tion as such save in the Western Presidency, and there side by side with the most poverty-stricken of all the agricultural regions in India.

Government Service.

In 1801 a large part of India had not come under British domination: it was not indeed until nearly fifty years later that the Lawrences and others of their day began the 'settlement' of the region of the Five Rivers. With what disastrous result a previous 'settlement' in the North-Western Provinces was arranged the *Pioneer's* description of the settlement of Gurgaon by John Lawrence will tell.[1] A hundred years ago the many Indian Courts provided positions of influence, honour, emolument, which gave scope to the proper ambition of thousands of able men, benefited tens of thousands of families, and produced, by the lavish expenditure of the resources of the country *in the country*, a widespread prosperity and personal contentment. Wars, it is true, now and then occurred; acts of rapine and cruelty were not unknown. But for ten persons affected by such incidents ten thousand persons were unaffected, while variety of service and occupation were open in a vast number of directions; these, by the opportunities they provided, more than counter-balanced the injustice which was but occasional. In all parts of their own land, save that already under British domination, Indians of a

[1] Gurgaon was, in 1877, a district with nearly 700,000 inhabitants.

From 1837 (Lord Lawrence—then Mr. Lawrence—being Settlement Officer) the district has been steadily rack-rented.

In 1877 the rents were raised.

Rains failed, crops were ruined, the Government demand was nevertheless exacted, with these consequences, as officially admitted:—

At the end of five years it was found that 80,000 people had died; 150,000 head of cattle had perished; 2,000,000 rupees of debt, to pay the Government rents, incurred; the people were emaciated, and unable to reap a good crop when it came.

Mr. S. S. Thorburn, ex-Commissioner in the Panjab, says the first effect of the British occupation of the Panjab was over-assessment, and, referring specially to Gurgaon, remarks, 'at first ignorantly over-assessed by us.'

hundred years ago could become that for which their personal bravery and intellectual acumen fitted them. Every civilised country requires a certain number of high officials: where now Europeans occupy important positions, Indians were then at the top of the tree.[1] In a phrase,

[1] In 'Asia and Europe,' by Meredith Townsend, published by Archibald Constable and Co., Ltd., Westminster, the following observations on this point occur:—

'It is the active classes who have to be considered, and to them our rule is not, and cannot be, a rule without prodigious drawbacks. One of these, of which they are fully conscious, is the gradual decay of much of which they were proud, the slow death, which even the Europeans perceive, of Indian art, Indian culture, Indian military spirit. Architecture, engineering, literary skill, are all perishing out, so perishing that Anglo-Indians doubt whether Indians have the capacity to be architects, though they built Benares; or engineers, though they dug the artificial lakes of Tanjore; or poets, though the people sit for hours or days listening to rhapsodists as they recite poems, which move them as Tennyson certainly does not move our common people. Another is, that the price of what they think imperfect justice is that they shall never right themselves, never enjoy the luxury of vengeance, never even protect their personal dignity and honour, about which they are as sensitive as Prussian officers. They may not even kill their wives for going astray. And the last and greatest one of all is the total loss of the interestingness of life.

'It would be hard to explain to the average Englishman how interesting Indian life must have been before our advent; how completely open was every career to the bold, the enterprising, or the ambitious. The whole continent was open as a prize to the strong. Nothing was settled in fact or in opinion except that the descendants of Timour the Lame were entitled to any kind of ascendency they could get and keep. No one not of the great Tartar's blood pretended to the universal throne, but with that exception every prize was open to any man who had in himself the needful force. Scores of sub-thrones were, so to speak, in the market. A brigand, for Sivajee was no better, became a mighty sovereign. A herdsman built a monarchy in Baroda. A body-servant founded the dynasty of Scindia. A corporal cut his way to the independent crown of Mysore. The first Nizam was only an officer of the Emperor. Runjeet Singh's father was what Europeans would call a prefect. There were literally hundreds who founded principalities, thousands of their potential rivals, thousands more who succeeded a little less grandly, conquered estates, or became high officers under the new princes. Each of these men had his own character and his own renown among his countrymen, and each enjoyed a position such as is now unattainable in Europe, in which he was released from law, could indulge his own fancies, bad or good, and was fed every day and all day with the special flattery of Asia—that willing submissiveness to mere volition which is so like adoration, and which is to its recipients the most intoxicating of delights. Each, too, had his court of followers, and every courtier shared in the power, the luxury, and the adulation accruing to his

the measure of Indian degradation now, as compared with then, may be thus expressed :—

Not one Indian, during a whole century, has occupied a seat in the Supreme, or Presidency, or Provincial, Executive Councils, nor in the Secretary of State's Council in England.

It is true there has only been an average of about one hundred and fifty millions of people in British India

lord. The power was that of life and death; the luxury included possession of every woman he desired; the adulation was, as I have said, almost religious worship. Life was full of dramatic changes. The aspirant who pleased a great man rose to fortune at a bound. The adventurer whose band performed an act of daring was on his road to be a satrap. Any one who could do anything for "the State"—that is for any ruler—build a temple, or furnish an army with supplies, or dig a tank, or lend gold to the Court, became at once a great man, honoured of all classes, practically exempt from law, and able to influence the great current of affairs. Even the timid had the chance, and, as Finance Minister, farmers of taxes, controllers of religious establishments, found for themselves great places in the land. For all this which we have extinguished we offer nothing in return, nor can we offer anything. We can give place, and, for reasons stated elsewhere, it will be greedily accepted, but place is not power under our system, nor can we give what an Asiatic considers power—the right to make volition executive; the right to crush an enemy and reward a friend; the right, above all, to be free from that burden of external laws, moral duties, and responsibilities to others with which Europeans have loaded life. We cannot even let a Viceroy be the ultimate appellate court, and right any legal wrong by supreme fiat—a failure which seems to Indians, who think the Sovereign should represent God, to impair even our moral claim to rule. This interestingness of life was no doubt purchased at the price of much danger and suffering. The Sovereign, the favourite, or the noble, could cast down as easily as they raised up, and intrigue against the successful never ended. The land was full of violence. Private war was universal. The great protected themselves against assassination as vigilantly as the Russian Emperor does. The danger from invasion, insurrection, and, above all, mutiny, never ended. I question, however, if these circumstances were even considered drawbacks. They were not so considered by the upper classes of Europe in the Middle Ages, and those upper classes were not tranquillised, like their rivals in India, by a sincere belief in fate. I do not find that Texans hate the wild life of Texas, or that Spanish-speaking Americans think the personal security which the dominance of the English-speaking Americans would assure to them is any compensation for loss of independence. I firmly believe that to the immense majority of the active classes of India the old time was a happy time; that they dislike our rule as much for the leaden order it produces as for its foreign character; and they would welcome a return of the old disorders if they brought back with them the old vividness, and, so to speak, romance of life.'

throughout this period, and that number of human beings MAY never have produced one man fit for such a position anywhere in the world. Yet, in the Feudatory States—so far as Residential control would permit, which was not very far—some of the finest administrators of the century in any country have arisen, men who may be matched, so far as opportunity served, with the leading statesmen of any European country or the United States of America. The men to whom I refer, with a very few exceptions, were subordinate officers in the British service, and, but for the chance given by the Feudatory States, would never have risen higher than a Deputy Collectorship. In Sir Salar Jung, Sir Madhava Row, Sir Dinkar Row, Sir K. Seshadri Aiyar, and many other Indian administrators, were found instruments which in the old days of faith (days now, alas! destroyed for Anglo-Saxondom by Imperialism so-called) would have been regarded as Providential provisions to solve the difficulties in the way of a true and righteous government of India. Compare Sir Salar Jung's administration with that of the British Provinces. As against the interference of the Resident and the friction caused by the retention of the Berars, (although each of the articles of the treaty had been or would be complied with—powerful hindrances these to successful work—) must be placed the force of one mind continuously acting towards a given end. This gave Sir Salar Jung and all other native-Indian statesmen, in their respective spheres, a power the greatness of which may easily be overlooked. What Lord Salisbury has said of the rule of India in its higher ranks, that it was 'a government of incessant changes'—('It is,' he added, 'the despotism of a line of kings whose reigns are limited by climatic causes to five years')—may be said also of British rule in little. After making full allowance for continuity of policy, Sir Salar Jung's achievements rank before those of any administrator with like duties and opportunities which India has known. Take this series of comparisons prepared by me sixteen years ago:—

GSL

GROSS LAND REVENUE COLLECTED.

The Nizam's Dominions.	Rs.	*The British Indian Empire.*	£
Collected in 1853 ...	64,85,098	Collected in 1853 ...	16,190,000
,, in 1881 ...	1,83,40,861	,, in 1881 ...	21,860,000
Increase .....Rs.	1,18,55,763	Increase	£5,650,000
Percentage of increase 260 per cent.		Percentage of increase less than 25 per cent.	

INCREASE OF REVENUE.

Sir Salar Jung's last year of office compared with his first shows:—

1853.	Rs.	1881-82.	Rs.
Total revenue	68,01,130	Total revenue	3,11,40,538

Or an increase of 357·84 per cent. This was the result of unremitting care and consideration, combined with the exercise of the often disunited qualities of prudence and stonewall firmness. In this unique combination of qualities the late Sir Salar Jung stands head and shoulders above his contemporaries—Anglo-Indian and Indian.

COST OF COLLECTION OF CUSTOMS REVENUE.

The Nizam's Dominions.	Rs. a. p.	*The Berars.*[1]	Rs. a. p.
Average per cent.	6 7 3	Average per cent. ...	45 14 5

Or seven times higher!

REVENUE COMPARISONS.

The Nizam's Dominions.	Rs.	*The British Indian Empire.*	£
Revenue in 1853 ...	68,01,130	Revenue in 1853	28,610,000
,, in 1881 ...	3,11,40,658	,, in 1881	68,370,000
Increase .....Rs.	2,43,39,528	Increase	£39,760,000
Increase nearly 357·84 per cent.		Increase 230 per cent.	

[1] The condition in H.H.'s districts and in the Berars are exactly the same, or should be, seeing the territories join each other. The expensive administration of the Berars, and the consequent withholding of profit revenues from the Nizam, has long been known to all acquainted with Indian affairs. It is a transaction which, if it were the other way about, would draw from English public men comments concerning 'oriental perfidy' which would be unparliamentary in their vigour.

It will probably be said that Sir Salar Jung did all this so well because he followed the British plan. Granted. I am not contending for the overthrow of British rule, but for its being remodelled in such a way as may bring satisfaction to the Indian mind and prosperity to the country. What denial of service has meant in the loss to India of men who could wisely and well have administered her affairs may be judged by what Ranjitsinghi has done in cricket against the best batsmen of England and Australia; by what Paranjpe, Balak Ram, Chatterjee, and the brothers Cama have done at Cambridge University against intellectual athletes from all parts of Britain; by what Professor Bose is now doing in electrical science, and Dr. Mullick in medical practice. There may be a few Indian judges in the High Courts of India—not a dozen in all—and a couple of score great Indian pleaders, here and there an Indian Collector, and one solitary Commissioner in Bengal; but they are as naught in number compared with what their numbers should have been and would have been under a rational and fair system of government. Great work has been done by Indians; but it has been in Feudatory States and in England where a chance, denied to them in their own land, was open to them. Given fair-play, Indian administrators would, in their way, and so far as circumstances permitted, have become the equals of Bismarck, of Cavour, of Gortschakoff, of Gladstone, or of Disraeli.

Sir John Malcolm, in his day, warned the authorities of the mingled folly and injustice of the course they had then too long adopted. As usual, the words of three generations ago possess an application as great now as they ever did. 'There are reasons,' said Sir John Malcolm (or supposed reasons, let me interpolate) 'why, as foreign rulers, we cannot elevate the natives of India to a level with their conquerors. We are compelled by policy to limit their ambition, both in the civil government and in the army, to inferior grades, but this

necessity constitutes, in my opinion, the strongest of reasons for granting them all that we can with safety. Their vanity and love of distinction are excessive, and a politic gratification of such feelings may be made a powerful means of creating and preserving a native aristocracy worthy of the name, and exciting to honourable action men whom a contrary system must degrade in their own estimation and in that of the community, and who, instead of being the most efficient of all ranks to preserve order, and give dignity to the society to which they belong, and strength to the Government to which they owe allegiance, are depressed by our levelling system into a useless and discontented class. Many, judging from results, ascribe it to the want of virtue and good feeling, and to rooted discontent in this class, what appears to me to be distinctly attributable to our conduct as rulers. We shape our system to suit our own ideas. The constitution of our Government requires in all its branches an efficient check and regularity; but in our attention to forms and routine we too often forget the most essential maxims of State policy, and every deviation is arraigned that disturbs the uniform usage of our affairs in courts of justice. No motives suited to their prejudices and habits are supplied to awaken the inert to action, to kindle the embers of virtue, or to excite an honourable ambition among our native subjects. Yet pursuing this system, our record teems with eulogies on the excellences of our establishments, and the degeneracy of all, and particularly the higher classes of India, whom, in the case before me, it is desired (from no cause that I can understand but rigid adherence to system) to exclude from a few unimportant privileges, which, though little more than a shadow of distinction, are sought for with an eagerness that shows singularly the character of the community, and confirms me in the belief I have long entertained, that by our neglect in conciliating and honouring the higher and more respectable class of our native subjects, we cast away the most powerful means we possess

of 'promoting the prosperity and permanence of the Empire.'[1]

MORAL, INTELLECTUAL, AND SPIRITUAL POSITION.

In this region there cannot be any proper comparison, only a summing-up as to how India, with all her demerits, ranks among the world's peoples during this eventful century. May an Englishman, without shame, ask the question? The natural abilities of the Indian people being what they are, their inheritance of military courage, of administrative ability, of spiritual insight and saintly living, being of so varied and remarkable a character as they are, what has India to show in the array of the world's great men of the nineteenth century? This is her record:—

That is all. 'But,' asserts the reader, 'that is nothing.'

True; it is nothing. India has furnished no commanding intellect in the department of human service which may be denominated moral, intellectual, and spiritual, which may rank with those in Europe and America whose names are known the world over. The sole reason for this is that there is no scope for such development in their own country. The 'pousta' has worked too effectually. In the words of Mr. Thackeray, quoted in the preceding chapter, everything which would produce sages, statesmen, heroes, has been 'suppressed.' To-day we are shocked at such remarks as Mr. Thackeray's—and go on doing exactly what the remarks recommend. Yet India's people, as Lord George Hamilton never tires of

[1] Page 360, Appendix to Report from Select Committee, East India Company, 1853. Minute of Sir John Malcolm, November 30, 1830.

telling us, number one-fifth of the population of the globe. On an appropriate stage the late Mr. Justice Ranade would, for his goodness and his great character, have moved the admiration of all mankind. Only in spiritual things has India made any show at all. Ram Mohun Roy, Keshub Chunder Sen, Rama Krishna, Bengalis to a man, to mention spiritual workers only who have passed away, who are known everywhere and who are honoured as amongst humanity's noblest spiritual teachers. What are these amongst so many? What, especially, are they in a land which contains more real spirituality than, maybe, all the rest of the world put together? Opportunity has been denied to India to show her vast superiority in this or in any other respect. When Europe produced a Martin Luther she gave the world a religious reformer. At the same period India produced her religious hero: he was an Avatar of the Eternal, and is to-day worshipped by vast numbers of devout men and women as The Lord Gauranga. During the last century the finest fruit of British intellectual eminence was, probably, to be found in Robert Browning and John Ruskin. Yet they are mere gropers in the dark compared with the uncultured and illiterate Rama Krishna, of Bengal, who, knowing naught of what we term 'learning,' spake as no other man of his age spoke, and revealed God to weary mortals.

Why is India, spiritually, so little recognised, and the world, as a consequence, deprived of the advantage which the recognition would bring? Chiefly, I think, because of the existence of the Societies for the Conversion of the Heathen to Christianity. While Christian missions are sent by all the Churches to India it will be impossible for more than a select few to realise that Indian spiritualitymay as assuredly be an expression of the Divine Essence as are the faith and good works of pious men in the West who believe that the Holy Spirit of God is an abiding and helpful influence to them in all their thought and action. As a hindrance to their proper recognition as men of

character and often of noble life, the Christian Missionary Societies of England interested in India have done the Indian people almost irremediable mischief.

In one respect there is much that is common to the two time periods, 1801 and 1901, offering themselves for comment. It was not merely for effect that I put at the head of this chapter in juxtaposition the names of Lord Wellesley and Lord Curzon, though a comparison of these rulers of India would not be unworthy to either. Making allowances for the different circumstances of the different periods, both noblemen go about their work in much the same spirit: each was confronted by a harder task than even whole-hearted devotion to his sense of duty and desire to serve India and England could, apparently, perform, and greater than any predecessor had to contend with. The one aimed to bring all India under British rule; the other is endeavouring to grapple with an accumulation of adverse circumstances which has grown Himalaya-high without the officials in the past, including Lord Curzon himself as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of India, recognising what was going on, and quite contrary to what they all believed would happen. Each of the statesmen grapples with the situation before him in a broad-minded spirit. If anything, the ancient ruler was the more courageous. For, so far, Lord Curzon, brave as he is, has done nothing so great as was Lord Wellesley's beginning of the education of the Indian people. The English had been in touch with India for one hundred and sixty years, and in supreme power for thirty years in Bengal, for many more years in Madras. It was high time something was done for education. Lord Wellesley, to his lasting credit, made a beginning. Yet fifty-three more years passed, and there was then only one English school in the oldest Presidency—that of Madras. As to-day an organ of Anglo-Indian opinion, generally most loyal to the Raj, blind sometimes in its

devotion, does not hesitate to say of Lord Curzon that he is 'inclined to take too much upon himself,' that he 'is breaking with English traditions,' while he is derisively and sneeringly informed that 'the British have not conquered India in order that, in the fulness of time, Lord Curzon might be a Viceroy,' and further, that having two enemies in himself, he is on the way to making more enemies—so Lord Wellesley was subjected, in the Court of Directors and elsewhere, to like criticism, and was saved from penal discipline by the Board of Control as Lord Curzon may be saved by the devotion of the people whose best interests he seems desirous to appreciate and to serve.

As the round circle of the century's years comes once more to a beginning, that which hath been is now again passing before our eyes, and he who would measure its effect and forecast its consequences may learn much by looking backward over the long course of years since 1801.

APPENDIX.

In opposing the employment of Indian-built ships in the trade between England and India, the Court of Directors employed an argument which, in some of its terms, sounds very curious at the present time when so many Lascars are employed by all the great lines of steamers running to the East. After reciting other reasons against shipbuilding and ship-manning in India, the Court, writing from East India House on the 27th of January, 1801, said:—

'XVII. Besides these objections which apply to the measure generally, there is one that lies particularly against ships whose voyages commence from India, that they will usually be manned in great part with Lascars or Indian sailors. Men of that race are not by their physical frame and constitution fitted for the navigation of cold and boisterous latitudes; their nature and habits are formed to a warm climate, and short and easy voyages performed within the

sphere of the periodical winds; they have not strength enough of mind or body to encounter the hardships or perils to which ships are liable in the long and various navigation between India and Europe, especially in the winter storms of our Northern Seas; nor have they the courage which can be relied on for steady defence against an enemy. To have any considerable portion of the Property and Trade of this country, therefore, dependent on the energy of men of this stamp unless on the coasts of India, where they are less exposed to dangers, cannot be advisable: Yet on the employment of Indian sailors the chief freight of Indian ships seem naturally to turn: for if these ships, rigged and fitted out as they are with stores chiefly brought from Europe, were manned with Europeans, receiving wages far higher, and provisioned at a much greater cost than Lascars, it does not appear how they could be afforded at a lower rate of freight than British bottoms. But this is not all. The native sailors of India, who are chiefly Mahomedans, are, to the disgrace of our national morals, on their arrival here, led into scenes which soon divest them of the respect and awe they had entertained in India for the European character: they are robbed of their little property, and left to wander, ragged and destitute, in the streets; a sight that, whilst it wounds peculiarly the feelings of men connected with India and the Company, raises both the compassion and indignation of the Public; the one in favour of those miserable objects, the other against the Company, as if they had drawn the poor creatures into such a state of suffering, or neglected them in it; when in fact, though individuals bring them home, the Company are at great pains and expense to collect, maintain, and return them; but such are the bad habits they acquire, that they often escape from the houses where the Company have them lodged and provided for, and take to a mendicant state for the chance of obtaining from the pity of passengers new means of vicious indulgence. From causes of this nature, and from the severity of our winters, not a few have lost their lives or become incapable of further service. On the Continent of Europe, and even in America, where some of these Lascars are also now carried, they have no protector as here, and their case must be still more deplorable; so that, instead of a larger introduction into the Western world of this feeble race, it is very seriously to be wished, that before their numbers are thinned by fatigue, climate, or disease, some means were devised for preventing them from leaving their own seas.

'The contemptuous reports which they disseminate on their return, cannot fail to have a very unfavourable influence upon the minds of our Asiatic subjects, whose reverence for our character, which has hitherto contributed to maintain our supremacy in the East (a reverence in part inspired by what they have at a distance seen among a comparatively small society, mostly of the better ranks, in India) will be gradually changed for most degrading conceptions; and

in an indignant apprehension of having hitherto rated us too highly or respected us too much, should once possess them, the effects of it may prove extremely detrimental.

'From the waste of life and other losses attending the employment of this class of sailors, perhaps it may appear at length necessary to resort to European Mariners; these, in such case, will flock in great numbers to India; and hence it may be expected that colonisation will be accelerated there. Indeed the return of peace might call for this substitution of British seamen, many of whom must have to seek employment in the Merchants' Service; and no British heart would wish that any of the brave men who had merited so much of their country, should be without bread whilst natives of the East brought ships belonging to our own subjects into our ports. Considered, therefore, in a physical, moral, commercial, and political, view, the apparent consequences of admitting these Indian sailors largely into our navigation, form a strong additional objection to the concession of the proposed privilege to any ships manned by them.'[1]

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[1] Appendix, No. 47.—Supplement to Fourth Report, East India Company, pp. 23–24.

CHAPTER III

WHOSE IS THE AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL WEALTH OF INDIA?

A Detailed Inquiry concerning—

1. The Fields.
2. The Cattle.
3. The Forests.
4. Minerals.
5. Fisheries.
6. Manufactures.
7. Joint Stock Enterprises.
8. Railways.
9. Irrigation Works.
10. Shipping.
11. Civil Service.
12. Military.
13. Learned Professions.

British Lower Middle Class Savings Contrasted with Indian Total Income.

When Lord Clive entered Murshidabad, the old capital of Bengal, in 1757, he wrote of it: 'This city is as extensive, populous, and rich as the City of London, with this difference—that there are individuals in the first possessing infinitely greater property than in the last City.'

'IF,' it has been remarked to the present writer, 'you say the Indian people are growing poorer, whose is the huge trade, whose the wealth, we see on every hand, at every port we touch at in India, in every big town through which we go?'

A very proper question, and one which, as a British patriot, jealous for the good name of Britain and for the beneficial results of British rule, I am compelled to answer, not with pride and rejoicing but with pain and sorrow.

India's wealth to-day consists of her fields, her cattle, her forests, her minerals, her fisheries, her shipping, her

railways, her roads, her civil service, her learned professions, her military offices, and so on all through the various phases of human endeavour and human possession. How much of all this belongs to the people of India, by whom I mean all those who regard the land as their domicile, look upon it as their home and depend upon it for their sustenance, desiring that their children, also, shall do likewise?

A more or less detailed inquiry will show :—

1. The Fields.

They, subject to the rights of the Government, are India's in the sense I have just mentioned, with these deductions—

(*a*) The tea plantations,
(*b*) The coffee gardens,
(*c*) The jute and indigo estates,

which are mainly in alien hands, and such profits as are made in connection with them do not go to the Indians, do not stay in India, save in a slight degree. For example, one-twelfth of the tea-cultivated area is in Indian hands.

Further—

(*d*) The fields and the produce are mortgaged for such portion of the national debt of the country as is not covered by public works, a sum of over £63,000,000—the total land revenue of all India for three years and a half. The exact figures which this mortgage represents are not available, but I estimate them, at least, at one-third of the whole produce of the land in a good year. This is an under-estimate, probably, by ten crores of rupees, or £6,666,667. As the mortgagee (under civilised laws) can realise, if he will, the Indian cultivator all the Empire over, holds his fields at the mercy of the lenders, who are mainly English.[1] The village

[1] Not, however, as are Indian moneylenders, subject to the new legislation in the Panjab and the similar legislation in Bombay. It is only in regard to Indian moneylenders that legislation limiting security is contemplated. The English moneylenders to India are left untouched. Not a pleasant thing for an Englishman to record, but the fact nevertheless.

moneylender really holds only a second mortgage on the lands which are pledged to him. The extent of the moneylenders' hold on the soil and its produce may be estimated from the special legislation in the Panjab to prevent the moneylender becoming universal landowner, from the revelations made to the Deccan Riots Commission, and from the fact that in the Surat District of Bombay Presidency in 1900 eighty-five per cent. of the year's revenue was paid to the Government by the moneylenders. In respect to all these points details and comments will be found elsewhere.

2. Cattle.

These especially belong to the Indian people. Here the stranger intermeddleth not: it is not worth his while; that is why he has not meddled. For after all there are so few cattle in India, too few to attract his attention, or to make it worth his while to purchase them and to exact a tax on the produce they supply and on the fields they plough, to say nothing of the manure and fuel they furnish. In referring to the comparative fewness of the cattle I do not, for argumentative purposes, select the recent famine years in which the loss of cattle was appalling. I will take 1890, which was not a famine year—that is, not officially proclaimed as such.[1] During that year, among a population of 140,000,000 in British India (Bengal omitted, particulars not then available) there were only 90,750,065 animals (including cows, bulls, buffaloes, horses, ponies, mules, donkeys, sheep, and goats). Australia, with only four millions of population, had 113,550,831 animals. If India, an agricultural

[1] 'In my own missionary experience I once carefully investigated the earnings of a congregation of 300, and found the average amounted to less than a farthing a head per day. They did not live; they eked out an existence. I have been in huts where the people were living on carrion. I have taken photographs of famine groups which are enough for most people; *yet in all these cases there was no recognised famine.*'—Rev. J. Knowles, London Missionary Society, Southern India, in letter to the *Manchester Guardian*.

country if there be an agricultural country anywhere, had had the same proportion as Australia, she would have had 2,628,000,000 animals! This, however, would have been more than she wanted, and grazing land enough for them could not have been found. In respect to this same question of grazing land, here is an example of injustice to which the people are exposed. The Salvation Army in Gujarat wanted land for cultivation; about 560 acres were found which suited them admirably. But it was mainly grazing land, and had been under grass from time immemorial. If it were broken up or taken away from them a large village of cultivators would suffer. The cultivators protested. They might have saved their breath. The new-comers were in the land to bring the people into the way of eternal life, even though this life were ended through the combination (by the missionaries) of things seen with things unseen, things earthly with things heavenly. Only by very great exertions was a riot averted. To the man who told me this story I said, 'The people ought to have rioted.' He answered, 'Perhaps they ought. They were not very far from a riot once.'

3. The Forests.

Conserved by Government and managed for general revenual purposes, India, so far as may be, getting the whole benefit, though not, perhaps, in the way her people desire. The total revenue from this source in 1898 was £1,239,912. To obtain this amount a little over 10s. in the £ was paid for oversight and maintenance. What the people lost by deprivation of grazing grounds, dead wood for fuel, etc., is unknown. A large sum would be needed to recompense the cultivators deprived of ancient rights of grazing, fuel collection, gathering of roots, and other privileges.

4. Minerals.

(*a*) *Coal.*—Over 4,000,000 tons are raised annually, nearly all by English companies.

(*b*) *Iron Ores.*—Neglected everywhere—by Europeans because the ore-measures are too far from the seaboard, by Indians for want of capital and business connections, and often by both because of the stupid restrictions which are put upon would-be enterprise. A startling example of this occurred only a few years ago in the Central Provinces. Now the authorities would be glad to see the effort they then thwarted carried to success. With them, however, as with others :—

> 'He that will not when he may,
> When he would he shall have nay.'

(*c*) *Gold.*—Produced wholly by European exploitation.

(*d*) *Petroleum.*—Products of Assam and Burma, in whose hands does not appear from the records.

5. Fisheries.

These are almost wholly in the hands of Indians. A few years ago an attempt was made in England to form a limited liability company to exploit the Fisheries in the Hooghly, the northern part of the Bay of Bengal, and on the coast of Burma. Sufficient capital, however, was not raised to enable the project to be carried through.

6. Manufactures.

(*a*) *Cotton Mills.*—One hundred and seventy-six in 1898–99. Capital £14,900,000. Persons employed, 156,056. Almost entirely in Indian hands, and capital largely (but not exclusively) subscribed by Indians. The proportions are said to be—two-thirds Indian investments, one-third European. The advantages derivable from the employment of native Indian capital is apparent in Bombay and Ahmedabad especially. A noble use has, from the first, been made of the wealth thus acquired. Parsee benefactors of the community have been numerous; their generosity forms an indication of what India might

have done in the way of kindly and gracious acts of generousness under a judicious mode of administration.

(*b*) *Jute and Hemp Mills.*—Thirty-three in number. Capital, £4,955,000. Persons employed, 95,540. Almost wholly European.

(*c*) *General.*—Woollen and Paper Mills, Breweries, Cotton Ginning, Cleaning and Pressing Mills, Coffee Works, Flour Mills, Rice Mills, Oil Mills, Jute Presses, Indigo Factories, Timber Mills, Sugar Factories, and Silk Filatures. Three-fourths in European hands.

7. Joint Stock Enterprises.

In all India there are the following Companies :—

	No.	Capital.
Banking and Loan	405	£4,411,358
Insurance...	105	146,062
Navigation	9	1,237,300
Railways and Tramways	19	1,970,120
Other Trading Companies	252	3,090,885
Tea...	135	3,212,310
Other Planting Companies	15	113,186
Coal Mining	34	1,274,862
Gold Mining	12	500,842
Other Mining and Quarrying Companies	17	248,278
Cotton Mills	66	5,526,934
Jute Mills...	20	2,571,063
Mills for Cotton, Wool, Silk, Hemp, etc.	113	6,927,303
Cotton and Jute Screws and Presses ...	116	1,607,281
Other Companies...	99	2,670,665
Total ...	1,417	£35,506,449

Of this £36,000,000, even reckoning in all the Cotton Mills, by the utmost straining of estimates, not more than £10,000,000 can be credited to the Indian people. Note also that, for all India, Banking and Insurance, and, indeed, everything else, financial as well as industrial, the total capital invested is less than £36,000,000. How unimportant and insignificant all this is for a mighty Empire, which has been under British control for nearly

one hundred and fifty years, may be judged from the fact that, in Manchester, the money extent of—

Trading operations in 1872 were	...	...	£207,000,000
Ditto ,, 1881 ,,	...	...	318,000,000

'The commercial institutions of Manchester are too numerous for detailed description. Its chamber of commerce has for more than sixty years held a position of much influence in regard to the trade of the district and of the nation. There are eleven joint-stock banks, seven of which have their head offices in the town; these banks, besides numerous branches in the surrounding district, have sixteen branches in the town; and there are several private bankers.'[1] Since then the progress of this city in the United Kingdom has been very great. Mr. Elijah Helm, secretary of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, in answer to inquiries I made of him, courteously writes to me thus :—

'The estimates of the total value of the trading operations of this city, to which you refer, must have been conjectural, I think. I know of no method of arriving at anything like precise figures. Perhaps the most reliable way of forming an opinion as to the rate of progress is to take the yearly returns of the Manchester Bankers' Clearing-house. In 1891 the total amount of the clearings was £131,163,961, and in 1900, £248,750,600. These sums represent the value of the cheques exchanged between the various banks in Manchester, and do not of course include the cheques paid, or credited to the amounts of their customers, by the banks themselves. The increase between these two years may no doubt be, to some extent, the result of an extension of the practice of paying debts by cheque, but any allowance on this score must, I fancy, be comparatively small, and in the main the increase of clearings must be taken as indicative of increase of business.

'There can be no doubt that for many years both the industries and the commerce of Manchester have been growing—not always steadily perhaps—but still growing, both in variety and in magnitude. But I should not like to have to put the rate of progress into figures pretending to be at all authentic.

'Nor do I think one could give an entirely satisfactory account of the number and capital of the joint stock enterprises here. Some of

[1] *Encyc. Brit.*, vol. xiv., p. 464.

them are merely conversions of private concerns into limited companies, and some of these are placed under the Companies Acts for family reasons, their shares being privately held.

'I may add that the amount of the Manchester Bankers' clearings far exceeds that of any other city in the country except London, and these are swollen, as you know, by international and national settlements in London as well as by the payments of the Government.'

8. Railways.

Over 22,000 miles in length, and have cost, with land acquired, loss on interest, and other expenses, considerably more than £300,000,000. Practically, the whole of the sum invested in railways is held by Europeans, barring that which certain Feudatory States benevolently 'loaned'; in regard only to a portion of it has amortisation been provided, and that—as in the cases of the East India and Great Indian Peninsular Railways—on most costly terms to the Indian taxpayer; amortisation from the start would have made a difference of many millions of pounds sterling to the advantage of the Indian taxpayer, and, with wise provision, the earlier railways might have been largely redeemed before the great fall in the value of silver occurred. India has been very hard hit in all these transactions. The accounts show that £40,000,000 have been taken from the general revenue to make up the guaranteed interest to shareholders. That sum will never be repaid.

How the guarantee system has worked in practice may be judged from the facts narrated by Miss Ethel Faraday, M.A., in a paper on 'Indian Guaranteed Railways: An Illustration of *Laisser Faire* Theory and Practice,' read before the Economic Science and Statistics Section of the British Association in 1900. Miss Faraday says: 'The result, that *laisser faire*, like other religions, proves somewhat less beneficent in practice than in theory, might be illustrated by the later history of the Indian guaranteed railways. The guaranteed system, in origin a purely practical expedient, had outlived its utility before it was revived by the English Government

of 1868–74, apparently as being preferable, from the *laisser faire* point of view, to the direct State ownership which was considered by Lord Lawrence, as by Roscher, advisable in India. In the contracts renewed with three railways—the Great Indian Peninsular, Bombay, Baroda, and Central India, and Madras lines—it was agreed that the companies should receive interest at the guaranteed rate of five per cent. and half the surplus profits, no account being taken of deficits; that remittances to England should be converted at the rate of 1s. 10d. the rupee; and that calculations should be made on a half-yearly basis. The result was that the Indian Government bore all the loss of the unprofitable half-years, and, after 1875, never received its full share of gain in the profitable ones, since, as the exchange value of the rupee fell below 1s. 10d., the shareholders received a gradually increasing proportion of the surplus profits, while the contract obligation to pay interest at five per cent. deprived the State of advantage from cheaper money and improved credit, which would lately have enabled it to raise money at two and a half or three per cent. to pay off loans advanced at a higher rate of interest. On the three lines in question, taken together, the average proportion of earnings yearly remitted to England, 1892–7, was 99·70 per cent., and the net annual loss to Government amounted to Rs.13,000,000, a tax imposed on the Indian public for the benefit of the British shareholder.'

On this same subject some other comments may be added. The late Mr. Robert Brown, of Glasgow, an earnest student of Indian conditions, in one of his pamphlets (1892) wrote: 'Government occasionally buys up a railway originally constructed by a nominally independent company, the most recent cases being the Oudh and Rohilcund in 1888, and the Southern Indian in 1890. They are fine illustrations of the way in which the guaranteed company system has "developed the resources" of India. The former line from the

date of its opening had involved the Government in a total loss of Rs.2,323,287 for deficiency of guaranteed interest, and yet they bought up its share capital of £4,000,000 at a premium of £25 18s. 0¼d. per cent., being the average price at which the stock had stood in the market for the previous three years! That price, however, had no connection with the railway's traffic earnings, but depended entirely upon the Government's own guarantee. The market price would have been the same, although the traffic receipts had been *nil*. Similarly the Southern Indian ordinary stock, £3,208,508, was bought up at a premium of £989,048 11s. 2d., although till 30th June, 1888, Government had sustained a loss of £1,948,599 from deficiency of receipts to meet guaranteed interest. Some years earlier the East Indian, one of the few profitable lines, was bought up at a premium of £6,550,000.'

Finally, the Director-General of Railways, in his Report for 1900, published while these pages are in the printers' hands, remarks: 'The expenditure side of the account is further heavily weighted by the terms of the contracts of the guaranteed railways. Under these contracts payment of interest has to be made at a higher rate than is now necessary, and the calculation of the surplus profits has to be made at 22 pence to the rupee, while the current rate of exchange is nearer 16 pence. Until these contracts terminate, the State is unable to obtain any advantage from cheaper money, or from the improved credit of the country, or from a favourable exchange.'

9. Irrigation Works.

£35,000,000 capital expenditure, probably the whole of which is held in England.[1]

[1] Much boasting is indulged in concerning this expenditure by some official apologists, *e.g.*, Mr. J. D. Rees, C.I.E., paper on 'Famine Facts and Fallacies,' East India Association, p. 23. Mr. John Bright ridiculed all such pretensions effectually when, in 1878, he said:—

We hear that there has been £9,000,000 or £16,000,000 spent on such

10. Shipping.

All, except an infinitesimal portion, is of foreign construction out of foreign capital, and, save as ordinary seamen, in certain 'Lines,' such as the Lascars in the Peninsular and Oriental and British India services, no occupation in connection with shipping is found for Indians, save, of course, as clerks and coolies at the wharves and docks, and as seamen in the few craft still denominated in the returns as 'Native.'

Shipping employed in 1898–9: 9,115,646 tons, of which 133,033 tons were Indian. Forty years ago one-third of the tonnage employed in Indian waters was Indian.

11. Civil Service.

The 'salaries and expenses of Civil Departments,' which in 1886–87 amounted to Rx.11,726,148 (£7,817,432), had grown two years later to Rx.13,013,544 (£8,675,976), and in 1898–99 is returned at Rx.15,732,303 (£10,488,147). Out of this enormous sum 8,000 Europeans received Rx.8,000,000 (£5,333,334), while nearly 130,000 Indians received Rx.7,000,000 (£4,666,667), the remaining Rx.731,000 (£487,667) going to less than 6,000 Eurasians.

These figures showed average annual salaries in these proportions:—

works. What is that in India? The town of Manchester alone, with a population of 500,000 has spent £2,000,000 already, and is coming to Parliament now to ask to be allowed to spend £3,500,000 more: that will be £5,500,000 to supply the population of that town and its immediate surroundings with pure water, and a sufficient quantity of it. But in India we have 200,000,000 of population subject to the English Government, and with a vast supply of rainfall and great rivers running through it with the means—as I believe there are the means—of abundant irrigation, and still the whole expended has been only £16,000,000. We have heard some authorities say it is £20,000,000; but be it £16,000,000 or £20,000,000, what is it when we consider the vast extent of the country, and the greatness of the need?'

It is not an unfair criticism of Mr. Rees's paper to say that it is marked by an unacquaintance with the real position of non-official critics which vitiates its whole argument.

Each European received	...	...	...	£607
,, Eurasian ,,	...	...	...	81
,, Indian ,,	...	...	...	36

12. Military.

All the superior officers, in European and Indian forces alike, are Europeans. Lord Curzon has propounded a scheme, the announcement of which has moved the whole Empire of Britain to its depths, whereby opportunities are to be given to a score or two of Indian youths, after passing through an Indian Sandhurst, to obtain commissions in the Indian Army.

13. The Learned Professions.

Here, again, though many most capable Indian gentlemen, at great cost, and often at much sacrifice in many ways, have qualified themselves for professional positions in the law, in the educational service, and in other directions, they have done this only to discover that nearly all the best positions everywhere are occupied by Europeans.

Such, in general outline, but tolerably exact, so far as Indian official figures may be relied upon, is my answer to the question I quoted at the beginning of this chapter. I say, 'So far as the Indian figures may be relied upon,' for, when a painful proof of their own statements being hopelessly contradictory is held before their eyes, leading officials (in England) have been heard to say, 'Oh! those are only estimates! They are guesses at the facts! We don't know for certain what is the real state of things!' This is an actual confession made by a Secretary of State. But, as to the statistics given above, they may be accepted as fairly accurate on the whole.

'What then?'

That is *my* question. And I put it respectfully, but strenuously, to Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, to his Under-Secretaries, to the Members of his Council, to the Heads of Departments in the India Office, and to Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General, and each and all of His Excellency's subordinates in India. Until it be answered, I shall go on asking it:

> 'Although I be the feeblest of mankind,
> I will not cease to grasp the hope I hold,'

that some day, somewhere, somehow, the question may be answered in such a way that India shall once more become a prosperous land for its own people as it now is for the stranger encamped within its gates. I, again, ask the question of the Viceroy and of every Member of his Council, and outside the Council, especially of Mr. H. J. S. Cotton, C.S.I., Chief Commissioner of Assam, whose praise as a humane administrator is in all men's mouths, and who, in 1887, discerned so wisely and so well what the deplorable effects of the Economic Revolution, which British rule has brought about in India, has had upon the prosperity of the country.[1]

I put another question. It is this: Who will arouse England to a sense of the wrong she is doing to India in, year by year, draining large sums of money from that country without giving a direct equivalent in return? A rich nation, and that nation amongst the wealthiest in the world, is taking from the arteries and the veins of the very poor of another nation, and that nation the poorest in the whole world, their very life-blood. By the term 'rich' as applied to England I do not mean wealthy people only. Look at this fact:

The lower middle and artisan population of England—say, 6,000,000 families at the outside—have the very large sum of £322,146,422 invested as *savings* in Building Societies, Co-operative Societies, Friendly Societies,

[1] 'New India,' by H. J. S. Cotton, C.S.I., Chief Commissioner of Assam.

Trades Unions, Labour Loan Societies, Railway Savings Banks, Trustee Banks, and Post Office Savings Banks. How many people realise what these savings mean? They are *savings*—let me emphasise the fact!—and therefore PROPERTY, in addition to all that the homes of these investors contain of valuables of every kind, and after all indebtedness has been met.

In a prosperous year in India, when the rains have come in due season, when the land has been sufficiently ploughed, when the sun has been all-beneficial, when insect pests have been at a minimum, when cattle have been in plenty, and when a bountiful harvest has been gathered in, which happens hardly once in ten years, not even when the land has lain fallow in a 'jubilee' year of famine; conceive, I say, what all this would mean from Himalayan snows to Equatorial heat over so vast an area as the India of the Emperor Edward VII. covers; then bear in mind

the full value of all the produce is £150,000,000 *less than the savings—the well and safely-invested savings—of the labourer, the artisan, and the lower middle-class person, in England.*

This may be stated in another way:—

British lower middle class and artisan invested savings: £322,146,422.	Total value of all the crops raised in India in a good year: 258 crores of rupees, £172,000,000
Number affected: say, 25,000,000.	Number affected: 230,000,000.

I ask the reader to turn to the first page of this chapter, to once more go through the various matters discussed, to remember all the figures employed are Indian official figures, and then to put to himself the question, 'How *can* such a condition of things denote the prosperity of the native Indian people?' And, that they are prosperous is stoutly proclaimed by the Secretary of State of India by voice and pen on every conceivable opportunity.

The Circle ≈ represents
LOSS OF LIFE
BY
FAMINE
in
India
during 10 years
1891 – 1900

The Rectangle represents
LOSS OF LIFE
BY
WAR
in
All The World
during 107 years
1793 – 1900



Famine - 19,000,000.

War - 5,000,000.

CHAPTER IV

FAMINES: THEIR PRESENT FREQUENCY AND THE CAUSE OF THAT FREQUENCY

Famine Deaths versus War Deaths.

The Exceptional Famine-Position of India: Famine Come to Stay.

Famine 'a Good Thing: There are Too Many People in India.'

Frequency Much Greater than in Past and Proceeding at Accelerated Pace.

Sympathy 'Always with an Over-ruling Consideration for the Revenue.'

Famines Prior to British Rule.

Sir George Campbell on 'Frequency.'

The Famines of the Eighteenth Century.

A Comparison between 1769—1800 and 1868-69—1900.

Famines of the First Half of the Nineteenth Century.

Famines during Second Half of the Century.

Over Twenty-six Million Famine Deaths Officially Admitted.

The Four Quarters of the Nineteenth Century compared:

First Period	.....	Five Famines.
Second ,,	.....	Two ,,
Third ,,	.....	Six ,,
Fourth ,,	.....	Eighteen ,,

Maps showing the First and the Last Famines of the Nineteenth Century.

The Economic Drain the Chief Cause of Famine.

Mr. W. L. Hare's Table of Famines since 1729.

After the Word, the Deed.

A Minus Population of 36,000,000.

Estimate by the *Lancet* and the *Friend of India* of 19,000,000 Famine Deaths in past Ten Years.

Famines More Destructive Now than in Ancient Days.

Scarcity of Means more than Absence of Food Stores.

British Supremacy founded on Belief that a Dark Skin means a Combined Evil Heart and Lack of Administrative Ability and Common Honesty.

To the Honoured Memory of the Famine-Slain, 1891-1901.

'A red-haired child
Sick in a fever, if you touch him once
Though but as little as a finger-tip,
Will set you weeping: but a million sick—
You would as soon weep for the rule of three
Or compound fraction.' BROWNING.

THE time has passed when, in beginning a chapter on Famines in India, argument was essential to indicate the present exceptional position of India in respect to the most dire scourge known to humanity. On all hands, and by every one who has made any study of the question, it is accepted that famine is now chronic in certain parts of India, including even some irrigated regions. So much has the fact of famine having come to stay grown into the warp and woof of our ordinary life in Britain, that we hear of tens of millions of our fellow-subjects actually perishing, and, literally, of nine-tenths of us, it is true that we pass by on the other side of the way as if the fact concerned us not at all. Or, we say, 'A good thing, surely. There are too many people in India.' This—will it be believed?—is said to me by two

out of every four Englishmen to whom I mention the fact of India's gruesome state. Even more significant is the circumstance that, as with hospitals and other necessary alleviations of suffering, an Indian Famine Relief Fund is now looked upon as always in existence or needing to be in existence, and rich, philanthropically-minded, maiden ladies are beginning to leave legacies to such a Fund.[1] Therefore, it is not with famine as with some strange portent from the Unseen with which we have to deal, but something abiding with us;—slightly varying familiar words, famine has become

> 'No more a stranger or a guest,
> But like a child at home.'

'A child at home'—part of the imagery is exact; to be quite exact, in the portion of the home it occupies, the child has become Master.

My observations on Indian famines must be general in their character rather than exhaustive. There is no need for an exhaustive treatment in these pages. A small library of books has already been published on the subject. I shall simply show that India, under British rule, has *become* (the reader will, please, in his reading, carefully note and emphasise this word) chronically famine-stricken, and shall furnish some particulars, from official sources, which indicate that the famines of the past twenty years might have been prevented if the course which was strongly recommended to the Indian authorities by the Famine Commission in 1880, had been adopted. Following from these statements is the deduction—of the truth and accuracy of which, sorrowfully, I am fully convinced—that famines in India, under our

[1] On August 6, 1901, the provisions of the will of Miss Eliza Warrington, of the Belvidere, Malvern Wells, were published. The first provision in it read as follows: '£1,000 to the Lord Mayor of London as trustee to pay the same into the Indian Famine Fund; if there be no such Fund in existence at her decease, then on trust to be held and invested by the Lord Mayor and his successors until another Indian Famine Fund shall be opened, and thereupon such grant and its accumulations shall be paid to such Fund.'

enlightened and all-embracing rule, are the direct result of our neglect as rulers to do the right thing, at the right time, in the right way; and that, even now, their recurrence may be stopped if we will but do that which the commonest feelings of humanity, to say nothing of our plain and imperative duty, call upon us to attempt.

To what are famines in India due? That question may wait a moment or two for reply, until another question has been asked and answered: Are famines more frequent and more destructive now than in past times? Upon the answer to this inquiry depends the urgency of the task which the English people are, by every conceivable sense of duty, summoned immediately to undertake.

When the part played by the British Empire in the nineteenth century is regarded by the historian fifty years hence, by which time the true perspective of events will have been attained, the most striking and most saddening of all incidents for comment will be the steady sinking of India and its population into a state of chronic famine-strickenness. It was not until 1879, when the Famine Commission of that year reported that, in some part or other of India, famine might be expected once in four years, that famine relief and famine administration became a part of the current work of the Indian authorities. Since that time one of the most admirable of all administrative machines has evolved the Famine Code. This Code is evidence that the Government fully realised famine had come to stay. In regard to palliatives much has been done; in respect to prevention the hand has been slack, for reasons which will be obvious to the least observant reader of these chronicles.

The history of famines prior to, and during, early British rule is not exact or abundant. One thing, however, stands out most clearly. All the famines were local; not one approached in extent or intensity the three great distresses of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The list which follows may not be exhaustive. It is put

forward on investigations made independently and at different times by one English student of history and two Indians, one of the latter being an ex-Prime Minister of an important Feudatory State.

Before British Rule.

In the Eleventh Century		2	Famines,	both local.
,,	Thirteenth ,,	1	,,	around Delhi.
,,	Fourteenth ,,	3	,,	all local.
,,	Fifteenth ,,	2	,,	both local.
,,	Sixteenth ,,	3	,,	all local.
,,	Seventeenth ,,	3	,,	'General': area not defined.
,,	Eighteenth ,, (to 1745)	4	,,	North-Western Provinces; Delhi; Sind (twice); all local.

Under British Rule.

As to *frequency*. The late Sir George Campbell, K.C.S.I., M.P., who passed through the gamut of official experience, from a writership in Calcutta in the old days of The Company, to the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal, under the Crown, when, in 1866, he was deputed to inquire into previous famines in India, confined himself to the period 'since the establishment of British rule.' The Famine Commissions follow the same plan. As the Reports of those Commissions are, largely, my authorities, I must follow the example they furnish. Sir George records, for Eastern India, drought in 1769 and famine in 1770, accompanied with much suffering and great loss of life. But the harm then done could not have been of a very intense character, judging from the collections of the land revenue in 1771, which were Rs.530,000 (the rupee, then, was over 2s.—say 2s. = £53,000) higher than in 1768, before any failure of rain was recorded. 'The British authorities were early alive to the evil,' says Sir George Campbell, '*and much*

sympathised with it, BUT ALWAYS *with an overruling consideration for the revenue.*' A reporter of the last famine—(that of 1900—in spite of the elaborate Famine Code—that Code being, in far-reaching detail and completeness one of the most creditable as it is one of the most remarkable achievements of British administration in India)—might have used precisely these same words of events one hundred and thirty years later. The reporter would find the British authorities in the Bombay Presidency, in their 'overruling consideration for the revenue,' acting in a manner hardly to be reconciled with common (to say nothing of Christian) humanity. As a fact both non-official critic and official historian, dealing with far-apart periods, must say the same thing—cannot, honestly, say any other. In essentials, in some parts of India, there seems little advance on 1770. Whatever the condition of the country the revenue is squeezed from the people.

In 1784 the North-Western Provinces, Oudh, and the Panjab were in distressful condition, owing to 'extraordinary drought' during two previous years. The worst recorded price of the grain most generally consumed by the people was about thirty-two pounds for a rupee. Compared with the present depleted condition of the people that does not seem very terrible, though, contrasted with the one hundred and thirty-six pounds, which was what the people then were accustomed to, it may have seemed terrible. In 1897, when the same region was but secondarily, *i.e.*, through the railways, affected by the famine of that year, only twenty-six pounds and a quarter of the same kind of grain could be bought for a rupee. While the course of events in the United Kingdom during the last half of the nineteenth century has vastly cheapened food for the poor, and the means of purchasing have increased, a consideration of these figures will show that in India the exactly opposite state of things has been brought about—'been *brought* about': the words accurately describe the situation.

In 1787 there was again distress in various parts of Bengal, owing to a cyclone and floods. Though recorded as a famine the resulting distress ought not to be so regarded, seeing that it does not even begin to compare with scarcities, such as that in the district of Ganjam, Northern Madras, in 1889, when twenty thousand people died of starvation before the Governor of Madras awoke to his duty (on pressure exerted through the House of Commons by the late Charles Bradlaugh, M.P.) and visited the district. Of such minor calamities we hardly deign to take any notice nowadays; so full have we supped of famine horrors they no longer cause repulsion.

> 'The dewfall of compassion now is o'er
> So soon. So soon is dead indifference come.'

The Presidencies of Madras and Bombay suffered from drought in 1782, but the distress did not reach famine as famine is now understood; still it may be included in the count. In 1792 Hyderabad, Southern Bombay, the Deccan, Gujarat, and Madras, suffered from 'severe famine.' No particulars are given as to the extent of the distress, which, probably, was only locally 'severe'—the severity, in many parts, arising from defective communications, which we have removed by our roads, railways, and (a few) navigable canals.

There were thus four (or, if the cyclone damage be counted, five) famines in the last third of the eighteenth century. What is the record for the similar period in the nineteenth century? For answer I abstract, from official records, the following most significant (and most fearful) comparison of famines and scarcities during the respective periods:—

1769—1800.		1868-69—1900.[1]	
Year.	Region.	Year.	Region.
1769–70	Bengal.	1868–69	Rajputana.
1783 ...	Madras and Bombay.		North-Western Provinces.
1784 ...	Upper India.		

[1] Details concerning these famines and scarcities will be found in the Reports of the Famine Commissions of 1878–80 and of 1898.

1769—1800.

Year.	Region.
1792 ...	Madras, Hyderabad, Southern Bombay, Deccan, Gujarat, Marwar.

1868–69—1900.

Year.	Region.
1868–69	Panjab.
	Central Provinces.
	Bombay.
1873–74	Bengal and Behar.
	North - Western Provinces and Oudh.
1874–77	Bombay.
	Hyderabad.
1876–78	Madras.
	Mysore.
1877–78	North - Western Provinces and Oudh.
1884 ...	Panjab.
1884–85	Lower Bengal.
	Madras.
1886–87	Central Provinces.
1888–89	Behar.
1889 ...	Orissa (Tributary States).
1888–89	Madras (Ganjam).
1890 ...	Kumaun and Garwhal.
1890–92	Ajmere Merwara.
1892 ...	Madras.
	Bombay (Deccan).
	Bengal and Behar.
	Upper Burma.
1897–98	Madras and Bombay.
	Central Provinces.
	North - Western Provinces.
	Central India.
1899-1900	Bombay.
	Panjab.
	Central Provinces.
	Rajputana.
	Central India.
	Hyderabad, Deccan.
	Berar.

Stated roughly, famines and scarcities have been four times as numerous during the last thirty years of the

Details concerning these famines and scarcities will be found in the Reports of the Famine Commissions of 1878–80 and of 1898.

nineteenth century as they were one hundred years earlier and four times more widespread.

To make the record complete the whole series of famines since a British Governor-General began rule as such in Bengal, may be appended. The arrangement and enumerations are those of the various Famine Commissions in their respective Reports :—

(1) *The Last Thirty Years of the Eighteenth Century.*

Year.	Remarks.
1769–70...	Bengal. Drought followed by floods. In certain districts mortality very great.
1783 ...	Madras and Bombay. No mortality record.
1784 ...	Upper India. Ditto.
1792 ...	Bombay and Madras Deccan, and Southern India generally.

(2) *The First Half of the Nineteenth Century.*

1802–3 ...	Bombay. Deaths exceedingly many. Famine due to war. Plentiful supply of water and grazing for cattle.
1803–4 ...	North-Western Provinces and Rajputana. Life loss not severe.
1805–7 ...	Madras. Estimate of deaths 'very large.'
1811–14...	Madras. No serious distress.
,, ...	Bombay. Severe, but 'not much mention of mortality.'
1812–13...	Rajputana. Exceedingly bad; mortality, probably one and a half to two millions.
1823 ...	Madras. 'Deaths of frequent occurrence.'
1824–25...	Bombay. Scarcity 'nowhere amounting to famine.'
,, ...	North-Western Provinces. Ditto.
1833–34...	Northern Madras. Mortality very great. In some districts nearly 50 per cent. of the population perished.
,, ...	Bombay. Scarcity, but no famine.
1837–38...	Upper India. Mortality, probably one million.

(3) *The Second Half of the Nineteenth Century.*

		Mortality
1854 ...	Madras. 'Considerable check to growth of population.'	—
1860–61...	North-Western Provinces and Panjab. Estimates vary; not less than...	500,000
1865–66...	Orissa. In six districts alone	1,300,000
,, ...	Behar and Northern Bengal	135,000
,, ...	Madras	450,000

Year.	Remarks.	Mortality.
1868–69...	Rajputana	1,250,000
,, ...	North-Western Provinces	600,000
,, ...	Panjab	600,000
,, ...	Central Provinces	250,00
,, ...	Bombay. Life-loss not stated; emigration very extensive	—
1873–74...	Bengal and Behar...	None
,, ...	North-Western Provinces and Oudh	,,
1876–77...	Bombay. Estimates vary from 1,000,000 to 800,000, say	900,000
,, ...	Hyderabad (Deccan)	70,000
1876–78...	Madras, North-Western Provinces and Oudh. Noteworthy for the imposition of the '1 lb. ration' for famine-workers, subsequently withdrawn. The most terrible famine, to that date, known in India. The mortality was estimated by the Famine Commissioners in Southern India at 5,250,000; it was, probably, much more than that. Elsewhere it was at least three millions ...	8,250,000
,, ...	Mysore (then under British administration) ...	1,100,000
1880 ...	Deccan, Southern Bombay, Central Provinces, and Nizam's Dominions. High prices, but relief measures not taken. Mortality not stated	—
,, ...	North-Western Provinces. Ditto. Ditto. ...	—
1884 ...	Scarcity in the Southern and South-Eastern Panjab. Relief measures provided, and remissions of revenue granted. Mortality not stated. Vital statistics show increased deaths over previous year of	750,000
1884–85...	Bengal, Behar, and Chota Nagpore. Also Bellary and Anantapur districts in Madras. Mortality included in foregoing	—
1886–87...	Central Provinces. Earthworks prepared, but late autumn rains secured ripening of winter crops	—
1888–89...	Behar. Works established and relief granted for several months	—
1889 ...	Tributary States of Orissa. Relief works, 'many of the people brought on relief were in bad condition, specially the children'	—
1888–89...	Ganjam, Madras. South-west Monsoon late and scanty. Relief postponed until too late, and much suffering ensued	—

YEAR.	REMARKS.	MORTALITY.
	[The vital statistics show for the above year, and for 1890, an additional mortality of 1,500,000.]	1,500,000
1890	... Kumaon and Garwhal. Comparatively small help sufficed	—
1892	... Garwhal and Almora. '150,000 persons assisted by advances of grain by Government' ...	—
1891–92	... Madras. Failure of North-east Monsoon. 'A period of severe agricultural distress prevailed for over two years throughout the Madras Presidency.' Relief works opened, and nearly £1,000,000 spent in relief ...	—
,,	... Bombay Deccan. Only slight relief granted ...	—
,,	... Bengal. Relief of all kinds provided. 'Mortality in all the affected districts above the normal'	—
,,	... Upper Burma. Relief works, gratuitous relief, and agricultural loans, amounted to Rs.20,50,000	—
,,	... Ajmere-Merwara. Relief works of various kinds, and help to weavers provided ...	—
	[The mortality, all India, for 1891 and 1892, above the normal, was:— 1891 ... ... 420,000 1892 1,200,000	1,620,000
1895–97	... An exceeding great famine. Bundelkhund, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, Bengal, Central Provinces, Madras, Bombay, Panjab, Berar, and Burma. Widely extended relief of all kinds provided. The Commissioners profess to be unable to make an estimate of mortality. The vital statistics show increase above the normal, of:— 1895 ... ... 1,200,000 1896 ... ... 1,800,000 1897 2,650,000	5,650,000
	1898, a so-called non-famine year, shows excess of	650,000
1899–1900	The most widely-extended and most 'terrible' (Lord Curzon's word) famine known in Indian history. Its area covered most of the country west of the Ganges, from the borders of Kashmir to Mysore, with 'spots'	

Year.	Remarks.	Mortality.
	in Madras, and from Sind to the Orissa boundary. Crop and incidental losses, not less than £150,000,000. Mortality stated by Famine Commissioners at 1,250,000, but, judging from analogy, it is three or four times that figure. I carry forward only double the official estimate	2,500,000
1901	... Gujarat, Deccan, Bombay, Karnatak, Madras (part of), Southern Panjab (probably will be at least)	750,000
	Total (admitted) mortality in forty-seven years—1854 to 1901 ...	28,825,000

The foregoing official figures (official, with exceptions stated) show over one million deaths on the average per annum during the past ten years, or, *two British subjects passed away from starvation or starvation-induced diseases every minute of every day and every night from January 1, 1889, to September 30, 1901!* Nevertheless, only a few persons in the United Kingdom are doing aught to prevent a continuance of such an awful condition of things, and the Secretary of State for India stands amazed at the 'prosperity' of the regions he is governing!

A little more detail will make the GROWING impoverishment of India, as writ in famine deaths, more clear.

The nineteenth century, for comparison purposes, may be taken in four eqnal periods, and the immense increase in the last quarter as compared with the years, 1800 to 1825, be noted.

1800 to 1825.—FIVE famines, with SLIGHT loss of life (1802–3, 1804, 1807, 1812–13, 1823–25). Some of these 'famines' arose from wars, and none extended over a large area.

1826 to 1850.—TWO famines: 1833, 1837. These were mainly local, and great suffering was caused in particular districts, notably in Northern Madras.

The '33 famine led to the Great Godavari Irrigation works being begun.

By this time, practically all India, as we know it, had come under our sway.

1851 to 1875.—SIX famines, with the loss of five millions of lives, spread over the whole series of calamities. The worst famine was in Orissa.

1876 to 1900.—EIGHTEEN famines, including the FOUR most terrible famines ever known in India; in the first of these four, SIX AND A QUARTER MILLIONS OF LIVES WERE LOST; in the last two, during the ten years in which they occurred, according to the correspondent in India of the *Lancet*, and the estimate of the *Statesman and Friend of India*, Calcutta, NINETEEN MILLIONS OF LIVES were lost from famine and famine diseases.

During this quarter of a century, *eighteen parts of the Empire suffered from famines of varying degrees of poignancy*. There were thus, in the official reckoning, EIGHTEEN FAMINES in the last twenty-five years of the nineteenth century.

How completely famine has gained a hold on the Empire may be judged from this summary:—

		Deaths.
1st period, 25 years	FIVE FAMINES.	Perhaps 1,000,000
2nd ,, ,,	TWO ,,	,, 500,000
3rd ,, ,,	SIX ,,	Recorded 5,000,000
4th ,, ,,	EIGHTEEN ,,	Estimated 26,000,000

THE FIRST FAMINE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

1802-3.



The famine area is shaded; the degree of severity is indicated by the intensity of shading.

THE LAST FAMINE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

1900



The famine areas are shaded; the degree of severity is indicated by the intensity of shading. The native States are shaded from right to left, thus ///.

In the last twenty-five years of the past century more than one million of people died from famine and its effects on an average every year in a British-ruled country—that is two each minute, 120 each hour, 2,880 each day; and, during the past ten years, the average has been nearly four each minute, 240 each hour, 5,760 each day.

The whole series of famines since 1729 are most interestingly shown in a table prepared by Mr. William L. Hare, of Derby. I quote it on the following page.

Why is this? Is it a necessity of our (foreign) rule that the Indian people, the longer our rule continues, should become more and more famine-stricken? Or, is this most alarming state of things, the existence of which is beyond denial, due to causes entirely beyond our control? That matters get worse and worse with each twenty years that passes is a fact the alarming significance of which cannot be overrated. I ask every man and every woman, before whose eyes this comparison comes, to ponder its significance, to ascertain for himself and for herself how terrible a sum of human misery is involved. Let each make a further comparison—say, between our own country in 1769–1800 and in 1869–1900, and note that, during these periods, we have prospered even more than the Indian people have become increasingly poverty-stricken. 'Poverty-stricken?' No, worse than that, FAMINE-stricken. This comparison made, let it be carried a little farther and heed be paid to this circumstance: the wealth drained from India without a direct equivalent, and brought to England, has had not a little to do with the famine conditions on the one hand and with the marvellous prosperity on the other. Indeed, here is to be found the primary cause of India's deplorable condition—*the Economic Drain*. One step farther to be taken by my imagined sympathising readers of both sexes: it is that they should ask themselves the question, 'Is it possible that, recognising these facts, remembering that all the famines have passed into history without effectual measures having been taken to prevent a recurrence, is it

Province.	Year {	1729	1770	1781	1788	1790	1791	1799	1802	1803	1805	1812	1828	1832	1854	1857	1860	1865	1868	1878	1877	1882	1889	1890	1891	1897	1900
Bengal	...		F							F								F		F		F			F	F
Behar	...		F															F		F					F	F
Orissa	...																	F								F
Oudh	...				F					F		F				F			F	F	F		F	F	F	F
N.W. Provinces	...				F					F		F							F	F	F		F	F	F	F
Panjab	...				F							F							F		F		F	F	F	F
Central Provinces	...																		F					F	F	F
Central India	...				F							F							F					F	F	F
Rajputana	...											F							F					F	F	F
Sind	...																								F	F
Gujarat	...						F		F	F															F	F
Bombay	...						F		F	F		F							F						F	F
Berar	...						F		F																F	F
Hyderabad	...						F		F					F	F										F	F
Madras	...			F		F		F			F		F	F											F	F
Mysore	...					F																			F	F
Burmah	...																								F	F
Provinces affected ...		1	2	1	4	1	3	1	3	2	1	3	1	2	2	1	1	4	6	3	6	2	3	2	3	13	9

possible, I ask, for any dweller in these home realms in whom is any bowels of compassion, to sit with folded hands and do nothing? Rather, will not all, with a modern patriot poet, cry to their rulers, cry without ceasing, and follow their cries with untiring action:—

'O England! O Beloved! O Re-born!
Look that thou fall not on sleep again!

Thou art a star among the nations yet:
Be thou a light of succour unto them
That else are lost in blind and 'whelming seas.
Around them is the tempest; over them
Cold splendours of the inhospitable night,
Augustly unregardful: thou alone
Art still the North Star to the labouring ship,
In friendless ocean the befriending orb,
And, if thou shine not, whither is she steered?

Shine in thy glory, shine on her despair,
Shine lest she perish—lest of her no more
Than some lone flotsam of mortality
Remain to catch the first auroral gleam
When, in the East, flames the reluctant dawn.'

After the word, the Deed. Who *can* refrain from an effort, however slight, to remove the awful doom which now continually impends over many millions of our fellow-subjects—not strangers, but the King's lieges—in India? Only through the enlightenment of Englishmen and Englishwomen, and through pressure exerted from England, can India be saved from even worse and worse famine conditions than those which have been already described almost times without number. Redemption will not be found *in* India. The Viceroy is too much occupied with the daily work of an Empire too vast for any man, whatever his self-confidence, to imagine he can properly rule, while every civilian is so much concerned with his section of the machinery of State as to be unable to judge of the working of the machine as a whole, or to do anything affecting the whole. If India can be

redeemed—which is not at all certain—her redemption will come from the enlightened, and therefore quickened, consciences of British people.

Are Indian famines more destructive to human life now than in ancient days? Yes, and (until the 1901 Census statistics appeared I used to say) No. Yes—they were more destructive within the famine areas until '76–78: since then, the Famine Code, when acted upon as it mercifully was acted upon in the Central Provinces in 1900, checks mortality. The administration of relief, in that year, in that Province, was grappled with in a manner worthy of the best traditions of our nation. The extent may be judged when, in the district of Raipur, forty inhabitants out of each one hundred were on relief. As much time and energy given to the devising of means of prevention as have been given by numberless officials to relief measures, would, ere this, have stopped famine.

There were districts in Bombay in which, despite the Famine Code, the people 'died like flies.' So remarked Sir Antony Macdonnell, President of the latest Famine Commission. Meanwhile the Census Returns have been published:—

Population in 1891, all India ...	287,223,431
Population in 1900, as it should have been with normal increase, put forward by the Government of India as 'normal'	330,306,945
Population in 1901, as it actually was	294,000,000
Minus	36,306,945

The Indian special correspondent of the *Lancet* newspaper, to whom I have already alluded, writing to that journal on May 16, 1901, allowing for a lower rate of increase than did the Indian authorities, put the life loss from famine

at nineteen millions of people, '. . . and if,' he remarks, 'we put one million deaths down to plague there remain nineteen millions which can be attributed, with some reason, either to actual starvation or to the diseases arising therefrom.'[1] This statement by the correspondent of what is, probably, the foremost medical journal in the world, means that the loss of life thus recorded represented the 'disappearance' of fully one-half of a popu-

[1] The whole paragraph from which the remark is quoted is as follows: 'During the past ten years it is estimated that the population of the whole of India has only increased by 2,800,000—a rate considerably less than that of the previous decade. There are only two factors which can have an appreciable effect on the number of the people. A diminished birth-rate may have contributed to this lessened increase, but its influence cannot have been very great. At the outside 20 per cent. may be put down to this cause. An enhanced mortality must be the chief factor. It is estimated that there were 20,000,000 more deaths than under ordinary circumstances there should have been, and if we put 1,000,000 deaths down to plague there remain 19,000,000 which can be attributed with some reason either to actual starvation or to the diseases arising therefrom. It is impossible to know how many people have suffered from the famines of the past few years. A further increase in the numbers under famine relief has recently occurred and the total now requiring help is 312,169. These facts speak for themselves.' It would be a singular coincidence if the correspondent in India of the *Lancet* and the Editor of the *Friend of India* should have come to identically the same conclusion on this subject. On May 16, 1901, the *Friend*, in a second article on the Famine Mortality, reviewing the Census results, remarked: 'Even on the violent supposition that, taking the country all round, the reduction in the birth-rate was so great during the three worst years that it no more than sufficed to counterbalance a normal death-rate, still it would account for less than one-third of the defect in the increase of population. We are driven, in short, to the conclusion that, in round numbers, 20,000,000 of the defect were due to enhanced mortality; and, making the most liberal allowance for mortality from plague, we have a balance of at least 19,000,000 deaths which can reasonably be attributed to no other cause than actual starvation, or disease arising indirectly from insufficiency of food. This is a terrible fact, however it may be regarded; and it points to one of two conclusions. Either the Government did not do enough—did not spend enough, labour enough—for the saving of life, or its methods were seriously defective. . . . The inference is that, exert itself as it may on the present lines, and spend as much money as it may, the Government cannot hope to prevent extensive failure of the harvests, even for a single year, from being attended by a mortality so appalling that in any civilised country it would be regarded as conclusive proof of inefficient administration.' Possibly, what has happened is this—the *Lancet* correspondent has borrowed the *Friend's* calculations without acknowledgment of the source of the calculation.

lation as large as that of the United Kingdom! Yet, as I have already remarked, and must again observe, it did not occur to the Editor of that journal, sitting at the very heart of the Empire in his office in the Strand, that he was called upon to make any comments on his correspondent's appalling statement, not even to suggest that the Government might take such steps as should prevent any similar suffering in the future. We have, all of us, grown callous to Indian hunger and starvation, and our medical men, whose sympathies should be the last to become atrophied, judged by this incident, are in the front rank of the heedless, and are among the most unconcerned.

Once more the question may be asked, Are Indian famines more destructive to human life than in ancient days? Again the answer: Yes, and in a more deadly fashion. 'Tis suffering everywhere in India now.

Aforetime, as a rule famine was experienced only after two years of drought or three years of deficient rainfall not amounting to drought;

Now, one year's failure of rain at the right time for agricultural operations, even though plenty of rain fall *during the year* for one harvest, produces acute famine:

Then, the grain stores which every village possessed greatly mitigated suffering. Further, as all India has never, during recorded history, suffered from drought at one and the same time, the pangs of hunger arising from this cause and not to be satisfied were felt only in particular regions—regions isolated, for want of communications, from other parts of India where there was plenty and where the people ate fully from their abundance;

Now, thanks (sour thanks!) to railways which have found their way into every part of the Empire, each year sees the surplus exported which, in other days, was stored; when the faulty rainfall gives them trouble the empty districts are supplied from whatever district has grown a decent crop, with the result that all over India

prices rise and rise and never again fall to the old level. Consequently everywhere food is dear, and two hundred millions feel the pinch where, even under the pre-British conditions, a few millions only would have suffered. It is true, as Mr. Vaughan Nash shows in an interesting and well-informed chapter in his book on 'The Great Famine,' there is, even in famine years, food enough grown in India to meet the needs of each year—at a price. There would, however, be no surplus if all the people could, in any given year, eat what they need. The satisfaction of their hunger would empty every bunniah's store as well as absorb every trader's reserves. The railways, by the conveyance of grain to the affected districts, preserve the lives of millions, but they do this at the cost of making the people everywhere pay so high a price that a daily sufficiency of food becomes impossible to ever-increasing millions. The poorer classes who, at any time during the past half-century, seldom seem to have had enough to eat, as a consequence readily succumb to disease until now it is a normal condition of things in India for 'fever' to needlessly slay more Indian folk in three years than war all the world over destroys in thirty years. 'Fever,' said an Anglo-Indian medical authority nearly twenty years ago, 'is a euphemism for insufficient food, scanty clothing, and unfit dwellings.'[1]

Why is it that India is more liable to devastation by famine than are other countries?

In a phrase: Not because rains fail and moisture is denied; always, even in the worst of years, there is water enough poured from the skies on Indian soil to germinate and ripen the grain,[2] but because India is steadily and rapidly growing poorer. Time was when

[1] See the Fever statistics of the last ten years in *The Statistical Abstract of British India.*

[2] For detailed information on this point and an analysis of rain registers for nearly ninety years the reader is referred to a chapter in the *Life of Sir Arthur Cotton* (Hodder and Stoughton) entitled 'Is Famine in India due to an Insufficiency of Rain?'

the Empire was wealthy and prosperous, when, as Milton says of the East, she showered

'on her kings barbaric pearl and gold.'

Time was, not more distant than a century and a half ago, when Bengal was much more wealthy than was Britain. How is it now? Thus: there are many, many, more rich men in the little bit of England comprised between Liverpool and Barrow on the west coast and Hull and Newcastle-on-Tyne on the east coast than there are in the whole of the British Provinces of India. Why? Because, with the best of intentions in the world, or at least what we have deluded ourselves into believing were the best of intentions, we have done that which we ought not to have done and have left undone that which we ought to have done; consequently there is little 'health' in all that vast territory. In existing conditions there can be no improvement, but, contrariwise, further retrogression.

We started our supremacy in India with the fixed idea that dark skins must necessarily cover ignorant and inexperienced minds and wicked souls, especially the latter. The wickedness of an Indian was appalling to one who himself was probably a greater sinner than any Indian he had ever met. That the Founder of Christianity was an Oriental with a brown skin, as brown as that of many Indian races, did not prevent our associating such a skin with more than original sin. We did not *then* consider the Indians to be physical cowards, for it was only by the undaunted courage of Madrassi and Bengali soldiers that we attained our supremacy on the Indian continent. Because of the views we entertained respecting the people, instead of undertaking our rule with the light of local experience, by the aid of men with local knowledge and ability, and, first of all, to the advantage of the people ruled, we assumed that what we did not know, even about the government of an Asiatic kingdom—its climate, its people, its customs,

its history, of all of which we were quite ignorant, was not worth knowing. There was, we reasoned, to be no gainsaying that the ideas and practices which had made certain islands in the Western Ultima Thule great and prosperous were good enough for any country anywhere: and, it went without saying, particularly for India. Our practice in this respect was always tempered with the notion that we had to get something handsome out of our connection with India. ['The labourer,' we piously observed, 'is worthy of his hire,' and our hire we put at many millions of pounds sterling every year—paid regularly on monthly or quarterly pay-days.] So we embarked on a course of government founded upon certain economic principles which, in the result, has drained India of nearly all its resources, deprived it of working capital, and in so doing have rendered it helpless to cope with the changing necessities of a scientific and mechanical age—an age in which above all the ages that have preceded it money is required to make money. Although the consequences of what we have done, of the almost insane conceit we had (and still have) that we know everything and that India can teach us nothing, particularly in the art of ruling Oriental territories[1] —though the consequences are before our eyes, we will not see that (in some cases without meaning it) we have done ill to India and not good.

A potent example of our recent mispolicy is at hand as I write. Railways proved to be essential to the successful development of the mechanical arts in the United Kingdom. Therefore India, almost entirely an agricultural country, must be gridironed with steel rails. The locomotive must be as omnipresent among the bare fields of India as it is among the tall chimneys of Lancashire and Yorkshire factories. The members of a Select Com-

[1] Even Sir Henry Maine, philosopher and jurist, could find nothing valuable in the Indian life and thought of to-day, or even in the India of the past. And yet India *was* great in both spiritual and material things; is great to-day—no country in the world so great in many respects.

mittee of the House of Commons which, in 1878, conducted an inquiry into Public Works (East India) are, primarily, the authors of the recent famines—that is to say, the Report which they agreed upon makes those Committeemen jointly responsible with the India Office and the Government of India, who accepted and carried out the recommendations, for much, if not for all, of the vast amount of human anguish and widespread loss recently experienced. My matured conviction, after an exhaustive study of the whole question, is that, had the views which the greatest of Indian irrigation engineers, Sir Arthur Cotton, put forward in 1878 been adopted, instead of having been contemned, the recent famines would not have occurred, or if there had been scarcities in some parts of India they would have borne no relation to the 'terrible' famines which have wrought so much devastation. What makes our conduct as the nation responsible for the good government of India the more blamable is that the greatest of all the Famine Commissions—that which reported in 1880—gave the same advice to the authorities in India and in England two years after the Select Committee had reported, as did the veteran irrigation engineer. The Commissioners, in their Report, said:—

'Among the means that may be adopted for giving India *direct protection from famine arising from drought, the* FIRST PLACE *must unquestionably be assigned to works of irrigation.* It has been too much the custom, in discussions as to the policy of constructing such works, to measure their value by their financial success, considered only with reference to the net return to Government on the capital invested in them. The true value of irrigation works is to be judged very differently. First must be reckoned the direct protection afforded by them in years of drought by the saving of human life, by the avoidance of loss of revenue remitted and of the outlay incurred in costly measures of relief. But it is not only in years of drought that they are of value. In seasons of average rainfall they are of great service and a great source of wealth, giving certainty to all agricultural operations, increasing the out-turn per acre of the crops, and enabling more valuable descriptions of crops to be grown. From the Panjab in the north to Tinnevelly at the southern extremity of the

peninsula, wherever irrigation is practised, such results are manifest, and we may see rice, sugar cane, or wheat taking the place of millets or barley, and broad stretches of indigo growing at a season when unwatered lands must lie absolutely unproductive.'

The way in which the India Office and the Government of India acted upon the deliverance of the Commission of their own creation is this: From 1882–83 to 1897–98 they expended—

from REVENUE nearly *seven* times more on railways than on irrigation works, and

from CAPITAL more than *six* times as much.

Not only is irrigation in such a country as India quite needful if crops are to be grown every year, not only does irrigation immensely increase the productive power of the soil—four times at least—but by the supply-canals being made navigable nearly all that India wants in the way of district development and of general communication, with a few trunk lines of railway, could have been provided at a very moderate cost—a cost easily within a prosperous India's own providing. Increased production, cheaper communication, from one and the same source. Unsuited and costly locomotion with no production was the other and favoured policy. Direct water communication with every part of India could have been provided. The adoption, in 1878, of the policy which was rejected would have changed the whole face of India and have brought to England a ray of glory of a character which she may not now claim. Indeed, discredit has taken the place of what would have been a monument of unassailable praise.

In the mistaken Report of 1878, which was too readily acted upon, and in the neglect to follow the wise course recommended by the Commission of 1880, are, I repeat, to be found the chief reasons why there have been so many and such terrible famines in India during the past twenty years.

Irrigation is *a* remedy for famine: there are no famines in any fully canal-irrigated districts in India, though

terrible disasters occurred in some of them in pre-irrigation days. Irrigation is more than *a* remedy; it is a *great* remedy. But if all that the venerable water prophet of Madras predicted and indicated in his plans for every part of India had been carried out, or were yet to be adopted, and a great accession came, as it would come, to the annual income of our Eastern Empire, all this would merely postpone for twenty, forty, years, maybe, that collapse which is inevitable unless the whole economic principles on which India is governed be radically amended. We are, literally, draining India dry—bleeding, was Lord Salisbury's term in 1875; it is more accurate than my own. One consequence is discernible in the increased frequency of famines, to which attention has already been drawn. Now, as in the days of old, neither more nor less, rain-failure, monsoon-disturbance, occur. Wherein the present differs from the past is in the lamentable fact that the people are now so poor that they cannot stand any strain, not even the slightest.

There are no stores of grain in the villages;

the property represented by gold and silver (and pewter) ornaments is greatly depleted, has almost disappeared;

the ancient occupations of the people on sea and land have been destroyed, and more and more of men and women are driven to the soil without capital wherewith to properly cultivate it;

the ships which now carry its coastwise trade are steamers built in Britain, the officers are Britons, the profits derivable from the trade go to Britain;

the hillsides, joyous with the richly-blossomed tea and coffee bushes, the plains radiant at harvest-time with the indigo and jute plants, are cultivated with foreign capital and the profits arising therefrom go out of India, while all the managers are foreigners;

every profession and every mercantile enterprise which

spell profit are in their higher and more largely paid positions, exploited by foreigners to the detriment of the natives of the country;

all this is likewise true of the *personnel* of the Administration in each of its higher branches, where, above everything else, such a state of things ought not to have been conceivable even in a modified or remote degree.

This is why famine approximates more and more towards becoming a representation of the normal condition of many parts of India. As regards the future, it is not more certain that to-morrow's sun will rise on its annual course and perform its diurnal journey than it is that the sufferings of the Indian people will—a vast change denied—year by year become greatly increased. Even now those sufferings cry to Heaven for amelioration, and cry vainly, for the Eye which erstwhile saw the sparrow fall, and the Ear which heard the faintest cry, appear to be both closed for ever. Saddest of all, in any backward glance over British-Indian history, is the thought that the very opposite to what is now experienced was, if we cared to adopt it, before us as a certain achievement. This I have shown by citations from early documents in a previous chapter. Had the wiser policy been adopted, Britain would have built, for Britons to rejoice over, an edifice of imperishable renown based on the greater prosperity of the Indian people; England's trade with India would have been vastly bigger than it now is and have become a token of imperial prosperity instead of, as now, a sign of approaching death. The two policies have always been before us. As if under an almost demoniac possession, every time the choice has been ours, we have chosen the wrong. Under the East India Company the renewal of the Charter gave us the choice once every twenty years; to-day Parliament gives us the opportunity every year, but if India be mentioned, it is true of our legislators that 'they all with one consent begin to make excuse,' they troop out of the legislative chamber, and

India remains unredeemed. That is one reason why famine is to-day chronic in India.

Do any of us, I wonder, realise what the great nations of the world are thinking and saying of our administration in connection with these many dreadful famines? Depend upon it, they see the consequences which we will not allow ourselves to see and concerning which we comfort ourselves by describing what we do see by other and inoffensive appellations. I have seldom, as a Briton, felt more humiliated than I did in January, 1900, when I happened to be in Paris. *Le Matin*, one of the most trustworthy of Parisian journals, one day contained a long article descriptive of the sufferings of the famine-stricken Indian people, and depreciatory of British rule. Knowing I had lived in India, the President of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris came to me, as he said, so that I should supply him with material whereby he could demolish such horrible slanders on the British name as were contained in the article in question. I replied that I should only be too happy to do what he wanted. I read the article carefully. When I got to the end of it, I found I could not contradict or disprove a single statement it contained. There were some alleged incidents as to which I could say nothing, as I had no information concerning them, except that they were not improbable. The main story was unassailable, the deductions not unreasonable. The story was not complimentary, the deductions were not flattering, either to our self-esteem or to our humanity as the rulers of India.

The like thing happened in the United States. When Lord Curzon, in 1900, carried a begging bowl among the nations beseeching subscriptions for the famine-stricken, the question was asked, 'Why should America give?' It was urged that India's millions were starving because of England's neglect of duty to India.

Is it too late to bring India back to prosperity? More often than not, in pondering over the situation, I think it is too late. Only by a change in the mind and attitude

of the English people, requiring a great miracle to bring it about, is it possible to cherish even a hope for better things, for a brighter outlook. In the best of circumstances, which is that the British people, on being instructed as to the real facts of the case, should put their whole heart and strength into an effort for reform—the task will be tremendously difficult. But will the instruction be given? Where are the instructors? Who amongst us have eyes to see, ears to hear? If we would but see, did we dare to let ourselves hear, what India from nearly all her hundreds of districts is showing to us, is saying to us, only one thing *could* happen; we should be so worked upon as to determine, God helping us, that this one thing we would do:

> We would so change the conditions of our rule in India that the inhabitants of that distressful country should once again in their history have daily bread enough for comfortable sustenance, and that the whole realm of India once more should taste the sweets of prosperity.

Meanwhile, whether we heed them or whether we scorn them—

> 'A sorrowing people, in their mortal pain,
> Toward one far and famous ocean isle
> Stretch hands of prayer.'

Shall they—

> 'stretch those
> Hands in vain?'

VOX INDIÆ CLAMANTIS.

['"In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward." The forthcoming debate on the Indian Budget reminds us that we have still to profit by the wise words of Queen Victoria.'—*Daily Paper.*]

PROSPERITY!—when year by year
Grim poverty I see
Draw ever nearer and more near,
Devouring all my children's gear—
Why, what a mockery is here
Of Her benign decree!

What strength, O England, shall be thine
When such prosperity is mine?
Contentment!—what contentment lies
In that poor slavish heart,
That dumb despair, with sunken eyes,
That bears its ills, and rather dies
A thousand deaths than dare to rise
And play a freeman's part?

Ah, what security can be
On such contentment based by thee?
My gratitude?—ah, empty name!
Thy charitable mites
But feed to-day the feeble frame
That starves to-morrow; for the same
Old wrong grows on untouched. I claim
Not charity, but rights—
England, what gratitude have I?
Canst find reward in apathy?

—*Punch*, July 31, 1901.

TO

THE HONOURED MEMORY OF THE FAMINE-SLAIN

IN INDIA DURING THE PERIOD

1891—1901.

To you, Hira Singh Puri, your Wife and Little Ones,
" Abe Ram, " "
" Pershotum Cundy, " "
" Krishna Das, " "
" Hassan Khan, " "
" Ram Suk, son of Luchman, "
and
" Muttu Ramaswamy, " "

With all others of your respective races, there were at the least nineteen millions of you between 1891 and 1901, who

PERISHED FROM FAMINE,

I,

humbly, on behalf of myself and my fellow-Britons, men, women, and children, who, under God, are responsible for your welfare,

Pay my Sincere Homage

to

your patience, your long-suffering, your resignation, your general acquiescence in a condition of affairs which afflicted you so sorely; and, above all, for

the entire absence on your part from holding us responsible for your sufferings.

For, had you been strict to mark accountability, all justification were wanting.

I CANNOT SAY, 'GOD HELPING US, WE WILL ENSURE THAT

NEVER AGAIN SHALL SUCH SUFFERINGS AFFLICT YOUR RACE-FELLOWS WHO REMAIN.'

Believe me,
this is not because we in England were deliberately heartless, cruel in our thoughts, or wilfully careless concerning your well-being.

No! that was not our position:
We were among the Kindest-Hearted and Most Sympathetic People in the World (at least, this is what we often told ourselves),

But,
We were your Rulers, whatever happens in India happens as the result of what we do, and our eyes are holden so that we cannot see, our minds are numbed so that we cannot understand, that what is happening in India may be (I, for one, say *is*)

THE NECESSARY RESULT OF OUR SYSTEM OF RULE.

If this fact were once realised
by my Countrymen and Countrywomen,
The Hunger and Thirst, the Nakedness and Poverty, of Your People would speedily come to an end.

How shall this fact be brought home to the English Mind?

I KNOW NOT. I DESPAIR OF ITS EVER BEING DONE.

There is no Hope for Your Race.

YOU HAVE DIED. YOU HAVE DIED USELESSLY.

No one learns the lesson which your dying should teach.

Those you have left behind (less happy are they than are you) cannot do anything. They are listless in their energies, they are blind to the peril in which they stand.

Why? All their energies, necessarily, are concentrated in trying to keep life in their emaciated bodies.

WHO SHALL RESCUE YOUR SUCCESSORS FROM THIS BODY OF DEATH?

Again: I KNOW NOT. No one in authority here seems to know, or even to care very much, that they need salvation. I judge from their playing with words, their refraining from taking adequate action, their intense self-satisfaction with themselves, their belief that everything they do is for the best.

Nevertheless,
we deeply sympathise with them, and, when the next Famine becomes acute,

WE WILL SUBSCRIBE FOR THEIR RELIEF,

Less than Sixpence for every Hundred Pounds we have received from India since 1700.

It is true, really true,

we are sorry for them; as for stopping Famines, we are (we say) in God's Hands, and when He sends India less rain than we should like, or fails to send it at the moment which best suits their unirrigated fields, we say we can do nothing but help them to pull through—with the money we first take from them. If your people do *not* 'pull through,' we are sorry, but the fault, as you must know, really, is not ours; it is all God Almighty's. Kismet. His will be done.

That, actually, is not the whole truth, but it is the 'truth' with which we deaden our consciences. We *could* conserve the rain which does fall, if we would, and so save many of those who remain.

There, however, I must leave this matter. As I have said: We are sorry, very, very, sorry; but, you know, God is great. His will is powerful among the nations. We are but His instruments!

To my Countrymen, however, I say:
'AWAKE! ARISE! Remain not for ever fallen!'

Britons, protect the hungry ones: their fathers' bones
Lie scattered on vast Indian plains and hills;
Protect e'en them who, loyal, serve and trust
While all around them waste and die.
Forget not; day by day note thou the groans
Of those thy subjects, in their ancient homes
Slain by the ruthless Fiend, Starvation, who
Takes Mother and her infant heedlessly. Their moans
The vales redouble to the hills, and they
To Heaven. Their martyred blood and ashes sow
O'er all the English fields, where still do sway
Those who COULD prevent; that from these may grow
A hundredfold of succour, and, having learnt the way
You will, ere long, securely end this woe.

Sunday Morning, March 10, 1901.

APPENDICES

I

LETTER *extracted from a long Correspondence with* SIR HENRY H. FOWLER, G.C.S.I., P.C., M.P., *sometime Secretary of State for India.*

VALYEVO, BROMLEY, KENT,
February 4, 1901.

The Right Honourable SIR HENRY H. FOWLER, G.C.S.I., M.P., P.C., etc., etc., Woodthorne, Wolverhampton.

DEAR SIR,—I now proceed to deal with the questions contained in your letter of January 30th, acknowledgment of which I made on the 31st ultimo.

The questions you ask are two in number, namely,—

1. 'With reference to the question you put to me as to the expected recurrence of a famine in a small portion of the famine area of last year I shall be glad to know whether if this district had shared in the abundant rains in the autumn which have ensured good crops in four-fifths of that area, it would not have reaped the same harvest?'

2. 'And, in what respect you think the Government is responsible for the difference between the two portions of the same area.'

First, I must demur to the use of your expression 'small portion of the famine area,' 'good crops in four-fifths of that area.' So far as I can follow Lord Curzon's definition of areas they cover considerably more than one-fifth of last year's famine area, and, this time, a part of the Carnatic as well. In the Carnatic, let me add, it is a sin for us to permit a famine to occur for want of water, so abundant are Nature's supplies even in the worst rainfall years. In India it is the experience of administrators that their early forecasts are always exceeded. The ninety millions 'affected' last year began with about forty millions. It is not a minor disaster now facing us, but a serious one. To draw the right lesson from it is 'a man's job,' and that is one reason why I am troubling you, an experienced administrator and one of the leaders of an historic English political party, with my observations.

Next, as I read your questions once more, and especially the second one, Tennyson's lines occur to me:

'Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies;—
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but *if* I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.'

So, in like manner, if I am to answer your second question I shall need to write a long treatise; for, to indicate in what respects the Indian Government is responsible for the frequent famines in India is to deal with every branch of Indian administration, and to go back to the roots of the evil which were planted, in some cases deliberately planted (of which I have official proof) nearly one hundred years ago. Unhappily, though I have a knowledge as to how all this should be done and have my authorities handy for reference, I am a man who is under the necessity to give all his days to the earning of his living, and have only spare hours in the evenings and on Sunday mornings and afternoons to devote to this grave matter. I can, therefore, only give you brief statements of what I regard as indisputable facts, and in respect to which, where I do not state it, you must take my word that I have adequate authority for all I state.

You ask: 'If this' (the now affected) 'district had shared in the abundant rains in the autumn which have ensured good crops in four-fifths of that area, would it not have reaped the same harvest?'

(*a*) I do not know positively whether it would or would not. The requisite information for answering the question is not available here. So much depends upon the *period* at which the rain falls. Replying (as he imagines) to my letter in last Tuesday's *Standard* Colonel Bloomfield, an official of thirty-five years' experience, says famines are due, 'simply and manifestly from the failure of the rains. . . . when one of these (monsoon currents) fails, *e.g.*, Orissa suffers.' The answer to this is that in 1865–66, the year of the Orissa famine, fully sixty inches of rain fell in the Province. It fell at wrong times and too much at one time. Sir Arthur Cotton declares that if storage lakes had been provided and other consequential arrangements made, the crops could have been saved and the famine prevented. I do not know that sufficient rain did not fall in the now affected districts to answer every purpose, if only we had preserved it in storage lakes and from them led channels to existing tanks and have built others. My belief, founded on my close study of the irrigation needs of some of these regions, is that enough rain did fall to ensure crops but that our want of prevision—(your own, Sir, in some respects, especially during the years you were Secretary of State)—in storing what God's

reservoirs supplied to us, is really to blame. If I had time to take you, with adequate plans, district by district, over this whole area I am satisfied that I could demonstrate to you that it is only supineness and our determination in the past to build railways instead of navigation canals and irrigation works and our (needlessly) swollen military expenditure, which have prevented all these districts being protected—in like manner, if not to the same extent—as have the districts of Godaveri and Kistna in Madras and the Ganges Valley in Bengal and the North-Western Provinces.

For myself, I repeat that I believe enough rain lately has fallen in the particular area to which you allude, to grow crops, if only we had conserved it.

(*b*) You further ask whether the people in this area, given plenty of rain, would not have reaped as good crops as are being reaped in the other parts of last year's famine area. I don't know what you intend to convey by the term 'good crops.' Save, under canal irrigation chiefly, and in a few exceptional instances otherwise, no good crops, properly so called, are nowadays grown on 'dry land' in India. (The dry land area includes 166,073,159 acres against 30,414,499 in the 'wet' area.) Owing to the great 'drain' from India which has been going on for a hundred and thirty years—and more, and never to so great an extent as now, no capital remains in the country for use by the cultivator. Mill ('Political Economy,' ch. v.) says: 'Industry is limited by capital. Industry cannot be employed to any greater extent than there is capital to invest.' Once the cultivator could manure his fields—now he cannot; once he could well afford to allow land to lie fallow and also to arrange for a rotation of crops—now he cannot; consequently, the production of the fields has greatly fallen off—to the extent of thirty per cent. says one authority. In my letter of the 27th ultimo to your two Wolverhampton newspapers, I stated that since 1882—

16,000,000 additional acres have been brought under cultivation,
Rs.14,50,00,000 have been spent on irrigation (which means an increase of produce *six* times greater than dry land of the same area as the irrigation channels serve could supply, even when moderately manured), and
Rs. 60,00,00,000 have been expended on railway extension.

Nevertheless, the agricultural income of India in 1898–99 was only Rs.285,86,34,562 against Rs.350,00,00,000 in 1882, a *decrease* of Rs.64,11,65,438. That decrease, I unhesitatingly assert, is largely due to the decreasing fertility, the increasing sterility, of the soil.

That sterility arises from want of manure, which indicates the absence of any working capital. Our economic system of rule is responsible for this state of things; it is that system which has sucked the orange nearly juiceless. We have brought to England for our enrichment that which should have remained in India to fructify and increase the wealth of that land. If it had been so left, India would,

probably, have been a better customer of ours than she is now—herself prosperous.

I have given such answer as my limited time permits to your first question. Now for your second inquiry.

2. 'And, in what respect you think the Government is responsible for the difference between the two portions of the same area.'

Do you know, Sir, I do not think there is very much difference 'between the two portions of the same area,' even though crops will be reaped on one portion? So far as many, many, millions of the agricultural population of India are concerned, there is not much to choose between a famine year and a non-famine year. Twenty-one years ago, in a Midland town, the smoke from the factory chimneys of which can almost be seen from the heights of Tettenhall, the late Sir William Hunter discoursed on 'England's Work in India.' He discussed normal, not abnormal, conditions—non-famine years, not famine years. He said: 'There remain forty millions of people who go through life on insufficient food.'

Since those remarks were made the population has increased (or is alleged to have increased) by nearly sixty millions. Meanwhile—Lord Curzon's latest famine speech being my authority—the income of the Empire has not increased during this period. Wherefore this follows that if, with the same income, in 1880, forty millions were insufficiently fed, the additional millions cannot have had—cannot now have—enough to eat. This, then, ensues—

40,000,000 plus, say, 50,000,000 make 90,000,000; and there are this number of continually hungry people in British India at the beginning of the twentieth century.

In addition to this dreadful conclusion, one million and a half *more* people die of 'fever' (an official medical report, published in 1886 or thereabouts, speaks of fever as a euphemism for innutrition and insufficient clothing) now than died from like causes ten years ago, and the aggregate was high then! For every person who now dies from fever twenty persons are attacked by the disease. As, in 1897, the total number of 'fever' deaths was 5,015,842, you can estimate how much of physical suffering at least fifty millions of men, women, and children whom you once ruled, and may rule again, have to endure. An appreciable portion of these five millions of deaths are, practically, famine deaths in (so-called) non-famine years. 'A great majority of the rural population pass through at least one or two attacks of fever during the year,' is stated of one region.

Then, when I find that, in response to Lord Dufferin's inquiry in 1887, such reports as I hereunder summarise are put forward as 'satisfactory,' I again say that I am not sure there is such a thing as a non-famine year at any time in any 'dry'-cultivation regions in India. Here are a few records from the North-Western Provinces, which Mr. Romesh Dutt tells us are as fairly assessed as any of the territory not under a Permanent Settlement—

Mr. Crooke, Collector of Etah, under the stimulus of the Dufferin Circular in 1887, convened a meeting 'of the most experienced cultivators . . . and asked them to make an estimate of the income and expenditure of a man—owner of a pair of oxen and a single plough, and cultivating a patch of average land irrigated from a well.' The sample holding taken represented five acres and a half. 'The crops grown, out-turn, and value of the produce of such a holding would be as follows':—

Income.	Rs.	a.	p.
Kharif harvest ...	129	8	0
Rabi ,, ...	84	8	0
Total ...	214	0	0

Expenditure.	Rs.	a.	p.
Rent...	75	0	0
Seed grain	13	8	0
Other cultivating expenses	79	10	0
Balance	45	14	0
Total ...	214	0	0

That Rs.45 14a. (English money, £3 1s. 1d.) was all the family of this small farmer had to live upon for one year. Food was 17 seers a rupee—a seer is just over 2 lbs.—which required Rs.54 per annum for this necessary of life alone, leaving nothing whatever for clothing, though Rs.2 per head represent the minimum requirement. Thus, with only four reckoned to a family instead of five, as should have been, these families (for this a *typical* case) were Rs.16 short of enough money for food and decent clothing; and if five were reckoned, as ought to have been, the shortage would then have been Rs.32. Sir, I ask you, who are wont to make much of what you call the light taxation of India, to ponder these facts, especially the fact that Rs.75 out of Rs.214 produce value goes for rent, and not to overlook the other details as to the unmet needs of the family, including something for religion. There is no wonder English Christians have to pay for Christian teaching in India; with such particulars as these throwing light on the inability of the Indian people to give anything even to save their own immortal souls, it is clear they cannot hear the Gospel at their own charge. No Million Guineas New Century Fund could be suggested here by your political co-worker, Mr. R. W. Perks, although the population is six times that of our own, and a great deal more than sixty times that of the Wesleyan Methodist membership of the United Kingdom.

Kindly note that this land was irrigated (well-watered) land.

Of this same region an official reporter says: 'As to clothes, the women and children are worse off than the men. *It is unusual to find a village woman who has any wraps at all.* Most of them have to pass the night as best they can in their day clothes—a cotton petticoat, wrapper, and bodice.'

Here are some sample cases:—

Name of Cultivator.	Receipts. Rs. a. p.	Expenditure. Rs. a. p.	Rent. Rs. a. p.
Rup Ram (17 acres) ...	341 9 0	350 0 0	306 0 0
Baksha, Chamar (7 acres)...	102 0 0	124 0 0[1]	40 0 0
Hira, Lodha (24 acres) ...	162 0 0	234 0 0	72 8 0

Parsi, Lodha, aged 62, labourer, earns Rs.16 per annum; his daughter for grinding grain earns Rs.11 4a. The joint income is Rs.27 4a., which is just enough to buy two seers of grain a day, and leaves nothing for any other purpose. 'No children are to be married: he had one son and four daughters, who have all been married. Through poverty, in the marriage of his daughters, he had recourse to a less formal way of marriage, viz., *dola*, *i.e.*, he went to the house of the daughter's intended husband and consummated the marriage by giving only a small sum of Rs.5 or Rs.6.'

Here are two examples from Muttra District, North-Western Provinces:—

Name.	Receipts. Rs. a. p.	Expenditure. Rs. a. p.	Rent. Rs. a. p.
Kamle, Chamar (10 acres and 6 kinds of produce)	91 0 0	104 12 0	32 0 0
Abe Ram (9 acres) ...	103 4 0	129 15 0	68 15 0

This man's crops, when sold, realised Rs.70 4a.; the rent he paid was Rs.68 15a. 'When he had grain the family (five) ate five seers daily; at other times and now, when grain is dear, only three seers or less.' 'He ate the bajra before it was ripe.' 'He has no blanket.' Yet he is a farmer tilling nearly nine acres![2]

Two brothers, both married, no children—household: their wives, themselves, a cousin, an aunt—six in all. 'Fields are irrigated from a first-class well.' Income and expenditure show a debit of Rs.8 2a. 6p. They 'can afford a blanket.' Fancy, dear Sir, Indian farmers who, probably, have lived and laboured under your own painstaking and benign rule, *if they have no children* can actually afford to possess a blanket—one a-piece, I imagine, though this is not stated. The nights are cold enough in all conscience in the North-Western winter to make one hope there *was* a blanket each for these Indian yeomen and their womankind.

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[1] Out of this expenditure the shockingly extravagant sum of Rs.2 is put down as having been spent on 'Marriage and funeral expenses.'

[2] These incidents are told again in these pages, in a consideration of the economic condition of the North-Western Provinces. They cannot be told too often.

In the Etawah District, Mr. Alexander reports: In the village Marhapur 'the fifty-five cultivating householders were all in debt at the close of the year for sums varying from Rs.800 to Rs.10, and the day-labourers for sums varying from Rs.18 to Rs.2: most of the farmers were also obliged to part with jewelry or cattle.'

The above facts, I may once more state, are reported concerning what is declared to be the most fairly assessed Provinces under British rule outside the Lower Provinces of Bengal. I was going to say, God help the rest! But such people seem to be outside the help even of a Divine Ruler. If they had a hymn-book containing spiritual songs, I wonder how they would feel if they were called upon to sing such a verse as this—

> 'Thou art coming to a King:
> Large petitions with thee bring,
> For His grace and power are such
> None can ever ask too much.'

Evidently so far as India is concerned, He 'is asleep, or is on a journey.' Anyhow, whether their petition be for little or much, it is wholly unheeded. They get worse, not better.

I pause, sick at heart with what I could not help but write. Necessity is laid on me to say all this to you. If these things be typical—and in nothing I have stated have I gone elsewhere than to the reports of British officials who were put upon their defence to show that Sir W. W. Hunter's statements could not be true—how can I concern myself with the point you make in your second question?

'In what respect,' you ask, 'is the Government responsible for the difference between the two portions of the same area?' To me it seems that as between the cropped area and the partially cropped area (the non-famine and the famine districts, as they are officially called) there is very little to choose. Under the admirable Famine Code, admirable when fairly administered as it was last year in the Central Provinces—still admirable, but a cloak for great inhumanity, when administered as it was in Bombay (see Sir Antony Macdonnell's remarks on the 31st of January last) until Mr. Vaughan Nash, quoting a work on famines which I wrote in 1878, publicly demonstrated its cruelty—under the Famine Code, I say, the position of the famine-stricken farmer with his crops and the labourer will be as good as that of the farmer with his crops, as that of the prisoner in the district jail is—so far as food goes, better than either. For the revenue authorities and the moneylender between them will carry off every particle of grain beyond what is needed for daily food. Nay, worse: it is doubtful if the majority of cultivators in the well-cropped area will get as much to eat the year through as they would if they were located in famine camps—that is so long as they are not under the 'penal' control of the Bombay authorities.

The only real answer, dear Sir, which can be given to your questions is that, famine year or no (official) famine year, India is always in a state of famine and every year we are making matters worse, or if you do not like that word 'making' I will say we are permitting matters to get worse. In the end, so far as the cultivator is concerned, it comes to the same thing. I cannot, in the presence of such a state of things as now exists in India, split hairs in the way which would be necessary if I answered your second question in detail. I have not the inclination, even if I had the power attributed, by Butler in 'Hudibras,' to the controversialist—

> 'Who could a hair divide
> Betwixt the south and south-west side.'

Nor, I conceive, do you want to 'greatly quarrel with a straw.' Substantial justice, I am sure, is what you desire. If you could be convinced, as I am convinced, of the steady heaping up of wrath against the day of wrath, the weight of which England must one day bear, which is characterising our administration of India, and which, when it bursts, will be the consequence of that administration, I am sure you would not be less eager than I am that a change for the better should be at once made. If I still believed in the God, amongst whose steadfast worshippers in the Free Churches of this favoured land you rank high, I would pray to Him to touch your heart with experiences such as He granted in another famine-time to his prophet Elijah, so that you might grapple with the Indian evil and overcome it. For, with your great abilities, and occupying the high political position that you have won for yourself, if the scales could only be made to fall from your eyes and you could see things as they really are and not 'see men as trees walking,' you could not refrain from throwing all your energies into the conflict. But I cannot now appeal to you by the most sacred of all names, and, for Christ His sake, ask you to study this question for yourself, and without the help of the gentlemen of the Council of the Secretary of State for India. My study of Indian conditions has taken away from me every vestige of the trust I once had in the Redeemer, in Him of whom it was said, 'We trusted that it was He who should redeem Israel.' It is only on the grounds of a common humanity, in the light of my sense of duty as a British citizen to our Indian wards, I can now appeal to you. And, with all my heart, I do so appeal to you as man to man, as Liberal to Liberal, as Englishman to Englishman. As I have repeatedly said, the conclusions I arrive at I base entirely on official statistics and official statements. I judge the result of the rule in which you have had a great and responsible share solely by what those carrying on that rule themselves put forward. From their lips I receive the information which reduces everything I would fain write on India, let me struggle to the contrary never so strenuously, to an indictment of British rule.

'In all that I have written I have only distantly alluded to the economic and political causes which have brought about the state of things in India which makes it possible such a letter as this should be addressed to an English statesman. I cannot touch upon those causes to-day. But somewhere and somehow I trust the opportunity may come to me to lay them before you and my countrymen generally. Meanwhile, enough has, I hope, been said to induce you to resume your Indian studies, this time to pursue them in official documents, and not leaning upon the arms of those who are responsible for what needs to be examined and to whose minds it doth not yet appear there is spot or blemish or any such thing on their administration of India.

I remain,
Yours most truly,
WM. DIGBY.

II

THE CAUSE OF INDIAN FAMINES.—'THE EXTREME, THE ABJECT, THE AWFUL, POVERTY OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE'

The *New England Magazine* for September, 1900 (vol. xxiii., No. 1. Boston, Massachusetts), contained a summary investigation of the causes of famine in India by the Rev. J. T. Sunderland, who is able to speak of the condition of the people from personal observation. Referring to the series of famines, he says:—

'Such a state of things naturally awakens the sympathy of the world. But it ought to do more. It ought to compel a far more careful inquiry than has yet been made as to the causes of the famines, with a view to ascertaining whether these causes can be removed or not, and thus whether such scourges as now visit India with such appalling frequency are or are not preventable.'

Mr. Sunderland commences with an examination of the two most commonly alleged causes. The first question is: 'Does the failure of the periodic rains of India necessitate famine?'

'FAILURE OF RAINS IS NOT THE CAUSE.

'The great monsoon rains which supply most of the moisture for India vary greatly from year to year. These rains of course man cannot control. If they are abundant over the whole land, the whole land has abundant crops. If they fail in parts, those parts have agricultural scarcity. Three things, however, should be remembered. One is, that there is never failure of water everywhere; when drought is severest in certain sections, other sections have plenty. The second is that India is a land where there is much irrigation, and easily

might be much more; and wherever irrigation exists failure of rain does not necessarily mean failure of crops. The third thing to be remembered is that transportation is easy between all parts of the land. On two sides is the sea; navigable rivers and canals penetrate large sections; there is no extended area that does not have its railway. Thus food can readily be conveyed from areas of abundance to areas of scarcity. Under these circumstances it is easy to see that, even if we admit to the fullest extent the uncertainty of rains in many large areas of India, it does not follow that there need be famine or loss of life in those areas.

'It should not be forgotten that the aggregate of rainfall in India, taking the country as a whole, is large. The heaviest recorded precipitation in the world is found here. The only difficulty is that of distribution; and even in the matter of distribution, India's mountains and rivers furnish such facilities as are seen in few other lands of the world. . . . Thus India has two sources of water supply on a large scale: one is her rains, which fall in abundance in many parts; the other her mountains, which send down numerous and in some cases vast rivers to afford opportunities for almost limitless irrigation as they travel on their long journeys to the sea. As a result, the agricultural possibilities of India are greater than those of almost any other country in the world.

'Wherever in India water can be obtained for irrigation, crops are certain. From time immemorial there has been much irrigation. Since India came under the control of the British, the Government has interested itself to some extent in promoting irrigation works. But unfortunately it has also been guilty of much neglect. Not only have important opportunities for supplying extensive areas with water for irrigation purposes been allowed to go unimproved, but irrigation canals and storage reservoirs that were constructed in earlier times have been permitted to fall into decay. An enormous amount of water goes to waste that ought to be saved. Great numbers of new canals ought to be dug; old canals ought to be reopened; canals now in use ought to be deepened and widened. In regions where water cannot be obtained for the supply of canals, more wells ought to be sunk, and old wells in many cases ought to be deepened. New tanks and reservoirs ought to be constructed, and old reservoirs ought to be enlarged to store more adequately the surface water. In these ways the certainty of India's water supply, and therefore the certainty and abundance of her food supply, might be greatly increased.

'But even under present conditions, with irrigation as imperfectly developed as it is now, India is one of the greatest of food-producing lands. No matter how severe the drought may be in some parts, in others there is always sufficient water and are therefore abundant crops; so that there is seldom or never a time when India, as a whole, does not contain food enough for all her people. Three years ago,