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were also state officials; for were not the clergy themselves, in consequence of the thorough unity of state and church, semi-state officials? Frequently, indeed, the professors of theology took part in the government of the church; and it should be remembered that Luther and Melanchthon were university professors.

Only recently has the relation become a somewhat more delicate one. The cause for this lies in the growing estrangement of state and church. The German states abandoned their confessional unity during the nineteenth century, Prussia leading the way as early as the eighteenth century. To this must be added the change in the character of the government. The governing power is now exercised by ministers who, upon the floor of parliament, where all the confessions are represented, are compelled to take account of constitutional methods. Hence the Protestant churches have also begun to look upon the supreme authority of the state as an alien government.

This accounts for the efforts to secure a greater degree of freedom from the political power. The agencies of these endeavors are the synods, in which the clergy have retained a kind of political organization. The chief demand is that the general synod, through its committee, have uniform influence in the appointments to the theological professorships. (As early as 1855 the *Oberkirchenrath* in Prussia was given the right to make recommendations with respect to such appointments.) The basis of this demand is the independence of the church. It is intolerable, it is held, that she should have no sort of assurance against the possibility of students of theology receiving their education, and consequently an anti-ecclesiastical bias, from "unbelieving" instructors. If it is the duty of the church to preserve a pure system of doctrine she must have the power to exert a controlling influence upon the choice of teachers.

In reality, therefore, it is not a question of freedom, but of power, namely, of the power of the church, or, rather, of the dominant theological faction, over the theological faculties; she wishes to impose her interpretation of "doctrine" as the criterion of what ought to be taught in the universities; the exclusion of heterodox instruction is the goal. The evil to be removed is





that the state is altogether too liberal in the matter of doctrine. The Minister of Public Worship and his advisers are politicians who do not take purity of doctrine seriously enough, and who, especially, as the official representatives of science, are too much inclined to overlook aberrations in doctrine in case they are promulgated by men of recognized scientific standing.

What shall we say to these efforts? It is evident that with an enlarged "freedom of the church" neither the freedom of theological science nor the freedom of individual interpretation and acceptance of doctrine would be enhanced, the object, indeed, being rather to restrict it. I believe, however, that even the church would not be a gainer by such a process. There can be no doubt that Protestant theology especially would suffer both in power and significance if it were placed under the control of the church and her organs. What it is and does it is and does as a free self-developing science; and only as such, only in constant interaction with the other sciences, with philosophical and philological-historical investigation, can theology really live and prosper. A Protestant theology based merely upon the authority of the church would have no value at all. The Protestant church herself has no authority, none except that which she wins for herself from day to day by her achievements. She is not founded upon an external authority and cannot, therefore, justify either herself or her doctrine by any such authority; in this respect she will always be at a disadvantage in comparison with the Catholic church, if it be a disadvantage. But for this very reason the Protestant church could not thrive even with such a "freedom," the freedom, namely, to restrict research and science, faith and conscience. She must appeal to the free convictions of individuals; how could she do that without being ready to give a satisfactory answer to scientific criticism? The Catholic church rests upon the principle of external authority and proposes to employ it so far as she can. But the Protestant church has nothing with which souls can be compelled: no unity, no organon of doctrine, no means of discipline, no *exercitia spiritualia*; she has nothing but the "Word of God" and the power with which this seizes upon the heart and conscience, together with the memory of men who, depending upon the "Word," dared to withstand





human authority, even the organized authority of the "church universal." That a fixed norm of doctrine, which leaves the teacher and preacher with an office but without an opinion, cannot be serviceable to such a church can only be denied by a judgment blinded by lust for power. If a party should ever succeed in bringing Protestant theology and doctrine under its control for any length of time, the church which calls itself by Luther's name would become a feeble imitation of Romanism and would finally be absorbed by it. Christianity would even survive that, just as it has heretofore been equal to every emergency; perhaps it would issue from the depths of our national life in an entirely new and independent form. But whoever prefers a Protestant church must not deprive her of an independent theology or the freedom of scientific endeavor, and therefore must not deliver the theological faculties into the hands of an ecclesiastical party. The public administration of the universities is the neutral court which has thus far guaranteed the independent development of Protestant theology and can best guarantee it for the future. If theology and theological study are to be placed under ecclesiastical control, a further step should be taken and the preparatory training of the clergy turned over, as in the Catholic church, to the ecclesiastical seminaries, in which only "approved" sciences are taught. This would, of course, call for a still further step: the establishment of an infallible teaching corps, which would simply mean Catholicism. If this is not desirable, or rather, if it cannot be done; if the Protestant church cannot have an infallible teaching corps, then she cannot claim to possess the absolute truth; she can believe in a revelation from God, not in the form of communications to an authoritative teaching body, but in a revelation of God in history and in the Bible, which is really nothing but history or the precipitate of historical life. Hence she requires a scientific theology as a path-finder for a developing comprehension of the word of God in the Bible and the ways of God in history.

But a willingness to hear and to understand what the facts say must be presupposed. If a "believing" theology is demanded among Protestants, it must be insisted that here no other "belief" is possible than the faith which approaches the





Bible and history with a willingness to receive them for what they are, in the hope that in them are contained truths so important for mankind that they deserve to be regarded as revelations of God. Usually, however, the representatives of the demand for "orthodoxy" mean something else by that term, the disposition, namely, not to subordinate one's views to the given historical and literary facts, but to adapt these facts to a preconceived theory, which means, to subordinate oneself to the theory approved by the hierarchy, or the theory which has a majority of adherents in the synods. He who cannot adopt this theory is then outlawed as an unbelieving critic who places his own subjective opinion above "the faith of the church." It is true that even the most earnest investigations are conditioned by personality, but such subjectivity has at least the advantage of honesty and a good conscience.

2. *The Catholic Theological Faculties.* The Roman Catholic church sustains an entirely different relation to the state, and, consequently, also to the problem of the training of the clergy at the universities.

The Roman church is an independent world-power side by side with and, in a certain sense, above the secular states, superior to them on account of the extent of her territory, the age and compactness of her organization and her government. Her territory extends over all the continents, she has seen the beginning and the end of unnumbered states; she has fought and overcome the empire of the Roman Cæsars; she has wrestled with ancient philosophy and science, appropriating or rejecting them as she found them suitable or not; she is in possession of an infallible teaching authority and of absolute truth. Such an historical world-power, organized as no other for the control of souls, will not allow herself to be deprived of the right to regulate the education of her servants. As a matter of fact, this right is substantially conceded to her everywhere, in Catholic as well as in Protestant states. She makes a twofold use of it: she establishes and controls her own institutions for the education of her clergy, and she exercises a controlling influence in the filling of the theological professorships in the state institutions and supervises the instruction. It is true that the professor of Catholic theology is also appointed





by the state, but with regard to doctrinal instruction he acts entirely as the agent of the church.

I shall first point out, briefly, the historical development of this condition of things. The right, or rather, the duty, of recruiting the ranks of the clergy has always been, primarily, the bishop's. The cathedral school was originally nothing more than the nursery for the secular clergy of the diocese. During the second half of the Middle Ages the universities became the bearers of scientific life and instruction. The faculties of arts and theology expressly, and the faculty of law actually, devoted themselves to educating the clergy for their all-embracing calling. The universities were overwhelmingly ecclesiastical institutions, not, indeed, in respect of their administration, but, what is more important, in their essential character: the church was the mistress of instruction, the Pope established the institutions, by bestowing the right to teach and confer the degrees, and by means of the chancellorship the university was kept in formal connection with the ecclesiastical organization.

During the sixteenth century this close relationship between the university and the church was threatened with disruption. The tie had ere this been loosened by the previous development of science and education on the one hand and of the state on the other. The church then determined to restore the old conditions. Because of the great scarcity of priests and the deplorable condition of the universities which had remained Catholic, the Council of Trent made it the duty of bishops to establish seminaries for the clergy in their dioceses. Consequently there arose, in all the Catholic countries, episcopal schools, with *convicta*, in which the clergy received their philosophical and theological instruction. The control of these institutions was placed, for the most part, in the hands of the newly-founded order of the Jesuits, which may be precisely described as an order of professors. Although these seminaries were at first only regarded as necessary makeshifts for the universities, intended especially for poorer students, the gradual development was such that the old theological faculties in most of the purely Catholic countries, Italy, France, and Spain, ceased to exist at the universities, and the Catholic clergy there





now receive their education exclusively in ecclesiastical seminaries. On the other hand, the faculties in the German Empire, as well as in Austria-Hungary, not only continued in existence, but new ones were added, so that both forms now exist side by side in these countries.

One will not go far wrong in recognizing, in the maintenance of Catholic theology as a branch of university instruction in these countries, an indirect result of Protestantism. If Protestant theology ought to be represented at the universities of Protestant countries, it would seem that the parity of creeds in the empire demands Catholic faculties of theology also. Nor has the continuance of Catholic theology been without significance in connection with the university sciences. That a scientific Catholic theology can still be spoken of in the nineteenth century is really due to German university scholars. To be sure, this is probably a doubtful service in the opinion of the Roman Curia; those who are concerned more for the security of the government than for the recognition of the truth, the politicians, who are found as well in the church as in the state, always have a very poor opinion of scientific research; they esteem it only in so far as it can be made to serve the government; but in so far as it seeks the truth without regard for the necessities of government it becomes dangerous. For this reason the historical as well as the dogmatic theology of the German universities has constantly been an object of suspicion and offense to the Curia. This is shown by the long series of conflicts, running through the entire nineteenth century, from the great campaign against Hermesianism to the expulsion of Old-Catholicism and the more recent disciplining of Schell. It seems plausible that, among the causes leading to the Vatican Council and the acceptance of the dogma of papal infallibility, the desire for readier methods of taming the German university theologians was not the least. The year 1870 marked a turning point. Since then Catholic theological literature, which before that time had shown such a remarkable rejuvenescence (it is enough to mention the names of Döllinger, Möhler, and Hefele), has suffered a decline. Independent thought has been crowded out by the new scholasticism recommended, not to say enjoined, by Rome, and by the ultra-montane controversial liter-





ature. All this is very plainly shown in the review of the development of Catholic university theology during the nineteenth century, as it is given by the representatives of this very theology itself in the work published by Lexis on the German universities.

To this historical orientation let me append a review of present conditions.

At the present time there are seven faculties of Catholic theology in the German Empire: at Bonn, Breslau, Münster, Munich, Würzburg, Tübingen, and Freiburg. Their legal status is as follows. From the administrative point of view they are, like the other faculties, state institutions; the professors are appointed and paid by the government, and, in respect to the performance of their general official duties, are under governmental control. But with regard to doctrine, on the other hand, they are under ecclesiastical control: they must have the approval of the bishop in order to teach. In Prussia the coöperation of state and church is secured by the faculty-statutes, which prescribe that the government's candidate, who is, as a rule, proposed upon recommendation of the faculty, shall be referred to the bishop, who has the right to reject him "because of serious doubts concerning his orthodoxy or his conduct." The bishop also has the right of superintendence. He has visitational power, the lecture-schedules must be submitted to him, and in case a professor "should offend against Catholic faith and practice in his class lectures or publications, instead of confirming them, or if he should otherwise give occasion for grave scandal concerning morals or religion, the archbishop is authorized to notify the government of the fact, and the university, upon such notification, shall earnestly and emphatically interfere and provide a remedy."<sup>1</sup>

But in case the desired remedy cannot be secured in this way, there remains at the disposal of the episcopal power another means for the achievement of its end. It can paralyze the efficiency of the teacher objected to, even though it may not deprive him of his office, simply by prohibiting Catholic students of theology from attending his lectures. This method has been frequently resorted to with satisfactory results.

<sup>1</sup>The statutes of Breslau, in Koch, *Die Preuss. Univers.*, i., 233.





Besides the faculties there are also vicarious institutions, if we do not include the lyceums (smaller institutions supported by the state, of which there are six in Bavaria, and among which must be numbered, also, the *Lyceum Hosianum* in Braunsberg), namely, the theological seminaries. Of these there are now eight, five of them in Prussia: Paderborn, Fulda, Treves, Posen, Pelplin; one at Mainz (in place of the defunct faculty at Giessen), one at both Strassburg and Metz in Alsace-Lorraine. The establishment of a faculty at the university of Strassburg in place of the seminary at that point is at present under consideration.

The seminaries differ from the faculties in that they are ecclesiastical institutions not only with regard to doctrine, but also in the matter of administration. They offer a complete theological course, but cannot confer degrees. Since the state will not recognize their course of instruction, as a substitute for a university course, unless their instructors possess the legal qualifications demanded of university professors, which means, especially, that they hold the university degrees, the seminary professors are compelled to secure their education, or at least their theological degree, at a university. In this way the latter is, of course, acknowledged as the higher, the real scientific educational institution. Nor does the ecclesiastical character of the seminaries exclude the state's general right of supervision. Their courses must be recognized by the ministry of education as suitable substitutes for those of the universities. And, finally, the instructors must be subjects of the German Empire.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The current regulations for state supervision date from the period of the so-called *Kulturkampf*, after the earlier right of supervision by the state had been given up during the fourth and fifth decades of the last century. By the law of May 11, 1873, education for the ministry was regulated as follows for both confessions: It is necessary (1) To pass the final examination in a German gymnasium, (2) To complete a three-years' course at a German university, (3) To pass a state examination in philosophy, history, and German literature. Clerical seminaries were not formally suppressed, as were the boys' seminaries, which were prohibited from receiving new pupils, but it was decided that the course in a seminary could be substituted for the statutory university course only on condition that the course should





I turn now to a consideration of the significance and value of the ecclesiastical educational institutions. Both within and without the sphere of Catholicism there exist two diametrically opposed views concerning the value of and the necessity for the faculties. Within the church a radical and a more conciliatory party are at war. The former, organized in the Jesuits, and just at present in control of the Curia, for the reasons already indicated, looks with constant and lively distrust upon the theology of the German universities, and is, in general, not favorable to the university education of the clergy. Incorporation into the academic world, it is feared, will lead to more and more dangerous contact with the spirit of the German universities, the spirit of freedom and independence of thought, and that, too, in spite of every precaution and the most thorough good faith on part of the instructor and student. And even though this contact merely acts as an irritant to opposition, it is nevertheless dangerous, for even contact in conflict leaves its impression. Only the education which is had within the walls of the seminaries is thoroughly reliable; there only absolutely trustworthy agents of the church are trained, determined men, who will take up the struggle with the world for the control of the world.

first be submitted to the Minister of Education for his inspection and approval. Since the bishops refused to subordinate their institutions to state control in this way, they were closed, so that, in consequence, only the state-faculties remained as the recognized educational institutions for the Catholic clergy. In spite of this, however, the attempt to make the education of the clergy more dependent upon the state has failed, just as other similar efforts on the part of Joseph II. and Napoleon I. had failed. Because of the opposition of the church, attendance upon the state-faculties almost ceased entirely, and the attempt merely had the effect of nearly putting an end to the entire study of Catholic theology in Prussia. After the state gave up the struggle the seminaries resumed. The supervision of the state is now recognized, but the institutions enjoy perfect freedom. The state examination in philosophy, history, and literature has also been abandoned, after plaguing for a time the Protestant theologians, who were also subject to this regulation. That nothing was lost by abolishing it, especially not for education, has been shown by P. de Lagarde in an annihilating criticism (*Deutsche Schriften*, pp. 155 ff). It is to be hoped that the teachings of history on this point will not be forgotten.





The other tendency, represented primarily among the Catholic university professors themselves, fears precisely the isolation of the seminaries and its consequences; it aims to bring Catholicism into touch with the science and culture of the times, in order to guard it against the limitations and impoverishment peculiar to the self-sufficient seminary education. With shame it recognizes the backwardness of the Catholic portion of the German people in science and literature. It looks to the Catholic faculties for an impulse to a freer, stronger, aspiring form of Catholic character and life. It hopes ultimately to make its influence felt at the universities themselves, and upon the entire circle of Catholic students, and not merely upon the theologians. The Catholic student societies are of importance in this respect: isolation, is the conviction, means renunciation of efficiency.<sup>1</sup>

A similar conflict of opinions is met with on the non-Catholic side of the controversy. An anti-ecclesiastical radicalism, although actuated by opposite motives, agrees with the conclusions of the Curia. Permit the Jesuitical tendency to have its way, it is argued, and you destroy the Catholic faculties. The universities and science will lose nothing thereby: the Catholic faculties and the professorships affiliated with them in the philosophical faculties, are disturbing and alien elements in the organism of our universities. And the further consequence would also be desirable: the isolation of the theological students in the seminaries will lead to the impoverishment of their scientific education and therefore to the impotence of the Catholic clergy. The supremacy of Jesuitism in education will have the same result it once had: it will lead to the retrogression and impotence of Catholicism as in the days of the

<sup>1</sup> A strong and skillful defense of the faculties against their Jesuit opponents, occasioned by the proposed establishment of a new Catholic faculty at the University of Strassburg, is made by F. X. Heiner's article, *Theologische Facultäten und Tridentinische Seminare*, 1900. Concerning the long struggle between the two tendencies in the church, which for the present has ended with the victory of the Jesuits and the demagogic press over the bishopric and university theology, see the first volume of Friedrich's *Geschichte des vatikanischen Konzils*.





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*Aufklärung*, when it was evident to all the world and was even admitted by the Catholic powers and by the church herself.

He who is not in the habit of thinking and acting according to the maxim: Let us do evil or permit it to be done, because, since evil is self-destructive, good must come out of it, will scarcely agree with this conclusion. We certainly cannot wish that the German people should once more experience the misery of the seventeenth century, due to the isolation and separation of the creeds from each other. Neither can we wish, therefore, that the Catholic clergy should be entirely estranged from our national life by an exclusive seminary training; nor, recognizing the circumstances in which we live, can we wish that so important a part of our national life as Catholicism actually is and, so far as human judgment is concerned, will always be, should not be represented at all at the universities, the centers of our intellectual and scientific life. The same illusion might result to which was in part due the origin of the unfortunate *Kulturkampf*, from the consequences of which we are still suffering, the illusion, namely, that Catholicism, at least in Germany, is dead. Precisely the same painful awakening as we experienced at the close of the *Kulturkampf* would follow such a piece of self-deception.

And, further, we ought not to cease to hope that the independent spirit which seeks to assert itself in the Catholic theology of the German universities to-day, may again become influential within the church herself and assist in preparing the way to the more friendly relations between the creeds which once existed. Yes, I will not even renounce the hope that the German spirit may once again impart quickening intellectual and religious life to the Catholic church as such. This spirit would render a service to all the peoples whose historical institutions are rooted in Catholicism, if it would counteract, within the church herself, the inflexible and absolute Romanism, by its freer, deeper, and more personal religious life. That the case in this respect is not entirely hopeless, that the triumph of Romanism within the church is not necessarily a final one, is indicated, beyond the boundaries of Germany also, by a variety of movements within Catholicism itself, in countries where the English tongue prevails, especially in America. If Catholi-





cism expects to live, if it does not wish to cast its lot exclusively with the decaying group of nations, it will be compelled once again to submit to the influence of the Germanic spirit. It is not imaginable that that spirit will permanently permit itself to be subdued by the spirit of a commercial church versed in political routine. Something of Luther's indignation against "human ordinances" and "justification by works" is native to all Catholics of Germanic extraction.

Of course, the final presupposition for this view is that the existence of Catholicism be regarded as fully justified, and justified in German territory. There are many who do not admit this, who look upon it as a great misfortune for the German people that the Reformation was not universally successful and did not bring about a united Protestant national church. But I cannot regard the course our history has taken as a misfortune, in spite of the fearful conflicts engendered by religious division and in spite of the ensuing retardation of our progress as a people. I am of the opinion that a German national church under the control of the state would have had sinister consequences for the entire life of our people, and, if it could be accomplished, would necessarily have such consequences to-day. A system of ecclesiastical Cæsarism would be worse than the division of churches, for it would strangle both intellectual and political freedom. The existence of Catholicism, or what it amounts to, the tension between the creeds, seems to me, strange as this may sound to many, to be a guarantee of liberty in the German empire: the Catholic party, as the natural minority, will always jealously guard against any encroachments of the secular power upon the intellectual-religious life. And for Protestantism also contact with Catholicism is indispensable, compelling it, as it were, to keep its own vital principles clearly in mind.

These considerations lead me to look upon the Catholic theological faculties as a valuable inheritance of the past which is worthy of perpetuation and cultivation.

That these faculties, dependent as they are upon an external teaching authority, occupy a peculiar position at our universities, cannot be denied. If the universities are viewed as institutions entirely or principally devoted to scientific research,





then, certainly, it must be confessed that men for whom the results of investigation or the content of instruction are fixed beforehand are out of place at them. But the universities are not merely scientific institutions; they are historically and as a matter of fact at present equally or primarily institutions for the education of certain professions, those namely which require an academic preparation; and not only the church but the state has an interest in including the Catholic clergy among this class.

Moreover, it would be to misconstrue the character of the Catholic faculties to regard the traditional instruction enjoined by the church as their only function. They also offer opportunities for independent thought and scientific work, as, for example, in the inexhaustible field of church history. Furthermore, other faculties are not entire strangers to a prescribed content of instruction by an external authority. Passing by the survivals of an earlier similar restriction of the Protestant theological faculties, it is a fact that the content of instruction is, to a certain extent, prescribed for the juridical faculties. They recognize it to be their task, not to discover the law by means of untrammelled scientific investigation, as was the case with the old "natural right," but to deal scientifically with the law prescribed by the statutes, or to shape it into the form of a dogmatic system, not essentially different from the manner in which Catholic theology shapes the prevailing doctrines into a system of dogmatics. Of course, the jurist is not prohibited from assuming a critical attitude toward the law, at least not so far as particular laws are concerned. A rejection of all law, and the authority which imposes it, would doubtless be held to be inadmissible, however. But the Catholic theologian also, the recognition of ecclesiastical authority being granted, still has considerable "elbow room," even in dogmatics and morals, not to mention certain neutral fields of investigation. Hence the difference should not be pressed too far: it exists, but is not absolute.

On the other hand, the demand may also be made that the difference be not increased by still further diminishing the degree of independence heretofore granted to the faculties. Given the nature and constitution of the Catholic church, and the





Catholic faculties cannot have the same independence of ecclesiastical authorities as the Protestant faculties. But nevertheless, if they are to be of sufficient value to the state to induce it to defray the expenses of their support, they must be something more than theological seminaries incorporated with the universities. A greater influence of the church than that granted to the bishops at the Prussian universities by statute would be utterly inadmissible. Should the bishop's right of protestation in the filling of a professorship be extended into the right of presentation, which would amount to a nomination, should the right of complaint be extended into the right of deposing the objectionable individual and demanding the substitution of a satisfactory person, then such a faculty would certainly no longer not only be inconsistent with the character of a university, but with the nature of the state also, for it would mean the destruction of all the fundamental principles of the appointing power, even an attack upon the sovereignty of the state itself. The state which would permit itself to be degraded into a mere servant of the church, as its "secular arm," would suffer the loss of its own honor and dignity. If a Catholic theological faculty at Strassburg is to be had only on such conditions, it will be wiser to give it up and allow things to remain as they are. To permit the episcopal seminary to remain substantially as it is, and to grant it in addition the repute which connection with a German university bestows, would mean such gratuitous concessions to the Curia's lust for power as would infinitely increase its already overweening confidence in the state's complaisancy.

At two of the Prussian universities there is an arrangement historically connected with the existence of Catholic theological faculties, namely, the dual professorships in certain departments of the other faculties at the universities of Breslau and Bonn. At these two institutions the chairs of philosophy and history in the philosophical faculty, and of ecclesiastical polity in the law faculty, are each filled by a Protestant and a Catholic. The corresponding dual professorship of history at Strassburg, which recently gave rise to so much excited debate, is merely an imitation of this example.

The charter for the establishment of the university of Bres-





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lau points out the reasons which first led to such an arrangement at this institution: "for the comfort of our Catholic subjects" the chair of philosophy shall be held by both a Catholic and a Protestant instructor. Similar considerations, it seems, led to the extension of this system to the chair of history in 1853, and now to its introduction at Strassburg: the idea was to remove the apprehension that the universities of an overwhelmingly Protestant state had no place for certain educational needs of Catholic students. At first provision was made for a course in philosophy by a Catholic teacher, primarily, doubtless, for the sake of the students of Catholic theology, which is so closely related to the scholastic philosophy that a course in philosophy by an instructor thoroughly familiar with scholasticism must certainly be recognized as a necessity. At first, however, there was no obligation whatever to teach any given system. Since the Curia has adopted the system of Aquinas as the one approved by the Church, the transference of the Catholic professor of philosophy, who has now become the professor of "Catholic" philosophy, to the theological faculty would seem to be proper, and would guard against the error of supposing that there could be such a thing as a "Catholic science." There is a science of Catholicism, namely, Catholic theology, but there is no "Catholic science." Moreover, a Catholic priest, if called to this professorship, as was the case recently at Breslau, would probably feel more at home in the theological faculty; he is certainly an anomaly in the philosophical faculty, and the distrustful attitude of this faculty appears to be well founded. Such a transfer would, however, also make the chair of philosophy formally dependent upon the bishop; nevertheless, better a frank than a disguised dependence.

A similar consideration subsequently led to the same kind of dual professorship in the chair of history. There can be no doubt that the environment in which a man is born and reared exercises a considerable influence upon his conception of history. At least the historical movements and forms of life connected with the great conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism are almost necessarily viewed in a different light by a born Protestant and by a born Catholic, even an independ-





ent and free-thinking Catholic. This gives the Catholic population a kind of quasi-natural right to the opportunity to study history, at least at the universities of the preponderatingly Catholic provinces, under a man who, by birth and education, belongs to the Catholic system.

I cannot avoid the force of these arguments and cannot, therefore, join in the indignation with which the proposal to establish a chair of history for a Catholic at Strassburg has been received by many university instructors. I cannot recognize in it an attack upon the freedom of science. It is merely the recognition of a fact, the fact, namely, that history, viewed from divers standpoints, shows different aspects.

But scientific research, it is said, should seek the truth without any presuppositions. Assuredly it should; it must not allow any dogma or prejudice to confuse its recognition of facts. But what is to prevent the Catholic from acting in this spirit? There is no canonical exposition of history; the Catholic as well as the Protestant professor of history receives his chair from the government, without previous consultation with the bishop; there is no such thing as a *missio canonica* for the teaching of history. And neither the Catholic nor the Protestant will find in his commission any obligation to teach history according to the shibboleth of any party, or to secure the approbation of the ultramontane press or even of the Bishop of Strassburg. And one may be allowed to add: in every case the history taught by a university professor appointed by the government will be somewhat less biased and less offensive from a confessional standpoint than that which would be taught where the Catholic viewpoint was looked upon as the all-important one.

It is a different question, whether the establishment of this chair was, at the time, a wise political move. It might be said that, so long as the relations between the government and the Roman church are so strained, so long as the Curia is opposed to the establishment of a Catholic theological faculty in Alsace, or imposes conditions which it knows to be unacceptable to the government, there is no occasion to satisfy the wishes of the Catholic party. The government could have awaited the development of events, and then, when the faculty, desired in the interests of confessional peace and national progress, had





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been conceded, it could, for its part, have made concessions in the establishment of the other professorships.

I shall close this discussion with a remark or two concerning the idea of a purely Catholic university. The same reasons which compel me to argue for Catholic theological faculties at the universities, compel me to oppose a purely Catholic university as undesirable. The demand has been made that the Academy at Münster be developed into a university at which only Catholic teachers shall be employed, because, it is pointed out, there are Protestant universities (Halle-Wittenberg, Rostock) which were founded as such. It seems to me that would be a reversion to the old confessional and territorial principle to which the Prussian government could never give its consent. If any demands are justified upon the ground of the parity of creeds, they must be met by abolishing whatever few survivals of the Protestant confessional university may still remain.

Even less can the suggestion to erect a "free" Catholic university, like the so-called "free" universities of France, Italy, and Belgium, by private means but under ecclesiastical control, hope to meet the approval of those who desire a truce with Catholicism, though not its domination, in Germany. The chances are that, owing to a lack of means and the uncertainty of its existence, such an institution will never be established in Germany. But if one should be established upon a large scale, it would not only be compelled to play into the hands of those who demand a segregation of the Catholic students, but it would also have to use its influence for the suppression of already existing Catholic faculties. As a matter of fact, the idea of such a "free" Catholic university had its origin among those who are opposed to the "government faculties." A "free" Catholic university could be nothing but a school of ultramontaniam in Germany. It is self-evident that such a thing would not be desirable either for the peaceful development of our people or for the education of the individual. Certainly not for the latter. A university entirely enveloped in the atmosphere of ultramontaniam would assuredly not be a good educational institute; it would necessarily produce a fatal narrowness of mind toward reality and truth in those who committed themselves entirely to its influence. Nor for society as a whole: such





a complete separation would lead to a fatal increase of hatred and contempt among the educated classes of our people. Moreover, the progress of the French *facultés libres* does not seem to be very encouraging; in spite of all the ecclesiastical encouragement which they have received, they have, both in importance and number of students, fallen far short of what was expected of them at their establishment; they have a total of little more than a thousand students, as against thirty thousand for the state institutions.

3. *Denominational Representation at the Universities.* I shall add just a word here concerning some striking peculiarities of the case. Two things, in general, attract attention: the Catholic population falls far short of its percentage, while the Jewish greatly exceeds it. Conrad (cf. Lexis, p. 144) gives the following figures for Prussia in 1888-1890:

	Evangelical	Catholic	Jewish
Population .....	64.24	34.15	1.28
Higher Schools.....	72.11	17.5	9.7
Universities .....	72.13	18.62	8.94

It appears that the Catholic population is almost fifty per cent. below the average, while the Jewish is almost seven times above it.

A careful investigation in Baden,<sup>1</sup> gives the following figures, which also reveal the fluctuations during a considerable period of time. For every million inhabitants the number of students at the three universities in Baden was as follows:

Years	Evangelical	Catholic	Jewish
1869-73 .....	898	510	962
1874-78 .....	882	479	1269
1879-83 .....	784	455	2444
1884-88 .....	1131	779	3555
1889-93.....	1334	952	3593

<sup>1</sup> L. Cron, *Glaubensbekenntnis und höheres Studium* (from the archives of the universities of Heidelberg and Freiburg and the School of Technology at Karlsruhe, 1869-1893), Heidelberg, 1900.





The conspicuous feature in these figures is the rapid increase of the Jewish element; since the founding of the new German Empire this element of the population has quadrupled its attendance, the Catholics, who were far behind, have almost doubled theirs, and the Evangelicals have increased theirs by one-half.

Let us inquire into the cause of these conditions, especially the low average of the Catholics. That it is not due to governmental discrimination against them, as the occasional complaints about lack of equality by the Centre might lead us to believe, is somewhat conclusively shown by the fact that a state like Bavaria, with a strong Catholic majority, reveals essentially the same conditions.<sup>1</sup> The real cause is to be sought, rather, in a combination of industrial, social, intellectual, and national conditions. The following points must be noticed:

1. Throughout Germany the Catholics are not as numerous as the Evangelicals among the educated, well-to-do urban middle class, which furnishes the largest contingent of students, but they predominate among the class of small farmers and day laborers. This is due to the fact that the Reformation was universally first espoused in the towns, especially in the free towns. And the fact has also been pointed out, with reason, that the evangelical parsonage has made very considerable contributions to the increase of this educated middle class, while the Catholic clergy have for centuries drawn upon the energies of this class without making any returns. In the statistics of Baden these conditions are revealed by the fact that the farming and artisan class, and even the inferior servants, supply a disproportionately large part of the Catholic student contingent: 1242 students out of 3156 came from this class, among the Evangelicals only 493 out of 2728; but among the Evangelicals, merchants, clergymen and teachers formed a considerable contingent. For Prussia the additional fact must be considered that the Poles of the eastern portion, who, for various reasons, take but a scant interest in education, belong to the Catholic portion of the population.

<sup>1</sup> I add the figures at hand for the attendance at the higher schools: in 1890, in Prussia, there was 1 pupil in higher institutions for 198 evangelical, 366 Catholic, and 30 Jewish inhabitants; in Bavaria, 1 for 150 evangelical, 236 Catholic, and 27 Jewish inhabitants.





2. Appreciation of science and scientific culture, especially as a factor in industrial and social life, is less keen among Catholics than among Protestants. The former still regard an education as primarily a preparation for a clerical career, an idea due, in part, to the already described social condition of the Catholic population, but also to the ecclesiastical-intellectual atmosphere in which it lives. This intellectual bias can be recognized in the subjects selected by the students. In Baden statistics reveal the following conditions at the two universities:

Students of	Evangelical	Catholic
Theology .....	17.7	31.0
Jurisprudence.....	27.3	27.2
Medicine .....	18.6	15.8
Philosophy .....	17.2	14.0
Mathematics and Natural Science .....	9.4	4.1
Economics .....	6.3	4.5
Pharmacy .....	3.4	3.4
	100.0	100.0

The conspicuous features of this table are the large number of students of theology and the small number of students of the natural sciences among the Catholics; a condition which corresponds to the figures at the technological university, where there are 715 Catholics to 955 Protestants, 22.6 to 35.0 p. c. respectively of the whole number.

In Prussia the figures are: for each 100 Catholic students there are 37.8 theologians, 17.5 jurists, 24.6 doctors, 20.1 philosophers; among Evangelicals, 26 theologians, 21.2 jurists, 25.3 doctors, and 27.5 philosophers.

Nor is the Catholic population represented in proportion to its numbers among the university instructors. A recent thorough and intelligent investigation has revealed the existing conditions in this respect at the Prussian universities.<sup>1</sup> For each million of the male population of each denomination there were respectively 35 Catholic docents of all grades, 106.5 evangelical, and 698.9 Jewish; and 16.9 Catholic ordinary pro-

<sup>1</sup> W. Lassen, *Der Anteil der Katholiken am akademischen Lehramt in Preussen*, Cologne, 1901.





fessors, 33.5 evangelical, and 65.5 Jewish. The author justly points out that in former times the small representation of Catholics may have been due to the fact that four of the six Prussian universities were practically closed to them; but with equal justice, he also blames the Catholic population itself for the continuance of this condition of things; since 1866 their neglect can hardly be attributed to confessional reasons; the conditions are now most favorable for the promotion of Catholic docents to professorships. But the inclination to enter upon an academic career is, he says, weaker among the Catholics, for their proportion of private docents is shown by the statistics to be still less than their proportion of professors.

The causes for the strong preponderance of Jews at the universities lie upon the surface: they are practically without exception residents of the cities and more than ordinarily well-to-do. To this must be added their strong desire to improve their social position, and for this a course at the university is the best or rather the only means, a military career being closed against them. Nor must it be forgotten that, in addition to intellectual ability, the Jewish people are gifted with great tenacity of purpose, coupled with a capacity for self-sacrifice, to secure a desired end. Thus it happens that they send a disproportionately large contingent to the higher schools and universities in spite of the fact that later in the learned professions, especially in official careers, they meet with great and in part insurmountable obstacles. The consequence is that, denied a career in other directions, they crowd into the professions that are open to them, such as medicine and law, as well as the academic, as is evident from the figures supplied by Lassen.

That we are here face to face with a real and difficult problem cannot be denied even by one who does not look at the facts from an anti-Semitic standpoint. If the learned professions, like the other industrial callings, should be turned over unreservedly to free competition, it seems that they would be gradually monopolized or at least largely filled by the Jewish population, superior by reason of wealth, energy, and tenacity. That no European people would endure such a state of things, that it would look upon it as an alien yoke and do away with it by force,





cannot be doubted. Hence everybody, even the Jew, is interested in preventing it. It cannot, therefore, be taken amiss if some effort is made to counteract this Jewish superiority in the learned professions, at least wherever they partake of an official character, even though this may be a burden upon an individual here and there.





CSL

**BOOK III**  
**UNIVERSITY TEACHERS AND UNIVERSITY**  
**INSTRUCTION**





## CHAPTER I

## UNIVERSITY TEACHERS

1. *Function.* According to the German view the university professor has a double function to perform: he is both a *scholar* or *scientific investigator* and a *teacher of knowledge*. As has already been pointed out in the introduction the peculiar character of the German university depends upon this union of the two functions; the university is both an *academy* and a *higher institution of learning* (*Hochschule*) if we mean by academy an institution having as its object the extension of scientific knowledge and the organization of scientific labor.

It would accordingly be the ideal of the university teacher, on the one hand, to be an original thinker and a productive investigator within his particular field, and, on the other, to inculcate into the minds of his pupils the scientific spirit and to teach the most gifted ones among them to take part in the work.

Two things are needed in order that these aims may be realized: the teacher must have *learning*, he must possess extensive scientific knowledge and understand the methods employed in his field, and he must have an *original mind*, the power to see things from an independent point of view and to handle them in an original way. The complete possession of these two qualities characterizes the ideal university teacher. We must assume still another element, in accordance with Cato's saying: *orator est vir bonus dicendi peritus*: the university teacher must be a good man, a man capable of planting in the souls of his pupils great and noble thoughts, above all a strong love of truth, a proud independence of spirit, and a noble modesty manifesting itself in freedom from arrogance and vanity.

Academic circles are at present governed in their estimate of a man primarily by his scientific productivity; his ability to teach





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is a secondary consideration, or rather, it is looked upon as an accident of the former quality. The university has a tendency to regard itself primarily as a scientific institution; the function of teaching is not apt to be emphasized. Our historical survey has shown us that this was not originally the case. The universities were originally "higher schools," and retained this characteristic during the eighteenth century. Even a man like Melanchthon, the *praeceptor Germaniae*, in a letter to his friend Camerarius, also a distinguished university professor, speaks of the lowliness of the *vita scholastica* in which they had spent their entire days. And Michaelis of Göttingen expresses the same opinion with respect to the function of the university professor, declaring it to be his duty to give instruction and not to increase the stock of knowledge already acquired. Not until the nineteenth century was the demand for original work in science realized, the ideal that he alone is a fit teacher in a particular field of science who is a productive worker in that field. In accordance with this view the business of university instruction is not the mere handing down of knowledge, but stimulation to independent research.

It was the age of the greatest intellectual productivity ever experienced by the German people, the age of Kant and Goethe, that had the courage to rise to this high plane. Fichte and Schleiermacher were the first to give emphatic expression to the new conception in the memorials prepared by them at the founding of the University of Berlin. Whoever desires to enter the learned professions, the *clerus* of the nation, they declared, whoever aims to be more than a mere handicraftsman in his office, must be required not merely to know what has already been discovered, but must be capable of enriching the body of knowledge himself. Indeed, true knowledge cannot be acquired by mere learning by rote, but must be produced anew by each seeker after it.

The university these philosophers regarded as the institution in which, through the association of the older with the younger generation, this process of creating knowledge constantly takes place; and they therefore demanded that the university teacher be creative or at least a productive worker in his field.

Under the influence of these thoughts the German univer-





sities have become, in the nineteenth century, what they now are, the workshops and nurseries of the intellectual life of our people.

Nowhere is the demand which the German university makes upon its teachers more clearly emphasized than in the requirements for entrance into the teaching body, in the bestowal by the faculties, of the *venia legendi*. Scientific productiveness is so sharply emphasized among the conditions of admission that it overshadows all the rest. In the requirements which the candidate has to meet stress is laid not upon the extent of his knowledge and his readiness to impart it, not upon the elegance of his diction, not upon the formal aspects of his lecture, but upon the scientific content of the work presented by him, upon the evidence it shows of his capacity for original scientific research. It is true, the candidate has to deliver two lectures, one before the faculty, which is followed by the so-called *colloquium*, and a public lecture, but compared with the specimens of scientific work presented by him, these seem to be merely secondary, and are tending to become so more and more. The conviction is hereby expressed that whoever can prove his capacity for original research in a particular line shows himself to be in possession of the essential qualifications of the university scholar. A wide knowledge of the subject (for the possession of which the doctor's degree already offers some guarantee) will, it is supposed, come with the need of working over the whole field of a science in the lecture course; and the ability to teach will presumably not be lacking in a man who is capable of producing knowledge independently.

The German type of university becomes clearly defined when we contrast our requirements for "habilitation" with the conditions governing the so-called *agrégation* in France, a form which, at least in the law faculty, somewhat corresponds to our habilitation. The following information is taken from the exhaustive account given by L. Savigny in his *Französische Rechtsfakultäten* (pp. 108 ff). Candidates desiring to be accepted as *agrégés*, assistant teachers who are appointed by the minister in the faculties of law, and from whose ranks the vacant professorships are filled, must first pass a competitive examination. This is held in Paris by a commission composed of law professors and officials. The examination consists of a preliminary examination and the main





examination; the former decides the candidate's fitness to be admitted to the latter. No more than three times as many candidates can be admitted to the final examination as there are *agrégés* to be appointed in the faculties. In the preliminary examination the requirements are as follows: 1. The candidate must pass two written examinations, giving seven hours to each, one on some subject in Roman law, the other on some subject which shall be left to his choice; 2, he shall deliver a lecture, lasting three-quarters of an hour, on some topic of the French civil law, for which he will be allowed twenty-four hours of preparation, and shall spend a half-hour in interpreting texts in Roman law, for which he will be given four hours for preparation. The final examination intended for the smaller group of "*admissibles*" who have passed the preliminary, consists of: 1, a written examination on a subject taken from the "general theories of legislation" and for the preparation of which seven hours are allowed; 2, a lecture, lasting three-quarters of an hour, on some question of the French civil law; 3, a lecture, lasting three-quarters of an hour, on a subject in some field chosen by the candidate, for the preparation of which twenty-four hours are given. The winners in this competitive examination are then appointed *agrégés* and are advanced, according to term of service, to the vacant full professorships in four or five years.

It is plain, the emphasis is here laid on the extent of the candidate's knowledge and the readiness with which he can impart it, on his ability to apply it rapidly in the solution of the problems placed before him. The gift of eloquence is a quality of especial importance in these examinations: "by an instinct which can usually be depended on in such things the examiner gives the *leçons* a decided preference over the *compositions*, of which indeed it is generally believed that they are not read at all." Applicants may offer scientific works in addition, but these are not looked upon as having great weight. The result is that a person having the capacity for original research is outstripped by one who assimilates knowledge easily, has a good memory, and possesses a ready skill in expressing himself. A further consequence is that the students pay particular attention to these things and that the inclination to do original work receives too little encouragement. And the future career of the successful





candidate shows the same traits. The fact that the *agrégé* is considered capable of teaching any subject in his faculty and is called upon by the minister to fill any position in it according to the demands of the service, as well as the fact that he is promoted to any vacant professorship, according to his term of service, all this shows that emphasis is laid on encyclopedic culture rather than on research. The possession of certain knowledge in all branches, presence of mind, and a ready ability to apply such knowledge, these are the things that determine a man's success.<sup>1</sup>

These things have their value, to be sure. But it is also true that they are the qualifications of the practical man, of the attorney, the orator, the judge, rather than of the scholar. We are perhaps inclined to underestimate them, perhaps we lay too much stress upon productive scholarship in the university teacher, and we may perhaps at times regard the mere products of scholarly industry as signs of productiveness. Nevertheless we cannot abandon our principle that the university teacher ought to be a man of scientific achievement; that is our first demand. The fruits of his labors may not prove very satisfactory here and there, nor very palatable, but the demand exercises a universal influence. It develops thoroughness and concentration, it makes the investigator conscientious and persistent even in the solution of a rather modest problem which may seem to be or really may be an insignificant piece of work, but which may have to be solved none the less; it encourages him, on the other hand, to enter upon new and uncertain paths, an important element for the progress of knowledge, for without the daring courage of the discoverer who does not shrink from the road that leads into the unknown, many a discovery would be lost to science. Indeed, how can we ever predict with certainty, at the outset, the ultimate value of a scientific investigation?

In this connection let me also call attention to a phenomenon peculiar to the German universities: the scientific schools. The university teacher is also an investigator, he encourages his

<sup>1</sup> Concerning the similarly organized *agrégation* in the *facultés des lettres* and *des sciences* and its effects, see Ferd. Lot, *L'enseignement supérieur en France ce qu'il est et ce qu'il devrait être*, 1892, p. 30.





pupils to participate in his labors, and thus trains them to continue his work. In this way the continuity of scientific work, one of the great conditions of its fruitfulness, is preserved. At the same time a spirit of rivalry is aroused within the school, the teacher himself is greatly stimulated by active contact with his sympathetic and ambitious young co-workers, and through association with these his work receives an added value.<sup>1</sup>

Thus it has come to pass that the universities and not the academies of science have become the centers of scientific work in Germany. The Academy is a gathering place of experts who have not much to tell each other; each man works for himself, and the personal communication of results in the meetings is often nothing more than a useless formality, yes, perhaps even more or less of a burden; while in the university master and pupil come into living, active relations with each other. It is doubtful whether any one in Germany would consider it necessary to establish such academies as separate institutions, supplied with all the equipment with which the show-loving eighteenth century fitted them out. What they now accomplish, particularly in the organization of larger scientific enterprises, could easily be done in the more modest form of learned societies which might be formed as permanent committees at the universities, and which might be authorized to admit efficient members from other circles.

I shall let a foreigner speak of the effect of this tendency of our university system upon science itself. In the book mentioned above Ferdinand Lot compares the French with the German universities on this point, and draws the following conclusions: "The intellectual supremacy of Germany, in all fields, without exception, is at present recognized by all nations. It is

<sup>1</sup> In his readable *Excursions pédagogiques*, 1882, M. Bréal emphasizes the fact that personal pupils are a phenomenon peculiar to Germany. "In France one is not apt to be the pupil of a man, one is the pupil of the *école normale*, the *école des chartes*, the *école polytechnique*. These abstract and collective teachers are unknown to our neighbors; in Germany one is a pupil of Boeckh, of G. Hermann, of Ritschl, of Haupt." He thinks that this is, on the one hand, the result of the free choice of the teacher and of the subject, it leads to the independent association of investigators; on the other, of the conception of the function of the academic office in Germany: it is the pride of the teacher to found a school.





an established fact that Germany alone produces more than the rest of the world together; its supremacy in science is a counterpart to the supremacy of England in commerce and on the seas. Perhaps it is relatively still greater." Thus our author. I should not dare to make such a statement; it will have to be discounted to some extent, or perhaps considerably. But one fact is beyond dispute. The position which Germany occupies in the scientific world to-day, it owes in the main to its universities, and these owe what they are and what they accomplish to the principle on which the universities are based: they are scientific institutions, their teachers are at the same time or primarily scientific investigators. The French faculties are or were, first of all, state schools; they were such by public regulation, by the state examinations, the official curriculums, and the competitive tests. Hence their achievements are less fruitful for the scientific life of the people.

I add another fact. Not only the universities, but also the student bodies and the learned professions have been raised to a higher plane of intellectual life. Though only a limited number of students succeed in doing original scientific work, yet the majority have at some time or other been seized with the impulse to seek after the truth. This longing remains in the souls of many, they become permanently interested in science and scientific life. Even in their callings they regard themselves as parts of the academic world; the teacher in the gymnasium, the clergyman, the physician, the judge, all seek to keep in touch with science, and not a few succeed not merely in following the standard of science as sympathizers and sharers in its glories, but also in serving under it, here and there, as active co-workers. The multitude of scientific societies and the enormous number of periodicals give evidence of the wide diffusion of scientific interest in German lands. Everywhere the university forms the center of this life; think of what a small university like Kiel has meant and still means for Schleswig-Holstein, or Tübingen for Württemberg, or Jena for Thuringia. Beyond doubt even the professions themselves have in this way enhanced their reputation and dignity in the eyes of the population. The respect for science which is deeply implanted in the German people invests the members of the learned professions themselves





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with an authority which could not be conferred upon them by the power of the state alone. They are not mere functionaries of the government, but are at the same time endowed with a kind of inner authority by their presupposed possession of scientific knowledge.

Still another point. The triumph of the conception that the university is a scientific institution has, on the whole, given our academic youths a nobler and more independent bearing. The brutality and vulgarity which had come down from the seventeenth century to the eighteenth, and which again and again made their appearance during the latter century—we have only to read the descriptions of student life at Jena and Halle dating from this period—have not, it is true, been wholly suppressed, but they are no longer as prominent as they were and they no longer dare to parade as the legitimate forms of student life. The so-called “pennalism,” and everything connected with it, accorded with the conception of the university as a school; it represented the swaggering opposition to all binding rules which young men who have outgrown the discipline of the school-room are fond of exhibiting. Young men who are not drilled for examinations, but serve science, who come into daily personal relation with the leaders of their science, do not feel the need of demonstrating their academic freedom by insults against law and order. I am well aware that the reality has not kept step with the ideal in this regard, and yet I maintain that the academic life of the nineteenth century has undergone a great change, a change from the puerile to the manly.

We are therefore justified in saying that the German university has cause to look with satisfaction upon the century which has just closed. The principle that the scholars and investigators of the nation shall also be the teachers of the youth has triumphed. No one reviewing the century can doubt the fact that the strongest and most lasting influences in university instruction have invariably proceeded from those who held the leadership in the scientific world. We might mention a large number of celebrated names in all the different faculties (just run over the surveys of the particular subjects in the work entitled *The German Universities*), all of which testify to the truth of the proposition that scientific eminence and the ability





to teach go hand in hand. And this fact points to a deeper relation between these things: the desire to know and the desire to teach spring from the same root.

Für andre wächst in mir das edle Gut,  
Ich kann und will das Pfund nicht mehr vergraben.  
Warum sucht ich den Weg so sehnsuchtsvoll,  
Wenn ich ihn nicht den Brüdern zeigen soll?

2. *The Difficulties.* Like all other institutions the German university system has its weaknesses and dangers. Let me point out a few.

1. Certain dangers arise from the union of *instruction* with scientific research. They are manifested in both teacher and student.

In the teacher. Since the university professor regards himself, primarily, not as a teacher, but as a man of science, his scientific work is apt to seem more important and dignified to him than the business of instruction. Thus it may happen that he cares less than he ought for the development of his power to teach; that he does not take the business of instruction seriously enough, and cannot prevail upon himself to give the proper time to the preparation of his lectures and exercises; yes it may even happen that he regards his teaching as a burden, as a task that interferes with his true vocation and which he feels himself justified in performing as best he may. We have all heard the humorous saying: The semester is an inconvenient interruption of the vacation, of the period of scientific leisure. Whoever shares this feeling will not, of course, fully appreciate the responsibility resting upon the teacher; he will lecture because it is his business to lecture, he will read off his notes or talk like a book, like a book not caring whether the hearer can or is willing to follow him. And when he meets with poor success, when his attendance decreases, and his students finally stay away altogether, he consoles himself by throwing the blame upon them: they are too dull to feel a yearning for true science. And at last he comes to look upon his lack of success in teaching as a sign of his superiority; whatever is truly valuable is always a matter for the few, to attract large numbers brings the blush





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to the cheek of the true scholar. As the bee sucks honey from all kinds of flowers, so self-love and vanity succeed in extracting praise from occurrences of every sort.

This evil might perhaps be avoided as follows. Positions might be created for genuine scholars, who, however, possess neither the inclination nor the ability to teach, in which they could devote themselves entirely to research without being in any wise hampered by the duty to teach. In this sense the recent creation by the Berlin Academy of Sciences of a number of positions for "scientific officials" may be welcomed as a sign of progress, even from the standpoint of the universities. Hitherto there have been no assured positions for men feeling a call to scientific work, except university professorships. Such men, therefore, sought these places even when they felt neither the inclination nor the ability to fill them. And inasmuch as a man's admission to the university career and his promotion depended upon his capacity for original research, the professorships were frequently filled by persons wholly lacking in the ability to teach. It will be a gain both to the universities and these pure scholars if they are no longer burdened with each other.

The union of investigation and instruction also contains a danger for the students. It not infrequently happens that the student begins to "specialize" too early in his career. It will not be necessary for me to protest against the charge that I do not regard the introduction of the student into scientific work as the essential, nay as the highest, function of university instruction. But all study begins with learning. And this task of learning is rendered much more difficult than formerly. Scientific research necessarily leads to greater and greater specialization of labor. The consequence is a constant increase in number of professorships and a corresponding contraction of the field of study. Instead of the one old *professor physices* we now have eight or ten professors for each of the different branches of natural science. The same development has taken place in the field of history and the historical sciences. The result is that, instead of first obtaining a general survey of his field, which is particularly essential to him, the student is at once carried off into a lot of special investigations and buried under a





mass of details and problems. The teachers discuss not so much what the student needs as what they themselves are pursuing as investigators. And hence it not infrequently happens that students who do not get what they want and seek lose heart entirely. Others immediately plunge into some special investigation or other. This is a danger to which the most zealous and most competent among them are particularly exposed. Captivated by an eminent teacher, or perhaps monopolized by an instructor anxious to establish a school, they fail to obtain an impartial view of science as a whole, or to widen their horizon by studies of a general character. Instead, they at once attack some special problem and are thus enticed to play the scholar even before they have really begun to learn. This happens particularly in the philosophical faculty; the student delves into some specialty or other in the hope of striking a vein of gold. In this way his general education is neglected, and when at last the student is confronted with the teacher's examination and its requirements, he feels hurt because the affair does not pass off smoothly, after having done the very things which his professor induced him to do. And when he eventually enters upon his duties as a teacher, he feels out of place; he can use as good as nothing of what he has learned at the university; and that which is required of him in his position was not held in high esteem at the university. As a scholar our hero considers himself too high-toned to do the work of a teacher of elementary subjects, and yet the work has to be done. It often takes a long time before a person again gets his balance in these cases.

2. Its connection with the university system also exposes scientific activity to certain dangers. Let me point out two of these.

The first is a kind of pseudo-productivity. Scientific production is the precondition and therefore becomes a means of obtaining a position in the university world. In this way the younger man in particular is forced to produce hastily and prematurely; there is no time for his work to mature; he makes haste to finish something in order that he may be on hand as an applicant for some vacancy. And many a man entertains the view, which indeed does not seem to be wholly unfounded, that not only the quality, but the quantity of the work produced is the determining





factor in the struggle for place; it is so much easier to measure the quantity than the quality.

Another danger is that the competition for place also influences scientific work. The anger of the defeated candidates, the resentment felt against the favored ones, the envy of those who have succeeded, the distrust of the influential, all these feelings pass from the university sphere into the scientific literature and give the controversies and polemical discussions the venomous character which they so often reveal in Germany. Literary partisanship counts for something also in this connection. Writers attempt to gain the good-will of a powerful man by praising his works or dealing gently with his opinions, or with still greater success by industriously attacking his opponents. The unpleasing state of scientific criticism in Germany is connected with all this; only too often does it show a lack of pride and dignity; sometimes it is partial, insinuating, flattering, then again it is arrogant and scornful, maliciously intent upon running down and defaming the book and its author; the few accidental mistakes discovered by the critic seem to be the only notable thing about a book. In case a work meets with success, it is invariably defamed. Goethe once classified his opponents as follows (in *Eckermann*, April 24, 1824): Besides the class of the envious there is still another class, those who oppose "on account of their own want of success."

While I am dealing with this side of human nature, let me add a remark concerning certain weaknesses which might be characterized as the professional vices of the university professor. Like all professional diseases they grow out of his professional activity and often represent the reverse of professional virtues. As the reverse of independence of thought, the courage to doubt and to enter upon new lines of thought, which may be designated as the chief virtue of the investigator, we have the tendency to cavil or find fault; a professor, according to the well-known humorous definition, is a man who differs from you. Connected with this tendency to differ from you is stubborn opinionativeness; of course, a man who knows everything better than you demands that others listen to him and agree with him. Indeed, professors who can and love to talk and teach are common enough, but a professor who can listen is rare. Bismarck





once said that it was impossible to find a man in Germany who could not set you right in all matters, from politics to catching fleas. Was he perhaps thinking of his conferences with university professors? In case this opinionativeness is accompanied by an absence of healthy common sense, which is not infrequent among scholars, it becomes sheer pig-headedness.

Related to this stubbornness of opinion is *arrogance*, a plant ✓ 2) that grows on every soil, always assuming the color of the soil. In the university world the great Duns, to use an old expression, or "*das grosse Tier*," as students now call him, is a common phenomenon. He assumes an attitude of superiority, he speaks in the tones of a man whose deliverances settle the matter; to contradict him or express doubts is resented as impertinent. This attitude often goes with specialism; the specialist knows that there is no one superior to him in his own field and cheerfully disregards what he is ignorant of. Kant somewhere speaks of the "Cyclops of science" who carry an enormous load of learning, the "burden of a hundred camels," but possess only one eye, that is, their specialty, lacking the philosophical eye. He seems to have met these persons particularly among the philologists; "Cyclops of literature" he calls them. As a matter of fact, even the nineteenth century has produced perfect and truly exemplary copies of this type. But they are to be found everywhere, among the jurists and the medical men as well as among theologians and philosophers. Only think—not to go outside of the philosophers—of the exaggerated feeling of superiority with which the speculative philosophers looked down upon other mortals who could merely employ their understanding in solving problems. Or think of Schopenhauer who, if he got nothing else at the university, at least carried with him into his retirement a fair share of genuine Hegelian arrogance and bequeathed it to numberless successors outside of "the guild" of philosophy. In place of the halo of the professor, self-love here surrounds the thinker's brow with something of the lustre of the martyr's crown; a witness of the truth, of course, is not fit to be a professor of philosophy. Thus the scattered seeds of academic pride spring up even outside of their enclosures.

By the side of pride—to enrich this anthology with another species—*vanity* also blossoms out. This is a plant which grows





on the soil of publicity. The university as well as the stage produces fine specimens of this type. Its description I leave to a man who made his observations a hundred years ago. Meiners, of Göttingen, writes, without always preserving, it is true, the tranquillity of the wise man or of the Spinozistic natural-historian of the emotions: "I must confess that the most shameful examples of pride and foolish vanity, the good natured as well as the repulsive kind, ever observed by me, I have found among academic scholars. It would be a blessing if scholars were vain merely of their learning and their achievements. They are often just as proud of the favor of the powerful, especially of the ladies, of wealth and titles, of their good table and fine wines, in short of everything of which uncultured and narrow-minded people are proud." And he goes on to moralize: "It is hardly more than natural that among a class of men where pride and vanity predominate, *envy* and *jealousy* should also be common faults. These vices manifest themselves among scholars as often in a ridiculous as in a malicious way. Just note the effect produced when one of them receives an advance in salary or a higher title. . . . The same thing takes place when a young man receives an unusual share of applause. How often it happens that men who are without controversy reckoned among the leaders in their field and are themselves convinced of this fact, endeavor to destroy even their most insignificant rivals. The most ardent lover cannot be more jealous of his mistress than many scholars are of fame and applause in their line."<sup>1</sup>

I have nothing to add to these statements except to say that this is evidently a professional failing. Though the business of instruction is not a haughty thing as such, yet there is something alluring in lecturing from a university pulpit. The teacher in the schoolroom comes into constant contact with the actual world, the lecturer in the professor's chair is not so apt to meet with the resistances of everyday life. The professor delivers his lecture, makes his exit amid the

<sup>1</sup> Meiners, *Verfassung und Verwaltung der deutschen Universitäten*, vol. ii, p. 16. Whoever delights in slanders will not pass by a book by J. Flach, *Der deutsche Professor der Gegenwart*, 1886; otherwise it is neither an instructive nor a refreshing book, not even witty.





shuffling of feet, which has come to be the customary form of applause, and is convinced of having enlightened and convinced the entire audience. No wonder that under these circumstances the habit of mind develops which Mephistopheles, clad in Faust's professional garb, becoming indignant, so magnificently satirizes: How convinced we are of knowing it all! And still another thing may be mentioned in extenuation: the loving attention which the university scholar receives from the press. From the day when he enters upon his career, he is treated as an important public personality; at every new stage of his progress the public is reminded of him. Every time he is called to another institution the news is telegraphed to all the newspapers in the German Empire, for weeks the German people are kept in suspense as to whether he will accept the call or whether it will be possible to keep him at the university which he has adorned with his scholarship and which is now in danger of losing him. Finally comes the period of jubilees, and on every occasion he again appears under the calcium light on the stage, and is celebrated by the press, by his pupils and colleagues as an incomparable ornament of science. Indeed, extraordinary powers of resistance are needed to endure all this without having one's head turned somewhat.

Enough, enough of these human, all too human traits. Or would it have been better not to speak of them at all? No, I think it was necessary to speak of them. Not in order to bring the university professors into contempt—they get enough of that already, along with much foolish glorification—nor yet in the hope of exterminating these vices by giving a faithful description of them or by preaching eloquent moral sermons against them. They will continue to flourish as long as human nature and conditions remain what they are. But I felt it to be only right that in a work in which so many good and commendable features of the German universities are dwelt upon, some of the things that are not so good and commendable, should be candidly mentioned. Besides, I was not willing to leave the description of the reverse of the picture entirely to the ill-disposed; by inserting it into its proper place in the system it seemed possible to reduce it to its true proportions.

3. *The System of Private Docents.* As has already been





shown (p.103) the teaching staff of the German university consists of two groups whose legal status is entirely distinct, *professors*, in ordinary and extraordinary, and *private docents*. We have said all that is necessary on the legal side; here I should like to add a few statements concerning the significance of the system, and particularly concerning its value for the individual and the university.

As a rule the private-docentship is now regarded as a prelude to the professorship. The teacher usually passes through three stages. He enters the academic career as a private docent; after a shorter or longer period of years he is promoted to an extraordinary professorship in case he has distinguished himself by his scientific work and proved his ability as a teacher, and finally reaches the last stage in the full professorship. It is true, there are so many exceptions to this line of advance that we can hardly speak of a rule. Not only is the second stage, the extraordinary professorship, frequently passed over, but it also not infrequently happens that men in other avocations who have made a reputation for themselves through their scientific productions, are called to a professorship without having first habilitated themselves as private docents. This occurs particularly in the theological and philosophical faculties, the former being often recruited from the clergy, the latter from the secondary schools. But these occurrences seem to be becoming rarer, particularly the passage from the school to a professorship. This is due to the increased demands which are made upon the teacher and which leave little time for scientific work, and is in line with the general tendency towards a sharper separation of the different professions. The change is by no means a desirable one; many distinguished academic teachers have come from the ranks of the teachers in the gymnasium, and the fact that they had experience in teaching and possessed a knowledge of the schools and their needs was also a gain to the university.

Nor is it unusual, on the other hand, for a person to abandon the academic career which he entered as a docent. It not seldom happens that he enters a different calling, takes a position in a library or in a scientific institute, a clerical office or a place in a school. Or his academic career may end with an extraordinary professorship or an honorary professorship. And





it also comes to pass, though rarely, that a man remains a private docent for the rest of his days. In the medical faculty alone that is not unusual; it is due to the fact that the habilitation assumes a somewhat different character in this case; the position often serves as a mere foil to the practice of medicine, which continues to be the chief profession.

Aside from these exceptions, the stages mentioned before form the rule. The result is that two categories of academic teachers exist side by side, an official class and an unofficial class. In addition to the appointed and salaried professors every faculty contains a larger or smaller number of scholars who have no official standing, but who in other respects have equal rank as teachers. This is an arrangement peculiar to the German university and has often been praised by foreigners as the source of its power. I desire to describe the importance of this institution in a few words.

First a general remark. The academic career thus receives the character of a free profession, more so than any other official profession. The individual enters this career not by appointment, election, or through competition, but by an act of choice. Whoever feels the call to do scientific labor and to teach may, as soon as he has convinced a faculty of his qualifications, obey the inner voice and make the trial in the most independent position possible. He assumes no office, no obligation, nor does the university or the state assume any obligations towards him. The private docent occupies the freest, most independent position in the world; he continues to be a private scholar, with the privilege, however, of establishing himself as a teacher of the academic youth, if he chooses. There is no doubt that this is one of the reasons why the position has such great attractions for the most independent and daring spirits; there is no doubt also that in this way men are brought into the academic career whose primary object is not the dignity and the security of office, but the freedom of scientific work and the independence of an academic position. If the career could be entered, as in other countries, by means of a competitive examination and the candidate had to show before a commission, not his capacity for scientific research, but his familiarity with the entire field of a subject, if he had to begin his professional activity in some





faculty by offering a number of courses assigned to him by a minister of education for pay, then many a scholar would renounce the academic career altogether. It would have no attractions for him; the necessity of preparing himself for an examination embracing the entire scope of his subject, the uncertain outcome of a competitive examination, and the dependent position of an *agrégé*, would frighten him off. He would abandon it to persons recommended by the trustworthiness of their encyclopedic knowledge and their ability to adapt themselves to any position, perhaps also by the happy choice of their political views. The German plan encourages those to enter the university career who are convinced of their ability to promote scientific knowledge in some form or other by their work, and it gives them free play after they have formally entered the career, without claiming their services for any tasks not freely chosen by them. Thus the academic career, through the form which it assumes in its earliest stage, receives the most unmistakable impress of a free learned profession.

In this way the system is of fundamental importance to academic life. But it is no less important to the individual himself. Connected with the university in an independent manner, he has an opportunity to test and develop his fitness for his profession. Though his activity as a teacher is, as a rule, rather narrowly circumscribed, it is not wholly fruitless; he has the opportunity of practising the art of academic instruction within a narrow circle, and after all this art, too, must be acquired. Older scholars, who had been directly appointed to professorships, have not always found it easy to strike the right key in their lectures. The younger man gradually grows into the business; blunders which are bound to be made at first, are made before a small audience and are more easily remedied. On the other hand, if the trial results unfavorably, it is still possible to make a change.

From this point of view the system of private docents is also an extremely beneficial arrangement for the university administration. It represents a voluntary period of probation on the part of young scholars and imposes no burdens or obligations upon the university administration. The latter can, according to its needs, at any time draw from the ranks of the





private docents skilled and tried instructors to fill the gaps in the official teaching staff, without being bound by claims of succession. It may without injury to his legal rights permanently ignore the particular individual and allow him to draw what conclusions he chooses.

For the faculties, however, the institution of private docents means the right to make the first selections for the academic office. By granting the *venia legendi* they confer upon the individual the right to enter the ranks of those from whom the official positions in the instructing staff are primarily recruited. In this way a remnant of the old corporative organization is retained.

Finally, the activity of the private docents also constitutes a not wholly unimportant factor in university instruction. In the first place their lectures and exercises fill many gaps and satisfy many needs that would otherwise remain unsatisfied. Then again the competition and the freedom of choosing one's teacher, which is only made possible by the presence of private docents, have a wholesome effect. As a rule, of course, the official representative of the subject, who is the older and better known man, will gather about him a larger circle of students. He may, besides, be the director of a laboratory or seminar and a university examiner, perhaps also a civil service examiner. Still, nothing will prevent the student, particularly if he does not intend to take his degree at this particular university, from giving the private docent the preference in case he regards the latter's course as more helpful; he is not compelled to take work under a teacher whom he does not like. And hence it is not so rare an occurrence after all for a private docent to gather about him a considerable number of students, especially in the philosophical and medical faculties.

As a rule, this competition between the official and unofficial teachers also represents a competition between the older and younger ones. This is a relation which is both mutually helpful and complementary. Schopenhauer states, in the Preface to the second edition of *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, which appeared twenty-six years after the first, that the two volumes (the second had been added to the first, which dated from the days of his youth) supplemented each other, that the first excelled





in what only the fire of youth and the vigor of a first production could give, while the second surpassed the former in the maturity and consistency of its thoughts, which are the result of a long and industrious life. A similar relation obtains between the youthful private docent and the mature professor. It is not possible to have the same stages of life side by side in the same personality, but here we have them in the two generations of teachers. The older generation excels in maturity of knowledge and approved methods of instruction and investigation, the younger in the youthful courage to blaze out new paths, and in impulsiveness of spirit.

Thus the presence of the two groups of teachers doubtless helps to keep our academic instruction fresh and vigorous and hinders it from falling into the beaten tracks. The younger man must do his best in order to make a place for himself by the side of the older and more noted man. On the other hand, the older man cannot, if he would maintain his reputation, afford to take things easy, as his age and the security of his position might incline him to do. In order to attract the young men he must keep fresh and take part in the active movements of the present. If he were to become intellectually fossilized, or even to rest upon his laurels, he would soon lose touch with the youth and see the circle of his hearers grow smaller and smaller.

At the same time the two groups of academic teachers represent the two tendencies on which science, like all historical life, rests: the conservative tendency and the progressive tendency. The tendency to innovation is represented in the youthful ambitious doctors; the desire is strong in them to promote the cause by new thoughts and discoveries and to make a name for themselves: *plus ultra* is the motto of youth. The other tendency is revealed in men of acknowledged reputation, their motto is *parta tueri*. This tendency is equally necessary. If there were no desire to preserve and strengthen the established truths, there would be a constant whirl of new ideas, and it would be impossible to have that state of stability which is indispensable even to the new conceptions. Only by coming in conflict with the recognized truths can the new thoughts develop and be sifted out. It is certainly not my opinion that professors have





no new ideas or that all private docents are or ought to be the discoverers of new thoughts and systems. Nevertheless the time comes when the past preponderates over the future, and as a rule it so happens that the private docent has not yet reached this period, while the professors have passed it.

In conclusion let me give a few figures showing the composition of the teaching body. A table prepared by Conrad (in Lexis, *Deutsche Universitäten*, pp. 146 f.) gives us the following idea of the status and development of the teaching body in the second half of the nineteenth century, and of the ratio between the number of docents and the number of students. There were in the different faculties ordinary professors, extraordinary and honorary professors, and private docents as follows:

Year	Theology			Law			Medicine			Philosophy		
	o.	e.	p. d.	o.	e.	p. d.	o.	e.	p. d.	o.	e.	p. d.
1840.....	120	31	41	108	32	59	135	66	84	270	124	142
1870.....	130	33	22	126	30	41	166	100	146	383	175	169
1892.....	151	39	28	148	31	43	211	189	238	519	332	346

For each docent there were students:

Year	Theology	Law	Medicine	Philosophy
1840.....	18	16	8	5
1870.....	17	15	7	6
1892.....	23	31	12	6

For each full professor there were students:

Year	Theology	Law	Medicine	Philosophy
1840.....	26	30	17	10
1870.....	23	24	17	12
1892.....	33	47	41	14

Two things strike us in the figures of this table. First, the number of students has grown more rapidly than the number of teachers, the number of students to each teacher being greater





now than fifty years ago. This is especially true of the three higher faculties, most true of the faculties of law and medicine; instead of 30 there are now 47 students for every full professor in law; instead of 17 there are now 41 for every medical professor. Secondly, the number of private docents in the first two faculties is decreasing, absolutely and relatively, in spite of the increase in the number of ordinary professorships, whereas it shows a remarkable increase in the medical and philosophical faculties, in which the number of extraordinary professors is also constantly growing. This is obviously due to the rapid progress in specialization, which makes the establishment of new chairs necessary.

4. *The Personal Relations of University Teachers and Students.* On the whole the relation existing between teachers and students in the German universities may be called a very gratifying one; it is a relation of respect and mutual confidence. Conflicts, such as are not uncommon in the schools and also occur in foreign universities, are at present almost unheard of. The precondition of this happy relation is evidently its entire freedom. Professors and students do not stand in the relation of superiors and inferiors, which is necessarily the case where the professor plays the part of both monitor and examiner; they are, as the common phrase puts it, *commilitones*, fellow-soldiers, joined together to extend the realm of truth, to decrease the realm of ignorance and error. The role of leadership naturally falls to the professors, who are the older ones and have been tried in battle. But the position which they occupy with respect to the students is not that of a superior; the individual student chooses not only his university, but his teachers, and in case he no longer desires to follow them, nothing will prevent him from deserting them whenever he likes and going elsewhere.

It is owing to the perfect freedom of this relation, which, on account of the prevailing custom of changing from university to university, is not seriously restricted even by the fear of the examination, that the German university teacher is entirely relieved of the necessity of combating secret ill-will and open hostility. Disrespectful behavior and disturbances hardly ever occur during lectures and exercises, and whenever they do happen, as, for example, in case of a man coming late to a lec-





ture or misbehaving in any way, the students themselves do police duty. Interference on part of the academic disciplinary authorities in such cases is something wholly unheard of.

Teachers in turn manifest toward students a spirit of confidence and a willingness to be of service. No one who appeals to them for information or advice is apt to have his request denied. Closer personal relations are formed in the practical exercises and seminars; here the foundation is not infrequently laid for permanent scientific coöperation, sometimes also for intimate and lasting friendships. It may be said that unless a person is prevented by modesty or indolence from seeking a closer relation, he will be very apt to find it, provided he proves his worthiness by his earnestness and efficiency. Here again we might call attention to the private docents. They are nearer to the students in age and in all other respects, and not seldom form the center of a small personal circle, especially of older students; they likewise form a connecting link between the professors and students. It is also to be remembered that the academic teachers are fond of attending the meetings and festive gatherings of the entire student body or of particular societies, especially in the smaller universities. Nor is it unusual for them to participate more or less regularly in the meetings of the scientific societies. And it is noteworthy that students always value highly such acts of friendship.

We should therefore have every reason to be satisfied with the existing conditions. Yet we must not hide from ourselves the fact that things are gradually changing in this respect. Professor and student are growing farther apart, particularly in the larger universities. Here the great majority of students never meet the professor outside of the lecture-room; only a small number become personally acquainted with him in the *practica*. This is perhaps least common in the faculty of law, but more common in the theological and philosophical faculties where closer relations continue to obtain. And in the medical faculties the clinics bring the parties together.

Changes in general conditions are responsible for the widening of the breach. First we mention the great increase in the attendance. I remind the reader of the figures given above (page 183). In the faculty of law there were, in 1840, 30





students for every full professor, now there are 47; in the medical faculty there were then 17, now 41, while the ratio has not changed so much in the other two faculties. The custom of studying at different universities, which has grown with the development of the means of transportation, produces similar results; the average length of time spent in residence at one university has decreased to three semesters and less; not a few students, especially jurists, change every semester. And professors too sometimes make such rapid changes, their brief sojourn of a few semesters at an institution reminding one of starring engagements.

But another circumstance seems worthy of consideration. The position of the professor has become more dignified, and the distance between him and the student has correspondingly increased. In the eighteenth century the social standing of the university scholar was still quite modest, the income was usually meagre, the standard of life not far removed from poverty. Think of Kant whose outward mode of living during his later years is well enough known from the very detailed descriptions of his table-companions. It was certainly not below the average, for he was in prosperous circumstances towards the end of his life; and yet how narrow and scant his rooms, his furniture, and his social entertainments would seem to many of our modern professors. Or read the section on the vocation and training of professors in Meiners's work (II. 10 ff). Most of them, he observes, come from poor families and remain in needy circumstances all their lives, so that they can do very little for the social side of their lives. Hence it often happens "that academic teachers are unfitted for any other business than their scientific work, that the most celebrated men behave like children or even like persons from the lowest strata of society in everyday life, that, finally, they resemble inhabitants of another planet in their intercourse with others, especially with the higher classes, and consequently provoke contempt and scorn."

These words, which were written exactly one hundred years ago, affect us like a voice from another world. The impulsive Meiners may have made hasty generalizations and overdrawn the picture, but the direction taken by his thought is characteristic, nobody would write that way to-day. The university pro-





fessor has since risen to a very honored position ; he is at home in society, he is not a stranger at court either, and he no longer moves in the company of lords with an apologetic air. A change in his personal bearing corresponds to the change which has taken place in his position ; there still exist among the professors scholars who shrink from the world and are ignorant of the world, but they do not constitute the type. There are men in every faculty who feel equal to any occasion in self-assurance and social tact.

Apart from the general changes in the different social strata, the rise of the citizen class and the decline of the nobility in economic and political importance, the great scientific achievements of the preceding generations of professors are doubtless mainly responsible for the position of respect attained by the calling. The greater honor in which the profession has come to be held, has in turn brought into it an increasing number of men from the wealthy and aristocratic classes of society ; and marriages between professors and these classes have also become frequent. At the same time the income directly and indirectly dependent upon the office has been augmented, so that some professors now have large incomes, particularly in the great medical and law faculties, occasionally also in the philosophical faculty. The standard of life, again, has kept pace with the income. Every university has at least a few professors who make a great splurge and live in grand style. The state too has done its share ; it has become more and more liberal with its titles and distinctions of every sort.

Although this eminent position has been honestly won and in many respects is of great benefit to the university, it nevertheless has the less gratifying secondary effect of increasing the distance between professor and student, and that without any intention on the professor's part, indeed without his knowledge or consent. It is only natural that a man occupying a high position in society, whose income enables him to live in grand style, should not be as close to his students as was the old university professor. He may have remained a simple man at heart, nevertheless his house, his surroundings, are not designed to make a simple student feel at home in them. Imagine the feelings of the professor if he were asked to take students into





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his home, as boarders, as many professors did at Halle and Göttingen in the eighteenth century!

In order to understand the full force of the change which has taken place, examine the entries which A. Twesten made in his diary during his sojourn at the University of Berlin in 1810 and 1811.<sup>1</sup> He was the son of a non-commissioned officer in the Danish army at Glückstadt, and came to Berlin immediately after the founding of the new university. In a very short time he began to associate personally with a number of most distinguished men. F. A. Wolf invited him to go walking with him twice a week, and also asked him to his house on certain days and evenings; at Heindorf's home and afterwards also at Boeckh's he read a Greek author with a small circle; Schleiermacher invited him to visit him occasionally in the evening; we also often find him present at social gatherings in Niebuhr's house. Fichte allowed him to put questions to him after the lectures and explained points in the lecture to him. Fichte also conducted a discussion-class, the members of which prepared essays on subjects assigned to them, which he afterwards returned with his criticisms. No one will think it probable that a stranger coming from such a class of society would meet with a similar reception in Berlin in our day.

<sup>1</sup> *A. Twesten nach Tagebüchern und Briefen*, by Heinrich, Berlin, 1889.





## CHAPTER II

## UNIVERSITY INSTRUCTION

1. *The Lectures.* Two forms of instruction have always existed side by side at the university, *lectures* and *exercises*. Although there have been manifold changes in particular points, the functions of the two have, on the whole, remained the same. The object of the lectures is to present the subject in its totality, while the aim of the exercises is to introduce those who take part in them into more or less independent work in the field.

The term *Vorlesung* (lecture) originated in the Middle Ages; it is the translation of the term *praelectio*. The thing itself, has, it is true, undergone some changes. In the Middle Ages the lecture consisted in a running exposition and interpretation of the contents of a canonical textbook. In its present form it harks back to the lecture which was common in the Greek philosophers' schools; it gives, at least as a rule, a systematic exposition of a science in a more or less extended series of lectures. The so-called private lectures take up, primarily, the fundamental subjects in connected form, while the public lectures usually present, in fewer periods a week, a topic of more general interest to a larger number of hearers, to which many are admitted who do not belong to the university. We have already stated all that need be said (pp. 87 ff) concerning the outward difference between these two forms, the payment of fees for the private lecture and the historical evolution of the system.

In spite of occasional objections urged against it, the lecture system has maintained its old position as the fundamental and characteristic form of university instruction, as distinguished from the recitation system. Of late the attacks upon it have grown more vigorous and have aroused the attention of wider circles, and have also met with assent. I should there-





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fore like to consider these attacks at once and then discuss the nature and necessity of the lecture in the face of these objections.

Several years ago the historian Bernheim subjected the traditional lecture system to adverse criticism. He declared that it places the hearer in a passive attitude, limits his activity to hearing and taking down lectures which easily lend themselves to the need of taking notes, that, at best, but rarely, the student reviews these notes at home. Owing to the constant multiplication of lectures through specialization, which results from the growing extension of the sciences as well as from the progressive division of labor, the student is in danger of being completely buried under the mass of the great systematic lecture-courses. He saves himself from the state of stupid passivity to which he is reduced by constant attendance upon lectures, by cutting them. Bernheim recommends a complete transformation of the methods of instruction. The emphasis, he thinks, should be laid upon the independent use of the literary sources and upon the exercises which are to introduce the student to this work. The lectures should be limited to a few one or two-hour courses, which help the student to get his bearings, so that time may be left for reading and seminary work, by which alone the student can really be introduced to the subject. Participation in this work should be made obligatory, and only those semesters should be counted towards a degree in which written exercises have been produced, receiving the approval of the teacher.<sup>1</sup>

In attempting to defend the lecture system in academic instruction, let me declare at once that I do not desire to praise it at the expense of the exercises. I too regard the exercises as an absolutely necessary means of supplementing the lectures. I

<sup>1</sup> E. Bernheim, *Der Universitätsunterricht und die Erfordernisse der Gegenwart*, 1896. I also mention two later treatises by the same author on the reform of university instruction, in which, however, the criticism of the lecture system is not so prominent, and in which also the demand for compulsory exercises seems to be given up: *Die gefährdete Stellung unserer deutschen Universitäten* (Rector's address, 1899) and *Entwurf eines Studienplans für das Fach der Geschichte*, 1901. The treatises of Bernheim are the work of a capable and well-minded critic who has the university's best interests at heart. We can hardly say the same for an essay by E. von Hartmann on university instruction in *Moderne Probleme*, 1886. The lectures are here treated with sneering contempt as an intolerable survival: they consist, he





am also of the opinion that they will be given much wider scope in the future. Moreover, I have no intention of taking up the cudgels for all the lectures that are delivered in German universities. There may be lectures with respect to which the objections urged are entirely in place, lectures which really consist in the reading of an unpublished book, or in dictating an overwhelming mass of facts, formulæ, or book-titles, lectures which affect such infinite thoroughness that they never succeed in giving a complete view of the whole, and never get beyond the beginning, beyond the introduction to the introduction, lectures, moreover, which clumsily fail or even purposely scorn to hook on to what is known and interesting to their hearers, and are in consequence despised as unintelligible and tiresome. But, I must add, just as there are teachers who do not understand the purpose of the lecture, there are also hearers who do not understand it, hearers, for example, who think that they ought to get out of the lecture course the sum total of knowledge necessary to pass the examination and who therefore expect the teacher to dictate or perhaps even try to force him to do it by more or less vigorous expressions of dissatisfaction. Then there are hearers who think it their duty to listen to all the lectures on the subjects in their field, and so hope to come into possession of the entire body of knowledge. And we might mention other misconceptions and shortcomings on both sides.

But all this does not prove that the lecture system is a useless survival. The mere fact that it has been preserved through all the centuries, from the time of Aristotle down, would incline me to believe in its reasonableness. I am convinced, the systematic lecture course will be retained for all times as an essential

says, solely in the reading off or dictation of unpublished textbooks, obstinately ignoring the invention of the art of printing, which is now over 400 years old; the administration ought to suppress them at once by requiring the printing of the notes or the use of a printed book as the basis for the lecture. Similar sneering remarks are made by Dühring, *Der Weg zur höheren Berufsbildung der Frau und die Lehrweise der Universitäten*, 1877; no one has ever spoken of universities with more venomous contempt. The phrases about reading off lectures and the ignored art of printing are, however, already to be found in Fichte and Schleiermacher; presumably, they date still farther back.





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✓ and indispensable form of scientific instruction. The important thing is that its purpose be properly conceived, by both professor and student.

I formulate the purpose of the lecture course as follows: Its object is to give the hearer seeking an introduction into a subject a living survey of the whole field, through a living personality, in a series of connected lectures. It should enlighten him concerning the fundamental problems and essential conceptions of this science, concerning the stock of knowledge acquired and the method of its acquisition, and finally concerning its relation to the whole of human knowledge and the primary aims of human life, and should in this way arouse his active interest in the science and lead him to an independent comprehension of the same.

I supplement this formula by adding a negative phase. The lecture cannot and should not aim to transmit to the hearer the entire material of the science, to place before him all the facts and problems, all the opinions and controversies, the complete history and literature of this science. That would be the object of a systematic manual. A lecture course aiming to supply the student with a complete manual and reference-book would necessarily miss its mark; it would invariably succumb in competition with printed works. Even an otherwise mediocre text-book will necessarily surpass the most carefully prepared lecture course and the most faithful and accurate student's note-book in the completeness of its material, the accuracy of its dates and bibliography, in the fulness of its accounts of the history of its doctrines, and of the problems and controversies discussed in its pages. But however true this may be, it is no less true that the right kind of lecture course excels the best text-book and manual in the other respect. Where the object is first to arouse an interest in a science, to create a belief in its value, to direct attention to the essential facts and problems, to present general leading points of view and thus to bring the student into active touch with the subject, even an excellent book accomplishes less than a lecture which only moderately fulfils its purpose, but which has behind it a living human personality.

To the novice beginning the study of a subject, be it theology or jurisprudence, history or natural science, mathematics or





political economy, it seems an endless and boundless field. The mass of facts and problems, of theories and opinions, of investigations and discussions, of literature and criticism, which overwhelm him in an encyclopedic hand-book or text-book, is infinitely multiplied; he stands before it all perplexed and discouraged, like a layman in a great museum or exposition. Here the lecture system offers its services as a guide. It takes him by the hand, leads him through the whole field, points out to him the really important and essential things and supplies him with principles and points of view for understanding and judging what he has seen. And now he begins to show an interest in the subject and to appreciate it; he becomes acquainted with the methods of the science and learns to apply them, and finally ventures to do more independent work in the field himself. It is true, a book may also serve as such a guide. But, after all, is not a personal living guide, with whom the beginner comes face to face, superior to the other? Let me point out in what respects the living word has the advantage over the book.

(1) In the lecture the hearer is confronted with science in the form of a *personality* that possesses it and is devoted to it. In case the personality is equal to the occasion, he is at once inspired with a belief in the thing itself. A book, especially a systematic manual or text-book, is a lifeless object that cannot create a belief; all faith is transmitted from person to person. The fact that a man who is standing before me and speaking to me, a man whom I respect and in whom I have confidence, believes in science, and devotes his strength and life to it, that alone inspires me with the belief in its importance and reality. This experience resembles our experience with foreign lands of which we have read in books and heard about at school. By and by someone comes along who has been there himself, who has lived and labored across the seas for years. He tells us of the country and the people, how to get there, what one can find to do over there, and how much money one can make. And now for the first time we are impressed with the reality of these things. Africa and America do not exist merely on paper, which contains so much not found anywhere else, but they exist as tangible and accessible realities, and with the belief in their reality we begin to find the courage to venture across the seas. The pupil





passes through the same experience with the sciences, through the words of the living personality of the teacher before him the past assumes a reality for the incipient historian or philologist which no book can give it. And so also the minutiae which no science can overlook, the different readings and fragments, the micrological observations and the laborious deductions, take on importance and value in the eyes of the pupil, without which he would lose heart in his work. In this way, if I may be allowed to give a personal recollection, Trendelenburg succeeded in encouraging his pupils to attack the study of Aristotle. We had heard a great deal about the philosophy of the old Greek, we had even attempted to read him, but we were deterred by the feeling of doubt whether it was really worth while to study him, whether, after all, his wisdom had not become antiquated. It was not until a man appeared before us in the person of Trendelenburg who lived in the Aristotelian philosophy, and who seemed to stand in a personal relation to the Greek, that we came to believe in the thing and its importance even for the present. And with this faith arose our courage to penetrate into an unknown world of ideas.

The words of Aristotle are still applicable: He who would learn must believe. To produce this belief in the student is the chief and perhaps most essential respect in which the instruction of the teacher excels the book, not to mention the part which the presence of fellow-students and fellow-workers plays in this matter. And a remark of Goethe which von Savigny quotes in a discussion of this very point, expresses the same thought: "Writing is an abuse of language, silent reading a sorry substitute for speech. Whatever influence man exerts upon man he exerts through his personality."

(2) The book is a fixed and finished product, the lecture is a living and moving growth; even in the outward form, for the book exists as a complete whole, while the lecture offers a small and comprehensible part of the subject from hour to hour. And even this is not presented to the hearer as a finished product, but is developed before his very eyes at the present moment. It is well known with what keener interest we watch the growth of a thing than we contemplate the finished product. For that reason the map which the teacher draws on the blackboard with





a few lines fixes the outlines of a country in our minds more firmly and deeply than the much more perfect picture in the atlas. Nor can the interest with which the hearers follow the development of the lecturer's thought be easily awakened by a text-book. And this interest is in turn communicated to the teacher. He comes into a mutual personal relation with his hearers and depends upon the moment for the effective phrase, the telling expression, and the illuminating comparison. And the word is assisted by the voice, the way in which it is spoken, the expression of the countenance, none of which things can be found in any book. And a hundred little things, side remarks, glosses, references to this and that, passing criticisms, which one cannot and is not willing to make in a book, are added, giving the lecture the personal, intimate character which no book can have. That is the meaning of the old expression: *vox viva docet*.

(3) This outward flexibility of the lecture is accompanied by an *inner flexibility* and freedom. It can and does, for example, employ different methods of presentation. The text-book demands unity of style and form, it prefers to proceed systematically according to the deductive, synthetic method. The lecture course is more flexible, it is not compelled to adhere to a fixed plan, in one chapter it can adopt one method, in another another, if it seems pedagogically desirable. It will, on the whole, incline to the analytical method. It will not begin with an exhaustive discussion of the fundamental concepts and principles, but will start out with known facts and phenomena, rising to the general concepts, or, in the words of Aristotle, it will pass from the *πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς* to the *πρότερον φύσει*, from that which is known to the principles, while the text-book will attempt to develop the subject deductively. The lecture is also freer in the selection of the *material*. The text-book aims at completeness, uniformity, and accuracy in detail. Here too, the lecture is more flexible; it may, yielding to the interests of the teacher or student, dwell upon one chapter longer than upon another, and then rapidly pass over one that has less systematic value, for its object is not to furnish a reference book of which completeness and uniformity can justly be demanded, but to help the beginner to understand the subject, and to this end it





may be suitable to offer different materials in different proportions. Nor will anything prevent the lecturer from discussing occurrences and questions which happen to be of general interest, new discoveries, scientific controversies, literary productions, sometimes also public events. It would be foolish to ignore a subject in which the hearers happen to take a lively interest, nor would it be wise always to seek it out. The lecture has this great advantage: It is repeated at shorter intervals and can more easily keep pace with the events than a handbook which is intended rather to record the settled and permanent results of scientific labor. The lecture will absolutely refrain from overloading the student with dates and details, which are presented by the reference book. Details will have for it rather the value of methodical examples and illustrations. For it would after all be a useless undertaking to attempt to burden the memory of the hearer with a mass of detail. The object of the lecture is not to cram his memory with facts or to furnish him with a note-book that will prepare him for the examination, but to help him to understand the great and essential features of the sciences, as they are seen through the living personality of the teacher. If this end is realized, he will have no difficulty in handling the details himself, and in making profitable use of text-books and works of reference. The best that a lecture course can give a student is an active apprehension of the fundamentals, and the lecture can do this better than any book.

(4) All this is, of course, doubly and trebly true where *perception* plays an essential part, for example where the experiment stands in the foreground, as in experimental physics and chemistry or in physiology, or where the speaker's word explains a perceived object, as is the case in the clinic, or in archæology, or the history of art. Since this method of instruction has been constantly extended in our century, it may be said that the lecture system, far from having become superfluous, has grown more and more indispensable.

In a certain sense the same results apply to the literary branches, including theology and jurisprudence. The larger and more boundless the field of literature grows, the more need there is of the lecture to emphasize the essential and important elements in the infinite mass of material. It is natural and





inevitable that the personal attitude of the teacher should determine what is to be selected; it may also happen at times that important facts are neglected and suppressed, and less important ones accentuated. Nevertheless, any accentuation of particular authors and works is better than the uniform monotony of the detailed accounts of a hand-book aiming at completeness. The essential thing is that definite points be first staked out as guide-posts for the uninitiated in the book-desert, which shall enable him to get his bearings.

(5) But there is still another side to the question. The lecture not only helps him who hears it, but him who delivers it. If the lecture system were not necessary for the students, it would be necessary for the sake of the *teachers*. Let us emphasize two points.

First, the systematic presentation of a science in lecture-form constantly directs the attention towards the *essential* and the *universal*. It consequently acts as a healthy counterpoise against the tendency of scientific research to *specialism*. Without the constraint, under which the teacher is placed by the lecture course, of getting a general view of his subject in its broad outlines and relations, many a man would be still more inclined than is the case at present to pursue his specialistic investigations to the exclusion of everything else, regardless of whether his work accomplished anything for the general conception of the subject or not. It cannot be doubted that he would thereby lose some of his ability and effectiveness as a teacher. I am also convinced that he would not gain anything as an investigator; nothing is better calculated to save the thinker from losing his way in the labyrinths of fruitless and senseless specialistic investigations than a contemplation of the whole of things, I should like to say, the philosophical element in every science. And every time the lecture course is repeated the demand is repeated to keep in view the whole and its inner connections, to accentuate the principles more sharply and distinctly, to systematize more clearly and definitely. The German text-books are used the world over, both in the original and in translations; a more or less satisfactory proof, it seems to me, that the German professors, too, have learned something in their lectures, and not only the subject matter, but also the method of teaching it.





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Secondly, the teacher immediately perceives in the lecture, in the personal contact with his hearers, what is living, what is effective, what is fruitful, and what is true. Goethe once wrote to Frau von Stein: "Fritz [her son in whose education he was interested] was very well-behaved. I explained to him the first great educational efforts according to my new system; he understood everything very well and I was pleased with the attempt, which also made the whole matter clearer and more definite to me. Children are a good touchstone of truth and falsehood, they do not yet feel the need of deluding themselves as we old ones do." Is it not the contrast between the living presentation and the paper presentation which partly accounts for all this? Paper is patient; it accepts the most laborious ruminations and compilations, the mediocre, the barren, and the dead forms, just as readily as the living and vigorous and fruitful. It is much harder to say unreal and inane things in a lecture; we feel the opposition of the hearer who is repelled by artificiality and sophistry. Thus the lecture with silent, but perceptible force, draws us to the essential, the real, and the true.

(6) Lastly, the lecture is the only form of instruction in which a teacher can communicate his thoughts to a large number at the same time. Only a few can take part in the exercises; the active participation of the individual, on which the superiority of the exercises depends, diminishes as the number grows; if the number becomes too large, the individual is here condemned to stupid passivity more than anywhere else. Think of your school-days; can anything be more deadening than a large class of fifty, in which one pupil, more likely than not one who is unprepared or ignorant, mistranslates a passage or mangles the text, while the other forty-nine are condemned to watch the fruitless attempt? Well, the same thing would happen at the university if the exercises were made obligatory. When the number of participants becomes too large and the student who happens to have the floor or whose paper the professor is discussing, is not capable or energetic enough to do honest work, the others are dreadfully bored; at such a moment a mighty yearning is felt that some one acquainted with the subject give a connected account of it.





On the other hand, the effectiveness of the lecture is increased to a certain degree by the number of hearers. We are apt to speak in another strain to a hundred than to ten or five hearers; the many eyes that look up at the lecturer give wings to his thoughts, and lend his words such force and animation as cannot be attained within a narrower circle. It may be said that the great and far-reaching influences produced by university teachers have gone out from the large lecture halls. I remind the reader of Christian Wolff and F. A. Wolf, of Schleiermacher and Hegel, of Görres and Treitschke. Yes, those influences could only have gone out from large lecture halls, not from seminaries having ten or twelve members. I certainly do not underestimate the silent influence of these small classes, but it is unwise to underestimate the other form of instruction on account of them. To curtail the conditions essential to its existence would mean to deprive the university of its most forceful influence upon the intellectual life of our people. I am convinced that if we should follow the advice of the reformers and abolish the lectures or allow them to decline, if we should force our students to attend exercises several hours every day, the cry would soon be heard and compel recognition: Give us back the lectures.

And hence it will always remain true what Schleiermacher said in his discussion of this subject: "The true and peculiar good that a university teacher does will always be in direct proportion to his skill in the art of living speech."

2. *Cutting Lectures and other Habits.* The circumstance which gives the attacks upon the lecture system constant nourishment is the habit of cutting lectures. With Bernheim, too, this forms the starting point. According to him a more or less regular attendance upon lectures is the exception, to the discouragement of the teachers, to the ruin of the hearers, who thus come to regard the neglect of duty as a natural right of the students. Bernheim recommends the exercises for the reason that absences from them are much rarer, and because the participants themselves regard it as improper to miss them. We may grant that this is true in the case of smaller classes, but would not this advantage disappear if the exercises were made obligatory upon all? At present a few volunteers take part in the exercises;





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if many students participated and were forced to do so, they would behave just as they behave with respect to the lectures which tradition and partial compulsion persuade them to take.

As regards the extent of indolence and particularly the cutting of lectures, I believe that some of us have greatly exaggerated notions of these matters. To be sure, it would not be telling the truth to say that everything is as it ought to be in this respect; there is a great deal of wanton shirking. But it is sheer exaggeration to pretend that regular attendance upon lectures is wholly the exception. This may be true of this or that particular subject, of this or that teacher, it may be true especially of the law students in this or that university, for there is considerable difference between the universities also. There are some in which idleness is in the air, in which tradition and environment are unfavorable to attendance upon lectures; the natural surroundings and the semesters also have their influence. What usually happens most likely happens in this instance; the bad cases are brought to light or rather force themselves upon the attention in a sensational and scandalous manner, and the accusers then make a general law of what this or that group is really guilty of. Presumably the parliamentarians, who make the complaints in the diet, are fathers of law students, and they have been students of law themselves. On the other hand, no mention is ever made of those who quietly pursue their studies without attracting public attention, as little mention as of virtuous women.

If I may trust my own observations, I should say that a very considerable number of students, one-half to three-fourths, to give a conservative estimate, attend lectures regularly: another fourth is occasionally absent, while the others, after a more or less constant attendance, attend only now and then. The number of those who purposely or actually cut lectures and who can be found only at the pot-house or *Frühschoppen*, is not so very large; at some universities and in some lines of work, this class is almost entirely wanting. The ubiquity of this class in all public places and in all humorous papers and anecdotes is responsible for the popular notion of its great size. The number of those who drop out in the course of the semester is larger.





We must not forget, however, that there may be legitimate grounds for this. Not to mention sickness, the student may be kept away by urgent work, especially during the last semesters, or even by an excess of *ennui* in the lecture room, for the thing is actually said to exist, here as well as in schools and churches. The teacher, however, who takes his subject seriously himself, and has something to offer, will, as a rule, have a grateful and faithful audience. In case he, too, sees vacant seats, towards the close of the semester, I should advise him not to take the matter too tragically, for after all it is human. Even old Kant, or rather the still youthful Kant, whose praises as an academic teacher Herder sang so loudly, had such an experience and consoled himself in spite of his rigorous conception of duty. In the announcements of his lectures for 1765 he explains why he has placed empirical psychology at the beginning of the course, before metaphysics: "Everybody knows what a zealous beginning the sprightly and fickle young men make, and how the lecture-halls then gradually become somewhat emptier. If now I assume that what ought not to happen will still continue to happen in the future, in spite of all gentle reminders, the proposed plan of instruction possesses a peculiar fitness. For the hearer whose zeal will have already cooled off toward the end of the course in empirical psychology (which is hardly to be imagined if we follow this method of procedure) would still have heard something intelligible to him on account of its ease, agreeable to him on account of its interest, and practically useful on account of the frequent applications made of it." Besides the consolation we may derive from having even a Kant as "a companion in misery" the hint perhaps deserves to be taken to heart: so far as possible to place what is easily understood, interesting, and practical at the beginning.

Let me add a statement with regard to the short, one or two-hour "orientation courses" which Bernheim recommends in place of the comprehensive systematic lectures. It is to be their function to give a condensed survey of the material and a brief exposition of the personal point of view. I am afraid that such lectures would be too apt to become barren compendia, consisting of collections of the chief data and dogmatic formulæ. To be effective a lecture needs a certain freedom of scope. When





it lacks this, when it becomes too condensed, it loses its force, and pleases neither teacher nor student. It sometimes happens that one attempts, towards the close of the semester, hurriedly to discuss a few topics in somewhat more condensed form. I have always felt that the thing did not turn out satisfactorily, even for the hearer; to my great surprise, at first, for I had supposed that a brief summary of important points could not fail to be of particular interest. But it is of no use, it is not the material, nor the thought, nor the solution of the problem, be it ever so valuable, but the manner in which the problem is presented and solved, in which the thought is developed, that makes the subject interesting and instructive. The physical man cannot live on extracts, even though they contain all the essential nutritive ingredients in purest form. One might at first imagine that the body, grateful to be relieved of the work, would prefer them for nourishment; but it refuses them. The digestive organs happen to be arranged for the purpose of selecting and digesting the useful ingredients from a mass of foodstuffs taken into the system. The same thing applies to the intellect; this too cannot be nourished by extracts prepared by some one else. Accepting with gratitude any guidance that may be offered, the mind endeavors by its own activity to search after and select that which is suitable to it, from the abundance of facts.

Hence the problem cannot be to abolish the lecture system altogether, or to restrict it in the manner indicated by Bernheim, but to make it effective and fruitful. At the same time it must be confessed that it is not equally applicable everywhere. There are subjects to which the lecture system is less adapted than to others, for example grammar, and also logic. Some teachers, moreover, are better fitted for exercises than for lectures, and finally there are universities in which certain subjects hardly attract a sufficient number of students for lectures. True, the old proverb says: *tres faciunt collegium*, but I believe three are not enough, to give the lecture the necessary resonance as it were. It would seem somewhat strange to deliver a lecture to one person instead of conversing with him. The same thing holds true so long as there are not persons enough present to hinder the speaker from seeing every hearer at the same time. In the lecture the circle of diffusion, if I may so





express myself, must be indefinitely wide; only in that case can the mode of general speech be justified. If the members of a small class are so irregular in their attendance that every absence is noticeable, the effect is, of course, discouraging. And in such an event it would indeed be best, in my opinion, to give the instruction more of the form of the dialogue. In fact, what would prevent the teacher from devoting one or two of the four hours a week to discussions in connection with the lecture or assigned reading? And why should he not occasionally interrupt the lecture with questions addressed to his hearers in order to make sure of their interest and power of comprehension, as well as to secure their regular attendance? Only we must not seek to destroy what is possible and effective under other circumstances, simply because it is not feasible at Greifswald or Rostock.

3. *The External Form of the Lecture.* This depends upon the function of the lecture. The lecture can realize its purpose only when it assumes an independent form of delivery. If it merely consisted in reading aloud or dictating a finished, but not yet printed book, it would, of course, be hard to understand, as Schleiermacher says, why a speaker "troubles people to come to him and does not rather sell them his wisdom which he has already set down in stationary form, in the ordinary way. For it would certainly be ridiculous to speak of the wonderful influence of the living voice with such a method." But this method is, most likely, not followed very largely at present, at least outside of the faculty of law in which the old practice seems to have been mostly preserved. The reasons are obvious, for here we have to do, for the most part, with a body of final and impersonal knowledge, comprehended into fixed formulas. Besides, an unusual number of lecture courses is offered; in no other faculty does a teacher offer three or four private courses in one semester. By an independent delivery we do not, of course, mean an extemporaneous lecture, whose form and content are produced at the time of delivery. That would be wholly impossible. No one has such a hold on a science as to have the whole subject and its details constantly before his mind. And even if any one had, it would be necessary to arrange the material for the lecture; to know a subject and to teach it are not





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the same. Besides, the systematic arrangement is not always pedagogically the most desirable. Hence the lecture will have to be prepared, which means that the teacher will have to make notes. His notes may be more or less complete, that depends upon the subject or the professor's familiarity with it. They may contain the entire lecture in complete form, or they may be restricted to a systematic arrangement of the fundamental train of thought or perhaps to a presentation of the chief data, formulas, and catch words. To be willing to dispense with notes altogether would be to attempt the impossible, and would not result in good to the hearer. Nor is there any reason why the instructor should not bring his notes with him into the class-room, in order to refresh his memory on the general course of thought by an occasional glance at the manuscript, or to draw upon it for particular formulas, facts, quotations, and so forth. The purpose is not, of course, to present an oratorical work of art or a sermon, the effect of which might indeed be weakened by the presence of a manuscript; the sole aim is a simple and modest exposition of thoughts for the intellect. At the same time the teacher ought to speak off-hand in the sense that he should not keep his eyes fixed on the paper, but should be able to find the particular words and express his thought on the spur of the moment. To read from a completed manuscript would be to destroy the entire purpose of the lecture. An address that is read is lifeless, it cannot arouse the feeling of reality or actuality produced by the spontaneous speech. It also lacks the element of interest for the hearers as well as for the speaker, which compels the attention; in order to achieve that, the excitement of spontaneous creation and even the risk of failure are needed. ✓

The method of dictating, like that of reading from a manuscript, also contradicts the purpose of the academic lecture; both methods are perhaps uniformly employed together. The dictation-method makes impossible not only the spontaneous communication of thought, but also the spontaneous comprehension of it; it invariably results in a merely mechanical activity, without inner interest on either side. And only an external compulsion of some sort or other will be able to hold students in lecture courses employing such a method.





A not infrequent practice is to dictate the most important propositions and then to elucidate them offhand. This is done especially in systematic lecture courses in order to place before the hearer the essential thoughts in fixed form and to guard him against his own inadequate conception or formulation of the same. I am afraid that part of the effect of the living word is lost here also. In case the matter is dictated at the beginning of the hour, the common search for results or at least the friendly illusion that the results are obtained by the common search of student and professor is given up. The less alert student will feel inclined to consider what he has black on white as the essential points and to look upon the elucidations as a period of recreation from the business of taking notes. In case the dictation is given after the subject matter of the lecture has been developed as a *résumé* of the same, which seems to be the more desirable method, the hearer is relieved of the trouble of summarizing the essential points of the lecture himself. In case nothing is dictated, he is compelled to pay active attention to the entire lecture and to bring out the essential points of the train of thought himself.

It is different with a printed syllabus which gives the hearer an outline of the topics to be discussed and so makes it easier for him to find his bearings. The syllabus may also contain bibliographical references and similar items which unnecessarily overload the lecture.

Shall the lecture be based upon a *text-book*? This was formerly done; in the eighteenth century after the discontinuance of the practice of lecturing on text-books, this method was repeatedly enjoined upon the Prussian university teachers by the government. Kant, for example, during his entire life based his lectures on text-books on metaphysics, logic, and natural law, written by Baumgarten, Meyer, Achenwall, and others. The demand has recently been made by E. von Hartmann, as was mentioned above (page 190), that this method be re-introduced and that professors be compelled to follow it in order to prevent them from "dictating unpublished text-books."

I cannot convince myself of the advantages of the method, but at any rate the coercion would be unbearable. Ought the teacher to select another man's text-book? But he can find none





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that agrees with his own views. This was Kant's experience, and he therefore completely ignored the text in his lectures except that he allowed it to force upon him rather than to suggest to him the arrangement of the whole. The plan, however, of using a text-book side by side with the lecture can hardly have facilitated the student's understanding of the subject, if we may trust the notes which are still extant. Imagine a Schleiermacher obliged to lecture on some text-book on logic or ethics, or a Treitschke on a text-book on politics.

Ought he then to make a text-book of his own to lecture on? If only he were already able to do that! The very thing he is trying to accomplish is to compass the whole of his subject as he sees it. The repeated lectures are so many attempts in this direction. And would he still feel inclined to lecture on the subject after he had written the text-book? And would the hearer still have the desire to hear him? What would become of the interest if the results were already printed? Indeed there is something insipid in interpreting one's own text-book. Better another man's book; the friction of one's own thoughts with another's would put a little life into the thing. But can we take for granted that every student has read the book, that he has learned the *paragraphos* off by heart? Hardly. The contents of the book will therefore first have to be presented and developed. But that will make the book superfluous or inconvenient; and it would be better to take some other starting point. We see why it was absolutely necessary to discontinue not only the medieval custom of interpreting a canonical text, but also the method of lecturing on a text-book. The lecturer will mention good text-books and recommend their use; he will repeatedly refer to them and base his own expositions upon them. But he will not make himself absolutely dependent upon them. The fact that the teacher and student construct the science together, as it were, in the course of the lectures, is what gives them both pleasure in the undertaking. The entire proposal is based upon a mode of thought which is wholly out of touch with reality, with the active progress of science. It may be feasible to give Latin elucidations of Latin text-books in Catholic universities; the thing is impossible in a modern university.





✓ 4. *The Inner Form of the Lecture.* Instruction is the ob-  
ject of the lecture. That determines its form; it appeals to the  
understanding, not to the emotions or the will, or at least only  
through the mediation of the understanding. Hence eloquence  
and pathos are not suited to it, at least not that form of elo-  
quence which employs rhetorical means. There is also an  
eloquence for the intellect; an eloquence of the facts themselves.  
It knows how to present the facts in such a manner that they  
seem to speak for themselves, it arranges them so that they  
seem to draw the conclusions themselves. At the end of the  
lecture the hearer feels as though he had thought all this  
out himself and had told it to himself. This inner, logical  
“purposiveness” is the chief means of holding the hearer’s at-  
tention in a lecture and of permanently interesting him. The  
German student, let it be said to his credit, is not very suscepti-  
ble to rhetorical effects, to pathos, catchwords, and the like, and  
soon grows tired of them.

That form of speech will be most suited to the scientific  
lecture which is simple, convenient, and strikes at the heart of  
the subject. Too much subtlety, ornateness, and elegance are  
apt to tire the student and to divert his attention. The lecture  
should not be filigree work, otherwise it will fail to bring out  
strongly and sharply the principal outlines of the subject, which  
is more important than extreme care in details. The best plan  
is to prepare an outline embodying the essential ideas in a  
systematic and easily handled form and then to speak *im-*  
*promptu*, following the scheme, but elaborating it freely and  
not hesitating to make use of repetition, all the while keeping  
in active touch with the hearers. An approximation to the con-  
versational form, which is easily compatible with warmth and  
animation, is better suited to instructive speech than long  
and fine-spun periods, elegant and pointed phrases, or even  
oratorical display. All that soon becomes tiresome and insipid.  
Whoever is in search of knowledge does not care to be capti-  
vated by the form, but to be convinced by the matter. The  
philologist, F. A. Wolf, himself a master in the art, once gave  
the following description of the form to be followed in the  
academic address: *Familiarem sermonem oportet esse lec-*  
*tionum, varium illum quidem pro varietate rerum et multifor-*





*mem, neque tamen ulla parte similem libri.* This, in general, describes the form of the lecture as it is customary in Germany. And the simplicity of the outward forms corresponds with this, the lecture rooms and their equipment, the bearing and attitude of the teachers; there is nothing of official pomp or *grandezza* in their personal appearance. The display which is customary in other countries along this line (in France, for example, the professor takes his chair, clad in solemn robes and accompanied by a beadle wearing the official chain, who remains standing by his side during the entire lecture, von Savigny, p. 154) would be somewhat embarrassing to us. A great deal of oratorical display would be necessary to justify such pomp and to hinder it all from seeming incongruous.

A lecture may be not only too elegant, but also too thorough. It necessarily becomes so when it attempts to drag in and discuss at length, all possible facts, questions, doubts, objections, opinions, and whims. This may perhaps occasionally be done for the sake of example; for the most part, however, the student's gaze should be turned in the direction of the great and essential points. Otherwise he will lose himself in the accidental and secondary until he does not see the forest for the trees. It is better now and then to repeat the important phases from a new point of view than to discuss the insignificant and superfluous as though they had equal value. The physicist Lichtenberg once said (*Vermischte Schriften*, I, 221): "I am convinced that so-called thoroughness in the presentation of the elements of a science is very harmful. It is not at all necessary for a teacher to present the subject to the beginner in a thorough manner; but the teacher who presents a subject must understand it thoroughly, in which case the beginner is certainly taken care of."

Of great importance is clear and transparent classification. *Bene docet qui bene distinguit*, says the wisdom of the Middle Ages, mindful of two points: care in the differentiation of concepts, particularly of closely related concepts, and care in the differentiation of speech. With regard to the latter the lecture must repair the absence of the visible means of classification, which the book has at its disposal, the paragraphs, sections, and chapter-headings, by means of speech. A very essential item





in making things intelligible to the hearer and holding his attention is to emphasize clearly the conclusions of particular topics, the transitions to new topics, the development of an argument, giving the thesis, proofs, conclusions, and so forth. Point out to him the goal and give him the necessary finger-posts, and he will cheerfully and safely follow even intricate paths of the discussion.

Nor does it seem unimportant to me that each hour should form a complete whole so far as that is possible within a systematic lecture; a piece torn out of its connections, without beginning and end, makes an unpleasant impression on one, even from the artistic point of view. Besides we shall have to assume, after all, that the student will miss a lecture now and then. But, some one might ask, will not your plan encourage this very thing? Do you not exempt the absentee from the punishment, as it were, of not finding his bearings? Perhaps this is true. And yet I believe that it is fitting, to speak with Kant, to reckon with what actually happens here, although it ought not to happen. I also believe that the act of deterring the student by punishment, by preventing him from understanding the subject under discussion, would prove less effective than the incentive he would receive if a new topic were taken up at the beginning of each hour, and he were enabled to follow the subject without knowing what was said at the close of the last hour.

5. *Polemics in Academic Instruction.* The way to truth leads through error. All progress consists in showing that the past truths were errors, or at best half-truths. That does not make them superfluous; they constitute the stages by which the human mind ascends its precipitous path. Struggle is therefore the life of science, the struggle between the old and the new truths. The old ones defend their possessions, the new ones seek to prove their necessity by the insufficiency of the former. Conflict helps the truth; indeed, do we not even regard the lawsuit as a struggle between two parties for the purpose of bringing out the pros and cons and thus ensuring the correctness of the verdict? So, too, historical life, with the teleology immanent in it, produces a conflict of opinions in the service of the search for truth. This struggle, at the same time, adds to the latter a high





degree of interest; the progress of knowledge is crowned with the pride of victory in battle.

From this it follows that controversy has its use even in academic instruction. To introduce the student into the conflict of opinions means to carry him right into the heart of the science, and at the same time adds zest to instruction. The polemical element gives the lecture the dialectical form, it leads the speaker to prepare his case for trial, as it were, to unfold the question at issue, to contrast the different possible stand-points, to point out the facts as they appear to each party, to bring out the arguments clearly and sharply. There can be no doubt that the subject thus increases in interest; the mere dogmatic exposition is apt to have a monotonous and deadening effect. Though there is a place for controversy, as we have described it, in the lecture course, there is none for calumny and vituperation, abuse and reproach; nor is the university the place for holding views or persons up to ridicule. The place itself and its dignity forbid it, or ought to forbid it, for I am afraid that the boundary is, as a matter of fact, not infrequently overstepped. The philologists have been in the habit of claiming particular privileges along this line and the historians now seem to be following in their footsteps, while the natural-scientists and mathematicians are for the most part strangers to the custom. Is it because the uncertain sciences, as J. Grimm once said, are nearer to our hearts? It seems to me the fact that the party attacked cannot reply should be enough to banish this evil custom from the lecture-room; there is something malicious and cowardly in slandering an absent one. Nor is it either dignified or instructive to set up a dummy and to knock it down every once in a while for the amusement of the spectators. If the hearers learn anything from these methods, it certainly cannot be anything good. "Tell me, is there a country outside of Germany where one learns to turn up one's nose before one learns to blow it?" Lichtenberg once asked, and we might add: where people are really taught to turn up their noses and to split hairs?

In order to caution men against error, we must present it in its relative strength; to make it absurd will mislead no one. Polemical discussion is in place only where the combated





theory has something to justify it. And here the task is first to play the advocate of the theory before deciding against it as a judge. This method of procedure is particularly desirable when the problem is to enforce new ideas against old traditional theories. First we should state the theory which we have reason to suppose is also held by the hearer as the dominant one, then we should point out its reasonableness, the facts on which it is based, and then we should go on to show that it is inadequate to give a satisfactory explanation of all the facts and that a new explanation is necessary. When the hearer is guided in this way, he will understand both the actual and historical necessity of the new theory. A polemic, on the other hand, against the absurd and meaningless is superfluous. I do not see what rational grounds there can be for acquainting the hearer with all the possible absurdities, when so much needs to be done in order to teach him what wise and sensible people have thought.

That man has the greatest cause and right to employ the polemical method who is defending new truths against prevailing errors. This is largely the task of the younger man who, while engaged in this task, is at the same time struggling to assert himself. He feels the pressure of the traditional, even in his own person; the authority of older generations lies heavily upon him; for which reason we are more inclined to bear with his somewhat excited talk and even with a little arrogance on his part. He has not yet made a name for himself, yet feels that there is something in him. At the same time he too may be charged not to call everybody whom he has convicted of error, an ass or to give him to understand that he is an ass. A still more disagreeable impression is made by a literary controversy or even a spiteful quarrel among men who are well along in years. We have a right to expect something from that maturity of mind which is the best fruit of a long life devoted to research, that *mitis sapientia*, which is able not only to attack, but also to understand errors. Still another fact might deter the man of experience from polemics. The young man still believes that he can convince his opponent, that he can force him to see his error. One who has lived in the scientific world for a longer period, knows or ought to know, that that is





impossible. I doubt whether a single case could be cited in the history of the centuries in which a literary quarrel had been terminated by the confession of error. The gratifying thing about a war with arms is that it unequivocally decides who is the stronger. The war with words has no end and is never decided, in Proteus-like transformations error always succeeds in eluding the toils. The wise man will therefore aim, first of all, to tell the truth and not to ensnare error merely in order to refute it.

6. *Seminars and Exercises.* The seminary exercises follow from the nature of modern academic instruction. This aims not merely to transmit knowledge already acquired, but to introduce the student to scientific work, not merely to propagate knowledge itself, but also the knowledge of how to acquire it. Thus it is not enough in the mental sciences to know the organization of the Carolingian Empire, or the origin of the Pentateuch, one should also understand on what our knowledge of these things is based and how it has been acquired. Only he who knows the way to the sources and is able to draw from them, possesses original, scientific knowledge. And similarly in natural science, only one who understands the method of creating scientific knowledge, who knows how to use the experiment, the microscope, calculation, the method of error, possesses scientific knowledge in the real sense, *ἐπιστήμη*, to use Plato's expression, as distinguished from mere *δόξα*.

The student can be introduced to scientific research only by the method of coöperation. And that is the real purpose of the seminars; they are the nurseries of scientific research. In them, under the guidance and assistance of a master, pupils become acquainted with scientific work and learn how to do it. After their apprenticeship they continue the work themselves as masters and for their part preserve and improve the methods and train the younger generation in their use. The seminars are therefore the essential factors in preserving the continuity of scientific work.

The seminars are as old as the present organization of the German universities. Their origin goes back to the eighteenth century, the century in which the university passed from the old traditional methods of instruction to the principle of the





freedom of research and teaching. The new humanistic philology formed the starting point of the reform; the seminar established by Gesner is the oldest; it was still a cross between a seminary for teachers and a seminar for scholars. Although the seminar founded by F. A. Wolf at Halle was intended to be a pedagogical seminary, it showed a more pronounced tendency to introduce the student into scientific research. The nineteenth century has adhered to the method and has extended the seminar system to all the departments of university instruction: first to the different branches of the philosophical faculty, to the historical, natural-scientific, mathematical, and social sciences; then it passed over into the faculties of theology and law, to which, moreover, the so-called *practica* had long been familiar. The medical faculty has instead of the seminars the so-called *institutes* (laboratories) and clinics. It is worthy of note that the pedagogical seminars, which aimed to prepare the student to teach in the *gymnasias*, and which really represent the starting point of the seminar system, have gradually separated from the university, and have become allied with the schools themselves. This is due to the development of the philosophical faculty in the direction of purely scientific research, as well as to the belief that it is possible to introduce the student into practice only by practice, only, that is, in a real school.

The seminars are public institutions; admission to them is regularly conditioned by evidence of efficiency and likewise obligates the members to perform regular tasks. They are supported by public endowments, from which small sums of money are granted to the members, which, however, serve rather as a means of encouragement and recognition than as a means of support. Of great importance is the equipment of these seminars, during the last decades, with libraries and rooms for work; the new university of Strassburg has been epoch-making in this respect. The members of the seminars are in this way relieved of many disturbances incident to the use of the general libraries.

The method of work differs, of course, according to the nature of the subject. In the philological-historical sciences, on which the theological and legal sciences depend, the essential task is to acquire skill in the use of the sources, hence in reading, inter-





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pretation, text-criticism, historical criticism and interpretation, practice in which is at first acquired by a common and thorough study of the sources. The individuality of the teacher is also bound to assert itself; he will naturally prefer the lines of work in which he has been successful and the methods of which he is a master. The solution of larger scientific problems by the individual student, with the means at his disposal and under the guidance of the teacher, is common to all seminars. Such pieces of work often form the basis of doctor's dissertations, the first specimens of independent scholarly work. Good dissertations are the pride of the director of the seminar.

Besides these regular, publicly organized seminars there are private societies, associations, reading-clubs, and exercises. They are more independent in their movements and pursue diverse aims. It is a common plan for the members to read some standard author or some text. Especially the younger teachers, who are not yet in charge of a seminar, gather around them a small number of students and not infrequently achieve great results.

Still another type of academic instruction is to be mentioned: the so-called *conversatoria*, *disputatoria*, and *repetitoria*. It is characteristic of these that they are connected with a lecture course. Their object is to help the student to understand and assimilate what has been presented in the lecture, to solve difficulties, to answer questions, etc. In the eighteenth century such exercises accompanying the lectures were very common; Kant, for example, offered them during his entire life under many different names. During the nineteenth century they have retrograded more and more, in spite of the fact that the university administration from time to time urgently recommended them to the docents.<sup>1</sup> The reason may be sought in the changed relations existing between professors and students since the eighteenth century. *Repetitoria* and *disputatoria*, in the form of question and answer, are a continuation of the scholastic relation between professor and student; the preconditions for such a relation have, however, gradually disappeared in the nineteenth century. The large attendance and the rapid

<sup>1</sup> See the circular letter by Minister Eichhorn of the year 1844 in von Rönne, *Das Unterrichtswesen des preuss. Staats*, vol. ii., pp. 515 ff.





change of university residence make it difficult for the professor to become personally acquainted with the student, and without such personal acquaintance the method mentioned cannot be fruitful. Then again the more advanced age of the students renders the adoption of the methods practised in the school-room objectionable. Finally, the seminars and exercises supply forms of personal guidance and influence which are better adapted to the new conditions.

7. *Exercises for Beginners.* A not unessential supplement to the seminars is being developed at present, the exercises for beginners. The seminars always presuppose some familiarity with the subject, and they usually admit only the more advanced students to membership. The beginner, however, more than any one else, needs helpful advice in order that he may learn to do fruitful work. After groping around blindly and aimlessly for a while and finally becoming aware of the futility of his efforts, he is apt to give up entirely and to postpone independent work to some future date. This happens in all the departments, most frequently perhaps in the philological-historical, including the theological and law schools. Here again the philologists have made the beginning with institutions which satisfy the need. The *proseminars* admit the beginner and introduce him to the subject, offering him also the necessary practice in the use of language. In a little work by Bernheim which we have already mentioned (*Entwurf eines Studienplans für das Fach der Geschichte nebst Beilage: Beispiele von Anfängerübungen*, 1901), the author shows by examples taken from medieval and modern history how he conceives and solves the problem of such exercises for beginners in the field of history. It would be desirable to get from teachers frequent reports of their own methods; I consider them the most fruitful form of the literary treatment of what we have of recent years sought to embrace under the title "university-pedagogy." If the masters of a subject could be induced to discuss their methods of conceiving and solving the problem of university instruction in their particular lines, a number of opinions might gradually be gathered together that would make it easier for teachers to find the right path in the future.

The law faculty has also begun, of late, to extend its instruc-





tion in this direction, and the administration has shown an interest in the matter. It has even decided to require the exercises on civil law and civil procedure of all students, not without making the usual discovery that compulsion is not a strong motive to study. According to rumor, the purpose is to introduce still further changes along this line in legal instruction. Proseminars in Roman law are to be established, and all students are to be required to take these courses, during the first semesters, in small sections. Not until the student has successfully completed these courses will he be admitted to the second and final stage of the study of law. However desirable a thorough study of Roman law may be at the beginning, I am not sure that the disadvantages of such restrictions would not outweigh the advantages. Every addition to the number of exercises offered for beginners is to be welcomed, but I cannot conceal my objections to making them compulsory. But this side of the question will have to be taken up again later on.

I desire also to mention that a somewhat similar scheme was proposed for the theological faculty, years ago, by M. Kähler, of Halle. He referred to the *Tübingen Stift* and the institution of *repententes* as an example worthy of imitation. Competent young men who have completed their course of study with distinction might, he thought, under the supervision and with the advice of the professors, give assistance to a smaller number of younger students. By going over the matter of the lecture with them, explaining and familiarizing them with the fundamental principles, reading the original texts with them, instructing them in the application of the scientific methods, they would help beginners to overcome their first difficulties and make it easier for them to get acquainted with their subject. Kähler is right in assuming that a spontaneous demand would follow the supply; "the forlorn condition and restlessness of the beginners are often indescribable; their susceptibility to stimulating influences great. And younger men are particularly fitted to exercise such influence. They are closer to the students than the professors, and hold a place in the minds and the hearts of the students similar to that of older fellow-students."

The teachers of such courses would also derive great benefit from them. To review a subject as a teacher, after having





studied it, leads to a deeper and more independent comprehension of it, as experience proves. The work would also serve as a preparation for an academic professorship; successful performance of it, combined with scientific achievements, would make promotion, first to a private-docentship and then to a professorship easy; and the practice acquired by the young man in elementary, scholastic instruction, as well as his familiarity with the difficulties encountered by the beginner, would also help him in his subsequent work as a teacher.

There is another not unimportant side to the matter. The student would at the very beginning of his course have an opportunity and the incentive to produce smaller pieces of work of a more general character, which would, however, not pretend to be original scientific investigations, but which might be looked upon as continuations of the composition exercises of the *gymnasium* on a higher plane. The ability to carry on a systematic line of thought, let us call it rhetorical-literary training, is too often lacking in our students at the end of their course. What they have learned at school in this respect has gathered rust from long disuse. Opportunity for practice could be afforded by the exercises for beginners in all the sciences. They may also find a place in the independent scientific associations of the students. In certain respects short essays offered for criticism and discussion in such circles would do the student more good and be a greater incentive to others than if they were written with a view to criticism by a teacher.

In this way we might approximate the English-American system with intermediate and transition stages between the school and independent scientific research. Such an arrangement is desirable for more than one reason. It is indeed a big leap from the school to the university, and for many it is dangerous. Most young men, we may safely assume, enter the university, if not with a burning desire for knowledge, at least, like the student in Faust, with the honest intention to learn something and with the purpose not only to enjoy life, but also to do fair work. Although many things contribute imperceptibly to weaken his purpose, yet one of the reasons is that the student does not know how to begin. The lectures are not infrequently wholly beyond his powers of comprehension; in the very nature





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of the case they cannot be adapted merely to beginners. There is a lack of systematic instruction in the intelligent and methodical use of the scientific literature. The result is, the original enthusiasm of the student, even where it was present, cools off, he becomes discouraged, loses heart, and stays away from the lectures and so gradually falls into lazy habits.

8. *The Medical and Natural Science Institutes.* By the side of the seminars, which we find particularly in the philological-historical branches, are the numerous *institutes*, laboratories and clinics, in which the ramified natural-scientific and medical instruction has its chief place. They, like the seminars, first arose in the eighteenth century; during the nineteenth century they reached a truly wonderful development.

The beginning was made in medical instruction; its connection with the game of war proved beneficial to it. For a long time there had been occasional demonstrations in addition to the lecture; in the eighteenth century the instruction in anatomy was gradually based upon the dissections made by the students; in the nineteenth century these constituted the regular foundation for the entire scientific training of the physician. Instruction in physiology followed. In the same way, since the beginning of the eighteenth century, as the hospitals developed, the regular clinical instruction, on which the practical training of the physician now rests, grew out of the earlier occasional demonstrations at the sick bed.

Instruction in the natural sciences did not reach its present development until the nineteenth century. It owes a large part of its progress to the growth of medical and technical instruction. It began in the first half of the century with small private laboratories for the participation of the students in physical and chemical experiments and investigations; out of these grew the great physical and chemical *institutes*, during the second half of the century, in which investigation and instruction are now combined. How unwilling the university administrations were at first to incur the unusual expenditures connected with these institutes, Liebig, the founder of the first university chemical laboratory at Giessen, found out to his sorrow. The golden fruits have since made the governments more tractable. To the physical and chemical laboratories or institutes are now added the zoological,





botanical, mineralogical, and geological-paleontological institutes with their scientific collections. The aim of the instruction in all these widely ramified institutions is above all to train the student in the use of the apparatus and methods of investigation through which the modern natural-scientist seeks to penetrate the secrets of nature.

The natural-scientific and medical institutes have caused an astonishing increase in the budgets of our universities. The establishment of a university two hundred years ago meant an expenditure of a few thousand thalers a year. Now the original equipment costs many millions—the buildings and laboratories of the new University of Strassburg made necessary an outlay of nearly fourteen million marks at its foundation—and the annual appropriations of a larger university range from one to two millions, the greater part of which is spent on the laboratories. It is of course through these institutes that the universities come into closest touch with the life of the community; the medical faculty with its clinics is the hygienic center of the entire province. And our physical and chemical institutes have helped the German people to achieve the position which it at present occupies in the economic world.<sup>1</sup>

It is not saying too much to declare that the development of the seminars and institutes in our universities during the nineteenth century has contributed more than any other cause to give the German people the leadership which it now holds in the scientific world. This fact has not escaped the notice of foreign nations. When the Minister of Instruction, under Napoleon

<sup>1</sup> A. Wagner has discussed the development of the University of Berlin, especially from the financial-statistical side in his rector's address, 1896; let me give a few data here. Expenditures for salaries and institutes show the following growth:

Year	Salaries	Institutes
1811.....	116,550 (71.8%)	39,294 (24.0%)
1834.....	193,650 (64.6%)	78,434 (26.2%)
1880.....	321,000 (52.8%)	267,000 (40.1%)
1896-7.....	865,000 (30.9%)	1,481,000 (52.9%)

All the seminaries in the mental sciences (there are 18) cost 17,650 marks annually; the 15 natural-scientific institutes and collections cost 379,798 marks, the 10 medical-scientific institutes 190,054 marks, the 10 clinical institutes 617,691 marks.





III., Duruy, organized the *école pratique des hautes études* at Paris in 1868, he explained the need of it, in a report recommending to the Emperor the establishment of the institution, by referring to Germany, whose natural-scientific institutes had enabled it "to reach the high development in the experimental sciences of which we take note with *troubled sympathy*." And he likewise attributes our preëminence in the philological and historical studies, "which are held in such high esteem on the other side of the Rhine, but are at present not sufficiently honored by us," to the effectiveness of the seminars, noting that the French professors confined themselves to the logical-rhetorical development of the lecture.<sup>1</sup> And the American universities, like the French, have taken the German universities for their models in this regard: *original research* is the catchword which has guided the reform in that country during the last twenty years.

In conclusion, I cannot wholly stifle the question: Is the willingness to supply natural-scientific, medical, and technical instruction with the necessary equipment, accompanied by a corresponding willingness to do justice to the infinitely more modest demands of instruction in the mental sciences? Here the libraries form the chief basis of scientific study. Now, it is true that the appropriations for the equipment of university libraries have been considerably augmented during the last decades. The equipment of the reading rooms with accessible reference libraries is also an advance, while the seminary libraries have been gratefully received. Nevertheless it can hardly be said that all just complaints have thereby been removed. The number of persons who order books and come away from the supply-desk unsatisfied, because the desired books are in circulation or not in the library, continues to be rather large. Our libraries ought, it seems to me, to adopt a principle similar to that of the circulating libraries: the number of copies ought to depend upon the demand. If these libraries can pur-

<sup>1</sup> In the report by Lexis on the French university system in *Hochschulnachrichten*, May, 1901. In order to understand the condition of the French faculties and the difficulties of the minister, we must call to mind that the total budget of the state for all the faculties of the land in 1867 amounted to 221,154 francs (von Savigny, p. 27).





chase ten or twenty copies of new books for which there is a great demand and afterwards sell the surplus at second-hand when the demand decreases, I do not see why the university libraries cannot do the same thing. They ought to act on the theory that every unfilled order is a loss in intellectual power to the nation. At the very least, the person ordering loses time, perhaps makes two or three fruitless trips to the library, and meanwhile is delayed, much to his disgust, in what may be an urgent piece of work. Or he loses the lively interest which he may happen to have at the time, and the disappointment caused by his futile efforts makes him give up more easily in future. Or is it perhaps to be feared that the student's inclination to buy books will be still further weakened by increasing his loan-privileges too much? I am almost tempted to maintain the opposite; there is, according to my experience, no more effective motive to purchase a book than to have learned its worth by previous use.

I hardly dare to raise the question whether the natural-scientific equipment may not be excessive. Modest furnishings and apparatus can be more easily surveyed and managed; they also compel the independent invention of instruments of research. Where everything is at hand in abundance we are apt to become spoiled, and this is a serious thing when we are afterwards forced to get along with a meagre equipment. K. von Raumer once touched upon this point (*Geschichte der Pädagogik*, IV. 251): "The extravagant amount of apparatus in many larger universities is even an impediment in instruction. The students are not able to comprehend the enormous mass of material; we know that a lamp may refuse to burn as much from an excess of oil as from a lack of it."

9. *University-Pedagogy.* The attempt is now being made to establish a new science, or rather a new branch of an old one, under this title. Plans are being formulated, an association founded, and a movement set on foot to enrich the science of pedagogy, which has proved of such great importance for the other schools, with a general theory of university instruction. It is also intended to establish a practical institute for the training of teachers for the different kinds of university, a university-teacher's seminary. We see the ideals are far-reaching. In the meanwhile, however, the efforts have hardly gone beyond the





stage of plan-making. And I do not know whether fate intends that they should get any further.

It is not to be denied that there is an art of university instruction, nor that different men possess and practise it in different degrees. Therefore the conclusion seems to suggest itself: hence there ought to be a theory of the art and systematic training in the art, a didactic of university teaching—for I should prefer this term to the term pedagogy, as we are not concerned in the university with children and the education of children—and a training school for teachers.

However, certain objections soon present themselves, first, against the theory, or university didactics, as such. There can be a theory of child-training, and also school-pedagogy and didactics, because here we have to do with a problem identical in its fundamental principles: the same human nature, the same conditions of development, the same subjects of instruction, the same methods and means of instruction, the same difficulties, though in larger or smaller degree. In the university or in the universities we have to deal not with the same *abc*, the same kinds of arithmetic, the same elementary grammars, but with the most diverse problems. On the one hand we have classical philology or Egyptology, on the other, mathematics or chemistry, anatomy or psychiatry; in the technical universities, mechanical engineering, on the one hand, metallurgy, etc., on the other. Each of the different sciences has not only a different subject-matter, but also different methods of investigation, hence also different methods of instruction, for the real aim is to introduce the student into scientific research itself. Shall one "university-pedagogue" teach the methods of all the disciplines which are offered in the university? Well, the *didacticus* would have to be in possession of an astonishing amount of knowledge, in possession of an *artificium omnes omnia docendi*, for which old Ratichius would have envied him. But, if that is not possible, there will have to be as many teachers of university didactics as there are university sciences and arts. And that means that things will remain as they are; only the masters of a science, the men who investigate and teach it, are fitted to teach the art of university teaching in that branch. And this can be accomplished best as follows.





Whoever wishes to learn the art of teaching, or to use the curious term, university-pedagogics, in classical philology or gynecology, will attend the classes of a master in the art and will learn from him both the science and the art of teaching it, at the same time. As for the literary treatment of the matter, however, the master himself, again, will have to give it by telling us how he practises the art of teaching. The "personal equation" will of course make itself felt everywhere. Just as there is no universal method of scientific investigation, so there is no universal and fixed method of introducing the student to research. *La méthode c'est moi*: that is what the masters of "university-pedagogics" have always said hitherto, each in his own line.

But, it will be said, there surely are some universal principles in the different forms of university instruction, uniform types, uniform conditions of success, uniform difficulties. Well, to be sure, lectures will be delivered in all the departments and exercises held besides. And we can certainly formulate universal statements concerning the purpose and form of the lectures as such, concerning the purpose and form of the exercises, as well as concerning the function of both teacher and pupils; all of which has been attempted in this book. But it does not seem advisable, in my opinion, to claim for such statements the dignity of a special "science of university-pedagogics." The contrast between the modest content of such a science and the imposing form would be too glaring, and would give one a still poorer opinion of the value of such discussions than is already held. For many university teachers will feel inclined to comprehend the sum of all university-pedagogics in a single sentence, the sentence in which, according to F. A. Wolf, the whole of gymnasium-pedagogics is also embraced: "Have a mind and learn how to appeal to the mind."

Still more serious are my objections to the proposed practical institution, the "university-teacher's seminary." It seems to me, there is something strange and almost comical in the name itself, suggestive of other possibilities: a seminary for the teachers of a seminary for university teachers; and so on *ad infinitum*; teachers who teach teachers how to teach the art of teaching in a university-teacher's seminary. The thing will have to stop somewhere, and I think it ought to stop at the





university. For the men entrusted with the duty to pursue and propagate scientific research, the university itself is the proper school to learn both functions, and a university beyond the university, which shall teach the art of university instruction leads inevitably to the *regressus in infinitum* mentioned above.

Or does anybody really believe that such a thing is possible, not merely on paper, but in actual fact? In a "Plan of a Seminary for University-Pedagogics," published January, 1899, under article I., the purpose of the institution was stated to be: The seminary has as its purpose: (a) "to train teachers for all universities in everything that pertains to the pedagogical side; (b) to transmit the entire stock (!) of knowledge (!) and practice (!) which is subsidiary to this purpose; (c) to represent, at the same time, in its own methods and achievements a pedagogical model school and to realize in itself the superior advantages demanded of every university system." An institution, therefore, which shall train teachers for the university with its four faculties, for the schools of technology with their four divisions, for the higher schools of painting and of music, of commerce and agriculture, etc., by offering these teachers, first, the theory of their art, secondly, "all knowledge and practice" involved in it, and, thirdly, by affording them the opportunity "for practice work in university instruction by providing a practice school."

Let us return from the world of dreams to reality. Our universities have thus far also been seminaries for university teachers, and will continue in that role for the future. The form in which they realized this purpose was the "master's studio," to use a term employed by artists. A master of science, who was at the same time a master of instruction, trained pupils, who learned under him both how to do scientific work and the art of teaching it, and then imparted these things to others. This is the only kind of university-teacher's-seminary possible. So the philologists and historians trained their pupils to be teachers, the Wolfs and Ritschls, the Rankes and Waitzes; their seminars and lecture rooms were also their university-seminary; they taught without ever mentioning "university-pedagogics." And in the same way the great natural-scientists, too, were teachers of university-pedagogics, and





likewise, the professors of medicine, law, and theology. The clinics, the laboratories, the exercises, the lecture halls, these are the institutes or laboratories for university-pedagogics. All improvements in instruction and its methods began here; what a master discovered and practised, his pupils saw and imitated or improved upon, if they could. And others were incited to emulate him by the spirit of competition, which proves truly beneficial in this case, and by the migratory habit of the German students; they follow an efficient teacher to his new sphere of action, and the universities which are outstripped are soon deserted, at least in a given field.

Under this system German university instruction has prospered hitherto and will continue to prosper in the future. Whoever desires to become a master in any field of academic instruction, will, if he takes my advice, go, not to the "seminary for university-pedagogics" (which may, God willing, arise at some future time), but to the school of a master, and if he has the chance, to the schools of several masters whose methods differ, so that he may be more likely to hit upon what happens to suit him best. Nor will it be to his disadvantage to go to a foreign country and to see how the same problem is solved in France or England or America. But he will not go to an institution where "the method of university instruction is taught in a practice school."

Besides the essential necessity of studying under a master, it is also possible to use the copious literature on university problems. Of particular interest are the views of masters in one's own line of work on the method of instruction. There is a considerable literature of this kind, but it is somewhat inaccessible, being found scattered in academic orations, in forgotten memorials and reform-treatises, in personal memoirs and biographies. It would be a grateful task if some scholar would collect and sift these data and prepare them for use, each field, of course, for itself. A methodology of the philological or mathematical, natural-scientific or medical university instruction, *ex fontium locis contexta* as suggested, would certainly be welcomed by young university teachers. Or rather they ought to welcome it, for it is not to be denied that many among them care too little for the form of instruction, resting, as they do,





in the belief that whoever knows his subject can teach it without further trouble. It would also be a deserving task to write the history of university instruction with special regard to methods of instruction. Here, of course, after the presentation of some general matter a division of labor would have to take place, for only a mathematician could write the history of the methodology of mathematical instruction, only a philologist that of philology, and only an anatomist that of anatomy. It would therefore have to be a collection of treatises similar to the work on German universities prepared for the Chicago Exposition, which, by the way, contains some preliminary work along these lines, though very little, it is true, since its aim was to give a description of scientific achievements rather than of university methodology.

And in addition to such a work a journal would be a deserving enterprise in which the masters of a subject might freely exchange their views and discuss all the problems of academic instruction. To be sure, such organs have hitherto always had to contend against the insuperable indifference of the public of which and for which they are written. This is due to the inevitable division of labor in the field and also to the inevitable union of research and instruction. And so the different specialistic journals have, for the most part, had to perform this function incidentally, as best they could. It would be a deserving act on the part of the ministries of instruction in Germany if they were to furnish the financial means for a journal or library, which would render accessible and preserve for permanent use the important treatises or fugitive addresses that are now scattered and remain unknown.





## CHAPTER III

## FREEDOM OF TEACHING

1. *Nature and Need.* Freedom of teaching (*Lehrfreiheit*) is the pride of the German university. It is intimately connected with the intellectual freedom which constitutes such a marked feature of our national life. When other nations boasted of their power, their dominion, and their free institutions, the German people—whatever great cause it may have had for dissatisfaction in other respects—prided itself upon its intellectual freedom. When it was denied the privilege of free and vigorous action, it found compensation and consolation in independent thought. And this free thought had its seat especially in the universities. While thought and research were hampered by ecclesiastical and political restrictions or by the *vis inertiae* of corporative organization and the pressure of narrow-minded public opinion in the universities of other countries, which boasted of their political freedom, the German university rose to be the citadel of free thought, of thought bound by no dogmas and limited by no norms beyond those established by reason itself. Hence the pride of the German in his universities. Hence the sensitiveness on the part of wide circles to any pressure at this point. The German endures many restrictions of his personal liberty with great and, to strangers often astonishing, patience; here, however, he is, and we may say it to his credit, sensitive. The freedom of thought, research, and teaching is the jealously guarded palladium of the unwritten constitution of the German people.

"The German university," wrote a prominent American philosopher and pedagogue, Stanley Hall, more than a decade ago, "is to-day the freest spot on earth. . . . All the old forms and laws of beliefs men had lived by were upturned and every possibility of thought was explored in quest of new,





deeper, more ineluctable foundations. But the most perfect liberty was never more triumphantly vindicated by its fruits than amidst all this ferment. Shallow, bad ideas have died and truth has always attained power. While weak men have passed through a period of confusion and perhaps some have grown indifferent and sterile, strong natures have only struck deeper root.”<sup>1</sup>

May the time never come when the German universities will have reason to blush at these words.

Freedom of teaching follows from the nature of the German university as it has developed since the eighteenth century. It is no longer, as formerly, the function of the university teacher to hand down a body of truth established by authorities, but to search after scientific knowledge by investigation, and to teach his hearers to do the same. Science, that is the fundamental principle, does not exist as a fixed and finished system. It possesses a stock of truth, but not only is this infinitely far from embracing the entire field of possible knowledge, but it is both possible and necessary to subject its title to constant criticism. In science there is no statute of limitations nor law of proscription, hence no absolute property right. It consists solely in the constant and new appropriation of old truths and the acquisition of new knowledge; it exists only as a constantly repeated attempt to solve an endless problem, in which every seemingly settled point can be again called in question by the presentation of new evidence. Hence it follows that truly scientific instruction, that is, instruction that shall lead to scientific thinking and investigation, can be conceived only as absolutely free. Instruction that is hampered is not scientific. For the academic teacher and his hearers there can be no prescribed and no proscribed thoughts. There is only one rule for instruction: to justify the truth of one's teaching by reason and the facts.

It is not to be denied that such an unlimited freedom has its dangers. I do not mean chiefly the greatly feared dangers to the established political and ecclesiastical institutions, but internal dangers to science and teaching themselves. This freedom does not give us any guarantee that what is untenable, strange, and absurd will not also claim acceptance. If the

<sup>1</sup> *The Pedagogical Seminary*, i., pp. 7 ff.





academic teacher possesses the freedom to present only that and all that which he himself considers true and reasonable, the possibility is, of course, not excluded that he will not only not accept new truths, because his own settled views seem more reasonable to him, but also that he will reject existing truths in order to substitute for them his own inventions, which flatter his vanity by reason of their originality. This occasionally happens in all sciences. The jealously claimed independence of thought may deteriorate into a restless passion for innovation, particularly in the fields in which the subjective element has the greatest scope, in philosophy, theology, and the mental sciences in general, which are necessarily far removed from the certainty and exactness of the mathematical-natural-scientific branches. There can be no doubt that a great many foolish opinions are offered by German professors which have their origin partly in the mere mania for contradiction and originality. So in philosophy. Every new docent takes a pride in having his own system and in setting up something new, even though it be false and shallow, instead of "the old truth," of which Goethe once spoke. A more or less arbitrary principle is chosen, new paradoxical notions are deduced from it, and a system constructed out of them. Then pupils are enlisted and drilled in the new ideas; there is no absurdity for which, if only it appears in the form of a system, a number of pupils cannot soon be found in Germany, who proclaim it as the newest truth and call it the greatest thing of the day in newspapers and periodicals. So the creator of a new system, the founder of a new school, is born, his name gets into the "history of philosophy" and is enrolled among the immortals.<sup>1</sup>

That is the price for freedom of teaching, not a cheap price, but it must be paid; freedom and danger cannot be separated. There would be but one protection against this danger, and that would be the acceptance of the medieval Catholic principle of

<sup>1</sup> Goldschmidt (*Rechtsstudium*, p. 121) shows that this phenomenon is not unknown in jurisprudence: he speaks of an "inordinate ambition to produce new or seemingly new theories; of a certain mania, especially on the part of younger scholars, to bring real or alleged thoughts into the market as quickly as possible; to expand particular, perhaps helpful, observations into monographs on general doctrines, and then again to base the big book on entirely new principles."





the restriction of teaching. This step the German university cannot take, however, without abandoning its premises, without renouncing its glorious past and its proud claim to the title of pathfinder of truth. And it may make us willing to accept the inevitable reverse of academic freedom if we remember that the free presentation of individual thoughts—however questionable their worth may be in a particular case—has more life in it and awakens more life than the prescribed presentation of transmitted thoughts.

Helmholtz once pointed out how important it was that all fields of scientific research be surrounded with an atmosphere of free thought, in which alone men might have the courage to strike out new paths to new discoveries in the land of truth. He shows that Germany won the leadership in the study of organic nature, in physiology and medicine, for other reasons than the indefatigable industry of the German scholar and his strong idealistic bent: "The crucial point is that we are more fearless of the consequences of the whole truth than any other people. In England and in France, too, there are distinguished thinkers capable of working with their full strength in the spirit of the natural-scientific method, but thus far they have almost always been compelled to yield to social and ecclesiastical prejudices, and have not been able to express their convictions openly without endangering their social influence and their efficiency."<sup>1</sup>

2. *Boundary Disputes and Conflicts.* As a general thing freedom of teaching is the acknowledged and undisputed principle of the German universities. In most fields of research it is absolutely unimpeached; in the natural sciences and medicine, in the mathematical and philological disciplines no one would dream of imposing upon research and instruction either positive or negative prescriptions. Only at certain points is the attempt occasionally made to restrict the freedom of teaching, if not in principle, at least in practice. This is the case where scientific research comes in contact with the public authorities, the state and the church, where, in

<sup>1</sup> Helmholtz, *Populäre wissenschaftliche Vorträge*, Number 2, p. 210. From the address on the Aim and Progress of Natural Science, delivered at the opening of the meeting of Natural Scientists at Innsbruck, 1869.





other words, it deals with religious, political, and social affairs. Theology and philosophy, the political and social sciences, sometimes encounter such opposition and feel compelled to defend the freedom of teaching. I shall take up the different fields and say a few words about each. Let me, however, preface my statements with some general remarks.

The nature of the conflict is everywhere the same, it is the conflict between the theorist and the practical man, between the philosopher and the politician, we can also say, between the two essential phases of human nature itself, between the intellect and the will. The will, which reveals itself also in historical organisms as the will of self-preservation, demands, through its representatives, the politicians in the state and church, settled conceptions and convictions as the precondition of fixed institutions, and incontestible principles as their foundation.

The intellect, on the other hand, and its representatives, the philosophers and investigators, do not recognize anything as absolutely established, or as beyond criticism; even the principles are subject to doubt, there is no limit to criticism and the progress of new ideas. Error alone is dangerous and pernicious, never the truth. If the institutions are built upon error, they must simply be changed and placed upon new foundations.

The conflict is bound to break out again and again at this point. All sciences which investigate the foundations of historical institutions must encounter the resistance of established custom. Custom expects and demands of them that they recognize and prove its reasonableness and necessity. In case they decline, their work becomes subversive of the established order, and interference with science seems all the more permissible and justifiable because the institutions for scientific research are not only erected and supported by the political authorities, but are called to train the future officials of the state and the church. How then can they be allowed to shake the foundations of the very institutions which it is their office and function to preserve? <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This view is carried out in my *Ethics*, fifth edition, vol. ii., p. 212; English translation, pp. 698 ff. In a valuable lecture by G. Kaufmann, *Die Lehrfreiheit an den deutschen Universitäten im 19. Jahrhundert*, 1898, the most notable conflicts of the authorities with scientific freedom in the last century are discussed.





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Before I attempt to mark the boundaries between these claims for the different fields of research, I should first like to call attention to one point. All the sciences which are exposed to conflict with the representatives of practical institutions, have a peculiar character; they reflect the volitional nature of the investigator, even in his scientific work. In the mathematical-natural-scientific sciences the intellect has absolute control. In the sciences, on the other hand, which have to do with human historical life, subjective and personal demands inevitably influence thought. The entire personality of the thinker and investigator is steeped in the historical life of his people. He takes an interest in things, he approaches them with feelings of love and admiration or aversion and contempt, and these feelings influence his judgment, they directly affect his judgment of value, but they are also apt to color his judgment of facts, for feelings determine our ideas and perceptions of things and their relations.

And then a final factor enters. This inner and personal interest in the world is in a certain sense an indispensable condition of research. "In order to understand the poet we must go into the poet's country." The same may be said of religion and morals, law and politics; whoever wishes to understand these things must experience them in himself. But he can directly experience them only in this or that particular form. He cannot experience religion in general, but only a particular concrete form of historical religion, and so, too, he cannot experience moral or political life in general, but only the life of a particular community to which he belongs by birth and education, rank and occupation. In order, therefore, to understand this world, he will necessarily be biased; as a mere, pure, mathematical intellect he would have absolutely no interest in it; it must be experienced in order to be understood.

Hence, the institutions and their representatives conclude, since the perfect impartiality of a pure intellectual judgment is by the very nature of the case impossible here—it would be identical with indifference and inability to understand—it is a fair demand that whoever engages in scientific research, whoever wishes to instruct others, especially our future servants, concerning our nature, should be on our side and conceive and





interpret us with sympathetic interest. Let our enemies be occupied in the business of bringing our deficiencies to light, perhaps this, too, is a necessary business; but here where we desire to be understood, we need friends who will point out the good and the positive in us, and show the reason that is in us.

Such is the conflict. Let us now follow it into the particular fields and endeavor to find the principles on which to settle it.

3. *Theology and Freedom of Teaching.* Here the conflict is most likely to break out and become most acute, because the church is itself an institution of learning, and, as a church, assumes to be in possession of the truth. It formulates the truth in the dogma.

The Catholic church has created a particular ecclesiastical organ for ascertaining the truth, the infallible ministry, whose definition of the doctrine is placed beyond all criticism by the constitution of the church. The function of a teacher of theology can accordingly consist only in the scientific arrangement and proof of the truth established by the ministry in the dogma, to defend it against attacks, to strengthen the future ecclesiastics in their belief in the dogma, and to provide them with the weapons of polemics and apologetics. There is, in the very nature of the case, no room here for free research as a means of determining and developing the doctrine itself; obedience is the first duty even of the university teacher. The Catholic church has, as was already pointed out (p. 141), actually enforced this claim, and no radical conflict is therefore possible here.

In the field of Protestantism things are different. Here too, it is true, the church claims to possess the truth in the dogma, and consequently demands obedience, but without complete success. The teachers in the Protestant theological faculties assume a fundamentally different attitude: they do not aim to be servants of the church, but first of all servants of science, servants of the church only through science. The Catholic theologian bears the same relation to the dogma as the jurist to the positive law, he develops it into a conceptual system. The Protestant theologian, on the other hand, considers it his func-





tion to develop and extend the faith, in the doctrine of faith. Since the church, however, possesses, not an infallible ministry, it is true, but yet a body of doctrine fortified by creeds, we have here a constant possibility of conflict. The representatives of the church demand subordination to the doctrinal symbols as the standards of instruction, declaring that it would be absurd to demand this of the clergy if it were not likewise and especially required of their teachers at the university. The clergy, it is held, will be exposed to intolerable inner conflicts if they are abandoned to the influence of any doctrine you please at the university, and then required, upon entrance into office, to accept the church dogma as a fixed standard of faith and instruction.

The argument seems convincing, but closer examination shows it to be untenable. The office of the clergyman and that of the university teacher differ in their nature. It is one thing to edify the congregation on the basis of a presupposed common faith, another, to subject this faith itself to scientific investigation. For the latter function there can be no external standards, possessing the force of legal axioms, on Protestant ground. The Protestant churches have no organ for making dogmas and can have none. Protestantism, as has been said before, is in its origin an individualistic reaction against the institutional religion of the Roman church, a reaction supported by a powerful religious personality. It cannot deny its origin and hence is unable to create dogmas as binding norms. That was the opinion of the reformers: not human ordinances, but the word of God alone is the source and standard of faith. The "word of God" is, however, not embodied in a system of definitions and dogmas. It is, as we begin to see with increasing clearness, imbedded in a long series of writings of the most diverse contents and character, which are so many evidences of progressive historical life; or rather it is nothing but the meaning of this life itself. And therefore free scientific research is really possible here; it will aim to understand the nature, origin, development, and goal of the religious life of our civilization. Since historical life itself is not complete, religious life, which is its soul, cannot be complete but may develop into higher forms.





To the character of theological science in this field, the character of university instruction will have to correspond. It cannot be the aim, in the professional training of the Protestant clergy, to teach dogmatic proofs for the truth of the doctrine, but merely to introduce the student into this historical life and help him to understand its progressive development. The more deeply he is immersed in this stream, the better equipped will he be to act as a guardian of souls and as a spiritual adviser amid the extremely difficult and complicated relations existing in the spiritual life of our times. Not as a priest, not as an official of the church will he make his influence felt, but only as a living personality. All the more necessary is it that he become familiar with the life and thought of his age on the one hand and, on the other, that he rise above it through a deeper historical insight and through a consciousness, guided by higher ends, of that which is to come because it ought to come.

*One* restriction will, however, be imposed even upon the freedom of the professor of theology. He must be rooted in the soil of this historical life; he must be in sympathy with the great religious event of humanity which we call Christianity, he must experience it as the most valuable content of our life, to be realized more and more completely by us. A person who fails to do that, who sees nothing in Christianity and its literary creations, nothing but an outlived form of superstition, or who has perhaps been convinced by Nietzsche that Christianity represents the triumph of slave-morality, and is the radical curse of Western civilization, may continue to believe in his vocation as a historical-anthropological philosopher of religion or a reformer of humanity, but he cannot believe in his mission as a teacher of theology. As an honest man he will have to lay down his office, in case this conviction afterward takes possession of him, so that no one may be deceived with respect to his attitude.

And still another demand may be made of the professor of Protestant theology, that he place himself on the side of Protestantism, and do it willingly, that he be ready to build up the religious life of the community upon this basis. Whoever, instead of building, desires simply to tear down, whoever looks upon the Protestant church either as a form of apostacy from





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the Catholic church that ought to be abolished, or as an obstacle to the elevation of humanity that ought to be absolutely destroyed, cannot, as an honest man, retain membership in a Protestant theological faculty. This faculty happens to occupy a definite historical position with respect to these questions, which those who enter it accept as the basis of their activity. A man who cannot tolerate the restriction will do well to keep out of the faculty and use his freedom as a citizen in laboring in the interest of his own views.

Is the theological faculty therefore without that freedom from bias in research which we are wont to regard as the precondition of membership in a university as a scientific institution? In a certain sense, yes. Its scientific work is not unbiased in the same sense as that of the medical or mathematical-natural-scientific faculty. This is due not only to its history and its position amid the social problems, but mainly to the fact already mentioned that certain judgments of value underlie its work as well as its instruction, which are not derived from scientific research, but arise out of the affirmation of historical and personal life.

Mathematics and physics can exist as unprejudiced sciences, if we except the belief in the validity of logic, simply because their objects have no connection with the heart and will, but exist merely for the intellect. On the other hand, judgments of value, posited by the will itself, which can not be proved to the intellect, form the starting point in ethics. Similarly there are in the historical sciences, in the sciences of religion and the church, law and the state, judgments of value, having axiomatic character, which cannot really be proved to the understanding, positive and negative judgments of worth which are conditioned by the historical and personal attitude of the investigator, and which succeed in influencing him in the selection as well as in the conception and treatment of the subject. An inhabitant of Sirius, coming down upon the earth, could examine, classify, and psychologically explain the different religions of the earth-dwellers with the same objectivity with which the mathematician regards his lines and angles; an earth-dweller will never be able to do it. Immersed in this historical life, he takes an emotional interest in its products; he cannot get away





from it, he cannot make a pure intellect of himself here. He can rise above blind hatred and above blind love, but he cannot eliminate these feelings altogether. And even if he could, he ought not to do so; it would mean the annihilation of his personal life.

Such subjective-personal limitations exist in all fields of knowledge which have to do with historical and personal life, and cannot be eliminated. Hence honesty demands that we admit them and that we do not plead absolute freedom from bias. To be willing to accept as fact everything that honest research considers historical fact, and likewise to be willing to accept everything that unprejudiced judgment regards as a consequence of necessary thought, and finally to be ready to recognize and accept whatever the moral judgment absolutely looks upon as a higher value and as a higher standard of value, that is the only freedom from bias to which the investigator in these fields can bind himself. But he cannot subscribe to a freedom from bias which implies absolute indifference to the objects of investigation. The desire to understand, preserve, and elevate this historical life, that is not only the permissible, but also the necessary presupposition from which the Protestant theologian, no less than the Catholic, starts out, and which his hearers have a right to expect from him.

But for the rest, no restriction is to be placed upon his freedom of investigation and instruction, as happens in the case of the Catholic theologian. This is in harmony with the nature of the German university and the essential principle of Protestantism. Faith here does not depend upon an external authority, and hence instruction cannot be based upon it. Between the creed of the church and the teaching of the theological faculties the only possible relation is one of voluntary agreement and not of absolutistic subordination, the attitude which follows from the principle of absolute doctrinal authority in the Catholic church. Of course the Catholic attitude is simpler, but the simplest is not always the best and the surest. The living organism is not simple, the mechanical object is simpler than the organic. In the state, too, absolutism is simpler than the constitutional monarchy, but it has become impossible, and the state now rests upon the voluntary, not forced, agree-





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ment between two factors. A somewhat similar relation exists between theology and the church in Protestantism; they have grown up together, often in conflict, but the friction is beneficial to both.<sup>1</sup>

Is that a menace to the faith of the future clergy? To their faith in an infallible church and in a fixed body of doctrine it undoubtedly is. But does it threaten their religious faith? Perhaps. They cannot, however, get away from doubt here, they find it everywhere, even at school; they will also find it in the parish; how can they escape from it at the university? There is nothing left but to pass through doubt to a personally experienced faith in God, the God who has revealed himself to us in Jesus, as he can reveal himself to men in a man. The more deeply one has been steeped in doubt himself, the better leader will he be for a world steeped in doubt. But if he remains fixed in doubt, if he does not reach a personal certainty, which impels him to testify and preach, it is better for him to choose another calling while there is still time. The all-important thing is that he have a personal, and not merely a prescribed official, faith. The Protestant church must make up for what it lacks in doctrinal authority by the sincerity and truthfulness of its servants.

4. *Philosophy and Freedom of Teaching.* I shall add a few statements concerning the science which bears an intimate historical and material relation to theology, that is, philosophy. Its freedom to teach is likewise occasionally contested and by the same opponents who demand a binding standard for theology. From philosophy too they demand harmony with the doctrines of the church, or at least the exclusion of certain forms of thought which are condemned by the church. In the ultra-montanistic press and in the speeches of the parliaments and diets we hear the constant complaint that an "atheistic" philosophy is tolerated at our universities, which makes a business of undermining religion and corrupting the youth. The lecture rooms of the universities, it is maintained, are the nurseries of revolution, social-democracy, and anarchism, and it is futile to combat these evils outside so long as we do not

<sup>1</sup> Compare an excellent lecture by W. Kahl, *Bekenntnisgebundenheit und Lehrfreiheit*, 1897.





attack the very seat of the disease.<sup>1</sup> There is also a tendency among some Protestants to make such charges and to engage in the business of alarmists.

I do not intend to investigate these charges, or to find out whether or not "atheistic" philosophy is taught at German universities. As everybody knows who has even a slight acquaintance with the history of philosophy, the characterization of a system as atheism has, ever since the trial of Socrates, been the constantly repeated and therefore somewhat hackneyed method of discrediting a philosophy with the authorities and the masses. Nor do I intend to inquire whether political discontent is the result of unorthodox thinking and political orthodoxy the result of religious orthodoxy. I simply desire to point out that the demand of freedom from bias strictly applies to philosophy, that a philosophy that has a goal set before it, which thought must reach or dare not reach, is nothing, at least not philosophy.

Philosophy is nothing but the reflection of reason upon itself, the critical examination of the ultimate presupposition of all knowledge and willing, and likewise the attempt to explain the nature of reality and its meaning. Hence it follows that it cannot accept any unproved assumptions, not even the assumptions of logic. Reason examines even these and justifies them by convincing itself that the logical principles constitute the essence of reason. The same is true of the ultimate principles underlying the judgments of value; the rational will expresses itself and its nature in them. On the other hand, the exposition and interpretation of reality is a business that is subject to constant examination and improvement all along the line, down to the principles themselves. All sciences are constantly adding new facts and views to the knowledge of the world, from which alone it follows that there can be no final and immutable philosophy, that it must always be ready to re-examine every point that seemed settled, in the light of the new facts. Moreover, the conceptions of what constitutes the meaning of life

<sup>1</sup> As an example of this kind of denunciatory eloquence as well as of the way in which the "pious lie" is employed, examine a little treatise written by Nic. Siegfried, *Vom Atheismus zum Anarchismus, Ein lehrreiches Bild aus dem Universitätsleben der Gegenwart*, Freiburg, 1895.





and reality are also subject to change. Hence every age is confronted with the problem to repeat the attempt of solving the great riddle of reality by the means at its disposal. The attempt will be the more successful, the more it learns from the attempts of former times; the more faithfully a philosophy utilizes the results of past thinking, the more vigorous and fruitful it will be. But one thing no philosophy can abandon without abandoning itself, the right, namely, to examine and modify all traditional conceptions when the facts or the more highly developed consciousness of its own nature demand it.

As a matter of fact, however, philosophy itself is not without its presuppositions, presuppositions which are rooted in personal and historical life. The philosophy of an earth-dweller will be different from that of an inhabitant of Sirius, that of an Englishman different from that of a Hindoo. Philosophy must be without bias only in the sense of granting absolutely no presuppositions the examination of which it does not consider permissible, nay, necessary. Whether or not there can be knowledge at all, whether or not there can be any general principles for determining values, whether or not life and reality really form a cosmos and have a meaning, there is not a single question here that cannot be put, no question that might not as such be denied as well as affirmed. In this sense philosophy is free from presuppositions, the absolutely unbiased science, because it is its function to examine the presuppositions of all the rest. Reason is here wholly dependent on itself, determined to accept nothing as true that is not grounded in reason itself. That such a science cannot permit prescriptions and restrictions to be imposed upon it, is obvious. It would, as Kant once said, "be very absurd to expect illumination from reason and yet to prescribe to it beforehand what the illumination shall be." The same thing applies to philosophical *instruction*. It ceases to be philosophical when it does not depend solely upon the consent of reason, and when it does not appeal to the independent, perfectly unbiased reason of the student. It ceases to be fruitful as soon as this is no longer the case; it will have influence only in case the student is sure to receive in the lecture the untrammelled expression of the teacher's independent convictions, based upon his best knowledge and belief. Professor comes from *profiteri*; the





word calls for an open confession of a personal conviction, in no field more than in philosophy where the subjective and personal element plays a more important part from the very nature of the science. If the teacher is obliged to hold certain views, or at least *not* to hold certain views, the student will place little weight upon the arguments presented; of course there will be arguments if once the propositions are established. What should we think of a critical-historical investigation whose results had been prescribed to it? In such a case everything would simply depend upon the teacher's lawyer-like cleverness. The same holds here: a philosophy that degrades itself by consenting merely to find arguments for a theory prescribed by external authority, sinks to the level of a sophistical art of proving everything possible, for it might have pleased the authority to prescribe the opposite view. The effectiveness of university instruction in philosophy depends upon the student's belief that truth is the sole aim and not the proof of officially prescribed and quasi-officially desired or at least permitted views. He wishes to know what are the personal convictions of a sincere and serious man with respect to the great problems of life and the world to which such a man has devoted deep and serious thought. What functionaries have been ordered to say about these things he knows well enough already.

The fear is expressed that our young men will be misled by absolutely unfettered teaching and thrown into confusion. This belief rests upon the great misconception that our students come to the university with the child-like faith in what is handed down to them in the religious instruction of the schools as settled truth. Everybody who is even slightly in touch with the actual world knows how far removed we are from such a state at present. To be sure, nothing is said of these things in the certificates which are presented for entrance; in them it is perhaps attested that the student has thoroughly familiarized himself with the tenets of the Christian religion. As a matter of fact, we meet with the most sweeping doubts, even and especially in the schools, with doubts not merely in specific doctrines of the faith, but very often with absolute scepticism, and not seldom dogmatic atheism and materialism. The higher classes in our gymnasia perhaps furnish the most numerous and





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most zealous readers of the Büchners and Haeckels: the charm of these books is so great here because they have the value of forbidden fruit.

Such students are not satisfied at the universities with a new edition of an approved scholastic philosophy. They can be brought to a freer and deeper conception of the ultimate problems only by a philosophical instruction that does not ignore doubts, that has no goal prescribed for it, that considers the facts alone and listens only to reason, that is ready to accept every solution of these problems that is found necessary upon the most impartial examination. If philosophy is taught in this way at our universities by a man who is not handicapped by the suspicion which at present attaches to all prescribed or quasi-official views, he may succeed in convincing his hearers that reality does not stop where the panting wisdom of the *litterati* of materialism stops. And if he succeeded merely in arousing a feeling of reverence for reality and for the efforts which have been made by great and profound thinkers to interpret its secret, that would be something. But the freedom of teaching is the necessary precondition of all this. When only one kind of thinking is allowed, it is naturally suspected of not being able to withstand the force of argument, and whoever advocates it is at least exposed to the doubt whether he would have advocated it of his own accord and without pay. An idealistic philosophy is especially deeply interested in seeing that other schools are not deprived of the possibility of asserting themselves. Every restriction of academic freedom would encourage the suspicion that it was insincere, and rob it of its influence.

From this standpoint we are enabled to pronounce judgment upon "Catholic" philosophy, which is taught in ecclesiastical institutions and is also officially represented in some German universities. The philosophical conception of the universe which has been presented in the system of Thomas Aquinas, has of course absolutely the same rights as any other philosophy. But what gives it its peculiar position is that it is at present almost a prescribed philosophy. The recommendation of the Thomistic philosophy and the rejection of other systems, for example of Kant's, by explicit declarations of the supreme





authority, confer upon the representatives of this movement a position scarcely less exceptional in the German universities than that occupied by Catholic theologians. It would therefore now be appropriate, as was stated before, to have this philosophy presented by a member of the Catholic theological faculty.

5. *The Political and Social Sciences and Freedom of Teaching.* The representatives of the sciences which study political and social life also occasionally come in conflict with the ruling powers and are accused of "heterodoxy." There is, in reality, no real orthodoxy here. The state has no canonical dogma concerning its nature, functions, and rights, like the church. It is not an institution of learning, but a sovereign power. Nor have we an official doctrine of society and its functions. Instead, the party that happens to be in power proclaims its own doctrines as orthodox, and characterizes every doctrine antagonistic to it as false and dangerous. And so it endeavors by the power of the state to keep out or dislodge the "false doctrines," at least from public institutions of learning. The arguments which it employs are always the same. The false doctrines undermine the security of the state and society; these and the authorities representing them therefore owe it to themselves to oppose such doctrines, for the right of self-preservation is here also a duty. Least of all can false doctrines be tolerated among officials; correctness of thought is the first duty of the official, for he has to represent the authority of the state. And it is a double duty for the academic teacher. In the first place, he is himself an official, and in the second place, it is his function to train officials, which means, to instruct them in the right views of the nature and function of the state. In case he is not willing to do this, the authorities have the right and the duty to remind him of it, to censure him, and if he remains obstinate, to remove him, or at the very least to place a teacher holding the correct views by his side to avoid dangerous misunderstanding.

Our answer is that if there is to be a science of the state and society, it must, like every science, spring from the free investigation of the facts. A theory of the state and society that has its results prescribed, would have no theoretical value whatever,





but at best only a technical value, namely as an instrument of government to keep itself in power. To the parties science is but one of the means of keeping themselves in power by influencing public opinion. With the truth as such the parties have nothing whatever to do; if it is for us, very well, if it is against us, away with it! That is the maxim of every party as a party, which, of course, it does not confess and cannot confess. "Science" would manifestly lose its value even as a means of power if it appeared as the dogma of the party in power. It influences the opinion of men only so long as it seems to be an independent product of the intellect. The dominant party will therefore always desire to have a form of science that is really dependent, but publicly boasts of its independence, just as it is wise for a prince who proposes to embrace Machiavellianism, according to Voltaire's witty remark, to begin by writing a book against Machiavelli.

This is the way the matter stands for the parties. For the people as a whole and the state as such, meaning by the latter the permanent embodiment of its impulse of self-preservation, which is superior to the parties, the case is different. The people really care for the knowledge of the truth, at least in so far as the proper conception of reality constitutes the basis for properly influencing reality. A party may be interested in not having the truth prevail, but a people cannot as such have an interest in the preservation of false conceptions. Its ability to live depends in no small measure upon its doing that which is necessary from a proper knowledge of the actual conditions. And hence the people and the state, in so far as the latter represents the people, can have no desire to place obstacles in the way of an honest search for truth in the field of politics and social science, either by forbidding or favoring certain views.

We might make the matter clear by Socratic inductions. Is it not true that when any one, anxious about his health, consults a physician and places himself under his care, he does not prescribe to him what shall be the result of the examination, and does not tempt him to see or to say anything not in accord with the facts, either by rewarding him for favorable statements or threatening him with punishment for unfavorable ones? If any one should act like that, we should call him a fool. And





when the master of a ship takes a pilot on board, he does not mark out for him the course to follow, but leaves him to steer the ship and turn the helm; all he does is to determine the destination of the vessel. Well, the same holds here. When a people appoints experts to produce scientific knowledge of the nature of the state and society, their historical evolution and present condition, it is foolish for it to prescribe to these men what definitions and propositions they ought to employ in order to reach their results, just as foolish as it would be to prescribe to the statistical bureau the figures to be obtained, to insist upon figures, let us say, giving favorable evidence of the progress of the population and of its wealth.

If the results of statistics were decreed by the state, all enumeration and calculation would, of course, be superfluous or rather a mere illusion for the purpose of deception. And the same thing is true of political economy and the general theory of the state; it is their function to form general conceptions adequate to explain reality as it is. If now these conceptions are decreed by authority or their formulation influenced by favor or threats, these sciences sink to the level of mere sham-battles, arranged by a party for the purpose of keeping itself in power. The people as a whole would have no interest in them, none except to get rid of them. What the people needs, if it needs doctrines at all, is incorruptible, perfectly disinterested seekers after the truth; concealment and deception can only lead to ruin. And such men it will appoint to teach. The instruction of officials and statesmen in these sciences can have no value whatever, unless it leads to the most impartial knowledge of reality, even though this knowledge should not produce satisfaction with existing institutions. To content oneself with fancies and deceptions is no wiser than to strive to enrich oneself by adding ciphers to the figures in one's account-book.

Theoretically it will not be possible to reach any other conclusion. Still there are practical difficulties. Not only is the state always represented by persons who are in some way or other influenced by party interests and party views, but even the investigators and teachers as individuals stand in some relation to the political or social parties, by reason of private





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interests and personal feelings, descent and intermarriage, etc. They can at best vouch for their honest intention to see things as they are, but they cannot wholly get rid of the personal factor and the subjective character of the concepts and judgments conditioned by it. Under these circumstances the problem will always leave a remainder *in praxi*. But the principle will hold: a people is interested in the truth alone, and there can be a science of these things, only in so far as the influence of personal interests upon the results and judgment of the investigator is eliminated. If, therefore, the business of research is to be made a public function, the political powers will, so far as they represent the interests of the whole, have to observe strict neutrality towards the results of research.

Here, too, however, it will be necessary to place one restriction, if not upon the thinker, at least upon the teacher appointed by the state and supported from the funds of the people, the same restriction which we placed upon the professor of theology. Just as the latter must assume a positive relation to religion and the church in general, the former must assume a positive relation to the people and the state. A person who occupies the position of an enemy to this nation, not striving for its welfare, but for its ruin or the decline of its power, or assumes a hostile attitude towards the state as the historically developed institution of the people, aiming at its dismemberment and destruction and not at its preservation and improvement, cannot as an honest man accept an office and a commission from the hands of the people or the state. The implicit or explicit assumption is that the official desires the preservation and welfare of the community. If the pilot taken on board should use his position to steer the ship against the rocks and into shoals, he would be guilty of treachery; so would the man who used his official position to betray the interests of his people, or to drive the ship of state upon the rocks of civil war.

Or suppose that a man had been convinced by his own reflections upon the nature of the state or by the eloquence of a Tolstoi, that the state as an institution of force was an evil, and ought to be destroyed. That, too, would unfit him for the office of a teacher of political science just as it would unfit a person to be a teacher of law if he looked upon the positive law as a





foolish burden and a plague—always provided at least that the state is not inclined to abrogate itself and the law in case theory demands it. The teacher will, therefore, have to recognize that there is a reason in these things, and it will be his first task to see and to show the reason that is in them. Then he may also point out the distance between the reality and the ideal, and, if he can, the way to approximate the ideal. The man, however, who can find absolutely no reason in the state and in law, who, as a theoretical anarchist, denies the necessity of a state and a legal order, having the power to compel, not only for an ideal dream-world, but for this work-a-day world, may try to prove his theory by means of as many good arguments as he can, but he has no call to teach the political sciences at a state institution. And no state would be willing to appoint him to such an office or be able to tolerate him in it, however thoroughly he may be convinced of his vocation for it. Just as there can be such a thing as supersensitiveness, there can be supertolerance. We can neither justly demand nor reasonably expect that the state should voluntarily expose itself and its legality to whatever insults the theorists appointed by it as teachers may choose to offer. Such unlimited academic freedom would manifestly be conceivable only as an evidence of the state's absolute contempt for the professor's teaching; it would be placing it on a level with the pratings of an anarchistic demagogue which the state does not prevent because it regards them as utterly insignificant and harmless.

From this standpoint we may also judge of the state's attitude toward the academic presentation of the political and social sciences in accordance with the principles of the *social-democracy*. So long as the party advocates a theory hostile in principle to the state as such, claiming that the existing state is nothing but the product of the selfishness of the dominant parties, an institution for the oppression and exploitation of the "people," that its so-called justice is nothing but a peaceful form of gag-law, that the army is an instrument for the forcible coercion of the masses, that the goal to be sought is political power and that this is to be employed in destroying class distinctions and abolishing the state as such, the compulsory instrument for maintaining social oppression; so long as the social-democracy





advocates these theories, so long as it remains radically hostile to the state, hostile to this particular state and to the state in general, it cannot be permitted to teach the political sciences in state institutions. A state that will permit such theories to be taught, as "the results of science," in the lecture rooms of the universities established by it, and will allow the teachers of the political sciences employed by it to point out the worthlessness of the state as such, or of this particular state, as a scientifically proved fact, will be looked for in vain. The existence of such a state would simply prove that the authorities regarded the lectures of professors as harmless and insignificant, and considered it beneath their dignity to pay any attention to them. So long as the state takes the universities seriously, such a form of political science as has been described will be impossible in its institutions of learning.

This, of course, does not mean that the state should absolutely suppress all attempts to formulate such theories. Nor do I deny the need of a social-democratic party and of its criticism of existing political institutions. Though it may often shoot far beyond the mark, it has given rise to wholesome reforms in our legal and social institutions, and will continue to do so in the future, the more clearly it keeps in view, as a political party should, the most immediate positive ends and allows the ultimate ideals to take care of themselves. All I assert is this: The state cannot hand over the business of teaching the science of the state to men who show no deeper appreciation of the inner necessity of historical products, and who have no more respect for established institutions than the platforms, literature, and press of the social-democracy express. The state will permit such men to gain followers for their doctrines wherever they choose, but it cannot appoint them as the authorized leaders in the science of these things.

It is also to be added that so long as the social-democracy boasts of being a revolutionary party, expecting and aiming at the overthrow of the entire established political and legal order, no professor, be his chair what it will, can join this party without at the same time renouncing his office. The official oath includes the recognition of the existing constitution, and manifestly no state can relinquish its right of expressly demanding





or tacitly assuming such recognition from every official. No state, be it republican or monarchical or what you please, will confer an office upon a man who declares it to be his political function to destroy its very foundation. To destroy its very foundation, mind you, not to reform and improve the state, for which provision is made by the constitution itself. No one can be an officer of the state who seeks to destroy it. Not for a moment can we imagine that a social-democratic republic or whatever the future state might call itself, would assume a different attitude in this respect. Indeed, it is to be presumed that it would go much farther and be forced to go much farther in watching those under suspicion and expelling its enemies than any one of the existing states. The more firmly established a state is, the less sensitive it is to criticism; the weaker it is, the more anxious it will be to ward off attacks and to suppress public criticism. And hence the freedom of teaching would be nowhere less assured than in a place where a new revolutionary government was compelled to defend itself against reactionary movements, where law and authority were insecure and depended wholly upon public opinion, the most uncertain thing in the world.<sup>1</sup>

The case is somewhat different with respect to the private docent. He is not an official of the state, hence his particular duties are not circumscribed by law, nor does he possess the

<sup>1</sup> "The more naïve a power is, the younger the party-rule, the more brutal the parliamentary system, the smaller and more exclusive the society and its interests, the more the rich *parvenu* looks upon himself and his philanthropy and legal rights as a matter of course, the worse it will be for the freedom of science if it depends upon the power of these philanthropists." In these words G. Cohn in an article in the *Lotse* (vol. i., 455 ff., 1901), discusses the dismissal of a professor of political economy from a private American university on account of offensive economic views. With this agrees what Professor Perry says of some of the recently established "State Universities" in the United States (in *Monographs on Education in the United States*, ed. by N. M. Butler, i., 277): In some states, he says, "the constant changes in the political complexion of the legislature, and the self-seeking of party-leaders, have made the universities mere shuttlecocks of public or party opinion, and not only has their development been hindered, but in some cases their usefulness deliberately crippled. Instances are not unknown where particularly able and courageous professors, who would





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authority of a regularly appointed professor. The state might easily disregard his entire teaching as a private matter and ignore the fact that he presented doctrines hostile to the state. It would not thereby recognize such teachings as legitimate nor consider their presentation as desirable, it would merely tolerate them as harmless and insignificant.

For the faculties, however, the case would stand as follows. The bestowal of the *venia legendi* depends upon the candidate's scientific ability, without which an academic career is impossible in Germany; but with his politics the faculty has absolutely no concern. Only in case the applicant for the *venia legendi* had appeared publicly as a political partisan and agitator, would the faculty be justified in considering this point. The question might well be asked whether such partisan activity had been pursued in such a manner and to such an extent as to be no longer compatible with the candidate's function as a teacher of science. This applies equally to all parties. The scientific investigator and teacher cannot and ought not to be a partisan in the sense in which a politician can be one and is occasionally forced to be one, and I am convinced that no faculty will regard pronounced activity as a political agitator on the part of a candidate for the *venia legendi* as a recommendation. The universities are and desire to remain non-political corporations. And they will be particularly sensitive on the question of propagandism for the social-democratic party, not

not cut their scientific opinions after the prevailing political mode, have been driven from their chairs, even by outrageously underhanded methods." Enough, I think, not to make the universities particularly anxious for a change from state government, acting in accordance with formal legal principles, into an arbitrary "socialistic administration" based on universal suffrage. The way in which the ultramontanistic demagogues spy into the opinions of and hunt down university teachers who do not "wheel into line like under-officers" gives us a foretaste of what conditions would necessarily result from an administration dependent upon party-leaders and those in control of the press. A régime controlled by such elements would never appreciate or understand true science; the party rabble cannot help hating and persecuting superior minds refusing to cater and yield to its instincts; even the envy of inferiority against mental superiority makes a different procedure impossible. The university men in the social-democratic party are already beginning to feel something of this.





only in order to escape conflicts with the government, but also because of the peculiar character of this party: it is, more than any other political party, a "sect" with a "doctrine" and "correct tenets." This fact was again brought out at the recent Lübeck convention: not only the member's political action, but even his literary and scientific work is subject to the approval and disapproval of the party. This follows necessarily from the fact that the party platform contains a dogmatic system, that there is "scientific" socialism or socialistic science. There has never been "scientific" liberalism or conservatism; these parties have no "system," but merely a practical political program. The social-democracy aims to be more than a political party; it has a *doctrina fidei* to which it binds its members or attempts to bind them, for the belief in the system which has undergone so many and such rapid changes of late years, is now naturally declining in spite of the fact that the party conventions officially maintain it. When the social-democracy ceases to be a sect with an iron-clad doctrine, when it stops prating about the revolution or playing upon the double meaning of the word, when it assumes the attitude of a reform-party and aims to reform existing institutions by bringing about complete equality before the law and by elevating the moral and intellectual conditions of the lower classes, then it will no longer be possible to justify the state in treating this party differently from the others.

Opinions hardly differ on this point. On the other hand, it is a debatable question, whether membership in the social-democratic party should exclude a man from the university, even from lecturing on subjects that have nothing to do with politics. The Prussian ministry of state has affirmed the question.

In trying the case of the private docent of physics, Dr. Arons, as the highest disciplinary authority, according to the new law, it based its decision upon the general theory that membership in the social-democratic party was in itself incompatible with the position of a private docent, and furnished cause for removal, under the provisions of the new "law dealing with disciplinary measures for private docents," since "it made him unworthy of the confidence which his calling de-





manded." Sitting in judgment on the same case, as the disciplinary tribunal of the first instance, and according to the same law, the philosophical faculty of the Berlin University had not been able to convince itself of the soundness of this position. The faculty was, in my opinion, right in assuming that the private docent was not an official and hence had no special official duties towards the state, that his character as a man and as a scholar, hence also his worthiness of confidence in these respects, were not affected by his political opinions, and that therefore, in so far as these opinions did not influence his teaching, he suffered no loss of confidence in his standing as a private docent, which would have been the case with an official. Nor was the faculty able to discover any political danger to the state in the fact that a private docent of physics was an active member of the social-democratic party.

It is to be hoped that this conception will gradually triumph in the political world. The stronger a government is and the better its conscience with respect to the duty of equal justice to all, the less it will be overcome by fears of secret revolutionary movements, the less also will it feel the need of making a show of power against those of other mind. Prince Bismarck reckons among the things which should not tempt the statesman, the show of power. Purely formal success that is without material value and merely satisfies the desire for a show of power confers no glory on a government. I cannot help thinking that the victory of the ministry over Dr. Arons belongs to this category of success.

And now let me add a final word. In excluding the presentation of doctrines absolutely hostile to the state from the university, which should, of course, not be made a field of experiment for all possible and impossible notions—let us not forget that anarchism has always led to absolutism—we do not at the same time wish to exclude the criticism of existing political institutions and social conditions. I am rather of the opinion that the greatest possible scope should be given to a bold and impartial criticism. Here as in all human affairs criticism is a necessary function. When it strikes at what has outlived itself, at what is false and of evil, at what interferes with the healthy development of the whole, it is, looked at from the





standpoint of the life of the people, a highly commendable thing. And it has a place in academic instruction also. It is an inevitable function of such instruction to turn the attention of the leaders of the coming generation towards the necessary development of public institutions along the lines of justice and public welfare. The more thoroughly the first task is performed and the historical necessity of the established institutions understood, which is also the reason in things, the sooner will the second problem be solved, for reforms must depend upon the knowledge of the necessity and limitations of what already exists.

That it is impossible to escape the hostility of those whose real or supposed party-interests would be injured by a change of existing conditions, lies in the very nature of the case. They will attempt to arouse the government against the critics of the state and society, with accusations and denunciations, and their objections will also be directed against a university administration that is slow to comply with their wishes. A government that is sure of its ground, that regards itself and has a right to regard itself as the guardian of the interests of the people, will meet such accusations with the same clear conscience with which it endures accusations from the other camp.

We should not forget in this connection that it was not the men who were always satisfied that made life better and were honored after their death as the great leaders of progress. In all truly great men there has always been present a noble discontent with reality, with the existing conditions in the state and law, in church and religion, in society and education, in science and literature. To mention examples in the intellectual or academic world, I call to mind Socrates and Plato. The former was condemned as one dissatisfied with the beliefs and views, the education and political organization, of his environment; as the first of the great recluses, the latter passed through life, giving expression to his deep yearnings in his writings. I call to mind Kant and Fichte; they likewise were two great malcontents. With ardent longing they searched for perfection, which to them was possible because it ought to be. In religion and in law, in church and in state, everywhere the real is infinitely far behind the ideal, as "pure reason" necessarily





conceives it. Men of thought they were, not men of action, but thoughts are the seeds of acts. The German universities may proudly boast that never has there been among them a dearth of men of noble discontent who sowed the thoughts for future acts. May there always be such men, and may the universities always have room for such men!

To those, however, who believe that limits can be set to thought by restricting the freedom of teaching, Dahlmann makes a happy reply. "You may drive the sciences out of the universities by confining them to the propagation of traditional truths. It is by no means beyond the power of the state to transform the former seats of free culture into mere workshops, but the blow aimed at the sciences would not hurt them, for they are not unfamiliar with the wanderer's life—as much as the youths of the state. It is by no means beyond the power of the state to compel these young men to attend such universities, but it has not the power to prevent them from despising institutions which contradict all the academic traditions and ideals esteemed in our literature, and which public opinion indignantly scorns. For the places to which a noble ambition once led men of the highest culture, would then hold merely the hod-carriers of science. . . . After all our trouble we should simply have succeeded in transforming our young men into a lot of 'misfits,' and a still more obstinate lot at that. There is no help for it, we must take the dangers of the sciences along with their blessings; science is the spear that wounds, but at the same time heals." <sup>1</sup>

6. *The Professors and Politics.* In a well known passage of the *Republic* Plato attributes to the philosophers and to them alone the ability to organize and govern the state properly. In commenting on the passage Kant dissents from Plato's conception of the relation of the philosophers to the state: "It is not to be expected that kings should philosophize and philosophers should become kings, nor is it to be desired, because the possession of power inevitably destroys the independent judgment of the reason. But in order that both parties may properly understand their functions, it is indispensable that kings or kingly peoples (those governing themselves according to the

<sup>1</sup> Dahlmann, *Politik*, vol. i., p. 319.





laws of equality) should not permit the class of philosophers to perish or to become mute, but should allow them to speak openly. And there need be no fears of propagandism in such a case because this class is by its very nature incapable of banding together and forming clubs.”<sup>1</sup>

Applying the terms used in our heading, this means that professors, the representatives of science, should not engage in politics, but should reflect upon the state and the law; and it is of importance that their thoughts be heard by the politicians. I regard this as the proper solution of the problem.

The scholars cannot and should not engage in politics. They cannot do it if they have developed their capacities in accordance with the demands of their calling. Scientific research is their business, and scientific research calls for a constant examination of thoughts and theories to the end of harmonizing them with the facts. Hence these thinkers are bound to develop a habit of *theoretical indifference* with respect to the opposing sides, a readiness to pursue any other path in case it promises to lead to a theory more in accordance with the facts. Now every form of practical activity, and practical politics particularly, demands above everything else a determination to follow *one* path, the path that one has chosen. That this path should be the best and the most direct path is not so important as that one should not waver between two paths. But such very resoluteness of will is weakened by long continued theoretical activity; the latter is apt to produce a certain indecision, a kind of *aboulia*, a tendency to doubt, not only before the decision has been rendered, but even afterwards. The thinker is too much accustomed to look at every question from all sides, to see the justice of the other side, to return to the starting point in order to discover whether an error may not have crept into the argument somewhere. All these qualities are virtues in the theorist, but they are defects in the practical politician who must possess the courage of conviction, of consistency, yes, of onesidedness. New conceptions may be formed; the truth is in no hurry. Not so with reality; the opportunity for action comes, and when you have embraced it, you must go on. The thought that you

<sup>1</sup> *Zum ewigen Frieden*, Hartenstein's edition, vol. vi., p. 436.





ought to have acted otherwise, has a disturbing and paralyzing effect. Hence it is not the men of strong theoretical tendencies who produce the great crises in history and reform institutions; it is the men of strong will, the Luthers and the Bismarcks, who stand at the portals of new epochs. At the entrance of modern scientific development we find men like Erasmus, Galileo, and Lessing, men who possessed courage and force, no doubt, only not the courage and force of action.

Political activity, on the other hand, produces a habit that would prove fatal to the theorist, the habit of *opportunism*. The practical politician is necessarily an opportunist. Whenever the object is to realize practical ends, it will always be necessary to reckon with conditions, to adapt oneself to circumstances, to make compromises, to hold principles merely as movable axioms. All these things would be absolutely condemned in the theorist; he has to deal not with the creation of conditions, but with the creation of concepts, not with reality, but with the truth. Hence he must be an *intransigent*.

An investigator who permits circumstances to influence him in his theories, who allows conditions, be they material or personal, to induce him to abandon his principles or to yield any of their consequences, who makes compromises for the sake of peace, in short, who acts like a politician, loses all claim to consideration. We desire to know from him what is true and a necessity of thought, not what happens to be permitted or seems to be opportune at the present time or in this particular place. To be sure, the investigator's views and convictions, too, may change, only the change must have been brought about by reasons alone, and not by conditions and motives.

This is one phase of the question. Theory unfits one for politics, politics unfits one for theory. The other phase of the question, which Kant emphasizes no less than the other in the passage quoted, is this. The formation of philosophical concepts concerning the state and law is doubtless necessary, and politicians do not act wisely in ignoring these concepts. The business of philosophy is, according to Kant, to deduce rational ideas from principles, by which the value of the actual institutions is to be measured and according to which they are to





be shaped; as, for example, the idea of a perfect legal state, the idea of a perfect legal union of all the states, from which eternal peace would follow. They are goals which the practical men must ever keep in mind, and which must help to direct their course.

The belief in the possibility of a philosophical deduction of right is not so strong in our century, the historical century, as it was during the age of natural rights. And yet it may be asserted that theory has not lost its influence upon practice even in our age. At the beginning of the century the practical politicians came under the influence of the Kantian philosophy, under the influence of the liberalistic theory of rights and its conceptions of a legal state, a state with its freedom limited by law and all its citizens equal before the law. At the end of the century a new theory exercised an important influence upon the practical politicians and legislation, the social-political theory, which assigns to the state not only the function to ensure formal equality before the law, but the further function to care for the socially weak by protective measures against the superior force of private capital as well as by institutions directly aiming at their welfare. Had it not been for the new theory, practice would scarcely have made such important advances as have been made in German legislation during the last two decades. Besides, it ought also to be remembered that the unification of the German Empire by Bismarck was prepared by the theorists, particularly by the historians, who introduced the idea of national unity into the flesh and blood of the people.

The proper relation then is this: It is the business of the theorist to devote himself to reflection and to create necessary thoughts, concepts and laws of that which is, and ideas of that which ought to be, remembering always that philosophical or conceptual thought and historical knowledge must go hand in hand. It is the business of the practical man to turn the existing institutions in the direction of the ideal, always keeping his gaze fixed upon reality, however, and carefully considering what can be realized. The theorists, as it were, represent the self-consciousness of the people in its highest form, while the practical men represent the united will of the people, which





realizes the idea by action, in opposition to the thousand obstacles of the moment. Science as such has no bias. But reality, and, above all, history, certainly has a bias, and this bias the investigator who impartially devotes himself to reflection, can recognize, much more surely than the practical politician who is steeped in the interests and conflicts of the moment. Of course, nothing can hinder the theorist from making the recognized bias or the goal at which reality is aiming, his own, and passionately pursuing it; think of men like Plato and Fichte. But it is not wise to transfer to the philosopher also the business of realizing the ideal politically. The power to see things near at hand and the power to see them afar do not dwell in the same eye. What once happened to Thales, the Milesian, when with gaze fixed upon the sky and the stars he failed to see the well at his feet, might happen to the philosopher in politics. Nor would Plato's experiences in Sicily seem to invite imitation, any more than the experiences of the scholars assembled at St. Paul's church in 1848.

Hence the Kantian separation of the politicians and the philosophers will have to be accepted. The Platonic arrangement is impossible, impossible on account of the difference in the functions of the two. The man whose mission it is to listen to the deep and quiet thoughts that slumber in the soul of the people, cannot be placed in the noisy turmoil of everyday politics; and, conversely, the man whose business it is to put his shoulder to the wheel ought not to have too delicate a nervous system, yes, perhaps not even too sensitive a conscience; and his capacity to make use of all sorts and conditions of men ought not to be restricted by an all too delicate moral taste. But it is important nevertheless "that kings and nations should not permit the class of philosophers to perish or to become mute, but should allow them to speak out openly."

7. *The University's Duty With Respect to Political Education and Public Life.* In the discussions of the *lex Arons* the dismissal of Arons was also demanded on the plea that the university ought to cultivate patriotism. In the sense intended, the university cannot recognize this as its function. It is not a training school, its students are not minors; it is an institution





for scientific research and scientific instruction, and such instruction it offers to foreigners as well as natives. In so far as it becomes immersed in the spiritual essence of the German people and deepens the knowledge of its historical life, we may of course confidently hope that the university will arouse feelings of love and devotion for the German character, and perhaps also help to destroy some objectionable features of the present age. And this will most likely affect both natives and foreigners. Perhaps we may say that the love which the German people inspires abroad is in a great measure owing to the universities. If the universities should also contribute to a knowledge of the evils and false tendencies of the present, and, on the other hand, help us to discover the forces necessary to free us from these evils, that, too, would mean something for the political education of our people, for the generation which is now receiving its impress from our universities will in a few decades direct events.

At the same time the universities must never forget that the things which they are called upon to cultivate transcend the boundaries of countries and nations. Truth and science are by their very nature possessions of mankind, and they are created and constantly augmented by the coöperation of all peoples participating in the intellectual life of humanity. The men who serve science form something like a Masonic brotherhood, as Lessing conceived Free Masonry; unhampered by what separates nations, sects, and classes, it is their vocation to exemplify and represent the universal human element against the narrow aspirations of particular groups. We feel more keenly than was felt in Lessing's day that the universal can be expressed concretely only in the particular, that the wealth of human nature depends upon the manifoldness of national forms. But we shall not forget Lessing's wise words that there are limits beyond which patriotism as well as confessionalism ceases to be a virtue. Supersensitive nationalism has become a very serious menace to all the nations of Europe; they are in danger of losing their appreciation of human values. In its exaggerated form nationalism, like sectarianism, destroys the moral as well as the logical conscience: just and unjust, good and bad, true and false lose their meanings; what we call des-





picable and inhuman when others do it, we, in the same breath, advise our own country to do to a foreign people.

This is really the greatest work the universities can perform for public life; all of them together can serve as a kind of *public conscience* in domestic and foreign politics. The politicians who have their eyes fixed upon the most immediate goals are too apt to lose the standard of what is morally possible or impossible. Goethe's words, that the man in action is always without conscience, are doubly true of the man of political action. He is not working for his own good, but for the good of the whole; and what is not allowable to attain this end? Hence we need a tribunal that is not called upon to act, but represents and emphasizes the moral judgment. This would really be the function of the church, but the church is, actively and passively, too deeply immersed in the struggle for power. Hence, in Germany at least, the universities have taken up this work. Engaged in contemplation, they are less exposed to the temptation of power, to partisanship and party hatred, and for that very reason it is their mission to measure the acts of power by the ideal.

At a momentous period of our history, the German university proved true to its vocation to be the conscience of the country. I have in mind the seven professors of Göttingen who protested against the violation of the constitution by a despotic king and refused to pay homage to him. Dahlmann, the author of the protest, when commanded to withdraw the document under threat of punishment, declined to do so on the ground that this was not a case of disobedience, but "a defense against an illegal demand. But even this voice of necessity would not have been raised, had not those remained silent whose duty it was to act and to speak. By taking sides with the power aiming to destroy the basal law of the state, the ministers of state have forced the subjects to speak the truth in accordance with the dictates of their conscience." He concludes: "Shall we in future teach it as the basal law of the land that what pleases the supreme power is the law? I wish to leave the country as an honest man and not to sell to my students falsehood and deception as the truth. Until then I was conscious of not having violated the duty of obedience





either by deed or by word, and I shall remain faithful to my duty: but I cannot recognize a duty of slavery.”<sup>1</sup>

I cannot refrain from quoting the words of another one of these seven excellent men. J. Grimm in speaking of his dismissal once solemnly and beautifully expressed the idea that the German universities were the conscience of the people: “So long as their sterling and excellent organization remains what it is, the German universities will be extremely sensitive to everything good or bad that happens in the country. If it were otherwise, they would cease to serve their purpose. The frank and healthy minds of the young demand that their teachers shall at all times reduce every question concerning important relations of life and the state to their purest and most moral terms, and shall answer them openly and honestly. Here hypocrisy is impossible, and the influence of right and virtue upon the unbiased minds of the hearers is so strong that they instinctively submit to it and are disgusted by every kind of perversion. It is impossible to keep from them one’s independent teaching, fettered by inner conviction alone, concerning the nature, conditions, and consequences of good government.”<sup>2</sup>

The presupposition of such service, I repeat, is that the universities be not dragged into the political controversies of the day as participants and accomplices. Such a proceeding would destroy their impartiality and objectivity. Just as the judiciary is isolated against political influences, for the sake of justice, which is thereby recognized as a supreme good, higher than all temporary political ends, investigators and teachers should be isolated against the same influences, for the sake of conscience and truth, which is a no less supreme and eternal good, higher than all the temporal interests of politics.

Viewed from this standpoint, it seems like a happy accident of fate, that the German universities should for many hundred years have enjoyed the good fortune of dwelling apart from the great world, far from courts and society, power and wealth. V. A. Huber has emphasized this point in a notable comparison between the German and English universities, for whose value as educational institutions for the leading classes he

<sup>1</sup> A. Springer, *F. Chr. Dahlmann*, 1870, vol. i., p. 431.

<sup>2</sup> J. Grimm, *Kleine Schriften*, vol. i., p. 36.





has the greatest respect. "The English scholars live too much in and for the world, so that it is hardly possible for them to develop that species of almost monomaniacal love for the subject of their investigations. Their standard is an entirely different one; it is not derived from the subject itself, but from the opinion of the circle to which they belong." In England the universities are parts of the political system, the scholars are enmeshed in the views and judgments of the governing class of society. The German universities dwell in their own world, outside of politics, and their highest achievements are in science. "It is our part, our glory, and our task among the historical nations of the earth," though not the only one, it is to be hoped, he adds, "that the German mind alone has hitherto achieved the highest pinnacles of science, impelled by the ferment of philosophy, and the old loyalty to and love of truth for its own sake, which are so characteristic of the German spirit." The cause for this fact he seeks particularly in the unique combination of defiance and diffidence, the genuine and precious jewel we call our spirit (*Gemüth*); but he believes that external conditions have also played their part: "our poverty and narrowness, the contempt or at least indifference of the world, our isolation, in short, so many joys and sorrows known among us." He is a little afraid of the future. "Will not the favor which science, in the persons of some of its representatives, is beginning to find in the eyes of the authorities, deprive it eventually of its dearest treasure, of its innocence, as it were? It is easy enough to see in France what happens when scholars are made courtiers, councillors of the state, etc."<sup>1</sup>

It is easy to see what this man would think of the most recent development of the German university system, the accumulation of large incomes, the adoption of the customs of fashionable society, the extent to which titles and decorations are bestowed, and similar things. He would hardly regard them as means of increasing the inner dignity and power of the professors, perhaps he would look upon them as means of making them more dependent upon the powers of this world, thus exposing the German university to the danger of becoming untrue to its purpose.

<sup>1</sup> V. A. Huber, *Die englischen Universitäten*, vol. ii., p. 500.





CSL

BOOK IV  
STUDENTS AND ACADEMIC STUDY





## CHAPTER I

### MORALS

I SHALL discuss in this chapter two conceptions which play a great role in the life and sentiments of the student, the conceptions of *freedom* and *honor*.

✓ 1. *Academic Freedom, its Significance, and its Dangers.*  
The period spent at college is a period full of great significance for one's entire life; we may compare it with the germinating period of spring, upon the outcome of which the richness of the harvest depends.

✓ The college days at present fall in the period of transition from youth to manhood. The training received at home and in the school comes to an end; the period of self-education begins. The new problem now is to form the inner man and to give his life a content by means of his own reason and power. In what way this is to be accomplished will depend on the individual's future calling in life. Whoever devotes himself to university study expects to enter the ruling class of society. He also assumes the duty to justify his right to enter it; he alone who has the moral insight and energy to act as a guide for others on the path of duty and truth, has a right to enter the ranks of the leaders. This fixes the goal at which such study should aim: independent scientific knowledge in some large sphere of life, and a character strong in virtue and efficiency.

Freedom is the precondition of self-education and culture. Freedom from outward compulsion is therefore the symbol of student days, the much vaunted academic freedom.

✓ Indeed, the student days are the days of the greatest and most complete freedom from outward compulsion that life affords. Before and after this period we are surrounded with duties and restrictions of all kinds; the student is free to devote himself





wholly to his task of forming himself into an independent personality. He leaves the parental home and orders his outward life to suit himself; he disposes of his income as he chooses, he selects his associates and his friends. In the same way he disposes of his time. The pupil in the high school has a definite amount of work assigned to him every day; the university student selects his field of study, his university, his teachers, and the lectures to be taken. And he also assumes an independent mental attitude towards what the teacher offers him. The pupil has to learn and assimilate what is assigned to him; the student does not "learn" but "studies," he assumes an independent, critical attitude towards what he hears or reads. He can, if he chooses, stay away from the lectures altogether; no one is going to call him to account for that, no one is going to ask him why he is doing it or how he is spending his time, at least no one is officially charged to do such a thing. Such absolute freedom is never experienced again. Later in life a man's time is taken up with his calling and office, his family and society, and the many duties and troubles of the daily routine. The student belongs to himself, he is responsible to nobody and for nobody but himself.

To this great freedom the bright glamor which rests upon academic life is due. With his heart filled with hopes and expectations, the pupil looks forward to this period; with longing the man looks back upon the golden days of freedom, from the narrow surroundings of his later life.

✓ Responsibility is the correlate of this freedom. The less of external compulsion there is, the more imperative is the duty of self-control. Whoever confounds freedom with licence, misunderstands its meaning; it is given to the individual not that he may do as he pleases, but that he may learn to govern himself.

This task is not an easy one; the danger of missing the right road is not small. Many do not know what to do at first with such unusual and excessive freedom, indeed it actually becomes a burden to them. They do not know exactly what to do with their time; they try one thing, then another; glance into this science and then into that one; pick up one piece of work, then another, only to drop it again. We ought not to judge of this





attitude too harshly. Not infrequently such a state of vacillation is due to an instinctive desire to come into touch with things and men; the time is not lost if the nature of the student is broadened and he gradually succeeds in discovering what is suited to him. I shall later mention some of the ways in which he may learn to get his bearings in his helplessness. Sensible older fellow-students who have gone through the same experience and have found themselves, are the most accessible and perhaps also the best advisers. Moreover, the universities are doing more than they have done in the past to lend a helping hand during the earlier semesters by offering exercises for beginners.

Others are encouraged by such freedom and the difficulty of making a start, to abandon themselves, for the time being, to the present, and to taste the joys and pleasures of student life in an indiscriminate and aimless sort of fashion. That too may be pardoned; such a loosening of the reins is often the natural reaction against the overexertions of the last year at school. In case new and vigorous impulses for work spring up after a moderate period of rest and abandon, the brain may lie fallow for a while with good hygienic effects; and the experience too will not be without its value, teaching that it is not possible to ground one's life and happiness upon the love of pleasure.

The danger becomes more acute when, accustoming himself to a life without work and duties, the student gradually sinks into a state of listless inertia, which, occasionally interrupted by good resolutions and futile attempts to carry them out, finally degenerates into a kind of chronic exhaustion of the will. It is a danger to which the more indolent natures are exposed in our system. The suddenness of the transition from the long, rigid curriculum of the school to the absolute freedom of a course of study wholly left, for a series of years, to the individual's own judgment and energy, helps to magnify the danger. And then the feelings of discontent and weariness which are inseparably connected with a life of idleness lead to the use of the various narcotics by means of which human beings seek to disguise the inner emptiness of their lives. Fichte has described this phenomenon: "Laziness is the source of all vices. To enjoy as much as possible and to do as little work as possible, that is the





problem of the depraved nature, and the many attempts which are made to solve it are the vices of the same.”<sup>1</sup>

Persons of livelier and more energetic temperament may, however, purposely disregard the rational way of looking at things as Philistinism, and fall into that free and easy “transvaluation of all values” which has always found expression in student-poetry. They are not always fellows of inferior quality who consume their powers and waste their youth in such student exuberance or, as we now-a-days say, “supermanhood.” After they have again come to their senses, the past seems like a curious intoxication to them. Nor are those lacking who never succeed in getting back to the sober view of life and go to pieces in consequence.

It is worthy of note, by the way, that Plato, who understood the human soul, already observed this phenomenon. He describes it in the eighth book of the *Republic*, in the place where he draws a parallel between the revolution in the soul of a youngster whose father has brought him up in a vulgar and miserly way, and who for the first time goes out into life and freedom, and the transition from the oligarchical régime to democratic freedom. At first, when the youth gets into the company of loose, unbridled fellows, the “drones’ honey” tastes sweet to him, but the habits and conceptions acquired in the parental home still have influence over him; he is ashamed, the spirit of reverence enters his soul and order is restored. But his passions rise again, call to help desires which are like them, and secretly making common cause with them, bring the will to subjection. “At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man’s soul which they perceive to be void of all fair accomplishments and pursuits and of every true word, which are the best guardians and sentinels in the minds of men dear to the gods. False and boastful words and conceits grow up instead of them, and take the same position in him. And so the young man returns into the country of the lotus-eaters and takes up his abode there in the face of all men; and if any help be sent by his friends to the oligarchical part of him, the Messieurs Vain Conceit shut

<sup>1</sup> *Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten*, fifth lecture, *Works*, vol. vi., p. 343. See also an essay by Tolstoi, *Why Human Beings Use Narcotics?*





the gate of the king's fastness; they will not allow the new ally to pass. And if ambassadors, venerable for their age, come and parley, they refuse to listen to them; there is a battle and they win; then modesty, which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into exile by them. They affirm temperance to be unmanliness, and her also they contemptuously eject; and they pretend that moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and meanness; and with a company of vain appetites at their heels, they drive them beyond the border. And when they have made a sweep of the soul of him who is now in their power, and is being initiated by them in great mysteries, the next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in bright array, having garlands on their heads, with a great company, while they hymn their praises and call them by sweet names; insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and waste magnificence, and impudence courage. In this way the young man passes out of his original nature, which was trained in the school of necessity, into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures.”<sup>1</sup>

Thus these transformers of all values.

I mention still another danger of freedom; the degeneration of youthful exuberance into spiritual unbridledness and unrestraint. Goethe describes it in the second part of *Faust*: the *scholar* of the first part, who has become a *baccalaureus*, typifies it in perfect form. He is making up for his former bashfulness by the most licentious kind of talk; he at once introduces himself to us as “freed from all restraints of narrow Philistine thoughts”; he feels it as the noblest calling of youth to put old age to death:

Dass nicht, wie bisher, im Moder  
Das Lebendige, wie ein Todter  
Sich verkümmre, sich verderbe,  
Und am Leben selber sterbe.

Who will not think of Nietzsche, the *Unzeitgemässe*, who felt the call to brush away the mould of German educational Philistinism and the rubbish of academic life, who afterwards in the *Götzendämmerung* applies the hammer to all the heroes of the past, and then, with derisive laughter, breaks them all into

<sup>1</sup> Jowett's translation of Plato, vol. ii, *Republic*, book viii.





pieces, the empty and hollow forms? And following in his wake we see the whole swarm of false geniuses, who, without a spark of the master's genius, imitate his unrestraint, hoping to enter with him into the temple of immortality.

Goethe contemplates this phenomenon with thorough equanimity.

Doch sind wir auch mit diesem nicht gefährdet;  
In wenig Jahren wird es anders sein,  
Wenn sich der Most auch ganz absurd gebärdet,  
Es giebt zuletzt doch noch 'nen Wein.

It is true the fermentation of the student days evaporates, not infrequently with astonishing rapidity; but the wine is in consequence often not the best. Of many it may be said:

Verfliegen ist der Spiritus,  
Das Pflagma ist geblieben.

It is enough to have suggested the false and deceptive notions of freedom. True freedom, however, we insist, is that alone which Plato contrasts with the unbridledness of desires; the rule of the divine part of the soul over the lusts and desires, the feelings and passions of the "irrational" part. The purpose of academic freedom is to achieve this inner freedom in the battle with oneself and one's environment.

✓ 2. *Honor.* Next to freedom in the student's estimation of life's ideals stands honor. In what does it consist, in what does he glory?

Honor in the objective sense is the estimate in which the individual is held by his fellows, hence, in this case, by his fellow students. On what does high esteem depend in this sphere? Essentially on three things, in my opinion: courage, independence, and veracity.

✓ Courage is the first. Cowardice is a fatal reproach to a student. The ability to defend his honor if necessary, even with a weapon in his hand, is a demand which his fellows make, first and foremost. The man, the man in the making, demands of himself, and the demand is made on him, that he be ready to stand up for himself and everything he holds dear. A man without courage, a man who is not ready to risk his life for a cause that is worth it, does not deserve the name of a man. By





which is not meant, we hope, a contentious spirit or, worse still, a love of brawling which tries to pick quarrels with everybody simply in order to furnish a proof of courage; real love of honor demands the respect of others' honor no less than the defense of one's own.

Nor should it be forgotten that courage, manliness (*ἀνδρεία*) in the full sense of the term, implies not only the power to resist danger and harm, but also pleasure and desire. To be a slave to pleasure is no less degrading than to be a slave to fear. Courage in the full sense is the manly sovereignty of the will over the nature-side of our being. This applies especially to the control of the sexual appetites. Here also a battle is to be fought and an honor to be defended, the honor of the spiritual self in the battle against the natural impulses, the triumph of which results in every kind of degradation and forces the individual into the most disgraceful society.<sup>1</sup>

Independence is the second quality. I mean independence of will and judgment with regard to the demands of honor: the independence to follow one's own convictions of what is right and good and proper, not to bow to opinion because it is the dominating opinion, or to might because it has the power. It is plain that the student's sense of honor also aims at this. For we will surely be permitted to interpret thus the demand of academic youths to be measured by their own standards, as well as their cheerful and exuberant disregard of all kinds of conventional requirements of public opinion and society. And society makes these concessions as "following necessarily from the premises"; if the pupil is to become a man of independent thought and action during these years, he cannot be hemmed in by narrow barriers, he must have room to try to regulate his life himself and to rely upon his own judgment. The life of the student is, therefore, in the words of E. M. Arndt, "a life of poetic freedom and equality, a self-sufficient and self-controlled life without compulsion and without sin, in which the spiritual world stretches out immeasurably before him, and in which every exuberant pleasure or every youthful act of daring

<sup>1</sup> I call attention to a lecture by the physiologist, A. Herzen (Lausanne): *Wissenschaft und Sittlichkeit* (German translation, Leipzig, 1900).





is not confronted by a toll-bar and a watchman to drive him with staffs and pikes into the path of common custom and common virtue."

It will be an excellent thing if the fruit of these years is a proud and independent mind which bows in reverence to what is good and great, and refuses to honor and imitate what is base, even when it appears in the form of might.

To be sure, I cannot wholly rid myself of the fear that the age of "material politics," the traces of which are everywhere recognizable in the life of the German people, has also found favor and influence with the studying youth; they, too, have learned to esteem wealth and ostentation, to value outer appearances and conventional forms, to ape the customs of high society and to develop a mania for "correctness." I confess, the Philistine solicitude with which many circles insist upon what they call "good form," seems to me less in keeping with student ideals than the excessive indifference in these matters, which was formerly not uncommon among students. It at least showed courage on their part to apply their own standards as against prevailing custom. The all too ready acquiescence in the demands of talmi-elegance for "correctness" does not allow us to expect much independence of judgment and character later on, and when all these things are purchased at the price of privation and distress at home, this compliance with opinion becomes disgraceful servitude, nay, a thoroughly dishonorable frame of mind. "Cheerful poverty," on the other hand, is a proud affair; the ability to be surpassed by others in outward show, without feeling envy and without loss of pride, is really an evidence of a noble mind. Goethe's lines express it:

Ich bin ein armer Mann,  
Schätze mich nicht gering;  
Die Armut ist ein ehrlich Ding,  
Wer mit umgehen kann.

And connected with this is the ability to judge a man according to his inner worth, independently of wealth and rank. The aforesaid talmi-elegance usually goes hand in hand with plebeian arrogance towards plain people and with pliant submissiveness to power and wealth. In this respect also the German student





possessed a higher sense of freedom in the first half of the nineteenth century than is often the case now. We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world; the man who first uttered these words had the right to say them. But among those who speak them after him are, I fear, only too many who are afraid of everything in the world but God, who are afraid of society and public opinion, of money and rank, of everybody who may at some time be useful to them or harmful to them; yes, of every man of the people, even though he can do nothing but turn up his nose.

A word on making debts may not be out of place. I mean the frivolous making of debts which is the result of living beyond one's means. Debts mean a loss of freedom and honor; these are given in pawn to the lender. But whoever makes debts without the intention of paying back is at heart a thief. E. M. Arndt tells us somewhere in his *Wanderungen und Wandelungen mit dem Freiherrn von Stein* that von Stein did not think much of a niece of his whose extravagance had led her into debt: "Like his friend Niebuhr, he looked upon wise, old-fashioned customs and economy as an essential part of civic virtue; with the old Persians he believed that a man in debt would at last necessarily become a liar and a slave of men still worse than himself."

Finally the third point; veracity and frankness are among the things on which honor depends. Indeed, it is felt by the student's sense of honor that falsehood and breach of faith are, next to cowardice, the most disgraceful reproach. And frankness, too, may be reckoned among the qualities which youth esteems; the quick, frank word, the opinion spoken right out, even when it hurts, is preferred to a too cautious, calculating nature enveloped in a diplomatic coating. There is an instinctive feeling that openness and straightforwardness have value for a community which aims to make independent men of its members through free self-government.

But a still higher relation to the truth is demanded of the student: when he enters the university he theoretically places himself in the service of the truth. To seek for it and appropriate it is the first duty, to apply it and make it fruitful if he can, the further task of every one who considers





himself worthy to be counted among the *clerus* of the nation. Love of truth and courage of conviction would then be the qualities peculiar to the disciple of science; love of truth: pleasure in investigation and work, the impulse to woo and battle for truth; and courage to tell the truth: the will to stand up for the truth even when no one wants it, even when it arouses hatred and enmity and brings one contempt and derision.

Let Fichte express this thought with his impressive pathos: "It is a refreshing, soul-stirring thought which every one among you can have who is worthy of his vocation: To me, too, in my sphere, the civilization of my age and the following ages is entrusted. . . . I am called to bear witness to the truth; my life and my fortunes amount to nothing, the effects of my life amount to infinitely much. I am a priest of the truth; I am in her service; I have bound myself to do and to dare and to suffer everything for her. Should I be persecuted and hated for her sake, should I even die in her service, what should I be doing that is remarkable, what should I be doing further than what I simply had to do?

"I frankly confess, in the position in which Providence has placed me I should like to contribute something to diffuse among men a manlier mode of thought, a stronger sense of dignity and worth, a more ardent zeal to fulfill their mission, be the danger what it may, wherever the German language extends and farther, if I could; so that when you will have left these halls and will have been scattered over the entire land, I shall know you to be men, in whatever parts of the world you may live, men whose chosen friend is truth; who receive her when she is driven out by the whole world; who publicly protect her when she is slandered and calumniated; who for her sake cheerfully endure the slyly disguised hatred of the great, the shallow smiles of the foolish, and the pitying shrugs of the narrowminded."<sup>1</sup>

That would be honor in the true and noble sense of the word—to deem oneself worthy of a great task and to prove oneself worthy of it. The applause of the multitude and the honor achieved by outward show and money, will always have their lovers, only they ought not to be found among the spiritually free, not among students.

<sup>1</sup> *Bestimmung des Gelehrten*, fourth lecture.





## CHAPTER II

## REGULATION OF STUDIES AND FREEDOM OF LEARNING

1. *Preparatory Training.* The requirements for admission to university work are now fixed throughout Germany by public regulations. For full entrance at a university with the subsequent privilege of admission to the examinations and offices, all the German states now require the certificate of ripeness or fitness (*Reifezeugniss*), which is won by passing the final state examination in a higher school of nine grades. As a matter of fact the completion of the course in such a school regularly precedes the examination, although persons who obtained their preparatory training in some other way, perhaps in private institutions, are also admitted to the examinations, but their number is small.

The establishment of this system, the so-called *Abiturientenprüfung*, came about gradually during the last century, beginning with the first regulation for such an examination, held under the direction of a state commissioner in Prussia in 1788. I shall not rehearse the several stages of development; how the traditional entrance examination was for a while allowed as a substitute for the final school examination, but was gradually abolished, in fact, had to be abolished, if the latter was to be taken seriously. Nor shall I describe how the new forms of the nine-grade institution came into existence by the side of the old classical *gymnasium*: the *Realgymnasium*, without Greek, the *Ober-Realschule*, without any ancient language at all; and how they gradually obtained their demand for the admission of their graduates to the higher schools, and finally to the universities, even though a few restrictions are still in force. This was not less a matter of necessity. At the beginning of the twentieth century the ancient languages are not





necessary to the extent or in the degree in which they were at the beginning of the nineteenth century, nor do they form an adequate basis for scientific study. Mathematics and the natural sciences, the ability to see and observe, and a knowledge of the modern languages, have increased extraordinarily in importance. The rise and recognition of the new forms of the gymnasium were, therefore, an unavoidable necessity. Of course, it is self-evident to every one who knows anything about the universities that some knowledge of the Latin is still indispensable for every one who attends them.<sup>1</sup>

This system which makes admission to the universities dependent upon graduation from a higher school (passing the so-called *Abiturientenprüfung*)—though without the certificate of maturity it is indeed possible to matriculate and hear lectures, but without the privilege of taking either the state or university examination—now seems to be almost self-evident to us. And it has, beyond all doubt, such great advantages that a return to the freedom in vogue in other countries, America and France, for example, where the old entrance examinations as well as the final examinations of the secondary schools admit to the university, is entirely impossible for us. It is only through this system of final school examinations that the student, on the one hand, and the faculties, on the other, are really secured against entirely insufficient preparation. Of course, even our certificate of maturity is no safe guarantee of the capacity and the strength of will required for scientific studies; every year the examinations are passed by young men whose success is due entirely to mere patience and strong external helps. Nevertheless they assure us against wholly inferior elements; it is without doubt true that the mere prospect of these examinations deters a large number of those who are entirely incapable or wholly lacking in determination from the university and the professions requiring a university education, who, under more favorable external circumstances, would be able to enter. I will not here try to decide whether this purpose could not be secured without laying

<sup>1</sup>A detailed description of this movement has been given in my *Geschichte des Gelehrtenunterrichts*. My views on the requirements and the latest regulations are developed in an article, *Die höheren Schulen und das Universitätsstudium im 20. Jahrhundert*, 1900.





such strong emphasis upon the governmental character of the examination as is customary in Prussia.

But, while we are indebted to our well organized system for the assurance that we can presuppose in our students a certain degree of knowledge and a certain amount of experience and practice in intellectual work, there is also, it must be admitted, an element of danger in it. This is due to our rigid adhesion to the scholastic method, which, because of the prospective final examination, ties the student down to the very last day, and is so strict that the pupil in the upper class, who is from eighteen to twenty years old, is treated, kept at work, and supervised, just like a boy learning the elements in the lowest class; like him, the former is daily given a number of scholastic tasks to be handed in at certain definite times. Naturally, the examinations demand uniform training, and this is secured by uniform lessons, and this again by means of daily supervision.

As a result a phenomenon is often met with now-a-days in the highest grade of our gymnasia which may be described as school-weariness. It is something like the inertia due to official routine, and the work is done only with unwilling industry under the pressure of the approaching examination. When, finally, the examination has been passed, this "tired feeling" finds relief in that stretching of the limbs observable in animals that have been long in harness; the school-harness has been laid aside, and there must be recuperation, if not from overwork (for it was certainly not always too heavy), at least from the compulsion so long endured.

Assuredly, the transition from the school to the university has always had its difficulties, but I believe they have been increased by the adoption of the system of final examinations. Formerly the transition was more gradual; the higher grade of schools were somewhat less rigid in their system, larger concessions were made to personal inclination and individual talent, and, on the other hand the beginning of the university course was more scholastic. A student coming to Leipzig from the old *Schulpforta*, a hundred years ago, did not find a very great difference; at school he had enjoyed some free days for study, tried his hand at modest independent efforts, perhaps taken his leave with a more ambitious valedictory; at the uni-





versity he would at once find incentives to continue his work on a larger scale as a theologian or philologist. Since then the distance between school and university, in respect to form, method, and material of work, has developed into a chasm, the bridging of which is exceedingly difficult. Not a few labor at the task in vain, only to reënforce the army of stragglers, self-opinionated, malcontents, and failures.

This system in the form in which it has developed among us cannot now be undone. But our view of the situation will become clearer by a comparison of our own system with foreign and different ones. In America, where everything still is more flexible than in old Europe, a peculiar combination of English and German forms has grown up. Between the school proper and the university proper—the *graduate school*—there has been inserted an intermediate grade, the *college*. The four years spent at college are usually those between 17 and 21; they answer, therefore, to the last years at school and the first years at the university with us. And the methods and customs correspond to the dual nature of the college: they are no longer entirely those of the school and not entirely those of the university. The young people are students, they no longer live at home, but neither are they left entirely to shift for themselves, but live in the college. During the first two years their work is mainly modelled after that of the schools, but besides the required subjects there are also some electives. During the last two years the freedom allowed is greater and the instruction, which specially covers the philosophical sciences, approaches the academic form, but in such a way that the scholastic relation existing between teachers and pupils is retained.

I will allow an American, who is also familiar with the German conditions, to express himself concerning the value of this form. Professor Emerton (in the article already mentioned on page 71 summarizes his opinion as follows: "But the peculiar meaning and value of the American college has consisted, not so much in its studies as in the form of life under which these have been pursued. No American college has ever been successfully developed in a great city. The typical college is a rural institution. The essential thing in its discipline is that the youth leaves his home and during four years enters into





a life which, in spite of many limitations, is on the whole one in which he plays his part as an independent self-reliant individual. He lives in association with a multitude of other youths of similar habits and similar aims. He gives himself up during these four years to the happy traditions by which the early lives of the men he has been taught to reverence were formed; but he learns also that he is in so far responsible for himself. His life is, in the main, guided and sheltered, but he is made to feel the necessity of independent action. He comes out of his four years of mingled work and play without a specific preparation for anything whatever, but, if he has used his time wisely, ready for any kind of further training he may select."

We cannot, as has been said, get away from the institutions which have grown up among us. But I fail to see what would prevent us from essentially approximating this system in our methods, and it seems that we are moving in that direction. The placing of the three forms of the gymnasia on a basis of equality already shows that the old rigid demand for an "all-sided education," to realize which the Prussian gymnasial system was first inaugurated by Johannes Schulze, can no longer be maintained. Elective courses have also made their appearance, as well as the system of compensation in the *Abiturientenprüfung*. Let us go still further, let us accentuate the division in our class system between the upper and middle classes (*Unter- and Obersekunda*); let us give more scope in our upper grade to individual talent and initiative, so that special zeal and success in one branch, or in a group of related branches, will condone for a relative lack of success in other branches not so well adapted to the student's capacity and inclination. For example, let us reduce the requirements in mathematics in the gymnasia for those who do not like this branch, with the proviso, however, that they do correspondingly better work in the ancient languages; or, on the other hand, let us abate somewhat our insistence upon correct Latin in the case of those whose talents point them to mathematics and physics. Or, better still, let us form a select class in each group into which it would be an honor to be received. It is the spontaneity of acquisition which gives value to knowledge, not the extent and uniformity of its possession, not the much praised "all-sidedness."





The university can also make an effort to bridge the chasm from its side. And here too the process has already begun; the constant increase of exercises, especially the establishment and perfection of exercise courses for beginners (of which more will have to be said later on), in addition to the seminars for the advanced students, will be serviceable for this purpose.

✓ 2. *Academic Regulation of Studies.* In Germany this is limited, in the main, to a requirement for residence and a fixed number of semesters for the several branches. For the rest, and in contrast to the fixed gymnasial courses, the individual has almost unlimited freedom: the arrangement and sequence of studies, as well as the choice of subjects, lectures, and exercises, and finally and especially the use of the offered instruction, are all really left to individual choice. The university demands merely that a student shall register for at least one lecture course in each semester, not that he shall attend. Even the rules for the examinations touch upon the question of preparation usually in such a general way that there is abundant room for interpretation. Thus, in the most recent regulations for the upper-master's examinations (*Oberlehrerprüfung*) in Prussia (1898) one of the evidences of "due preparation" is stated to be "that the candidate, unless he has a special excuse, shall have taken part in those lectures and exercises most essential to his specialty, and shall have heard, in addition, several lectures of a general educational character." And the commission is given to understand that the candidate must be rejected when such evidence is not forthcoming. But so far as I am aware no attention is paid to this rule. Its indefiniteness will scarcely permit its application. It can, therefore, accomplish very little more than make the student careful to obtain the official signature of the professors at the beginning and end of a few lecture courses which are supposed to meet the requirement. He can attend them or not, as he pleases. The regulations for the juridical and medical examinations do, indeed, go a step further in that they prescribe certain lectures and exercises as indispensable.

The question might be raised whether, in view of such a wide exercise of personal choice, it would not be advisable to take still another step and do away also with the requirement for





residence. The state, it might be argued, could appoint examiners, and draw up rules for examinations, making the requirements equal to those which must be met by candidates for office or for admission to a profession, but leaving it to the individual himself to decide where and how he shall acquire his knowledge. If he sees fit to use a university for this purpose, well and good; but why interfere with him if he is convinced that in his case some other school, or perhaps no school at all, but purely independent study of scientific literature, would be more suitable? Why compel him to reside at a university and pay fees for matriculation and lectures, when he can, in no case, be compelled to use the instruction offered by the university? Is it impossible to learn philosophy and philology or jurisprudence and theology from books only? Are not many of the university lectures hardly more than a meager repetition as compared with the best books? Has not a capable young man the right to pass them by and apply himself to the sources of knowledge? Or rather, every one already actually has that right, yes, even the right, if he wishes, to satisfy his thirst for science at any secondary spring or rivulet; how many annually pass the examinations with knowledge picked up here and there? Why, then, the compulsion to live at a university? Is it merely to assure the professors their fees and to fill the lodging-houses and the hotels of the university town?

As a matter of fact, it cannot be denied that earnest and fruitful pursuit of the sciences is possible outside of the university and without the auxiliaries of academic instruction. In England this is not at all infrequently the case. Men like J. S. Mill and H. Spencer never attended a university. Nor would I, under all circumstances, advise a mature man in Germany, who, from pure interest in the subject, had determined to study some science, like philosophy, or law, or political science, to go to a university for that purpose and hear lectures. Nevertheless, the requirement of university study as a prerequisite for admission to the state examination does not seem to me to be groundless. The state must make its arrangements in a general way, knowing in advance that there will be exceptions to which they are not adapted. But that, generally, academic instruction is the quickest and best way to secure a scientific





education, such as is required by the learned professions, does not seem to me to be a matter of doubt; nor does any one, excepting such a thorough-going despiser of these institutions as Dühring, deny this. The thing is perfectly plain in the case of subjects which require a large equipment of apparatus, like medicine and the natural sciences. But for the other departments also the university with its lectures and exercises, libraries and laboratories and, not to be forgotten, its entire intellectual atmosphere, its stimulating intercourse with kindred spirits, societies, etc., cannot easily be dispensed with.

And it ought not to be forgotten that while these requirements restrict, they also, at the same time, often insure real freedom. Compulsory education limits the personal choice of both parents and children; but in reality it assures the independence of both in that it guarantees schools even in a poor or indifferent community, secures an education for the children by putting it beyond the control of childish folly on the one hand or the shortsightedness and selfishness of parents on the other. And it is precisely in the same way that the obligation to take a university course protects one's freedom against one's own or another's lack of judgment. If the method of preparation for the state examinations were left to each individual's choice, the student would not infrequently be tempted to avoid the expensive university course by preparing privately at home; nor would it be impossible, provided the examining commission was absolutely indifferent as to where the candidate and his knowledge came from, for establishments to grow up by the side of the universities which would offer the quickest, surest, and cheapest preparation for the examinations. Enterprises of this kind, it is well known, are not now entirely wanting, although the requirement for university training prevents them from posing as legitimate and normal forms of "scientific" education.

Academic study also, at the same time, secures a certain similarity in general intellectual culture, a kind of uniformity of thought and feeling. The learned professions could certainly not afford to remain indifferent if entrance to them could be had through all kinds of side doors. It is well known how long and effectively they opposed the recognition of other





schools by the side of the gymnasia, in the interest of "the honor of the profession"; would they not oppose the setting aside of the university much more vehemently? And not without reason, in this instance; the consciousness of a kind of corporative unity which the members of the learned professions carry with them into office from the university is not without value.

3. *Election and Compulsion.* The course of study at a German university is based upon the principle of freedom of learning (*Lernfreiheit*), which is the correlate of freedom of teaching (*Lehrfreiheit*). Aside from a fixed period of study, almost everything is left to individual choice; there is no prescribed course of study, with intermediate examinations, as at the French faculties; each student selects the branches which he wishes to study in each semester, and attendance upon the lectures depends solely upon his own volition; the freedom of learning is so extensive that it actually includes the freedom not to learn or do anything.

There is no lack of abuse of this liberty. Blunders are made sometimes on account of ignorance; many an *Abgangszeugniss* (testimonial given the student upon leaving a university) reveals at first glance, by the sequence and choice of the lectures and exercises, the student's perplexity in selecting them.

And few will avoid making mistakes in the choice and order of lectures; almost every one, arrived at the end of his course, is conscious that he could have done many things better than he did. Nor is there lacking abuse of this liberty from the want of an earnest will; frivolity, inordinate love of pleasure, and laziness lead many a one into a life of inane folly, from which it is impossible to escape until it is almost or entirely too late.

And first, a word or two concerning the student's helplessness in the choice and sequence of lectures and exercises. It would seem that this could be obviated by an official regulation of the course of study. In the juridical and medical faculties the examination regulations give a few general directions, and, as a matter of fact, it is perfectly possible to apply the principle of correlation of studies, which stands out so prominently here, to the regular sequence of subjects, at least in general outline. On the whole, the fluctuations of personal choice will here be con-





fined within comparatively narrow limits by the circumstances of the case. And in opposition to the inclination to make the course too rigid, it may be said that science has many approaches, this one is easier for one, this one for another, according to inclination and talent. Moreover, the liberty to pass freely from one institution to another, to which our university system owes so much, makes a rigid regulation of the course impossible: no one will wish to hinder a student who has the opportunity of hearing an excellent instructor, from taking a course of lectures under him somewhat before the time and postponing, to do so, another course for another university. All this applies still more to the theological and philosophical faculties: to fix the sequence of studies here in an obligatory course would be an unqualified evil. There can be, of course, no objection to an optional schedule of studies, such as was formerly often suggested to students at matriculation. But even the adoption of an official schedule of studies by the faculties would meet with serious difficulties. And a required course would be simply impossible. The individual must be left to find his own way, though this does not mean that he should not seek private advice; it rather presupposes it. If he happens to select a roundabout way, well, the direct way is not the one from which most of the surrounding country can be seen. If only one arrives at the goal, byways and roundabout ways will do no harm. Goethe has a kind word to say about the usefulness of such mistakes, and he certainly was no friend of error or of getting lost. He once said to Eckermann: "It is a good thing to seek and to go astray, for by seeking and straying we learn. And one learns not merely the bare fact, but all the circumstances. What would I know about plants and color if my theory had been handed over to me ready-made, and I had learned it off by heart? But because I had to seek and find everything myself, and occasionally had to go astray, I can now say that I know something about both these things, and more, too, than I have put upon paper." (III, 73.)

As to the second point: the lack of an earnest purpose to make the right use of academic freedom. The fact that it is abused by many students has forced upon anxious government officials and representatives, heads of families and university





professors, the problem whether this freedom might not be safeguarded against such abuse. Could not a lack of individual will power be supplemented by means of supervision, honors, compulsory attendance upon lectures, more frequent examinations, obligatory exercises, and similar things? There need not necessarily be the compulsion of the schools, but a little assistance might be given to young people who, as they themselves recognize, still have too little will-power to decide for themselves what is really needed. The consequence is, that many students miss the real value of the academic course: the first semesters are as good as lost and the last ones must then be employed in a hurried acquisition of the knowledge needed for the examination.

The evil really exists, even though its extent is not seldom much exaggerated; I refer the reader to what has already been said above upon this point (p. 200). But I do not think very much of the methods by which it is proposed to remedy it; I fear the looks of the thing, and its concomitant effects. If we really wish to maintain our freedom of learning, if we do not desire a system of university instruction modelled after that of the schools, we must have the courage to desire a thorough-going freedom at the cost of any possible abuse of it. We must recognize that freedom without the possibility of its abuse is an impossibility. There is only one possible and necessary counterpoise to freedom: a strict state examination. In my opinion this is the only really effective outward incentive to study, and it is effective simply because it is not an arbitrarily imposed one, but made necessary by the very nature of the case. The state examination has a pedagogical effect, just because it is not intended to be pedagogical, because it does not call to mind the regulations of school-discipline and school-supervision; the educating power of reality is in it. Concerning those other methods through which it is proposed to assist the student, I would offer the following suggestions:

1. All the proposed methods of supervision would be substantially ineffective. Young men between the ages of nineteen and twenty-five cannot be compelled to learn, much less, to do scientific work. That plan does very well in the schools, where they are under control, and where the influence of the home is





still potent. And it is really a question whether it works there, especially in the highest grade. But it in no wise applies to the university; unless, indeed, we should go back to the Middle Ages, and housed the students in colleges and burses. If this is impossible, if we neither can nor wish completely to transform the entire external and internal form of our university life, as it has grown up during the last two hundred years, we cannot expect to make students diligent by supervision and compulsion.

Schmoller once suggested that a record be kept of the student's attendance upon lectures and the results be forwarded to his parents at the end of each semester (as is the present practice in France): there should be full liberty to loaf, but the facts should be made known.<sup>1</sup> Even if the suggestion were a practicable one—which it is not—how could this system of control be carried out in the large universities? By calling the roll? Shall the instructor do that, or shall some university official note down the absentees either at the door or while the lecture is going on? Or shall each student present sign his name in a record? Or, granted that the thing is practicable, how would it affect the students themselves? It would certainly not be edifying; on the contrary, it would arouse a feeling of humiliation and resentment, even on the part of the maturest and most efficient, which would certainly not be favorable to hard work. For others it would be an incentive to get their names upon the roll in all sorts of surreptitious ways, all of which could not be circumvented by the authorities, and the result would be that idleness would be protected by positive testimonials of industry and surrounded with the semblance of duty well done. Shall we then attempt to control studiousness by means of examinations at the end of each semester or term? How would it be possible, again especially at the large universities, to carry such a plan into effect, to examine all the students in all branches, either orally or in writing, without either wearing out the examiners, or bringing the examinations into contempt? And all this entirely aside from the effects upon the persons examined: passive resistance and deadening of the desire for knowledge on the part of the ablest and most efficient, mere routine work on the part of the

<sup>1</sup> Schmoller, *Jahrbücher für Gesetzgebung*, 1886, p. 612.





mediocre, make-belief and fraud on the part of the dishonest. It would be incumbent upon us to go a step further and have small, separate classes with regular work, instead of the freely-chosen lectures; in other words, we should have to transform the university into a school.

2. The suggestion to make obligatory exercises the center of instruction points in this direction. The proposition is to compel participation in certain exercises during each semester, and to require written work which is to be graded by the instructor, under the penalty of loss of credit for the entire semester. Such a suggestion, so far as I can learn, was first submitted by Rümelin, and intended for the jurists.<sup>1</sup> It seems to have formed the basis for the regulation of 1897, governing the preliminary law examination in Prussia, which makes it incumbent upon the student when he presents himself for examination, to offer proof of participation in at least three prescribed exercises in the form of testimonials and corrected papers. Subsequently, in a work already alluded to, Bernheim suggested the extension of the practice to the other faculties; only such semesters in which a sufficient amount of work has been duly reviewed by the instructors, should receive credit.

It must be admitted that this method is, under certain circumstances, as in the case of the jurists, less open to objections than the others, more especially because its provisions are directly connected with the state examinations. But, nevertheless, I cannot regard as wholesome the general introduction of compulsory participation in the exercises, especially for all semesters; and Bernheim himself seems to have receded from this position. The main argument against it is this. The character of the scientific exercises at a university depends essentially upon the fact that the few who participate in them do so voluntarily, although self-evidently a certain degree of supervision of the attendance of those who register, for example, by rejecting those whose sole aim it was to get credit for the course, may be exercised at the option of the director. They would, however, lose much of their character and value, both for the instructors and students, if by fixed regulation they should be transformed into compulsory exercises for all. This is especially true of the philosophical

<sup>1</sup> *Jahrbücher für Gesetzgebung*, pp. 1097 ff.





faculty, where at present a select number of students are attracted to certain teachers by a desire for real scientific work. But if all, even the unwilling ones, were compelled to take part, the entire life of such classes would be disturbed; in place of voluntary attempts at scientific work, we should have, in part, at least, the compulsory tasks of the schools, in which neither instructor nor students could find any pleasure; instead of the university with its independent societies and labors there would be classes like those in the schools, with a prescribed amount of preparation, exercises, corrected papers, and all the disagreeable things connected with them.

So far as I have been able to learn, the jurist's delight in the new regulations is by no means an unmixed one; aside from an excessive burden of cheerless work for the conductor—a colleague assured me that he had to correct and grade 7,000 folio pages in a single semester—the results for the participants are often very meagre; the same colleague told me that formerly there were a few efficient papers, but now he received a mass of mediocre work of little value.

One thing more. Can the undesirable incidental effects of compulsion be avoided? Will attempts at dishonesty be prevented? Will not factories for the production of such compulsory exercises come into existence? I hear that such institutions have already become active among the law students. And will not the relations between colleagues be unpleasantly disturbed when the students discover the different meanings of the necessary "satisfactory" or the desired "good" as used by different instructors, and select their courses accordingly? Would it not then become necessary, in order to prevent friction, to determine upon a maximum of attendance upon lectures and exercises? And ultimately we should have to exercise a kind of control over the marking systems, like that which the school director exercises over the grades of the gymnasium teacher. Thus here again the result would be to transform the university into a school with fixed classes and a definite course of study. The joy of the academic instructor, who would have to supervise young men of the age of our students, may readily be pictured! The relation between teachers and students is now throughout so wholesome because it is a voluntary one: the student who





cannot get what he wants in the lecture room remains away, a proceeding in all respects better for him and all concerned than a forced physical presence on his part.

And this also would have to be considered. If, instead of voluntary lectures and scientific exercises, obligatory exercises and compulsory work were substituted, would men who amount to anything as scientific investigators and writers be willing to become university instructors? Does any one really believe that men like Wolf and Boeckh, Ranke and Waitz, Savigny and Gneist, J. Müller and Helmholtz would consent to spend their lives in setting tasks and correcting work for reluctant participants in compulsory exercises? What the elimination of such names from a university would mean need not be further discussed. If you turn the university into a school—well, then it ceases to be what it has been thus far: a place for scientific investigation; the distinguished scholars and investigators would retire to the Academy, and the same separation that now exists in France would come about here.

But all this need not imply that there is any objection to allowing the work that has been examined and passed upon by the director of the exercises to be considered in the examination; it ought at least to be permitted to submit such work; two excellent papers would, naturally, be a recommendation in any examination. And perhaps a further step could be taken by allowing the examining commission to give credit for such work, just as is now done in the case of the thesis. It may be taken for granted that a piece of work which has grown out of the exercises would furnish a better guarantee of independent thought and scientific capacity than an essay on almost any prescribed subject, hastily put together in six weeks with the help of all sorts of literature.

3. There is still a third argument against compulsory studies. Even if supervision and control should always bring about the desired result: even if an average amount of industry could be produced in that way and all the students could be guarded against failure in the examinations—as is now to some extent done in the final school examinations—even then we should not desire them. One of the principal objects of academic study would be frustrated: the university would cease





to be the school of independence that it now is. The student ought to learn the difficult art of controlling himself, of working spontaneously, so to speak; and this can not be acquired under compulsion. An Englishman once asked me: How does it happen that the Germans, who usually lay so much stress on regulation in the school and in life, allow the university student such unconditional freedom, much more than in England? I replied that it was probably due to the instructor's feeling that it was necessary at some time to throw the individual on his own resources if he was to become a man. The years at the university are the test which decides whether a young fellow has in him the making of a man who can guide and rule himself, and then also others. Whoever does not learn this is ruined and is in this way eliminated. This is, of course, a bitter experience for those concerned. But for the state it is a needful guarantee against an irrational society. In spite of the loudest protests of nature the young fellow has been pushed and whipped through the gymnasium; now he is sent to the university, merely that he may afterwards be thrust upon the state as an applicant for office. But here a man who has too little to offer, either in the way of intellectual gifts or energy of will, makes a failure; which is not a loss for society, but rather a guarantee against intellectual and moral insufficiency. The parents usually place the blame upon the university: it did not know how to attract him and make him work. Assuredly, it did not, as it is the duty of the gymnasium to do, force and push him; but neither did it beg him to come: it only invites those who, as wooers, court the gifts which it offers.

I am well aware that by this process even young men, who, with proper care, would have developed into very serviceable officials, come to grief and ruin. They represent the price which we must pay for the school of freedom. It is costly, but cannot be had for less; the young must be exposed to such risks if we are to have men. The university is not a kindergarten; nor is it skilled in the art of "educating a young prince, who has a horror of all study, so that he will, nevertheless, become learned and clever." The individual must depend upon himself, upon his own will. And the more plainly each one is given to understand that no one will be responsible for him, that no one will





drive him, that, no matter how he carries on or what he does, it is always at his own risk, so much the better! Let there be no illusive security! If he goes wrong, the university cannot prevent it; she may perhaps quietly console herself with the thought that even error is not without profit to a man who, by his own effort, finds the way back to the right road. By weathering the storms the tree grows sturdy, and in conflict with himself and the world the youth develops into a man.

Such is the attitude of the German university. And it is this very feature which, in later life, arouses the true man's gratitude that he was not led about by the hand like a schoolboy, but was allowed to find his own way. He feels that forces were awakened in him which enabled him to see for himself and to depend upon himself. Not the teachers only—he will have been fortunate if, here and there, one of them succeeded in throwing a little light upon his path—but the entire university, its life and its environment, everything taught him self-dependence, everything called out to him: to allow yourself to be pushed and pulled along amounts to nothing; what you are to be depends upon your own will.

Since this question touches the very heart of the German university, two classical witnesses shall add their testimony on this point.

H. von Sybel, in his rectoral address on the character of the German universities says: "It is impossible to overestimate the advantage in favor of our universities in having for their essential aim the complete emancipation of manhood. In the lower schools authority necessarily controls the individual in every direction; in later life practice and, consequently, authority, again control a considerable portion of his existence. But every educated man on German soil should experience at least one moment of life when all the organs of authority, even the nation, the state, and his instructors proclaim, as the supreme demand upon him, the injunction to be intellectually a free man." And Schleiermacher in his *Gelegentliche Gedanken* (p. 110) declares that learning is not the real purpose of the university, but the purpose is "to arouse, if possible, an entirely new life, a higher, truly scientific spirit in the youths. But this cannot be done by compulsion; the attempt can only be





made in the atmosphere of complete intellectual freedom, even speaking generally, but especially among Germans and with Germans. Just as a human being can be brought under the law of love and faith only by love and faith, and by assuming him to be susceptible of these things, and not by means of any kind of force or the compulsion of external exercises; so likewise he can be brought to science and knowledge, which deliver him from the service of all authority, only by influencing him through knowledge and through nothing else. And we Germans, especially, the avowed worshippers not only of freedom, but of each individual's peculiar form of it, who have never believed in a universal form and means of knowing and believing, nor in a single infallible method of achieving them, what can we do but assume that this higher spirit of knowledge will reveal itself in each one in a peculiar way? How can we assume aught else (and prove it by our institutions) than that the process can by no possibility be regulated in a mechanical way, but must in all respects reveal the character of freedom? Hence we cannot but deal with everything that pertains to it in an extremely delicate manner."

4. *Experiences under the Principle of Compulsory Studies.* Because in spite of all that has been said the idea will scarcely become extinct that it must be possible by some means of gentle compulsion to limit laziness and propagate industry, I shall, in conclusion, mention some of the experiences of other nations in this field, for the use and profit of future defenders of the principle of freedom.

At the Austrian universities the old system of compulsion with required attendance upon certain lectures, more especially general philosophical courses, was in vogue from the time of the old Jesuit organization down into the nineteenth century. In 1781, Friedrich Nicolai, the distinguished Aufklärer of Berlin, had occasion to observe its effect at the University of Vienna; what he saw is thus described in the record of his travels (IV. pp. 57 ff): In the philosophical lecture room there were about 200 hearers; the lecture was good, interesting and comprehensible, but the listeners behaved themselves like boys. "Some were lying on the benches, others chattered, others gaped about like children, others dozed. All this is allowed, but in order





that these budding lovers of wisdom shall not become too noisy and disturb the professor, a mature student known as the *fiscus philosophiae* is seated behind a railing, beside the lecturer's desk, and rises, whenever the noise becomes too great, and reminds the students of their obligations to the teacher."

The compulsory system also continued in vogue in the old Bavarian university. The second volume of Friedrich Thiersch's work, *Ueber gelehrte Schulen mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Bayern* (1827), is principally devoted to the demonstration of the inefficiency of this system, with its enforced attendance upon lectures and its "cramming" for the examinations, and to proving the necessity of adopting, for the revived university of Munich, the system of freedom in vogue in the northern institutions.

From Erlangen we have a report by K. von Raumer (*Geschichte der Pädagogik*; IV. pp. 240 ff) on the result of enforced attendance upon the philosophical lectures and the examinations connected with them, the so-called *Fuchsenexamina*; also one on the establishment of a board in Erlangen for the superintendence and guidance of the students of theology, which consisted of a professor assisted by four tutors, one for each year of the course, during 1833-1848. It was no less hateful and repugnant to the diligent student than to the lazy ones. He concludes: "We cannot be blind to the fact that the students look upon every attempt at superintendence and control of their studies by the authorities as an interference with their freedom, and therefore oppose it, no matter how well meant it might be."

A really typical example of a university course arranged with regard to pedagogical considerations is supplied by the French law faculties. There is a rigid curriculum in which the courses are prescribed for each year; there can be no chance of error in the choice of a teacher either, since there is always only one teacher for each subject; the instruction must be in accordance with a program which the instructor formerly received, complete, from the ministry of education, but which he must now submit to it for approval; attendance upon lectures and exercises is compulsory; an annual report of his progress is sent to the student's father (*bulletin scolaire*); finally, there is a graduated series of examinations, intimately connected with the





several courses: they are held annually in two parts by the professors, and in order to promotion to the next highest course they must be passed successfully; the examination is always only upon the work of the preceding year. And the result? With such scholastic rigidity it might be supposed that the average results could not but be highly satisfactory. But according to L. von Savigny's report (*Die französischen Rechtsfakultäten*, pp. 187 ff), which no one who expects anything from examinations during each semester should fail to read, even the purely external results are far from satisfactory. The percentage of failures is considerable; varying among the different faculties from one-third to one-ninth, it averages from one-fourth to one-fifth. Owing to the frequency of the examinations and the little time lost by failures in any one of them (early opportunity for re-examination is allowed), failure to pass is not taken seriously, is not looked upon as a serious catastrophe, as with us, but only as requiring a longer term in a class. The dean of the Parisian faculty thus describes the work done: The good papers are the exception; about one-third of the whole fairly good, and the great majority average and poor; many of the examinees are culpably ignorant, not a few enter the examination only for appearance' sake, without giving a single answer, merely to satisfy the requirements; a deplorable situation for the examinee, but more so for the examiner, who must sacrifice time and strength for the sake of a comedy. And how much time! In Paris each professor is compelled to devote from 400 to 600 hours annually to examinations, 6000 examinations being given.

I do not think we have cause to look with envy upon such results. But the effects of the system extend even further. The purely scholastic character of the examinations exerts a reflex influence upon the instruction given and the character of the work done by the students; these also become scholastic. Independent work and thought is never achieved, scarcely aimed at; the object is to learn by rote with the examinations in view. Hence the schoolboy-like way of looking at things that characterizes the student to the end, appearing even in the work done for the doctorate: mere reproduction, without any real independence and productive power.

Von Savigny thus closes his report: "If we must choose be-





tween the German system of uniting professional education with research work and the French system of their separation, we unqualifiedly adopt the German view, which seems to be more successful for scientific research as well as more truly and permanently advantageous for the professions."

And what about Russia? Here also are to be found official programs for the session; attendance is compulsory, and at the close of the year examinations are held and reports are made. And the result? One who is familiar with Russian conditions describes it as follows (in a book: *The Reform of the Russian Universities by the Law of 1884*, Leipzig, 1886): "The complaint is general that even after the middle of November the lecture rooms are deserted. From New Year to the end of February, a slight increase of the attendance is noticeable; but after that the preparation for the examinations leaves little time for lectures." "Lithographed lectures" play an important part in the entire system; they are bought at a stiff price and receive official recognition: the professor himself reviews the stenographic reports of his lectures in order to use them as a basis for the examinations (pp. 99 ff). There is, in addition, interesting but not very edifying information concerning the manner in which the examinations are conducted.

In conclusion a report from England and another from the United States. In his work on *Higher Schools and Universities in Germany* (1874), Matthew Arnold quotes from Laboulayes as follows: *Le pays à examens, l'Autriche, est précisément celui dans lequel on ne travaille pas*. He adds: "I do not say that in countries like Austria and England, where there is so little real love for the things of the mind, examinations may not be a protection from something worse. All I say is that a love for the things of the mind is what we want, and that examinations will never give it." And his conclusion is: "The French university has no liberty, and the English universities have no science; the German universities have both."

J. M. Hart, the American, in his work on *German Universities*, draws a parallel between the relation of the German professor to his hearers and that of the American professor to his students. "The chief drawback to the lot of a professor in America, namely, police-duty and discipline, does not exist in





Germany. He lectures only to those who are willing and able to hear. His relation to his hearers is that of one gentleman speaking to another. He is not in perpetual dread of hearing himself nicknamed, or seeing his features caricatured; his domestic repose is not disturbed by midnight serenades."

All of which goes to show that the infallible system which makes all the students reasonable, industrious and virtuous has not yet been invented; the German system of freedom does not do it. But the systems of restraint, supervision, and examinations accomplish as little; even the most careful precautions are unavailing. On the contrary, it is a question whether the strongest and most capable students who thrive under the free system, are not the very ones who would suffer under the system of restraint, and whether this latter would not be a worse injury than the former. Let it be admitted that our system is unsuitable for twenty or thirty out of every hundred who are not capable of freedom and never learn to use it aright. Suppose we changed it for the scholastic system, which also is unsuitable for from 10 to 20 per cent., but the 10 or 20 per cent. upon which our strength and hopes are based, the most independent, efficient and freest personalities: would we have gained by the exchange?

5. *The Length of the Course.* Since the close of the eighteenth century the length of the course in Prussia has been officially fixed at three years. And so it has thus far remained, except that three additional semesters were subsequently added in medicine, and more recently a fourth. For the jurists also a seventh semester is spoken of, to be secured, however, by a corresponding shortening of the practical probationary period. In Bavaria the *quadrennium* has long been the standard, originally on account of the shorter gymnasial course of eight years which prevails there; the first year at the university was intended to supplement the general scientific studies in the philosophical faculty.

As a matter of fact the length of the course in northern Germany everywhere exceeds the prescribed limits. In Prussia statistics show that, for the years 1886-1888, it was, for Protestant theologians 7.85 semesters, for Catholics 10.70; for jurists, 7.47; physicians 12.16, and for philosophers 11.16.