



command sustained a loss of one man killed and eighteen wounded—two mortally.

The garrisons left at Jagdalak and Jagdalak Kotal, under the command of Colonel Norman, were not allowed much peace by the hostile tribesmen, who, after several vigorous attacks, made a final effort against those places on the 29th of December, under the leadership of Azimatullah Khan of Lughman; and it was only after some severe fighting that he was defeated and his following dispersed. Our casualties in these affairs amounted to four killed and eight wounded; amongst the former was Lieutenant Wright, Royal Artillery, and amongst the latter Major Thackeray, Royal Engineers. The force under the command of Colonel Norman consisted of detachments of the Hazara Mountain Battery, the 10th Bengal Lancers, the 51st Foot, and the 24th Native Infantry.

The Kuram
Valley.

Zaimukht
Expedition.

In the meantime the force on the south side of the Paiwar Kotal had passed the autumn without important incident, except a punitive expedition against the Zaimukhts, who had been guilty of many dastardly outrages on the line of communications in the Kuram valley. The force employed on this service was under the command of Brigadier-General Tytler, and was composed of No. 1 Battery, 8th Brigade, Royal Artillery (four screw guns), No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery (two guns), a company of sappers and miners, detachments of the 1st, 13th, and 18th Bengal Cavalry, a small detachment of the 2-8th Foot, the 85th Foot, the 13th, 20th, and 29th Native Infantry, and the 4th Punjab Infantry. Marching from Balesh Khel on the 8th December, Brigadier-General Tytler entered the Zaimukht country the same day, and having destroyed a number of towers and villages *en route*, the force arrived on the 12th within a short distance of the strong fastness of Zawo. At daybreak on the 13th, General Tytler advanced to attack this place. Under cover of the fire of the two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, four companies of the 85th and four of the 29th Native Infantry moved forward on the right, and quickly carried several of the lower positions, while, as this attack developed, General Tytler advanced with his main column of infantry and guns up the defile leading to Zawo. The village of Bagh was reached without much resistance, but the column on the right did not succeed in occupying the ridge to the east of that place without some hand-to-hand fighting.



The troops bivouacked for the night in the positions they had occupied, and on the following morning, the advance being continued, the crest of the pass was gained after considerable resistance and the village of Zawo taken. Subsequent to this the force traversed various parts of the Zaimukht country, and having destroyed the villages concerned in the outrages in the Kuram valley and levied heavy fines in punishment, General Tytler withdrew, reaching Thal on the 23rd December. The casualties in the expedition were one man killed, and Lieutenant Renny, 4th Punjab Infantry (mortally), Jemadar Fazl Ahmad, 29th Native Infantry, and one man wounded.

Whilst these events were proceeding in the north, the force in Southern Afghanistan had not been altogether idle. Having recalled the troops which had already left for India and assembled the force under his command at Kandahar, Sir Donald Stewart, in accordance with his orders, proceeded to make a demonstration towards Ghazni. The force detailed for this purpose was placed under the command of Brigadier-General Hughes, and consisted of six guns of the Royal Artillery, the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, a wing each of the 59th Foot and the 3rd Gurkha Regiment, and the 29th Bombay Native Infantry. Marching from Kandahar on the 23rd September, Hughes occupied Kalat-i-Ghilzai without opposition, and having left a small force there, he advanced to Tazi, three marches further on the Ghazni road, where he remained for some weeks. Shortly after the middle of October reports began to be prevalent that the Taraki Ghilzais, incited by that fire-brand the Mushk-i-Alam, were gathering at Shahjui, under their chief, Sahib Jan, for an attack on the British camp at Tazi, and a detachment was accordingly sent forward, under the command of Colonel Kennedy, to surprise them. This small force, which consisted of three guns of the Royal Artillery, two squadrons of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and two companies each of the 59th Foot and the 29th Bombay Native Infantry, reached Shahjui as day broke on the 24th, drove in the picquets of the enemy, and after a sharp hand-to-hand encounter with their main body, broke and dispersed them entirely, Sahib Jan and 41 of his men being left dead on the ground. Our own loss amounted to two men killed, and two British officers, two native officers and 24 men wounded.

By the end of October, Brigadier-General Hughes returned to Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and leaving a garrison there, on the 2nd November

The Kandahar
Field Force.

withdrew the main body of his column to Kandahar. For the rest of the winter almost complete tranquillity prevailed in the districts around that city. In the tracts, however, to the north-west of Kandahar much excitement and confusion prevailed, and reports were rife that Ayub Khan, the brother of Yakub Khan, was advancing on that place from Herat.

Kabul, 1880.

The new year opened quietly in and around Kabul, where the principal interest of the moment was centred in the political question of the government of Afghanistan. In March the Kabul Field Force was reorganised. The existing Second (or Khaibar) Division was broken up, and the troops, excepting those sent on to Kabul, were absorbed on the line of communications, of which Major-General Bright was now appointed Inspector-General. The force at Kabul, having been strengthened and some of the worn-out corps replaced by fresher troops from the late Khaibar Division, was now formed into two divisions, the command of the Second of which was conferred upon Major-General John Ross, Sir Frederick Roberts continuing in command of the First and of the whole force. The Kabul Field Force now consisted of the following troops :—

Artillery.—Four batteries of Royal Artillery, No. 2 Mountain Battery, and No. 4 Mountain Battery.

Sappers and Miners.—Four companies.

Cavalry.—The 9th Lancers, the 3rd and 17th Bengal Cavalry, and the 3rd Punjab Cavalry.

Infantry—

- | | | |
|-------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| 1st Brigade | { | 92nd Foot. |
| | { | 28th Native Infantry. |
| | { | 45th Native Infantry. |
| | { | 72nd Foot. |
| 2nd Brigade | { | 3rd Sikh Infantry. |
| | { | 5th Punjab Infantry (six companies.) |
| | { | 5th Gurkha Regiment. |
| 3rd Brigade | { | 67th Foot. |
| | { | 27th Native Infantry. |
| | { | 2nd Gurkha Regiment. |
| 4th Brigade | { | 29th Foot. |
| | { | 24th Native Infantry. |
| | { | 4th Gurkha Regiment. |
| Unattached | { | 23rd Native Infantry (Pioneers). |
| | { | The Corps of Guides. |

On the Khaibar line the Ghilzais continued to give trouble, and it was decided in consequence to send an expedition into Lughman as soon as the re-inforcements then coming up from India should have arrived. Before this could be undertaken, however, operations had



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to be entered upon against the Mohmands, who had gathered on the northern bank of the Kabul river and begun crossing over. A party of them who attacked the post at Ali Boghan on the 12th January were repulsed, and a larger body was dispersed on the following day by artillery fire alone. The main body, about 1,500 strong, crossed the river near Dakka, and took up a position on the Gara heights; here they were attacked on the 15th by Colonel Boisragon (in command of a small force consisting of detachments of the 6th Dragoon Guards, 17th Bengal Cavalry, and 8th and 30th Native Infantry, with four guns) and, after a brief contest, routed and driven back over the river with considerable loss. The casualties on our side amounted to Jemadar Bahadur Khan, 8th Native Infantry, killed, and seven men wounded.

Towards the end of January the arrival of reinforcements at the base enabled General Bright to despatch a force into the Lughman valley. This force was under the command of Colonel Walker, of the 12th Foot, but was accompanied by General Bright himself; it consisted of four guns of the Royal Artillery, two guns of No. 4 Mountain Battery, two companies of Madras sappers, a squadron each of the 6th Dragoon Guards and the 17th Bengal Cavalry, a wing each of the 1-12th Foot, 1-25th Foot, and 27th Native Infantry, and six companies of the 30th Native Infantry. During three weeks Lughman, on both sides of the Kabul river, was traversed and explored in every direction, without any opposition from the enemy. On the 21st February the force was broken up, and the troops returned to their several posts on the line of communications.

The altered organisation of the forces holding the Khaibar line of communications has already been mentioned. Extensive changes amongst the troops employed on the line also took place at this time, many regiments and batteries having been moved on to Kabul and several sent back to India, the places of all these being taken by other corps. At the end of March the troops employed on the line were five batteries of Royal Artillery, No. 1 Mountain Battery, one company of Bengal and three of Madras sappers, the 6th Dragoon Guards, the 8th Hussars, the 4th and 5th Bengal Cavalry, a wing each of the 1st and 2nd Central India Horse, the 1-5th, 1-12th, 2-14th, 1-18th, 1-25th and 51st Foot, the 8th, 9th, 16th, 22nd, 30th, 31st, 32nd (Pioneers), and 41st Bengal Native Infantry, the 1st Gurkha



Regiment, and the 1st, 4th and 15th Madras Native Infantry. Major-General Bright was in command of the whole as Inspector-General of the line of communications, Brigadier-Generals Gib, Doran and Hill being in command respectively of the three sections into which the line was divided, and Brigadier-General Arbuthnot in command of a moveable column to operate on any part of the line in which its services might be required.

The month of March in the Khaibar was marked by several attacks on small parties and on posts on the line of communications. On the 22nd Lieutenant Thurlow, 51st Foot, was shot dead, between Jagdalak and Jagdalak Kotal, by a band of Ghilzais from Hisarak, and on the 26th a most determined attack was made on the post of Fort Battye, near Fatehabad, by a body of Shinwaris and Khugianis. This post was held by detachments of the 4th Bengal Cavalry and the 4th Madras Native Infantry, but the garrison had fortunately been increased that evening by a detachment of the 31st Bengal Native Infantry, which had halted there for the night while in progress to a post higher up the line. The attack was pressed home with great energy, but was repulsed with heavy loss to the assailants, that of the garrison being Lieutenant Angelo, 31st Native Infantry, and six men killed, and 19 men wounded. In consequence of these affairs two columns were sent into the Khugiani country early in April, but the enemy offered no opposition, and after some of their towers had been destroyed, they submitted and paid the fines imposed upon them. This expedition was followed a few days later by the despatch of a force into the Hisarak valley, for the punishment of a Ghilzai chief named Muizzullah Khan, who was concerned in the attack in which Lieutenant Thurlow was killed. The force, which was under the command of Brigadier-General Arbuthnot, was composed of two horse artillery and two mountain guns of the Royal Artillery, two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, detachments of the 6th Dragoon Guards and 4th Bengal Cavalry, two companies of sappers, one Madras and one Bengal, the 51st Foot, the 8th and 31st Native Infantry, and the 1st Gurkha Regiment. Muizzullah Khan's fort was destroyed on the 12th April; subsequently, though there was some skirmishing, and a good deal of firing into our camp at night, little opposition was encountered, except at the Auzangani defile on the 14th, where the Ghilzais made a determined stand and caused some casualties. Our losses during the expedition amounted to Lieutenant Palmer



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(Commissariat Department) and one man killed, and four officers and fifteen men wounded.

During the early months of 1880 nothing of importance occurred in the Kuram valley, where Major-General Watson had succeeded Brigadier-General Gordon in the command. In February Brigadier-General Newdigate was appointed to the command of a brigade, in succession to Brigadier-General Tytler, who died of pneumonia on the 14th of that month.

Kuram Valley.

In January 1880, as part of a plan for the pacification of Afghanistan and our eventual withdrawal from the country, the Bengal troops under Sir Donald Stewart were ordered to move up from Kandahar to Ghazni, and thence open communication with Kabul, their place at Kandahar being taken by Bombay troops, to be moved up from Pishin and Sind. The Ghazni Field Force, as Sir Donald's command was now designated, accordingly left Kandahar on the 29th of March, and for three weeks advanced northward without meeting any opposition, although after passing Kalat-i-Ghilzai all the villages were found deserted, and it was only with much difficulty that supplies could be procured.

Southern
Afghanistan,
1880.

Advance on
Ghazni, March
1880.

At length on the morning of the 19th April, about two hours after beginning the march from Mushaki, the Afghans were discovered in great force in advance of the head of the column and on a range of hills to the left of the road at Ahmad Khel, twenty-three miles south of Ghazni. Dispositions were at once made to attack the enemy and the force was arranged as follows:—In the centre were one battery of horse and one of field artillery, with a squadron of the 19th Bengal Lancers and a company of the 19th Native Infantry as escort; on the right was the greater portion of the cavalry, *viz.*, a squadron of the 19th Bengal Lancers, the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and two squadrons of the 1st Punjab Cavalry; on the left of the guns was Brigadier-General Hughes' brigade (the 59th Foot, the 3rd Gurkha Regiment, and the 2nd Sikh Infantry) with a troop of the 19th Bengal Lancers, and on the extreme left, and slightly in rear, a heavy battery of artillery. In reserve were the 19th Native Infantry, two companies of sappers, and the head-quarters escort, consisting of a troop of the 19th Bengal Lancers and a company each of the 2-60th Rifles and the 25th Native Infantry. On the road behind were the hospitals, field parks, and baggage, and in rear of all Brigadier-

Battle of
Ahmad Khel,
April 19th.



General Barter's brigade,—a mountain battery, the 2-60th Rifles, the 15th and 25th Native Infantry, and one squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry. Before the action commenced, half of Barter's brigade was moved up to the front of the baggage, and arrived in time to reinforce the right centre before the close of the fighting.

At 9 A.M. the guns took up positions, but scarcely had they opened fire, when masses of *ghazi*-led Afghans rushed furiously down the slopes from their position against the line of British infantry, while a large body of horsemen, turning the left of the British line, now reinforced by a squadron of the 19th Bengal Lancers, poured down two ravines, and, uniting at the foot of the hill, struck the Lancers before they could get up sufficient speed to meet the shock, and forced them back on the knoll occupied by Sir Donald Stewart and his staff; nor could they be rallied until they had passed to the rear of the right of the line of infantry, which was itself hard pressed and beginning to give way. The 3rd Gurkhas formed rallying squares and, throwing in a withering fire, checked for a time the reckless rush of the enemy, but the fanatic horde pressed on, enveloping both flanks, and it became necessary to bring forward every man of the reserve, the two sapper companies and a half battalion of the 19th Native Infantry reinforcing the left, while the remaining half battalion and the two companies of infantry of Sir Donald's escort supported the guns on their left.

In the centre and on the right, at this time, so impetuous was the rush of the Afghan swordsmen, that even case-shot from the guns at a distance of fifty yards was insufficient to check them; and at last, all their ammunition having been expended, the two batteries were compelled to fall back about two hundred yards.

The situation for the moment was critical; both flanks had been forced back, and all the reserves were in the front line: but the enemy's advance on the left was now effectually checked and turned back by the deadly fire of the 3rd Gurkha Regiment; the 2nd Sikh Infantry, in the centre, still maintained their position with unwavering steadiness; and on the right the enemy were charged and pushed back by the 19th Bengal Lancers and the 2nd Punjab Cavalry. All along the line the attack began to slacken; in a few minutes it ceased, and as part of Barter's brigade came up the Afghans began to fall back; soon the retirement became a rout, and the masses of



the enemy, flying in all directions, were dispersed over the country. Of the 15,000 they brought into action, upwards of a thousand were left dead on the field, and the total loss could not have been less than three times that number. Our own losses amounted to seventeen killed, and one hundred and twenty-four (including nine British officers) wounded.

After a rest of two hours, the march was resumed, and Ghazni was reached on the 21st April. On the 23rd, before day-break, a strong force was despatched under Brigadier-General Palliser, against a large body of the enemy who had taken post in the villages of Shalez and Arzu, about seven miles to the south-east of Ghazni. The position was, however, found to be so strong that General Palliser considered it imprudent to attempt an assault until he was reinforced. The remainder of the troops (excepting those left to guard the camp and to hold Ghazni) arrived at 11 A.M. under Sir Donald Stewart, who immediately made dispositions to attack. In less than an hour the affair was over; the Afghans, making little or no stand, were easily expelled from the villages, and fled in confusion with a loss of 400 of their number, our own losses being no more than two killed and eight wounded.

Attack on
villages of
Shalez and
Arzu,
April 23rd.

On the 25th, at Shashgao, Sir Donald Stewart came into communication with Major-General Ross's division of Sir Frederick Roberts' force, then at Saiadabad, and on the 28th, handing over the command of the Ghazni Field Force to Brigadier-General Hughes at Haidar Khel, he left for Kabul to assume supreme command of the forces in Northern Afghanistan. The Ghazni Field Force now became the Third Division of the Kabul Field Force, and moved into the Logar valley, where, on the 16th May, the command was taken over by Major-General Hills.

During the early days of April nothing of importance from a military point of view occurred at Kabul, though there were rumours of hostile gatherings in various parts of the country. The first movement of importance was the despatch to the southward of Major-General Ross with a force which was intended to meet and escort supplies to the troops moving up from Kandahar under Sir Donald Stewart. This force was composed of four guns of the Royal Artillery, No. 4 Mountain Battery, a company of sappers, a squadron of the 9th Lancers, the 3rd Bengal Cavalry, two squadrons of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, the 2-9th Foot, the 23rd (Pioneers) and 24th

The Kabul
Field Force.



Action at
Chihildaktaran,
April 25th.

Native Infantry, and the 4th Gurkha Regiment; it marched from Kabul on the 17th April, and six days later reached Saiadabad without experiencing any opposition worthy of notice. Two days after the despatch of General Ross's force, intelligence was received that an attack was to be made on it from the Logar valley, and in order to obviate any such movement a small force (two horse artillery guns, the Corps of Guides and a wing of the 92nd Highlanders) was sent to Charasia on the 20th under the command of Colonel Jenkins. On the 21st Colonel Jenkins encamped at Chihildaktaran, near Charasia, and here he was vigorously attacked on the 25th by a body of three thousand Logaris: though hard pressed he was able to keep the enemy in check until 1-30 P.M., when Brigadier-General Macpherson arrived with reinforcements consisting of two guns of the Royal Artillery, four guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, a troop of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, the remaining wing of the 92nd Highlanders, six companies of the 45th Native Infantry, and two of the 2nd Gurkha Regiment. Macpherson at once assumed the offensive against the enemy's left, and having turned that flank with the Gurkhas, Highlanders and Sikhs, forced the Afghans to retire, and eventually put them to flight with heavy loss. The casualties on our side were four killed and thirty-four wounded.

On the same day (25th April) General Ross with a part of his force encountered a body of Afghans at Shekabad, near Saiadabad, and drove them from the ground with considerable loss, himself having only one man killed and four wounded in the engagement. Having established communication with the Ghazni Field Force, Ross's column (now joined by Sir Donald Stewart) moved back to Kabul, where it arrived on the 2nd May.

Nothing of much importance connected with the Kabul Field Force occurred during the months of May and June. Portions of the force moved into various parts of the surrounding country with a view to keeping open the roads and to ease the pressure on the supplies at the capital, but in no case was any opposition encountered, though Muhammad Jan, Mir Bucha, and other chiefs had in no measure relaxed their efforts to create fresh disturbances. During this period a mission was sent to Turkistan, to communicate with Abdur Rahman Khan, one of the candidates for the throne of Afghanistan, and was well received.



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Towards the end of June the Third Division (late the Ghazni Field Force), under the command of Major-General Hills, after making various movements in the Logar valley, marched to Zargunshahr, where it arrived on the 30th of the month. Thence on the 1st of July, a force (under the command of Brigadier-General Palliser, and consisting of detachments of the 19th Bengal Lancers and of the 1st and 2nd Punjab Cavalry, amounting altogether to about 560 men) was detached against a gathering of 1,500 Zurmatitis at the village of Patkao Shana. The enemy were overtaken while in retreat and were completely dispersed, with a loss of 200 of their number, our own loss being three killed and twenty-nine (including one officer) wounded.

All through the spring and summer negotiations had been in progress with the Kabuli sardars and Abdur Rahman Khan, with a view to establishing the latter as Amir. At last, after much intriguing, the negotiations were brought to a successful issue and the new Amir was formally proclaimed in Durbar on the 22nd of July.

Proclamation
of Abdur
Rahman,
July 22nd.

During these months (April to August, 1880) affairs on the Khaibar line continued in a very unsettled state: raids and disturbances were frequent, and more than one punitive expedition had to be undertaken. During the third week in May a force under Brigadier-General Doran (two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, and detachments of the Central India Horse, 1-5th and 1-12th Foot, and 1st and 4th Madras Native Infantry) moved from Jalalabad into the Besad district, north of the Kabul river, and at Beninga, on the 19th, defeated and dispersed a body of Safis from Kunar, with a loss on our side of only one British officer, one native officer, and five men wounded. At the same time a column under Brigadier-General Gib (four guns of the Royal Artillery, and detachments of the 8th Hussars, 5th Bengal Cavalry, 2-14th Foot, and 32nd Native Infantry (Pioneers) encountered and defeated a large gathering of Shinwaris at Mazina (20th May), our loss being four men killed and two officers and five men wounded. Early in June a force, which was under the command of Brigadier-General Doran and included detachments of the Central India Horse and of the 9th and 32nd Native Infantry, moved into Kama, and destroyed the forts and towers of the hostile clans. In the middle of the same month an expedition was led by Brigadier-General Arbutnot

The Khaibar
Line.



into the Lughman valley; and early in July another under Colonel Ball-Acton, which included detachments of the 4th Bengal Cavalry and the 31st Native Infantry, captured and destroyed the village of Nargashai, with a loss of only five men wounded.

In the Kuram district during these months but little of military importance occurred, though raids by the Waziris and Khostwals were frequent; in one of these the post of Chapri was rushed (1st May) by a band of Waziris and Dawaris, who succeeded in getting into the enclosure, where they killed Lieutenant Wood, of the Transport Department, and eight men, and wounded thirteen others. As the summer advanced, however, the country quieted down to some extent, and the troops were principally occupied with preparations for the return to India, which was to be commenced in October.

At the end of July, when the principal subject of consideration was the withdrawal to India of the British troops in Northern Afghanistan, news was received of the long-threatened advance of Ayub Khan from Herat, of the terrible disaster which had befallen the Bombay force at Maiwand, and of the investment of Kandahar by the troops of Ayub Khan and the mutinous regiments of the Wali Sher Ali Khan of Kandahar. Measures for the restoration of British prestige in Southern Afghanistan and for the relief of the beleaguered garrison were promptly adopted, and on the 3rd of August orders were given for the immediate despatch from Kabul to Kandahar of a strong force under the command of Sir Frederick Roberts. At the same time instructions were issued for the formation of another strong force at Quetta (for which the 3rd, 4th, and 17th Bengal Native Infantry were detailed) to move on Kandahar from the southward under the command of Major-General Phayre. The force under the command of Sir Frederick Roberts was designated "The Kabul-Kandahar Field Force," and was composed of the following corps:—

Cavalry Brigade:—

Brigadier-General
H. H. Gough.

{ 9th Lancers.
3rd Bengal Cavalry.
3rd Punjab Cavalry.
Central India Horse.

Artillery:—

Colonel A. C. Johnson

{ No. 6 Battery, 8th Brigade, Royal Artillery
" 11 " 9th " " "
" 2 Mountain Battery.

Kuram,
April-August,
1880.

News of Mai-
wand, July,
1880.



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Infantry,—Major-General J. Ross, C.B., Commanding.

1st Brigade:—

Brigadier-General	{	92nd Highlanders.
H. T. Macpherson.		23rd (Punjab) Native Infantry (Pioneers).
		24th " "
		2nd Gurkha Regiment. "

2nd Brigade:—

Brigadier-General	{	72nd Highlanders.
T. D. Baker.		2nd Sikh Infantry.
		3rd " "
		5th Gurkha Regiment.

3rd Brigade:—

Brigadier-General	{	2-60th Rifles.
C. M. MacGregor.		15th (Sikh) Native Infantry.
		25th (Punjab) Native Infantry.
		4th Gurkha Regiment.

By the end of the first week of August all arrangements at Kabul were complete, and on the 8th the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force was assembled at Bini Hisar; thence on the following morning it began that memorable march which has since become one of the most famous achievements of the British arms in India.*

The story of "Roberts' march" is interesting and instructive as an example of what can be effected by energy and careful organization. Starting with a force of picked troops, and with transport as complete as could be procured under the circumstances, the undertaking was aided by the influence of the new Amir during the first part of the march, and it was not at any time impeded by open hostilities: notwithstanding these advantages the fact yet remains that to march over three hundred and twenty miles in twenty-two days with an army of 10,000 fighting men and 8,000 followers, two-thirds of the distance being through an enemy's country, was a feat which required not only energy and forethought of the first order at the head, but the most careful and competent supervision of all details, however small, and the most thorough and conscientious work in all ranks from the general commanding to the junior officer of transport.

Marching through the Logar valley, in order to gain the benefit of its fertile crops, the force reached Ghazni on the 15th August,—98 miles in seven days. Thence without a halt the march was

March of
relieving for
from Kabul
to Kandahar

* In the opinion of Sir Frederick Roberts himself the advance on Kabul from Kuram, in the autumn of 1879, was in every particular a more difficult and dangerous operation.—P.



continued through a rough and treeless country, under a scorching sun, with all the trying accompaniments of rear guard and baggage guard duties, the difficulties of which no one who has not had experience of the Indian camp-follower can fully realise; or with the almost equally wearying nights on guard, after the labours of the march and the toils of fatigue duty. Day after day the force pushed on, until on the 23rd August Kalat-i-Ghilzai was reached, 232 miles having been covered in fifteen days. Here one day was allowed for well-earned rest; and on the 25th, when the march was resumed, the force was augmented by the garrison of Bombay troops, which Sir Frederick Roberts deemed it expedient to withdraw. At length on the 27th August, at Robat, heliographic communication was established with the Kandahar garrison by the cavalry brigade, and in the evening the camp of that brigade was joined by several officers from the lately beleaguered city. It being now ascertained that the siege had been raised, and that the Afghan army was entrenching itself in a position north-west of the town, Sir Frederick Roberts determined to give his force a day's rest at Robat, and thence to march the remaining eighteen miles to Kandahar by two easy stages, in order that his men might arrive there as fresh as possible for the work before them. The forced marches of the division therefore ended at Robat, where the main body arrived on the 28th August, and when 303 miles had been covered in twenty days.

On the 31st Kandahar was reached, and after a halt outside the Shikarpur gate, the troops encamped on the plain to the west of the city and cantonments, the 2nd and 3rd Brigades occupying Picquet Hill, Karez Hill, and a spur of the hill above old Kandahar. On the same afternoon a reconnaissance in force (the 3rd Bengal Cavalry and the 15th Native Infantry with two guns, under Brigadier-General Gough) demonstrated that Ayub Khan was holding the village of Pir Paimal and the Baba Wali Kotal, north-west of the camp, in considerable strength; and that his encampment was behind (north of) these, at Mazra, but whether the latter was entrenched or not was not ascertained. Our loss in this reconnaissance amounted to three killed, and an officer and eleven men wounded.

Having thus obtained all the information he required, Sir Frederick Roberts decided on attacking Ayub Khan on the following morning, his plan of operations being briefly to threaten the enemy's left at the Baba Wali Kotal and to assail his right in



force by the village of Pir Paimal, carry that point, and take the Baba Wali Kotal in reverse. For the former purpose part of the Bombay force was detailed, for the latter the whole of the infantry of the Kabul-Kandahar Force,—the 1st and 2nd Brigades to deliver the attack, while the 3rd remained in reserve, the cavalry of the Kabul-Kandahar Force meanwhile operating by the left, by the village of Gandigan, and working towards the Argandab river, so as to threaten the rear of Ayub Khan's camp and his line of retreat towards Girishk and Kakrez. To carry out these operations the troops were in position at an early hour on the morning of the 1st September, but it then became apparent that the enemy were themselves contemplating offensive measures, they having during the night occupied the villages of Gandhi Mulla Sahibdad and Gandigan, at the foot of the Baba Wali range, as well as the gardens and orchards connecting these villages,—positions from which it would be necessary to expel them before any advance could be made on Pir Paimal. To secure this object Brigadier-General Macpherson was instructed to advance direct on Gandhi Mulla with the 1st Brigade, take the village, and then drive the enemy from the enclosures lying between it and the low spur of the hill short of Pir Paimal, Brigadier-General Baker, with the 2nd Brigade, being ordered to advance at the same time on Macpherson's left, and clear the gardens and orchards in his immediate front. To Major-General Ross was entrusted the direction of these attacks.

Shortly after 9.30 A.M. the operations of the day were begun by a heavy battery of Royal Artillery with the Bombay force opening fire on the Baba Wali Kotal, and the attention of the enemy having been attracted to this point, General Ross was directed to begin the real attack, on the right of the Afghan position. Covered by the fire of two batteries, Macpherson advanced on Gandhi Mulla, and after a sharp contest the village was carried by the 92nd Highlanders and the 2nd Gurkha Regiment. Baker, moving forward at the same time, encountered an obstinate resistance from the Afghans posted in the walled gardens and orchards on the left, and the 72nd Highlanders and the 2nd Sikh Infantry sustained considerable loss. At length, however, all opposition was overcome and the enemy were driven back to Pir Paimal, and the two brigades, uniting at that point and wheeling to the right, swept all before them until they reached an entrenched position on the further side of the Baba Wali Kotal,



where the Afghans made a last desperate stand: it was, however only for a moment; a gallant rush of the 92nd, headed by Major White, broke through the opposing force, and soon the whole Afghan army was in full flight. Owing, however, to the nature of the ground, General Ross was unable to realise the extent of the victory, and expecting the enemy to take up a fresh position further on he halted to re-form his brigades. When, however, the advance was resumed a few minutes disclosed the fact that the victory was complete, and that Ayub's camp was standing deserted. The pursuit was taken up by the cavalry as effectually as possible, but owing to the extended position occupied by the enemy on the morning of the 1st Brigadier-General Gough was obliged to make such a wide detour that he did not arrive on the Afghan line of retreat in sufficient time to do as much execution as might otherwise have been effected.

Our loss on the 1st September was 3 British officers, one native officer and 33 men killed, and 10 British officers, 4 native officers and 202 men wounded,—making a total loss on the two days of 40 killed and 228 wounded,—of the latter of whom more than twenty afterwards succumbed to the injuries they had received.

Thus was brought to a worthy conclusion an undertaking which at the time was watched with breathless interest by the whole military world, and which will always rank as one of the most brilliant achievements of the British arms in India.

The battle of Kandahar not only relieved the garrison of that place, but brought the war to a speedy conclusion. The withdrawal of the remaining troops from Kabul had commenced almost immediately after the departure thence of Sir Frederick Roberts' force, and the frontier, as arranged by the peace of Gandamak, was resumed. In Southern Afghanistan the field force was withdrawn, as quickly as possible, with the exception of a moderate garrison which was retained at Kandahar. Early in the following year Kandahar also was given up and the frontier, as it existed before the war, was re-established both in the north and in the south.

For the second campaign in Afghanistan the thanks of Parliament were voted to the army and the generals engaged; a medal was granted to all who were not already in possession of the first, with clasp, for the actions of CHARASIA, KABUL, AHMAD KHEL, AND KANDAHAR, and a special bronze star was given to the troops who took part in Roberts' march to Kandahar (G. G. O. Nos. 673 of 1880 and 472 of



1881). Regiments engaged were authorised to bear all the above names on their colours and appointments (G. G. O. No. 418 of 1881); and a second grant of six months' batta was made to all ranks (G. G. O. No. 459 of 1880).

In October 1880, during the withdrawal of the troops from Afghanistan, a punitive expedition under Brigadier-General MacGregor was despatched from the Harnai line against the Marri tribes, who, since the disaster at Maiwand, had been conspicuous for the boldness of their outrages. The force employed consisted of a mountain battery of the Royal Artillery, the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, the 2-60th Rifles, the 4th and 5th Gurkha Regiments, and the 2nd and 3rd Sikh Infantry. Very little opposition was met with, but the exceedingly difficult nature of the country rendered the expedition one of great hardship to the troops. Having traversed the country in various directions and visited Kahun, the chief town of the tribes, and the terms dictated by the British Government having been accepted, and due submission and reparation made by the tribesmen, the force withdrew in November.

Marri
Expedition,
1880.

The termination of hostilities in Afghanistan left the Government of India at leisure to turn their attention to the Mahsud Waziris, who, incited thereto from Kabul, had, during the continuance of the war, been guilty of numerous raids and outrages on our borders and on the line of communications in the Kuram valley, and in the spring of 1881 an expeditionary force, under the command of Brigadier-General Kennedy, was prepared at Tank to visit them with the punishment due to their misdeeds. The force consisted of the Peshawar Mountain Battery, three guns of the Hazara and two of the Derajat Mountain Batteries, detachments of the 1st and 4th Punjab Cavalry, the 8th Company of Sappers and Miners, and a wing each of the 32nd Native Infantry (Pioneers), 1st and 4th Sikh Infantry, and 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th Punjab Infantry. A reserve column was also assembled at Bannu under the command of Brigadier-General J. J. H. Gordon, comprising No. 1 Battery, 8th Brigade, Royal Artillery, No. 1 Mountain Battery (two guns), the 18th Bengal Cavalry, the 6th Company of Sappers and Miners, the 14th, 20th, 21st, and 30th Native Infantry, and the 5th Punjab Infantry. Before General Kennedy's advance, which took place on the 21st of April, the submission of most of the tribe had already been received; but the Nana Khel section still held out, and it was against them

Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris, May
1881.



principally that the operations were directed. Passing up the Shuhur valley, the force visited various settlements of the recusant clan without experiencing much opposition until the 3rd of May, when the advance was furiously attacked, near Shah Alam Ragza, by a large force of the enemy. The charge, however, was easily repulsed by the 1st Sikh Infantry, and the enemy were driven back completely beaten; on the 5th Kaniguram was occupied, and on the 11th Makin. In the meantime, under instructions from General Kennedy, the Bannu column, under Brigadier-General Gordon, had moved into the hills, and, proceeding up the Khaisora valley, had, after some skirmishing, reached Razmak on the 9th May, when it came into communication with the Tank column. Some more skirmishing took place, but no further serious opposition was encountered, and the Nana Khels having submitted, the troops returned to British territory,—General Kennedy by the Tank-Zam and General Gordon by the Shaktu valley. The total casualties during the expedition amounted to eight killed and twenty-four wounded.

Interval
history.

But few internal changes or points of interest are to be noted in the three years covered by this chapter; not only is the period a very short one, but it was too fully occupied by the business and excitement of active operations to leave much time for organisation or reform of details. The outbreak of the war in Afghanistan occasioned a temporary increase of regiments to a strength of 480 sowars in the cavalry and 800 sepoy (912 of all ranks) in the infantry (G. O. C. C. dated the 19th December 1878), and an attempt was made to re-enrol pensioners for garrison duty, but this proved a complete failure. On the conclusion of the first phase of the hostilities, preparations were made for a reduction by the cessation of recruiting, but the rising at Kabul soon necessitated a return to the augmented strength. An advance of Rs. 15,000 was sanctioned to all silladar regiments of cavalry thus augmented, in order to meet the expense of equipping the new men, 96 in number—the money to be repaid within two years.

The drain of the protracted operations in Afghanistan, where the great amount of sickness, rather than the severity of the fighting, occasioned a continual demand for recruits, led to the grant, in 1880, of a bounty of Rs. 50 to all recruits, Rs. 25 being paid on enlistment, and the other half on the conclusion of three years' service.



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No other changes remain to be noticed, nor do any of the small alterations in the equipment of native regiments call for remark, except that contained in G. O. No. 10 of 1879, by which brown leather accoutrements took the place of buff in infantry regiments of the line.



Chapter XI—(1882—1890).

History of the Sudan Campaigns (*Colonel Colville*)—Battle of Tofrek (*Galloway*)—Official Accounts of the Akha, Expedition Egyptian Expedition, 1882,—Suakin Operations, 1885,—Third Burmese War,—Zho Valley Expedition,—Black Mountain Expedition, 1888,—and Sikkim Expedition—G. O. C. C., G. G. O., I. A. C., etc.

The year 1882 witnessed the commencement of a series of campaigns in Egypt, which afforded to Indian troops an opportunity of fighting and working side by side with certain British corps with which they are never brought into contact in their duties in Asia; and a special interest, therefore, attaches to the expeditions of 1882 and subsequent years such as had not existed since the force under Sir David Baird had excited the curiosity and admiration of the European troops in the same country in 1801.

The outbreak of hostilities in Egypt in July 1882 was soon followed by a call for a contingent from India. The force which, in accordance with this requisition, was despatched to take part in the operations in that country, was composed of the 2nd and 6th Bengal Cavalry, the 13th Bengal Lancers, the 7th, and 20th Bengal Native Infantry, and the 29th Bombay Native Infantry (the 2nd Baluch Battalion), the whole under the command of Major-General Sir H. T. Macpherson. The first of these regiments to disembark was the 2nd Bengal Cavalry, which landed on the 24th August and by the second week in September the whole force was collected at Ismailia, on the Suez Canal. A part of the 13th Bengal Lancers was sent on to Kassassin at the end of August and took part in a reconnaissance towards Salahieh on the 1st September, in which, however, nothing was seen of the enemy. On the 9th September, about an hour after day-break, a general advance was made by the Egyptian army against the British position at Kassassin. The infantry under Major-General Graham moved out to meet the attack, with their left resting on the Freshwater Canal, and the right supported by the cavalry, which, threatening the enemy's left, fell in with and defeated a separate portion of his force advancing from Salahieh. The enemy's repulse was general all along the line, the British losses being three killed and seventy-five wounded, of whom one killed and one wounded belonged to the 13th Bengal Lancers.

Expedition
to Egypt,
1882.



On the 11th September the Indian Contingent, under Sir Herbert Macpherson, arrived at Kassassin, and the infantry was then attached to the 2nd Division under Lieutenant-General Hamley, while the cavalry became the Second Brigade of the Cavalry Division. On the same day arrangements were made for an attack on the enemy's fortified position of Tel-el-Kebir on the following night, according to which the 1st Battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders (72nd Foot) and No. 9 (Mountain) Battery, 1st Brigade, Northern Division, Royal Artillery, were attached to the Indian force.

Battle of Tel-el-Kebir,
September
13th.

After dark on the 12th September camp was struck, and the troops moved on to their respective rendezvous. At 1-30 A.M. on the 13th the march of the main body and of the Cavalry Division, which was slightly in rear of the right, commenced. Just as day was breaking the infantry became engaged and after a short but sharp contest carried the enemy's entrenchments, and the 2nd Cavalry Brigade moving round the extreme left of the enemy's position, harassed the retreat of the Egyptians and rapidly converted it into a headlong rout. Pushing on to the railway station, the brigade succeeded in capturing a train full of fugitives which was just leaving Tel-el-Kebir for Zag-a-zig; thence without a halt the pursuit was continued to Belbeis, which was reached soon after noon. The Indian Infantry Brigade, marching from Kassassin at 2-30 A.M., moved along the south side of the Freshwater Canal: about day-break the batteries on the enemy's right were engaged, and in a few minutes the whole of the position south of the canal was captured. The main body of the infantry halted at Tel-el-Kebir; but the Indian Brigade, pushing on through the day, reached Zag-a-zig at 6 P.M. Sir Herbert Macpherson had meanwhile ridden on in advance, and, arriving at Zag-a-zig two hours earlier, captured ten engines and a hundred carriages, some of which were on the point of leaving the station.

The casualties of the Indian Contingent during the day were only one killed and three wounded.

On the 14th, at 3 A.M., Major-General Drury-Lowe, commanding the cavalry, taking the 2nd Brigade, with the 4th Dragoon Guards and the mounted infantry, left Belbeis; and by 4-15 P.M. arrived at Abbassieh, outside Cairo. Here he found a large portion of the Egyptian army drawn up ready to surrender; and on the same evening Cairo was entered, the citadel occupied, and Arabi Pasha a prisoner.



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By the victory of Tel-el-Kebir and the rapid pursuit to the capital resistance was completely broken, and active military operations were brought to a close. Through the remainder of September the Indian Contingent remained in garrison at Zag-a-zig and Abbassia and early in October the withdrawal of the troops from Egypt commenced. By the end of that month all the Indian regiments had reached Bombay.

For services in Egypt a medal was granted to all ranks, and bronze star was presented by the Khedive; and the words "EGYPT 1882," and "TEL-EL-KEBIR" were authorised to be borne on the colours and appointments of the corps engaged in the operation (G. G. O. Nos. 578 and 665 of 1882 and 325 and 341 of 1883).

In the winter of 1883-84 it was found necessary to despatch a small expedition against the Akhas, a savage tribe inhabiting the hills to the north of the Darrang district in Upper Assam, to punish them for repeated raids into British territory and to enforce the release of some captives they had carried off. The troops employed consisted of a detachment of No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery, No. 2 Company Sappers and Miners, and 200 men of the 12th and a wing of the 43rd Bengal Native Infantry, the whole under the command of Brigadier General R. S. Hill. Diju Mukh, on the frontier, was the rendezvous but before the arrival of all the troops an advance column of the 43rd Native Infantry and police marched (17th December) into the hills. A night attack was made on this detachment on the 23rd, with the result that two men were killed and seven wounded. Three days later, on arrival at the Tenga river, the passage was found to be opposed by the enemy in considerable force, and it was decided to concentrate the whole column before pushing on. Accordingly it was not until the 8th January that the passage of the river was effected, in the face of considerable opposition from strong stockades on the opposite bank, but as the only weapons of the enemy were bows and arrows, the casualties were not many. The Akhas, finding their position forced, fled into the hills in all directions and offered no further resistance, and the objects of the expedition having been attained, the column returned to British territory by the 23rd January. Our losses during the expedition were four killed and nine wounded.

In the autumn of 1884 a small affair disturbed the tranquillity of the North-West Frontier. During the preceding eighteen months the tribes inhabiting the Zhob and Bori valleys had been guilty of

The Akha
Expedition,
1883-84.

Zhob Valley
Expedition,
1884.



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eated outrages in the neighbourhood of the Harnai pass, and it at became necessary to send a punitive expedition against them. e expeditionary force, which moved forward from Thal-Chiotiali October, and was under the command of Major-General Sir O. V. nner, K.C.B., was composed of two mountain batteries, one squadron h of the 10th Bengal Lancers, the 5th Punjab Cavalry, and the 1st mbay Lancers; a wing of the 1st Battalion, Worcestershire Regi- nt (29th Foot); a wing of the 1st Battalion, North Lancashire giment (47th Foot); the 2nd Battalion, North Staffordshire Regi- nt (98th Foot); two companies of the Bengal Sappers and Miners; 1st and 45th Bengal Native Infantry; the 4th Punjab Infantry; the d Bombay Infantry (Grenadiers), and a detachment of the 1st Madras fantry (Pioneers). Advanced detachments were sent on into the ori valley early in October, and on the 13th of that month the Political gent, Sir Robert Sandeman, held a durbar of chiefs at the entrance the valley, at which the submission of all except the Mena Khel, ilzai, and Zhob tribes, was received. A standing camp having been rmed at Dulai, a forward movement was made on the 18th against e fort of the chief Shah Jahan, which was occupied on the 21st. A athering of the tribesmen was shortly after discovered at Daulatzai, n the hills north of Shah Jahan's fort, and Sir Oriel Tanner moved p to attack them on the 24th; the enemy, who were badly armed, eing almost entirely without fire-arms, were quickly driven from their osition with a loss of about fifty killed and several prisoners, the asualties on our side being only five wounded, including two native fficers,—all of the 4th Punjab Infantry. During the next few days everal villages were destroyed; but the recalcitrant tribes having ow tendered their submission hostilities ceased, and about the last week in November the force was withdrawn.

Early in 1885 it became necessary to despatch another expedition o Egypt, to co-operate with the British force at Suakin. Orders on he subject were issued in G. G. O. dated the 14th February 1885, oy which Major-General J. Hudson was appointed to command the Indian troops. A special scale of pay was laid down for native ranks whilst in receipt of Government rations, and the supply of grain and forage for horses was also undertaken by Government. The corps detailed were the 9th Bengal Cavalry (equipped as lancers), the 15th and the 17th Bengal Infantry,* and the 28th

The Suakin Expedition, 1885.

* By an order of Government in the Military Department the designations of all regiments of Native Infantry were altered from the 1st January, 1885, by the elimination of the word "Native." These regiments became, therefore, from that date, "Bengal Infantry," "Madras Infantry" and "Bombay Infantry."—P.



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Bombay Infantry. The first detachment embarked at Bombay the 22nd February, and by the 14th of March the whole contingent was landed at Suakin.

For the first few days but little active work was done outside camp, but the force was subject to the annoyance of continual night attacks, in which several sentries were killed or wounded. On the 19th a reconnaissance was made by the Cavalry Brigade, supported by the Indian Contingent, through dense bush and difficult country in the direction of Hashin; the enemy were not seen in any strength though a few shots were exchanged at long ranges. On the following day a strong force moved out of Suakin with the object of establishing a *zariba* at Hashin; it consisted of the Guards, the 21st Brigade, the Cavalry Brigade, the Indian Contingent, three batteries of artillery, and some engineers. As the force advanced a continuous skirmishing fire was kept up by Arabs concealed in the bush, and the hill on which it was proposed to construct the look-out post was not carried without considerable opposition and loss,—the 9th Bengal Cavalry, in a conflict in the bush, having had twelve (including Resaidar Shibdeo Singh) killed and fifteen (including Major Robertson) wounded. At length the *zariba* having been established, the force retired, reaching Suakin the same evening.

The fight at
Tofrek,
March 22nd.

On Sunday, the 22nd March, at 7 A.M., the Indian Contingent, infantry, with the 1st Battalion of the Berkshire Regiment (49th Foot), some sappers, two squadrons of the 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers, and one of the 9th Bengal Cavalry, the whole under the command of Major-General Sir J. C. McNeill, marched from Suakin to form a *zariba* eight miles south-west of the town. At 11 A.M. only six miles had been covered, but it was determined to halt and commence the *zariba* at a place called Tofrek. At 2-40 P.M., when the sappers and the Berkshire Regiment were cutting down the thick bush round the *zariba*, the cavalry scouts and working parties were suddenly driven in by a furious rush of a large force of Arabs. The unfinished *zariba* was defended on the west by the 15th Bengal Infantry, on the south by the 17th Bengal Infantry, and on the north by the 28th Bombay Infantry; the main attack came from the south-west, and so impetuous was the charge that the southern face of the square, which had been thrown into disorder by the cavalry picquets galloping in on the front, was broken through, and the enemy rushed into



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the centre in great numbers, causing great confusion amongst the baggage animals, and inflicting considerable loss on the 17th Bengal Infantry and the followers. On the first alarm the Berkshire Regiment hastened to stand to their arms and open fire, and in the meantime the 15th Bengal Infantry sustained the brunt of the attack on the west face without flinching, and by their steadiness and gallantry did much towards preserving the whole force from disaster. The enemy was at length driven off at 3-30 P.M., after having suffered terrible loss, and the *zariba* having been completed and garrisoned by the 15th and 17th Bengal Infantry, the remainder of the force returned to Suakin. The casualties amounted to seventy killed, one hundred and thirty-three wounded and thirty missing, the loss of the Bengal troops being Major Von Beverhoudt, 17th Bengal Infantry, and twenty-nine men killed, and forty-five (including Lieutenant Drury, 17th Bengal Infantry) wounded.

Throughout the rest of March the troops at Suakin were constantly employed on escort or convoy duty between that place and the various *zaribas* in the surrounding country, but no fighting took place beyond occasional long range firing in the bush; in fact, it appeared that the enemy's power was broken by his losses on the 22nd March. On the 31st of March a cavalry reconnaissance reported Tamai to be held in strength by the Arabs; and accordingly two days later a force marched in that direction, 7,200 strong, and including 1,585 men of the Indian Contingent. Passing through Tofrek, Tesselah hill was reached in the afternoon without any opposition being met with, and the force bivouacked there that night. On the 3rd April the column advanced to Tamai, and having burned all the huts there, whilst the enemy kept up a skirmishing fire from the bush, the return march to Tofrek was effected without incident. The next day the column return to Suakin.

Uneventful convoy duties were performed by the whole garrison through the month of April. On the 2nd May Lord Wolseley arrived at Suakin, and four days later a combined attack from Suakin and Otao was made on the enemy's position at Thakul, eighteen miles west of the former place, and ten miles south of Otao. The Suakin column consisted of the 9th Bengal Cavalry, some mounted infantry, and the Camel Corps; that from Otao included a company of mounted infantry, the 15th Bengal Infantry, and some native scouts. The enemy



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were taken completely by surprise, and were driven with considerable loss from their camp, which was destroyed. The casualties on our side were only three wounded.

The active operations of the campaign soon after came to a conclusion, but the 15th and 17th Bengal Infantry and one squadron of the 9th Bengal Cavalry were retained in garrison at Suakin, and did not return to India until November.

The Egyptian medal of 1882, with clasp inscribed "SUAKIN, 1885," was granted to all troops who took part in the operations in Egypt between the 26th March 1884, and the 14th May 1885, together with a special clasp for the battle of Tofrek (G. G. O. No. 655 of 1885), and by G. O. No. 849 of 1887, the Khedive's bronze star was also granted to the troops employed at Suakin. Authority was afterwards given to the corps engaged to inscribe the words "SUAKIN, 1885," and "TOFREK," on their colours and appointments (G. G. O. No. 478 of 1886).

We come now to the Third Burmese War, 1885, which, with the subsequent operations of 1886-89, is remarkable not so much for the breadth or brilliancy of the military operations, as for the importance of its consequences, the number of troops employed, and the harassing and arduous nature of the duties entailed.

The relations of the British Government with that of Mandalay had, ever since the accession of King Thebaw in 1879, been in a strained and unsatisfactory condition, owing to the violation of treaties by the King, to acts of aggression on the British frontier, to outrages upon British subjects and injustice to British traders, and to the intrigues of the King with a foreign European power with objects hostile to British interests. Remonstrances in connection with these matters were received with indifference and evoked nothing but insolence, the forbearance exhibited by the British Government serving only to inflate the arrogance of which two disastrous wars and the loss of large tracts of territory had failed to cure the Burmese people. Misconstruing this forbearance, King Thebaw, in 1885, filled up the measure of his offences by arbitrarily imposing on a British trading company a fine of ruinous amount, and insolently refusing to submit the matter to impartial enquiry. Under these circumstances an ultimatum was addressed to the Court of Mandalay, and this being met with an evasive reply and by the simultaneous issue of an openly hostile proclamation, war became inevitable, was declared accordingly, and

The Third
Burmese War,
1885-1889.



orders issued (30th October, 1885) for the despatch of a field force to Burma with all speed.

The force detailed for this service was placed under the command of Major-General H. N. D. Prendergast, C.B., V.C., and was composed of six batteries of artillery, six companies of sappers and miners, three regiments of British and seven of native infantry, and a naval brigade,—out of which the Bengal Army contributed No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery, two companies of sappers and miners, and the 2nd and 11th Bengal Infantry.

The whole force arrived at Rangoon between the 5th and the 11th of November, and proceeded in a fleet of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company's steamers to Thyetmyo; thence an advance was made on the 14th of November, and on the following day the frontier was crossed. The small towns which were first reached, such as Sinbaungwe, etc., were occupied without any opposition, the whole strength of the Burman forces in the neighbourhood of the frontier being concentrated at the forts of Gwe-gyaung-Kamyo and Minhla, which face each other on opposite sides of the river. A simultaneous attack was made on these places on the morning of the 17th November. It was expected that Gwe-gyaung-Kamyo, on the left bank, which was much the stronger position of the two, would be resolutely held; but on the approach of our troops the garrison ran off after a faint resistance, and the position was captured with a loss on our side of only two men wounded.

The brigade employed on the opposite side of the river, consisting of the 2nd and 11th Bengal Infantry and the 12th Madras Infantry, had a more arduous task to perform, and encountered considerable opposition in the attack on the village and fort of Minhla. The former was a place of some size, stretching along the river bank south of the fort, and surrounded by a bamboo stockade; the latter was a square stone structure, its walls about twenty-five feet in height, entered on the side facing the river by a narrow arch, and having on the west a double ramp, which approached the ramparts with a slope of about 25°. The troops for the attack were landed at Malun, a large village four miles down the river, and on approaching the village of Minhla the advance was received by a smart fire from the enemy, who were concealed in thick jungle. The 11th Bengal Infantry, however, pushed on rapidly, and, supported by the 2nd, quickly carried the stockade and entered the village. The attack was now directed

The taking of
Minhla, Nov-
ember 17th.



against the house of the Woon, which was within a further stockaded enclosure, and, in spite of a vigorous resistance, the Burmans were driven from point to point and the position carried. The fort alone remained, and it was approached by an encircling movement, the 11th Bengal Infantry making for the left or north side of the ramp, while the 2nd, extending to the right, cut off the line of retreat to the river, and at the same time advanced to the southern approach of the ramp. During the whole advance the troops were subjected to a heavy fire from the jungle round and from the fort, but, advancing steadily, the ramp was carried by a final rush from both sides, and the garrison, flying into the casemates of the fort or out of the east gate, offered no further resistance. The first to reach the *terre-plein* at the top of ramp was Lieutenant Wilkinson, of the 12th Madras Infantry, who had joined the 11th Bengal Infantry, and was closely followed by a large number of the latter regiment; as he reached the *terre-plein* he stumbled, and, falling forward, was at once set upon by the enemy and severely wounded; his life was only saved by the advance of the men of the 11th. In the day's fighting the casualties amongst the officers were heavy, Lieutenant Dury, 11th Bengal Infantry, being killed, and four officers of the 12th Madras Infantry wounded; of the rank and file three were killed and twenty-three wounded.

With the fall of Minhla the opposition of the Burman army to the British advance was almost at an end. Two Italians, who had led and trained the enemy's forces on the frontier, surrendered on the following day, and our further advance up the river met with no serious resistance. Pagan was evacuated after a few rounds had been fired: Myingyan, where alone anything like a stand was made, was taken without loss on our side: Ava and Sagain surrendered on the 27th November without a shot being fired: and on the 28th Mandalay was reached, the palace occupied, and the king a prisoner. On the 29th Thebaw was sent down the river under escort, and later on he was deported to India.

Intelligence having been received that the Chinese were massing troops on the frontier with a view to seizing Bhamo, Major-General Prendergast left Mandalay on the 18th December with a force of about a thousand men (which included the Hazara Mountain Battery and a company of Bengal sappers), and, proceeding up the Irrawaddy, occupied Bhamo on the 28th, without having encountered any opposition.



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Annexation of
Upper Burma.

Thus ended the third war against the Alompra dynasty. The deportation of King Thebaw from Mandalay was followed by the annexation of Upper Burma; and throughout the remaining months of the cold weather of 1885-86, though there were repeated skirmishes with bands of insurgents, no military operations of any consequence took place, and it appeared that the country was likely in time to settle down quietly under its new rulers. But the seeds of future troubles had been sown when hundreds of Burmese soldiery, unused to any but an idle and self-indulgent life, had been allowed, on the disbandment of the king's army, to disperse armed over the country.

As the spring drew on, dacoities and outrages became more and more frequent; pretenders to the throne and local leaders arose in every quarter, whose influence and boldness increased proportionately as they perceived the inadequacy of the British force then in Burma to cope with the difficulties of the situation. To deal with these increasing disorders considerable reinforcements were sent to Burma during the winter and the succeeding spring, and amongst other corps the 7th Bengal Cavalry and the 26th, 27th, and 43rd Bengal Infantry were despatched thither on service.

General Prendergast vacated the command on the 1st April 1886, and was succeeded by Brigadier-General G. S. White, v.c., with the local rank of Major-General. Throughout the summer actions of various degrees of importance with bands of insurgents and dacoits were frequent in every district. In the neighbourhood of Pagan, Myingyan, and Meiktila, the 11th Bengal Infantry and detachments of the Sappers were continually engaged around the many posts which were established in the districts,—one officer, Lieutenant Forbes, of the former corps, being killed while on convoy duty between Meiktila and Hlaingdet on the 21st April, on which occasion also seven sepoy were wounded.

Operations in
the summer of
1886.

In the Bhamo district, at the same time, an expedition was despatched against Katran, close to the Chinese frontier, the stronghold of the Phonkan Tsawbwa, in which the 26th Bengal Infantry and the Hazara Mountain Battery took part. Katran, a position of considerable strength, was captured after some resistance with a loss of nine wounded, but the force was obliged to retire immediately owing to the deficiency of supplies. Another expedition marched to Katran in the following month, on which occasion no resistance was met with.



During the summer a small force, which included detachments of the 4th, 42nd, and 44th Bengal Infantry, advanced from Manipur, and, after some fighting, occupied Tammu, in the Kubo Valley. Several skirmishes took place in that neighbourhood during the summer and autumn, and eventually the enemy were driven completely out of the Kubo Valley.

But the most important operations of this period were in the Minbu district, where the 2nd Bengal Infantry were stationed. Salin, a large walled town, six miles from the right bank of the Irrawaddy and about forty miles north of Minbu, was the centre of much disturbance; the place was threatened by a large force of dacoits early in June, and in an engagement outside the walls on the 12th of that month Captain Dunsford was killed. Six weeks later the dacoits, having gathered in still greater numbers, commenced a regular siege of the town, of which the walls were with difficulty manned by the small garrison stationed there. All the ammunition was exhausted and the defenders in serious straits, when the place was relieved on the last day of July. In the western part of the district, the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. R. Phayre, was killed at Padaing, near Magwe, on the 8th of June. This was followed by the advance of a mixed column under Major Gordon, 2nd Bengal Infantry, from Minbu, which, on the 19th June, attacked and captured Ngape, a large village at the foot of the Aeng Pass over the Arakan Yomas, thirty-seven miles west of Minbu; our loss in the affair was six killed and twenty-five wounded. The climate of Ngape, however, was found to be so terribly unhealthy at that season of the year that it became necessary to abandon the place, and the garrison retired on the 1st August.

Towards the end of the summer further reinforcements were despatched to Burma: the field force was divided into six brigades and one independent command; and early in the autumn Sir Herbert Macpherson, Commander-in-Chief of Madras, assumed command of the whole. On the 1st October 1886 the following were the Bengal troops serving in Burma:—

In the 1st Brigade—

7th Bengal Cavalry.

Sappers and Miners.

43rd Bengal Infantry (Gurkhas.)



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In the 2nd Brigade—

No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery.

Sappers and Miners.

26th Bengal Infantry.

In the 3rd Brigade—

27th Bengal Infantry.

In the 4th Brigade—

11th Bengal Infantry.

In the 6th Brigade—

2nd Bengal (Light) Infantry.

In the Chindwin Command—

18th Bengal Infantry.

These were supplemented shortly after by the 3rd Gurkha Regiment and the 5th Bengal Infantry in the 1st Brigade, and by the 1st and later by the 12th Bengal Infantry in the 2nd Brigade.

The plan of operations for the winter was to traverse the districts apportioned to these brigades with a succession of strong columns, supplemented by flying columns of cavalry and mounted infantry; the end in every case being the capture or destruction of the local chiefs who everywhere headed the dacoit bands. Before the operations commenced, the field force and the whole Indian army suffered a sudden and severe loss in the death of Sir Herbert Macpherson, who died of fever on the 26th October 1886, near Prome. In consequence of this misfortune, Sir Frederick Roberts, then Commander-in-Chief in India, at the special request of the Government of India, transferred his head-quarters to Burma, and assumed the command of the troops there.

The following is a brief summary of the principal events of the next twelve months in which Bengal troops were engaged :—

A column composed of the 3rd Gurkha Regiment, a detachment of Bengal sappers, and some Madras infantry, under Colonel Stedman of the first-mentioned corps, marched for the hills east of Mandalay at the end of October, and on the 26th of that month some slight skirmishing took place, in which one man was killed and three wounded. The column continued its movements in the hills for some time, during which a few unimportant skirmishes occurred. On the 20th November Captain Pulley, with a detachment of the 3rd Gurkha Regiment, marched from Lamaing, and on the 25th attacked and captured a strong position at Zibyubin, where he himself and six men were wounded. Throughout December the

Operations of
1886-87.

First Brigade.



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Second Brigade.

pursuit of the dacoit leader Hla-u was prosecuted with vigour by the 7th Bengal Cavalry. In March a mixed column, including some of the 27th Bengal Infantry, attacked and carried the stockaded position of Hmawaing.

In the Second Brigade a mixed force, under Brigadier-General Cox, consisting of detachments of the 7th Bengal Cavalry, the Hazara Mountain Battery, Bengal Sappers, Royal Welsh Fusiliers (23rd Foot), and 26th Bengal Infantry, marched to Wuntho, where a column from Shwebo co-operated; the latter was composed of detachments of artillery, of British infantry, and of the 1st and 12th Bengal Infantry. No resistance was met with, and the inhabitants of Wuntho were disarmed.

Third Brigade.

Considerable activity was exhibited in the districts of the Third Brigade during this winter, most of the operations being prosecuted by Bombay troops. In January a column assembled at Hlaingdet, under Colonel Stedman, consisting of artillery, some of the Hampshire Regiment (67th Foot), and the 3rd Gurkha Regiment from the First Brigade; this force marched into the Shan States, where little opposition was experienced and no fighting took place.

Fourth Brigade.

In the Fourth Brigade Captain Rose commanded a mixed column which included a detachment of the 27th Bengal Infantry. This marched in December 1886 from Wundwin against Hmawaing: several days of jungle fighting took place before the objective was reached; Hmawaing was destroyed and the column then retired, its operations having made an excellent impression in the district.

Fifth Brigade.

The chief operation in the Fifth Brigade was the Ruby Mines expedition, which was organised in December and marched on the 19th of that month from Sagadaung under Brigadier-General Stewart. It consisted of four guns, 110 Bengal sappers, 96 of the King's Own South Yorkshire Light Infantry (51st Foot), and 293 of the 43rd Bengal Infantry. Occasional slight skirmishes took place, but on the whole but little resistance was experienced.

Sixth Brigade.

The operations of the Sixth Brigade were directed entirely against the two dacoit leaders, Boh Shwe and Oktama. A strong column advanced from Minbu under Brigadier-General Low early in December, composed of detachments of artillery and Madras cavalry, the 1st Battalion of the Rifle Brigade, the 2nd Bengal Infantry, the 3rd Hyderabad Infantry, and some mounted infantry. Little was seen of the enemy until Paeng, at the foot of the Arakan range, was reached.



when a skirmish took place, in which one man was killed and seven wounded. Moveable columns were now formed, which patrolled the country, without, however, meeting many of the enemy. At the same time a column, which included some of the 11th Bengal Infantry, marched from Mitchi into the Pauk country, where a skirmish took place on the 5th January, in which one man was killed and five wounded.

On the Chindwin river the dacoit gangs were very active during the winter. On the 10th October some of the 18th Bengal Infantry had a smart skirmish on Taung-talon hill, in which three men were wounded. On the 19th of the same month Captain Sage, with a detachment of the 18th Bengal Infantry, some Bombay infantry, and Military Police, attacked and carried a dacoit position at Chauktat, with a loss of one killed and one wounded. On the 28th October the Assistant Commissioner of the district, Mr. Gleeson, was killed at Yu, and his escort of twenty men of the 18th Bengal Infantry were hard pressed; their defence, however, was so steady that they succeeded in beating off their assailants and carrying away Mr. Gleeson's body to Tandwin. Their loss was one killed and five wounded. On the 7th November a column, under Lieutenant L. C. Fryer, of the 18th Bengal Infantry, and some Madras infantry, attacked an entrenched position at Myogyi, from which they expelled the enemy with considerable loss. The casualties were three killed, and Lieutenant Fryer and two men wounded.

The Chindwin
Command.

In the spring of 1887 Major-General White succeeded Sir Frederick Roberts in the command of the field force, which, on the 1st April was reorganised,—the Fifth Brigade being amalgamated with the Second, and the Sixth with the Fourth. Several corps were relieved and returned to India, while the force which remained continued the work of settling the country by the operation of numerous small and rapidly moving columns.

Many engagements of more or less importance took place during the summer and autumn, in the course of which most of the dacoit leaders were either killed or captured. Of the skirmishes in which the Bengal troops were engaged, and with which alone we are now concerned, only three were of much consequence. In one, on the 5th June, detachments of mounted infantry and of the 5th Bengal Light Infantry, under Lieutenant Cuppage, attacked a strong position at Taungma, near Pyumbwin, and lost Lieutenant Darrah, Assistant



Commissioner, and one man killed, and four men wounded. Four days later another detachment of the 5th had a smart skirmish in the capture of the stockaded position of Mangon, in the Second Brigade district; and on the 11th July detachments of the Royal Munster Fusiliers (104th Foot) and 5th and 10th Bengal Infantry attacked and carried Mezadaung hill, in the First Brigade district, with a loss of one killed and four wounded.

During the autumn of 1887 and the spring of 1888 detachments of the 7th Bengal Cavalry and of the 1st, 5th, 10th, and 33rd Bengal Infantry were frequently engaged in skirmishes with bands of dacoits in various parts of the country, while portions of No. 1 Bengal Mountain Battery and of the 12th Bengal Infantry were employed in operations against the Kachins in the Mogoung district, but though these services were harassing and some losses were sustained, no action took place deserving of special mention.

The operations carried out and the defeat and dispersion of dacoit bands wherever met with had the effect by the spring of 1888 of restoring order to a very great extent throughout the newly acquired territory, and it was found practicable then to make a considerable reduction in the forces in the country and to redistribute those that were retained. On the 1st of May the troops in Burina (the whole under the command of Major-General Sir George S. White) were re-arranged in three brigades (with head-quarters at Mandalay Myingyan, and Meiktila respectively) and four commands (designated respectively the Bhamo, Ruby Mines, Chindwin, and Shwebo commands), the Bengal troops remaining in the country being distributed as follows:—

1st Brigade.—No. 1 Bengal Mountain Battery, and half of the 42nd Bengal Infantry.

2nd Brigade.—Half of the 10th and the whole of the 33rd Bengal Infantry.

Bhamo Command.—No. 2 Bengal Mountain Battery and the 12th Bengal Infantry.

Ruby Mines Command.—Half of the 42nd Bengal Infantry.

Chindwin Command.—Half of the 10th Bengal Infantry.

Later on in the year the Bengal troops in Burma were increased by the despatch thither of the 17th and 44th Bengal Infantry.

By G. G. O. No. 434 of 1887 the India medal, with a special clasp inscribed "BURMA, 1885-87," was granted to all the troops employed between the declaration of war and the 30th April 1887, and in 1891 G. G. O. No. 64 authorised the words "BURMA, 1885-87," being borne on the colours of all regiments so employed.



Though the summer of 1888 brought with it no absolute cessation of military movements in Burma and on its frontiers, it will be convenient at this point to leave that part of the country for a while, and turn to some events of importance which were in progress elsewhere.

At the end of 1887 the infringement of the treaty of 1861 by the Sikkim Rajah, and the establishment of a force of Tibetans at the fort of Lingtu, rendered military measures in that quarter necessary, and early in 1888 a small force was concentrated on the Sikkim frontier for that purpose. It consisted of four guns of No. 9 Battery, 1st Brigade, Northern Division, Royal Artillery, 200 of the 2nd Battalion, Derbyshire Regiment (95th Foot), a wing of the 13th Bengal Infantry, and the 32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers), the whole under the command of Colonel T. Graham, Royal Artillery. Half the force remained at Padong, while the remainder advanced on the 16th March, and on the 20th, having attacked and carried a stockaded position at Jelaktso, near Lingtu, and a stone breastwork above, advanced towards the main position of the Tibetans. On the 21st the fort of Lingtu was occupied without resistance. The casualties in the two days were one officer and four men slightly wounded.

The Sikkim Expedition,
1888.

Early in April an entrenched camp was established at Gnathong, and here, on the 22nd of May, the garrison was attacked by the Tibetans in considerable force. The enemy were by no means wanting in courage, but the worthlessness of their weapons rendered their assault comparatively harmless, and they were beaten off with considerable loss; the casualties on our side were three killed and eight wounded.

In the middle of June the artillery and the detachment of the Derbyshire Regiment were withdrawn from Gnathong to Jalapahar; but hardly a month had elapsed before the increasing numbers of Tibetans in the Jalep pass compelled Colonel Graham to ask for reinforcements; and by the end of August his force at Gnathong amounted to 1,700 men, composed of four guns, 386 of the Derbyshire Regiment, the 32nd Bengal Infantry, and 514 of the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Gurkha Regiment.

Three weeks passed in comparative inaction, during which the Tibetans were adding to their numbers and strengthening their position in the Jalep pass. At length Graham assumed the offensive, and on the 24th of September attacked and captured the Tibetan advanced position, drove the enemy over the Nimla pass, advanced



against and captured the Jalep pass after a feeble resistance, and, having crossed the pass on the 25th, advanced as far as Chambi, which place he reached on the 26th. The enemy being completely beaten and disorganised, the force returned to Gnathong, where it arrived on the 28th. The casualties in these operations were only two officers and three men wounded.

Concurrently with Graham's advance against the Tibetan position in the Jalep pass a detachment of 150 of the 13th Bengal Infantry was sent from Padong to occupy Gantok, and on the 30th a part of this detachment advanced as far as Tumlong, the capital of Sikkim; both there and on the road these troops were met with cordiality by the inhabitants. The detachment returned to Gantok on the 5th October.

Active military operations were now at an end, and, while political arrangements were in progress of settlement the troops were employed in opening out and improving the roads on both sides of the Tibet frontier. The Derbyshire Regiment and the artillery were sent back to India before the winter set in, but it was not until October in the following year that the remaining corps were withdrawn from Sikkim.

The India medal, with a special clasp inscribed "SIKKIM, 1888," was granted by G. G. O. No. 431 of 1889 to the troops employed in these operations.

The increasing unruliness of the tribes of the Black Mountain, Hazara, culminating (18th June, 1888) in an attack on a party of the 5th Gurkha Regiment, in which Major Battye of that regiment and Captain Urmston, 6th Punjab Infantry, were killed, resulted in the despatch against them, in the autumn of 1888, of a punitive expedition of considerable strength, under the command of Brigadier-General J. W. McQueen. The force detailed for this service was organised in two brigades, commanded, respectively, by Brigadier-Generals Chaner and Galbraith, and each brigade was formed into two columns, of which the composition was as follows :—

First Column.

Colonel J. M. Sym, Commanding.

No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery.

Two Gatling guns.

Half of the 3rd Company of Sappers and Miners.

2nd Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers (5th Foot).

3rd Sikh Infantry.

1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Regiment.

Second Column.

Colonel R. H. O'G. Haly, Commanding.

No. 3 Battery, 1st Brigade, South Irish Division, Royal Artillery (four guns).

1st Battalion, Suffolk Regiment (12th Foot).

A wing of the 34th Bengal Infantry (Pioneers).

40th Bengal Infantry.

45th Bengal Infantry (Sikhs).

*Third Column.*

Lieutenant-Colonel M. S. J. Sunderland,
Commanding.

No. 3 Battery, 1st Brigade, South Irish
Division, Royal Artillery (two guns).
Half of the 3rd Company of Sappers and
Miners.

2nd Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment
(107th Foot).

14th Bengal Infantry (Sikhs).

24th Bengal Infantry.

Fourth Column.

Colonel A. C. W. Crookshank, C.B.,
Commanding.

No. 2 Battery, 1st Brigade, Scottish
Division, Royal Artillery, and some
Gatling guns.

2nd Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment
(18th Foot).

29th Bengal Infantry.

A wing of the 34th Bengal Infantry
(Pioneers).

4th Punjab Infantry.

A field reserve, composed of the 15th Bengal Cavalry, the 2nd Battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders (78th Foot), and the 2nd Sikh Infantry, was also formed at Abbottabad, and a contingent of the troops of the Maharajah of Kashmir was afterwards added to it. The Khaibar Rifles subsequently joined the field force, and were attached to the Third Column. The First, Second and Third Columns assembled at Ughi, in the Agror valley, on the 1st October; the Fourth concentrated at Darband on the Indus.

The Fourth Column, under the command of Colonel Crookshank and accompanied by Brigadier-General Galbraith, advanced from Darband to Chamb on the 2nd October, and thence on the morning of the 4th towards Kotkai; they were met by parties of the enemy at Shingri, and in the firing which ensued Subadar-Major Chatter Singh, 34th Bengal Infantry, was mortally wounded. The column proceeding on to Kotkai found the tribesmen assembled in force near that place. The 34th Bengal Infantry and the 4th Punjab Infantry, who had covered the advance, having cleared the flanks, the guns came into action, and their fire was followed by a charge of the Royal Irish Regiment. At this moment one flank was exposed to an attack by a large party of *ghazis*, mostly Hindustanis, who had concealed themselves in a ravine; these fanatics (about two hundred in number) made a desperate attempt to break our line, but their onslaught was met and in a moment repulsed by the Royal Irish and portions of the 29th and 34th Bengal Infantry, who promptly shot down or otherwise destroyed the whole gang, not a single man escaping. By 3-30 P.M. the enemy were in full flight towards Kunhar, and an hour later Colonel Crookshank seized and occupied Kotkai. The British loss amounted to 4 killed and 12 wounded: amongst the



latter were three British officers, one of whom, Captain Beley, D.S.O., Assistant Quarter-Master-General, died next morning of his wounds.

On the following day a reconnaissance was made from Kotkai towards Kunhar, in which Colonel Crookshank, commanding the column, received a severe wound, which afterwards necessitated amputation of the leg, and, eventually, on the 24th of the month, caused his death. The command of the column devolved upon Colonel Beddy, who held it until the arrival of Colonel Pratt ten days later. Several days were now spent in reconnaissances, during which some skirmishing took place, resulting in several casualties, and on the 13th General Galbraith crossed to the right bank of the Indus, and destroyed the Hindustani fort and settlement at Maidan. The Fourth Column afterwards came into communication with the Third, but nothing of any importance occurred, and not a shot was fired after the destruction of Maidan.

The other three columns, moving up the Black Mountain from the Agror valley, also began their operations on the 4th October. The First Column, advancing to Mana-ka-dana and Chittabat, met with little opposition beyond a few stray shots, mostly directed against working parties; the Second advanced up the Barchar spur without meeting any opposition, whilst the Third moved up the Sambalbat and Chatta spurs. On the 5th the summit of the Black Mountain was reached. The advance was then continued towards Seri, skirmishing occurring each day with scattered parties of tribesmen. Seri was taken and destroyed on the 9th, and other villages of the hostile tribesmen suffered the same fate on subsequent days. On the 13th, October the Third Column reached Kunhar, and came into communication with the Fourth.

The result of these operations, and of the punitive measures adopted, was that on the 19th October the Akazais tendered their submission, their example being followed on the 30th by the Hasanzais.

The efforts of General McQueen were now turned to coercing into submission the Pariari Saiads and Tikariwals, coupled with a demonstration against Thakot and the Allai country. In these operations the First Column was employed, reinforced by a wing of the 34th Bengal Infantry and assisted by a Fifth Column composed of two guns, two Gatlings, a wing each of the Seaforth Highlanders and 40th Bengal Infantry, and the Khaibar Rifles.



The Pariari Saiad country was entered on the 24th October without much opposition having been experienced. On the 28th a lightly equipped force, selected from the First and Fifth Columns, was pushed on to the village of Thakot; only a few shots were fired from a distance at the troops and the detachment soon afterwards returned to the head-quarters of the force. On the 1st November another detachment advanced into the Allai country by the Ghoraphor pass, and, after a feeble resistance, a strong position on the Chaila ridge was captured with a loss of one killed and one wounded; part of the force penetrated to Pokal on the 3rd, with a loss of one killed and four wounded.

All the tribes now tendered their submission and acceptance in full of the terms imposed upon them by Government. The objects of the expedition having thus been attained, the troops withdrew into British territory, and the field force was broken up.

The loss of the force during the operations amounted to 20 killed and 57 wounded, among the latter being five British officers, two of whom died of their wounds.

The India medal, with a clasp inscribed "HAZARA, 1888," was, by G. G. O. No. 413 of 1889, granted to all troops engaged.

The cold season of 1888-89 witnessed a renewal of field operations in the newly-acquired province of Upper Burma. The country was, indeed, internally quiet, and the results of the three years' occupation were satisfactory beyond the hopes of the most sanguine, but the wild tribes of the frontiers, unsettled by the change of government and by the temporary prevalence of lawlessness amongst their Burmese neighbours, began to encroach on our now comparatively peaceful subjects, and necessitated a recourse to hostilities. At the commencement of the cold weather accordingly a plan was drawn up for operations in the Chin country, and in the Mogoung, Eastern Karenni, Ruby Mines, and Bhamo districts.

The most important operations were those in the Chin country. The tribes of the Chin hills had been incessant in their depredations throughout the summer of 1888, and in September two columns moved up to the outskirts of their country, one by way of Pauk, the other by Kalewa, and occupied Thilin, Gangaw, Kan, Sihaung, Kanbale and Indin. The raids, however, continued; in December attacks were made on a working party of the 42nd Bengal Infantry near Kanbale, and on the posts of the same regiment at

Operations in
Burma, 1888-89.

The Chin Ex-
pedition.



Sihaung and Kangyi, and in January 1889 the posts at Kan and Gangaw (where detachments of the 10th, 33rd, and 44th Bengal Infantry were engaged) were also assailed. At length a force under Brigadier-General Faunce, which included two guns of No. 1 Bengal Mountain Battery and 250 of the 42nd Bengal Infantry, moved into the Chin country, and on the 5th February, after a good deal of desultory skirmishing, occupied Tokhlaing (afterwards named Fort White), where head-quarters were established. Thence General Faunce detached a column, which included 75 of the 42nd and 100 of the 44th Bengal Infantry (which had also joined the force), with two guns, to operate against the Kanbau Chins, upon whom, between the 8th and the 20th March, severe punishment was inflicted, almost all their villages having, after considerable skirmishing, been destroyed. Later, on the 4th May, a detachment, including 60 of the 42nd, was sent against the Siyin Chin village of Tartan. Here the enemy were strongly posted behind stockades, and offered such a determined resistance that the attacking force was compelled to retire with a loss of one officer and three men killed, and two officers and eight men wounded. This however was the only *contresens* of the operations, which were on the whole eminently successful. Our losses from first to last amounted to two officers and 24 men killed, and six officers and 49 men wounded, of which the Bengal share was nine men killed and twenty-seven wounded.

Mogoung
operations.

In January 1889, an expedition was despatched from Mogoung for the punishment of the Lepei Kachins. This was practically a police expedition, but two guns of No. 2 Bengal Mountain Battery and a small detachment of the 1st Battalion, Hampshire Regiment (37th Foot) were attached to the police levy during the operations. Thama, the chief village of the Lepeis, was taken after a smart skirmish on the 19th February, and Wawang on the 21st, and early in March the force returned to Mogoung. On the 13th March a column was despatched against the Ithi tribe, and on the 1st April against the Sana Kachins, and a detachment was also employed against the Hlegyoman dacoits; in all these operations No. 2 Bengal Mountain Battery took part. The losses sustained during these operations were only one killed and twenty-four wounded, but of the latter no less than six were British officers, one of whom (Lieutenant Hawker, Hampshire Regiment) died of his wounds.



Two guns of No. 1 Bengal Mountain Battery took part in the operations of the Northern Column, under Brigadier-General H. Collett, which marched from Fort Stedman against the Eastern Karenni on the 29th December, 1888; and which, after some smart fighting near Lwekaw (costing us five killed and eleven wounded), occupied Sawlon on the 8th January, 1889.

Karenni
Expedition.

In the Ruby Mines district a rising took place in January 1889, a body of eight hundred rebels threatening the town of Momeit. Several skirmishes took place, in one of which an officer of the Hampshire Regiment (37th Foot) was killed. On the 24th March a column under the command of Major Garfit, Hampshire Regiment, in which two guns of No. 1 Bengal Mountain Battery were included, was despatched from Momeit to visit the insurgent stronghold at Binbaung, which was taken on the 30th after some resistance. The column returned to Momeit on the 10th April. In February 1889, a small force, under the command of Captain E. A. Smith, Royal Artillery, composed of a detachment of the Hampshire Regiment (37th Foot), two guns of No. 2 Bengal Mountain Battery, and 150 of the 17th Bengal Infantry, was despatched from Bhamo against a body of rebels who had taken up a position at Malin in the Sinkan valley, where they had repulsed a party of police. The enemy were encountered at that place on the 7th and their stronghold captured, but not without a sharp engagement, in which a loss of five killed and eighteen wounded was sustained, including Second-Lieutenant Stoddart and two men of the 17th Bengal Infantry killed, and ten men of the same regiment wounded. In the following month a detachment under the command of Major Spencer, 17th Bengal Infantry, twice defeated bodies of rebels in the neighbourhood of Mansi.

Ruby Mines
district.

In April, 1889, a force, under the command of Brigadier-General Wolseley, was despatched from Bhamo to operate against the Paukan Kachins. The force operated in two columns, of which the northern column was under the command of Captain E. A. Smith, Royal Artillery, and the southern under that of Major St. Paul of the Rifle Brigade. In these columns were included four guns of No. 2 Bengal Mountain Battery, and 150 of the 17th and 100 of the 42nd Bengal Infantry. Little opposition was encountered by either column, and only the northern column sustained any loss,—Captain Smith and six men having been wounded, of the latter of whom two died.



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On the 1st April 1889 the commands in Burma were redistributed and the force further reduced, Major-General B. L. Gordon succeeding Sir George White in the chief command. Upper Burma was now divided into two districts,—that of Mandalay, including the Bhamo, Ruby Mines and Shwebo commands, in which were Nos. 1 and 2 Bengal Mountain Batteries and the 17th Bengal Infantry; and that of Myingyan, including the Chin Field Force, with which were employed the 10th, 33rd, and 42nd Bengal Infantry.

The grant of the India medal, with a clasp for Burma, originally limited to operations up to the 30th April 1887, was by G. G. O. No. 31 of 1890 extended to all who had served in the country up to the 31st March, 1889, and an additional clasp was granted to those who were already in possession of the previous one.

In the cold weather of 1888-89 it was decided to despatch, from the Chittagong side, an expeditionary force into the Lushai country, with the combined object of inflicting punishment for past raids, in one of which a British officer employed in surveying had been murdered, and of opening out the country and establishing frontier posts. The command was given to Colonel V. W. Tregear, and the troops employed were, besides Madras and Bombay detachments, 250 men each of the 2nd and 9th Bengal Infantry and a wing of the 2-2nd Gurkha Regiment. These troops were all assembled at Demagiri by the middle of February, 1889, and in the following month the Shendu country was visited, and the village of Howsata, the chief concerned in the murder of the British officer, taken and destroyed. The operations lasted until the middle of April, when the objects of the expedition having been fully attained, the troops were withdrawn. The only obstacles encountered were those arising from the nature of the country.

Notwithstanding the lessons taught to the wild tribes of the Chin hills during the winter of 1888-89, their depredations by no means ceased throughout the following year. This fact, coupled with the advisability of thoroughly exploring and opening out the narrow strip of country which now alone divided British Burma from India, led to the undertaking, in the cold weather of 1889-90, of military operations from Burma and Chittagong into the country of the Chins and Lushais. The Burma force was commanded by Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, South Wales Borderers, and was divided into three portions:—first, the Northern Column, which

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included a wing of the 10th, a detachment of the 38th, and a wing of the 42nd Bengal Infantry, to operate from Fort White under the command of Colonel Skene; secondly, the Southern Column, with which were a detachment of No. 1 Bengal Mountain Battery and a wing of the 2-4th Gurkha Regiment, to advance from Kan into the Baungshe Chin country under the command of Brigadier-General Symons himself; and thirdly, the garrisons on the lines of communications.

The Northern Column advanced at the end of November, and by the close of the year had succeeded in establishing several posts for the protection of the Burma frontier from Chin raids. During its operations it encountered considerable opposition from the Kanbau and Siyin Chins, and several casualties occurred.

The Southern Column, delayed by the extraordinary difficulties of the country which it had to traverse, took sixty-six days, instead of twelve, as had been estimated, to reach Haka. Throughout the operations the opposition of the Chins was of a very faint character; the malarial fever of the thickly wooded valleys through which the troops moved was the most dangerous enemy met with, and from it all the regiments engaged suffered very severely.

In March 1890 a simultaneous advance of detachments was made from Fort White and from Haka into the Tashon Chin country, which, though elaborate preparations for resistance had been made by the tribes, succeeded in reaching the Tashon Ywama, and establishing British influence without any actual fighting. The remainder of the season was occupied by the Northern Column in operations against the Siyins, and by the Southern in numerous reconnaissances and explorations.

The losses of the two columns during these operations amounted to two British officers and seven men killed, and nine men wounded.

The force from Chittagong, under Brigadier-General V.W. Tregear, consisted of a company of sappers, the 3rd Bengal Infantry, a detachment of the 9th Bengal Infantry, the 2-2nd Gurkha Regiment, and a half battalion of the 2-4th, and a Bombay corps, and was destined to operate against the Chins, Lushais, Shendus, and other tribes occupying the hill tracts lying between the Chittagong district and the Chindwin and Kale valleys in Burma. It was divided into two columns, the Northern and the Haka. The former advanced



into the Lushai country, enforced the surrender of prisoners, exacted satisfaction for raids in past years, and opened the country by the construction of roads, etc. The Haka Column was hindered beyond expectation by the same difficulties of country which so impeded the advance of the Southern Burma Column, and was unable to complete the western section of the mule road to Haka until the 13th April. Immediately afterwards, the season being far advanced, the troops were withdrawn, and the field force broken up.

The India medal, with a special clasp inscribed "CHIN-LUSHAI, 1889-90," was, by G.G.O. No. 275 of 1891, granted to all troops employed in these operations between the 15th November, 1889, and the 30th April, 1890.

During the winter of 1889-90, two columns were despatched (from Bhamo and Momeik) to coerce the Tonhôn Kachins, who had been giving a good deal of trouble. In the Bhamo Column was included a part of the 17th Bengal Infantry, but having been left on the line of communications, this detachment was not prominently engaged in the operations, during which a good deal of fighting occurred, our losses during the expedition amounting to five killed and twenty (including two British officers) wounded.

The year 1890 closed with an expedition on the North-West Frontier, undertaken with the double object of exploring the Zhob Valley and of operating against the unruly sections of the Kidarzai Sherani tribe. The only Bengal troops comprised in the Zhob Valley force, which was commanded by Major-General Sir George White, were the 18th Bengal Lancers; but a force which moved from the Derajat under Colonel A. G. Ross, and co-operated from the east, included detachments of No. 1 (Kohat) and No. 7 (Bengal) Mountain Batteries, and of the 1st and 3rd Punjab Cavalry, half battalions of the 1st and 2nd Sikh Infantry, and the whole of the 2nd Punjab Infantry. The operations entailed exertions and exposure of an exceptional kind, but little opposition was encountered from the tribesmen, and the work of the force terminated on the 3rd December, 1890.

The years under review are remarkable for many changes, as well in the strength as in the interior economy and conditions of service of the Indian Army. The period opens with considerable reductions. In 1882 (G. G. O. No. 210) the strength of the Bengal Army was reduced by three regiments of cavalry and six of infantry,

Zhob Valley
Expedition,
1890.

Internal
history.
Reductions.



the strength of corps retained being at the same time fixed at three squadrons, with a total strength of 550 of all ranks, for cavalry, and at eight companies, with a total strength of 832 of all ranks, for infantry. The three Assam regiments,—the 42nd, 43rd, and 44th Bengal Infantry,—and subsequently the five Gurkha regiments, were, however, specially allowed to retain a total strength of 912 of all ranks. The number of British officers with every corps was at the same time increased by one, making a total of eight. The regiments selected for disbandment were the 16th and 17th Bengal Cavalry and the 4th Punjab Cavalry, the 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, and 41st Bengal Infantry, and the 3rd Punjab Infantry.

Before many years had elapsed, however, these reductions were not only made good, but the strength of the Army was raised to a higher point than that to which it had attained prior to the reductions. In the autumn of 1885 the 16th and 17th Bengal Cavalry were resuscitated, and the strength of regiments of Bengal Cavalry was increased by the addition of a fourth squadron. In the following year second battalions were added to the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th Gurkha regiments, and two Bengal mountain batteries were raised. In 1887, five new battalions of Bengal infantry were raised; four (one of Mazbi Pioneers, two of Sikhs, and one of Dogras) to take the places of the disbanded 34th, 35th, 36th, and 37th Bengal Infantry, and the fifth (formed of Garhwalis) to be the second battalion of the 3rd Gurkha Regiment; at the same time the addition of a squadron to the cavalry of the Corps of Guides was ordered. In 1890 a complete re-organisation of certain regiments of Bengal infantry took place, resulting in the disappearance of the last of the old "low-caste levies" raised during the Mutiny; the old material having been mustered out, the 33rd Bengal Infantry was re-organised as a class regiment of Punjabi Musalmans, the 38th as one of Dogras, and the 40th as one of trans-frontier Muhammadans, including Baluchis; at the same time the second battalion of the 3rd Gurkha Regiment, raised three years before, became the 39th (Garhwal) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, and a new 2nd battalion of the 3rd Gurkha Regiment was formed in its place.

In addition to the above, a temporary increase of 200 men was (clause 45 of India Army Circulars, 1887) sanctioned for all corps ordered on service in Upper Burma; and (clause 44 of the Circulars of the same year) the normal strength of all infantry corps was increased to 912 of all ranks.

Increase.



Nor were the changes and reforms in the interior economy of regiments less noticeable during this period. Closely affecting the British ranks were the orders concerning the tenure of regimental commands published in G.G.O. No. 209 of 1882, by which it was provided that the then holders of regimental commands should continue in that office up to the completion of a term of seven years or until fifty-five years of age, whichever should happen first, but in no case for less than five years; that their immediate successors should retain command for seven years or up to fifty-five years of age; and that thereafter the limits should invariably be seven years' command or fifty-two years of age.

Worthy of note too is the sanction given by Her Majesty, published in G. G. O. No. 592 of 1882, to the inscription of "NAGPUR" on the colours of the 6th Bengal Infantry, of "CHINA, 1858-59" on those of the 7th, 10th, and 11th Bengal Infantry, and of "CHINA, 1860-62" on those of the 15th, 22nd, and 27th Bengal Infantry,—honours somewhat belated, perhaps, but none the less eminently merited by these corps.*

By G. G. O. No. 210 of 1882 good conduct pay was granted to non-commissioned officers as follows:—one, two, three, and four rupees after two, four, six, and eight years in the grade; but in the case of naicks one and two rupees only after two and four years in that grade.

In the same year orders were published restricting the enlistment of Afridis, and naming the following corps as being alone permitted to entertain recruits of that tribe:—the 7th Bengal Cavalry, the 11th and 19th Bengal Lancers, and the 20th, 21st, 24th, 26th, and 27th Bengal Infantry. In 1885 the 17th Bengal Cavalry was added, and the 7th Bengal Cavalry and the 24th and 27th Bengal Infantry expunged from this list, nor was any more extended enlistment of Afridis encouraged until 1890 when (India Army Circulars, clauses 81, 151 and 201) the formation of extra companies of Afridis was ordered in the 21st, 24th, 26th, 27th, and 28th Bengal Infantry, and the 1st, 4th, and 5th Punjab Infantry, *viz.*, one company in each, except the 26th, in which two companies were to be formed. These extra companies were only to be a temporary increase of the established strength, and previously existing companies were in each case to be gradually reduced, in order to bring the regiment to its normal establishment.

* *Vide* pages 131-32 and 297-98.



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On the 20th January, 1883, a General Order was published laying down rules as to the classes whose enlistment in the Bengal Army was permitted or otherwise, and adding a statement, such as had not been published since 1864, of the caste constitution of every corps. Of this statement the following is a *résumé*:-

CORPS.	Class regiment or class troop.	MUHAMMADANS.		HINDUS.				REMARKS.	
		Hindustani.	Punjabi.	Trans-Indus and Border.	PUNJABI.		HINDUS-TANI.		
					Sikhs.	Dogra.	Rajputs.		Other Hindus.
1st Bengal Cavalry	C.	6		
2nd " "	C.T.	2	1	...	1	2(a) (a) Jats.	
3rd " "	C.T.	3	1	...	1	1(b) (b) "	
4th " "	C.T.	3	1	2(c) (c) "	
5th " "	C.T.	2	1	...	1	2(d) (d) "	
6th " "	C.T.	2	2	...	1	1(e) (e) "	
7th " "	C.T.	2	1	...	1	2(f) (f) One troop of Jats and one of Brahmans.	
8th " "	C.T.	3	1	...	1	1	
9th " "	C.T.	...	2	1	2	1	
10th " Lancers	C.T.	...	1	1	2	2	
11th " "	C.T.	...	1	1(g)	3	1	(g) One-fourth of the troop might consist of Afridis.
12th " Cavalry	C.T.	...	2	...	3	1	
13th " Lancers	C.T.	...	1	1	2	2	
14th " "	C.	6(h) (h) Jats.	
15th " Cavalry	C.	...	2	4	
18th " "	C.T.	...	4	...	2	
19th " Lancers	C.T.	...	1	1	2	1	and one troop of independent trans-border tribes.



CSL

CORPS.	Class regiment or class company.	MUHAMMADANS.	HINDUS.								NORTH-EAST FRONTIER.		Jarwals of Assam.	REMARKS.		
			Hindustani.	Punjabi.	Independent Trans-border.	Trans-Indus and Border.	PUNJABI SIKHS.		HINDUSTANI.			Carkhas.			Hillmen.	
							Jats, etc.	Mazbis.	Dogras.	Brahmans.	Rajputs.					Other Hindus.
1st Bengal Infantry	C.C.C.	2	2	3	1		
2nd "	"	C.C.C.	2	2	3	1		
3rd "	"	"	2	3	2	1		
4th "	"	C.C.C.	2	2	3	1		
5th "	"	C.C.C.	2	1	2	3(a)	(a) Two of Jats. 1	
6th "	"	C.C.C.	2	2	4(b)	(b) Ditto.	
7th "	"	C.C.C.	2	1	3	2		
8th "	"	C.C.C.	2	1	3	2		
9th "	"	C.C.C.	1	1	2	2(c)	...	2	...	(c) Jats.	
10th "	"	C.C.C.	2	1	2	3(d)	(d) Two of Jats.	
11th "	"	C.C.C.	2	2	3	1		
12th "	"	C.C.C.	3	1	2	2		
13th "	"	C.C.C.	2	1	4(e)	...	1	...	(e) Two of Jats.	
14th "	"	C.C.	...	1	7(f)	(f) Cis-Sutlej Sikhs chiefly.	
15th "	"	C.C.	...	1	7(g)	(g) Ditto.	
16th "	"	C.C.C.	2	1	3	2		
17th "	"	C.C.C.	3	2	3		
18th "	"	C.C.C.	2	1	2	1	...	2	...		
19th "	"	C.C.C.	...	2	1	1	4(h)	(h) Cis-Sutlej Sikhs prohibited.	
20th "	"	C.C.	...	1	2(i)	1	2(l)	...	2	(i) Afridis.	
															(l) Cis-Sutlej Sikhs prohibited.	

THE SERVICES OF THE



BENGAL NATIVE ARMY.



THE SERVICES OF THE

CSL

The addition of a squadron to every cavalry regiment, the raising of four new infantry regiments of the line, and various minor changes, necessitated the publication in 1889 (2nd January) of a corrected table, of which the following gives the Cavalry constitution:—

CORPS.	Class regiment or class troop.	MUHAMMADANS.				HINDUS.					REMARKS.
		Hindustani.	Punjabi.	Trans-frontier Tribes.	Trans-Indus Border Tribes.	PUNJABI.		HINDUSTANI.			
						Sikhs.	Dogras.	Rajputs.	Jats.	Other Hindus.	
1st Bengal Cavalry	C.	8	
2nd	" "	C. T.	2	2	...	2	2	...	
3rd	" "	C. T.	3	2	...	1	2	...	
4th	" "	C. T.	4	2	2	...	
5th	" "	C. T.	2	1	...	1	4	...	
6th	" "	C. T.	2	3	...	1	1	1	
7th	" "	C. T.	2	1	1	1	2	1(a)	(a) Brahmans.
8th	" "	C. T.	3	1	...	1	...	1	1	1	
9th	" Lancers	C. T.	3	...	1	3	1	
10th	" "	C. T.	...	2	...	3	2	
11th	" "	C. T.	...	1	...	4	2	(b) 4 Afridis allowed.
12th	" Cavalry	C. T.	...	3	...	4	1	
13th	" Lancers	C. T.	...	2	...	3	2	
14th	" "	C.	8	...	
15th	" Cavalry	C.	...	3	
16th	" "	C. T.	5	
17th	" "	C.	...	4	2(c)	2	2	...	(c) Such as Baluchis, Afghans, Afridis.
18th	" Lancers	C. T.	...	5	...	3	
19th	" "	C. T.	...	2	1(d)	1	3	1	(d) Afridis allowed.
Guides Cavalry	C. T.	...	1	...	2	3	
1st Punjab Cavalry	C. T.	...	2	...	2	2	(e) May include Punjabi Hindus.
2nd	" "	C. T.	...	1 1/2	...	1 1/2	3	...	1	...	
3rd	" "	C. T.	...	2	1	3	1(e)	
5th	" "	C. T.	...	1	...	3	1(e)	...	1	...	

The constitution of the infantry corps was, except in a few cases, almost identical with that ordered in 1883, the only difference being that the companies of "other Hindus" (exclusive of Jat companies) were entirely eliminated, and extra companies of Rajputs substituted in their place; the Assam Gurkha regiments exchanged their



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Jarwah companies for an eighth company of Gurkhas, while the Jarwahs were distributed throughout the regiment, fifteen to each company; the 45th became a class regiment of Sikhs only, recruiting from Cis and Trans-Sutlej; the 38th Bengal Infantry, retaining its two Rajput companies, became otherwise a class regiment, having six companies of Jats. The constitution of the new corps and of the Punjab Frontier Force was as follows :—

CORPS.	Class regiment or class company.	MUHAM- MADANS.			HINDUS.				REMARKS.
		Punjabi.	Afridis.	Trans-Indus and Border Tribes.	SIKHS.		Dogras.	Other classes.	
					Jats.	Mazbis.			
34th Bengal Infantry (Pioneers)	C.	8	(a) Trans-Sutlej.
35th Bengal Infantry (Sikhs)	C.	8(a)	
36th Bengal Infantry (Sikhs)	C.	8(a)	
37th Bengal Infantry (Dogras)	C.	8	...	(b) One mixed company; one company of Gurkhas.
Guides Infantry	C. C.	1	1	1	2	...	1	2(b)	
1st Sikh Infantry	C. C.	1	...	2	4	...	1	...	
2nd " "	C. C.	2	...	1	2	...	3	...	
3rd " "	C. C.	1	...	2	4	...	1	...	
4th " "	C. C.	2	...	1	4	...	1	...	
1st Punjab Infantry	C. C.	2	1	1	2	...	2	...	
2nd " "	C. C.	3	...	1	3	...	1	...	
4th " "	C. C.	2	1	1	2	...	2	...	
5th " "	C. C.	1	1	2	3	...	1	...	
6th " "	C. C.	1	...	3	2	...	1	1(c)	(c) Hindustanis.

Two important changes marked the year 1886. By G. G. O. 485 of that year the Punjab Frontier Force, which had since its formation been under the control of the Government of the Punjab, was brought



directly under the Commander-in-Chief in India. In notifying this transfer it was said that "His Excellency in Council is authorised to express the high sense entertained by Her Majesty the Queen-Empress of the loyal and brilliant services which, under the Government of the province, the Punjab Frontier Force has invariably rendered to the State from the earliest period of its creation. The Force will . . . continue as a separate unit and, as far as may be found practicable, its local and distinctive character will be preserved, its institutions maintained, and its existing privileges continued."

The following is extracted from the order of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Roberts, announcing this change (G. O. No. 58 of 1886):—

"For upwards of thirty-five years the Punjab Frontier Force has been steadily adding to its laurels. Its list of casualties during that time bears testimony to the gallantry and devotion of all ranks in many a hard-fought action, while the admirable manner in which discipline has at all times been maintained has contributed materially to the high reputation for soldier-like qualities which the Brigade now so deservedly enjoys.

"The addition of so distinguished a Force to the Bengal Army would, under all circumstances, be a matter of congratulation to the Commander-in-Chief in India; but, as a former Commandant of the Punjab Frontier Force, it is especially gratifying to Sir Frederick Roberts that this measure has come into operation during his tenure of office.

"His Excellency takes this opportunity of assuring the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Brigade, that it will be his special privilege, not only to watch over their interests in the future, but also to take care that the many customs and traditions which have so largely contributed to make the force what it is are interfered with as little as possible. In offering a soldier's welcome to all ranks of the Punjab Frontier Force, Sir Frederick Roberts is sure that he is only giving expression to what is the unanimous feeling throughout the Army of Bengal."

On the 13th October, 1886, an Army Circular (clause 170) was issued which closely affected the soldiers and regiments of the Bengal Army. It ordered that all native infantry regiments should be linked together in regiments of three battalions each; that enlistment should be for any one of the linked battalions; that at present the numbers of corps would remain unaltered; and that liability to transfer from one battalion to another would come into force only in the case of one or more battalions being ordered on service. At the same time a system of reserves was notified as sanctioned for the Bengal infantry, *vis.*, an active and a garrison reserve, the former composed of men transferred after not less than five or more than ten years' service with the colours; the latter of men pensioned



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after twenty-one years' service, or who have completed a total of colour and reserve service of twenty-one years. The active reserve was limited to 100 men per battalion; the garrison reserve was unlimited.

Further, the same circular granted pay to recruits, wherever enlisted, from date of enlistment, as well as marching batta, or free carriage for their baggage; the rates of good-conduct pay were sanctioned after three, six, and ten years' service, instead of after three, nine, and fifteen; the annual allowance for half mounting was raised from R4 to R5; and the pension rules were altered by the abolition of invalid pension after fifteen years' service, the grant of ordinary pension to all soldiers after twenty-one years' service, and of a gratuity of twelve months' pay of rank to all men discharged as unfit for further service between fifteen and twenty-one years' service.

Finally, on the 13th October, 1888, an India Army Circular (clause 163) authorised fixed regimental centres for the groups of linked battalions under a territorial distribution of Native Infantry.



Chapter XII—(1891—1895).

Expeditions
against the
Chins, Lushais,
etc., 1890-93.

The punishment inflicted on the Chins, the Lushais, and other tribes on the frontier of Burma, during the period from 1888 to 1890, did not prove wholly effectual in putting a stop to their incursions into British territory, and during the years from 1890 to 1893 a number of expeditions took place against one or another of these savage tribes.

Lushai
outbreak, 1890.

As early as the autumn of 1890, a sudden outbreak occurred in the Lushai Hills culminating in determined attacks on the forts of Changsil and Aijal, which were then held by bodies of military police. Reinforcements, which included a detachment of the 40th Bengal Infantry, were hurried up from Silchar; the village of Thanuma, the leading insurgent chief, was taken and destroyed on the 4th October, and Changsil and Aijal were relieved on the following day; the village of the Chief Khalkum was destroyed on the 17th.

Operations in
the Chin Hills,
1890-91.

Of greater importance than these were the operations which it was found necessary to carry out in the Chin Hills during the winter of 1890-91, the immediate causes of which were the general restlessness of the Chin tribes and the perpetration of numerous outrages by the people of Thetta, a village in the Baungshe Chin country. On the 1st of January a small force (130 of the 2-4th Gurkhas, and a few Madras sappers) was despatched against Thetta, under the command of Captain Carnegie; an attack was made on the place on the following day, but the enemy's stockades were found to be too strong to be forced, and the detachment had to be withdrawn after Lieutenant James, of the Royal Engineers, and two men of the 2-4th Gurkhas had been killed. Notwithstanding the ill-success of this attack, the Thetta people almost immediately afterwards made their submission, and entered into an agreement to pay a fine and to desist for the future from molesting our lines of communication in the Chin Hills. Subsequently, the countries of the Baungshe and Kanhow Chins were visited by columns detailed for the purpose, and of which detachments of the newly-formed 39th Bengal Infantry (composed of Garhwalis) and of the 2-4th Gurkhas formed part; these columns met with little opposition, and indeed there was no fighting, except a skirmish with the Kanhows at Tenzauing on the 21st February. Later on (2nd April) a small column under the command of Lieutenant Mocatta, 39th Bengal Infantry, was engaged



in a smart action with the Chins of Tlantlang, near the Sao-var stream; in this engagement a detachment of the 39th greatly distinguished itself by its steadiness and bravery under circumstances extremely trying to young soldiers, and sustained considerable loss. These operations did not, however, finally settle matters with the Chins, and the general restlessness of the tribes led, during the winter of 1891-92, to the despatch of several columns into the Southern Chin Hills. These columns, in which No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, a small detachment of the 7th Bengal Infantry, and 310 men of the 39th Bengal Infantry were included, traversed the country in various directions without meeting with much opposition, though they experienced great hardships, and they were eventually broken up at Haka and Fort White in the spring of 1892. A fresh outbreak amongst the Lushais in the early part of the same year necessitated the despatch of reinforcements, including a portion of the 18th Bengal Infantry, to Fort Aijal, in the neighbourhood of which place they were engaged in numerous skirmishes with the insurgents. At the same time a column under the command of Captain Loch, of the Military Police, in which a detachment of the 18th was included, operated in the Eastern Sonai country and captured and destroyed numerous Lushai villages. Besides these, a column under the command of Captain Rose, which included two guns of No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery and 150 of the 39th Bengal Infantry, was despatched from Fort White to Dao-khama's village, the centre of the rising, to effect a diversion in favour of Captain Shakespeare, who was hemmed in at Vansanga's, and losing men daily. After a good deal of desultory fighting, the men of most of the insurgent villages took refuge in the Lieukhan and Howlong countries; the rest submitted, and in July 1892 the operations were brought to a conclusion.

In October 1892 disturbances broke out afresh in the Northern Chin Hills. Troops (including a detachment of the 39th Bengal Infantry from the Southern Chin Hills) were promptly moved into the disturbed area, and punitive operations immediately undertaken against the enemy, who were defeated in numerous skirmishes and many of their villages destroyed, but it was not until the end of March 1893 that the Chins finally gave in their submission and surrendered their fire-arms. Our losses during these operations amounted to 13 men killed, and one British officer, one Native officer and 33 men wounded.

Operations
against the
Chins, 1891-92.

Lushai
outbreak, 1892.



By Army Order No. 154 of 1893 (republished in G. O. C. C. No. 969, dated the 10th November 1893) the India medal with clasps inscribed "BURMA, 1889-92," and "LUSHAI, 1889-92," according to the locality of the service, was granted to the troops employed on various expeditions in Burma and on its frontiers during the years named.

While these affairs were proceeding on the frontiers of Burma events of importance were occurring in other parts of the country, and especially on the Eastern and North-Western frontiers, to which attention must now be given. Though they were not actually first in order of time, it will be convenient to give precedence to affairs on the Eastern frontier, where an unfortunate and unexpected reverse was experienced.

A revolution having occurred in Manipur in September 1890, resulting in the abdication of the Maharaja, in March 1891, Mr. Quinton, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, with an escort of 400 Gurkhas of the 42nd and 44th Bengal Infantry, under the command of Colonel Skene, proceeded to Imphal, the chief town (at which place there was already present a company of the 43rd Bengal Infantry), for the purpose of settling the affairs of the State, and of arresting and deporting Tikandrajit Bir Singh, a brother of the late Maharaja, who had been one of the leading spirits of the revolution, and now held the post of Senapati, or Commander-in-Chief of the Manipur Army. The attempt to arrest the Senapati, which was made on the 24th March, proved a lamentable failure; it was violently and successfully resisted, and open hostilities followed, desultory fighting being continued until the evening when the British force was withdrawn within the grounds of the Residency, having sustained a loss of about 40 officers and men, killed and wounded, amongst the former of whom was included Subadar Rajbir Newar of the 43rd, and amongst the latter Lieutenant Brackenbury and Subadar Hima Chand Thakur, both of the 44th, who succumbed to their injuries in the course of the night. The retirement was followed by an act of sanguinary treachery on the part of the enemy. Late in the evening Mr. Quinton, Colonel Skene, and Lieutenant Simpson, 43rd Bengal Infantry, were induced to proceed to the Maharaja's palace on pretence of a conference, and there they were seized and barbarously put to death under the orders of the Senapati and other leaders of the insurgents, who followed up this

Outbreak at
Manipur,
March 1891.



infamous proceeding by opening a heavy fire on the troops in the Residency. These, being almost without ammunition, and the place being untenable, evacuated the position during the night and, retreating in some disorder, made their way in small parties to Kohima, Cachar and Tammu.

A detachment (33 rifles) of the 43rd Bengal Infantry stationed at Langthobal, four miles from Imphal, under the command of Jemadar Birbal Nagarkoti, held on to their post with considerable determination until the following day, and then retired in good order to Tammu, where (27th March) they joined Lieutenant Grant, commanding a detachment (50 rifles) of the newly reconstituted 12th Madras Infantry (the 2nd Burma Battalion). On the following day Lieutenant Grant pushed up to Thobal in Manipur with both detachments, in the hope of saving Mr. Quinton and the other officers, the fact of whose murder was not then known, and who were believed to be prisoners in the palace at Imphal. At Thobal Lieutenant Grant and his detachment were confronted by a rabble of several thousand Manipuris, who kept up a heavy and almost ceaseless fire for several days on his entrenchment. He, nevertheless, maintained his ground without difficulty until ordered to retire to Tammu on the 9th April. The insurgents followed him in his retreat, but were met and routed by a small detachment under the command of Captain Presgrave. For his conduct in this affair Lieutenant Grant was awarded the Victoria Cross and promoted to the rank of Major, while the native officers of the detachments of the 43rd Bengal and 12th Madras Infantry were admitted to the Order of British India, and every non-commissioned officer and man was decorated with the Order of Merit.

In the meantime arrangements had been made to push forward troops on Imphal with all possible despatch from Kohima, Cachar and Tammu, and towards the end of April, after overcoming considerable difficulties with regard to the provision of transport, a column moved forward from each of those places. These columns were composed as follow:—

Kohima Column.—Brigadier-General H. Collett, c.s.:—Three guns of No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, and detachments of the 13th (100), 42nd (200), 43rd (400), and 44th (300) Bengal Infantry, and Assam Military Police (200).

Silchar (Cachar) Column.—Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. F. Rennie:—Two guns of No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, and detachments of the 18th (370), 42nd (103), 43rd (282), and 44th (114) Bengal Infantry; the 1-2nd Gurkha

Manipur
Expedition,
April 1891.



Regiment; 50 of the Pioneer Company of the Calcutta Volunteer Rifles; and 207 of the Surma Valley Military Police.

Tammu Column.—Brigadier-General T. Graham, C.B.:—Four guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery; a wing of the 4th Battalion of the King's Royal Rifle Corps; the 24th Gurkha Regiment; and the 12th Madras Infantry.

These columns reached Imphal almost simultaneously on the 27th of April, the enemy having offered little or no opposition except to the Tammu force, an advanced detachment of which, composed of parties of the 24th Gurkhas and the 12th Madras Infantry, had a sharp fight with a considerable body of them on the 25th April in an entrenchment at Bapam, six miles north of Palel. The Manipuris, being hemmed in, fought until nearly all were killed, the loss on our side being Jemadar Kiruram Gurung, 24th Gurkhas, and one man killed, and four British officers (including Captains Drury and Carnegy, 24th Gurkhas), two native officers and seven men wounded. With the occupation of Imphal the Manipur outbreak came to an end. The Senapati and other prominent persons fled before the arrival of our troops, but all were subsequently apprehended, and the Senapati, an official styled "the Tongal General" (said to have been an ex-mutineer of the 34th Native Infantry), and others concerned in the murder of Mr. Quinton and his companions, were executed in due course.

By G. G. O. No. 652 of 1892 the India medal, with a clasp inscribed "NORTH-EAST FRONTIER, 1891," was granted to the troops of the three columns engaged in the re-occupation of Manipur.

The North-West Frontier at this period was in a rather disturbed state, and the early months of 1891 witnessed the despatch of no less than three expeditions against recalcitrant tribes,—two against the Orakzais and one against the tribes of the Black Mountain in Hazara. The conduct of the Orakzai clans had for some time been so unsatisfactory, especially with regard to their repeated incursions into the Miranzai valley, that towards the end of 1890 it became apparent that a punitive expedition against them could no longer be delayed.

Accordingly in January 1891, the following force was concentrated at Kohat under the command of Brigadier-General Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B.:—

No. 3 (Peshawar) and 4 (Hazara) Mountain Batteries; two squadrons of the 5th Punjab Cavalry; the 5th Company of Bengal Sappers and Miners; the 22nd, 23rd (Pioneers) and 29th Bengal Infantry; the 3rd Sikh Infantry; and the 1st, 4th and 5th Punjab Infantry.



This force, organised in three columns, advanced into the country of the hostile clans on the 26th January, traversed it in various directions, blowing up forts and towers, and having, in order to put a stop to further raids into the Miranzai valley, established posts at various points on the Samana Range, returned to Kohat about the middle of February, without having met with any opposition from the enemy, though the troops had experienced great hardships from the severity of the climate in winter.

But the results obtained were not of a lasting nature, and an attack on the troops on the Samana, which took place on the 4th April, necessitated the despatch of a second expedition, for which purpose the following troops were concentrated at Hangu and Darband on the 16th April, under the command of Sir William Lockhart :—

No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery ; three guns of No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery ; No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery ; three guns of the Punjab Garrison Battery ; the 19th Bengal Lancers ; two squadrons of the 5th Punjab Cavalry ; the 5th Company of the Bengal Sappers and Miners ; the 1st Battalion of the King's Royal Rifle Corps ; the 15th, 19th, 27th and 29th Bengal Infantry ; the 3rd Sikh Infantry ; the 1st, 2nd and 6th Punjab Infantry ; and the 1-5th Gurkha Regiment.

A half battalion of the 2nd Manchester Regiment (96th Foot) was subsequently added to the force.

The force advanced in three columns from Hangu and Darband on the 17th April, and during that and the following day, after a series of smart conflicts, drove the enemy off the Samana Range. Much fighting, some of it of a severe character, took place during the operations of the succeeding days, in the course of which the enemy's country was traversed in every direction, until the 16th of May, when the work entrusted to the force was finished, the offending clans having all been visited and punished and brought into complete submission. The losses sustained during these operations, from the 4th of April, amounted to 28 (including Jemadar Hashim Ali, 19th Bengal Infantry) killed, and 73 wounded, including Major Egerton, Assistant-Adjutant-General of the Punjab Frontier Force, Captains Maisey and MacLeod, 29th Bengal Infantry, Jemadar Tilok Sing, 15th Bengal Infantry, and Subadar Mawaz Khan, 6th Punjab Infantry.

By G. G. O. No. 61 of 1892 the India medal with a clasp inscribed "SAMANA, 1891," was granted to the troops employed in the operations on the Samana Range in April and May 1891.

Second
Miranzai
Expedition,
April 1891.



Shortly before the outbreak which brought about the second Miranzai operations, it had become necessary to despatch a punitive expedition against some of the tribes of the Black Mountain, in Hazara, in consequence of their having, contrary to the agreement entered into in 1888, violently opposed (October 1890) the march of a British detachment over the crest of the mountain. To carry out the punishment of the offending tribes, the following troops were concentrated at Darband and Oghi by the 1st March 1891, with Major-General W. K. Elles, C.B., in command:—

Left (or River) Column.—Brigadier-General R. F. Williamson:—No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery; three guns of No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery; the 2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders (78th Foot); a wing of the 32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers); the 37th (Dogra) Bengal Infantry; the Infantry of the Corps of Guides; and the 4th Sikh Infantry.

Right (or Tili) Column.—Brigadier-General A. G. Hammond, V.C., D.S.O.:—No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery; 1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers (23rd Foot); the 11th Bengal Infantry; a wing of the 32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers); the 2-5th Gurkha Regiment; and the Khaibar Rifles.

Divisional Troops.—One squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, and the 4th Company of the Bengal Sappers and Miners.

The advance of the two columns was begun on the 12th March, but until the 19th little opposition was experienced. Before day-break on that day, however, a sudden and most determined attack was made on our advanced post at Ghazikot by a body composed partly of Hindustani fanatics and partly of tribesmen of the Black Mountain. The post was held by the Dogra company of the 4th Sikh Infantry, who behaved with the greatest gallantry, and after a sharp conflict repulsed the attack, though not without the loss of Jemadar Darshanu and three men killed, and Lieutenant Maconchy, Subadar Dheru, and seventeen men wounded. Slight engagements subsequently occurred at Kanhar, Diliari, Darbanai and other places, and various movements followed, but in the end the enemy made complete submission, and with the exception of a small force left to hold the Black Mountain temporarily, the troops were withdrawn to their cantonments. Our total losses during the operations amounted to 6 killed and 47 wounded.

By G. G. O. No. 258 of 1892 the India medal with a clasp inscribed "HAZARA, 1891," was granted to the troops engaged in the operations on the Black Mountain.

Towards the close of the same year disturbances broke out on quite a different part of the frontier, in the remote khanates of Hunza



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and Nagar. With the object of restoring order, the Gilgit Agency guard (consisting of thirty men of the 20th Bengal Infantry) was reinforced by two guns of No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery, and two hundred men of the 1-5th Gurkha Regiment. With this small force, together with a small party of Bengal Sappers and Miners, two battalions of the Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry, and some local levies, the whole amounting to little more than a thousand men, the British Agent, Colonel Durand, took the field on the 1st of December, effected the passage of the Hunza river into Nagar the same day, and on the 2nd, after a sharp conflict, carried the fort of Nilt by storm, with a loss of three men killed, and himself, Captain Aylmer, Bengal Sappers and Miners, Lieutenant Badcock, 1-5th Gurkha Regiment, and 27 men wounded. Some further ineffective fighting occurred on the following day, in which Lieutenant Gorton, No. 4 Mountain Battery, was wounded, and on the 20th of the month, under the orders of Captain Mackenzie, Seaforth Highlanders, who was in temporary command, the almost inaccessible position of the enemy on the Hunza river, beyond Nilt, was stormed and taken with a loss of only two men wounded. The enemy were completely defeated and dispersed; on the 21st the Rajah of Nagar surrendered, and Hunza was occupied on the following day, thus bringing the operations to a conclusion.

By G. G. O. No. 986 of 1892 the India medal with a clasp inscribed "HUNZA, 1891," was granted to the troops employed in these operations.

The three Isazai clans of the Black Mountain—the Hasanai, the Akazai, and the Madda Khel—having, in 1892, in breach of engagements entered into by them after the Black Mountain campaign of 1891, received and harboured in Baio, on the right bank of the Indus, one Hashim Ali Khan, a banished chief of the Khan Khel Hasanais, who had been a prime mover of the Black Mountain disturbances, and refused to surrender or expel him, it became necessary in the autumn of 1892 to use coercive measures, and accordingly, on the 1st October, the following force was concentrated at Darband under the command of Major-General Sir W. S. A. Lockhart:—

Isazai
Expedition,
October 1892.

Nos. 3, 8 and 9 Mountain Batteries, Royal Artillery; No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery; the 4th and 6th Companies of Bengal Sappers and Miners; two



squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers; the 1st Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment (16th Foot); the 1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps (60th Foot); the 25th and 30th Bengal Infantry; the 4th Sikh Infantry; and the two battalions of the 5th Gurkha Regiment.

The force advanced on Baio on the 6th October, but the place was found to be deserted, and no opposition of any sort was experienced; and all towers and defences having been blown up and destroyed, the troops were withdrawn.

In March 1893 Chilas, on the Gilgit frontier, was the scene of a sharp engagement. The fort at that place was garrisoned at the time by 300 men of the Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry under the command of Major Daniell, 1st Punjab Infantry, and on these, on the morning of the 5th March, there came down a body of 1,200 Chilas and Kohistanis. Some severe fighting ensued, in the course of which Major Daniell fell in a daring attempt to expel the enemy from a village from which they were keeping up a heavy fire on the fort. The tribesmen were eventually repulsed with a heavy loss of 350 men in killed alone, that on our side amounting to only 20 killed and 32 wounded.

The course of events now takes us back to the Eastern Frontier, where, in May 1893, a small expedition (a hundred men of the 43rd Bengal Infantry) was despatched from Manipur for the purpose of punishing the people of the Kuki village of Mongham (twenty miles east of Imphal), who had made an unprovoked raid on the Naga village of Swemi and massacred nearly three hundred of the inhabitants. Mongham was reached on the 22nd May, the leaders of the raid arrested, and the village destroyed. Other villages implicated in the raid were also punished, and the detachment returned to Manipur about the middle of June.

In January 1894 an expedition was undertaken against the Abors. The force employed was composed for the most part of police, the only regular troops consisting of 100 men of the 44th Bengal Infantry. Some desultory fighting took place, and the total losses of the force amounted, including followers, to 41 killed and 45 wounded.

Towards the end of 1894 a serious outbreak took place on the North-West Frontier. In accordance with the terms of a treaty entered into with the Amir of Kabul in November 1893, measures were adopted during the autumn of 1894 for the delimitation of the Waziri-Afghan Boundary from Domandi, on the Gomal river, to the

Expedition to
Mongham,
1893.

Abor
Expedition,
1894.

Waziristan
Boundary
Delimitation,
1894.



Laram peak, on the borders of Khost. The attitude of the Mahsud Waziris necessitated the boundary commission being accompanied by a strong escort, and for this purpose the following troops were detailed, under the command of Brigadier-General A. H. Turner:—

No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery; No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners; a squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry; the 20th Bengal Infantry; the 1st Gurkha Rifles; and the 3rd Sikh Infantry.

The escort was assembled at Dera Ismail Khan on the 1st October, and moving forward *via* Kajuri Kach (where it was joined by the members of the Commission on the 18th), it was concentrated in a position near the Inzar Kotal, in Wana, on the 27th. There had during this march been many indications of Mahsud hostility, but, though no attack in force was anticipated, all needful precautions were taken to secure the camp in the event of its being suddenly assailed. It was as well that these precautions were adopted, for before daylight on the morning of the 3rd November a Mahsud Waziri *lashkar*, said to have been three thousand strong, taking advantage of the darkness and of the broken nature of the ground in the vicinity, made a sudden and desperate attempt to rush the camp, and were successful in penetrating it at several points. A severe hand-to-hand conflict ensued, ending in the enemy being driven out of the camp at the point of the bayonet, though not before they had done much damage and inflicted considerable loss. As day broke they began to retreat towards the hills; the cavalry were immediately launched in pursuit, and cut up large numbers of them before they could win their way to a place of safety. Our losses amounted to Lieutenant Macaulay, Royal Engineers, Subadar Padam Sing Rana and Jemadar Khark Sing Nagarkoti, both of the 1st Gurkhas, 18 non-commissioned officers and men, and 24 followers killed, and 6 British officers, 47 non-commissioned officers and men, and 22 followers wounded, of whom Lieutenant Angelo, 1st Gurkhas, afterwards died of the injuries he had received. The losses of the enemy were much more severe, amounting to above 600, of whom 350 were killed or died afterwards of their wounds.

This unprovoked outrage necessitated the despatch of a punitive expedition, and for that purpose the following troops, to the



command of which Lieutenant-General Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B., was nominated, were detailed:—

Nos. 1 (Kohat), 3 (Peshawar), and 8 (Bengal) Mountain Batteries; a Maxim gun manned by a party from the Devonshire Regiment; Nos. 2 and 5 Companies of the Bengal Sappers and Miners; two squadrons of the 1st and one of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry; the 3rd Punjab Cavalry; the 2nd Battalion of the Border Regiment (the 55th Foot); the 20th, 33rd, and 38th Bengal Infantry; the 1-1st and the 1-5th Gurkha Rifles; the 1st and 3rd Sikh Infantry; and the 2nd, 4th and 6th Punjab Infantry.

These troops were organised in three brigades, which were concentrated at Wana, Jandola and Mirian, respectively, on the 17th December, and the Mahsuds having failed to comply with the demands made upon them, the force moved forward on the same day, marching respectively on Kaniguram, Makin and Razmak, which points were reached on the 21st without much opposition having been experienced. In the course of the succeeding four weeks the troops, broken up into smaller and more easily handled columns, visited every part of the Mahsud Waziri country without meeting with any opposition, except from small detached bands of the enemy, whose guerilla tactics caused a few casualties. The Mahsuds themselves, on the other hand, suffered substantial losses in men and property, most of their fortified towers having been blown up and destroyed, and almost all their sheep, goats and cattle captured and driven off; they eventually made their submission on the 21st of January, and shortly afterwards complied in full with the terms imposed upon them. The losses sustained by our troops amounted to no more than two killed and twenty-two wounded.

By G. G. O. No. 1082 of 1895 the India medal, with a clasp inscribed "WAZIRISTAN, 1894-95," was granted to all the troops employed in these operations from October 1894 to March 1895.

Outbreak in
Chitral, 1895.

In January 1895, while the operations against the Mahsud Waziris were still in progress, events were occurring in Chitral, which eventually led to the movement of a large force upon that place through Bajaur and Swat, and of a smaller separate force from Gilgit direct. On the 1st of that month Nizam-ul-Mulk, Mehtar of Chitral, was murdered, and his brother Amir-ul-Mulk placed upon the throne. The local disturbances which ensued reached their climax when the British Agent, Surgeon-Major Robertson, was besieged in Chitral fort with a small force consisting of no more than 99 men of



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th Sikhs and 300 of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, the whole of which under the command of Captain Campbell. The leaders of the tribesmen were Umra Khan, Chief of Jandol, and Sher ncle of the Mehtar.

Major Afzal and his following arrived in the neighbourhood of Chitral on the 3rd of March. In the course of the same afternoon a detachment composed of 200 men of the Kashmir Rifles was sent out to observe the movements of the enemy and, if possible, to drive him back; these were not long in coming into collision with the hostile force, but the action which ensued was not successful, and the detachment was compelled to retreat into the fort with a loss of 23 killed and 33 wounded, Captains Campbell and Baird being included amongst the latter. Captain Baird, who was mortally wounded, was carried into the fort by Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch, of the Indian Medical Service, who afterwards received the Victoria Cross for the gallantry he displayed upon this occasion.

Immediately on intelligence of these events being received by the Government of India, arrangements were set on foot for the despatch of a force through Swat, Bajaur and Dir for the purpose of relieving the Chitral fort. The following troops were detailed for this service under the command of Major-General Sir R. C. Low, K.C.B.:—

The 15th Field Battery, Royal Artillery; Nos. 3 and 8 Mountain Batteries, Royal Artillery; No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery; a Maxim gun manned by a party from the Devonshire Regiment; Nos. 1, 4 and 6 Companies, Bengal Sappers and Miners; the 11th Bengal Lancers; the Cavalry of the Corps of Guides; the 1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment (3rd Foot); the 1st Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment (16th Foot); the 2nd Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers (25th Foot); the 1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps (60th Foot); the 1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders (75th Foot); the 2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders (78th Foot); the 13th, 15th, 23rd, 25th and 37th Bengal Infantry; the 2-4th Gurkha Rifles; the Infantry of the Corps of Guides; and the 4th Sikh Infantry.

Besides these, No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, the 1st Battalion of the East Lancashire Regiment (30th Foot) and the 29th and 30th Bengal Infantry were detailed for service on the line of communication, and a Reserve Brigade was formed at Rawal Pindi. At the same time Colonel Kelly, who, with his regiment (the 32nd Pioneers), was engaged in road-making in the Gilgit Agency, was directed to assume command there and make such arrangements as seemed to him to be possible to effect the relief of Chitral though

Chitral
Expedition,
1895.



he was prohibited from undertaking any operations which could afford a reasonable prospect of success.

While these arrangements were in progress, collisions between detachments of our troops and bodies of the enemy had occurred in several places. At Reshun, a detachment (Bengal Sapper and Kashmir Rifles) under Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler, proceeding from Mastuj to Chitral with a supply of ammunition, was vigorously attacked during several days, and eventually, by a gross act of treachery, captured by the enemy during an armistice. In a defile beyond Koragh a detachment of the 14th Bengal Infantry, under the command of Captain Ross, which was hastening from Mastuj to the assistance of Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler, was surrounded by the enemy on the 7th March, and after three days' fighting had to cut its way back to Koragh and Buni, which it effected, though not without heavy loss, Captain Ross and 46 men (besides a hospital-assistant and six followers) being killed, and Lieutenant Jones and nine men wounded. Finally, at Mastuj a detachment (48 men of the 14th Bengal Infantry, 228 of the 4th and 6th Kashmir Rifles, and 50 Paniyali levy sepoys) under the command of Lieutenant Moberly sustained for more than a fortnight a series of desultory attacks from a body of the enemy nearly three thousand in number, on whom it inflicted considerable losses.

Of the remaining operations of this campaign the first that claims notice is the defence of the fort at Chitral. After the action of the 3rd March the place was closely invested by Sher Afzal and his following, who, during the ensuing forty-six days, kept up a heavy fire, and made repeated attempts to storm the defences. In these attempts they were invariably repulsed with loss, though on one occasion (7th April) they succeeded in setting fire to one of the defensive towers, and killed and wounded several of the garrison, Surgeon-Major Robertson being amongst the latter. Finding that there was small probability of their capturing the place in this way, the enemy endeavoured to breach the wall by means of a mine, and actually succeeded in pushing a gallery up to one of the towers before they were detected. On their intentions being discovered, their plans were promptly frustrated by a daring and brilliant sortie made by a detachment composed of 40 men of the 14th Sikhs and 60 of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, led by Lieutenant Harley. The enemy were taken by surprise and driven off, and the shaft of the mine



blown up and entirely destroyed, with a loss on our side of 21 men killed and wounded. Forty-eight hours later, having heard of the approach of the force under the command of Colonel Kelly from the north and of the Khan of Dir from the south, Sher Afzal hastily raised the siege and fled. During this gallant defence of the fort from the 4th of March to the 18th of April, the losses of the garrison amounted to 48 killed and wounded.

Colonel Kelly, whose approach was a principal factor in the raising of the siege of Chitral, marched from Gilgit on the 23rd March with two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery and nearly four hundred men of the 32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers); he was afterwards reinforced by forty Kashmir Sappers and a hundred and fifty levy men from Cherkila, Hunza, Nagar, and Sai, and having passed Ghizr on the 31st, he succeeded during the first days of April in getting over the Shandur Pass (12,230 feet above the level of the sea),—a truly formidable operation owing to the severity of the weather and the depth of the snow. It was not, however, until the 9th of April that he came into collision with the tribesmen. On that day they attempted to bar his advance in a formidable position at Chakalwat, but he forced his way through with a loss of only four men wounded, and relieved Lieutenant Moberly at Mastuj the same day. Reinforced by a hundred men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, Kelly advanced from Mastuj on the 13th, and in the course of the same day drove the enemy from a formidable position at Nisa Gol, inflicting on them a loss of 160 killed and wounded, while our own casualties did not exceed twenty. Continuing his advance, he reached Chitral on the 20th April, from before which place Sher Afzal and the besieging tribesmen had already fled, and Colonel Kelly thus had the good fortune, after brief though exceedingly arduous operations, to accomplish the object for which a force had been placed in the field.

It now only remains to describe the operations of that force under the command of Sir Robert Low. Sir Robert advanced from Jalala on the 2nd April, having previously by proclamation made known to the people of Swat and Bajaur, in the most distinct terms, the objects of the expedition, informing them that we had no hostile design against them, and that if they refrained from attacking our troops and from impeding in any way our march to the relief of Chitral, no hostilities would be directed against them on our part, and no part of their territory permanently occupied by us. Notwithstanding

Colonel Kelly's operations.

Operations in Swat and Bajaur, 1895.



these assurances, however, the Malakand was strongly held, and Sir Robert's advance opposed with great determination when he moved up on the 3rd of April. The pass was found to be precipitous and difficult, and the enemy who held it numbered over 12,000, though some of these were badly armed. After an engagement of over five hours' duration, the position was carried by storm with a loss on our side of eleven men killed and eight British officers (including Major Tonnochy and Lieutenant Harman of the 4th Sikhs, and Lieutenant Ommanney of the Guides Infantry), two native officers and fifty men wounded, that of the enemy being over five hundred. On the following day an advance was made into the Swat valley and the enemy defeated at Khar, with a further loss of nearly five hundred men, our own casualties amounting to no more than twenty, amongst whom were Lieutenant Baldwin, of the Guides Cavalry, and Lieutenant Wynch, of the 37th Bengal Infantry. This was followed on the 7th by the passage of the Swat river, after an action in which the 11th Bengal Lancers made a gallant charge against an immensely superior number of the enemy, killing more than a hundred of them. On the 13th and 14th an action took place on the banks of the Panjkora, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, of the Guides Infantry, was killed, and Captain Peebles, commanding the Maxim detachment of the Devonshire Regiment, mortally wounded. The last engagement took place at Mamuzai on the 17th, and on the 20th a detachment of five hundred men was pushed on from Barwa towards Chitral to rescue the garrison, which was believed to be in great straits, but reassuring intelligence of its safety having been received, the detachment was halted at Ashreth on the 27th, on which day Sher Afzal was brought in a prisoner by the Khan of Dir, who had been actively co-operating with our forces, with the object of recovering his territory, of which he had been deprived by Umra Khan. Umra Khan himself effected his escape and took refuge in Afghanistan. Colonel Kelly, having already effected the relief of the Chitral fort, the further advance of the force under the command of Sir Robert Low became unnecessary, but at a later period that officer with a small portion of one of his brigades moved up to Chitral. The total losses of the force during these operations amounted to 127 officers and men killed and wounded.

By G. G. O. No. 509 of 1896 the new India Medal, recently instituted, with clasps inscribed "RELIEF OF CHITRAL, 1895," and



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"DEFENCE OF CHITRAL, 1895," was granted to the troops employed in the defence of Chitral fort and in the operations carried out for its relief, and subsequently the several corps engaged in the operations were permitted to inscribe the word "CHITRAL" on their colours, the 14th Bengal Infantry being allowed at the same time to emblazon "DEFENCE OF CHITRAL" upon their's.

The period from 1891 to 1895 was noteworthy for the great number of reforms that were introduced, not only in the organisation and system of administration of the army (in which some remarkable changes took place), but in matters of interior economy and in those affecting the improvement of the soldiers' position as well. The principal of these changes shall now be briefly adverted to.

Amongst the first of these reforms was the amalgamation of the Staff Corps of the three Presidencies under the general designation of "the Indian Staff Corps," which was sanctioned and notified in a Royal Warrant, dated the 28th January 1891, and announced in India in G. G. O. No. 208 of 1891. This measure, however, was one the effect of which—so far as the Bengal Army was concerned—would be felt by the British officers alone, and that only in the future; it left the Bengal Army itself unchanged.

Another important reform which was announced about the same time was the grant of an increased rate of pay to the silladar cavalry (G. G. O. No. 224 of 1891). By this grant the pay of non-commissioned officers and sowars was raised by R4 per mensem, that of sowars thus becoming R31 instead of R27.

Four years later the pay of all non-commissioned ranks in the native artillery (including drivers of British batteries), the three corps of sappers and miners, and the native infantry, was also increased by R2 per mensem, and the grant of the annual half-mounting allowance of R5 was allowed from date of enlistment. This increase of pay (which was extended to the Viceroy's Body-Guard and the local corps under the Government of India) was notified in G. G. O. No. 670 of 1895.

As a step towards removing a difficulty that was said to exist in attracting recruits of good quality to the service and to facilitate recruiting for the native army generally, recruiting depots were established in 1892 at the following stations, each to form the centre of a recruiting district for the classes specified:—

Peshawar For Pathans.

Internal changes,
1891—1895.

Amalgamation
of the three
Staff Corps,
1891.

Increase of pay
of silladar
cavalry.

Recruiting
centres.



CSL

THE SERVICES OF THE

Rawal Pindi	For Punjabi Mahomedans.
Amritsar	" Sikhs.
Sialkot (in winter)	" Kashmir Dogras.
Dharmasala (in summer)	" Kangra Dogras.
Delhi	" Jats and Hindustani Mahomedans.
Lucknow	" Hindustani Hindus.
Gorakhpur	" Gurkhas.

Each centre was placed under the direct control of an officer (styled the "District Recruiting Officer") specially selected for his knowledge of the classes with whom he would have to deal.

In 1892-93, on the introduction of the Lee-Metford magazine rifle for the British infantry, the Native infantry was re-armed with the Martini-Henry rifle.

With a view to increasing their fighting value, it was proposed in June 1892 to re-organise the sixteen Hindustani regiments of Native infantry as class regiments. Experience had shown that not only were recruits of a better stamp attracted to class regiments, but that all ranks were more happy and contented when serving with men of their own race and caste; the regimental system was found to work more harmoniously in such corps, while *esprit de corps* was fostered and a healthy spirit of rivalry between regiment and regiment engendered. This re-organisation was carried out early in 1893, the regiments in question being divided into five classes, as follow:—

Brahmins.—(Two regiments,—the 1st and 3rd.)

Rajputs.—(Seven regiments,—the 2nd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 11th, 13th, and 16th.)

Musalmans.—(Four regiments,—the 5th, 12th, 17th, and 18th.)

Jats.—(Two regiments,—the 6th and 10th.)

Hillmen (Khas Gurkhas).—(One regiment,—the 9th.)

During this period a new and a somewhat unique departure was made in the grant of permission to volunteers from the Indian Army to take temporary service under the local authorities in British East and Central Africa. The first of these bodies of volunteers was given in 1891, when, at the request of the British Central Africa Company and with the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, a party of sixty native soldiers (principally Mazbi Sikhs and men of the Hyderabad Contingent) were permitted to proceed to Central Africa with Captain Maguire, Commandant of Police there. These men did excellent service in Central Africa, many being killed or wounded in encounters with the Arab slave hunters. Captain Maguire himself

Arms.

Re-organisation
of Hindustani
regiments.Indian soldiers
in Africa, 1891
—1895.



fell in one of these conflicts. Early in 1892, Captain Johnson, 36th Bengal Infantry, proceeded to Central Africa as successor to Captain Maguire, taking with him ten more men (Sikhs) to replace casualties in the Central Africa Police, and in 1893 a further reinforcement of 100 men under Lieutenant Edwards, 35th Bengal Infantry, was furnished. In the early part of 1895, two hundred Sikh volunteers from the native army were despatched to British Central Africa to relieve detachments already serving there, and in October of the same year a body of three hundred Punjabi Mahomedans was despatched to Mombassa, for service in the British East Africa Protectorate.

In this connection it may here be mentioned that in 1892 the Government of India raised and despatched to China, for service at Hong-Kong, a battalion of infantry, composed of Mahomedans of Upper India, as well as detachments of artillery for service at Hong-Kong, Singapore, Ceylon and Mauritius.

The Hong-Kong Regiment.

In 1895, a new medal was instituted to commemorate wars in India and on the frontier, in substitution of the India Medal of 1854, which had been introduced, on the suggestion of Lord Dalhousie, to avoid the multiplication of medals, and which was first issued to commemorate the Burmese War of 1852-53. With the exception of the Mutiny and the Afghan War of 1878-80, for which special medals were issued, this medal had been granted for every Indian campaign during a period of forty years, and it had, in 1895, no less than twenty-one clasps,—some officers and native soldiers possessing as many as nine and ten. There was a wide-spread feeling among those who had earned clasp after clasp that the time had come for some better recognition of their services than the addition of more clasps to the medal already possessed by them. It was therefore determined, in connection with the grant of a medal for the defence and the relief of Chitral in 1895, that the opportunity should be taken to inaugurate a new India Medal, with a distinctive ribbon, and to grant it first to the troops who took part in those operations, which would thus be placed at the head of a new series of minor wars and expeditions for which an India Medal is granted.

New India Medal.

Finally, in the year 1895, there came into operation the most important and far-reaching reform that had been instituted in the Armies of India since their formation during the early days of the rise of the British power in this country,—*viz.*, the abolition of the Presidential

Abolition of Presidency Armies.



Army System, under which the Madras and Bombay Armies had been maintained on a separate footing under the control of the Governments of those Presidencies and independent of the authority of the Commander-in-Chief in India. This reform had been advocated by many eminent officers who had devoted their attention to matters of military administration, as well as by the Army Organisation Commission assembled in 1879. The recommendations of the Army Commission on the subject were laid before Her Majesty's Government in 1881, but it was not considered expedient at that time to ask Parliament to legislate on the subject, and the matter was for the time dropped. It was not, however, forgotten, and in 1885, in 1888, and again in 1892, this important matter was brought under the notice of Her Majesty's Government. On the last occasion, the proposals of the Government of India, somewhat modified, found acceptance, and a Bill ("Madras and Bombay Armies Act, 1893—56 & 57 Vict., Cap. 62") was passed through Parliament to give effect to them. By this Act the offices of Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of Madras and Bombay were abolished, and the Governors in Council of those Presidencies ceased to exercise all military control and authority.

At the same time the Bengal Army was for administrative purposes divided into two portions which were styled respectively the Punjab and the Bengal Commands.

The changes in the administration and organisation of the Army of India arising out of this Act were brought into effect on the 1st April 1895 (G. G. O. No. 980 of 1894) and were briefly as follow :—

The Bengal Army was organised as the Bengal and Punjab Commands,—the Army of India consisting of the Punjab, Bengal, Madras and Bombay Commands, each under a Lieutenant-General styled the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, Bengal, Madras and Bombay, respectively, and all under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief in India and the control of the Government of India.

Details as to the powers of the Lieutenant-Generals Commanding, the conduct of business till then transacted by the Military Department of the Governments of Madras and Bombay, the distribution of the district commands, and the composition of the several forces in each command, etc., etc., were published in G. G. O.



No. 981, dated 26th October 1894, Clause No. 143 of India Army Circulars of 1894, and G. O. C. C. No. 1061, dated 26th October 1894.

The details of most of these several matters need not be entered upon here: it will suffice to mention that the forces lately composing the Bengal Army were divided between the two Commands in the manner following:—

Punjab Command.—The 9th, 10th and 11th Bengal Lancers; the 12th Bengal Cavalry; the 13th and 15th Bengal Lancers; the 16th and 17th Bengal Cavalry; the 18th and 19th Bengal Lancers; the 14th, 15th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 40th and 45th Bengal Infantry; the 1st and 4th Gurkha Rifles and the whole of the Punjab Frontier Force, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Punjab Cavalry; the Corps of Guides; Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 Mountain Batteries and the Punjab Garrison Battery; the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Sikh Infantry; the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Punjab Infantry; and the 5th Gurkha Rifles.

Bengal Command.—1st Bengal Cavalry; 2nd Bengal Lancers; 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Bengal Cavalry; 14th Bengal Lancers; Nos. 7 and 8 Mountain Batteries; the Corps of Bengal Sappers and Miners; the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 39th, 42nd, 43rd and 44th Bengal Infantry; and the 2nd and 3rd Gurkha Rifles.

The introduction of this great change in the administration and organisation of the Indian Army presents a point at which this brief sketch of the rise and progress of the Bengal Army may fittingly be brought to a conclusion. It marks the disappearance of that Army as a separate and homogeneous entity, and brings to an end the glorious record of its achievements, a record which begins with Plassey and closes only with the consolidation of the British Indian Empire. The unhappy episode of the Mutiny darkens its history, but the long roll of its victories and conquests effaces that sad chapter, and we can never forget how great a part the old Bengal Army has played in the extension of the British Empire, and in the fame of its arms. For nearly a century and a half it has borne an honourable part in all our campaigns from the Nile to the Great Wall of China, and has helped to carry our victorious standards to Kabul and Mandalay, to Cairo and Peking. The story of the Bengal Army is ended; but it leaves to its successors a great tradition and an inspiring example.

Date of raising.	Where raised.	First Commandant.	Original number and native name.	REMARKS.	Present name or date of disbandment.
Jan. 1757	Calcutta	1st Battalion " <i>Lal Paltan</i> "—afterwards <i>Gillis-ki-Paltan</i> .	Became the 9th Battalion in 1764, the 16th in 1775, the 10th Regiment in 1781, the 17th in 1784, the 17th Battalion in 1786, the 2nd Battalion 12th Regiment in 1796, and the 1st Regiment in 1824.	Mutinied at Cawnpore in 1857.
Aug. "	"	2nd Battalion	Destroyed at Patna in 1763.
1758	Patna	3rd "	Destroyed at Patna in 1763.
Sep. "	Chittagong	Capt. Hugh Grant	4th Battalion— <i>Grand-ki-Paltan</i> .	Became the 3rd Battalion in 1764, the 2nd in 1775, the 2nd Bombay Battalion in 1781, the 2nd Bengal Regiment in 1784, the 2nd Battalion in 1786, the 1st Battalion 2nd Regiment in 1796, the 5th Regiment in 1824.	Mutinied at Umballa in 1857.
Dec. "	...	Lt. George Wilson	5th Battalion— <i>Wilson-ki-Paltan</i>	Destroyed at Patna in 1763.
1761	Patna	Capt. Giles Stibbert	6th Battalion— <i>Jalasur-ki-Paltan</i> .	Became the 1st Battalion in 1764, the 8th in 1775, the 2nd Regiment in 1781, the 8th in 1784, the 8th Battalion in 1786, the 1st Battalion 8th Regiment in 1796, and the 9th Regiment in 1824.	Mutinied at Aligarh in 1857.



A Chronological List of the Corps of the Bengal Army, showing particulars of their origin, and their subsequent history—continued.

A.—INFANTRY—continued.

Date of raising.	Where raised.	First Commandant.	Original number and native name.	REMARKS.	Present name or date of disbandment.
Dec. 1761	Chittagong	Lt. J. Matthews	7th Battalion— <i>Mat-thews-ki-Paltan</i> .	Became the 15th Battalion in 1764, the 10th in 1775, and the 4th Regiment in 1781.	Disbanded for mutiny in 1784.
1762	Burdwan	Capt. L. MacLean	8th Battalion— <i>Burd-wan-ki-Paltan</i> .	Became the 2nd Battalion in 1764, the 1st in 1775, the 1st Bombay Battalion in 1781, the 1st Bengal Regiment in 1784, the 8th Battalion in 1786, the 1st Battalion 1st Regiment in 1796, and the 2nd Regiment in 1824.	Disbanded at Barrackpore in 1859, for having exhibited disaffection in 1857.
1763	"	Capt. Smith	9th Battalion— <i>Chota Burdwan-ki-Paltan</i> .	Became the 8th Battalion in 1764, the 9th in 1775, the 3rd Regiment in 1781, the 9th Regiment in 1784, the 9th Battalion in 1786, the 1st Battalion 9th Regiment in 1796, and the 8th Regiment in 1824.	Mutinied at Dinapore in 1857.
"	Midnapore	Lieut. A. Swinton	10th— <i>Soolteen-ki-Paltan</i> .	Originally a local corps; became the 13th Battalion in 1764, the 6th in 1775, the 6th Bombay Battalion in 1781, the 6th Bengal Regiment in 1784, the 6th Battalion in 1786, the 1st Battalion 6th Regiment in 1796, and the 3rd Regiment in 1824.	Mutinied at Phillour in 1857.
"	Chittagong	Lieut. L. Brown	11th Battalion	A local corps; became the 7th Battalion in 1764; was made a local corps at Chittagong in 1775.	Disbanded in 1786.