on the 7th December began closely besieging it. On the 17th the defenders were compelled to abandon the city and take refuge in the fort. Here they suffered greatly from cold and want of provisions and water until the 6th of March, when the place was surrendered. The garrison were not however suffered, as they had been promised, to depart in safety; a few days after the capitulation they were furiously attacked by *ghazis*; for three days they sustained from house to house an unequal combat with their foes; at length some of the sepoys determined to cut their way out and try to make across country to Peshawar, which they believed to be only fifty or sixty miles off; on the 10th they started on their mad attempt, only to be cut down or taken prisoners in the snow-covered fields. The whole of the British officers (except one,—

Defence of  
Ghazni, 1841-42.





Lieutenant Lumsden,—who had fallen during the fighting) became prisoners, and remained in captivity for many months, subjected to the severest privations.

Operations at  
Kandahar.

At Kandahar, Nott easily held his own against the insurgent gatherings that appeared in his neighbourhood. On several occasions (at Kali-Shak on the 12th January; Kanji-Kak, Panjwai and Tilu-Khan on the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th March; and at Baba-Wali on the 25th March) he defeated and drove off the Duranis by whom the place was threatened. During his absence on one of these expeditions, the Afghans made a furious night attack on Kandahar (10th March), evidently hoping to carry the place with a rush. Every attempt was, however, repelled by the garrison, under the command of Major Lane, 2nd Native Infantry, and eventually the enemy drew off after having sustained heavy loss. On the 10th of May Nott was joined by Major-General England, with the 41st Foot and some Bombay troops from Sindh.

Defence of  
Kalat-i-Ghilzai.

The first measure now to be undertaken was the relief of the fort of Kalat-i-Ghilzai. This place had been garrisoned since November of the preceding year by the 3rd Infantry of Shah Shuja's Force, under Captain J. H. Craigie, and 40 British artillerymen; in December, as has been noticed, it had been reinforced by 300 of the 43rd Native Infantry. After sustaining a close blockade for several weeks, which was preceded by the hardships occasioned by the severity of the winter and the hostility of the surrounding country, the little garrison successfully defeated with great loss a determined attack by the enemy on the 21st of May. A week later they were relieved by Colonel Wymer from Kandahar, who withdrew the garrison and destroyed the works, and, after visiting Girishk, returned to Kandahar on the 7th June. In recognition of its gallantry, the 3rd Infantry was at a subsequent period taken into the Company's service, and is still, as the 12th Bengal Infantry, permitted to bear the name of "KALAT-I-GHILZAI," with which it is so honorably connected.

Taking advantage of the absence of Colonel Wymer and the greater part of the force, the Duranis to the number of about 8,000 men, led by Aktar Khan, came down on Kandahar on the 29th May. Nott moved out at once with a force of about 2,000 men, which included the 42nd and 43rd Native Infantry, and gave the





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enemy a complete overthrow, inflicting on them heavy loss, while the casualties in his own force amounted to no more than one killed and 52 wounded.

It was not until August that General Nott received permission to advance on Kabul, and on the 10th he left Kandahar with the following force :—

Nott's  
advance on  
Kabul.

Two troops of horse artillery, one 9-pounder foot battery, four 18-pounders, with two companies of Bengal foot artillery; the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, three *risalahs* of the 1st Irregular Cavalry, five *risalahs* of the 1st Cavalry of Shah Shuja's Contingent (Christie's Horse); the 40th and 41st Foot, the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd, and 43rd Native Infantry, and the 3rd Infantry of Shah Shuja's Contingent.

The remainder of the force, including the Bombay troops not detailed to move northwards, two *risalahs* of Christie's Horse, and three infantry regiments of Shah Shuja's Contingent, returned to India through the Bolan.

During his march towards Kabul, Nott had several engagements with the enemy. An unfortunate cavalry affair took place near Kila Azim and Karez Usman Khan, on the 28th August, in which more than seventy casualties occurred on our side, including two officers (both of the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry) killed and three wounded. On the 30th at Karabagh, near Goaine, thirty-five miles from Ghazni, a very large force of Afghans was completely defeated and dispersed with a loss on our side of about thirty killed and wounded.\* Ghazni was reached on September 4th and evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 5th, after an engagement in which Nott's force suffered a loss of three killed and 43 wounded : 327 of the 27th Native Infantry were here released from captivity; the walls of the citadel were demolished; and, by order of Lord Ellenborough, the famous gates of the temple of Somnath were carried off from the tomb of Sultan Mahmud. The march was resumed on the 10th September, and after further engagements with the enemy, on the 14th and 15th, near Beni Badam and Maidan (in which a loss of 4 killed and 59 wounded was sustained, including Subadar Jham Singh, 43rd Native Infantry, mortally wounded), Nott reached Kabul on September the 17th.

\* Our losses in these two engagements are very inconveniently "lumped" together in General Nott's casualty returns. These returns show a total of 38 killed (including two officers) and 66 wounded (including four officers). The casualties at Beni Badam on the 14th and at Maidan on the 15th September are also "lumped" together in the same way.—P.



General Pollock, however, was there before him. Leaving Jalalabad on the 20th of August, he pushed on his advance with surprising rapidity though opposed daily by the Afghans. His force included in the 1st Division the 26th and 35th Native Infantry and a company of Sappers and Miners, and in the 2nd Division the 33rd and 60th Native Infantry, as well as two troops of horse artillery, one field battery, the 1st Bengal Light Cavalry, and 600 of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry. Following, whenever opposed, his tactics of crowning the heights on either side of the pass, Pollock,—defeating the enemy at Mamu Khel on the 24th (in which action he lost 7 men killed and 4 officers and 45 men wounded), and again at Jagdalak on the 8th September (when his casualties amounted to 6 killed and 58 wounded,—Captain Nugent, of the Commissariat Department being amongst the former),—drove all before him until the 12th September, when, in the Tezin Valley, his flanks were assailed in a very daring manner by the enemy, who, though repulsed and driven off, returned in the evening and kept up a series of harassing attacks throughout the night. On the morning of the 13th Pollock advanced to the mouth of the Tezin pass, where he left the 3rd Light Dragoons, part of the 1st Light Cavalry, and the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, to cover his rear, but he had no sooner quitted the valley than the Afghan horse appeared and, as had been anticipated, made a movement to fall upon the baggage train; the attempt was fatal to them, for the dragoons and the native cavalry, catching them in comparatively open ground, made a brilliant charge, completely routing them, cutting up large numbers, and capturing a standard, which was taken by Captain Goad of the 1st Light Cavalry. While this combat was proceeding in the valley, Pollock, with the main body of his force, was slowly winning his way up the Tezin pass, though obstinately opposed at every step by Muhammad Akbar Khan, who had that day brought into the field a force of 16,000 men. Infuriated by the sight of the remains of their comrades who had fallen in the retreat a few months before, the British soldier and the sepoy alike fought with irresistible spirit; the Afghans were expelled from every position they took up, and finally after a severe contest the Haft Kotal was surmounted and the enemy driven in headlong flight towards Kabul, with the loss of all their guns (three in number) and of probably from 1,200 to 1,500 men killed and wounded. Our own losses amounted to 32 killed and 130 (including four British officers)





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wounded, among the former being a most gallant and distinguished Native officer, Haidar Ali, the Native Commandant of Ferris's Jazelchis.

This was the last effort of Muhammad Akbar. Barring a series of attacks on his rear-guard and baggage train, on the 9th, 10th and 11th, in which a loss of 6 killed and 59 wounded was sustained, Pollock's farther advance to Kabul was absolutely unopposed, and that place was reached on the 15th September, two days before the arrival of the force from Kandahar under Major-General Nott. A week later the whole of the British captives in the hands of the Afghans (those from Ghazni as well as those taken at Kabul and in the passes), having practically effected their own deliverance, arrived in Pollock's camp. On the 25th a force was detached under Major-General M'Caskill, consisting of one battery of 9-pounders and two 18-pounders, seven squadrons of cavalry, Broadfoot's Sappers, and five regiments of infantry, including the 26th, 42nd, and 43rd Native Infantry. This force marched against Istalif, in Kohistan, defeated the Afghan force which had taken refuge there (29th September), seized the town, and set fire to it in several places. The casualties in this affair amounted to one officer and five men killed, and four officers and 41 men wounded. Prince Shahpur was now chosen to ascend the throne in the place of Shah Shuja, who had been murdered in the preceding April. The great bazar of Kabul was blown up as a mark of British vengeance; and on October the 12th the return march to India was commenced. The rear-guard, formed by General Nott's force, was, in the retirement, several times engaged with the enemy; on the 14th, 15th and 16th October in the Haft Kotal Pass, where a loss was sustained of 7 killed and 58 wounded; in the Jagdalak Pass on the 18th (7 killed and 37 wounded); at Gandamak on the 19th (2 killed and 15 wounded), and on the 4th and 6th November near Ali Masjid, where the loss sustained was 4 killed and 19 wounded; amongst the latter was Lieutenant Chamberlain of Christie's Horse (now General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, G.C.B.), who was here wounded for the sixth time that year. Late in the evening of the 3rd, near Garhi Lala Beg, the rear-guard of Brigadier Wild's brigade was rushed in the darkness by a body of Afridis and sustained a loss of 19 killed and 32 wounded, Lieutenant Christie, of the Artillery, Ensign Nicholson, 30th Native Infantry, and Subadar Siu-din Singh, 53rd Native Infantry, being amongst the former;

Evacuation of  
Afghanistan,  
October 1842.



two guns of the mountain train were also lost, but they were recovered next day. Peshawar was reached by the rear-guard on the 6th, and then the march to Ferozepore was begun.

In the meantime, in India, the Government had found it necessary to adopt measures of precaution against a new danger which had begun to develop itself. This was the hostility which for many months past the Sikhs, as a nation, had exhibited towards us, and which was, in fact, the beginning of the animosity which eventually found expression in the war of 1845-46. So marked was this hostility that apprehensions were entertained that the Sikhs would take advantage of any opportunity that might present itself of falling upon General Pollock's force during its march through the Punjab. As a support, therefore, to Pollock, and as a menace to the Sikh capital in the event of any overt act of hostility, a powerful force was assembled at Ferozepore in the autumn of 1842, under the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Jasper Nicolls, in person. This was styled "The Army of Reserve," and was organised as follows :—

**ARTILLERY :—**Under Brigadier C. Graham, C.B.—

- Four troops of horse artillery.
- Four companies of foot artillery.
- Three light field batteries.

**ENGINEERS :—**Under Major E. J. Smith.—

- Two companies of Sappers and Miners.

**CAVALRY :—**Under Major-General Sir J. Thackwell, K.C.B.—

- 1st Brigade*—The 16th Light Dragoons (Lancers), the 7th Light Cavalry, and the 4th Irregular Cavalry.
- 2nd Brigade*—The 3rd Light Cavalry and the 6th Irregular Cavalry.

**FIRST INFANTRY DIVISION :—**Under Major-General J. Dennis.—

- 1st Brigade*—The 1st European Light Infantry, and the 1st and 2nd Light Infantry Battalions.
- 2nd Brigade*—The 3rd Foot (the Buffs), and the 9th and 10th Native Infantry.

**SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION :—**Under Major-General W. Rattine, C.B.—

- 3rd Brigade*—The 39th Foot, and the 59th and 72nd Native Infantry.
- 4th Brigade*—The 2nd European Regiment, the 39th Native Infantry, and the Sirmoor Battalion.

The precaution taken had the desired effect. Sikh turbulence was overawed for the time, and the army returning from Afghanistan was allowed to proceed unmolested. Marching across the Punjab, Pollock's force reached Ferozepore in three detachments on the





17th, 19th and 23rd December, and then after a period of general festivity, ending in a grand review of the united forces (40,000 men, with 100 guns) before the Governor-General, the army was dispersed and returned to cantonments. So ended the first Afghan War.

The satisfaction of the Governor-General at the conclusion of the war is evinced by his complimentary orders to the army. For the second campaign a further donation of six months' batta was made to all troops serving in and above the Khaibar or the Bolan Pass on the 8th September, 1842. Corps engaged in the actions around KANDAHAR, in the defence of JALALABAD and KALAT-I-GHILZAI, the re-capture of GHAZNI and the re-occupation of KABUL, received permission to bear those names upon their colours. All ranks present in the actions at Kandahar and Ghazni and those leading to the re-occupation of Kabul, received a medal inscribed with the names of the same and the date "1842" under-written. Additional medals were given to the garrisons of Jalalabad and Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and the corps engaged in the former received permission to wear a mural crown on their appointments in commemoration of the siege. The 3rd Regiment of Shah Shuja's infantry were, in consideration of their valour and discipline in the defence of Kalat-i-Ghilzai, brought on the strength of the Bengal Army as an extra regiment, and denominated "The Regiment of Kalat-i-Ghilzai." The 2nd and 16th Native Infantry were made grenadier regiments, and the 38th, 42nd, and 43rd were made Light Infantry,—(G. O. G. G., 4th October, 1843). The corps which still exist of those thus honored are the Sappers and Miners, the 1st Irregular Cavalry (1st Bengal Cavalry), the 33rd (4th), 42nd (5th), and 43rd (6th) Native Infantry, and the Kalat-i-Ghilzai Regiment (12th).

Embarrassed as the Indian Government was with the great and unexpected expenses of the Afghan campaigns, it was nevertheless unable to avoid taking part in another expedition at almost the opposite extremity of Asia. This was the first Chinese war, the cause of which was the forcible destruction of two and a half million pounds worth of British property by the Chinese authorities, in a violent effort to destroy the opium traffic. As in the Burmese war, however, the prejudices of the Bengal sepoys, as well as the pressing need for troops on the western frontier, prevented any but a very small contingent being despatched from this presidency, the greater part of the

War in China,  
1840-42.





Native soldiery employed being from Madras. Volunteers to form one regiment were called for by G. O. C. C. of the 20th January, 1840, "for service to the eastward;" and this corps, together with the 18th, 26th and 49th Foot, sailed from Calcutta in April of that year. The island of Chusan was occupied on the 5th of July, and here the British force remained during the rest of the year, in which time all the regiments suffered terribly from sickness.

1841.

Attempts at negotiation having failed, the fort of Chuenpee, situated on an island in the Canton river, was attacked and taken on January the 7th, 1841, with trifling loss. Six weeks of desultory negotiations then ensued, during which the island of Chusan was evacuated by the British. On the 19th February hostilities were resumed, and during the next fortnight some hard fighting took place in attacks on the forts at the mouth of the Canton river. On the 24th of May Canton itself was attacked, and during that and the next six days the heights above the place were occupied and several other advantages obtained, with a loss on our side of 15 killed and 122 wounded; the city itself was, however, not entered, negotiations having been resumed, and the place ransomed for six million dollars. From Canton the force was moved to Hong-Kong, where it again suffered terribly from disease.

About this time the Bengal Volunteer-Battalion (except a detachment under Major Mee, which remained in China and took part in subsequent operations up to August, 1841) returned to India, where, on their arrival they were complimented in a G. O. (No. 122 of 1841) for the alacrity with which they had volunteered for the service, and received one month's full pay and batta as a gratuity, with special leave to their homes before rejoining their several regiments.

1842.

At the end of August operations were resumed, and Amoy, Chusan, Chinhae, and Ningpo were captured by the British. During the winter operations were suspended, but were re-commenced in March, 1842, by an attack by the Chinese on the British force at Ningpo, which was repulsed with very heavy loss to the enemy.

Major Mee's detachment was sent back to India in March, 1842, previous to which, in G.O. No. 291 of 1841, another battalion of volunteers was called for in Bengal, and was formed of companies from eight different regiments,—the 3rd, 15th, 17th, 23rd, 32nd, 41st, 52nd, and 56th Native Infantry. This corps, however, was delayed at



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Calcutta, and did not arrive in China until June, 1842, when it joined the expedition then about to set out for the Yang-tse-Kiang. Chin-Kiang-Foo was reached on the 15th of July and taken by storm on the 21st, with a loss on our side of 34 killed, 107 wounded, and 3 missing. On this occasion, as is recorded in a complimentary G. O. dated October 14th, three companies of the Bengal Volunteers, under Major Kent, had the good fortune to be the first engaged with the enemy. The battalion had three men wounded. The Chinese troops were scattered with great loss. This victory was the last engagement of the war, for before the British force could advance on Nankin, the Chinese sued for peace, and a treaty was concluded on August the 17th.

To the troops employed in the earlier part of the campaign, up to June, 1841, twelve months' full batta was presented; for the latter operations six months' batta was given, while all ranks received a medal, and certain honorary distinctions were granted to the British and Madras regiments.—(G. O. No. 54 of 1842).

In 1840-41-42, while the wars in Afghanistan and China were still proceeding, disturbances of a somewhat serious character occurred in Bundelkhand and in the Saugor and Nerbadda territories, which necessitated the employment of a considerable military force for their suppression. The first notable outbreak was that at Chirgaon, a small town lying about eighty miles south-west of Kalpi, the *jaghirdar* of which place went into rebellion and began committing depredations in the surrounding country: a force of nearly 2,000 men (which included the Bundelkhand Legion and part of the 13th Native Infantry) was employed in the reduction of the place, which was evacuated by the insurgents (April, 1841) after two days' operations and the capture by storm of one of the outworks. In an action near Malthone, in April, 1842, Captain Ralfe, of the 3rd Native Infantry, was mortally wounded. In June, 1842, an action took place at Panwari, in which a squadron of the 8th Light Cavalry and two companies of the 13th Native Infantry defeated a body of 3,000 Bundela insurgents, killing upwards of eighty, including their leader. In December, 1842, a smart engagement was fought at Bhagaura, near Jaitpur, in which detachments of the 40th and 57th Native Infantry defeated a considerable body of insurgents. Subadar Yar Khan, 51st Native Infantry, was killed in a skirmish

Disturbances  
in Bundel-  
khand.





## THE SERVICES OF THE

# CSL

### The conquest of Sindh.

Battle of Miani, February 17th, 1843.

with a body of rebels in February, 1843. Several other engagements took place in various parts of the disturbed districts, and it was not until the summer of 1843 that order was eventually restored. The troops employed from time to time in the suppression of the disturbances were the 8th Light Cavalry, the 2nd and 8th Irregular Cavalry, the 3rd, 11th, 13th, 24th, 40th, 50th, 51st, 57th and 61st Native Infantry, and the Bundelkhand Legion.

Scarcely were the campaigns in Afghanistan and China concluded when the Indian Government found themselves involved in a war with the Baluch Amirs of Sindh. A long course of intrigues and misunderstandings came to a head in a treacherous attack on the Residency of Hyderabad on the 15th February, 1843. Major-General Sir Charles J. Napier, commanding in Sindh and Baluchistan, who was then at Halla, thirty-five miles to the north-west of Hyderabad, immediately marched towards that place with such troops as were then available in that part of Sindh. His force consisted of—

The 9th Bengal Light Cavalry, a detail of the Poona Horse, the Sindh Horse, two companies of artillery, one company of Madras sappers, Her Majesty's 22nd Foot, and the 1st, 12th, and 25th Bombay Native Infantry.

With these troops, amounting to less than 2,800 men, with twelve pieces of artillery, Sir Charles met and attacked the enemy (20,000 strong) at Miani, six miles from Hyderabad, on February the 17th. Rather less than 1,800 of the British troops were actually engaged in the battle which ensued, Major Outram being absent with a detachment of 200, while the detail of the Poona Horse and four companies of infantry were employed as a baggage guard. The enemy were strongly posted on and beyond the dry bed of the *Fulaili nala*, of which the high banks served as a rampart, while their flanks rested on thick jungle impassable for cavalry. Napier made a frontal attack, advancing in echelon of regiments across the plain, and our troops were met as they came to close quarters by repeated and determined charges of the Baluch infantry: for three hours a stubborn hand-to-hand fight was maintained, until at length the fortunes of the day were decided by a brilliant charge of the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry and the Sindh Horse, under Colonel Pattle, who, breaking through the enemy's right, swept across the *nala* and fell on their rear. Slowly they began to give way, and, disputing every inch of ground, they were gradually driven from the field, leaving their camp, stores, and artillery in the hands of the victors.



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The loss of the enemy was reckoned at 5,000, but was probably not so great; that of the British was 6 British officers and 56 men killed, 13 British officers, 3 Native officers, and 178 men wounded. Among the killed was Captain Cookson, of the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry.

Sir Charles Napier entered Hyderabad on the 20th February, and on the 12th of March the annexation of the whole of Sindh was proclaimed, and the Baluch Sardars who had tendered their submission were deported to Bombay.

One powerful chief, Mir Sher Muhammad, of Mirpur, still remained in arms at the head of about 20,000 men, and posted himself at Dabba, about four miles from Hyderabad, where Sir Charles Napier, who had received reinforcements (principally Bombay troops) which had brought the strength of his force up to 5,000 men, attacked him on the 24th March. Here again the enemy were strongly posted behind a *nala*, and the resistance which they offered was, while it lasted, as firm and gallant as that they had made at Miani; but shaken by a raking cross-fire from the British artillery they began to give ground, and the advance of the infantry, led by the 22nd Foot, and the turning of both flanks by the cavalry, speedily completed their discomfiture. They gave way in utter rout and were pursued for many miles with much slaughter, and the conquest of Sindh was complete. The British loss amounted to two officers and 37 men killed, and 10 officers and 221 men wounded, Captain Garrett, of the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry, being numbered amongst the former.

Battle of  
Hyderabad,  
24th March,  
1843.

For these successes the troops received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament; a medal was conferred on all ranks, inscribed with the names "MEEANEE" and "HYDERABAD;" and those names, with that of "SCINDE," were authorised to be borne on the colours of all corps engaged in the two actions.

In April, 1843, a sudden outbreak took place at Kaithal, in the Karnal District. The Kaithal territories having lapsed to the British Government, Mr. Greathed, a civil officer, proceeded to the town to settle the affairs of the State, escorted by about 150 men of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry and two companies of the 72nd Native Infantry. On the 9th April the escort was suddenly attacked by the people of the place, and compelled to retire to Karnal after having sustained

Kaithal,  
1843.





The Gwalior  
campaign,  
1843.

heavy loss. One Native officer of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, (Ressadar Sarmast Khan) and all those of the two companies of the 72nd (Subadars Parsan Dicht and Hassan Khan, and Jemadars Hara Singh and Gangacharan Misser) were killed, and Lieutenant Farr of the 72nd was severely wounded in the conflict. A considerable force had to be sent to Kaithal before order was restored.

The death of the Maharajah of Gwalior (Sindhia), and the disturbances incidental to the succession of a minor, necessitated British intervention in the affairs of that State towards the close of 1843, and eventually involved the Government of India in the last of the wars with the Mahratta powers. It was at first expected that a simple demonstration would be sufficient to put an end to disturbances which had already begun to affect injuriously the peace of British districts bordering on the Gwalior territories, and accordingly with that object, in the autumn of 1843, orders were issued for the assembly of forces which were for the time designated the "Army of Exercise." The mere concentration of troops did not, however, produce the beneficial effect which had been anticipated, and eventually, in December, under the designation of the Right and Left wings of the Army of Gwalior, the forces which had been assembled at Agra and Jhansi were moved forward to attack Gwalior, respectively, from the north and the south.

The composition of the two wings of the Army of Gwalior was as follows :—

*Right Wing* :—Three troops of horse artillery; four companies of foot artillery; three companies of sappers; the 16th Light Dragoons, the Body Guard, the 1st, 4th and 10th Light Cavalry, and detachments of the 5th and 8th; the 4th Irregular Cavalry; the 39th and 40th Foot, the 2nd, 14th, 16th, 31st, 39th (one company), 43rd, 56th, 62nd and 70th Native Infantry, and the Regiment of Kalat-i-Ghilzai.

*Left Wing* :—Two troops of horse artillery; one company of foot artillery; one company of sappers; the 9th Light Dragoons (two squadrons), the 5th (two squadrons), 8th and 11th (two squadrons) Light Cavalry; the 8th Irregular Cavalry; the 3rd and 50th Foot, the 39th, 50th, 51st and 58th Native Infantry, and the Sipri Contingent.

The cavalry were organised in four brigades, and the infantry in three divisions of two brigades each. The 1st and 2nd Brigades of Cavalry and the 1st Division (1st and 2nd Brigades) of Infantry formed the Left Wing under Major-General Grey. The 3rd and



4th Brigades of Cavalry and the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of Infantry constituted the Right Wing. The 2nd and 3rd Divisions were commanded respectively by Major-Generals Dennis and Littler.

The Right Wing, under the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Hugh Gough, and accompanied by the Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough, in person, crossed the Chambal river on the 22nd and 23rd December, and reached Hingona on the 26th. Advancing thence on the morning of the 29th, Sir Hugh Gough found the Mahrattas numbering about 18,000 men, with a powerful artillery, drawn up in a very strongly entrenched position in front of the villages of Maharajpur and Chaunda, about fifteen miles to the north-west of Gwalior. The 5th Brigade (39th Foot and 56th Native Infantry), under the command of Brigadier Wright, was forthwith launched against the village of Maharajpur under cover of the fire of two light field batteries, while the 3rd Brigade (40th Foot, and 2nd and 10th Native Infantry) under Major-General Valiant was directed to take the village in reverse, both movements being supported by the 4th Brigade (14th, 31st and 43rd Native Infantry) under the command of Brigadier Stacy. After a desperate contest, often hand-to-hand, these troops drove the enemy from Maharajpur; then moving on Chaunda the 5th Brigade, after a severe conflict, carried that position too, while the 3rd and 4th Brigades, co-operating, drove the Mahrattas from the villages of Shikarpur and Dompura. The cavalry at the same time were fully employed, and a spirited charge of the 4th Irregular Cavalry, resulting in the capture of two guns and two standards, was specially mentioned in the Commander-in-Chief's despatch. In the end the enemy were driven from the field with heavy loss, leaving in our possession fifty-six guns and the whole of their ammunition wagons. In this severe engagement the 16th and 56th Native Infantry were greatly distinguished and suffered heavily. The loss on our side was great, amounting to 106 killed, 684 wounded, and 7 missing, making a total of 797. Major-General Churchill, c.b., Quarter-Master-General, Queen's troops, Lieutenant-Colonel Sanders, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Lieutenant Leathes, of the Artillery, Major Crommelin, 1st Light Cavalry, Lieutenant Newton, 16th Native Infantry, Subadar-Major Jodha Singh, *Bahadur*, 4th Light Cavalry, and Jemadar Khushial Singh, 16th Native Infantry, were numbered

Battle of  
Maharajpur,  
December 29th,  
1843.





Battle of  
Panjar, De-  
cember 29th.

amongst the slain, and 34 officers were wounded, including Major-Generals Valiant and Littler. One native officer, Jemadar Ajudhia Singh, 16th Native Infantry—died of his wounds.

On the same day Major-General Grey, with the Left Wing of the Army of Gwalior, advancing from the south, gained a decisive victory over another Mahratta army. Having crossed the Sindh river at Chandpur, that officer reached Barka-ka-Sarai on the 28th December, and there heard that the enemy, 12,000 strong, were in position at Antri, seven miles off. On the following day he made a long march to Panjar, about twelve miles from Gwalior, the Mahrattas at the same time quitting Antri and proceeding by a parallel movement until they reached the fortified village of Mangor, near Panjar, where they took up a strong position on the heights four miles to the east of the British camp, and began an attack on General Grey's long line of baggage. Detaching all the cavalry he could spare to protect the baggage, Grey attacked the enemy's centre with the 3rd Buffs, the 39th Native Infantry and a company of sappers, who carried every position before them, notwithstanding a galling fire from the enemy's guns, while the 50th Foot and a wing of the 50th Native Infantry, supported by the 58th Native Infantry, attacked and routed the enemy's left. After a conflict of two hours the Mahrattas were driven from their position with heavy loss in men and also with the loss of all their guns (twenty-four in number) and the whole of their ammunition. The loss on our side amounted to 35 killed (including two officers) and 182 wounded (including Brigadier Yates and six other officers). These two victories brought the campaign to a speedy termination, and order was soon restored in the Gwalior territories.

A bronze medal, made from the material of the captured guns, was issued to all ranks engaged in the campaign, and the several corps engaged in the battles of MAHARAJPUR and PANJAR were permitted to inscribe those names on their colours and appointments. Subsequently, a memorial column to those who had fallen was erected at Calcutta.

At this point it will be convenient to glance briefly at such interior changes and other matters of interest of the period as have not already been mentioned.

In October, 1840, three battalions of Light Infantry were formed at Meerut and Cawnpore from the light companies of various

Plank Bat-  
talions, 1840.



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corps, and during the progress of the Afghan War the 1st and 2nd of these battalions were moved up to Ferozepore and Ludhiana.

They were composed as follow :—

*1st Light Infantry Battalion* :—the light companies of the 7th, 8th, 13th, 17th, 21st, 29th, and 31st Native Infantry, with the rifle company of the 68th Native Infantry.

*2nd Light Infantry Battalion* :—the light companies of the 14th, 22nd, 49th, 55th, 63rd, and 66th Native Infantry, with the rifle company of the 72nd Native Infantry.

*3rd Light Infantry Battalion* :—the light companies of the 1st, 11th, 12th, 24th, 50th, 58th, and 67th Native Infantry, with the rifle company of the 9th Native Infantry.

A constant fluctuation in the strength of regiments was an inevitable result of the great demand made by the Afghan war on the resources of India, and the reductions consequent on its termination. Besides these, several more or less important additions were made to the Bengal Army between 1840 and 1845, first of which was the formation, by G.O.G.G. No. 106 of 1841, of the 7th Irregular Cavalry. This corps, which still exists as the 5th Bengal Cavalry, was raised at Bareilly, by Captain Wheler, of the late 2nd Light Cavalry. By G. G. O. No. 18 of the following year the formation of a new regular regiment of cavalry was directed, to replace the 2nd Light Cavalry, disbanded for misconduct in Afghanistan; the new corps was numbered the 11th, but eight years afterwards it received the number of the regiment whose place it was raised to supply. In January, 1842 (G.G.O. No. 25) the 8th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry was raised at Fatehgarh, under Lieutenant Ryves, 61st Native Infantry; it is now the 6th Bengal Cavalry. The 9th Irregular Cavalry was formed in February, 1844, of drafts partly from other corps of irregular cavalry and partly from Christie's Horse, one of the regiments of Shah Shuja's Force. This force had been disbanded by G.O.G.G., dated the 16th June, 1842, all the regiments, except the 3rd Infantry, which was retained as the "Regiment of Kalat-i-Ghilzai," being broken up and the men distributed throughout the infantry and irregular cavalry of Bengal. In 1844 (G.G.O. No. 234) two companies were added to the "Assam Sebandy Corps" formed in 1835, which was now armed, clothed, and equipped as light infantry and designated "the 2nd Assam Light Infantry." Earlier in the same year was formed the Gwalior Contingent, numbering 10,000 men of all arms, in which

Augmentation  
1840—45.





Mutiny and  
disbanding of  
the 34th Native  
Infantry.

the Sipri Contingent was incorporated. Volunteers from several regiments joined this force, and amongst others the 31st, 43rd, and 70th, and the Regiment of Kalat-i-Ghilzai contributed. This Contingent, which in a short time came to be regarded as the model force of India, gained in 1857 an unenviable notoriety by the atrocities which accompanied its mutiny.

The years now under review, as well as the succeeding decade, are full of signs of the deterioration of the Bengal Army, which, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, had been growing since the early years of the century, and which was shortly to come to a head. Not the least among these symptoms was the behaviour of the sepoys of several regiments on being ordered to Sindh. The service was unpopular, especially because full batta did not accompany it, although it was, at any rate according to the notions of Hindustani soldiers, as much foreign service as the campaign in Afghanistan. The British officers, instead of repressing unreasoning complaints with a firm hand, seem in many cases to have been afraid of their men, and to have humoured them when they should have enforced the strictest discipline. Thus, when several regiments were ordered to Sindh, as many as 190 men in the 4th and 90 in the 69th applied for, and—extraordinary to relate—obtained their discharge; the 7th Light Cavalry at first refused to march, but afterwards, having expressed deep contrition for their conduct, the men were pardoned; the matter reached a climax in the 34th Native Infantry, who obstinately and in the worst spirit disobeyed its orders and refused to march, and was for this offence disbanded and the number struck out of the Army List (G. O. C. C., 20th March, 1844). The 64th at first contented themselves with writing objectionable anonymous letters to head-quarters, and was, as a punishment, ordered to Barrackpore, but, on hearing of the mutiny of the 34th, the commanding officer of the 64th represented that his corps begged to be pardoned, and to be permitted to march to Sukkur in place of the 34th; on arrival at that place, however, the 64th broke into open mutiny, and inquiry disclosed the fact that the state of the regiment had been one of utter disorganisation throughout, and that its condition had been entirely misrepresented by the commanding officer. That officer was cashiered, and the regiment was deprived of its colours until such time as it should have regained a sound state of discipline; 69 men were immediately dismissed the service, and powers were



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vested in Sir Charles Napier to disband the corps, if necessary. This extreme measure, however, was not resorted to (G.O.C.C., 20th and 30th March 1844; G. G. O. No. 357).

To the unsoldier-like behaviour of these regiments the conduct of the Bundelkhand Legion was a bright contrast. This corps, on hearing of the mutinous refusal of the 34th Native Infantry to march to Sindh, immediately volunteered for service there: the offer was accepted with an expression of the satisfaction of the Government (G. G. O., No. 101 of 1844), and it was at the same time notified that the Legion was brought permanently on the strength of the Bengal Army: the corps immediately proceeded to Sindh, where it rendered good service and earned high praise for its conduct during a trying period of two years. The 6th Irregular Cavalry also volunteered for service in Sindh, and here it may conveniently be mentioned that during the years 1844-45 the 6th and 9th Irregular Cavalry were actively employed in protecting the northern frontier of Sindh against the incursions of the Jakranis, Bugtis, Dumkis, and other predatory tribes, with whom they had frequent engagements; on one occasion, at Uch, on the 15th January, 1845, Captain Salter, with 390 men of these two regiments, surprised and routed nearly double that number of Jakranis and Bugtis, killing a great many, including two prominent chiefs, and recapturing several thousand cattle and other plunder that they were carrying off. In the early part of 1845, the 2nd Bengal European Regiment, the Bundelkhand Legion, and detachments of the 4th, 64th, and 69th Native Infantry took an active share in the campaign against these tribes, and in the reduction (9th March, 1845) of their almost inaccessible stronghold of Trakki; their conduct earned the high commendation of Sir Charles Napier himself, who now, in recognition of the good conduct and excellent services of the regiment, directed the restoration to the 64th Native Infantry of the colours they had forfeited a year before.

Operations on  
the Northern  
Sindh frontier.

The Sindh mutinies were by no means isolated instances of insubordination and bad feeling; reference to the General Orders of the Commander-in-Chief shows that the number of courts-martial in the Native army had trebled in the last twenty years, and were steadily on the increase. It is not to be wondered at then that the Governor-General (Sir Henry Hardinge) arrived at the conclusion

Flogging in the  
Native army.





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that this unsatisfactory state of things was in a great measure the result of Lord William Bentinck's abolition of flogging; accordingly, after long deliberation, he issued (1845) a minute repealing Lord William Bentinck's order.

Changes in  
equipment.

Formation of  
Rifle  
Companies.

The most important change in the equipment of Native infantry at this time was the gradual introduction of muzzle-loading "Brunswick" rifles, the first to receive them being one company in each of the light infantry regiments (including the 42nd and 43rd), while two years later the whole of the Nasserri and Sirmoor Battalions were so armed, as well as one company each in five more regiments of the line (including the 31st and 65th). Less important, though far from trivial, changes were the substitution of canvas havresacks for the old unwieldy knapsack (G. O. C. C., 22nd March, 1844), and the introduction (12th January, 1844) of a forage cap for general duties.

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## Chapter VII.—(1845—1857.)

History of India (*Marshall*)—Political and Military Events (*Hough*)—Career of Major George Broadfoot (*W. Broadfoot*)—History of the Sikhs (*Cunningham*)—Medals of the British Army (*Carter*)—Punjab Campaign, 1848-49 (*Official*)—Year in the Punjab (*Edwardes*)—Decisive Battles of India (*Mallett*)—Second Burmese War (*Laurie*)—Tracts on the Bengal Army (*Jacob*)—The Sonthal Field Force (*Official*)—Expeditions on the North-West Frontier (*Paget and Mason*)—G. G. O. and G. O. C. C.

The close of the year 1845 found the Government of India involved in a sanguinary contest with the Sikhs. Ranjit Singh, the founder of the Sikh dominion, had been on terms of friendship and alliance with the Government of India since the year 1809. He died in June, 1839, and after the death of his son and successor on the 5th November, 1840, and on the same day, of his grandson, the competition for the vacant throne, and the struggle of successive candidates for power resulted, after a series of ruthless assassinations, in the Khalsa Army becoming the real master of the state, and in the whole of the Punjab being plunged into what has been well described as a condition of "widely-spread, frantic, and sanguinary anarchy." Under such circumstances the Lahore Government, unable to control the Army and dreading its power, perceived that their only hope lay in its destruction, and in this view secretly encouraged it in its desire for a contest with the English, hoping and expecting that the conflict would terminate in its overthrow and dispersion. Not much encouragement was indeed, needed, and on the 11th December, 1845, in defiance of existing treaties, a portion of the Sikh Army headed (unwillingly, it is said) by Sirdar Lal Singh (the Wazir) and Sirdar Tej Singh, crossed the Sutlej, and took up a position within a few miles of Ferozepore.

A hostile inroad of this nature had been threatening for some years, and especially during the summer and autumn of 1845, and the event consequently did not find the Government of India unprepared. It was, indeed, a fortunate circumstance that changes in the disposition of the Army on our North-Western Frontier, adopted partly for sanitary reasons and partly as a reply to the menace from beyond the Sutlej, had resulted during the preceding three years in a considerable increase to the forces in the neighbourhood of the locality in which they were now most needed, and

The first Sikh War.



where they now proved sufficient to stem the first torrent of invasion. In addition to the old military post at Ludhiana, which had been considerably reinforced, a permanent cantonment, with a large garrison, had been established at Ferozepore. On the abandonment of Karnal, on account of excessive unhealthiness, Umballa had been adopted as a military station of the first class, with a garrison of one regiment of British dragoons, one of Native regular cavalry, one of irregular cavalry, one of British infantry and three of Native infantry, besides artillery. And a regiment of British infantry had been stationed at Kasauli and another at Sabathu, the battalion of Gurkhas displaced from Sabathu being removed to Jutogh, near Simla.—(G.O.G.G., 17th November, 1842).

The British forces in the upper provinces were quickly put in motion to resist the Sikh invasion. Those on the north-west frontier were first assembled, and under the designation of the "Army of the Sutlej" were arranged (G. O. C. C., 13th December, 1845) in the manner following, the whole being under the command of General Sir Hugh Gough, the Commander-in-Chief, who was accompanied into the field by the Governor-General, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Hardinge:—

**ARTILLERY**:—Under Brigadier G. Brooke,—seven troops of Horse and seven companies of Foot Artillery.

**ENGINEERS**:—The Corps of Sappers and Miners.

**CAVALRY**:—Under Brigadier D. Harriott—

*1st Brigade*—H. M.'s 3rd Light Dragoons, the 8th Light Cavalry and the 9th Irregular Cavalry.

*2nd Brigade*—The Body-Guard, the 5th Light Cavalry, and the 8th Irregular Cavalry.

*3rd Brigade*—The 4th Light Cavalry, and the 2nd and 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

**INFANTRY**:—

*1st Division*:—Under Major-General Sir H. G. Smith, K.C.B.—

*1st Brigade*—H. M.'s 31st Foot, and the 24th and 47th Native Infantry.

*2nd Brigade*—H. M.'s 50th Foot, and the 42nd and 48th Native Infantry.

*2nd Division*:—Under Major-General W. R. Gilbert.—

*3rd Brigade*—H. M.'s 29th Foot, and the 41st and 45th Native Infantry.

*4th Brigade*—1st European Light Infantry, and the 2nd and 16th Native Infantry.

*3rd Division*:—Under Major-General Sir J. M'Caskill, K.C.B.—

*5th Brigade*—H. M.'s 9th Foot, and the 26th and 73rd Native Infantry.

*6th Brigade*—H. M.'s 80th Foot, and the 11th, 27th, and 63rd Native Infantry.



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*4th Division* :—Under Major-General Sir J. Littler, K.C.B.—

*7th Brigade*—H. M.'s 62nd Foot, and the 12th and 14th Native Infantry.

*8th Brigade*—The 33rd, 44th, and 54th Native Infantry.

Of these troops a small garrison was left at Ludhiana, and the Umballa column marched as lightly equipped as possible to relieve Sir John Littler's division of 7,000 men, which was threatened at Ferozepore.

The strength of the Sikh forces has been variously stated; the majority of the estimates made at the time are supposed now to have been exaggerated, and their total strength was probably not much above 40,000.

The Umballa Division and the troops from Ludhiana (which had united at Bassian) arrived on the 18th December at Mudki, eighteen miles from Ferozepore, after a long and fatiguing march, but they were scarcely encamped when intelligence was received that the Sikhs were advancing. Sir Hugh Gough immediately pushed forward to meet the enemy, and two miles from Mudki found them in position, in considerable strength and with forty pieces of cannon.

Mudki,  
December 18th,  
1845.

The battle commenced with heavy artillery fire on both sides, during which the British infantry advanced in echelon of brigades and deployed; the enemy's fire told severely on them in this formation, and to effect a diversion the 3rd Light Dragoons, the Body-Guard, the 5th Light Cavalry, and part of the 4th Light Cavalry (Lancers) were directed to make a movement on the enemy's left: this was effected with great gallantry, and, turning the left flank of the Sikh army, these regiments swept along the rear of the enemy's infantry and guns, silenced the latter for a time, and put the whole of the hostile cavalry to flight. At the same time the remainder of the 4th and the 9th Irregular Cavalry assailed the Sikh right with success, and our infantry, advancing in echelon of lines, drove the Sikhs, who resisted gallantly, from one position to another at the point of the bayonet, until night put an end to the conflict. The Sikhs do not appear to have suffered very severely in men, but they lost seventeen out of their forty guns, and were obliged to fall back on their main army in the entrenched camp which they had formed at Ferozeshahr. Our losses amounted to 215 killed (including 12 officers) and 657 wounded (including 44 officers). Among the former were Major-General Sir John M'Caskill, Captain Trower of the Artillery,





Lieutenant Fisher of the Body-Guard, Lieutenant Hamilton, 24th Native Infantry, and Lieutenant Spence, 42nd Native Light Infantry. Major-General Sir R. H. Sale, Brigadier Bolton, Lieutenant Munro, Aide-de-Camp to the Governor-General, Captain Van Homrigh, 48th Native Infantry, serving on the Staff, and Captain Dashwood and Lieutenant Pollock of the Artillery, died of their wounds within a few days of the battle. Among the Native officers Jemadar Atar Singh, 16th Native Infantry, and Subadar Siu-din Tiwari, 48th Native Infantry, were killed.

On the 19th December Sir Hugh Gough was reinforced by the arrival of the 29th Foot, the 1st Bengal European Light Infantry, the 11th and 41st Native Infantry, two companies of foot artillery, and some heavy guns, and on the 21st, leaving the two native regiments to guard the wounded, he marched from Mudki for the purpose of attacking the Sikhs at Ferozeshahr.\* After a fatiguing march of sixteen miles he was joined, as had previously been concerted, at Misriwala, about four miles from Ferozeshahr, by the Fourth Division, under Major-General Sir John Littler, from Ferozepore, and at 3 p.m. the united forces, amounting to 16,700 men, with 69 guns, moved forward to assail the enemy (numbering, according to their own estimate, 47,000 men, with 88 guns) in the formidable position in which they had entrenched themselves.

Battle of  
Ferozeshahr

In the arrangements for the attack, which was delivered on the western, and to some extent on the southern face of the entrenchment, the Second Division (Gilbert's) was placed on the right, the Third (now commanded by Brigadier Wallace) in the centre, and the Fourth (Littler's) on the left,—while the First Division (Smith's) was kept in reserve. The attack of the Fourth Division was entirely under the direction of Sir John Littler: the remaining three divisions (less the 6th Brigade, of which only one regiment—the 80th Foot—was present in the field, temporarily attached to the 3rd Brigade in place of the 41st Native Infantry, left at Mudki) were divided into two wings, of which the Commander-in-Chief in person directed the right, while Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Hardinge (who had volunteered his services as Second-in-Command) superintended the left. The Fourth Division commenced the attack, and the "Chance of War," as Sir Hugh

\* This battle has been variously styled that of "Ferozeshah," "Ferozeshahr," "Ferozeshahar," and "Pheerozshuhur." The simple unadorned name of the village round which it was fought is *Pheru*.—P.



Gough expressed it, "placed it in opposition to the strongest part of the enemy's entrenched position": it advanced under a terrific fire of grape and canister to within 150 yards of the enemy's batteries, and the leading brigade sustained heavy losses; notwithstanding this it did not desist from its efforts to carry the position, until Colonel Reed, the Brigadier in command, perceiving that it could not get forward and "was exposed to a most destructive fire without any object," directed it to retire, which it did in almost as good order, allowing for the losses it had sustained, as that in which it had advanced. The Division, with greatly reduced numbers, was thus withdrawn out of fire, and was not again brought into action.\* In the meantime the Second and Third Divisions had advanced and, under a storm of shot and shell, "with matchless gallantry" carried the batteries opposed to them at the point of the bayonet, but the enemy were only driven as far as their camp in the immediate rear, from which they kept up a galling musketry fire. By this time the First Division, hitherto in reserve, had also come into action, and carrying the opposing guns it penetrated deep into the enemy's camp and captured the village of Ferozeshahr, which it held for several hours, while the 3rd Light Dragoons made a magnificent charge, capturing some of the most formidable batteries, sabreing the gunners, and driving the enemy to the further end of the entrenchment. But night had now set in, and in the darkness terrible confusion arose; regiments and brigades became intermixed and were unable in the gloom to entirely recover their formation, while the enemy, still in possession of a large portion of the entrenchment, kept up a devastating fire. Under these circumstances a partial retirement became necessary before midnight; the hard-won ground was abandoned, and the exhausted troops, retiring to the south and south-west of the entrenchment, bivouacked for the

\* The repulse of the Fourth Division on this occasion was at the time and long afterwards attributed to the misconduct of the troops and especially of the leading regiment, the 62nd Foot; and one author (Trotter,—*History of the British Empire in India*, Vol. I., page 53) goes to the length of asserting that "the 62nd Foot followed by the Native regiments on either flank, wavered, turned, and fled in utter panic towards the rear." This assertion is apparently based on a statement which appeared in Sir John Littler's report, which was made in error and afterwards withdrawn: it is entirely without any justification in truth. The conduct of the division was enquired into at the time, and Sir Hugh Gough, in a special General Order, showed how entirely uncalled for were the aspersions which had been cast upon it. (See G. O. C. C., dated Camp Nihalki, the 28th January, 1846.)—P.





remainder of the night, and endeavoured to snatch a little repose. But there was little repose for them; for, perished with cold and thirst and almost starving, they were still throughout the night exposed to a harassing and incessant fire whenever the moonlight or their own fires disclosed their whereabouts to the enemy. But no hardship could quell the indomitable spirit of the British soldiers; exhausted as they were, when morning dawned they were ready to complete the work begun the day before, and a general advance at daybreak, on the 22nd, carried the enemy's camp, forced them from the village of Ferozeshahr, and drove them from the field. The dangers of the day did not, however, end here: Tej Singh, with the force which had menaced Ferozepore, appeared on the field at noon and threatened to overwhelm the exhausted British Army, which, without ammunition and weakened by fatigue and want of food, was now in a critical position. However, a bold front was shown by the English General, and, after an unsuccessful attempt on the position of Ferozeshahr, now occupied by the latter, Tej Singh withdrew, and the Sikhs, defeated but not demoralised, retired across the Sutlej, weakened by the loss of seventy-three pieces of artillery.

The conduct of the sepoy regiments in this battle has several times been criticised severely, but it is only fair to them to remember that the British Army was exhausted by fatigue and by long fasting and want of water; that under such circumstances the sepoy collapses much sooner than the British soldier; and that the sepoys fully retrieved their reputation when fighting under more favourable conditions at Sobraon. The loss of the Sikhs at Ferozeshahr is unknown, but it is probable that the killed alone amounted to two thousand: that of the British was 39 British and 17 Native officers, and 664 men killed; 82 British officers, 19 Native officers, and 1,677 men wounded, and 379 men missing,—making a total of 2,877.\*

Among the officers killed were Brigadier Wallace, Captains Hore (officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department) and Burnett (Brigade-Major), serving on the staff; Captain Todd and Lieutenant Lambert, Bengal Artillery; Captain Box and Ensign Moxon, 1st European Light Infantry; Ensign Armstrong, 2nd Native Infantry; Major Hull, 16th Native Infantry;

\* This is four less than the number given in the revised official return, but that return erroneously includes four officers who had been wounded, not at Ferozeshahr, but at Mudki,—P.



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Major Griffin, 24th Native Infantry; Lieutenants Croly and Eatwell, 26th Native (Light) Infantry; Lieutenant Wollen, 42nd Native (Light) Infantry, and Captain Hunter, 73rd Native Infantry. Amongst the slain were also numbered two distinguished political officers,—Major Broadfoot, 34th Madras Native Infantry, whose prominent services in the glorious defence of Jalalabad have already been mentioned, and Captain Nicolson of the 28th Bengal Native Infantry. Captain Egerton, of the staff, Captain Kendall, 1st European Light Infantry, Captain Bolton, 2nd Native Infantry, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce, Captain Holmes, and Lieutenant Tulloch, 12th Native Infantry, died of their wounds.

The native officers killed at the battle of Ferozeshahr were Jemadars Raghunath and Bihari Singh, of the Artillery; Risaldar Mir Wazir Ali and Jemadar Pir Khan, 9th Irregular Cavalry; Subadar Shaikh Madar Bakhsh, 2nd Native Infantry; Subadar Bhawanilal Pande, 12th Native Infantry; Subadar-Major Umed Singh, 14th Native Infantry; Subadars Rangulam Singh and Shaikh Rajab and Jemadars Sukhlal Singh and Mansaram Bajpae, 24th Native Infantry; Subadar Ganesh Patak, 33rd Native Infantry; Jemadars Rustam Patak and Din Singh, 42nd Native Infantry; Subadars Fakira Khan and Siu-lal Singh, 45th Native Infantry; Subadar Shaikh Khuda Bakhsh, 48th Native Infantry; and Subadar Shaikh Kadir Bakhsh, 73rd Native Infantry. Jemadar Ghulam Rasul Khan, 3rd Irregular Cavalry; Jemadar Jurakan Sukal, 2nd Native Infantry; Subadar Fateh Singh, 26th Native Infantry; Subadar Hanuman Tiwari, 45th Native Infantry; and Jemadar Bhawanidin Singh, 48th Native Infantry, died of their wounds.

Having driven the Sikhs across the Sutlej, Sir Hugh Gough advanced to Araf, and on the 27th December pushed a reconnaissance to the left bank of the river, when the enemy were found to have established themselves in great force on the opposite bank, in advance of the village of Sobraon. Having placed the First Division in a position to watch the Sikhs, with the rest of the troops at hand ready to support Sir Harry Smith in case of necessity, the Commander-in-Chief deferred further action until the arrival of reinforcements in men, artillery, ammunition, and stores, which were now on the way to join him. The arrival of some of these reinforcements and the approach of the rest necessitated a re-arrangement

Re-organisation  
of the Army of  
the Sutlej.